41. G.R. No.

L-47941 April 30, 1985

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee,
vs.
JAIME TOMOTORGO y ALARCON, defendantappellant.

serving the minimum of the medium penalty of

prision mayor.
Let copy of this decision be furnished, his
Excellency, the President of the Philippines, and
the Chairman of the Board of Pardons and
Parole.
SO ORDERED.

ALAMPAY, J.:

Tomotorgo would not accede to his wife's

request. He did not like to abandon the house
wherein he and his wife were then living.
Furthermore, he had no inclination to leave
because he has many plants and improvements
on the land which he was then farming in said
municipality of Siruma, Camarines Sur, a town
very far from the place of his in-laws where his
wife desired their family to transfer to.

Given at Naga City, this 22nd day of December,

1977.

On June 23, 1977, at about seven o'clock in the

morning, the accused left his home to work on
Jaime Tomotorgo y Alarcon, the accusedhis farm Upon his return at about nine o'clock
appellant in this case, appeals from the decision SGD. ALFREDO S. REBUENA
that same morning. He found his wife and his
rendered on December 22, 1977, by the Court of Judge (Rollo, pg. 10)
three-month old baby already gone. He
First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch IV, in
proceeded to look for both of them and sometime
Criminal Case No. 403 of said court finding him
guilty of the crime of parricide for having killed his The facts of this case as recited in the decision of later on, on a trail about two hundred (200)
meters from their home, he finally saw his wife
wife Magdalena de los Santos. The dispositive
the trial court and in the appellee's brief stand
carrying his infant son and bringing a bundle of
portion of said judgment reads, as follows:
uncontroverted and undisputed. From the
clothes. He asked and pleaded with his wife that
evidence submitted it is disclosed that the victim,
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
she should return home with their child but she
considerations, the accused Jaime Tomotorgo y Magdalena de los Santos, was the wife of the
adamantly refused to do so. When appellant
herein accused. Several months prior to the
Alarcon is hereby condemned to suffer the
sought to take the child from his wife, the latter
occurrence of the fatal incident on June 23,
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify
threw the baby on the grassy portion of the trail
1977, Magdalena de los Santos had been
the heirs of the deceased Magdalena delos
hereby causing the latter to cry. This conduct of
persistently asking her husband to sell the
Santos in the sum of P12,000.00 without
his wife aroused the ire of the herein accused.
conjugal home which was then located at Sitio
subsidiary imprisonment, plus costs. And
Incensed with wrath and his anger beyond
Dinalungan, Barangay Cabugao, Municipality of
considering the circumstances under which the
control, appellant picked lip a piece of wood
Siruma, Camarines Sur. She wanted their family
offense was committed, the court hereby
nearby and started hitting his wife with it until she
to transfer to the house of her husband's in-laws
recommends executive clemency for him, after
fell to the ground complaining of severe pains on
which is in the town of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
her chest. Realizing what he had done, the
(TSN, pp. 6-10, December 13, 1977). Accused
1

accused picked his wife in his arms and brought

her to their home. He then returned to the place
where the child was thrown and he likewise took
this infant home. Soon thereafter, Magdalena de
los Santos died despite the efforts of her
husband to alleviate her pains.
After the accused changed the dress of his wife,
he reported the tragic incident to the Barangay
Captain of their place who brought him to
Policeman Arellosa to whom the accused
surrendered. He also brought with him the piece
of wood he used in beating his wife.
Charged with the crime of parricide, the accused
at his arraignment on November 24, 1977, with
assistance from his counsel de-oficio, pleaded
not guilty to the said offense. However, when his
case was called for trial on December 13, 1977,
his counsel manifested to the court that after his
conference with the accused, the latter
expressed a desire to change his previous plea
of not guilty to that of guilty. Accordingly, and
upon motion by the counsel of the accused and
without objection on the part of the prosecution,
the trial court allowed the accused to withdraw
his original plea. Upon being re-arraigned, the
accused entered a plea of guilty. He confirmed
the manifestations made by his counsel to the
court regarding his desire to change his initial
plea. He expressed his realization of the gravity

of the offense charged against him and the

consequences of his plea. His counsel was then
permitted by the court to establish the mitigating
circumstances which were then invoked in favor
of the accused.

3. In not following the mandatory sequence of

procedures for determining the correct applicable
penalty;

4. In denying the appellant the benefits of the

Indeterminate Sentence Law. (Appellant's Brief,
After the accused had testified and upon his plea pg. 1, pars. 1-4)
given in open court, the court below found him
We find no merit in the appeal of the accused
guilty of the crime of parricide, but with three
herein which assails only the correctness of the
mitigating circumstances in his favor, namely:
penalty imposed by the trial court on him.
voluntary surrender, plea of guilty, and that he
acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally
Appellant submits that the penalty for the felony
to have produced passion and obfuscation.
committed by him which is parricide being higher
than that for the offense which he intended to
commit, and which he avers to be that of physical
injuries only, the provisions of Article 49 of the
Revised Penal Code which relate to the
application of penalties should have been
observed and followed by the trial court. The said
provision of law which accused invokes provides
In his appeal, accused argues and contends that that:
the lower court erred:
ART. 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the
1. In disregarding its own findings of fact which
principals when the crime committed is different
showed manifest lack of intent to kill;
from that intended in cases in which the felony
committed is different from that which the
2. In disregarding the provisions of Article 49 of
offender intended to commit, the following rules
the Revised Penal Code which prescribes the
shag be observed;
proper applicable penalty where the crime
committed is different from that intended;
1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony
committed be higher than that corresponding to
With the imposition by the court below of the
penalty of reclusion perpetua on the herein
accused and the subsequent denial of his motion
for reconsideration of the judgment rendered
against him, the accused through his counsel
filed a notice of appeal to this Court.

the offense which the accused intended to

commit, the penalty corresponding to the latter
shall be imposed in its maximum period.

no aggravating circumstances, namely: voluntary

surrender, plea of guilty, and obfuscation. We
submit that the plea of guilty, which, as we had
shown earlier, was improvidently made, should
xxx xxx xxx
no longer be considered. This leaves only two
mitigating with no aggravating. Sufficient
Continuing, appellant argues in his appeal brief
compliance with the law. Hence, an automatic
submitted to this Court, that:
lowering of the penalty by one degree, or to
reclusion temporal medium This being a case
xxx xxx xxx
where a period constitutes the entire range of the
The felony actually committed, parricide. has a
penalty prescribed, and therefore, also a degree.
higher penalty (reclusion perpetua to death) than (Appellant's Brief, pp. 8-9)
the felony intended, qualified physical injuries
Appellant maintains the belief that he should be
(reclusion temporal medium and maximum).
punished only for the offense he intended to
Hence, since the penalty corresponding to the
felony intended shall be imposed in its maximum commit which he avers to be serious physical
injuries, qualified by the fact that the offended
period, the prescribed penalty is
therefore reclusion temporal maximum. This is a party is his spouse. Pursuant to the subparagraph of paragraph 4 of Art. 263 of the
divisible penalty.
Revised Penal Code and as his wife is among
Under Article 64, sub-par. 5, of the Penal Code, the persons mentioned in Art. 246 of the same
code, appellant contends that the penalty
When there are two or more mitigating
imposable should then be reclusion temporal in
circumstances and no aggravating
its medium and maximum periods. On this
circumstances are present, the court shall
mistaken premise, appellant therefore claims that
impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed
the penalty prescribed by law for his offense is
by law, in the period that it may deem applicable,
divisible and he should thus be entitled to the
according to the number and nature of such
benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
circumstances.

Penal Code expressly states that criminal liability

shall be incurred by any person committing a
felony (delito) although the wrongful act be
different from that which he intended and that the
accused is liable for all the consequences of his
felonious acts.
The reference made by the accused to Article
263 of the Revised Penal Code which prescribes
graduated penalties for the corresponding
physical injuries committed is entirely misplaced
and irrelevant considering that in this case the
victim died very soon after she was assaulted. It
will be, therefore, illogical to consider appellant's
acts as falling within the scope of Article 263 of
the Revised Penal Code. The crime committed is
parricide no less.
We are in complete accord with and we sustain
the ruling made by the courts below that the
accused is not entitled to the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. The court sustains
the submissions of the appellee that

... Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code does not

apply to cases where more serious
consequences not intended by the offender result
from his felonious act because, under Article 4,
par. I of the same Code, he is liable for all the
These contentions of the accused are manifestly direct and natural consequences of his unlawful
The trial court itself found "that the accused is
untenable and incorrect. Article 4 of the Revised act. His lack of intention to commit so grave a
entitled to three (3) mitigating circumstances with
wrong is, at best mitigating (Article 13, par. 3).
3

Article 49 applies only to cases where the crime

committed is different from that intended and
where the felony committed befalls a different
person (People vs. Albuquerque, 59 Phil. 150).
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code punished
parricade with the penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death, which are two indivisible penalties. As
the commission of the act was attended by
mitigitating circumstances with no aggravating
circumstances, the lesser penalty, which is
reclusion perpetua, should be imposed (People
vs. Laureano, et al., 71 Phil. 530; People vs.
Francisco, 78 Phil. 697; People vs. Belarmino, 91
Phil. 118) Appellee's Brief, pp. 6-7). (Emphasis
supplied)

a wrong. (Article 13 (3 Id.) The penalty imposed

on the herein accused is therefore correct in the
light of the relevant provisions of law and
jurisprudence.

The trial court in its consideration of this case

had added a recommendation that "executive
clemency be extended to the accused-appellant
after his service of the minimum of the medium
penalty of prison mayor." The Solicitor General
likewise concludes and prays in the People's
Brief that in view of the circumstances which
attended the commission of the offense, a
recommendation for the commutation of the
penalty would be appropriate. (Appellee's Brief,
pg. 7). This Court is constrained to take note that
the accused-appellant is said to have been in
We hold that the fact that the appellant intended detention since June 23, 1977 or for more than
to maltreat the victim only or inflict physical
seven years already. This Court can do no less
imjuries does not exempt him from liability for the than express its hope that hte accused-appellant
resulting and more serious crime committed. In
can be now extended an absolute or conditional
the case of People vs. Climaco Demiar, 108 Phil. pardon by the President of the Republic of the
651, where the accused therein had choked his Philippines or that there be a commutation of his
mother in a fit of anger because the latter did not sentence so that he may qualify and be eligible
prepare any food for him, it was ruled that hte
for parole.
crime committed by Demiar is parricide (Article
246, Revised Penal Code), the deceased victim WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby
of his criminal act being his legitimate mother.
affirmed without any pronouncement as to costs.
Said crime was declared as punishable with
Considering the circumstances which attended
reclusion perpetua to death. As the mitigating
circumstance of alck of intent to commit so grave the commission of the offense, the manifest
repentant attitude of the accused and his

remorse for his act which even the trial court

made particular mention of in its decision and the
recommendation made by the Office of the
Solicitor General as well as number of years that
the accused-appellant had been imprisoned, this
Court can do no less than recommend that
executive clemency be extended to the accusedappellant, Jaime Tomotorgo y Alarcon, or that his
sentence be commuted so that he can now
qualify and be considered eligible for parole. This
recommendation of the Court should be promptly
brought to the attention of the President of the
Republic of the Philippines by the proper
authorities in whose custody the herein accused
has been placed.
Aside from this, let copy of this decision be
furnished the Office of the President of the
Republic of the Philippines and the Chairman of
the Board of Pardons and Parole.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera,
Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente,
JJ., concur.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

42. G.R. No. L-36282 December 10, 1976

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee,
vs.
COSME MONLEON, accused-appellant.
Prospero A. Crescini, for appellant.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant
Solicitor General Conrado T. Limcaoco and
Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero for appellee.

AQUINO, J.:
Cosme Monleon appealed from the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, finding him
guilty of parricide, sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua, and ordering him to pay the heirs of his
deceased wife, Concordia Bongo, an indemnity
of twelve thousand pesos plus moral damages in
the sum of two thousand pesos (Criminal Case
No. BO-121).

executive clemency because the penalty

of reclusion perpetua appears to be excessive,
considering the degree of malice exhibited by
Monleon (Art. 5, Revised Penal Code; Sec. 14,
Art. IX, 1973 Constitution).
The judgment was based on the following facts:
Appellant Monleon and his wife, Concordia
Bongo, who had been married for twenty-six
years (Exh. A), were residents of Barrio Lunas,
Borbon, Cebu. On June 1, 1970 Monleon, a
forty-five year old illiterate farmer, worked in
the palihug (a sort of bayanihan) at the farm of
Tomas Rosello, his brother-in-law. There, he
imbibed copious amounts of tuba, the coconut
wine that is a causative factor in the rampancy of
criminality or lawlessness in rural areas.

squezzed her neck, pressed her head against a

post, and kicked her in the abdomen.
He shouted: "What do I care if there would be
someone who would be buried tomorrow. You let
your brothers and sisters stand up and I will also
include them." Felicisimo, one of the couple's six
children, pulled away his father and stopped his
assault on Concordia.
The following morning Concordia vomitted blood.
She died at eleven o'clock on that morning of
June 2. Death was due to "acute abdomen" (Exh.
B), a pathologic condition within the belly,
requiring surgical intervention (Blakiston's New
Gould Medical Dictionary, 2nd Edition, page 2).
Sixteen days after Concordia Bongo's death, or
on June 18, Monleon thumbmarked a
confession, written in the Cebuano dialect and
sworn to before the town mayor (Exh. C). He
admitted in that confession that he assaulted his
wife and that he had repented for the wrong
which he had done to her. He orally admitted to
Perfecto Bongo, a lieutenant in the Cebu City
police department and a relative of Concordia,
that he (Monleon) assaulted his wife because he
was drunk and she was a nagger (133-134 tsn
November 24, 1972).

At about seven o'clock in the evening of that day,

June 1, Cosme Monleon arrived at his house. He
was drunk. He inquired from Concordia whether
their carabao had been fed by their ten-year old
son, Marciano. She assured him that the carabao
had been fed. He repaired to the place where the
After that judgment was read to him in open court carabao was tethered to check the veracity of her
on January 11, 1973, he asked that the penalty
statement. He discovered that the carabao had
be reduced (156 tsn). The court advised him to
not been adequately fed. He became furious.
appeal if he was not satisfied with the penalty.
When he was about to whip Marciano, Concordia
The Solicitor General submits that the judgment intervened. A violent quarrel ensued between
On July 31, 1970 or about two months after
of conviction should be affirmed but recommends them. He placed himself astride his wife's chest, Concordia's death, a medico-legal officer of the

National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) exhumed

her body. He found bluish-black discolorations on
the sphenoid temporal bones of her skull, on the
atlas or cervical vertebra below the skull or at the
base of the neck, and on the first ribs. The
discolorations were due to internal hemorrhage
"caused by trauma or external violence" (Exh. D1; 21-24 tsn). The doctor ventured the opinion
that the "acute abdomen" could have been
caused "by external violence" (37 tsn).
Appellant Monleon, by means of his testimony
and the testimonies of his nineteen-year old
daughter, Felicisima, and his twelve-year old son,
Marciano (a third-grade pupil), denied that he
used violence against his wife. He testified that
he and his wife had merely a verbal quarrel and
that Clemencia Bongo-Monleon, the sister of
Concordia and the wife of his elder brother,
testified against him because Clemencia and
Monleon had a boundary dispute regarding the
lands inherited by Clemencia and Concordia
from their father, Victor Bongo.
Monleon said that Lieutenant Bongo asked him
to sign a "recibo" that he would take care of his
children (113 tsn). He also said that some
persons threatened to kill him if he did not affix
his thumbmark to his confession (116 tsn).
As already stated, the trial court convicted
Monleon of parricide. In this appeal, his counsel

de oficio the trial court erred in giving credence to

Monleon's confession, the affidavit of his son,
Marciano (Exh. E), and the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, Clemencia BongoMonleon, Epifania Bongo, Perfecto Bongo, and
the NBI medico-legal officer, Doctor Ceferino
Cunanan; in treating the alleged declarations of
Concordia Bongo to Clemencia's husband as
part of the res gestae and in rejecting the
testimonies of Monleon and his two children,
Marciano and Felicisima.
The crucial fact in this case is that Monleon
feloniously assaulted his wife in the evening of
June 1, 1970 by choking her, bashing her head
against a post and kicking her in the abdomen.
He did not use any weapon but the acts of
physical violence which he inflicted on her
produced internal complications which caused
her to vomit blood the next day and eventually
snuffed out her life.
The corpus delicti or the fact of the commission
of the crime of which Concordia Bongo was the
victim was established by the prosecution
witnesses, Clemencia Bongo-Monleon and
Epifania Bongo. Hence, Monleon's extrajudicial
confession (Exh. C) was corroborated by
evidence of the corpus delicti (Sec. 3, Rule 133
and sec. 29, Rule 130, Rules of Court).

The trial court said that it took pains to observe

the demeanor on the witness stand of the mayor
Epifania, and Clemencia, who all testified for the
prosecution, and appellant Monleon himself. It
was convinced that the confession "was
voluntarily executed by the accused."
Appellant's counsel de oficio contends that there
are discrepancies between Monleon's confession
and the version given by the prosecution
witnesses, Epifania and Clemencia. Those two
witnesses testified that Concordia died at eleven
o'clock in the morning while Monleon in his
confession declared that his wife died at one
o'clock in the afternoon. Another discrepancy is
that according to prosecution witnesses Monleon
was not present when his wife died but according
to the confession, he was with her when she
breathed her last. Counsel de oficio also points
out that the confession was supposed to have
been thumbmarked on June 16, 1970 and then
sworn to before the mayor two days later or on
June 18 but, according to Lieutenant Bongo, he
investigated Monleon in the early morning of
June 18 and his confession was executed at that
time.
We are of the opinion that those discrepancies
do not destroy the probative value of the
confession nor negate Monleon's admission
therein that he assaulted his wife. A court may
6

reject portions of the confession by reason of the

improbability of the facts or statements therein or
because of their falsity or untrustworthiness
(People vs. Layos, 60 Phil. 760; People vs.
Piring, 63 Phil. 546; People vs. Villanueva, 115
Phil. 858; 22 C.J.S. 1479).

worthless The two prosecution witnesses are

uneducated. The fiscal in his direct examination
and the defense counsel did not ask them
whether they saw each other in the yard of
Monleon's house when they allegedly saw
Monleon mauling his wife. Most likely, they
assumed that Monleon was merely chastising his
The mayor and Lieutenant Bongo testified that
wife, as he had repeatedly done in the past, and
Monleon was not forced to affix his thumbmark to that he did not intend to kill her. They were not
the confession. There is no evidence that he was cognizant at first of the grave consequences
tortured or maltreated. Monleon could have
resulting from Monleon's violent acts. Hence,
complained to the fiscal during the preliminary
they did not see the necessity of the intervention
investigation that he was forced to execute his
of other persons or of the barrio captain and the
confession. He did not do so.
police.
Attorney Prospero A. Crescini, appellant's
counsel de oficio, examined meticulously the
evidence, conscientiously studied Page 268 the
case and submitted a good brief. He points out
that Clemencia and Epifania did not mention that
they saw each other when they allegedly
witnessed the assault made by Monleon on his
wife; that they did not report immediately to the
authorities the alleged incident; that it was
strange that Epifania did not ask her husband,
Gervasio Bongo, the brother of the victim, to stop
the assault, and that Clemencia failed to
summon her husband, an elder brother of
Monleon, to pacify the latter.
Those acts and omission of Clemencia and
Epifania do not render their testimonies

Appellant's counsel argues that the trial court

erred in admitting Marciano Monleon's affidavit
which was written in the Cebuano dialect (Exh.
E) and which was not accompanied with the
corresponding translation. That confession is
well-taken.

attorneys are directed to have such translation

prepared before trial" (See. 34).
Also meritorious is appellant's contention that the
trial court erred in ruling that the alleged
declarations of Concordia Bongo to the husband
of Clemencia Bongo Monleon, as to the violent
acts inflicted upon her (Concordia) by appellant
Monleon, are part of the res gestae. That ruling
was made in connection with Clemencia's
testimony (not on direct examination but in
answer to the questions of the trial judge) that at
eight o'clock in the evening of June 1, 1970, or
about an hour after Concordia was assaulted by
Monleon, she (Concordia) left her house and
went to Clemencia's house three hundred meters
away and recounted to Clemencia's husband
(appellant Monleon's brother) how she was
beaten by Monleon (22 tsn).

Appellants counsel observed that it was

incredible that Concordia, after being severely
The trial court erred in admitting that affidavit
maltreated by Monleon (according to the
over the objection of appellant's counsel because prosecution's version), would still have the
section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
strength to go to Clemencia's house which was
provides that documents written in an unofficial
located on a hill.
language shall not be admitted as evidence,
Clemencia's testimony reveals that she must
unless accompanied with a translation into
have been confused in making that assertion,
English, Spanish or the national language "To
avoid interruption of proceedings, parties or their assuming that it was accurately translated and
reported. A careful scrutiny of her entire
testimony reveals that what she really meant was
7

that Concordia on the following day, June 2,

recounted to her, as Concordia recounted also to
Epifania, how she was maltreated by Monleon. In
all probability what happened was that
Clemencia, on arriving at her house at around
eight o'clock in the evening of June 1, apprised
her husband that she witnessed the assault
made by Monleon on her sister, Concordia.
The trial court's error in regarding as part of
the res gestae the statement supposedly made
by Concordia to Clemencia's husband
immediately after the incident and its error in
admitting Monleon's affidavit are not sufficient to
exculpate Monleon or engender any reasonable
doubt as to his guilt.

Monleon in his inebriated state had no intent to

kill her. He was infuriated because his son did not
feed his carabao. He was provoked to castigate
his wife because she prevented him from
whipping his negligent son. He could have easily
killed his wife had he really intended to take her
life. He did not kill her outright.
The trial court did not appreciate any mitigating
circumstances in favor of Monleon. The Solicitor
General is correct in finding that the extenuating
circumstances of lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong and intoxication, which was not
habitual, are present in this case. Hence, the
penalty imposable on Monleon is reclusion
perpetua (Arts. 63[3] and 246, Revised Penal
Code).

As a result she suffered an attack and died. He

was convicted of parricide and sentenced
toreclusion perpetua. The commutation of the
penalty was recommended to the Chief
Executive (See People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil.
658; U.S. vs. Guevara, 10 Phil. 37; People vs.
Castaeda, 60 Phil. 604, 609; People vs.
Gungab, 64 Phil. 779).
Therefore, there is sufficient justification for the
Solicitor General's recommendation that
Monleon's case be brought to the attention of the
Chief Executive so that the penalty of reclusion
perpetua may be reduced.

WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is

affirmed. Pursuant to article 5 of the Revised
The testimonies of Epifania and Clemencia, the
Penal Code, a certified copy of this decision
confession of Monleon, as supported by the
But considering that Monleon had no intent to kill should be furnished the Chief Executive through
testimonies of the mayor and Lieutenant Bongo, his wife and that her death might have been
the Secretary of Justice (See sec. 3[1], Art. XVII,
and the expert opinion of the NBI medico-legal
hastened by lack of appropriate medical
1973 Constitution). Costs against the appellant.
officer are sufficient to establish the guilt of
attendance or her weak constitution, the penalty
appellant Monleon.
of reclusion perpetua appears to be excessive. A SO ORDERED.
strict enforcement of the provisions of the Penal Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio and
The instant case is covered by article 4 of the
Code means the imposition of a draconian
Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.
Revised Penal Code which provides that criminal penalty on Monleon.
liability is incurred by any person committing a
felony although the wrongful act done be different This case is similar to People vs. Rabao, 67 Phil. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
from that which he intended. The maltreatment
255 where the husband quarrelled with his wife
inflicted by Monleon on his wife was the
because he wanted to restrain her from giving a
proximate cause of her death.
bath to their child, who had a cold. In the course
of the quarrel, he punched her in the abdomen.
8

43.
PhilippineLaw.info Jurisprudence 1909 Oct
ober
PhilippineLaw.info Jurisprudence Phil.
Rep. Vol. 14
ONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES
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ENGINEERS INC., KILUSANG MAYO UNO,
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PILIPINAS, KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYAN NG
MGA MARALITA, ELSA O. GUEVARRA,
ARCADIO B. GONZALES, JOSE G. GALANG,
DOMINGO P. MANAY, TITO P. ESTEVES,
EDUARDO P. GALOPE, REMEDIOS M.
YSMAEL, ALFREDO BACUATA, EDGARDO J.
DAMICOG, REMEDIOS M. MALTU AND
REMEGIO S. MERCADO,

Petitioners,

G.R. No. 167324

- versus -

Present:

THE COURT OF APPEALS, EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO,
SECRETARY OF HEALTH MANUEL M. DAYRIT,
SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
PUNO, C.J.,
EMILIA T. BONCODIN,

Respondents.

QUISUMBING,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

VELASCO, JR., and

CARPIO,

NACHURA, JJ.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES,

AZCUNA,

TINGA,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

GARCIA,

10

Promulgated:

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

July 17, 2007

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under

---------------x
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision,[1] promulgated by the Court of Appeals
on 26 November 2004, denying a petition for the
nullification of the Health Sector Reform Agenda
(HSRA) Philippines 1999-2004 of the
Department of Health (DOH); and Executive
Order No. 102, Redirecting the Functions and
Operations of the Department of Health, which
was issued by then President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada on 24 May 1999.
DECISION
11

Prior hereto, petitioners originally filed a Petition

for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure before the Supreme Court on 15
August 2001. However, the Supreme Court, in a
Resolution dated 29 August 2001, referred the
petition to the Court of Appeals for appropriate
action.

HEALTH SECTOR REFORM AGENDA (HSRA)

In 1999, the DOH launched the HSRA, a reform

agenda developed by the HSRA Technical
Working Group after a series of workshops and
analyses with inputs from several consultants,
program managers and technical staff
possessing the adequate expertise and
experience in the health sector. It provided for
five general areas of reform: (1) to provide fiscal
autonomy to government hospitals; (2) secure

funding for priority public health programs; (3)

promote the development of local health systems
and ensure its effective performance; (4)
strengthen the capacities of health regulatory
agencies; and (5) expand the coverage of the
National Health Insurance Program (NHIP).[2]

Petitioners questioned the first reform agenda

involving the fiscal autonomy of government
hospitals, particularly the collection of socialized
user fees and the corporate restructuring of
government hospitals. The said provision under
the HSRA reads:

effectively exercise fiscal autonomy. Such

investment must be cognizant of complimentary
capacity provided by public-private networks.
Moreover such capacities will allow government
hospitals to supplement priority public health
programs. Appropriate institutional arrangement
must be introduced such as allowing them
autonomy towards converting them into
government corporations without compromising
their social responsibilities. As a result,
government hospitals are expected to be more
competitive and responsive to health needs.

Petitioners also assailed the issuance of a draft

administrative order issued by the DOH, dated 5
January 2001, entitled Guidelines and Procedure
in the Implementation of the Corporate
Restructuring of Selected DOH Hospitals to
Achieve Fiscal Autonomy, and Managerial
Provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals. Flexibility to Start by January 2001;[3] and
Government hospitals must be allowed to collect Administrative Order No. 172 of the DOH,
socialized user fees so they can reduce the
entitled Policies and Guidelines on the Private
dependence on direct subsidies from the
Practice of Medical and Paramedical
government. Their critical capacities like
Professionals in Government Health Facilities,[4]
diagnostic equipment, laboratory facilities and
dated 9 January 2001, for imposing an added
medical staff capability must be upgraded to
12

burden to indigent Filipinos, who cannot afford to ART II, SEC. 5. The maintenance of peace and
pay for medicine and medical services.[5]
order, the protection of life, liberty, and property,
and the promotion of the general welfare are
essential for the enjoyment of all the people of
the blessings of democracy.

Petitioners alleged that the implementation of the

aforementioned reforms had resulted in making
free medicine and free medical services
inaccessible to economically disadvantaged
Filipinos. Thus, they alleged that the HSRA is
void for being in violation of the following
constitutional provisions:[6]

ART II, SEC. 9. The State shall promote a just

and dynamic social order that will ensure the
prosperity and independence of the nation and
free the people from poverty through policies that
provide adequate social services, promote full
employment, a rising standard of living and an
improved quality of life for all.

ART. III, SEC. 1. No person shall be deprived of

life, liberty or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the law.
ART II, SEC. 10. The State shall promote social
justice in all phases of national development.

ART II, SEC. 11. The State values the dignity of

every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights.

ART II, SEC. 13. The State recognizes the vital

role of the youth in nation-building and shall
promote and protect their physical, moral,
spiritual, intellectual and social well-being x x x.

ART II, SEC. 18. The State affirms labor as a

primary social economic force. It shall protect the
rights of workers and promote their welfare.

ART XV, SEC. 1. The State recognizes the

Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.

13

Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and

actively promote its total development.

ART XV, SEC. 3. The State shall defend:

services available to all people at affordable cost.

There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women,
and children. The State shall endeavor to provide
free medical care to paupers.
ART XIII, SEC. 14. The State shall protect
working women by providing safe and healthful
working conditions, taking into account their
maternal functions, and such facilities and
opportunities that will enhance their welfare and
enable them to realize their full potential in the
service of the nation.

xxxx

(2) the right of children to assistance, including

proper care and nutrition, and special protection
from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to
their development.

xxxx

ART II, SEC. 15. The State shall protect and

promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them.

ART XIII, SEC. 11. The State shall adopt an

integrated and comprehensive approach to
health development which shall endeavor to
make essential goods, health and other social

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 102

On 24 May 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito

Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102, entitled
Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the
Department of Health, which provided for the
changes in the roles, functions, and
organizational processes of the DOH. Under the
14

assailed executive order, the DOH refocused its

mandate from being the sole provider of health
services to being a provider of specific health
services and technical assistance, as a result of
the devolution of basic services to local
government units. The provisions for the
streamlining of the DOH and the deployment of
DOH personnel to regional offices and hospitals
read:

Sec. 4. Preparation of a Rationalization and

Streamlining Plan. In view of the functional and
operational redirection in the DOH, and to effect
efficiency and effectiveness in its activities, the
Department shall prepare a Rationalization and
Streamlining Plan (RSP) which shall be the basis
of the intended changes. The RSP shall contain
the following:

b)
the structural and organizational
shift, stating the specific functions and activities
by organizational unit and the relationship of
each units;

Sec. 5. Redeployment of Personnel. The

redeployment of officials and other personnel on
the basis of the approved RSP shall not result in
diminution in rank and compensation of existing
personnel. It shall take into account all pertinent
Civil Service laws and rules.

c)
the staffing shift, highlighting and
itemizing the existing filled and unfilled positions;
and

d)
the resource allocation shift,
specifying the effects of the streamline set-up on
the agency budgetary allocation and indicating
where possible, savings have been generated.

Section 6. Funding. The financial resources

needed to implement the Rationalization and
Streamlining Plan shall be taken from funds
available in the DOH, provided that the total
requirements for the implementation of the
revised staffing pattern shall not exceed available
funds for Personnel Services.

The RSP shall [be] submitted to the Department

of Budget and Management for approval before
the corresponding shifts shall be affected (sic) by
the DOH Secretary.
Section 7. Separation Benefits. Personnel who
opt to be separated from the service as a
consequence of the implementation of this
a)
the specific shift in policy directions,
Executive Order shall be entitled to the benefits
functions, programs and activities/strategies;
under existing laws. In the case of those who are
15

not covered by existing laws, they shall be

entitled to separation benefits equivalent to one
month basic salary for every year of service or
proportionate share thereof in addition to the
terminal fee benefits to which he/she is entitled
under existing laws.

function. They argued that Executive Order No.

102 is void, having been issued in excess of the
Presidents authority.[8]

other DOH employees had to relocate to far-flung

areas.[10]

Moreover, petitioners averred that the

implementation of the Rationalization and
Streamlining Plan (RSP) was not in accordance
with law. The RSP was allegedly implemented
even before the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) approved it. They also
maintained that the Office of the President should
have issued an administrative order to carry out
the streamlining, but that it failed to do so.[9]

Petitioners also pointed out several errors in the

implementation of the RSP. Certain employees
allegedly suffered diminution of compensation,
[11] while others were supposedly assigned to
positions for which they were neither qualified nor
suited.[12] In addition, new employees were
purportedly hired by the DOH and appointed to
positions for which they were not qualified,
Executive Order No. 102 was enacted pursuant
despite the fact that the objective of the ongoing
to Section 17 of the Local Government Code
streamlining was to cut back on costs.[13] It was
(Republic Act No. 7160), which provided for the
also averred that DOH employees were deployed
devolution to the local government units of basic
or transferred even during the three-month
services and facilities, as well as specific healthperiod before the national and local elections in
Furthermore, petitioners Elsa O. Guevarra,
related functions and responsibilities.[7]
Arcadio B. Gonzales, Jose G. Galang, Domingo May 2001,[14] in violation of Section 2 of the
Republic Act No. 7305, also known as Magna
P. Manay, Eduardo P. Galope, Remedios M.
Carta for Public Health Workers.[15] Petitioners,
Ysmael, Alfredo U. Bacuata and Edgardo J.
however, failed to identify the DOH employees
Damicog, all DOH employees, assailed the
validity of Executive Order No. 102 on the ground referred to above, much less include them as
parties to the petition.
that they were likely to lose their jobs, and that
Petitioners contended that a law, such as
some of them were suffering from the
Executive Order No. 102, which effects the
inconvenience of having to travel a longer
reorganization of the DOH, should be enacted by distance to get to their new place of work, while The Court of Appeals denied the petition due to a
Congress in the exercise of its legislative
number of procedural defects, which proved
16

fatal: 1) Petitioners failed to show capacity or

authority to sign the certification of non-forum
shopping and the verification; 2) Petitioners failed
to show any particularized interest for bringing
the suit, nor any direct or personal injury
sustained or were in the immediate danger of
sustaining; 3) the Petition, brought before the
Supreme Court on 15 August 1999, was filed out
of time, or beyond 60 days from the time the
reorganization methods were implemented in
2000; and 4) certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus will not lie where the President, in
issuing the assailed Executive Order, was not
acting as a tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

In resolving the substantial issues of the case,

the Court of Appeals ruled that the HSRA cannot
be declared void for violating Sections 5, 9, 10,
11, 13, 15, 18 of Article II; Section 1 of Article III;
Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1
and 3(2) of Article XV, all of the 1987
Constitution, which directly or indirectly pertain to
the duty of the State to protect and promote the
peoples right to health and well-being. It
reasoned that the aforementioned provisions of

the Constitution are not self-executing; they are Circular No. 275-C, Series of 2000, which
not judicially enforceable constitutional rights and created the different committees tasked with the
can only provide guidelines for legislation.
implementation of the RSP, only after both the
DBM and Presidential Committee on Effective
Governance (PCEG) approved the RSP on 8
July 2000 and 17 July 2000, respectively.

Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that the

petitioners assertion that Executive Order No.
102 is detrimental to the health of the people
cannot be made a justiciable issue. The question
of whether the HSRA will bring about the
development or disintegration of the health
sector is within the realm of the political
department.

Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a

Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision
rendered on 26 November 2004, but the same
was denied in a Resolution dated 7 March 2005.

Hence, the present petition, where the following

issues are raised:

Furthermore, the Court of Appeals decreed that

the President was empowered to issue Executive
Order No. 102, in accordance with Section 17
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. It also
declared that the DOH did not implement
Executive Order No. 102 in bad faith or with
grave abuse of discretion, as alleged by the
I.
petitioners, as the DOH issued Department

17

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 102 IS

The Court finds the present petition to be without
DETRIMENTAL TO THE FILIPINO IS LIKEWISE merit.
NOT A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY AND
THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS THE AUTHORITY
TO ISSUE SAID ORDER; AND
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN RULING
THAT ANY QUESTION ON THE WISDOM AND
EFFICACY OF THE HEALTH SECTOR
REFORM AGENDA IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE
CONTROVERSY AND THAT THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE FILIPINO
PEOPLE ARE NOT JUDICIALLY
ENFORCEABLE;

II.

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN
UPHOLDING TECHNICALITIES OVER AND
ABOVE THE ISSUES OF TRANSCENDENTAL
IMPORTANCE RAISED IN THE PETITION
BELOW. [16]

Petitioners allege that the HSRA should be

declared void, since it runs counter to the
aspiration and ideals of the Filipino people as
embodied in the Constitution.[17] They claim that
the HSRAs policies of fiscal autonomy, income
generation, and revenue enhancement violate
Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 of Article II,
Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of
Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV of
the 1987 Constitution. Such policies allegedly
resulted in making inaccessible free medicine
and free medical services. This contention is
unfounded.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN RULING
THAT PETITIONERS COMPLAINT THAT
18

As a general rule, the provisions of the

by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the
Constitution are considered self-executing, and
exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the
do not require future legislation for their
legislature in its enactment of laws.
enforcement. For if they are not treated as selfexecuting, the mandate of the fundamental law
can be easily nullified by the inaction of
Congress.[18] However, some provisions have
already been categorically declared by this Court
as non self-executing.

In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming

Corporation,[20] this Court declared that
Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Article II; Section 13 of
In Tanada v. Angara,[19] the Court specifically set
Article XIII; and Section 2 of Article XIV of the
apart the sections found under Article II of the
1987 Constitution are not self-executing
1987 Constitution as non self-executing and
provisions. In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,
ruled that such broad principles need legislative
[21] the Court referred to Section 1 of Article XIII
enactments before they can be implemented:
and Section 2 of Article XIV of the Constitution as
moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially
enforceable rights. These provisions, which
merely lay down a general principle, are
distinguished from other constitutional provisions
as non self-executing and, therefore, cannot give
rise to a cause of action in the courts; they do not
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a
declaration of principles and state policies. x x x. embody judicially enforceable constitutional
rights.[22]
These principles in Article II are not intended to
be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They are used

Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in

the present case were taken from Article II of the
Constitution -- specifically, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11,
13, 15 and 18 -- the provisions of which the Court
categorically ruled to be non self-executing in the
aforecited case of Taada v. Angara.[23]

Moreover, the records are devoid of any

explanation of how the HSRA supposedly
violated the equal protection and due process
clauses that are embodied in Section 1 of Article
III of the Constitution. There were no allegations
of discrimination or of the lack of due process in
connection with the HSRA. Since they failed to
substantiate how these constitutional guarantees
were breached, petitioners are unsuccessful in
establishing the relevance of this provision to the
petition, and consequently, in annulling the
HSRA.

19

In the remaining provisions, Sections 11 and 14

of Article XIII and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV,
the State accords recognition to the protection of
working women and the provision for safe and
healthful working conditions; to the adoption of
an integrated and comprehensive approach to
health; to the Filipino family; and to the right of
children to assistance and special protection,
including proper care and nutrition. Like the
provisions that were declared as non selfexecutory in the cases of Basco v. Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation[24] and
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,[25] they are
mere statements of principles and policies. As
such, they are mere directives addressed to the
executive and the legislative departments. If
unheeded, the remedy will not lie with the courts;
but rather, the electorates displeasure may be
manifested in their votes.

The rationale for this is given by Justice Dante

Tinga in his Separate Opinion in the case of
Agabon v. National Labor Relations
Commission[26]:

two reasons for denying a cause of action to an

alleged infringement of broad constitutional
principles: basic considerations of due process
and the limitations of judicial power.[27]
x x x However, to declare that the constitutional
provisions are enough to guarantee the full
exercise of the rights embodied therein, and the
realization of the ideals therein expressed, would
be impractical, if not unrealistic. The espousal of
such view presents the dangerous tendency of
being overbroad and exaggerated. x x x
Subsequent legislation is still needed to define
the parameters of these guaranteed rights. x x x
Without specific and pertinent legislation, judicial
bodies will be at a loss, formulating their own
conclusion to approximate at least the aims of
the Constitution.

The HSRA cannot be nullified based solely on

petitioners bare allegations that it violates the
general principles expressed in the non selfexecuting provisions they cite herein. There are

Petitioners also claim that Executive Order No.

102 is void on the ground that it was issued by
the President in excess of his authority. They
maintain that the structural and functional
reorganization of the DOH is an exercise of
legislative functions, which the President usurped
when he issued Executive Order No. 102.[28]
This line of argument is without basis.

This Court has already ruled in a number of

cases that the President may, by executive or
administrative order, direct the reorganization of
government entities under the Executive
Department.[29] This is also sanctioned under
the Constitution, as well as other statutes.

20

Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,

clearly states: [T]he president shall have control
of all executive departments, bureaus and
offices. Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of
Executive Order No. 292, also known as the
Administrative Code of 1987 reads:

the immediate offices, the Presidential Special

Assistants/Advisers System and the Common
Staff Support System, by abolishing
consolidating or merging units thereof or
transferring functions from one unit to another;

In Domingo v. Zamora,[30] this Court explained

the rationale behind the Presidents continuing
authority under the Administrative Code to
reorganize the administrative structure of the
Office of the President. The law grants the
President the power to reorganize the Office of
(2)
Transfer any function under the
the President in recognition of the recurring need
Office of the President to any other Department of every President to reorganize his or her office
or Agency as well as transfer functions to the
to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. To
Office of the President from other Departments or remain effective and efficient, it must be capable
Agencies; and
of being shaped and reshaped by the President
SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to
in the manner the Chief Executive deems fit to
Reorganize his Office - The President, subject to
carry out presidential directives and policies.
the policy in the Executive Office and in order to
achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall
have continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the
President. For this purpose, he may take any of (3)
Transfer any agency under the Office
the following actions:
of the President to any other department or
agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office The Administrative Code provides that the Office
of the President from other Departments or
of the President consists of the Office of the
agencies.
President Proper and the agencies under it.[31]
The agencies under the Office of the President
are identified in Section 23, Chapter 8, Title II of
the Administrative Code:
(1)
Restructure the internal organization
of the Office of the President Proper, including
21

Sec. 23. The Agencies under the Office of the

President.The agencies under the Office of the
President refer to those offices placed under the
chairmanship of the President, those under the
supervision and control of the President, those
under the administrative supervision of the Office
of the President, those attached to it for policy
and program coordination, and those that are not
placed by law or order creating them under any
specific department. (Emphasis provided.)

Section 2(4) of the Introductory Provisions of the

Administrative Code defines the term agency of
the government as follows:

Agency of the Government refers to any of the

various units of the Government, including a
department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or
government-owned or controlled corporation, or
a local government or a distinct unit therein.

The power of the President to reorganize the

executive department is likewise recognized in
general appropriations laws. As early as 1993,
Sections 48 and 62 of Republic Act No. 7645, the
General Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1993,
already contained a provision stating that:

Sec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase Out of

Activities Within the Executive Branch.The heads
of departments, bureaus and offices and
Furthermore, the DOH is among the cabinet-level
agencies are hereby directed to identify their
departments enumerated under Book IV of the
respective activities which are no longer essential
Administrative Code, mainly tasked with the
in the delivery of public services and which may
functional distribution of the work of the
be scaled down, phased out, or abolished,
President.[32] Indubitably, the DOH is an agency
subject to civil service rules and regulations. x x
which is under the supervision and control of the
x. Actual scaling down, phasing out, or abolition
President and, thus, part of the Office of the
of activities shall be effected pursuant to
President. Consequently, Section 31, Book III,
Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the
Chapter 10 of the Administrative Code, granting
Office of the President. (Emphasis provided.)
the President the continued authority to
reorganize the Office of the President, extends to
the DOH.

22

Sec. 62. Unauthorized Organizational Changes.

Unless otherwise created by law or directed by
the President of the Philippines, no
organizational unit or changes in key positions in
any department or agency shall be authorized in
their respective organizational structures and be
funded form appropriations by this Act.

the Philippines, no changes in key positions or

particularly the RSP. However, these contentions
organizational units in any department or agency are without merit and are insufficient to invalidate
shall be authorized in their respective
the executive order.
organizational structures and funded from
appropriations provided by this Act.

The RSP was allegedly implemented even before

the DBM approved it. The facts show otherwise.
It was only after the DBM approved the Notice of
Organization, Staffing and Compensation Action
on 8 July 2000,[33] and after the Presidential
Committee on Effective Governance (PCEG)
Clearly, Executive Order No. 102 is well within
issued on 17 July 2000 Memorandum Circular
the constitutional power of the President to issue.
No. 62,[34] approving the RSP, that then DOH
Again, in the year when Executive Order No. 102 The President did not usurp any legislative
Secretary Alberto G. Romualdez issued on 28
was issued, The General Appropriations Act of
prerogative in issuing Executive Order No. 102. It
July 2000 Department Circular No. 275-C, Series
Fiscal Year 1999 (Republic Act No. 8745)
is an exercise of the Presidents constitutional
of 2000,[35] creating the different committees to
conceded to the President the power to make
power of control over the executive department,
implement the RSP.
any changes in any of the key positions and
supported by the provisions of the Administrative
organizational units in the executive department Code, recognized by other statutes, and
thus:
consistently affirmed by this Court.

Sec. 77. Organized Changes. Unless otherwise

provided by law or directed by the President of

Petitioners also pointed out several flaws in the

implementation of Executive Order No. 102,

Petitioners also maintain that the Office of the

President should have issued an administrative
order to carry out the streamlining, but that it
failed to do so. Such objection cannot be given
23

any weight considering that the acts of the DOH

Secretary, as an alter ego of the President, are
presumed to be the acts of the President. The
members of the Cabinet are subject at all times
to the disposition of the President since they are
merely his alter egos.[36] Thus, their acts,
performed and promulgated in the regular course
of business, are, unless disapproved by the
President, presumptively acts of the President.
[37] Significantly, the acts of the DOH Secretary
were clearly authorized by the President, who,
thru the PCEG, issued the aforementioned
Memorandum Circular No. 62, sanctioning the
implementation of the RSP.

In several cases, this Court regarded

reorganizations of government units or
departments as valid, for so long as they are
pursued in good faiththat is, for the purpose of
economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.
[38] On the other hand, if the reorganization is
done for the purpose of defeating security of
tenure or for ill-motivated political purposes, any
abolition of position would be invalid. None of
these circumstances are applicable since none of
the petitioners were removed from public service,
nor did they identify any action taken by the DOH
that would unquestionably result in their
dismissal. The reorganization that was pursued
in the present case was made in good faith. The
Petitioners Elsa Odonzo Guevarra, Arcadio B.
RSP was clearly designed to improve the
Gonzales, Jose G. Galang, Domingo P. Manay,
efficiency of the department and to implement the
Eduardo P. Galope, Remedios M. Ysmael,
provisions of the Local Government Code on the
Alfredo U. Bacuata, and Edgardo Damicog, all
devolution of health services to local
DOH employees, assailed the validity of
governments. While this Court recognizes the
Executive Order No. 102 on the ground that they inconvenience suffered by public servants in their
were likely to lose their jobs, and that some of
deployment to distant areas, the executive
them were suffering from the inconvenience of
departments finding of a need to make health
having to travel a longer distance to get to their
services available to these areas and to make
new place of work, while other DOH employees delivery of health services more efficient and
had to relocate to far-flung areas.
more compelling is far from being unreasonable

or arbitrary, a determination which is well within

its authority. In all, this Court finds petitioners
contentions to be insufficient to invalidate
Executive Order No. 102.

Without identifying the DOH employees

concerned, much less including them as parties
to the petition, petitioners went on identifying
several errors in the implementation of Executive
Order No. 102. First, they alleged that
unidentified DOH employees suffered from a
diminution of compensation by virtue of the
provision on Salaries and Benefits found in
Department Circular No. 312, Series of 2000,
issued on 23 October 2000, which reads:

2. Any employee who was matched to a position

with lower salary grade (SG) shall not suffer a
reduction in salary except where his/her current
salary is higher than the maximum step of the
SG of the new position, in which case he/she
24

shall be paid the salary corresponding to the

maximum step of the SG of the new position.
RATA shall no longer be received, if employee
was matched to a Non-Division Chief Position.

Incidentally, the petition shows that none of the

petitioners, who are working in the DOH, were
entitled to receive RATA at the time the petition
was filed. Nor was it alleged that they suffered
any diminution of compensation. Secondly, it was
claimed that certain unnamed DOH employees
were matched with unidentified positions for
which they were supposedly neither qualified nor
suited. New employees, again unnamed and not
included as parties, were hired by the DOH and
appointed to unidentified positions for which they
were purportedly not qualified, despite the fact
that the objective of the ongoing streamlining
was to cut back on costs. Lastly, unspecified
DOH employees were deployed or transferred
during the three-month period before the national
and local elections in May 2001, in violation of
Section 2 of the Republic Act No. 7305, also

known as Magna Carta for Public Health

Workers.

102 would, nevertheless, remain unaffected.

Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to
declare statutes invalid, although they may be
abused or misabused, and may afford an
opportunity for abuse in the manner of
application. The validity of a statute or ordinance
is to be determined from its general purpose and
its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not
from its effects in a particular case.[40]

Petitioners allegations are too general and

unsubstantiated by the records for the Court to
pass upon. The persons involved are not
identified, details of their appointments and
transfers such as position, salary grade, and the
date they were appointed - are not given; and the
circumstances which attended the alleged
violations are not specified.
In a number of cases,[41] the Court upheld the
standing of citizens who filed suits, wherein the
transcendental importance of the constitutional
question justified the granting of relief. In spite of
Even granting that these alleged errors were
adequately proven by the petitioners, they would these rulings, the Court, in Domingo v. Carague,
still not invalidate Executive Order No. 102. Any [42] dismissed the petition when petitioners
therein failed to show any present substantial
serious legal errors in laying down the
compensation of the DOH employees concerned interest. It demonstrated how even in the cases
in which the Court declared that the matter of the
can only invalidate the pertinent provisions of
case was of transcendental importance, the
Department Circular No. 312, Series of 2000.
petitioners must be able to assert substantial
Likewise, any questionable appointments or
interest. Present substantial interest, which will
transfers are properly addressed by an appeal
process provided under Administrative Order No. enable a party to question the validity of the law,
requires that a party sustained or will sustain
94, series of 2000;[39] and if the appeal is
meritorious, such appointment or transfer may be direct injury as a result of its enforcement.[43] It
is distinguished from a mere expectancy or
invalidated. The validity of Executive Order No.
25

future, contingent, subordinate, or

inconsequential interest.[44]

SO ORDERED..

just over the lower ribs, at the point where the

handle of Saldivar's bolo lay against the belt from
Kincaid and Hurd for appellant.
which it was suspended. On being struck,
In the same way, the Court, in
Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.
Saldivar threw up his hands, staggered. (dio
Telecommunications & Broadcast Attorneys of
vueltas spun around helplessly) and without
the Philippines, Inc. v. Comelec,[45] ruled that a CARSON, J.:
saying a word, went away in the direction of his
citizen is allowed to raise a constitutional
sister's house, which stood about 200 yards
The defendant, James L. Brobst, and another
question only when he can show that he has
(100 brazas) away, and about 100 feet up the
American named Mann, were engaged in work
personally suffered some actual or threatened
on a mine located in the municipality of Masbate, side of a hill. He died as he reached the door of
injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct
the house, and was buried some two or three
where they gave employment to a number of
of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to native laborers. Mann discharged one of these
days later.
the challenged action; and the injury is likely to
number of native laborers. Mann discharged one
be redressed by a favorable action. This case
The trial court found the defendant guilty of the
of these laborers named Simeon Saldivar,
likewise stressed that the rule on constitutional
crime of homicide (homicidio), marked with
warned him not to come back on the premises,
questions which are of transcendental
and told the defendant not to employ him again, extenuating circumstances, defined in
importance cannot be invoked where a partys
because he was a thief and a disturbing element subsections 3 and 7 of article 9 of the Penal
substantive claim is without merit. Thus, a partys with the other laborers. A few days afterwards,
Code, in that the defendant "had no intention of
standing is determined by the substantive merit
committing so grave an injury as that which he
some time after 6 o'clock on the morning of the
of his case or a preliminary estimate thereof.
inflicted," and that he struck the blow "under such
10th of July, 1907, Saldivar, in company with
After a careful scrutiny of the petitioners
three of four others, went to the mine to look for powerful excitement as would naturally produce
substantive claims, this Court finds that the
entire loss of reason and self-control." Sentence
work. The defendant, who at that time was
petitioners miserably failed to show any merit to dressing himself inside his tent, which was
of six years and one day of prision mayor was
their claims.
erected on the mining property, when he caught imposed, and from this sentence defendant
appealed to this court.
sight of Saldivar, ordered him off the place,
exclaiming in bad Spanish, "Sigue,
Counsel for the appellant, relying mainly on
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant
Vamus!" (Begone). Saldivar made no move to
appellant's claim that he did not strike Saldivar,
Petition is DENIED. This Court AFFIRMS the
leave, and although the order was repeated,
and that he merely pushed him lightly with the
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals,
merely smiled or grinned at the defendant,
black of his open hand, and relying also on the
promulgated on 26 November 2004, declaring
whereupon the latter became enraged, took
lack of satisfactory proof of the existence of
both the HSRA and Executive Order No. 102 as three steps toward Saldivar, and struck him a
lesions or external marks of violence on the body
valid. No costs.
powerful blow with his closed fist on the left side,
26

of the deceased, contend: first, that the evidence

fails to sustain a finding that the deceased came
to his death as a result of injuries inflicted by the
defendant; and, second, that even if it be a fact
that the defendant, in lying his hand upon the
deceased, contributed to his death, nevertheless,
since the defendant had a perfect right to eject
the deceased from the mining property, he can
not be held criminally liable for unintentional
injuries inflicted in the lawful exercise of this right.
Two witnesses, Dagapdap and Yotiga, who were
standing close by the time, swore positively that
the blow was delivered with the closed fist, from
the shoulder (de dentro para fuera), and that it
was a hard blow; Dagapdap testifying that, "Al
pegar el puetazo, Simeon dio vuelta, y despues
se marcho (when the blow was struck, Simeon
staggered and afterwards went away); and
Yotiga that "despues de dar el golpe se
retrocedio y levanto los brazos" (after the blow
was struck, he backed away and threw up his
arms). The testimony of these witnesses is clear,
positive, and definite and is wholly
uncontradicted, excepted for the improbable
story told by the accused in his own behalf, when
he testified that seeing Saldivar standing outside
his tent, he told him twice to go away and then
stepped up to him and pushed him lightly with
the back of his hand, which came in contact with
the handle of Saldivar's bolo, but not with

sufficient force to push him back or do him any

injury. If it had been necessary to use force to
compel Saldivar to leave the place, it is at least
highly improbable that the accused approaching
him from the front would have lightly placed
theback of his open right hand on
Saldivar's left side, without attempting to seize
him, or to compel him to give around.
Pedro Leocampo, the only other witness called at
the trial who appears to have been present when
the incident occurred corroborated the testimony
of the witness Dagapdap and Yotiga as to all that
occurred prior to the actual infliction of the blow,
which he did not see. He testified that at the time
when the accused, standing in his tent, ordered
the deceased to leave, he, the witness, was
eating his breakfast, with his back to the accused
and the deceased; that hearing the order, he
turned his head and saw the accused start
toward the deceased with his arm outstretched,
but that at that moment he turned away and did
not see the accused actually come up to, strike
or touch the deceased; that when he saw the
accused approaching the deceased, the accused
did not have his fist clenched, but that he could
not say whether the blow was struck with the
open hand or the closed fist, because at the
moment when it is said the accused came up to
and touched or struck the deceased, the

witness's head was so turned that he could not

and did not see what took place.
No evidence was introduced at the trial which in
any wise tends to put in doubt the truth of the
testimony of these witnesses as to the fact that
they were present at the time when the place
where the incident occurred; and of this fact we
are satisfied that there can be no reasonable
doubt, although, as frequently happens when
ignorant witnesses are testifying in the courts in
these Islands, their evidence is conflicting as to
the precise hour by the clock when it took place.
Some attempt is made to discredit the testimony
of Yotiga, because it appears from the record that
in answer to certain questions on his
examination-in-chief, he stated that when the
blow was struck he was some
hundred brazas (200 yards) away. It developed,
however, on examination by the trial judge, that
this answer was given under the impression that
the question asked was the distance from the
mine to the house of the sister of the deceased,
as to which considerable testimony was taken;
and it is very clear from all the testimony that
both these witnesses were standing within a few
yards of the defendant when he struck the blow.
The testimony of Dagapdap is also criticized
because, in answer to the opening questions on
the examination-in-chief, he spoke of the blow
27

inflicted as a bofetada (a slap with the open hand

on the cheek), which, later on in his testimony, he
changed to the word puetazo (a blow with the
fist), as a result, it is intimated, of suggestive
questions by counsel for the prosecution. We do
not think this criticism well founded, or that the
language of the witness on which it rests sustains
the inference sought to be drawn therefrom. In
the first place, it must be forgotten that the
witness was manifestly an ignorant man,
unskilled in the use of words, and testifying in a
remote province in a native dialect; and that his
testimony was interpreted into the Spanish of the
record by an interpreter who might well have
been mistaken in selecting the precise Spanish
equivalent of the word or words actually used by
the witness, and whose use of Spanish
throughout the record does not demonstrate
such precision and nicety in the use of words as
to justify the laying of too much stress on the
phrasing adopted by him in the haste of
interpretation in the course of a trial: so that, in
our opinion, the detailed description of the
manner in which the blow was inflicted, as given
by the witness without suggestion or assistance
of any kind, is much more decisive as to its
nature than the word by which reference to it was
made. And in the second place, as appears from
the Diccionario Enciclopedico de la Lengua
Castellana and the Diccionario de la Lengua por
la Academia Espaola, the word "bofetada,"

when used strictly, connotes not merely a blow

with the open hand, but such a blow struck on
the cheek or side of the face, a meaning which
the whole testimony of the witness clearly
discloses it was not his intention to give to
whatever word he did actually make use of in
referring to the act. The definition of the word
"bofetada," as given in the former dictionary, is "a
blow which is given on the cheek (mejilla) with
the open hand," and in the latter is "a blow given
with the open hand, on the side of the face
(carillo) or cheek (mejilla) of another."

threw up his hands and staggered away is

necessarily in conflict with the evidence of the
witnesses for the prosecution as to the weight of
the blow and the place where it was inflicted.

We are satisfied that the evidence of record

leaves no room for reasonable doubt that the
defendant struck Saldivar a powerful body blow
with his closed fist; and that whatever authority
the defendant may have had to eject the
deceased from the mining property and to use
physical force to that end in case of need, the
blow thus struck was far in excess of such
It has also been suggested that the testimony of authority, and was, therefore, unlawful, and can
the witnesses for the prosecution is inherently
not be excused or justified as an exercise of
improbable, because, as it is said, if the blow had necessary force in the exercise of a right. The
been struck as described by them, the injured
defendant's own testimony does not indicate that
person would necessarily have "doubled up or
there was any danger to be apprehended from
over," and not, as appears from their testimony, Saldivar, and there is nothing in the record which
thrown up his hands and staggered away. No
would indicate that the defendant had reasonable
expert testimony was introduced at the trial upon ground to believe that he would offer a violent or
this point, and while it may, perhaps, be admitted even a substantial resistance to an attempt to
that if the blow took effect in the abdominal
expel him from the mining property.
region, common experience would justify us in
expecting as a result of the blow, that the injured We are satisfied also that the deceased came to
person would "double up or over," it must not be his death as a result of the blow inflicted by the
defendant. Two or three days prior to his death
forgotten that the blow having been delivered
over the ribs on the left side, it may as well have he was employed as a laborer in defendant's
mine; his sister testified that on the morning of
taken effect in the region of the heart; in the
absence of expert testimony we do not think that the day he died, he left her house in apparent
good health and went to the mines to look for
in the event, evidence that the injured person
28

work; a short time afterwards he received a

violent blow on his lower left side, a region of the
body where many of the vital organs are located;
and immediately thereafter, he stared up the
short trail leading to his sister's house, and died
as he reached the door. In the absence of
evidence of any intervening cause, we think there
can be no reasonable doubt that his death
resulted from the blow.
Counsel for appellant suggest that death may
have been the result of some cause unknown,
such as a fall, an assault by robbers, or
perchance a suicidal frenzy, intervening between
the time when the accused was last seen starting
up 200-yard trail to his sister's house, and the
time when, as she testified, he died just as he
reached her door on his way back from the mine;
and that the accused is entitled to the benefit of
the doubt. But the doubt which must be decided
in favor of an accused person in a criminal trial is
a reasonable doubt, and not a mere whimsical
and fanciful doubt, based upon imagined but
wholly improbable possibilities, unsupported by
evidence; and while we do not hold that it is
absolutely and morally impossible that some
other cause could have intervened to bring about
the death of Saldivar, we do hold that there can
be no reasonable doubt in the mind of a
reasonable man that death was in fact brought
about by the blow inflicted by the accused, and

was not the result of some independent cause

intervening during the very short period of time
prior to his death, during which he was not under
observation by witnesses called at the trial.

It is true that no autopsy was had on the body of

the deceased, and that a medical officer called in
by the accused who saw the body, but who does
not appear to have examined it very closely,
certified that he found no outward lesions or
Counsel for the appellant enlarge on the fact that marks of violence; but this evidence is not
accepting defendant's statement that he sent the sufficient to negative the existence of internal
deceased away from the mines about a quarter
lesions, for the medical authorities inform us that
past six, it would appear from the testimony of
death may and often does result from a blow
the sister of the deceased that about two hours
over or near the heart or in the abdominal region,
may have elapsed between that time and the
notwithstanding the fact that the blow leaves no
time when he arrived at her house. The sister
outward mark of violence; and there is evidence
fixed the time of the arrival of her brother at from in the record of the discovery on the cadaver of
7 to 8 o'clock or possibly a little later; but she
two suspicious black spots, one about the place
appears to have been an ignorant woman who
where the blow was struck, and another at or
did not know how to read the face of a clock, and near the umbilicus, though the evidence fails to
it is quite clear that hers was no more than a
disclose the precise nature of these
rough estimate, based on the height of the sun,
discolorations. (Medical Jurisprudence, Taylor,
and the most that can fairly be inferred from the 12th Am. Ed., pp. 310 and 388; Moulin's Treatise
testimony is that the deceased was struck early on Surgery, Hamilton, part 2, chap. 1, p.
on the morning in question, and that not long
151; Tratado de Medicina Legal por Legran de
afterwards on the same morning, he died at the Sulle, Vol. II, pp. 206, 207.)
door of his sister's house 200 yards away. But
even if it be granted that two hours actually did
It has been suggested that the deceased may
elapsed from the time the deceased left the
have had a weak heart or some other diseased
mines, until he reached his sister's house, this
organ, and that but for such physical defect
interval is not long enough to materially weaken death might not have ensued from the mere
the inference that the death resulted from the
force of the blow inflicted by the defendant. There
blow.
is no evidence to this effect, and on the contrary
there is testimony in the record that on the
morning before he died he was in apparent good
29

health; and the fact that a few days before, he

was able to work in the mines, and that he came
to the mines that day in search of work, renders it
highly improbable that he was suffering at the
time from any grave organic weakness. But
however this may have been, it has been
frequently and justly decided that where death
results as a direct consequence of the use of
illegal violence, the mere fact that the diseased
or weakened condition of the injured person
contributed to his death, does not relieve the
illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility. (U.
S. vs. Luciano, 2 Phil. Rep., 96; U.
S. vs. Montes, 6 Phil. Rep., 443; see also
decisions of supreme court of Spain, March 10,
1871, and June 26, 1980.)

November 9, 1885, February 10, 1876, July 5,

1888, and July 12, 1890, and appears to rely
especially on the former decision wherein
sentence of homicidio por imprudencia
temeria was imposed, the court holding "que es
condicin esencial del delito de homicidio, que el
hecho material de que resulte sea impulsado por
voluntad libre encaminada por acto idneo a
causar la muerte algun mal fisico que por
consecuencia natural la produzca."

In the case, however, it was proven, and the

court found that not only did the defendant not
intend to kill the deceased but also that he did
not intend to do him any physical injury whatever;
but in the case at bar the evidence conclusively
establishes the voluntary, intentional, and
Counsel for appellant also contend that even if it unlawful infliction by the accused of a severe
be granted that in unlawfully exercising force
blow on the person of the deceased; and while it
upon the person of the deceased, the appellant
is true that the accused does not appear to have
caused for contributed to his death, nevertheless intended to take the life of his victim, there can
he should at most be convicted of homicidio por no doubt that in thus striking the deceased, he
imprudencia temeraria (homicide as a result of
intended to do him some injury, at least to the
reckless negligence), because, manifestly, the
extent of inflicting some degree of physical pain
unlawful act was not committed with the intent to upon him, and he is therefore, criminally
kill, and as counsel contend, the striking of the
responsible for the natural, even if unexpected
blow by the appellant was not an act adapted, or results of his act, under the provisions of article 1
likely (idneo) to inflict a death wound under
of the Penal Code, which prescribes that
ordinary circumstances, or reasonably calculated
Any person voluntarily committing a crime or
so to do. In support of this contention counsel
misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even
cite decisions of the supreme court of Spain of

though the wrongful act committed be different

from that which he had intended to commit.
In such cases the law in these Islands does not
excuse one from liability for the natural
consequences of hi illegal acts merely because
he did not intend to produce such consequences,
but it does take that fact into consideration as an
extenuating circumstance, as did the trial judge
in this case.
What has been said sufficiently disposes of all
errors assigned by counsel for appellant, except
certain alleged errors of procedure in the court
below which we do not think it necessary to
discuss, because even if it be admitted that such
errors were committed, they do not appear to
have in any way wise prejudiced the substantial
rights of the defendant.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence
imposed by the trial court be and are hereby
affirmed, with the costs of this instance against
the appellant. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, and Mapa, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MORELAND, J., dissenting:
The facts in this case, as claimed by the
Government, are as follows:
30

The defendant, James L. Brobst, and another

American, named Mann, were engaged in
working a mine belonging to them, located in the
municipality of Masbate, where they gave
employment to a number of native laborers.
Mann discharged one of these laborers, named
Simeon Saldivar, ejected him forcibly from the
premises and warned him not to come back, and
told the defendant not to employ him again or
permit him to be upon the premises because he
was a thief and a disturbing element with the
other laborers. A few days afterwards, at about 6
o'clock in the morning on or about the 10th of
July, 1907, Saldivar, in company with three of
four others, went to the mine ostensibly to look
for work. The defendant, who at that time was
dressing himself inside his tent, which was
erected on the mining property, catching sight of
Saldivar, ordered him off the place. Saldivar
made no move to leave, and, although the order
was repeated, still did not leave, although he said
and did nothing whatever; whereupon, as
claimed by the Government, the defendant
became enraged, took three steps towards
Saldivar and struck him a powerful blow with his
fist on the left side, just over the lower ribs.
Saldivar turned around, without saying a word,
and went in the direction of his sister's house,
which stood about 200 yards away and about
100 feet up the side of a hill. He was not seen by
anybody after starting toward the house. About

two hours later, slightly more or less, he came to

the front door of the house in dying condition. He
died just after being carried into the house and
was buried two or three days later.

evidence. The prosecution asserts that it has

proved by direct evidence a blow or push
delivered by the defendant to the person of the
decedent, and, the subsequent death being
admitted, asks the court to make the deduction
The trial court found the defendant guilty of the
that the one resulted from the other. No autopsy
crime homicide, marked with the extenuating
was had. No examination of the body, either
circumstances defined in subsections 3 and 7
before or after death, which merits the slightest
article 9 of the Penal Code in that the defendant consideration, was made by the prosecution. No
had no intention of committing so grave an injury expert testimony worthy of the name was
as that which he inflicted and that he struck the
produced by the Government as to the cause of
blow under such powerful excitement as would
death. Such as was given is not wholly valueless,
naturally produce entire loss of reason and self- but positively ridiculous.
control. Sentence of six years and one day
of prision mayor was imposed, and from this
The prosecution claims to have proved by
sentence the defendant appealed to this court.
reliable evidence, and rest its case wholly upon
that proposition, that the defendant administered
The claim of the defendant is that was not
to the decedent a powerful blow with the closed
enraged, that he did not strike Saldivar, the
fist in the lower left side; that the death of
decent, a blow with his fist or a blow in any other decedent occurred very soon thereafter, and that,
manner, but that he simply stepped up to the
therefore, the irresistible inference is that the
decedent, put his open hand against him and
injury caused the death. The claim of a proper
pushed him gently backwards.
conviction rests upon the proposition laid down
generally by the authorities that where there has
To secure a conviction it was necessary for the
been inflicted an injury sufficient to produce
Government to prove, first, that the defendant
death, followed by the demise of the injured
unlawfully injured the decent, and, second, that
person, the presumption arises that the injury
the decedent died because of that injury.
was the cause of death, and, if no other cause is
In this case the death is admitted. The cause of suggested by the evidence, the conclusion
becomes practically irresistible and need not be
death is in dispute. The Government seeks to
corroborated by expert testimony. It should be
prove the cause of death by circumstantial
31

noted here, however, in order to avoid confusion,

that if there is no injury sufficient to produce
death, then that presumption does not arise and
no conclusion as to the cause of death can be
indulged without additional proof.
The first question to be decided in this case is,
Was the blow one which, in the ordinary
acceptation of the term, was sufficient to produce
death? If it was, and that fact is established by
the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, then
the conviction of the defendant might possibly be
sustained a proposition not necessary to
decide under my view of the case. If it was not,
then, there being an absolute failure of proof as
to the cause of death, the judgment of conviction
must reversed.
The resolution of this question depends, in this
particular case, wholly upon the nature and
character of the blow delivered.
After a very careful and through examination of
the proof adduced at the trial, I can not bring
myself to believe that the prosecution has
established satisfactorily that the blow
complained of was sufficient to produce death.
I am not convinced that the claim of the
Government that the alleged blow was delivered
with the clenched hand, or fist, has been
sustained. Three witnesses were sworn on behalf

of the Government to the question of the blow

alleged to have been delivered by the defendant
to the decedent. One of them, Pedro Leocampo,
testified flatly and directly that the push or blow
(he does not designate by express words which it
was) was administered with the open hand. At
page 19 and following pages of the evidence he
declares that, at the beginning of the incident in
question between the defendant and the
decedent, he had his back toward the
participants, eating his breakfast; that he heard
the defendant say to the decedent, "Fuera, go
ahead, vamus," and immediately turning his head
he saw the defendant with his open hand
extending toward and touching the body of the
decedent; that he saw decedent then turn and
walk away. Later, in replying to questions put by
the trial judge, he said he was not quite sure
whether the open hand of the defendant actually
touched decedent's body or not. It is
unquestionable, however, that the movement of
the defendant's hand which he saw was the blow
or push which it is claimed caused the fatal
injury; because it is admitted by all, and the
evidence also on that point is undisputed, that
what the witness saw was at least the critical part
of the incident the delivery of the alleged blow.
Moreover, it is conceded that the alleged blow
was not delivered until after the defendant had
uttered the words referred to and had stepped
forward at least one pace: and it is nowhere

asserted or claimed by anybody that the

defendant extended his hand toward the
decedent more than one or that more than one
blow was given. It is evident, therefore, that what
the witness saw was the delivery of the very blow
or push which the prosecution claims was the
cause of death. If can not well be imagined, in
view of the testimony given by this witness, how
the Government could fairly claim otherwise.
These conclusions are, I am convinced, fully
supported by the testimony as it is found in the
record. In answer to a question put by the fiscal
on direct examination he said:
T. Que estuve de espada con ellos y el
americano no ha dicho nada y momentos
despues dijo: "fuera," "go ahead," le vi que tenia
la mano abierta y esta mano toco el cuerpo de
Simeon, pero no he visto como estaba.
After cross-examination the court questioned the
witness as follows:
J. Oyo Vd. ruido de algun golpe cuando el
acusado Brobst dijo "fuera de aqui?" T. No he
oido el golpe.
J. En el momento de decir "fuera de aqui," a
que distancia estaba Simeon del acusado? T.
A distancia de mas una vara.

32

J. De modo que en aquel momento estaba el

occiso Simeon al alcance del acusado Brobst?
T. S seor.

F. Sabe Vd. si durante el mes de Julio de 1907

que estuvo Vd. trabajando alli ha occurrido
alguna cosa extraordinaria? T. Si senor.

F. A que distancia estaba Vda. de Mr. Brobst

cuando dio el puetazo a aquel individuo? T.
Una distancia de 10 metros.

J. Y vio Vd. al acusado empujar al occiso

Simeon? T. No puedo decir si el acusado
empujo a Simeon.

F. Que es? T. El haber abofeteado el

americano a un tao.

F. Sabe Vd. por que el acusado habia

dado puetazo a aquel? T. Que yo le he visto
pegar con bofetn, pero que no se el motivo.

F. Estaba Vd. presente? T. Si, senor.

J. Vio Vd. a Simeon Saldivar retroceder en el

momento de decir el acusado "fuera de aqui?" F. Relate Vd. fielmente en este juzgado todo lo
que Vd. ha presenciado desde el principio hasta
T. He visto retroceder y dar las espaldas.
el fin. T. Yo he sido asalariado por el para
J. Cuando hizo el ademan de empujarle, como acarrear arroz. Cuando llegue en las minas era
tenia el puno cerrado o abierto? T. Tenia la ya de noche, y al requerir nuestro salario nos dijo
mano abierta.
Cristbal que nos dormiriamos alli porque el
americano estaba ya durmiendo y que Vds.
J. En que forma? T. Tenia abierta la mano.
pueden salir muy temprano por la maana. Se
nos dio el salario por dijo que quedaramos para
The testimony of this witness clearly discloses
the fact that he saw the critical part of the event, desayunar. Despues de desayunar llegaron
tambien 4 hombres; el cocinero me dijo: "Miguel
that is, the part wherein the hand of the
presente Vd. a estos 4 hombres por si el Sr.
defendant touched the body of the decedent in
the alleged blow. At that moment the hand of the Brobst los quiere emplear en el trabajo." Los 4
individuos fueron uno tras otro. Yo dije al Sr.
defendant was open.
Brobst si aun pueden trabajar esos 4 hombres.
El Sr. Brobst se levanto para ver a aquellos 4
The witness Miguel Yotiga, another witness
called by the Government, testified on page 2, 3, hombres, al ultimo de los cuales le pego
and 4 of the record that during the month of July, una bofetada, y yo habia visto la bofetada que le
dio en la cintura en el bolo colocado en la
1907, he was at the place where the dispute in
cintura, e inmediamente el hombre se dirigio a la
question occurred. Then follow these questions
casa de su hermana.
and answers, among others:

F. Cruzaron entre ellos alguna disputa o rina

antes que el acusado haya dado el golpe? T.
No se nada, unicamente he visto que cuando
llegaba Mr. Brobst dio el puetazo.
Later on the witness says, in reply to leading
questions, that the blow was struck with the
closed hand and was a heavy one.
It will be observed from this testimony that the
witness, in making his statement in narrative
form and without the influence which particular
words in questions frequently exerts on simpleminded witnesses, used the
words abofeteado and bofetada in speaking of
the kind blow which the defendant administered
to the decedent. The word bofetada, as well
as abofeteado, means a blow with the open
hand. It does not mean a severe blow, and
particularly not a blow with the fist or closed
hand. It is much nearer in character to a push
than it is to a puetazo, which is always a blow
with the fist. It is a light slap rather than a blow. It
is the diminutive of the word bofetn; that is to
33

say, if it can be called a blow at all, it is a gentle

blow than would be signified if the
wordbofetn were use. All of the dictionaries say
that puetazo is a blow with the clenched hand,
or fist, and that bofetada is a blow with
the open hand. The dictionaries also say, in
giving the definition of bofetn, that is the
aumentativo de bofetada. In his testimony on
page 2, 3, and 4, the witness continually and
persistently used the word bofetada in describing
the blow given by the defendant to the decedent
until the word puetazo was suggested to him or
put into his mouth, as it were, by the questions of
the fiscal. Then the witness himself picked up the
word and thereafter used it. No amount or
species of word torture can make the word "slap"
mean a blow with the fist. No more
can bofetada be made to mean puetazo. A
witness who, in describing the same blow, first
uses the word bofetada and then, after
suggestion, changes it to puetazo, provokes a
contradiction in his testimony, which, if not
explained, militates strongly against his
credibility. This is especially so when the change
in the word goes to the very essence of the
cause of action, as it does in this case. This
whole case depends upon the whether the
word puetazo or the word bofetada correctly
describes the event out of which this action
grows:

It is but repeating the general experience of

those familiar with the trial of causes to say that
suggestions to a witness by the form and specific
wording of a question are of very frequent
occurrence. The suggestion produces the same
result whether willfully made and received or
innocently indulged, as was undoubtedly the
case here on the part of the fiscal. In the case of
an ignorant or simple-minded witness, his
vocabulary being limited, he catches very readily,
as a rule, the words used by the interrogator and,
in his answers, uses the exact words in which the
question is propounded, without, perhaps, being
in the least conscious that the words he assumes
do not exactly, sometimes not at all closely,
represent what he really wants to express. These
suggestions display one of the vices found by the
courts in what are termed "leading questions,"
and furnish a reason for the rule uniformly
enforced in trial courts that they will not be
permitted.
The questions and answers already quoted
illustrate this voice forcibly as to the use by the
witness Yotiga of the
words bofetada and puetazo. On page 5 of the
evidence occurs another illustration. There the
fact sought to be elicited was whether the blow
was gentle or severe. "F. Hizo despacio o
fuerte? T. Fuerte." On pages 12, 19, and 24
the following occurs:

F. Donde toco directamente en el cuerpo o

en el bolo? T. Dio en el bolo.
F. En que parte del bolo en la vaina o en el
puno? T. En el puno del bolo.
F. Era fuerte el puetazo flojo? T. Fuerte.
F. Cuando el acusado pego a Simeon Saldivar,
estaba riendose o estaba furioso? T. Furioso.
F. Tenia cerrado el puno o abierto la mano?
T. Cerrado la mano.
In these illustrations, it will be observed, the
witness is presented by the questions with only
two words to make use of in answering one
word the very extreme in one direction and other
word the very extreme in the other. The ignorant
or simple-minded witness whose vocabulary is
extremely limited, who is unused to court
proceedings, is strongly tempted, and in many
instances is virtually forced, to accept one word
or the other and thereby assume one extreme or
the other in making his answers, although the
word made use of may not within many degrees
express his real meaning. All of these questions
were leading and suggestive, and, judging from
the testimony given anterior to those questions,
especially by the witness Yotiga, led to very
marked contradictions of, or, at least, changes in,
the evidence as previously presented.
34

The third and last witness for the Government

who testified as to the blow was Fermin
Dagapdap. In describing the blow this witness
from the first used the word puetazo. This
witness, however, stated that he was at the time
of the occurrence about 100 brazas (600 feet)
from the participants. Later in his testimony he
attempts to claim that he gave 100 brazas as the
distance which the decedent was from his
brother's house at the time of the occurrence.
This, however, is very difficult to believe in view
of the evidence which he gave, as shown on
page 25, which follows:
F. A qu distancia estaba Vd. de los dos
cuando dio el puetazo? T. Unas 100 brazas.

of the nature of the question, the witness did not

then understand, he displayed qualities, or the
lack of them, which justly lead to the conclusion
that his testimony ought not to be given any
weight whatever, especially where it is in conflict
with the testimony of any witness more reliable.
Moreover, his manifest evasions on crossexamination materially weaken any claim which
may be made in favor of his credibility.
These witnesses for the Government are in
conflict in other particulars. Yotiga declared that
the incident occurred at eight o'clock in the
morning. Yotiga declared that it happened while
the workmen were eating breakfast; Dagapdap
averred that it took place after breakfast and
while the men were working.

decedent with his fist but gave him a push with

his open hand.
The following are the said circumstances,
present at the very time the act complained of
was committed, which go to prove that the blow,
alleged to have been delivered against the body
of the decedent, was not a blow at all in the real
sense of the word and was wholly insufficient
ordinarily speaking, to cause any injury whatever;
The decedent at the time showed absolutely no
signs of having been injured in the slightest
degree.

(a) The three witnesses for the prosecution

above referred to, Yotiga, Dagapdap and
Leocampo, if their testimony is to be believed,
F. Vd. estaba 100 brazas de distancia? T.
unite in declaring that they were looking the
S, seor.
It seems to me, therefore, that the direct
testimony adduced by the Government to prove decedent full in the face when the alleged blow
F. Indique Vd. aqui la distancia aproximadamente that the defendant delivered against the body of was struck and that they saw thereon nothing but
de las 100 brazas que Vd. dice. T. Aquella
a perfectly natural expression. There is not the
a decedent a blow with fist, is conspicuously
casa de techo de hierro.
slightest evidence to show that the countenance
weak, particularly when we take into
of the decedent betrayed even the faintest
F. Esa es la distancia donde Vd. estaba cuando consideration that one of the Government
witnesses flatly contradicts the other two in every appearance of pain, distress or discomfort at the
dio el puetazo a Simeon Saldivar? T. S,
time the blow was delivered or at any time
important point; and that testimony, taken in
seor.
thereafter so long as he was observed.
connection with all the circumstances
If, after all that questioning as to the distance he surrounding and accompanying the incident,
(b) Nobody heard any blow struck. It is conceded
was away from the scene of the occurrence, and seems rather to support the testimony and claim by every witness for the Government that there
of the defendant that he did not strike the
if, after all the effort which the fiscal evidently
was no sound of a blow. There were at the place
made to induce in him a proper comprehension
where the incident occurred about twenty men,
35

all of them as close to the participants as were

the three witnesses for the Government and yet,
so far as can be gathered, only three of the
twenty the sound of a blow. In fact, only three of
the twenty (the witnesses for the Government)
knew that anything unusual had happened at all.
(c) The decedent gave no cry of pain, made no
exclamation, uttered no sound. This is the
uncontradicted proof.
(d) The decedent did not reel or stagger
backward, forward or sideways, nor did he lose
his equilibrium in any way.
This is established by uncontradicted proof.
Every witness for the Government declares that
after the delivery of the alleged blow the
decedent remained in a perfectly upright attitude
and in a natural position; and that immediately
after receiving the blow he turned and walked
away.
One of the witnesses, after being sharply
questioned by the fiscal, stated that on the
delivery of the blow the decedent stepped back,
threw up his arms and walked away. The
following is his testimony:

colocado en la cintura inmediatamente el

hombre se dirigi la casa de su hermana.

the decedent threw up his arms. He testified that

the decedent simply whirled around and walk
away.

F. En que posicion se quedo aquel individuo en

el miso momento de recibir el golpe? T. Que
The claim of the prosecution that the decedent
inmediatamente de haber recibido el puetazo
staggered at the time of the alleged blow is
se marcho.
based upon the translation of "di vueltas." One
of the Government's witnesses says that on the
F. Yo le pregunto Vd. en el miso momento de
delivery of the blow the decedent "di vueltas y
haber dado el puetazo.T. Que despues de
se march." So far as my researches go, no such
dar el golpe se retrocedio y levanto los brazos y interpretation can be given those words. They do
en seguida se marcho.
not mean that he "staggered." They mean simply
that he turned or whirled around. This might
It will be observed, from the evidence quoted,
that the witness testified at first that the decedent follow a blow or a push. No other witness uses
these same words; but the other two witnesses
did nothing on receiving the blow except to turn
for the Government, in describing the same act
and walk away. This testimony the witness
repeats in response to a second question of the of the decedent, used words which, it may fairly
be assumed, in order to maintain as much
fiscal. The third question as to the same point
was evidently very sharply put by the fiscal, and harmony as possible in the testimony of the
Government's witnesses, were intended to mean
that effort drew from the witness the additional
the same thing. Such words are "se dirigi la
statement, quite inconsistent with his two
casa," and "volv la cara y se march el difunto."
previous ones, that the decedent stepped back
These words were used by the other two
and threw up his arms. Neither of the other two
Government witnesses in describing the very
witnesses for the Government saw this latter
manifestation on the part of the decedent. One of same act to which the other Government witness
applied the description "di vueltas." Those
them, Leocampo, testifies directly that no such
thing happened, and other, Dagapdap, although words can not possibly be construed to mean
that the decedent staggered.
one of those who claimed to have been an

El Sr. Brobst . . . le pego una bofetada y yo habia

eyewitness of the whole affair and who assumed
visto la bofetada le dio en la cintura en el bolo
to describe the whole incident in detail, fails to
mention the very important fact, if it is a fact, that

36

(e) The decedent, according to the testimony of

the prosecution, did not attempt to ward off,
dodge or escape the blow in any way.

about 6 a. m.) he examined the body of decedent

and found a black spot about the size of a peso
on the left side. The other witness, Alejandro
Santiago, 70 years, farmer and herbalist,
He had abundant opportunity to do so. It is
declared that he examined the body, he does not
nowhere denied, but always admitted, that the
remember when, and found a black spot on the
defendant twice ordered the decedent to leave
ribs (he does not remember on which side of the
the place and after delivering the order the
body) and another one on the navel. The cause
second time advanced toward him a pace or two. of these spots, if they really existed, is pure
The decedent was fully warned. Yet the
speculation. Certainly one blow could not make
witnesses of the prosecution claim that, up to the both. They may have been caused by the
time the blow touched him, he made no move
decedent falling or by handling the body at the
whatever. It is unbelievable that the decedent
time or of subsequent to death, or by
would permit the defendant to walk up to him,
ecchymosis. No one knows. Certain it is that an
after due warning, and plant a powerful blow in
examination of the body by a licensed physician,
his abdomen without any effort to dodge or
Hans Hoch, made the day of the alleged injury,
escape and without the slightest effort to ward off some hours thereafter, disclosed, so the
the blow by movement of body, hand, or arm.
physician testified, absolutely no external signs of
The throwing of the arms down to protect the
injury is not conclusive that there was no injury,
abdomen in such a case is involuntary and
still such signs are usual in cases of this
almost inevitable; and the fact that he did not do character and their absence is significant and
so points strongly to the conclusion that he was important.
not struck as claimed.
The weight of the testimony produced seems,
(f) the body of decedent exhibited no external
therefore, to be that there were no external signs
sign of injury after death.
of injury upon the body of decedent certainly
Two witnesses were sworn by the prosecution as none that were fairly traceable to the blow, even
to signs of injury upon the body of the decedent. if delivered in the manner and with the force
One, the father of decedent, laborer, testified that claimed by the Government.
at 4 o'clock of the afternoon of the day after the
alleged injury (the alleged injury occurred at

It seems to me, therefore, that there is an

essential and fatal conflict in the evidence of the
prosecution. The prosecution claims (and
portions of the direct testimony of some of its
witnesses tend to prove) that the defendant gave
the decedent a powerful blow with his fist, full in
the left side; on the other hand, other portions of
the testimony are utterly and destructively
contradictory to that claim. It is contrary to the
universal experience of life to assert that a man,
receiving in his lower left side a powerful blow
with the fist, a blow which, it is claimed, was
sufficiently forcible to cause death within a short
time, can maintain an erect and natural posture
and exhibit absolutely no signs of pain.
Experience also demonstrates that it is little short
of the impossible that one receiving such a blow
would throw his arms up. I do not believe a case
can be cited where that has occurred. It is the
experience of mankind that under such
circumstances the person always throws his
arms down. Such a blow in or about the
abdomen or in the lower ribs produces such a
shock to the nervous system, causes such a
contraction of all the muscles thereabouts,
induces such a difficulty of respiration, and such
great pain, that the person so struck is not only
wholly unable to throw his arms up but he is
absolutely incapable of maintaining the body in
an erect position. He involuntarily and inevitably
throws the arms down over the abdomen and
37

bends the body forward at the hips. In other

words, using a phrase which almost universal
experience has taught accurately describes the
position necessarily assumed by one receiving
such a blow, he would "double up like a
jackknife." The claim that the blow was a
powerful one delivered with the fist is so utterly
inconsistent with the appearance and conduct of
the decedent at the time of the assault and
subsequent thereto as to lead almost necessarily
to the conclusion that no such blows was struck.
Granting such a blow, it would be little short of
the impossible, it certainly would be most
extraordinary, for the decedent to exhibit no signs
of pain, maintain an erect and natural position,
preserve perfectly his equilibrium with the
exception of stepping backward a little, turn in the
ordinary way and walk off the premises at his
usual and natural gait and with his usual and
natural carriage. The entire absence of
symptoms or evidence of injury at the time of the
act complained of is, in my judgment, of the very
gravest importance. It speaks louder and
stronger and clearer than all the other evidence
in the case as to whether or not the decedent
was actually injured at that time.
On the other hand, the theory and claim of the
defendant, that he simply stepped forward and
pushed the decedent backward lightly with the
open hand, after ordering him to leave, explains

fully and satisfactorily every fact and every

circumstance above mentioned as being so
utterly inconsistent with the claim of the
prosecution.

(6) It explains why, among the twenty persons

there present, only a very small per cent knew
that anything unusual had taken place.

(3) It explains why decedent was able to walk

away promptly at his usual gait and with his
customary carriage.

was delivered with the fist, but has failed as well

to show that any blow, in the real sense of that
term, was struck. Rather the strong tendency of
the proof, taken as a whole, together with all the
circumstances is to support the contention of the
defendant that he simply pushed the decedent
back with the open hand. That being so, it is
perfectly apparent that such an act was utterly
insufficient to produce death.

(7) It explains why the witness Yotiga first used

(1) It explains why the decedent did not try to
the word "bofetada" instead of puetazo" or
dodge or escape or protect himself by movement "golpe."
of the body, or by using the hands and arms to
(8) It explains why the witnesses Leocampo
defend himself from the assault of this enraged
testified that the defendant's hand was open at
and furious man. There was no violence from
the very time of its contact with decedent's
which he needed to protect himself.
person.
(2) It is explains why there was no cry of pain, no
(9) It explains the entire lack of reason or motive
appearance of distress, no reeling, staggering,
falling, doubling up or other exhibition or sign of on the part of defendant inducing him to inflict on
injury. It explains why he did not at once drop to the decedent punishment as severe as would
the ground, as he naturally and almost inevitably follow such a blow.
wound on receiving a blow such as is sought to
It seems, therefore, to be demonstrated from the
be established by the prosecution. There was no evidence that the prosecution has not only not
violence or force to cause any of these things.
sufficiently substantiated its claim that the blow

(4) It explains why there was no satisfactory

proof of marks of violence or external signs of
injury on the body of the decedent.
(5) It explains why no body of all who were
present heard the sound of a blow, not even the
witnesses for the prosecution.

38

As stated at the outset, the Government rests its

case wholly upon the proposition laid down by
the authorities that where there has been inflicted
an injury sufficient to produce death, followed by
the demise of the injured person, the
presumption arises that the injury was the cause
of death, and if no other cause is suggested by
the evidence, the conclusion becomes practically
irresistible and need not be corroborated by
expert testimony. But it must always be
remembered that the basis of and the reason for
that presumption is the injury sufficient to
produce death. If the injury is not one capable of
producing death, ordinarily speaking, then no
such presumption can possibly arise. The law
invariably requires that there be established by
clearest proof the connection between the injury
and the death, making the one the result of the
other. Where the injury is one capable of
producing death that connection of cause and
effect is established between the injury and death
by theinherent nature of the act its sufficiency
to produce death. But where the act is one not
sufficient to produce death, then the relation of
cause and effect is not established for the reason
that the act fails of the very quality from which
the presumption of cause and effect springs,
namely, its capability of producing death. In such
a case, when the Government has proved simply
the injury and death, it has done nothing. The
connection between the two is wholly lacking. It

is indispensable to a conviction in such case that

the Government prove the cause of death; and
that cause must be proved in addition to the fact
of inquiry. This the Government has wholly failed
to do. No effort was made to do so. The
Government rested its case entirely upon the
presumption, which it assumed arose by reason
of the inquiry and death, to establish the relation
of cause and effect between them. No autopsy
was held. No one knows the cause of death. The
incident occurred at about 6 clock a. m. The
decedent died at about 8 o'clock the same
morning. He left the scene of the event instantly.
He was not seen again by anybody, so far as the
evidence shows, until the very moment of his
death. Where he was, what he did, and what
happened to him during the two hours
intervening, the evidence does not disclose.
It being fairly established by the evidence that
the defendant simply pushed the decedent, the
remaining question is simple. The land and
premises were the event transpired belonged to
the defendant. The decedent, according to the
evidence, was known to the defendant as a thief
and as a marker of mischief among the workers
in the mines. Only two days before the event
from which this suit arose defendant had seen
the decedent forcibly ejected from these the
same premises by one Mann, a partner of
defendant; and the defendant was at the time

advised by Mann that the decedent was a

mischief-maker and a thief and should not be
allowed about the mines. The defendant had a
right to protect his property from invasion,
particularly by such person as he believed
decedent to be; and if, being upon the premises,
defendant refused to leave when given fair
warning, the defendant had a right to eject him
therefrom using no more force then was
necessary to that end. (Cooley, Torts, 1st Ed.,
167; McCarty vs. Fremont, 23 Cal., 196;
Woodman vs. Howell, 45 III., 367;
Bucher vs. Parmelee, 9 Vt., 352;
People vs. Payne, 8 Cal., 341;
People vs. Batchelder, 27 Cal., 69.)
That he did not use more force than was
necessary is established by the evidence as
shown by the preceding discussion.
Wills, on Circumstantial Evidence, says on page
291:
(3) In the proof of criminal homicide the true
cause of death must be clearly established; and
the possibility of accounting for the event by selfinflicted violence, accident of natural cause,
excluded; and only when it has been proven that
no other hypothesis will explain all the conditions
of the case can it be safely and justly concluded
that it has been caused by intentional injury. But,
in accordance with the principles which govern
39

the proof of every other element of the corpus

delicti, it is not necessary that the cause of death
should be verified by direct and positive
evidence; it is sufficient if it be proven by
circumstantial evidence, which produces a moral
conviction in the minds of the jury, equivalent to
that which is the result of positive and direct to
that which is the result of positive and direct
evidence.
In the People vs. Bennett (49 N. Y., 144) the
court said:
In determining a question of fact from
circumstantial evidence, there are two general
rules to be observed: (1) The hypothesis of
delinquency or guilt should flow naturally from
the facts proved, and be consistent with them all.
(2) The evidence must be such as to exclude, to
moral certainty, every hypothesis but that of his
guilt of the offense imputed to him; or in other
words, the facts proved must all be consistent
with the point to his guilt not only, but they must
be inconsistent with his innocence.

by some other cause. (U. S. vs.Wilterberger, Fed. THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Cas. No. 16738.)
MAXIM0 MALLARI, Defendant-Appellant.
On trial for murder, the State's failure to prove by Ledesma, Lim & Irureta Goyena for Appellant.
what means the deceased came to his death is
fatal to its case. (Cole vs. The State, 59 Ark., 50.) Solicitor-General Corpus for Appellee.
In order that a defendant may be properly
convicted by circumstantial evidence, all the
circumstances proved must be consistent with
each other, consistent with the hypothesis that
the accused is guilty, and, at the same time,
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent, and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt.
(12 Cyc., 488; U. S. vs. Reyes, 3 Phil. Rep., 3;
People vs. Ward, 105 Cal., 335; Carlton vs. The
People, 150 III., 181; State vs. Vinson, 37 La.
Ann., 792; Commonwealth vs. Costley, 188
Mass., 1; People vs. Aikin, 66 Mich., 460; U.
S. vs. Reder, 69 Fed. Rep., 965.)

The judgment of conviction should be reversed,

the defendant declared not guilty and his
On an indictment for murder, the prosecutor must discharge from custody ordered.
prove that the blows caused the death; but, if he Johnson, J., concurs.
proves that the blows were given by dangerous
weapon were followed byinsensibility or other
alarming symptoms, and soon afterward by
44. [G.R. No. 10037. December 23, 1914. ]
death; this is sufficient to impose it on the
accused, to show that the death was occasioned

SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; PLEA OF EXEMPTION
FROM RESPONSIBILITY. The plea or
circumstance of exemption from criminal
responsibility must be duly proven in the case in
the same way as the principal fact, in order to
free the perpetrator of the crime from
responsibility therefor.
2. ID.; RESPONSIBILITY FOR
CONSEQUENCES OF ACTS. The proven
perpetrator of a crime is directly responsible for
all the consequences of his criminal act, and
therefore for the death that occurred five days
after the victim had received the wound that
caused it.
3. ID.; DYING DECLARATIONS; GROUNDS OF
ADMISSIBILITY. The credibility of statements
made by a severely wounded person to a justice
of the peace in the preliminary investigation rests
not only on the serious situation resulting from
the wound he has received but also on his
40

physical and mental condition, which, given the

depressed state of his mind, has induced the
profound conviction that his life is actually
slipping away, and that he is in positive and
imminent danger of dying sooner or later as a
consequence of his serious wound; nor is the
force of such declaration affected by the
circumstance that he did not die until many hours
or days afterwards, for he finally did die from the
wound, whose gravity did not diminish from the
time he made his declaration until the hour of his
death. (Moore v. State, 96 Tenn., 209.)

bolo. At his wifes suggestion Vicente Sunga tried

to get out to report the matter to the teniente of
the barrio, who lived at some paces from their
TORRES, J. :
house, but as he met the defendant on the
stairway, he immediately went back inside and
jumped out of a window. He was straightway
pursued by the defendant and on arriving almost
This case has been brought up on appeal filed by in front of the house of the teniente saw that the
the defendant from the judgment dated April 22, defendant was following closely behind him. He
therefore turned to face his pursuer and defend
1914, whereby the Honorable Julio Llorente,
himself as well as he could with his hands.
judge, sentenced him to the penalty of twelve
Thereupon the defendant with a single slash of
years and one day of reclusion temporal,
the bolo wounded Vicente Sunga in the
accessories, the payment of an indemnity of
4. ID.; ID.; ID. Notwithstanding the fact that
abdomen, so that his intestines protruded
P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, and the
hearsay evidence is not admissible at a trial, the costs.
therefrom. In this condition the victim sat down,
statements made by an individual who is
endeavoring with his hands to keep his intestines
seriously wounded, at a moment when he was
from falling out, while his assailant took to flight.
On the morning of September 25, 1913, in the
dying, being convinced that there was no hope of barrio of Batasan, municipality of Macabebe,
recovery, constitute per se at least a grave,
Province of Pampanga, before going to his work, The justice of the peace of Macabebe arrived on
conclusive and decisive indication of the
the defendant Maximo Mallari went to the house the scene a few moments later and in his
culpability of the persons designated by the dying of the married couple, Vicente Sunga and Canuta presence the wounded man declared that his
man, inasmuch as it must be assumed that he,
Flores, and from the shed outside asked Vicente assailant was Mallari, who had been in his
being in so precarious a condition, spoke
Sunga to cure his wife of a sickness from which house, and who had inflicted the serious wound
truthfully, and that he was not induced by a
he had in the abdomen. As a consequence of
she had been suffering for several days, and
desire to tell a lie and to injure an innocent
which he thought was due to enchantment on the this wound he died three days later.
person. (U. S. v. Castellon, 12 Phil. Rep., 160.)
part of the said Vicente. As the latter refused,
An autopsy was held on the corpse by the
averring that he was not a wizard and that he
physician who is president of the municipal board
had not caused the illness of defendants wife,
the former became enraged and insulted the said of health of Macabebe, and as a result of the
spouses. Threatening to kill them, he ascended examination made, it appeared that the
DECISION
deceased had received an incised wound in the
the stairway carrying in his hand a thin, sharp
41

epigastric region, which penetrated the

gastrocolic epiploon, the middle part of the
transverse colon and the rectoabdominal
muscles, and which had caused severe
peritonitis, the entire length of both intestines
having become gangrened with sanious
discharges. This wound was necessarily fatal,
especially in view of the scarcity of antiseptics
available in the towns of the provinces.

Defendant declared that on the morning of the

occurrence his wife, who was ill, told him before
going to work to. stop in at Isidro Sungas house
and ask the latters wife to treat her, for it was
reported that she was a witch; that when he
reached the yard of Isidro Sungas house he
asked the latters son, Silvino Sunga, for his
mother; that at Silvinos invitation he entered the
yard and Isidro Sunga asked him from the
window what he wanted and invited him to come
The facts set forth appear to have been duly
in; but that he refused to enter, saying that he
proven in the case and constitute the crime of
could tell what he wanted from outside; that
homicide, provided for and penalized in article
thereupon Isidro Sungas wife appeared at the
404 of the Penal Code, for the reason that the
window and upon seeing him called to her
defendant appeared at the house of deceased
children, saying that a bad man had come. Then
with the demand that the latter treat his wife,
they began to insult him, and when he tried to get
whom he believed to be bewitched by the
away, Vicente Sunga, Silvino Sunga, Isidro
artifices of the deceased. As the latter refused to Sunga, and Florentino Sunga, armed with long
do so, saying that he was not a wizard, the
bolos, pursued him. At that instant Vicente
defendant Mallari insulted the Sunga spouses,
Sunga, who was foremost among them, struck
threatened them with death and straightway went him a blow with a pocket-knife on one of his
up into the house of the deceased with a bolo in rumps. Upon feeling the wound he turned and
his hand. When the deceased saw this he
slashed his assailant in the belly with his bolo,
immediately leaped out of the window in flight but and then forthwith took to flight, for the others
the defendant pursued him and upon coming up continued to pursue him. Defendant attempts to
with him in front of the house of the teniente of
show by this testimony that he was through
the barrio, to whom he was going to complain,
necessity defending himself from the unlawful
struck him a blow in the abdomen with the bolo, assault made upon him by the deceased.
inflicting a serious and fatal wound that caused
death on the third day thereafter.
But it appears fully proven in the case that the
defendant Mallari did not go to Isidro Sungas

house to perform his wifes errand but that he

went directly to another house, in which Vicente
Sunga lived apart, to compel the latter to cure his
sick wife; that when the defendant pursued him
in the direction of the house of the teniente of the
barrio, Sungas wife, Canuta Flores, and her
brother, Dalmacio Flores, came out of the house
unarmed and saw the assault; that upon
approaching Sunga, whom they found seated on
the ground with a wound in his belly, they
rendered him aid. At that time the defendant, who
had assaulted him, was no longer there, as he
had straightway taken to flight. The agents of the
authorities and the justice of the peace who went
to the place of the assault found no weapon in
possession of the deceased, or of his wife and
his brother-in-law.
Isidro Sunga, who lived in another house with
Silvino Sunga and Florentino Sunga, was not in
his house at the time of the occurrence and none
of these persons saw the affair, so they could not
have pursued the defendant with weapons, as he
affirms. The two neighbors, Bernardo Saual and
Esteban Yama, who lived in houses adjoining the
deceaseds, stated that when they heard the
cries of Canuta Flores calling for help they left
their houses and thereupon saw the defendant
pursuing the deceased Vicente Sunga; that upon
arriving in front of the house of the teniente of the
barrio, at the moment when Sunga turned toward
42

the defendant, who was pursuing him, said

defendant slashed him in the belly and
straightway took to flight. They did not at that
time see Sunga carrying any weapon, or that he
attacked his assailant before being wounded in
the belly.
The witnesses for the defense, Bonifacio Ignacio
and Diego Yabut, assert that they saw four
armed men pursuing the defendant on that
occasion, the foremost of whom was the
deceased, who was carrying a pocket-knife,
while the others were provided with bolos,
wherefore the defendant, upon being wounded in
the right rump by the deceased, defended
himself and slashed the latter with his bolo. To
offset these declarations, the case affords
positive proof that the defendant, without
provocation or prior aggression, attacked the
deceased with a bolo and wounded him in the
belly.
The affirmations of said witnesses cannot prevail
against the testimony of two impartial neighbors
who came up at the cries of the deceaseds wife
calling for help and who, along with the brotherin-law of the wounded man, witnessed the
occurrence and rendered him aid, without having
seen those two witnesses of the defense on the
spot or the alleged prior aggression of the
deceased against the defendant.

erroneous, for in spite of the statement of the

Moreover, when the defendant was asked by the health officer that the deceased might have been
chief of police how he came to be wounded in
saved if the wound had been aseptically treated
the rump, he replied that he did not know who
from the first, its seriousness and fatal character
had inflicted that wound, and this statement of
being due to lack of antiseptics, still the person
the chief was not impugned at the trial, so it may inflicting it is responsible for all the consequences
be that the defendant in preparing his defense
of his criminal action, and therefore for the death
wounded himself with a pocket-knife, for the
that occurred some days after the deceased
wound was of a trifling nature; and at the
received the wound.
investigation held by the justice of the peace who
went to the defendants house, the latter made
With respect to the third error assigned to the
no statement regarding the person who had
court for having held that the declarations made
inflicted said wound, while the physician who
by the deceased before the justice of the peace
examined him said that it must have been
had the character of ante mortem declarations,
received when he was standing still.
when the death of the deceased did not occur for
three days and the wound was not in itself of a
It does not therefore appear to be duly proven in fatal nature, it must be remembered that as a
the case that the defendant was attacked and
result of the wound inflicted upon the deceased
wounded with a pocket-knife by the deceased,
his intestines protruded and for this reason the
and consequently that there was any prior
wound was of a serious if not fatal nature.
unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased, Therefore the opinion of the court with reference
to justify the finding that the defendant was
to the nature and force of the statements made
compelled to wound him in the belly with a bolo
by the victim before the justice of the peace at
in lawful self-defense. The plea or circumstance the time of the investigation is quite proper,
of exemption from responsibility must be fully
because the credibility of statements made by a
proven in the same way as the principal fact, in
person severely wounded rests not only on the
order to hold that the perpetrator of the crime is
serious situation resulting from his wound but
not responsible therefor.
also on his physical and mental condition, which,
given the depressed state of his mind, has
With reference to the classification of the criminal induced the profound conviction that his life is
act, it does not appear in the case that this was
actually slipping away, and that he is in positive
43

and imminent danger of dying sooner or later

from the wound: nor can the force of such
declaration be affected by the circumstance that
he died later, hours o days after it was inflicted,
for when the patient did final die his death was
due to the wound whose gravity did not diminish
from the time he made his declaration until the
hour of his death.
In the case of Moore v. State (96 Tenn., 209) the
principle was maintained that "a dying
declaration, otherwise competent, will not be
excluded because it was made five days before
death."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the syllabus of the decision in the case of
Daughdrill v. State (113 Ala., 7, 9) it is held:
"Where it is shown the deceased had received a
dangerous wound and stated several times that
he was dying, and wanted witness to take
message to his wife, and was gasping for breath
at the time he was talking, and trembling from
fear or excitement, sufficient predicate is laid for
the admission of a statement made at that time,
as a dying declaration; and it is no objection to its
admission that such declaration took the form of
a message to another."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the syllabus of the decision rendered in the
case of the United States v. Castellon (12 Phil.
Rep., 160) it is held "Notwithstanding the fact that

hearsay evidence is not admissible at a trial, the

statements made by an individual who is
seriously wounded, at a moment when he was
dying being convinced that there was no hope of
recovery, constitute per se at least a grave,
conclusive and decisive indication of the
culpability of the persons designated by the dying
man, inasmuch as it must be assumed that he,
being in so precarious a condition, spoke
truthfully, and that he was not induced by a
desire to tell a lie and to injure a innocent
person."cralaw virtua1aw library
For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors
assigned t the judgment appealed from are
refuted and said judgment found to be in
accordance with the law and the merits of the
case, it is affirmed, with the costs against
the Appellant.
Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Trent and Araullo, JJ.,
concur.
Moreland, J., concurs in the result.
45. G.R. No. L-27097 January 17, 1975
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee,
vs.

ANTONIO TOLING y ROVERO and JOSE

TOLING y ROVERO, defendants-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar
and Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz for plaintiffappellee.
Santiago F. Alidio as counsel de oficio for
defendants-appellants.

AQUINO, J.:
Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, brothers,
appealed from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna, finding them guilty of
multiple murder and attempted murder,
sentencing them to death and ordering them to
indemnify each set of heirs of (1) Teresita B.
Escanan, (2) Antonio B. Mabisa, (3) Isabelo S.
Dando, (4) Elena B. Erminio (5) Modesta R.
Brondial (6) Isabel Felices and (7) Teodoro F.
Bautista in the sum of P6,000 and to pay
Amanda Mapa the sum of P500 (Criminal Case
No. SC-966). The judgment of conviction was
based on the following facts:
Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, twins, both
married, are natives of Barrio Nenita which is
about eighteen (or nine) kilometers away from
Mondragon, Northern Samar. They are illiterate
farmers tilling their own lands. They were forty44

eight years old in 1966. Antonio is one hour older

than Jose. Being twins, they look alike very
much. However, Antonio has a distinguishing cut
in his ear (44 tsn Jan. 14, 1966).
Antonio's daughter, Leonora, was working in
Manila as a laundrywoman since September,
1964. Jose's three children one girl and two
boys, had stayed in Manila also since 1964.
Antonio decided to go to Manila after receiving a
letter from Leonora telling him that she would
give him money. To have money for his
expenses, Antonio killed a pig and sold the meat
to Jose's wife for sixty pesos. Jose decided to go
with Antonio in order to see his children. He was
able to raise eighty-five pesos for his expenses.
On January 6, 1965, with a bayong containing
their pants and shirts, the twins left Barrio Nenita
and took a bus to Allen. From there, they took a
launch to Matnog, Sorsogon. From Matnog, they
went to Daraga, Albay on board an Alatco bus,
and from Daraga, they rode on the train, arriving
at the Paco railroad station in Manila at about
seven o'clock in the morning of January 8th. It
was their first trip to the big city.
At the Paco station, the twins took a jeepney
which brought them to Tondo. By means of a
letter which Aniano Espenola a labor-recruiter,
had given them, they were able to locate an

employment agency where they learned the

address of the Eng Heng Glassware. Antonio's
daughter was working in that store. Accompanied
by Juan, an employee of the agency, they
proceeded to her employer's establishment.
Leonora gave her father fifty pesos. Sencio
Rubis Antonio's grandson, gave him thirty pesos.
Antonio placed the eighty pesos in the right
pocket of his pants. It was then noontime.
Jose was not able to find any of his children in
the city. The twins returned to the agency where
they ate their lunch at Juan's expense. From the
agency, Juan took the twins to the Tutuban
railroad station that same day, January 8th, for
their homeward trip.
After buying their tickets, they boarded the night
Bicol express train at about five o'clock in the
afternoon. The train left at six o'clock that
evening.
The twins were in coach No. 9 which was the
third from the rear of the dining car. The coach
had one row of two-passenger seats and another
row of three- passenger seats. Each seat faced
an opposite seat. An aisle separated the two
rows. The brothers were seated side by side on
the fourth three-passenger seat from the rear,
facing the back door. Jose was seated between
Antonio, who was near the window, and a threeyear old boy. Beside the boy was a woman

breast-feeding her baby who was near the aisle.

That woman was Corazon Bernal. There were
more than one hundred twenty passengers in the
coach. Some passengers were standing on the
aisle.
Sitting on the third seat and facing the brothers
were two men and an old woman who was
sleeping with her head resting on the back of the
seat (Exh. 2). on the two-passenger seat across
the aisle in line with the seat where the brothers
were sitting, there were seated a fat woman, who
was near the window, and one Cipriano Reganet
who was on her left. On the opposite seat were
seated a woman, her daughter and Amanda
Mapa with an eight-month old baby. They were in
front of Reganet.
Two chico vendors entered the coach when the
train stopped at Cabuyao, Laguna. The brothers
bought some chicos which they put aside. The
vendors alighted when the train started moving. It
was around eight o'clock in the evening.
Not long after the train had resumed its regular
speed, Antonio stood up and with a pair of
scissors (Exh. B) stabbed the man sitting directly
in front of him. The victim stood up but soon
collapsed on his seat.
For his part, Jose stabbed with a knife (Exh. A)
the sleeping old woman who was seated
45

opposite him. She was not able to get up

anymore. 1
Upon seeing what was happening, Amanda
Mapa, with her baby, attempted to leave her seat,
but before she could escape Jose stabbed her,
hitting her on her right hand with which she was
supporting her child (Exh. D-2). The blade
entered the dorsal side and passed through the
palm. Fortunately, the child was not injured. Most
of the passengers scurried away for safety but
the twins, who had run amuck, stabbed everyone
whom they encountered inside the coach. 2

knife (Exh. A) upon the count of three, or he

would be shot.

Aldea stood on a seat and repeatedly struck

Antonio on the head with the butt of his pistol,
knocking him down. Aldea then jumped and
Instead of obeying, the man changed his hold on stepped on Antonio's buttocks and wrested the
the knife by clutching it between his palm and
scissors away from him. Antonio offered
little finger (with the blade pointed inward) and, in resistance despite the blows administered to him.
a suicidal impulse, stabbed himself on his left
breast. He slowly sank to the floor and was
When the train arrived at the Calamba station,
prostrate thereon. Near the platform where he
four Constabulary soldiers escorted the twins
had fallen, Rayel saw another man holding a pair from the train and turned them over to the
of scissors (Exh. B). He retreated to the steps
custody of the Calamba police. Sergeant Rayel
near the platform when he saw Rayel armed with took down their names. The bloodstained
a pistol.
scissors and knife were turned over to the
Constabulary Criminal Investigation Service
Rayel learned from his wife that the man sitting
(CIS).
opposite her was stabbed to death.
Some of the victims were found dead in the
Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Aldea was also in coach while others were picked up along the
the train. He was in the dining car when he
railroad tracks between Cabuyao and Calamba.
received the information that there were killings
Those who were still alive were brought to
in the third coach. He immediately went there
different hospitals for first-aid treatment. The
and, while at the rear of the coach, he met Mrs.
dead numbering twelve in all were brought to
Mapa who was wounded. He saw Antonio
Funeraria Quiogue, the official morgue of the
stabbing with his scissors two women and a
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Manila,
small girl and a woman who was later identified
where their cadavers were autopsied (Exh. C to
as Teresita B. Escanan (Exh. I to I-3). Antonio
C-11). A Constabulary photographer took some
was not wounded. Those victims were prostrate pictures of the victims (Exh. G to I-2, J-1 and Jon the seats of the coach and on the aisle.
2).

Among the passengers in the third coach was

Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Z. Rayel, a train
escort who, on that occasion, was not on duty.
He was taking his wife and children to Calauag,
Quezon. He was going to the dining car to drink
coffee when someone informed him that there
was a stabbing inside the coach where he had
come from. He immediately proceeded to return
to coach No. 9. Upon reaching coach 8, he saw a
dead man sprawled on the floor near the toilet. At
a distance of around nine meters, he saw a man
on the platform separating coaches Nos. 8 and 9,
holding a knife between the thumb and index
finger of his right hand, with its blade pointed
outward. He shouted to the man that he (Rayel) Aldea shouted at Antonio to surrender but the
Of the twelve persons who perished, eight,
was a Constabularyman and a person in
latter made a thrust at him with the scissors.
authority and Rayel ordered him to lay down his When Antonio was about to stab another person, whose bodies were found in the train, died from
stab wounds, namely:

46

(1) Isabel Felices, 60, housewife, Ginlajon,

Sorsogon.
(2) Antonio B. Mabisa, 28, married, laborer,
Guinayangan, Quezon.
(3) Isabelo S. Dando, 45, married, Paracale,
Camarines Norte.
(4) Susana C. Hernandez, 46, married,
housekeeper, Jose Panganiban, Camarines
Norte.
(5) Teodoro F. Bautista, 72, married, Nawasa
employee, San Juan, Rizal.
(6) Modesta R. Brondial 58, married,
housekeeper, Legaspi City.
(7) Elena B. Erminio 10, student, 12 Liberty
Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City and
(8) Teresita B. Escanan, 25, housemaid, 66
Menlo Street, Pasay City (Exh. C to C-3, C-7, C8, C-9, C-11, L to L-2, N to N-2, 0 to 0-2, P to P2, Q to Q-2, R to R-2 and T to T-2)
Four dead persons were found near the railroad
tracks. Apparently, they jumped from the moving
train to avoid being killed. They were:
(1) Timoteo U. Dimaano, 53 married, carpenter,
Miguelin, Sampaloc, Manila. .

(2) Miguel C. Oriarte, 45, married, Dalagan,

Lopez, Quezon.

The case was investigated by the Criminal

Investigation Service of the Second Constabulary
Zone headquarters at Camp Vicente Lim,
(3) Salvador A. Maqueda 52, married, farmer,
Canlubang, Laguna. On January 9, 1965
Lopez, Quezon and
Constabulary investigators took down the
statements of Mrs. Mapa-Dizon, Cipriano
(4) Shirley A. Valenciano, 27, married,
Reganet, Corazon Bernal, Brigida de Sarmiento
housekeeper, 657-D Jorge Street, Pasay City
(Exh. C-4. C-5, C-6, C-10, J, J-1, J-2, K to K-2, M and Sergeant Aldea. On that date, the
statements of the Toling brothers were taken at
to M-3 and S to S-2).
the North General Hospital. Sergeant Rayel also
Among the injured were Lucila Pantoja, Baby X, gave a statement.
Mrs. X, Mrs. Armanda Mapa-Dizon, Brigida
Antonio Toling told the investigators that while in
Sarmiento-Palma, Cipriano Reganet and
Corazon Bernal-Astrolavio (Exh. D to D-5). Mrs. the train he was stabbed by a person "from the
Astrolavio supposedly died later (43 tsn January station" who wanted to get his money. He
retaliated by stabbing his assailant. He said that
14, 1966).
he stabbed somebody "who might have died and
others that might not". He clarified that in the
Mrs. Mapa declared that because of the stab
train four persons were asking money from him.
wound inflicted upon her right hand by Jose
He stabbed one of them. "It was a hold-up".
Toling, she was first brought to the Calamba
Emergency Hospital. Later, she was transferred
to the hospital of the Philippine National Railways He revealed that after stabbing the person who
wanted to rob him, he stabbed other persons
at Caloocan City where she was confined for
because, inasmuch as he "was already bound to
thirteen days free of charge. As a result of her
die", he wanted "to kill everybody" (Exh. X or 8,
injury, she was not able to engage in her
occupation of selling fish for one month, thereby 49 tsn Sept. 3, 1965).
losing an expected earning of one hundred fifty
Jose Toling, in his statement, said that he was
pesos. When she ran for safety with her child,
wounded because he was stabbed by a person
she lost clothing materials valued at three
"from Camarines" who was taking his money. He
hundred pesos aside from two hundred pesos
retaliated by stabbing his assailant with the
cash in a paper bag which was lost.
scissors. He said that he stabbed two persons
47

who were demanding money from him and who

were armed with knives and iron bars.
When Jose Toling was informed that several
persons died due to the stabbing, he commented
that everybody was trying "to kill each other"
(Exh. I-A).
According to Jose Toling, two persons grabbed
the scissors in his pocket and stabbed him in the
back with the scissors and then escaped. Antonio
allegedly pulled out the scissors from his back,
gave them to him and told him to avenge himself
with the scissors.

trial, Judge Arsenio Naawa rendered the

judgment of conviction already mentioned. The
Toling brothers appealed.

whom they were suspecting of having evil

intentions towards them, sat on the seat facing
them, while the other two seated themselves
behind them. Some old women were near them.
In this appeal, appellants' counsel de
When the train was already running, the man
oficio assails the credibility of the prosecution
sitting near the aisle allegedly stood up,
witnesses, argues that the appellants acted in
approached Antonio and pointed a balisong knife
self-defense and contends, in the alternative, that at his throat while the other man who was sitting
their criminal liability was only for two homicides near the window and who was holding also
and for physical injuries.
a balisong knife attempted to pick Antonio's right
pocket, threatening him with death if he would
According to the evidence for the defense (as
not hand over the money. Antonio answered that
distinguished from appellants' statements,
Exhibits 1 and 8), when the Toling twins were at he would give only one-half of his money
the Tutuban Railroad Station in the afternoon of provided the man would not hurt him, adding that
his (Antonio's) place was still very far.
January 8, 1965, Antonio went to the ticket
counter to buy tickets for himself and Jose. To
When Antonio felt some pain in his throat, he
pay for the tickets, he took out his money from
suddenly drew out his hunting knife or small bolo
the right pocket of his pants and later put back
(eight inches long including the handle) from the
the remainder in the same pocket. The two
back pocket of his pants and stabbed the man
brothers noticed that four men at some distance with it, causing him to fall to the floor with
from them were allegedly observing them,
his balisong. He also stabbed the man who was
whispering among themselves and making signs. picking his pocket. Antonio identified the two men
The twins suspected that the four men harbored whom he had stabbed as those shown in the
evil intentions towards them.
photographs of Antonio B. Mabisa (Exh. L-1 and

On January 20, 1965 a Constabulary sergeant

filed against the Toling brothers in the municipal
court of Cabuyao, Laguna a criminal complaint
for multiple murder and multiple frustrated
murder. Through counsel, the accused waived
the second stage of the preliminary investigation.
The case was elevated to the Court of First
Instance of Laguna where the Provincial Fiscal
on March 10, 1965 filed against the Toling
brothers an information for multiple murder (nine
victims), multiple frustrated murder (six victims)
and triple homicide (as to three persons who died When the twins boarded the train, the four men
after jumping from the running train to avoid
followed them. They were facing the twins. They
being stabbed).
were talking in a low voice. The twins sat on a
two passenger seat facing the front door of the
At the arraignment, the accused, assisted by
coach, the window being on the right of Antonio
their counsel de oficio pleaded not guilty. After
and Jose being to his left. Two of the four men,

L-2 or 5-A and

5-B) and Isabelo S. Dando (Exh. N-1 and N-2 or
7-A and 7-B). While Antonio was stabbing the
second man, another person from behind
allegedly stabbed him on the forehead, causing
him to lose consciousness and to fall on the floor
48

(Antonio has two scars on his forehead and a

scar on his chest and left forearm, 85, 87 tsn).
He regained consciousness when two
Constabulary soldiers raised him. His money was
gone.

Wound, stabbed, 3/4 inch, 1 inch medial to

anterior axillary line level of 3rd ICS right,
penetrating thoracic cavity (chest wound (Exh.
11).

It also appears that the accused, who are twins,

are queerly alike, a fact which could easily invite
some people to stare or gaze at them and
wonder at their very close resemblance. Like
some persons who easily get angry when stared
and on Jose Toling a stab wound, one inch long at, however, the accused, when stared at by the
Seeing his brother in a serious condition, Jose
on the paravertebral level of the fifth rib on the
persons in front of them, immediately suspected
stabbed with the scissors the man who had
left, penetrating the thoracic cavity (Exh. 10). The them as having evil intention towards them
wounded his brother. Jose hit the man in the
wound was on the spinal column in line with the (accused).
abdomen. Jose was stabbed in the back by
armpit or "about one inch from the midline to the
somebody. Jose stabbed also that assailant in
left" (113 tsn). The twins were discharged from
To the mind of the Court, therefore, it is
the middle part of the abdomen, inflicting a deep the hospital on January 17th.
despondency on the part of the accused coupled
wound.
with their unfounded suspicion of evil intention on
The trial court, in its endeavor to ascertain the
the part of those who happened to stare at them
However, Jose did not see what happened to the motive for the twins' rampageous behavior, which that broke the limit of their self-control and
two men whom he had stabbed because he was resulted in the macabre deaths of several
actuated them to run amuck.
already weak. He fell down and became
innocent persons, made the following
unconscious. He identified Exhibit A as the knife observations:
We surmise that to the captive spectators in
used by Antonio and Exhibit B as the scissors
coach No. 9 the spectacle of middle-aged rustic
What
could
be
the
reason
or
motive
that
actuated
which he himself had used. He recovered
twins, whom, in the limited space of the coach,
the accused to run amuck? It appears that the
consciousness when a Constabulary soldier
their co-passengers had no choice but to notice
accused
travelled
long
over
land
and
sea
brought him out of the train.
and gaze at, was a novelty. Through some
spending their hard earned money and suffering telepathic or extra-sensory perception the twins
The brothers presented Doctor Leonardo del
privations, even to the extent of foregoing their
must have sensed that their co-passengers were
Rosario, a physician of the North General
breakfast, only to receive as recompense with
talking about them in whispers and making
Hospital who treated them during the early hours respect to Antonio the meager sum of P50 from depreciatory remarks or jokes about their humble
of January 9, 1965 and who testified that he
his daughter and P30 from his grandson and with persons. In their parochial minds, they might
found the following injuries on Antonio Toling:
respect to Jose to receive nothing at all from any have entertained the notion or suspicion that
of his three children whom he could not locate in their male companions, taking advantage of their
Wound, incised, 1-1/4 inches (sutured), frontal,
Manila.
ignorance and naivete, might victimize them by
right; 3-1/2 inches each, mid-frontal (wound on
stealing their little money. Hence, they became
the forehead) and
49

hostile to their co-passengers. Their pent-up

hostility erupted into violence and murderous
fury.

In his statement and testimony, Antonio declared

that he was armed with a knife, while Jose
declared that he was armed with the scissors
which Antonio had purchased at the Tutuban
A painstaking examination of the evidence leads station, before he boarded the train and which he
to the conclusion that the trial court and the
gave to Jose because the latter is a barber
prosecution witnesses confounded one twin for
whose old pair of scissors was already rusty. As
the other. Such a confusion was unavoidable
thus clarified, the person whom Sergeant Rayel
because the twins, according to a Constabulary espied as having attempted to commit suicide on
investigator, are "very identical". Thus, on the
the platform of the train by stabbing himself on
witness stand CIS Sergeants Alfredo C. Orbase the chest would be Antonio (not Jose). That
and Liberato Tamundong after pointing to the
conclusion is confirmed by the medical
twins, refused to take the risk of identifying who certificate, Exhibit 11, wherein it is attested that
was Antonio and who was Jose. They confessed Antonio had a wound in the chest. And the
that they might be mistaken in making such a
person whom Sergeant Aldea subdued after the
specific identification (28 tsn September 3, 1965; former had stabbed several persons with a pair
32 tsn November 5, 1965).
of scissors (not with a knife) was Jose and not
Antonio. That fact is contained in his statement of
In our opinion, to ascertain who is Antonio and
January 9, 1965 (p. 9, Record).
who is Jose, the reliable guides would be their
sworn statements (Exh. 1 and 8), executed one The mistake of the prosecution witnesses in
day after the killing, their own testimonies and
taking Antonio for Jose and vice-versa does not
the medical certificates (Exh. 10 and 11). Those detract from their credibility. The controlling fact
parts of the evidence reveal that the one who
is that those witnesses confirmed the admission
was armed with the knife was Antonio and the
of the twins that they stabbed several
one who was armed with the scissors was Jose. passengers.
The prosecution witnesses and the trial court
assumed that Antonio was armed with the
Appellants' counsel based his arguments on the
scissors (Exh. B) and Jose was armed with the
summaries of the evidence found in the trial
knife (Exh. A). That assumption is erroneous.
court's decision. He argues that the testimonies
of Sergeants Rayel and Aldea are contradictory

but he does not particularize on the supposed

contradictions.
The testimonies of the two witnesses do not
cancel each other. The main point of Rayel's
testimony is that he saw one of the twins
stabbing himself in the chest and apparently
trying to commit suicide. Aldea's testimony is that
he knocked down the other twin, disabled him
and prevented him from committing other killings.
It may be admitted that Rayel's testimony that
Aldea took the knife of Jose Toling was not
corroborated by Aldea. Neither did Aldea testify
that Antonio was near Jose on the platform of the
train. Those discrepancies do not render Rayel
and Aldea unworthy of belief. They signify that
Aldea and Rayel did not give rehearsed
testimonies or did not compare notes.
Where, as in this case, the events transpired in
rapid succession in the coach of the train and it
was nighttime, it is not surprising that Rayel and
Aldea would not give identical testimonies (See 6
Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970
Ed. 139-140; People vs. Resayaga, L-23234,
December 26, 1963, 54 SCRA 350). There is no
doubt that Aldea and Rayel witnessed some of
the acts of the twins but they did not observe the
same events and their powers of perception and
recollection are not the same.

50

Appellants' counsel assails the testimony of Mrs.

Mapa. He contends that no one corroborated her
testimony that one of the twins stabbed a man
and a sleeping woman sitting on the seat
opposite the seat occupied by the twins. The
truth is that Mrs. Mapa's testimony was
confirmed by the necropsy reports and by the
twins themselves who admitted that they stabbed
some persons.
On the other hand, the defense failed to prove
that persons, other than the twins, could have
inflicted the stab wounds. There is no doubt as to
the corpus delicti. And there can be no doubt that
the twins, from their own admissions (Exh. 1 and
8) and their testimonies, not to mention the
testimonies of Rayel, Aldea, Mrs. Mapa and the
CIS investigators, were the authors of the killings.

On the other hand, the twins' theory of selfdefense is highly incredible. In that crowded
coach No. 9, which was lighted, it was
improbable that two or more persons could have
held up the twins without being readily perceived
by the other passengers. The twins would have
made an outcry had there really been an attempt
to rob them. The injuries, which they sustained,
could be attributed to the blows which the other
passengers inflicted on them to stop their
murderous rampage.

Appellants' view is that they should be held liable

only for two homicides, because they admittedly
killed Antonio B. Mabisa and Isabelo S. Dando,
and for physical injuries because they did not
deny that Jose Toling stabbed Mrs. Mapa. We
have to reject that view. Confronted as we are
with the grave task of passing judgment on the
Apparently, because there was no doubt on the
aberrant behavior of two yokels from the Samar
twins' culpability, since they were caught
hinterland who reached manhood without coming
in flagrante delicto the CIS investigators did not
into contact with the mainstream of civilization in
bother to get the statements of the other
urban areas, we exercised utmost care and
passengers in Coach No. 9. It is probable that no solicitude in reviewing the evidence. We are
one actually saw the acts of the twins from
convinced that the record conclusively
beginning to end because everyone in Coach
establishes appellants' responsibility for the eight
No. 9 was trying to leave it in order to save his
killings.
life. The ensuing commotion and confusion
prevented the passengers from having a full
To the seven dead persons whose heirs should
personal knowledge of how the twins
be indemnified, according to the trial court,
consummated all the killings.
because they died due to stab wounds, should

be added the name of Susana C. Hernandez

(Exh. P, P-1 and P-2). The omission of her name
in judgment was probably due to inadvertence.
According to the necropsy reports, four persons,
namely, Shirley A. Valenciano, Salvador A.
Maqueda, Miguel C. Oriarte and Timoteo U.
Dimaano, died due to multiple traumatic injuries
consisting of abrasions, contusions, lacerations
and fractures on the head, body and extremities
(Exh. J to J-2, K to K-2, M to M-2 and S to S-2).
The conjecture is that they jumped from the
moving tracing to avoid being killed but in so
doing they met their untimely and horrible
deaths. The trial court did not adjudge them as
victims whose heirs should be indemnified. As to
three of them, the information charges that the
accused committed homicide. The trial court
dismissed that charge for lack of evidence.
No one testified that those four victims jumped
from the train. Had the necropsy reports been
reinforced by testimony showing that the
proximate cause of their deaths was the violent
and murderous conduct of the twins, then the
latter would be criminally responsible for their
deaths.
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
"criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he
51

intended". The presumption is that "a person

intends the ordinary consequences of his
voluntary act" (Sec. 5[c], Rule 131, Rules of
Court).

multiple frustrated murder based on the injuries

suffered by Cipriano Pantoja, Dinna Nosal,
Corazon Bernal and Brigida Sarmiento (Exh. D,
D-3 to D-5) was dismissed by the trial court for
lack of evidence. Unlike Mrs. Mapa, the offended
The rule is that "if a man creates in another
parties involved did not testify on the injuries
man's mind an immediate sense of danger which inflicted on them.
causes such person to try to escape, and in so
doing he injures himself, the person who creates The eight killings and the attempted killing should
such a state of mind is responsible for the
be treated as separate crimes of murder and
injuries which result" (Reg. vs. Halliday 61 L. T.
attempted murder qualified be treachery
Rep. [N.S.] 701, cited in U.S. vs. Valdez, 41 Phil. (alevosia) (Art. 14[16], Revised Penal Code). The
4911, 500).
unexpected, surprise assaults perpetrated by the
twins upon their co-passengers, who did not
Following that rule, is was held that "if a person
anticipate that the twins would act
against whom a criminal assault is directed
like juramentados and who were unable to
reasonably believes himself to be in danger of
defend themselves (even if some of them might
death or great bodily harm and in order to
have had weapons on their persons) was a mode
escape jumps into the water, impelled by the
of execution that insured the consummation of
instinct of self-preservation, the assailant is
the twins' diabolical objective to butcher their coresponsible for homicide in case death results by passengers. The conduct of the twins evinced
drowning" (Syllabus, U.S. vs. Valdez, supra, See conspiracy and community of design.
People vs. Buhay, 79 Phil. 371).
The eight killings and the attempted murder were
The absence of eyewitness-testimony as to the
perpetrated by means of different acts. Hence,
jumping from the train of the four victims already they cannot be regarded as constituting a
named precludes the imputation of criminal
complex crime under article 48 of the Revised
responsibility to the appellants for the ghastly
Penal Code which refers to cases where "a
deaths of the said victims.
single act constitutes two or more grave felonies,
or when an offense is a necessary means for
The same observation applies to the injuries
committing the other".
suffered by the other victims. The charge of

As noted by Cuello Calon, the so-called

"concurso formal o ideal de delitos reviste dos
formas: (a) cuando un solo hecho constituye dos
o mas delitos (el llamado delito compuesto); (b)
cuando uno de ellos sea medio necesario para
cometer otro (el llamado delito complejo)." (1
Derecho Penal, 12th Ed. 650).
On the other hand, "en al concurso real de
delitos", the rule, when there is "acumulacion
material de las penas", is that "si son varios los
resultados, si son varias las acciones, esta
conforme con la logica y con la justicia que el
agente soporte la carga de cada uno de los
delitos" (Ibid, p. 652, People vs. Mori, L-23511,
January 31, 1974, 55 SCRA 382, 403).
The twins are liable for eight (8) murders and one
attempted murder. (See People vs. Salazar, 105
Phil. 1058 where the accused Moro, who ran
amuck, killed sixteen persons and wounded
others, was convicted of sixteen separate
murders, one frustrated murder and two
attempted murders; People vs. Mortero, 108 Phil.
31, the Panampunan massacre case, where six
defendants were convicted of fourteen separate
murders; People vs. Remollino, 109 Phil. 607,
where a person who fired successively at six
victims was convicted of six separate homicides;
U. S. Beecham, 15 Phil. 272, involving four
murders; People vs. Macaso, 85 Phil. 819, 828,
52

involving eleven murders; U.S. vs. Jamad, 37

Phil. 305; U.S. vs. Balaba, 37 Phil. 260,
271. Contra: People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 82,
102-103; People vs. Floresca, 99 Phil. 1044;
People vs. Sakam, 61 Phil. 27; People vs.
Lawas, 97 Phil. 975; People vs. Manantan, 94
Phil. 831; People vs. Umali, 96 Phil. 185; People
vs. Cu Unjiengi, 61 Phil. 236; People vs. Penas,
66 Phil. 682; People vs. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437,
where the crimes committed by means of
separate acts were held to be complex on the
theory that they were the product of a single
criminal impulse or intent).

(8) reclusion perpetuas for the eight murders and

to an indeterminate penalty of one (1) year
of prision correccional as minimum to six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum for the attempted murder and to pay
solidarily an indemnity of P12,000 to each set of
heirs of the seven victims named in the
dispositive part of the trial court's decision and of
the eight victim, Susana C. Hernandez, or a total
indemnity of P96,000, and an indemnity of P500
to Amanda Mapa. In the service of the penalties,
the forty-year limit fixed in the penultimate
paragraph of article 70 of the Revised Penal
Code should be observed. Costs against the
appellants.

As no generic mitigating and aggravating

circumstances were proven in this case, the
penalty for murder should be imposed in its
SO ORDERED.
medium period or reclusion perpetua (Arts. 64[l]
and 248, Revised Penal Code. The death penalty Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
Barredo, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez and
imposed by the trial court was not warranted.
Muoz Palma, JJ., concur.
A separate penalty for attempted murder should
Makasiar, J., took no part.
be imposed on the appellants. No modifying
circumstances can be appreciated in the
46. March 22, 1921
attempted murder case.
G.R. No. 16486
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appelle,
modified by setting aside the death sentence.
vs.
Defendants-appellants Antonio Toling and Jose
CALIXTO VALDEZ Y QUIRI, defendantToling are found guilty, as co-principals, of eight appellant.
(8) separate murders and one attempted murder.
Each one of them is sentenced to eight

Angel Roco for appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Feria for appellee.
STREET, J.:
The rather singular circumstances attending the
commission of the offense of homicide which is
under discussion in the present appeal are these:
At about noon, on November 29, 1919, while the
interisland steamer Vigan was anchored in the
Pasig River a short distance from the lighthouse
and not far from where the river debouches into
the Manila Bay, a small boat was sent out to
raise the anchor. The crew of this boat consisted
of the accused, Calixto Valdez y Quiri, and six
others among whom was the deceased,
Venancio Gargantel. The accused was in charge
of the men and stood at the stern of the boat,
acting as helmsman, while Venancio Gargantel
was at the bow.
The work raising the anchor seems to have
proceeded too slowly to satisfy the accused, and
he accordingly began to abuse the men with
offensive epithets. Upon this Venancio Gargantel
remonstrated, saying that it would be better, and
they would work better, if he would not insult
them. The accused took this remonstrance as a
display of insubordination; and rising in rage he
moved towards Venancio, with a big knife in
hand, threatening to stab him. At the instant
53

when the accused had attained to within a few

feet of Venancio, the latter, evidently believing
himself in great and immediate peril, threw
himself into the water and disappeared beneath
its surface to be seen no more.
The boat in which this incident took place was at
the time possibly 30 or 40 yards from shore and
was distant, say, 10 paces from the Vigan. Two
scows were moored to the shore, but between
these and the boat intervened a space which
may be estimated at 18 or 20 yards. At it was full
midday, and there was nothing to obstruct the
view of persons upon the scene, the failure of
Venancio Gargantel to rise to the surface
conclusively shows that, owing to his possible
inability to swim or the strength of the current, he
was borne down into the water and was
drowned.
Two witnesses who were on the boat state that,
immediately after Venancio leaped into the water,
the accused told the remaining members of the
crew to keep quiet or he would kill them. For this
reason they made no movement looking to
rescue; but inasmuch as there witnesses are
sure that Venancio did not again come to the
surface, efforts at rescue would have been
fruitless. The fact that the accused at his juncture
threatened the crew with violence is, therefore, of

no moment except tho show the temporary

excitement under which he was laboring.
On the next day one of the friends of Venancio
Gargantel posted himself near the lighthouse to
watch for the body, in the hope that it might come
to the surface and could thus be recovered.
Though his friendly vigil lasted three days nothing
came of it.

spot hidden from the view of his companions, we

consider too remote to be entertained for a
moment.

As to the criminal responsibility of the accused

for the death thus occasioned the likewise can be
no doubt; for it is obvious that the deceased, in
throwing himself in the river, acted solely in
obedience to the instinct of self-preservation and
was in no sense legally responsible for his own
It may be added that Venancio has not returned death. As to him it was but the exercise of a
to his lodging in Manila, where he lived as a
choice between two evils, and any reasonable
bachelor in the house of an acquaintance; and
person under the same circumstances might
his personal belongings have been delivered to a have done the same. As was once said by a
representative of his mother who lives in the
British court, "If a man creates in another man's
Province of Iloilo. His friends and relatives, it is
mind an immediate sense of dander which
needless to say, take it for granted that he is
causes such person to try to escape, and in so
dead.
doing he injuries himself, the person who creates
such a state of mind is responsible for the
The circumstances narrated above are such in
injuries which result." (Reg. vs. Halliday, 61 L. T.
our opinion as to exclude all reasonable
Rep. [N.S.], 701.
possibility that Venancio Gargantel may have
survived; and we think that the trial judge did not In this connection a pertinent decision from the
err in holding that he is dead and that he came to Supreme Court of Spain, of July 13, 1882, is
his death by drowning under the circumstances
cited in the brief of The Attorney-General, as
stated. The proof is direct that he never rose to
follows: It appeared that upon a certain occasion
the surface after jumping into the river, so far as an individual, after having inflicted sundry injuries
the observers could see; and this circumstance, upon another with a cutting weapon, pointed a
coupled with the known fact that human life must shotgun at the injured person and to escape the
inevitably be extinguished by asphyxiation under discharge the latter had to jump into a river
water, is conclusive of his death. The possibility where he perished by drowning. The medical
that he might have swum ashore, after rising in a
54

authorities charged with conducting the autopsy

found that only one of the wounds caused by a
cut could have resulted in the death of the injured
person, supposing that he had received no
succour, and that by throwing himself in the river
he in fact died of asphyxia from submersion.
Having been convicted as the author of the
homicide, the accused alleged upon appeal that
he was only guilty of the offense of inflicting
serious physical injuries, or at most of frustrated
homicide. The Supreme Court, disallowing the
appeal, enunciated the following doctrine: "That
even though the death of the injured person
should not be considered as the exclusive and
necessary effect of the very grave wound which
almost completely severed his axillary artery,
occasioning a hemorrhage impossible to stanch
under the circumstances in which that person
was placed, nevertheless as the persistence of
the aggression of the accused compelled his
adversary, in order to escape the attack, to leap
into the river, an act which the accused forcibly
compelled the injured person to do after having
inflicted, among others, a mortal wound upon him
and as the aggressor by said attack manifested a
determined resolution to cause the death of the
deceased, by depriving him of all possible help
and putting him in the very serious situation
narrated in the decision appealed from, the trial
court, in qualifying the act prosecuted as
consummated homicide, did not commit any

error of law, as the death of the injured person

was due to the act of the accused." (II Hidalgo,
Codigo Penal, p. 183.)

The only fact that the evidence shows in that

Venancio Gargantel, one of those who were in a
boat of the steamer Vigan subject to the orders of
the accused Calixto Valdez and who at the time
The accused must, therefore, be considered the was engaged in the work of raising the anchor of
responsible author of the death of Venancio
that vessel, which was then lying at the Pasig
Gargantel, and he was properly convicted of the River, a short distance from the lighthouse and
offense of homicide. The trial judge appreciated not far from its mouth at the Manila Bay, upon
as an attenuating circumstance the fact that the seeing that the accused was approaching him,
offender had no intention to commit so great a
armed with a big knife, and in the attitude of
wrong as that committed. (Par. 3, art. 9 Penal
attacking him, threw himself into the water and
Code.) In accordance with this finding the judge disappeared from the surface and had not been
sentenced the accused to undergo imprisonment seen again. This event took place at noon on
for twelve years and one day, reclusion temporal, November 29, 1919, the boat being then about
to suffer the corresponding accessories, to
30 or 40 yards from land and about 10 steps
indemnify the family of the deceased in the sum from the Vigan, there being two lighters moored
of P500, and to pay the costs. Said sentenced is to the shore and at a distance of about 18 or 20
in accordance with law; and it being understood yards from the boat. All of these facts are stated
that the accessories appropriate to the case are in the decision itself.
those specified in article 59 of the Penal Code,
the same is affirmed, with costs against the
The original information in the present case,
appellant. So ordered.
charging Calixto Valdez y Quiri with the crime of
homicide and alleging that as a result of his
Mapa, C.J., Malcolm, Avancea and Villamor,
having thrown himself into the river under the
JJ., concur.
circumstances mentioned, Venancio Gargantel
was drowned, was presented on December 8,
Separate Opinions
1919, that is, nine days afterwards.
ARAULLO, J., dissenting:
There is no evidence whatever that the corpse of
Venancio Gargantel had been found or, what is
I dissent from the majority opinion in this case.
the same thing, that he had died. From
55

November 28, the day when the event occurred,

until December 8, when the information was filed,
it cannot in any manner be maintained that the
necessary time had passed for us to properly
conclude, as is alleged in the information, that
said Gargantel had died by drowning, as a
consequence of his having thrown himself into
the water upon seeing himself threatened and
attacked by the accused. Neither does it appear
in the evidence that all the precaution necessary
for us to assure ourselves, as a sure and proven
fact, that Venancio Gargantel then died by
drowning, were taken; nor is there any evidence
that it would have been impossible for him, by
swimming or by any other means to rise to the
surface at a place other than the Pasig River or
that where the boat was, from which he threw
himself into the river, and in that manner save
himself from death.

some effects, a fact which caused his mother,

who lived in the municipality of Guimbal, in the
Province of Iloilo, upon being informed of it and
upon the failure of Venancio to appear in said
place, to give special power on the 28th of that
month of December, that is, one month
afterwards, to a student, Ignacio Garzon, to get
the trunks and effects of Venancio from said
house. Sid Garzon himself testified, upon being
asked whether Venancio Gargantel had returned
to the house of his parents since November 29,
1919, that he had no information about it, and
another witness, Pedro Garcia, of the
prosecution, stated that he had probably died,
because he had not seen Venancio Gargantel.
Therefore, in short, the only fact proved is that
since Venancio Gargantel threw himself into the
river, upon being threatened with a knife by the
accused, his whereabouts has remained
unknown even at the moment of rendering
judgment in this case, or, February 9, 1920, that
is, two and one-half months after the occurrence
of the event.

executed in favor of Ignacio Garzon that the

latter should take steps in order that the city
fiscal might investigate the death of her son
which, according to information, was caused by
another members, of the crew of the steamer
Vigan; and none of his friends, that is, none of
the two members of the party in the boat at that
time and of the crew of the steamer Vigan, nor
Maximo Gumbog, the owner of the house in
which Gargantel lived in this city, nor Pedro
Garcia, another member of the crew of that
steamer, and finally, nor Ignacio Garzon himself
has stated that he gave up Gargantel for dead,
for the simple reason that this was not possible,
for they only knew that he did not again rise to
the surface and was not seen again after having
thrown himself into the river from the boat.

For this reason it is stated in the decision that the

circumstances therein stated are such that they
From the evidence of the witnesses for the
exclude all reasonable possibility that Venancio
prosecution which is the only evidence in the
Gargantel could have survived and that the
record, for the accused di not take the stand, it
circumstance that never rose to the surface after
only appears that Venancio Gargantel, after
having jumped into the river, as witnessed by the
having jumped from the boat, did not rise again
persons present, together with the admitted fact
It
is
stated
in
the
decision
that
the
friend
and
to the surface. Such was the statement of two of
that human life is necessarily asphyxiated under
those witnesses who were members of the boat's parents of Gargantel give him up for dead. There the water, is conclusive that he died. Then, there
is nevertheless in the record no statement of any is nothing more than a deduction that Gargantel
crew at the time. Another witness also declared
that Gargantel was afterwards not again seen at parent of Gargantel to that effect; for his mother had died based upon those facts and
the house where he lived in this city, No. 711 San Maria Gatpolitan, a resident of the municipality of circumstances.
Guimbal, merely stated in the power of attorney
Nicolas Street, where he kept his trunks and
56

In my opinion this is not sufficient to convict the

accused as guilty of homicide, because there is
the possibility that Gargantel had risen to the
surface at some place away from the where he
threw himself into the river and had embarked on
some other vessel in the same river or out of it in
the bay and had gone abroad, or to some
province of these Islands and is found in some
municipality thereof, cannot be denied. And this
is very probable inasmuch as it does not appear
in the record that the necessary investigation has
been made in order to determined even with only
some measure of certainty, not to say beyond all
reasonable doubt, that it was and is impossible to
find said person or determined his whereabouts.
Furthermore, there is not even a presumption
juris tantum that he had died, for in order that this
presumption may exist, according to section 334
of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is necessary
that no information about him should have been
received for seven years from his disappearance
upon his throwing himself into the river, which
occurred on November 29, 1919, that is, only
about one year and four months ago. And if, in
order that a finding of a civil character in favor of
or against some person, may be made, by virtue
of that presumption, it is necessary that seven
years should have elapsed without any notice
being received of the person whose whereabouts
is unknown, it is not just, reasonable, or legal that

the period of one year and four months from his

disappearance or since Venancio Gargantel
threw himself into the water should suffice for us
to impose upon the accused Calixto Valdez such
a grave penalty as that of twelve years and one
day of reclusion temporal, merely assuming
without declaring it, as a proven fact, that
Gargantel has died and at the same time finding
said accused to be the author of that death.

deceased be considered as not having resulted

exclusively and necessarily from that most grave
wound, the persistence of the aggression of the
accused compelled his adversary to escape it
and threw himself into the river, by depriving him
of all possible help and placing him in the serious
situation related in the judgment appealed from
-a case which, as is seen, is very different from
that which took place in the present case.

Lastly, the decision of the English Supreme Court

or that of the Spanish Supreme Court dated July
13, 1882, cited by the majority opinion is not
applicable. The first, is not applicable because in
the present case it is not proved, beyond
reasonable doubt, that some damage resulted to
Gargantel, just as it cannot be considered as
proved that he had died, or that he had been
injured or that he had suffered some injury after
having thrown himself into the river as a result of
the threat of the accused. The second is not
applicable because the decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain refers to a case, in which the
injured party had already been wounded with a
cutting instrument by the accused before
throwing himself into the river upon the latter
aiming at him with his gun, it having afterwards
been proved upon his being taken out of the river
that the wound inflicted upon him by the accused
was mortal; and, consequently, it was declared
by said court that, even if the death of the

For the reasons above stated, I am of the

opinion, with due respect to the opinion of the
majority, that the accused Calixto Valdez y Quiri
cannot be found guilty of homicide and should be
acquitted.
47. GR No. L-1003 October 27, 1947
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee,
vs. Buhay FRANCISCO AND
OTHERS defendants. FEDERICO
BASCO, appellant.
D. Arnaldo J. Guzman for appellant.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Ruperto
Kapunan, Jr. and Attorney Mr.
Adolfo F. Arguelles representing the government.

PAUL, J .:
57

On the morning of October 28, 1945 at Plaza

Burgos Township Bayambang, Province of
Pangasinan, Dee Ching Ting, a deaf-mute
Chinese, I stick with starting fuel to the soldier
Federico Basco, who fell to the ground from the
blow . His companion, the soldier Fermin Aguilar,
for companionship undoubtedly pursued the
Chinese who escaped Addressing the
market; But I Did not get catch. In the afternoon,
Fermin and other comrades, all soldiers of the
Philippine Army, the Chinese continued to search
with much effort and other Arsenias Alexander
learned of the search; They have not found him
yet. In the first of November 1945, Feast of All
Saints, Alejandro Arsenias who was on duty in
the village cemetery found Dee Ching Ting, and
told him to come out of the cemetery to avoid
being seen Federico Basco and Fermin Aguilar
who resented him and who were looking for
him. The warning given by Alejandro did not work
because by chance Basco and Chinese Aguilar
saw him and were immediately towards him, and
to catch up on the street that goes to the
municipal building, buffeted him. Seeing the
Chinese Aguilar draw his hunting knife, I run
towards the dam, and Aguilar Basco and pursued
him hitting him in the highest part. Aguilar
immediately gave him another punch, after
pushing so I fell into the river. When Chinese
crawled over the rocks of the shore, and Basco
Aguilar declined precipitously down the stairs and

pushed him back into the water throwing; I

TRENGTHENING doing to save, again he
returned to cling to the rocks and the two
accused pushed him; thrown into the river for the
third time, made efforts to gain the edge, but it
did not succeed because, won in vain struggle
against the currents flowing waters found delas
Agno River, disappeared; Three days later his
body was found.Verified autopsy reveals that she
died drowned. By this unfortunate event Fermin
Aguilar, Federico Basco, Francisco Alejandro
Arsenias Buhay were sued by the Pangasinan
Provincial Prosecutor for the crime of murder. At
the request of the prosecution, the court
dismissed the complaint regarding Buhay
Francisco because his testimony was essential to
the prosecution. After the corresponding view,
the Court of First Instance of the District absolved
Alejandro Federico Arsenias and condemn
Bascoa penalty life imprisonment with the
accessory, to compensate the heirs of Dee Ching
Ting in cantidadde P2,000 and pay one third the
costs. Fermin Aguilar was convicted but as in
fencha of the crime only had 17 years, 9 months
and 18 days of age the process is suspended as
far as he and the court ordered referral to
Reformatory Children until you reach your of
age. Federico Basco appeal.

Chinese, that if they had had such a purpose

would not be difficult for them to find in such a
small town like Bayambang. It is true that there is
no express proof that Aguilar and Basco have
agreed to take revenge on the Chinese, but the
evidence of record shows that the two were
looking into Chinese in the cemetery and
pursued him to catch him at the crossroads of
the streets the town square where of got
punched. When the Chinese, seeing Aguilar
make out his hunting knife, he fled toward the
dam the two defendants pursued him and
although they punched and shoved into Chinese
in the highest part of the dam was Aguilar, the
two, however, immediately went down the stairs
and pushed the Chinese when perched on the
rocks of the shore. And when he tried to climb a
second time, the two accused pushed him. The
common and concerted effort to seek Aguilar and
Basco, punching, chase and push the Chinese to
the river are combined acts that resulted in the
death by drowning of Chinese. Such acts were
inspired by one motive: the spirit body, as both
belong to the same company of the Philippine
Army.

The defense insists that Basco should only be

convicted of the lesser offense of abuse, beating
and abuse because only the Chinese; This "did
The defense argues that Basco and Aguilar have not need to suspend their ordinary occupations
had no previous conspiracy to avenge the
or had need of medical assistance for any
58

time." This contention is untenable. The

defendants are not liable only for punches that
have given him, nor because he pushed the river
but the necessary consequence of such acts, it
was the death of Chinese. In this jurisdicion it
has stated that the defendant, burning in anger,
threatening to attack with a large Venancio and
this knife, believing obviously in immediate
danger, is thrown into the water and perish, is
guilty of murder and not a
threat. (EU against Valdez, 41 Phil. Rep.,
528.) lawphil.net
In the same decision cited an English case law
siquiente states: "If an individual created in the
mind of another a feeling of immediate danger
that determines elque that person try to escape,
and in doing so, injures himself, who infuses
such mood is responsible for the resulting
damage. " (Reg. v . Halliday, 61 LT Rep., NS,
701.)
The Supreme Court of Spain in its judgment of
July 13, 1882, stated "that while not deemed
caused the death of the victim by exclusive and
necessary effect of the serious injury that cut
almost completely his axillary artery, causing
hemorrhaging impossible detention in the
circumstances in which that was as persistent
aggression otherwise processed ASU forced to
flee her to lie on the river to end violently

compelled him after causing such processing,

besides others, depriving him of all possible and
putting in relief the plight told in the judgment,
"the sentencing Chamber did not err in
sentencing the accused for the crime of homicide
accomplished. (11 Hidalgo, Penal Code, 183.) In
the so casosarlo for fear of hunting knife made
shine Aguilar, according to the defense contends,
but because he was mistreated and then pushed
first by Aguilar and later by the two
defendants. Basco therefore should not respond
only punches or the nudge to give the Chinese
but by the death of this was the necessary
consequence of such acts and forced.
Among the cases cited and the present there is a
noticeable difference in those the deceased
jumped into the water by miedode imminent
danger; Last, the two defendants empujarona unmute deaf I could not even call for help, abusing
his physical superiority: they made the delitosin
ball over him quepudiera oppose any resistance
the victim.Therefore, the defendants
hancometido the crime of murder in violation of
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, without
modifying circumstance of responsibility.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

48. September 28, 1935

G.R. No. 42607
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN QUIANZON, defendant-appellant.
Pedro B. Pobre for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for
appellee.
RECTO, J.:
Charged with and convicted of the crime of
homicide in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte, and sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of from six years and one day of prision
mayor, as minimum to fourteen years, seven
months and one day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, Juan Quianzon appeal to this court for
the review of the case.

On February 1, 1934, a novena for the suffrage

of the soul of the deceased person was being
Moran, Pres., Paras, Fair, Great, Yarn, Bengzon, held in the house of Victoria Cacpal in a barrio,
near the poblacion, of the municipality of Paoay,
Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., Concur.
Ilocos Norte, with the usual attendance of the
Judgment with costs is confirmed.

59

relatives and friends. The incident that led to the

filling of these charges took place between 3 to 4
o'clock in the afternoon. Andres Aribuabo, one of
the persons present, went to ask for food of Juan
Quianzon, then in the kitchen, who, to all
appearances, had the victuals in his care. It was
the second or third time that Aribuabo
approached Quianzon with the same purpose
whereupon the latter, greatly peeved, took hold
of a firebrand and applied ran to the place where
the people were gathered exclaiming that he is
wounded and was dying. Raising his shirt, he
showed to those present a wound in his
abdomen below the navel. Aribuabo died as a
result of this wound on the tenth day after the
incident.

an error of the lower court to have taken it into

consideration in formulating the findings of its
judgment. Not so with respect to the testimony of
the other witnesses. Roman Bagabay, one of the
persons present at said gathering, testified that
he saw Juan Quianzon apply a firebrand to the
neck of Andres Aribuabo who shortly afterwards
went toward the place where the witness and the
other guests were gathered, telling that he was
wounded and was going to die and naming Juan
Quianzon as the person who wounded him. He
also testified that Juan Quianzon, upon being
asked immediately by him about the incident,
admitted to him attacked Aribuabo with a
bamboo spit. Gregorio Dumalao, a barrio
lieutenant, who, upon being informed of the
incident, forthwith conducted an investigation,
There is no conflict between the prosecution and questioned Aribuabo and the latter told him that it
the defense as regards the foregoing facts. The was the accused who had wounded him. He
question to be determined is who wounded
likewise questioned the accused and the latter, in
Aribuabo. The prosecution claims that it was
turn, stated that he had wounded the deceased
Juan Quianzon and, to prove it, called Simeon
with a bamboo spit. Upon being brought before
Cacpal, Roman Bagabay, Gregorio Dumlao and Juan Llaguno, chief of police of Paoay, for
Julian Llaguno to the witness stand.
questioning, Quianzon confessed to Llaguno that
The first witness, Simeon Cacpal, claims to have he had applied a firebrand to Aribuabo's neck
and had later wounded him with a bamboo spit.
witnessed the wounding of Andres Aribuabo in
Before the chief of police could put this
the abdomen by Juan Quianzon. However, we
find the testimony of this witness so improbable, confession of Quianzon in writing, the later
retracted, denying that he had wounded
incongruent and contradictory that we consider
Aribuabo, for which reason in the affidavit Exhibit
meritorious the claim of the defense that it was
B the fact of having applied a firebrand to

Aribuabo's neck appears admitted by Quianzon

but not of having wounded the deceased with a
bamboo spit.
The disinterestedness of these three witnesses
for the prosecution, Bagabay, Dumalo and
Llaguno, is not questioned by the defense.
Neither the accused, in his testimony, nor his
counsel, in the brief filed by him in this court, was
able to assign any unlawful, corrupt or wicked
motive that might have actuated them to testify
falsely in this case and knowingly bring about the
imprisonment of an innocent person. Bagabay is
not even a relative of the deceased. Dumlao, the
barrio lieutenant, is a nephew of the accused.
Llaguno, chief of police of Paoay, is an officer of
the law whose intervention of this case was
purely in compliance with his official duties. All
the appellant has been able to state in his brief to
question the credibility of these witnesses is that
they were contradicted by Simeon Cacpal, the
other witness for the prosecution, who testified
that he had not seen them speak neither to
Aribuabo nor to Quianzon in the afternoon of the
crime. But the position of the defense in invoking
Simeon Cacpal's testimony for the purpose of
discrediting the other witnesses for the
prosecution is untenable, after having vigorously
impeached said testimony, branding it as
improbable, incongruent and contradictory. If
Cacpal is a false witness and the court
60

believes this claim of the defense as true ,

none of his statements may be taken into
account or should exert any influence in the
consideration of the other evidence in the case.
After discharging testimony of Simeon Cacpal,
the evidence presented by the prosecution
relative to the appellant's criminal liability for the
death of Andres Aribuabo, briefly consists, first, in
the victim's statement immediately after receiving
the wound, naming the accused as the author of
the aggression, and the admission forthwith
made by the accused that he had applied a
firebrand to Aribuabo's neck and had wounded
him, besides, with a bamboo spit. Both
statements are competent evidence in the law,
admissible as a part of the res gestae (section
279 and 298, No. 7, of the Code of Civil
Procedure; U.S. vs. Macuti, 26 Phil.,
170; People vs. Portento and Portento, 48 Phil.,
971). Second, in the extrajudicial confession of
the accused to the barrio lieutenant, Dumlao, and
later to the chief of police Llaguno, in the same
afternoon of the crime, that he was the author of
Aribuabo's wound and that he had inflicted it by
means of a bamboo spit. Inasmuch as this
confession, although extrajudicial, is strongly
corroborated and appears to have been made by
the accused freely and voluntarily, it constitutes
evidence against him relative to his liability as
author of the crime charged (U.S. vs. so Fo, 23

Phil., 379; People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil., 64, 82;

U.S. vs. Jamino, 3 P.R.A., 52; Francisco's
Quizzer on Evidence).

drainage which Dr. Mendoza had placed to

control or isolate the infection. This contention is
without merit. According to the physician who
examined whether he could survive or not." It
The defense of the accused consisted simply in was a wound in the abdomen which occasionally
denying that he had wounded the deceased and results in traumatic peritonitis. The infection was
that he had confessed his guilt to the witnesses cause by the fecal matter from the large intestine
Bagabay, Dumlao and Llaguno. But such denial which has been perforated. The possibility,
cannot prevail against the adverse testimony of
admitted by said physician that the patient might
these three veracious and disinterested
have survived said wound had he not removed
witnesses, all the more because neither the
the drainage, does not mean that the act of the
accused nor any other witness for the defense
patient was the real cause of his death. Even
has stated or insinuated that another person, not without said act the fatal consequence could
the accused, might be the author of the wound
have followed, and the fact that the patient had
which resulted in Aribuabo's death, and because so acted in a paroxysm of pain does not alter the
it is admitted by the defense that it was the
juridical consequences of the punishable act of
accused, whom Aribuabo had been pestering
the accused.
with request for food, who attacked the latter,
burning his neck with a firebrand, afetr which
One who inflicts an injury on another is deemed
Aribuaboappeared wounded in the abdomen,
by the law to be guilty of homicide if the injury
without the accused and the witnesses for the
contributes mediately or immediately to the death
defense explaining how and by whom the
of such other. The fact that the other causes
aggression had been made.
contribute to the death does not relieve the actor
of responsibility. . . . (13 R. C.L., 748.)
It is contended by the defense that even granting
that it was the accused who inflicted the wound
Furthermore, it does not appear that the patient,
which resulted in Aribuabo's death, he should not in removing the drainage, had acted voluntarily
be convicted of homicide but only of serious
and with the knowledge that he was performing
physical injuries because said wound was not
an act prejudicial to his health, inasmuch as selfnecessarily fatal and the deceased would have
preservation is the strongest instinct in living
survived it had he not twice removed the
beings. It much be assumed, therefore, that he
61

unconsciously did so due to his pathological

condition and to his state of nervousness and
restlessness on account of the horrible physical
pain caused by the wound, aggravated by the
contract of the drainage tube with the inflammed
peritoneum. "When the peritonitis is due to
traumatism, or to a perforation of the stomach,
intestine or gall-bladder, etc., it is indicated by
violent shivering and pain first localized at a point
in the abdomen, extending later to the entire
abdominal wall; acute intolerable pain, which is
aggravated by the slightest movement, becoming
unbearable upon contact with the hand, a rag, or
the bedclothes. The pain is continuous but it
gives frequent paroxysms. The abdomen is
swollen, tense. Vomittings of the greenish matter,
which are very annoying and terribly painful, take
from the beginning and continue while the
disease lasts." (XVI Spanish-America
Encyclopaedic Dictionary, 176; see also XXI
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1911 ed., 171.) If to
this is added the fact that the victim in this case
was mentally deranged, according to the defense
itself, it becomes more evident that the accused
is wrong in imputing the natural consequences of
his criminal act to an act of his victim.

following: "Inasmuch as a man is responsible for

the consequences of his act and in this case
the physical condition and temperament of the
offended party nowise lessen the evil, the
seriousness whereof is to be judged, not by the
violence of the means employed, but by the
result actually produced; and as the wound which
the appellant inflicted upon the deceased was
the cause which determined his death, without
his being able to counteract its effects, it is
evident that the act in question should be
qualified as homicide, etc."

increase the criminal liability of his assailant, but

because of his nervous condition due to the
wound inflicted by said assailant, the crime is
homicide and not merely slight physical injuries,
simply because the doctor was of the opinion
that the wound might have healed in seven
days."
The grounds for this rule of jurisprudence are
correctly set forth in 13 R.C.L., 751, as follows:

While the courts may have vacilated from time to

time it may be taken to be settled rule of the
In the case of People vs. Almonte (56 Phil., 54), common law that on who inflicts an injury on
the abdominal wound was less serious than that another will be held responsible for his death,
although it may appear that the deceased might
received by Aribuabo in this case, as it was not
have recovered if he had taken proper care of
penetrating, merely involving the muscular
himself, or submitted to a surgical operation, or
tissue. In said case the death of the victim was
that unskilled or improper treatment aggravated
due to a secondary hemorrhage produced
the wound and contributed to the death, or that
twenty-four hours after the wound had been
death was immediately caused by a surgical
inflicted, because of the "bodily movements of
operation rendered necessary by the condition of
the patient, who was in a state of nervousness,
sitting up in bed, getting up and pacing about the the wound. The principle on which this rule is
room, as as a consequence of which he internal founded is one of universal application, and lies
at the foundation of the criminal jurisprudence. It
vessels, already congested because of the
wound, bled, and the hemorrhage thus produced is, that every person is to be held to contemplate
and to be responsible for the natural
caused his death." The court in deciding the
consequences of his own acts. If a person inflicts
The question herein raised by the appellant has question stated that "when a person dies in
already been finally settled by jurisprudence. The consequence of an internal hemorrhage brought a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner
Supreme Court of Spain, in a decision of April 3, on by moving about against the doctor's orders, as to put life in jeopardy, and death follows as a
consequence of this felonious and wicked act, it
1879, said in the case similar to the present, the not because of carelessness or a desire to
62

does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality

to prove that other causes co-operated in
producing the fatal result. Indeed, it may be said
that neglect of the wound or its unskillful and
improper treatment, which are of themselves
consequences of the criminal act, which might
naturally follow in any case, must in law be
deemed to have been among those which were
in contemplation of the guilty party, and for which
he is to be held responsible. But, however, this
may be, the rule surely seems to have its
foundation in a wise and practical policy. A
different doctrine would tend to give immunity to
crime and to take away from human life a
salutary and essential safeguard. Amid the
conflicting theories of the medical men, and the
uncertainties attendant upon the treatment of
bodily ailments and injuries, it would be easy in
many cases of homicide to raise a doubt as to
the immediate cause of death, and thereby to
open a wide door by which persons guilty of the
highest crime might escape conviction and
punishment.

been caused because, according to the

physician who testified in this case, it was
produced by a "sharp and penetrating"
instrument.

The appellant was tried in the Court of First

Instance of Batangas for homicide upon the
following information:

Avancea, C.J., Abad Santos, Hull, and Vickers,

JJ., concur.

considering that the accused had no intention to

commit so grave an evil as that committed,
sentenced him to twelve years and one
day, reclusion temporal, P1,000 indemnity to the
family of the deceased, and the costs.

That on or about June 24, 1929, in the

Inasmuch as the mitigating circumstances of lack municipality of Balayan, Province of Batangas,
of instruction and of intention to commit so grave Philippine Islands, the above-named defendant
a wrong as the committed should be taken into
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously dealt Juan
consideration in favor of the appellant, without
Magsino a blow with his closed fist in the right
any aggravating circumstances adverse to him,
hypochondriac region, bruising his liver and
we modify the appealed judgment by sentencing producing an internal hemorrhage resulting in the
him to an indeterminate penalty with a minimum death of said Juan Magsino.
of four years of prision correccional and a
Contrary to law.
maximum of a eight years of prision mayor,
affirming it in all other respect, with cost to said
The case was duly tried, and the trial court found
appellant.
the defendant guilty of the crime charged, but

49. March 14, 1930

G.R. No. 32076
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NATALIO ILUSTRE, defendant-appellant.

Assuming that we should disregard Simeon

Cacpal's testimony, there is no evidence of
record that the crime charged was committed by
means of the knife, Exhibit A, and we only have Trinidad, Suarez and Diokno for appellant.
the extrajudicial admission of the accused that he Attorney-General Jaranilla fro appelle.
had committed it by means of a bamboo spit with
VILLAMOR, J.:
which the wound of the deceased might have

Defendant appealed from this sentence, and his

counsel now alleges that:
1. The lower court erred in finding that the
appellant herein hit Juan Magsino in the right
hypochondriac region with his fist, and that said
blow bruised the victim's liver.
2. Even admitting hypothetically for the sake of
argument, that the defendant hit the deceased
63

causing a contusion or congestion of the liver,

the lower court still erred in finding that said
contusion or congestion was the direct cause of
Magsino's death, and in condemning the herein
appellant.
3. There being some doubt as to the real cause
of Juan Magsino's death, the lower court erred
likewise in convicting the defendant of homicide,
instead of sentencing him for misdemeanors
against persons.
4. Even supposing that the act prosecuting was
really committed by the defendant, as it was
done without criminal intent, the trial court also
erred in not acquitting him.
5. Finally, the lower court erred in not giving the
defendant the benefit of the reasonable doubt,
and therefore in not acquitting him.
It is not disputed that on the morning of June 24,
1929, on St. John's day, a procession was held in
the barrio of Canlurangbayan, Balayan. The trial
court describes the feast and the occurrence, as
follows:

to enliven the celebration, the people try to take a

piece of barbecued pig. To direct the procession
and present the people from consuming the
whole animal before reaching the end, a man is
placed in charged, who on the day of record,
June 24, 1929, happened to be the defendant
Natalio Ilustre.
A young man, Juan Magsino by name, delicate
and suffering from incipient tuberculosis, made
one of the gay multitude and tried to secure a
piece of the crackling. To punish his boldness,
the defendant ran after him, boxed him, and left
him sprawling on the ground. Upon being struck
Juan Magsino suddenly became very ill and his
companions had to take him home in a
carromata. This was in the morning, and about
three o'clock in the afternoon he expired.
The real question raised in this appeal is, What
was the cause of Juan Magsino's death?

The autopsy was performed by Doctor Jose

Ilagan, municipal physician for Balayan, assisted
by Doctors Antonio Agoncillo, municipal physician
for Taal, and Hermenegildo de Castillo, municipal
physician for Lemery, all of the Province of
It is characteristic of this feast to make the
rounds of the town in procession, with a roasted Batangas. Doctor Ilagan, testifying on the
pig on a piece of cane followed by music and the autopsy as evidenced by Exhibit A, bases his
diagnosis upon the following: The symptoms of
populace. The bearer goes about daring to the
tune of the music, and as is customary, designed the deceased before death; the interstitial
hemorrhage of the liver produced by the lesion

thereof; the ecchymotic spots on the skin of the

right epigastric region, an indication of internal
hemorrhage; the hemorrhagic condition of the
peritoneum, and the sanguineous liquid found in
the abdominal cavity; adding, that he also found
the lungs covered with military granules and the
heart was somewhat dilated, but that its valves
were normal. In the opinion of this physician,
Juan Magsino's death was caused by the
contusion of the liver and the internal
hemorrhage; that, although the autopsy showed
that the deceased had incipient tuberculosis, he
could not have died of it; that neither could he
have died of heart disease, because the slight
dilation noticed was due to the increased efforts
of this organ owing to the incipient tuberculosis of
the lungs. "Tubercular lesions," he declares, "are
cavities in the lungs that contain blood causing
congestion, and the heart being called upon to
make a greater exertion becomes dilated."
Doctor Agoncillo corroborates Ilagan's opinion;
but Doctor Castillo, with the self-same data
gathered at the autopsy, has not arrived at a
definite conclusion as to the real cause of Juan
Magsino's death.
Doctor Sixto Roxas, director of the provincial
hospital of Batangas, was called upon to express
his opinion as to the cause of Magsino's death, in
view of the information obtained at the autopsy,
64

to wit: According to Doctors Ilagan and Agoncillo,

the anterior right lobe of the liver was bruised,
while the left side was normal. They also found
sanguineous fluid in the abdominal cavity. They
examined the heart and lungs, and found upon
the latter military granules, indicating, according
to them, the presence of tuberculosis in its first
and second stages. The dilated heart they found
to weigh 400 grams. The heart valves were
normal. They went over the body and found no
ecchymosis or lesion, save one ecchymotic spot
in the lower part of the abdomen beneath the
navel. The peritoneum was hemorrhagic. To the
autopsy data, must added the theory that the
death of Juan Magsino occurred a few hours
after receiving a blow in the right hypochondrium.
The other theory sustained is that the deceased
had taken wine and then bathed in the river, and
that he had afterwards received a push and had
fallen on his back.

lungs, and a consequent dilation of the heart: do

you believe, doctor, that a blow could have killed
him in five hours? A. He might die, but it would
be an extremely rare case.
Q. Do you not think, doctor, that a sufferer from
tuberculosis in the first or second stage, no
longer has the amount of blood he had before?
A. Naturally not.
Q. And with a hemorrhage, an internal
hemorrhage caused by a blow on the right
hypochondrium, don't you think such hemorrhage
contributed considerably to bring about this
man's death? A. Naturally.

performed the autopsy on the body, with their

own eyes saw the result thereof, the latter, that
is, Doctor Roxas, simply considered the data
hypothetically. We are therefore convinced there
is no fundamental disagreement among the
medical witnesses as to the cause of the victim's
death; and that is was caused by the defendant's
blow on the deceased right hypochondrium,
which bruised the liver and produced an internal
hemorrhage.
The appellant denies having hit Magsino,
protesting that he had no motive for doing so; but
the evidence shows that he punched Magsino in
the abdomen a little to the right, felling him to the
ground.

Q. And if that man was killed by a shock, that

shock was caused by the blow, wasn't it, doctor? The fact that the deceased had a delicate
A. Of course.
constitution and suffered from incipient
The testimony just quoted inclines us to believe pulmonary tuberculosis does not affect the
that in the long run Doctor Roxas agrees with the defendant's criminal liability, for eve if it rendered
After giving some explanation of the data
diagnosis of Doctors Ilagan and Agoncillo, to the the blow more fatal, the efficient cause of the
death remains the same. (U. S. vs. Fenix, 11
presented to him by the court, Doctor Roxas was effect that Juan Magsino's death was due to a
Phil., 95) And the circumstance that the
thus interrogated:
contusion on the liver accompanied by an
defendant did not intend so grave an evil as the
internal hemorrhage.
Q. Well, at any rate, a blow on the right
death of the victim does not exempt him from
hypochondrium of this individual could have
It is thus seen that, passing over Doctor Castillo's criminal liability, since he deliberately committed
caused his death? A. Yes, sir; the shock of it. opinion, which of course, cannot serve as a basis an act prohibited by law, but simply mitigates his
for a definite conclusion, the three medical men, guilt in accordance with article 9, No. 3, of the
Q. Supposing five hours passed, as His Honor
Doctors Ilagan, Agoncillo, and Roxas agree, with Penal Code. (U. S. vs. Samea, 15 Phil., 227.)
remarked, considering that the person was
this exception, that while the first two who
delicate, with symptoms of tuberculosis in both

65

The instant case comes under the provision of

article 404 of the Penal Code providing the
penalty of reclusion temporal, which must be
imposed in its minimum degree in view of the
mitigating circumstance just mentioned, or twelve
years and one day, reclusion temporal.
Therefore, the judgement appealed from must
be, as it is, hereby affirmed, with costs against
the appellant.[[1]] So ordered.
Johnson, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez
and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

distance of twenty brazas from the place, he

again fell to the ground, this time dead.
Two witnesses testified to having seen the
defendant strike those two blows.
The following were offered by the defendant as
defenses:
(1) The testimony of his daughter and two other
witnesses;

This defense was not sustained by the trial

judge. But on the contrary, he accepted the
preponderance of evidence for the prosecution,
sustained by three witnesses, of whom two were
eyewitnesses to the crime, and the other, of the
confession alleged to have been made to him by
the defendant when arrested by this witness, to
the effect that the victim's death was an
unlooked-for misfortune.

Nor was the defense advanced by the defendant

(2) the fact that his right hand was disabled; and to the effect that his right hand was crippled and
he was unable to work with sustained by the trial
50. August 17, 1912
(3) the medical certificate issued by a physician court, and rightly, since, as the defendant
as a result of the autopsy.
testified, he worked with his left hand and
G.R. No. 7123
sometimes used a spoon with his right;
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
The defendant's daughter averred that it was she
moreover, it was not proved that it was
vs.
who struck Marciano Magno the blow with the
ROSALINDA RODRIGUEZ, defendant-appellant. fist, for the reason that the deceased had caught impossible for him to strike blows with either
hand.
hold of her hand with unchaste designs, and
G. E. Campbell, for appellant.
testified that her father arrived after Magno had
The defense founded on the medical
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
fallen to the ground, which testimony was
examination of the corpse consists in that the
supported
by
two
witnesses.
physician who made the autopsy declared that
ARELLANO, C.J.:
Rosalino Rodriguez is charged with having dealt
Marciano Magno two blows with the fist, one on
the left side toward the stomach and the other on
the back, which knocked him down who were
present at the time of the occurrence and by their
aid endeavored to return to his home, which he
did not reach, for the reason that, having gone a

he had observed hypertrophy of the heart, a

discharge in the spleen, an increase of this latter
organ to four times its ordinary size, and
abdominal peritonitis; and in that according to
this examination, the cause of death can not be
determined for the blows which he may received
could have coincided with the traumatism, and
"the traumatism which the body received
66

hastened the death of the said individual;" and,

finally, this witness being questioned by the
defense as to whether the cause of death was a
traumatism or a shock, replied, that he was
unable to determine which it was.
As was proper, neither was this defense
sustained by the trial judge. The defendant was,
therefore, found guilty of the crime of homicide
and sentenced to twelve years and one day
of reclusion temporal, to the accessory penalties
and an indemnity of P1,000 to the heirs of the
deceased and to the payment of the costs; from
which judgment be appealed.
This appeal, forwarded from the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, having heard, together
with the allegations and arguments therein made
by the parties, whereby it appears to have been
well proven that the defendant did strike
Marciano Magno in the abdomen and in the
black two blows with his hand, as a result of
which the latter fell to the ground, and scarely
had he gotten up and started to walk when he fell
down dead, we hold that the crime is properly
classified as homicide and that Rosalino
Rodriguez is responsible therefor.
A blow with the fist or kick, though causing no
external wound, may very well produce
inflammation of the spleen and peritonitis and
cause death; and although the assaulted party

was previously affected by some internal malady,

if, because of a blow given with the hand or the
foot, his death was hastened, beyond
peradventure he is responsible therefor who
produced the cause for such acceleration as the
result of a voluntary and unlawfully inflicted injury.
But in the complaint itself it is alleged that the
cause of the assault was the fact that the
defendant saw the deceased catch hold of his
daughter Roberta's hand, for the purpose of
making love to her, and the provincial fiscal
stated at the trial that this assertion was the
result of a careful investigation made by him,
which was indeed confirmed by the facts proven.

Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.

51. March 29, 1935
G.R. No. 42117
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GREGORIO REYES, defendant-appellant.
Jose G. Pardo for appellant.
Acting Solicitor-General Melencio for appellee.
HULL, J.:

Appellant was convicted in the Court of First

Instance of Camarines Sur of the crime of
It therefore appears that the defendant's act was homicide committed on the person of Fausta
preceded by an immediate provocation on the
Tavera on the evening of April 30, 1934.
part of the deceased, and, evidently, the
Previous to the crime, the deceased for a couple
defendant did not intend to cause so grave an
of weeks had been living with appellant, but her
injury as he produced.
parents had persuaded her to come home and
With the existence of these two well-defined
were demanding that appellant pay a dowry of
extenuating circumstances and without any
P30 before the date of the celebration of the
aggravating circumstance rule 5 of article 81 of
marriage could be fixed.
the Penal Code must be applied and the penalty
immediately inferior to that fixed by law imposed. That evening there had been a barrio procession,
Consequently, modifying the penalty imposed by and after the procession, they were gathered in
one of the houses, where an impromptu dance
the lower court to eight years and one day
took place. The deceased and appellant were
of prision mayor, the judgment appealed is
talking in the yard of the house where the dance
affirmed, with the costs of this instance against
was taking place, and she informed him that she
the appellant. So ordered.
67

could not return to him and that she was going

with her parents of Catanduanes. Appellant
dragged the deceased towards the street and
stabbed her in the chest with a fanknife.
Deceased ran to the house of
the barriolieutenant, a short distance away, falling
deed at the foot of the staircase, although the
wound was only a slight one, it not having
penetrated the thoracic cavity, having hit a bone.
Immediately Andres Tapil, Tomas and Rufino,
relatives of the deceased, attempted to seize the
appellant, but with the aid of his knife, he
escaped and ran from the scene of the affray.
Appellant as witness in his own behalf claimed
that he was attacked by the three relatives of the
deceased, and if deceased was wounded by him,
it was in the midst of that affray and purely
accidental on his part.
Not only is this testimony directly contrary to the
witnesses for the prosecution but is greatly
weakened by appellant's own statement given to
the chief of police the day after the crime. The
story as told by appellant was not believed by the
trial court, and on the whole does not ring with
sincerity and truth.
Appellant contends that he cannot be convicted
of homicide as the wound actually inflicted was a
superficial wound of no intrinsic magnitude. As

above stated, deceased ran screaming to the

nearby house where she dropped dead. The
sanitary inspector who examined the body the
next day, found no other wound and certified that
deceased had died from shock as a result of the
wound and so testified at the trial.

We have repeatedly held that when a person

stabs another with a lethal weapon such as a
fanknife upon a part of the body, for example, the
head, chest, or stomach, death could reasonably
be anticipated, and the accused must be
presumed to have intended the natural
consequences of his wrongful act. The means
The death having occurred in an outlying barrio, employed contradict the claim that appellant had
there was no proper autopsy. So far as is known, lack of intention to commit the crime of homicide.
deceased was in normal health, but appellant
contends that it is incumbent upon the State to
The trial court considered provocation as a
prove that the deceased did not die of poisoning mitigating circumstance based on the testimony
or some other cause.
of appellant that he had been attacked,
overlooking the fact that the law requires that the
In this jurisdiction it is well settled that such is not provocation come from the offended party.
the law. A person is responsible for the
Certainly the deceased did not attack appellant,
consequences of his criminal act and even if the and her refusal to renew her illicit relationship
deceased had been shown to be suffering from a with him can hardly be construed as legal
diseased heart (which was not shown),
provocation.
appellant's assault being the proximate cause of
the death, he would be responsible (U.S. vs.
On a careful review of the evidence we are
Luciano, 2 Phil., 96; U.S.vs. Lugo and Lugo, 8
convinced that appellant is guilty beyond a
Phil., 80; U.S. vs. Brobst, 14 Phil., 310; U.S. vs. reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide
Rodriguez, 23 Phil., 22.)
without either aggravating or mitigating
circumstances and therefore sentence him
The trial court appreciated the mitigating
under Act No. 4103 to from eight years ofprision
circumstances that the offender had no intention mayor to fourteen years, eight months, and one
to commit so grave a wrong as that committed
day of reclusion temporal and to indemnify the
and that sufficient provocation or threat on the
heirs of the offended party in the sum of P1,000.
part of the offended party immediately preceded As thus modified the judgment appealed from is
the act.
affirmed. Costs against appellant. So ordered.
68

Avancea, C.J., Malcolm, Vickers, Imperial,

Butte, Goddard, and Diaz, JJ., concur.

straight, it will put certain logs and trees on your

land.?"

Separate Opinions

To this the accused replied: "This is false."

Saying this he drew his knife and struck at
Mendoza.

52. August 15, 1914

evidence given fully supports the findings. We

have examined the case carefully and see no
reason why it should be reversed upon the facts.
We may say the same as to the law.

The accused asserts that he should have a new

trial upon the ground that if he should be given
G.R. No. L-9426
On attempting to ward off the blow Mendoza was another opportunity to present evidence he
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
cut in the left hand. The accused continued the
would be able to show by a physician, Gregorio
vs.
attack, whereupon Mendoza seized the accused Limjoco, that the finger which the court found to
FILOMENO MARASIGAN, defendant-appellant. by the neck and the body and threw him down.
have been rendered useless by the cut already
While
both
were
lying
upon
the
ground
the
described was not necessarily a useless
Silvester Apacible for appellant. Office of the
accused
still
sought
to
strike
Mendoza
with
his
member, inasmuch as, if the accused would
Solicitor-General Corpus for appellee.
dagger. The latter seized the hand which held the permit a surgical operation, the finger could be
dagger and attempted to loosen his hold upon it. restored to its normal condition. He also asserts
Moreland, J.:
While they were thus fighting for the possession that he could demonstrate by the physician
In this case it appears that about 4 o'clock of the of the knife, the wife of the accused came
referred to that it was not the middle finger that
afternoon of the 23d of January, 1913, Francisco forward and took the dagger from her husband's
was disabled but the third finger instead.
Mendoza, while engaged in examining his sugar hand, throwing it to one side. She then seized
crop growing upon his lands in the barrio of
who after various maneuvers, struck Mendoza a We do not regard the case made as sufficient to
Irucan, now called Calayan, in the municipality of blow which knocked him senseless.
warrant a new trial. It is immaterial for the
Taal, Batangas Province, was asked by the
purposes of this case whether the finger, the
As a result of the fight Mendoza received three
accused and his wife to approach them.
usefullness of which was destroyed, was the
wounds, two in the chest and one in the left
middle finger or the third finger. All agree that one
On arriving near them the accused said to
hand, the latter being the most serious, the
of the fingers of the left hand was rendered
Mendoza: "Why is this line curved?" [indicating
extensor tendor in one of the seven days at a
useless by the act of the accused. It does not
the division line between the lands of the two.]
cost of about P45, but the middle finger of the left matter which finger it was.
"Let us make it straight."
hand was rendered useless.
Nor do we attach any importance to the
Francisco replied saying: "Why do you want to
The story of the affair told by the accused is quite contention that the original condition of the finger
make the line straight? If you make the line
different from that just related, but the facts as
could be restored by a surgical operation to
stated were as found by the trial court and the
relieve the accused from the natural and ordinary
69

results of his crime. It was his voluntary act which

disabled Mendoza and he must abide by the
consequences resulting therefrom without aid
from Mendoza.

Saylon. There were about eighteen passengers,

including the driver and conductor. Among the
passengers were Juan Bataclan, seated beside
and to the right of the driver, Felipe Lara, sated to
the right of Bataclan, another passenger
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with
apparently from the Visayan Islands whom the
costs against the appellant.
witnesses just called Visaya, apparently not
knowing his name, seated in the left side of the
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson and
driver, and a woman named Natalia Villanueva,
Araullo, JJ., concur.
seated just behind the four last mentioned. At
about 2:00 o'clock that same morning, while the
53. G.R. No. L-10126
October 22, 1957
bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus,
SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle
the minors NORMA, LUZVIMINDA, ELENITA,
began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch
OSCAR and ALFREDO BATACLAN, represented on the right side of the road and turned turtle.
by their Natural guardian, SALUD VILLANUEVA Some of the passengers managed to leave the
VDA. DE BATACLAN, plaintiffs-appellants,
bus the best way they could, others had to be
vs.
helped or pulled out, while the three passengers
MARIANO MEDINA, defendant-appellant.
seated beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara
and the Visayan and the woman behind them
Lope E. Adriano, Emmanuel Andamo and Jose
named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of
R. Francisco for plaintiffs-appellants.
the overturned bus. Some of the passengers,
Fortunato Jose for defendant and appellant.
after they had clambered up to the road, heard
groans and moans from inside the bus,
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
particularly, shouts for help from Bataclan and
Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952
Lara, who said they could not get out of the bus.
bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation,
There is nothing in the evidence to show whether
operated by its owner defendant Mariano Medina or not the passengers already free from the
under a certificate of public convenience, left the wreck, including the driver and the conductor,
town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay
made any attempt to pull out or extricate and
City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado
rescue the four passengers trapped inside the

vehicle, but calls or shouts for help were made to

the houses in the neighborhood. After half an
hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying
a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on
one end, evidently fueled with petroleum. These
men presumably approach the overturned bus,
and almost immediately, a fierce fire started,
burning and all but consuming the bus, including
the four passengers trapped inside it. It would
appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline
began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank
on the side of the chassis, spreading over and
permeating the body of the bus and the ground
under and around it, and that the lighted torch
brought by one of the men who answered the call
for help set it on fire.
That same day, the charred bodies of the four
deemed passengers inside the bus were
removed and duly identified that of Juan
Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow,
Salud Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of
her five minor children, brought the present suit
to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory,
moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees in the total amount of P87,150. After trial,
the Court of First Instance of Cavite awarded
P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's
fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise
being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City for sale
and which was lost in the fire. The plaintiffs and
70

the defendants appealed the decision to the

Court of Appeals, but the latter endorsed the
appeal to us because of the value involved in the
claim in the complaint.

ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to

passengers, common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently,
unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles
1733 and 1755

Our new Civil Code amply provides for the

responsibility of common carrier to its
passengers and their goods. For purposes of
ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the
reference, we are reproducing the pertinent codal death of or injuries to passengers through the
provisions:
negligence or willful acts of the former's
employees, although such employees may have
ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of acted beyond the scope of their authority or in
their business and for reasons of public policy,
violation of the order of the common carriers.
are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in
the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of This liability of the common carriers does not
the passengers transported by them, according
cease upon proof that they exercised all the
to all the circumstances of each case.
diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of their employees.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over
the goods is further expressed in articles 1734,
ART. 1763. A common carrier responsible for
1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extra injuries suffered by a passenger on account of
ordinary diligence for the safety of the
the willful acts or negligence of other passengers
passengers is further set forth in articles 1755
or of strangers, if the common carrier's
and 1756.
employees through the exercise of the diligence
of a good father of a family could have prevented
ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry
or stopped the act or omission.
the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence We agree with the trial court that the case
of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all involves a breach of contract of transportation for
the circumstances.
hire, the Medina Transportation having
undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his
destination, Pasay City. We also agree with the

trial court that there was negligence on the part

of the defendant, through his agent, the driver
Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the
time of the blow out, the bus was speeding, as
testified to by one of the passengers, and as
shown by the fact that according to the testimony
of the witnesses, including that of the defense,
from the point where one of the front tires burst
up to the canal where the bus overturned after
zig-zaging, there was a distance of about 150
meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must
have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus,
but because of the velocity at which the bus must
have been running, its momentum carried it over
a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the
canal and turned turtle.
There is no question that under the
circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable.
The only question is to what degree. The trial
court was of the opinion that the proximate cause
of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning
of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the
bus, including himself and his co-passengers
who were unable to leave it; that at the time the
fire started, Bataclan, though he must have
suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious, was
still alive, and so damages were awarded, not for
his death, but for the physical injuries suffered by
him. We disagree. A satisfactory definition of
proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages
71

695-696 of American jurisprudence, cited by

plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:
. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.' And more
comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is
that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion,
all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection
with its immediate predecessor, the final event in
the chain immediately effecting the injury as a
natural and probable result of the cause which
first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as
an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of
his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom.
It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus
overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely
causing him physical injuries, if through some
event, unexpected and extraordinary, the
overturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or
if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets
it on fire, and the passenger is burned to death,
one might still contend that the proximate cause
of his death was the fire and not the overturning

of the vehicle. But in the present case under the

circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not
hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the
overturning of the bus, this for the reason that
when the vehicle turned not only on its side but
completely on its back, the leaking of the
gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or
unexpected; that the coming of the men with a
lighted torch was in response to the call for help,
made not only by the passengers, but most
probably, by the driver and the conductor
themselves, and that because it was dark (about
2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a
light with them, and coming as they did from a
rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not
available; and what was more natural than that
said rescuers should innocently approach the
vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue
requested from them. In other words, the coming
of the men with a torch was to be expected and
was a natural sequence of the overturning of the
bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and
the call for outside help. What is more, the
burning of the bus can also in part be attributed
to the negligence of the carrier, through is driver
and its conductor. According to the witness, the
driver and the conductor were on the road
walking back and forth. They, or at least, the
driver should and must have known that in the
position in which the overturned bus was,
gasoline could and must have leaked from the

gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around

the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline
when spilled, specially over a large area, can be
smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet
neither the driver nor the conductor would appear
to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the
rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near
the bus. Said negligence on the part of the
agents of the carrier come under the codal
provisions above-reproduced, particularly,
Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.
As regard the damages to which plaintiffs are
entitled, considering the earning capacity of the
deceased, as well as the other elements entering
into a damage award, we are satisfied that the
amount of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS
would constitute satisfactory compensation, this
to include compensatory, moral, and other
damages. We also believe that plaintiffs are
entitled to attorney's fees, and assessing the
legal services rendered by plaintiffs' attorneys not
only in the trial court, but also in the course of the
appeal, and not losing sight of the able briefs
prepared by them, the attorney's fees may well
be fixed at EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS for
the loss of merchandise carried by the deceased
in the bus, is adequate and will not be disturbed.
There is one phase of this case which disturbs if
it does not shock us. According to the evidence,
72

one of the passengers who, because of the

injuries suffered by her, was hospitalized, and
while in the hospital, she was visited by the
defendant Mariano Medina, and in the course of
his visit, she overheard him speaking to one of
his bus inspectors, telling said inspector to have
the tires of the bus changed immediately
because they were already old, and that as a
matter of fact, he had been telling the driver to
change the said tires, but that the driver did not
follow his instructions. If this be true, it goes to
prove that the driver had not been diligent and
had not taken the necessary precautions to
insure the safety of his passengers. Had he
changed the tires, specially those in front, with
new ones, as he had been instructed to do,
probably, despite his speeding, as we have
already stated, the blow out would not have
occurred. All in all, there is reason to believe that
the driver operated and drove his vehicle
negligently, resulting in the death of four of his
passengers, physical injuries to others, and the
complete loss and destruction of their goods, and
yet the criminal case against him, on motion of
the fiscal and with his consent, was provisionally
dismissed, because according to the fiscal, the
witnesses on whose testimony he was banking to
support the complaint, either failed or appear or
were reluctant to testify. But the record of the
case before us shows the several witnesses,
passengers, in that bus, willingly and

unhesitatingly testified in court to the effect of the

said driver was negligent. In the public interest
the prosecution of said erring driver should be
pursued, this, not only as a matter of justice, but
for the promotion of the safety of passengers on
public utility buses. Let a copy of this decision be
furnished the Department of Justice and the
Provincial Fiscal of Cavite.

vs.
ANICETO MARTIN, defendant-appellant.

In view of the foregoing, with the modification

that the damages awarded by the trial court are
increased from ONE THOUSAND (P1,000)
PESOS TO SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS,
and from SIX HUNDRED PESOS TO EIGHT
HUNDRED (P800) PESOS, for the death of
Bataclan and for the attorney's fees, respectively,
the decision appealed is from hereby affirmed,
with costs.

Aniceto Martin was accused of the complex

crime of parricide with abortion before the Court
of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. After trial he was
acquitted of abortion, but found guilty of parricide
and was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of
the penalty of deceased in the sum of P2,000,
with the accessory penalties of the law, and to
pay the costs. He appealed.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A.,

Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,
J. B. L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.

We shall not consider the charged of abortion as

he was acquitted of it, confining our review to that
of parricide.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

54 May 23, 1951

G.R. No. L-3002
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee,

E. L. Peralta for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista
Angelo and Solicitor Ramon L. Avancea for
appellee.
JUGO, J.:

The defendant, twenty-eight years old, a farmer,

was living in the barrio No. 12 of the municipality
of Laoag, Ilocos Norte. He courted the girl Laura
Liz of the same barrio for several months and
was accepted. They had sexual intercourse
before marriage and she became pregnant. In an
advanced stage of pregnancy, she came to live
with the family of the family of the defendant and
73

demanded marriage, which was duly solemnized The police took possession of the rope and put
on June 7, 1948, and they continued to live as
the defendant in a jeep bound for the municipal
husband and wife.
building. There the defendant made a confession
in the Ilocano language, which he signed and
Between four and five o' clock in the morning of swore to at about noon before the provincial
August 1, 1948, the corpse of Laura was found
fiscal at the latter's house. Said confession, as
inside the family toilet, which was at a certain
translated into English, reads as follows:
distance from their home, with a maguey rope,
six meters long and one centimeter in diameter, I, Aniceto Martin, married, 27 years old, resident
around her neck, leaving a circular mark around of Bo. No. 12, Laoag, Ilocos Norte, after having
it with the exception of the nape which was
been sworn to in accordance with law, do hereby
unmarked undoubtedly due to her long and thick declare the following:
hair covering it. The corpse was first seen by
Anselma Martin, sister of the accused, who was Policeman: Why are you here in the office of
the Chief of Police of Laoag, Ilocos Norte, this
living in the same house, and Saturnino
1st day of August, 1948?
Tumaneng, brother-in-law of Laura, who
happened to be passing by. The defendant was Aniceto: I am here, sir, in the office of the
absent from home.
Chief of Police of Laoag as I came to report what
The barrio lieutenant immediately reported the
matter to the chief of police who, accompanied
by a policeman, came to the barrio that same
morning to make an investigation. When the
chief of police arrived, the defendant had not yet
returned home. A relative looked for him, finding
in a farm which was at considerable distance
from the defendants house, and brought him to
the latter. Upon being interrogated by the police
officer, the defendant at first denied any
knowledge of the event, but later promised to
make a statement in the municipal building.

I did to my wife, Laura Luiz, because I killed her

and the killing was perpetrated as follows:
That at dawn, today August 1, 1948, at about 4 o'
clock, I awoke and my wife also awoke and she
said to, "Why is it that you seem to have no
interest in me?, and I answered her I do not have
interest in you and I did not love you with intent
to marry you because I am not the author of your
pregnancy; again she said to me, "Why is it that
you consented to be wedded with me if you did
not love me? and in answer, I again told her that I
merely consented to be married to you, because

otherwise, you would file an action against me, I

then went down to our closet west of our house
at barrio No. 12, Laoag Ilocos Norte, for major
personal necessity, and my wife, Laura Luiz,
came after me to the toilet with a rope in her
hands and, as she approached me while I was in
the very act of ejecting waste matters inside the
toilet she placed around my neck the rope which
she had in her hands, and immediately, I gripped
the rope and took it off and I said, "Why did you
do this? my wife also said, "Yes because you do
not love me." I snatched the rope from my wife
and in turn I placed same around her neck, and
in that position I tightened the rope with my two
hands and when my wife, Laura Luiz, died I laid
her then and there at the foot of the door of our
closet with head towards the east. Soon after my
wife expired I left her already and I proceeded to
the country where we use to go, barrio Barit, No.
55, Laoag, west of the barrio school threat.
Q. How did you place the rope around the neck
of your wife Laura Luiz, for which reason she
died? A. I wound the rope one turn around the
neck of my wife, Laura Luiz, and my two hands
tightened the rope and when she expired I laid
her at the foot of the door of the toilet and then I
went away.

74

Q. The rope which you used in throttling your

somebody in having made this declaration of
wife, where is it?. A. It was just laid down at he yours? A. Absolutely, there was none, sir that
place where she was, sir.
compelled me, but I spontaneously made my
declaration above, it being the whole truth that I
Q. Who knows about and who saw what had you committed against my wife, Laura Luiz.
done to your wife which caused her death? A.
Nobody knows about it and saw it, sir, I, alone.
Q. Are you willing to sign your name at the
bottom and at the margin of your declaration
Q. Is it not true that the reason why you killed
A. Willingly, sir, because said declaration is
your wife was that you made a preconcerted plan what in truth and in fact I did, and in testimony
with your sister, Anselma Martin and your mother, hereof, I sign my name in the presence of
Ciriaca Tomas to commit the crime A. No,
attending witnesses this 1st day of August, 1948,
sir, I have no companion, I am alone.
at Laoag, Ilocos Norte.
Q. Why did you treat your wife in that way? A.
I became obfuscated, is, when she placed the
rope around my neck, and in turn, I tried the
same in her person but, in so trying she died.

Dr. Roman de la Cuesta, resident physician of

the Ilocos Norte Provincial Hospital, performed
an autopsy on the corpse of Laura and issued a
certificate which reads as follows:

Q. Are you, therefore, very positive that the death

of your wife, Laura Luiz, was caused by you in
having tightened the rope that was wound
around her neck? A. Yes, sir, that was the
cause of her death, I have no doubt that I was
the one who killed my wife, Laura Luiz, today
August 1, 1948. I killed her in our toilet at barrio
No. 12 Laoag.

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

Q. Have you some more to say ?- A. I say, no

more, sir.
Q. Were you, in any manner compelled,
threatened, maltreated or remunerated by

(d) Almost circular contusion around the neck,

but absent in the occipital region.
(e) No evidence of strangulation in the lungs.
In the opinion of the undersigned the cause of
death was acute dilatation of the heart. (Heart
failure.)
Dr. de la Cuesta testified that Laura must have
died five or six hours before he examined her
corpse at about nine o'clock in the morning of
August 1; that the cause of death was heart
failure due to fright or shock; that the deceased
was eight months pregnant at the time of her
death; that there was no expulsion of the fetus;
and that the foetus must have alive at the time of
the death of Laura.

At the trial the defendant testified that while he

was moving his bowels in the toilet with his back
This is to certify that the undersigned performed toward the door of the same, he left that a rope
an autopsy on the person one Laura Luiz Martin, was being put around his neck from behind. He
on August 1, 1948, at 9 o'clock a.m. at the
forthwith snatched the rope and wound it around
request of the Chief of Police of Laoag, Ilocos
the neck of the person who had attempted to
Norte, with the following findings:
strange him upon knowing who that person was.
The person fell and upon looking at the same he
(a) Acute dilatation, heart.
found that it was his wife.
(b) Spleen, enlarged, malarial.
(c) Pregnancy, 8 month, female fetus.

This version cannot be believed, for although it

was dark, his wife must have shouted or given
some sign of who she was when she felt the rope
75

tightening around her neck. Furthermore, this

version is against that freely given by him in his
spontaneous confession made before the chief of
police and sworn to before the provincial fiscal.
There is no reason for supposing that either the
chief of police or the provincial fiscal had any
motive for wringing from him a forced false
confession.
As to the motive of the defendant, it may be
found in the fact that the defendant married
Laura unwillingly due to fear being sued,
because he was suspected that he was not
responsible for her pregnancy.
The appellant contends that the death of Laura
was not due to the strangling, but to her heart
disease. It should be noted, however that the
heart failure was due to the fright or shock
caused by the strangling, and consequently, the
defendant was responsible for the death,
notwithstanding the fact that the victim was
already sick. Had not the defendant strangled the
deceased, the latter, notwithstanding her illness,
would not have died. In other words, the
defendant directly caused her death.
In the case of People vs. Reyes (61 Phil. 341,
343) the Court held:
. . . A person is responsible for the consequences
of his criminal act and even if the deceased had

been shown to be suffering from a diseased

heart (which was not shown), appellants assault
being the proximate cause of the death, he would
be responsible. (U.S. vs. Luciano, 2 Phil.,
96; U.S. vs. Lugo & Lugo, 8 Phil.,
80; U.S. vs.Brobst, 14 Phil.
310; U.S. vs. Rodriguez, 23 Phil., 22.)
In the case of U.S. vs. Brobst (14 Phil. 310), the
following doctrine was established:
Where death results as the direct consequences
of the use of illegal violence, the mere fact that
the diseased or weakened condition of the
injured person contributed to his death, does not
relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal
responsibility. (Syllabus)
The trial court considered two mitigating
circumstances in favor of the defendant: (1) that
of unlawful aggression on the part of the
deceased without any sufficient provocation on
the part of the defendant which in this case is
equivalent to incomplete self-defense on the part
of the defendant, he should not have wound it
around her neck and tightened it and (2) the
lack of instruction, without any aggravating
circumstances to offset them, the penalty next
lower in the degree should be imposed, which is
that of reclusion temporal.

In view of the foregoing, the judgment appealed

from is modified by imposing upon the appellant
the penalty of from twelve (12) years of prision
mayor to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal,
with the accessory penalties of the law, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P6,000, without subsidiary imprisonment in case
on insolvency, and to pay the costs. It is so
ordered.
Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, and
Montemayor, JJ., concur.
55. January 28, 1954
G.R. No. L-5775
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee,
vs.
AGUSTIN PIAMONTE, ET AL., defendants;
GUILLERMO MASCARIAS alias ELMO and
VICENTE JASME,
JR., alias DODONG,defendants-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and
Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres
for appellee.
Quiremon Alkuino for appellant Guillermo
Mascarias.
Conrado G. Abiera for appellant Vicente Jasme,
Jr.

76

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

of Police and the Justice of Peace went to the

hospital to verify the correctness of the
Agustin Piamonte, Guillermo Mascarias, and
statements attributed to the victim and when they
Vicente Jasme Jr. were charged with robbery
arrived they found him restless, his face was
with homicide in the Court of First Instance of
pale, he was breathing hard, and his whole body
Leyte, and, after due trial, were found guilty and was bandaged. His legs and hands were tied to
sentenced each to suffer reclusion perpetua, with his bed. The attending nurse informed the two
the accessory penalties of the law, to indemnify
officials that the medicine being administered to
jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased in the patient was only to prolong his life. The
the sum of P320, the amount stolen, plus the
Justice of the Peace read the written statements
sum of P6,000, without subsidiary imprisonment to the patient and after being sure that he
in case of insolvency due to the nature of the
understood them he was asked to ratify them.
penalty imposed, and to pay the costs. From this The patient did so under oath. In his affidavit, the
judgment, Guillermo Mascarias and Vicente
patient, among other things, stated that of the
Jasme Jr. have appealed.
person who went to his house in the morning in
question he was only able to identify Guillermo
Early in the morning of October 28, 1951, a
Mascarias who was long known to him. The
robbery was committed in the house of Magno
robbers took away his cash amounting P320. He
Israel in barrio Gabas, municipality of Baybay,
was not able to identify those who actually
Leyte. In the course of the robbery Israel was
wounded him.
seriously wounded and was brought to the
Western Leyte Hospital in Baybay for treatment. The revelation of Magno Israel gave rise to the
Upon being informed of the incident, the Chief of arrest of Mascarias who, upon being
Police of Baybay sent a policeman to the hospital investigated, made a written confession (Exhibit
to find out what had happened. Policeman
F). He stated that early in the morning of October
Macario Dawal found the wounded groaning
28, 1951, he was invited by Agustin Piamonte
because of the serious wounds he had received. and Vicente Jasme, Jr. to go to the house of
Nevertheless, the policeman was able to get
Magno Israel to rob him. Since they were his
some statements from him as to the robbery
friends he agreed. When they arrived at the
which the policeman wrote on a typewriter upon house Piamonte went upstairs followed closely
his return to office. In the next morning, the Chief by Jasme, Jr. while he remained downstairs to

guard the place. While he was thus guarding he

noticed that Israel offered resistance and so his
two companions assaulted him. When he heard
the screams of Israel he was frightened and ran
away and since then he never met again his
companions.
The revelation of Mascarias also gave rise to
the arrest of Piamonte and Jasme, Jr. Upon
being arrested, Piamonte was investigated and
made also a written confession. He stated that in
the afternoon of October 27, 1951, Mascarias
revealed to him his plan to rob the house of
Magno Israel. While he and Jasme, Jr. were
attending a dance at the Baybay National
Agricultural School they met Mascarias who told
them that after the dance they would go home
together and would proceed to the house they
planned to rob. To this effect, Mascarias
borrowed the clothes of Jasme, Jr. so that he
may not be recognized by Israel who knew him
personally. When they arrived at the house of
Israel, he and Mascarias went upstairs and
when he focused his flashlight on a trunk
Mascarias proceeded to ransack it. Israel was
awakened by their presence and Mascarias
stabbed him several times. At this juncture, he
(Piamonte) became afraid and ran downstairs
followed by Mascarias. This time, Jasme Jr.
who was left downstairs, had already gone ahead
on the road. On their way home and upon
77

reaching the a bridge, Mascarias took off the

clothes which he borrowed from Jasme Jr. and
returned them to him. Mascarias used a hunting
knife in stabbing his victim. He did not know how
much money was taken by Mascarias because
the latter did not tell him about it.
Vicente Jasme Jr. was also arrested but refused
to give any statement to the police. The evidence
further shows that Magno Israel was operated on
the very day he was brought to the hospital to
save his life. The operation did him well but he
had a stormy post-operative period. Sometime in
December 19, 1951, he contracted a sickness
known as mucuous colitis which developed
because of his weak condition. He died on
December 28.
Mascarias, testifying in his defense, declared
that after attending the dance held at the Baybay
National Agricultural School he, Piamonte and
Jasme, Jr. went to the house of Magno Israel not
to rob the latter but merely to escort Jasme Jr.
who was the nephew of Israel. When they arrived
Jasme, Jr. went up and then he left the premises.
While he was gone for sometime he heard
someone shouting for help but he thought that it
was Jasme, Jr. who was being maltreated by his
uncle for coming late. Later Piamonte joined him
and both returned to their respective homes. As
regards to his confessions, Mascarias claimed

that he signed id because policeman Aurelio

Altivo compelled him to do so as otherwise he
would send him to the constabulary headquarters
at Ormoc City.

testimony in court only that this time he gave the

explanation that he merely accompanied Jasme,
Jr. to the house of Israel who was his uncle and
did nothing in connection with the robbery, but
this is belied by the ante mortem declaration of
The defense of Vicente Jasme, Jr. consisted in a the victim who pointed to him as one of those
mere alibi. While he admitted having gone to the who entered his house and robbed him. There is
dance held at the Baybay National Agricultural
no question that said declaration partakes of the
School he declared that he did not meet there his nature of ante mortem as found by the lower
co-accused Piamonte and Mascarias. he
court because it has been established that at the
claimed that he went home with a group of
time it was taken the victim was in a very serious
persons among whom one Macarangal, the
condition and would have succumbed if not
drummer of the orchestra, and arrived home at
because of the opportune medical treatment
4:00 o'clock in the morning. He denied knowing extended to him.
Magno Israel or the place where he lived. He
also said that one week before the dance,
The claim of Mascarias that he signed his
Piamonte came to his place to ask him whether written confession because policeman Aurelio
he was willing to sell his pants and shirt and as
Altivo threatened to send him to the constabulary
he owed Piamonte P3.00 he agreed and gave
headquarters at Ormoc City cannot be
his clothes to him.
entertained, it appearing that the investigation of
the accused was conducted by the Chief of
There is no doubt that Mascarias is guilty of the Police and the only intervention of Altivo was to
crime charged. His guilt is established not only
write his answers on a typewriter. This claim is
by his own confession (Exhibit F) but also by the also belied by the Justice of the Peace before
confessions of his co-accused Agustin Piamonte whom the confession was signed who affirmed in
and Vicente Jasme, Jr. and the ante
court that said confession was signed by him
mortem declaration of the deceased, Magno
voluntarily. And his testimony was corroborated
Israel. In his confession, Mascarias admitted
by the Chief of Police. We do not find any
not only the plan they had conceived to rob
justifiable reason to brush aside the testimony of
Magno Israel but also the part he had in the
these officials in the absence of any showing that
execution of said plan. This he reiterated in his
78

they had testified for improper or personal

reasons.

It shows that they are the ones who could have

possibly committed the act, but to save their skin
they laid the blame on each other as regards the
injuries inflicted on the deceased. This certainly
cannot be sustained on the face of their
suspicious behavior. There being conspiracy in
the commission of the crime the confession of
one is admissible and can be considered as
corroborative evidence against the other. Thus,
"it has been held that when extrajudicial
confessions had been made by several persons
charged with conspiracy and there could have
been no collusion with reference to the several
confessions, the fact that the statements were in
all material respects identical, was confirmatory
of the testimony of an accomplice."
(People vs. Badilla, et al., 48 Phil., 718.)

The same thing may be said with regard to

appellant Vicente Jasme, Jr. His co-accused
testified that this appellant went with them to the
house of Magno Israel in the evening the latter
was wounded only that to avoid being implicated
they stated that their purpose in going to that
house was merely to escort Jasme, Jr. who was
a nephew of Israel. But we now see that their real
purpose was not exactly the one above pointed
out but to rob Israel in pursuance of a plan they
had arranged the previous night, as clearly
manifested in their extrajudicial confessions. If to
this we add what Flaviana Escuadra testified that
in the early morning of October 28, 1951, this
appellant came to her house and left a pair of
trousers and shirt which, upon inspection, were
The remaining question to be determined is: Has
found to be tainted with blood, his guilt becomes the deceased died as a result of the wounds
strengthened.
inflicted upon him by the accused? It is true that
he did not die immediately after the infliction of
That there is conspiracy among the three
the wounds and that he was able to survive for
accused is evident. They were in the dance held sometime because of the operation to which he
at the Baybay National Agricultural School in the was subjected and he medical treatment
evening preceding the commission of the crime. extended to him at the Western Leyte Hospital.
After the dance, or early in the following day, they But the fact remains that he did as a result of
went home together and proceeded to the house themucuous colitis he contracted because of his
of Magno Israel, and shortly thereafter the latter weak condition resulting from the wounds he had
was found seriously wounded and robbed. This
received. The doctors who attended him are
much appears in the testimony of these accused.

agreed that this weakened condition which had

caused disturbance in the functions of his
intestines made it possible for him to
contract mucuous colitis, which shows that, while
said wounds were not the immediate cause, they
were however the proximate cause of death. This
is enough to make the accused responsible for
the crime charged.
The crime committed is robbery with homicide
punishable with reclusion perpetua to death
(Article 294, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code).
Considering the aggravating circumstances of
nocturnity and dwelling without any mitigating
circumstance to offset it, the Solicitor General
recommends that the maximum penalty be
imposed upon the appellants. However, some
members of the Court are of the opinion that in
the light of the circumstances obtaining in this
case, the penalty of reclusion perpetuawould be
commensurate for the crime charged.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is
affirmed, with the proportionate share of the
costs.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor,
Reyes, Jugo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., concurs in the result.

79