You are on page 1of 11

Ledys Sanjuan Mejia

We Speak in Tongues: A Woman of Colour Critique of Jacques Rancieres Political


Subject
I lack Imagination, you say
No, I lack the language
The language to clarify
My resistance to the literate
Words are at war to me
They threaten my family
To gain the word to describe the loss
I risk losing everything
(Moraga, 1983)

The subject of the rights (hu-) man is a contentious struggle over the right to speak from
a collective that is at the same time recognition of exploitation, oppression and
domination. The exploited, the dominated, and the oppressed are political categories
that recognise the struggle of the subject of politics and over the political subject. Yet
the struggle over the political subject requires a certain kind of knowledge, a certain
kind of language and articulation that some cannot understand and that some do not
want to hear. Moragas poem points to a certain kind of subjectivity which ties the pain
and loss of oppression to a political self and undresses the illusion of necessity ineffably
embedded in the inequality of democracy. Thus, the question of the subject is a struggle,
not only over equality as a subject of the rights of Man or any other categories of
signification, but a struggle over a subject who remembers; a struggle over telling our
history from the subject. A risk taken through the means of speech and action.
In this vein, I seek to initiate conversation between Rancieres thought and Women of
Colour feminist conceptualisation of the political subject. Black, Third World and
Women of Colour feminists have consistently criticised white feminism for creating a
woman subject which does not coincide with our subjectivity and the way we
experience being women (Mohanty, 1984; hooks, 1982; Carby, 1996: 63). Consequently,
this movement can then be argued to be a segment of the police while simultaneously
being part of the political, according to Rancieres thought. In other words, white
feminism rallies around a political subject that challenges the inequalities of women in
the police system. White feminism simultaneously reproduces and perpetuates these
inequalities by excluding Women of Colours experiences through leaving unquestioned
the racial relations in which white women and women of colour are unequal. Thus,
Women of Colour feminist thought forces us to determine where, who, and why there is
the political subject of the Woman of Colour. Whilst also revealing the ways in which
police and politics can co-exist in movements that superficially appear to challenge the

Ledys Sanjuan Mejia

patriarchal, white supremacist capitalist system (Carby, 1996: 62). The histories of
Black, Third World, and Women of Colour movements have denoted a recognition of
race, class and gender as necessary and intersecting loci of oppression and therefore,
agitation (Mohanty, 2002: 510). The emphasis on speech and experience is a political
act for Women of Colour because it marks us as outcasts whilst seeking to tear down the
silence of our subjectivities. Our bodies and our lives are not represented within antiracist, feminist and anti-capitalist movements (the political) and they are made invisible
by official or police historiography and politics. Certainly, an outcast is not a poor
wretch of humanity; outcast is the name of those who are denied an identity in a given
order of policy (Ranciere, 1992: 61). Our speech and writing is an essential part of our
political subjectivity because, as Anzaldua writes, our speech is inaudible. We speak in
tongues like the outcast and the insane (1983: 27) whilst also aiming to reveal how
gender, class and race produce our experiences and forge our political subject. That is to
say, the subjectivisation of the woman of colour is arguably the manifestation of
dissensus, as the presence of two worlds in one (Ranciere, 2001).
Further, the political subject and how we choose to theorise them bears significant
consequences for democracy. For Ranciere, democracy is the power of those who have
no specic qualication for ruling, except the fact of having no qualication (2010: 70).
However, for Ranciere, democracy is also about consensus, the continuous (un-)
settlement of a wrong in which the democratic ideal is perpetually set upon dissensus,
as far as justice goes, democracy only offers the theatrics of dispute democracy is
incapable of giving politics its true measure (1999: 63). Dissent over inequality, then,
can be interpreted as a necessary characteristic of democracy which can carry out
consensus but never fully eliminate its authoritative character. This open-ended idea of
dissensus and democracy allows for Rancieres thought to be flexible and easily
applicable to the differing politics of resistance, and accommodates their spontaneous
character. However, as I will argue, this emphasis on spontaneity and fragmentation
reflects the way in which the history of the oppressed is fragmented and hidden. It does
not follow then, that our resistance should mirror the way in which our history is
denied to us. So, I challenge Rancieres hidden neutrality in which Blackness is
performed as a romantic Other or fragmented and silenced by more vocal and
privileged (white) neutral representations of the political.
Finally, I consider the police in terms of my own epistemological location against
Rancieres. In other words, underlying this written work is a larger effort to demarginalise Women of Colour theorising of what constitutes the political. Throughout
the essay I speak from the subject position of I, as a Woman of Colour, to elucidate my
inability to speak from the universal contrasting Rancieres. This is not to fall into
postmodern relativism; on the contrary, this is to position our experience and
theorising within the debates over the political. In other words, to claim our very right
to be heard and recognized as an equal partner in the debate (Zizek, 2008: 222). Thus, I
consider our very act of writing, thinking and theorising as embedded within the
process of dissensus.

Ledys Sanjuan Mejia

Subjectivistation: Who is the Subject of the Rights of (wo-) man?


What is a process of subjectivization? It is the formation of a one that is not a self but is
the relation of a self to an other
(Ranciere, 1992: 60)
The subject of politics or the political subject is a contentious, yet essential, element in
the enquiry of the political. Around the axis of the subject we encounter the
construction of power relations that can be oppressive or oppressed, the political
ontology of the establishment and, conversely, the perhaps deluded idea that the ideal
modern political subject can be found in reality. This debate over the subject of the
Rights of Man has seen thinkers such as Hannah Arendt arguing that the modern
political subject does not exist outside of a nation-state which can uphold those rights;
that those at the margins of the nation state or the stateless are consequently, rightless
(Ranciere, 2004: 300; Arendt, 1998). Jacques Rancieres thought seeks to contravene
this idea of the subject of politics by placing the struggle over the rights of man as
subjectivisation. The absence of a sovereign to ensure those who are rightless are in fact
protected, enclosed and, indeed, oppressed then is a fundamental historical struggle
over equality that has less to do with the state and more to do with political agitation to
reclaims these rights (Ranciere, 2004:303).
Further, the process of subjectivisation presupposes the recognition of a universalised
and hegemonic system of determinants which distort yet anchor the subject into the
liberal modern individual (Zizek, 2008: 214). Rancieres formation of the political
subject proposes that entering the political means recognising the distortion of what
the subject is against that which the subject should be, subjectivisation is a process of
disidentification or declassification (Ranciere, 1992: 61) from the pre-given categories
of the police order. Subjectivisation, therefore, is an inherently political act in which
dissent simultaneously attaches the subject to the police verifying its equality through
the handling of a wrong. Ranciere places this process in terms of speech and
enunciation in which articulating a wrong, political subjectification produces a multiple
that was not given in the police constitution of the community, a multiple whose count
poses itself as contradictory in terms of police logic (1995: 36). The deep instability of
the political subject becomes apparent when there is demonstration of a wrong or a
verification of equality in regard to the categories posed by the police system. The police
is defined as the set of procedures whereby the aggregation and consent of
collectivities is achieved, the organization of powers, the distribution of places and
roles, and the systems for legitimizing this distribution (Ranciere, 1999: 28). Thus, the
police system determines the distributions according to a certain abstract subject:
citizen, man, human, etc., and inequality is inscribed into this universal equality.
However, the police system appears to be a set of abstract categories, loose and vague
enough to encompass manifold forms of control, but without the historical and social

Ledys Sanjuan Mejia

roots that name the police system and its conditions -- locating the political subject in a
neutral space.
Moreover, the political subject for Ranciere is enunciated as a performance of a wrong
that becomes collective, or held by a collective, identification with the wrong. Ranciere
does not name or connect the political subject with any historically permanent
categories. Indeed, he refers to the proletariat as subjectivity which is pass and
women as a more relevant locus of resistance (de Boever, 2011) suggesting that the
political subject is an empty category available for purchase by any given collective.
Moreover, as the police system is a broad based definition of power, Rancieres empty
subject leaves a void in understanding where police ends and politics begins. It can be
argued, then that this dissensus he refers to is a dialectical process in which police and
politics are inseparable apparatuses, leaving the agency of the political subject as
perpetually determined by the vague ontology of the police.
Conversely, the subjectivity of Woman of Colour resists the neutral subject and
unearths the silences and lived experiences of Women of Colour, suturing the identity
with a common historical past and a political present. The Woman of Colour political
subject attempts to break the opacity and fragmentation of our histories of oppression
and resistance performed by the police system. As bell hooks notes,
There are times when so much talk or writing, so many ideas seem to stand in the way,
to block the awareness that for the oppressed, the exploited, the dominated,
domination is not just a subject for radical discourse, for books. It is about pain
the pain of hunger, the pain of overwork, the pain of degradation and
dehumanization, the pain of loneliness, the pain of loss, the pain of isolation, the
pain of exile- spiritual and physical. Even before words we remember the pain
Our struggle is also a struggle of memory against forgetting (1989: 3-4)
The political subject that speaks communicates through the real life experience and
social reality of gender, race and class relations that exploit and dehumanise Women of
Colour. These words are a reminder that the histories where we were slaves, servants,
and colonised people are still here, that they have not been resolved. This subject that
remembers struggles to speak because our speech is a recollection of what the police
wants us to hide, to forget. Indeed, as noted by Gramsci, the history and activity of the
subaltern is notoriously fragmented, episodic and decidedly silenced (Gramsci,
1971:54-5). Nevertheless, Rancieres definition of the police as a vague and
undetermined system as well as the empty category of the political subject does not, and
cannot, challenge this fundamental fragmentation in collective political subjectivities of
resistance. Rather, his theory reproduces the idea that the political is spontaneous and
sporadic, opposing a collective history of resistance. Thus, as the epigraph from bell
hooks shows, predominant ideas that privilege spontaneity over history in resistance
and in hegemonic ideology stand in the way (hooks, 1987: 3) of reaching
subjectivisation. Our histories, as people dominated and oppressed, are allowed to

Ledys Sanjuan Mejia

fragment and be forgotten. Yet it is these histories, embedded in colonialism and


imperialism that are a wrong upon which we can position our collectivity in spite of our
differences and particularities. Certainly, the history of colonialism, imperialism is a
record of betrayal, of lies and deceits. The demand for that which is real is a demand for
reparation, for transformation. We make revolutionary history telling the past as we
have learned it mouth-to-mouth telling the present as we see, know and feel it in our
hearts with our words (hooks: 1989: 3).
Moreover, as Gloria Anzaldua articulates,
Why am I compelled to write?... Because the world I create in the writing compensates
for what the real world does not give me. By writing I put order in the world, give
it a handle so I can grasp it. To become more intimate with myself and you. To
discover myself, to preserve myself, to make myself, to achieve self-autonomy. To
dispell the myths that I am a mad prophet or a poor suffering soul. Finally I write
because I'm scared of writing, but I'm more scared of not writing (2007: ).
The woman of colour subject is encouraged to speak, to enact her equality in the face of
inequality, to open a set of practices driven by the assumption of equality (Ranciere,
1995: 30). This, quite correctly, suggests that there is something inherently political at
stake for Women of Colour when we speak; our speech act is not sporadic or
performative, it is a historical and political act in which the equality we are creating and
fighting for is inextricably attached to our race, class and gender oppressions. This
determines a police system that circumscribes these social relations that holds our
throats tightly closed every time we are amiss in movements of the political and every
time we are to question the police. This subjectivisation is wholly different from that of
white women or of the white working class. It requires a complex piecing together of
other forms of oppression, for example, that of the immigrant or the refugee (Zizek,
2008:237). But also a recognition of how whiteness is constructed against the colonial
and imperial pasts of people of colour, while simultaneously accepting that class and
gender are constitutive of these relations. Consistently, white women have struggled for
political goals which run against those needs of Women of Colour constructing our
political subjectivity against the white womans movement (Mohanty, 1988; Eisenstein,
2008: 65). Certainly, Sojourner Truths famous speech Aint I a woman? particularly
locates the political subjectivity of Women of Colour in the relationship of inequality to
white women; of disidentification from the (white) woman category. Truth speaks:
That man over there says that women need to be helped into carriages, and lifted over
ditches, and to have the best place everywhere. Nobody ever helps me into
carriages, or over mud-puddles, or gives me any best place! And ain't I a woman?
(Truth, 1851).
Truths speech enacts equality by positioning herself as a woman -the category given by
the police system- whilst questioning whether this category of woman does actually
refer to her position as a black slave. Hence, Rancieres neutrality over the political

Ledys Sanjuan Mejia

subject erases the way in which these can be positions of oppression for women of
colour. In the same vein, Women of Colours experiences highlight the consitution police
system, the experiences of this political subject draws a map of social relations in which
we are forged. This map has to be consistently drawn by Women of Colour who speak
and connect our present with our history; this relies on a persistent subject and not one
that can be spontaneously grasped by the newest, baddest movement within the
political. On the contrary, Women of Colours political subjectivity is forged against the
inability of white women to recognise our race and class as consituitive of our gendered
realities. It comes from the inability of the anti-racist and anti-colonial movements to
take gender seriously (Moya, 2001: 44; hooks, 1989: 119) and from fighting within anticapitalist movement to be taken seriously. All of these struggles take place within the
political, suggesting that the police system is embedded in the political unless we
determine what police is, how it functions and what kind of subjectivities it is forming
and erasing.
The Perpetual Dissidence of Blackness and White Liberal Democracy
Thus far, I have argued that the political subjectivisation of the Woman of Colour draws
from speech and writing to convey our political subjectivity. This proposition is similar
to Rancieres emphasis on speech and understanding in the political. Nevertheless, the
Woman of Colour subject unveils a police system which is conditioned by race, class and
gender that is present in our bodies and experience. Our political subject experiences a
language by the police that is not shared by other political subjects, the multiple of
oppressions of race, class and gender in which we exist must exist as the outcast and the
insane. Rancieres method may help us to understand how subjectivities come to be, but
it fails to elucidate who they are and more importantly, to discern whether the police
and the political exist within them. In this section, I will argue that the political and the
police for Ranciere exists within the Western white European neutral and universal
gaze which perpetuates the negation of colonialism and imperialism as a fundamental
space of transformation. This is a significant point of enquiry as academics in the West
use this flexible -though problematic- method in resistance politics wherever they may
find them without questioning their implication within the police but also negating any
kind of real transformation. In this sense, the following section will proceed in two
parts: I will problematise first, the neutrality of the political subject as a white subject
and second, the implications this has for transformation, emancipation or any
categorical qualification of fundamental change of the police.
Rancieres intervention in Western philosophy partially stems from recovering the
political from the post-political (Zizek, 2008; May, 2003). Yet, as I have shown before,
his reluctance to name a political subject that elucidates the social relations of power of
the police system, renders a form of resistance which mirrors the official history of the
oppressed as fragmented, sporadic and unstable. This rescuing of the political,
therefore, is embedded in a historiography that does not recognise the perpetual
struggles of people of colour in their daily lives. In other words, the political does not

Ledys Sanjuan Mejia

need rescuing it exists permanently in sites of oppression and resistance. This


flexibility and neutrality of the political subject to be taken up by any social movement
in question ignores the fundamental realities of the oppressed, and renders the political
subject as those who simply have the means and the loudest voices to be heard. For how
are we to determine who is making the political if not by those whose histories are seen
as disruptive and dissenting?
This intellectual leftist (white) gaze that underlies Rancieres conceptualisations does
not render the Women of Colour who exist in multiple spaces of oppression more
visible. Rather, it recognises the dissent of those who have the entitlement to speak
about their oppressions and to see to it that these are redressed in lieu of a (Western,
white and liberal) democratic system. Speech, again, is crucial here. As bell hooks notes,
one of the jokes we used to have about the got everything white people is how they
just tell all their business, just put their stuff right out there. One point of Blackness
became like how you keep your stuff to yourself, how private you could be about your
business (1987: 2). This prerogative of speech and speaking for and about the Other
has its origins and representations in colonial histories, white academia and the
unquestioned gaze of those who speak and represent us even within the political (Said,
2003; hooks, 1989).
Thus, Rancieres supposedly neutral political subject and police perform a certain kind
of farcical universality. This open ended police system, malleable enough to inscribe any
kind of resistance to the police, stems from Rancieres lack of reflexivity on his own
position as a white, male, Western, European philosopher. The pretension to speak in
the universal, even when distilled enough not to appear this way, can be contrasted with
Women of Colour that speak from the I from the pain, the suffering and the
articulation of this reality. Thereby placing the I as the open veins of a white
supremacist patriarchal capitalist system. It denotes what permissions we have to
speak, what we are rebelling against and about what. Whereas white, male, Western,
European Ranciere can speak in his tongue the universal we, Women of Colour are
forced speak from the individual at the margins drawing a police system inscribed by a
historical set of social relations. However, this is not to argue for a deep relativism,
rather this is to show the different subject positions and the historical social relations
that can be unravelled when we reflect on the race, class and gender of the speaker and
the political theorist.
Furthermore, some might argue that the seeming neutrality of the subject presumes
that these are categories others should struggle for, that if we determine that the
political subject of Ranciere is white then we can accommodate his theory to the
resistance of people of colour thereby reconceptualising the subject constituting a
political act. On the contrary, this permanence of dissensus to be taken up by people of
colour and crucially by women of colour forged in the crucibles of difference or
multiple sites of oppressions (Lorde, 1983) remain inextricably tied to the white logic.
That the West is the constitution of the modern social order wherever that relation is

Ledys Sanjuan Mejia

inscribed. In these symptomatic and emancipatory idioms, black politics is alterity,


antagonism, and even epiphany, addressing itself to the reinhabitation of the
sociogeographic West (Hesse, 2011: 977). This perpetual dissensus, then, when applied
to non-white struggles reproduces the notion that Blackness is an inherent site of
resistance, of chaotic instability constantly presented against whiteness as organised,
stable and less likely to be disturbed. This natural oppositional nature of Blackness
against Whiteness performs the inequality of people of colour, perpetuating the police
system which produces racialised violence, racialised sexism and racialised exploitation.
Thus, by not inscribing the social relations of the subject and rather performing a
perpetually dissenting (white) subject Rancieres theory performs two ways of othering
Blackness and the struggle of people of colour. On the one hand, the white gaze, that
determines the political to be saved or to be recovered, works within the logic of a
hegemonic historiography that only sees the political in the movements of those with a
prerogative to speak. Yet the invisibility and silence which proscribes the structural
racism faced by people of colour as well as our negotiation with its implications and
ramifications are rendered invisible by the neutral and undetermined police system.
Some might argue that if Rancieres paradigm can be applied to struggles of people of
colour then the subject can be claimed from the neutral white subject. However, it is
pertinent to ask about the structural inequality of Blackness. If even within the leftist
gaze we must struggle to speak, to claim the subjectivities that are naturally there for
white subjects. What does it say about a theory of democracy and change when those
who want to change it have to first destabilise it from the very system it is seeking to
challenge? Rancieres insistence on dissensus answers our question. That the political
subject has to perpetually dissent and contest with the police in order to render
democracy more consensual or to verify their inequality, is one thing. That the Black
political subject has to perpetually dissent with the political itself in order to render the
subject of politics, of dissent, adequate for their own social relations suggests that
Rancieres subject is by definition exclusionary of people of colour. Moreover, this
struggle over the political subject that takes place within the political and not
immediately the police perpetuates the notion that Blackness is opposite to Whiteness
that Blackness is a naturalised space of contention and disorder, whereas whiteness can
be neutral and harder to destabilise.
Finally, Rancieres dissensus, a perfomativity which delineates the spaces of oppression
and contention somehow improves democracy. Democracy is the process of dissensus,
the never ending battle over the political subject (Ranciere, 2010: 70). Given what I
have argued before, if these categories are to be revelant to Women of Colour and to
Blackness they need to be struggled with and fought with, in the mean time are we to
accept that white liberal democracy is necessary exclusionary of us? Now, this might
elucidate the difficulty and obstacles for racial equality, but nevertheless, it is worth
asking what kind of political is being circumscribed by the very act of writing by
Ranciere, by me and by all other high or low theorists of the political.

Ledys Sanjuan Mejia

Conclusion
The reader might have noticed a tension in my assessment of Rancieres political subject
and its relevance and implications for women of colour theorising. On the one hand, I
have been weary of applying the concepts of his theory at the backdrop of a critique of
his position within Western philosophy. I have not sought to hide the voices of women
of colour, I have however argued ways in which women of colour theory of the political
subject fit within Rancieres propositions. I have argued that the disidentification of
women of colour from the category of (white) woman is a process of dissensus.
However, I have also noted that Rancieres neutral police-political system renders the
dissenting subject as white unless there is a process of disidentification within the
political by people of colour. This struggle takes place within women of colour political
organising and writing. Through our speech we communicate the experience of the
police system as a white supremacist patriarchal capitalist totality in which we are
situated, but also forged in every single day.
The neutral police-political system reproduces our resistance as fragmented, divided
and sporadic detracting us from histories that have been denied and hidden. On the
other hand, that white privilege speaks from the universal (through neutrality) as
opposed to the political subjectivity of the I, where women of colour have the political
obligation to speak from, illustrates the very inequality that is performed even in
writing this piece. Moreover, I argue that in recognising speech and epistemological
labour as part of the political, Western philosophers reflect on how their whiteness
reproduces Blackness as naturalised sites of resistance. How blackness is made to prove
some progressive democratic ideal that is not going to meaningfully change the lives of
people of colour but instead improve Western liberal democracy. I ask that we be
reflexive of the very act of writing and thinking about the political from a universalised
standpoint of privilege or own subjectivity of oppression and how our realities and
resistance are hidden in lieu of movements that are more visible or amenable to the
white gaze. Indeed, the political subject of the woman of colour seeks to enact and
create change and transformation through a subject that remembers, that resists and
that can live a just society.

Ledys Sanjuan Mejia

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Anzaldua, G., (1983), Speaking in Tongues: A Letter to Third World Women Writers;, in This
Bridge Called my Back (2 ed.), edited by Moraga, C. and Anzaldua, G., New York: Women of
Colour Press, pp. 12-4.
nd

Arendt, H., (1998), The Human Condition, London: University of Chicago Press.
Carby, H., (1996), White Woman Listen! Black Feminism and the Boundaries of Sisterhood,
in Black British Cultural Studies edited by Baker, H., Diawara, M. and Lindeborg, R. (ed),
University of Chicago Press: London, pp. 61-86.
De Boever, A., (2011), Feminism After Ranciere, Women in J.M Coetzee and Jeff Wall,
Transformations, Issue No. 19, Available at:
http://www.transformationsjournal.org/journal/issue_19/article_03.shtml Last
accesesed: May 6th 2013.
Gramsci, A., (1971), Selections From Prison Notebooks, edited and translated by Hoare Q.
and Nowell Smith, G., Lawrence, London: Wishart.

Hesse, B., (2011), Marked Unmarked: Black Politics and Western Political, South Atlantic
Quarterly, Vol.110 (4), pp. 974-984.
hooks, b., (1982), Aint I a Woman?, London: Pluto Press.
hooks, b., (1989), Talking Back, Thinking Black, South End Press: Cambridge, MA.

Lorde, A., (1984), The Masters Tools Will Never Dismantle the Masters House,
available at: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/pipermail/margins-to-centre/2006-March/000794.html
Last accessed: May 6th 2013.

May, T., (2008), The Political Thought of Jacques Ranciere: Creating Equality, Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press.
Mohanty, C., (1984), Under Western Eyes, Boundary 2, Vol. 12(3), pp. 333-358.
Mohanty, C., (2002), Under Western Eyes Revisited: Feminist Solidarity Through
Anticapitalist Struggles, Signs, Vol.18(2), pp. 499-535.
Moraga, C., (1983), For The Color of My Mother, in This Bridge Called my Back (2nded.),
edited by Moraga, C. and Anzaldua, G., New York: Women of Colour Press, pp. 12-4.
Moya, P.M., (2001), Chicana Feminism and Postmodernist Theory, Signs, Vol. 26 (2),
pp.441-83.
Ranciere, J., (1992), Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization, Vol. 61, The Identity
Question (n/a), pp. 58-64.

Ledys Sanjuan Mejia

Ranciere, J., (1999), Dissagreement: Politics and Philosophy, Minneapolis: University of


Minnesotta Press.
Ranciere, J., (2001), Ten Thesis on Politics, Theory & Event. Vol. 5, No. 3, available at:
http://es.scribd.com/doc/21247046/Ten-Theses-on-Politics-by-Ranciere Last accessed: April
29th 2013.
Ranciere, J., (2004), Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man?, South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol.,
103(2-3): 297-310.
Ranciere, J., (2010), Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics, London: Continuum Group
International Publishing Group.
Said, E., (2003), Orientalism, London: Penguin.
Truth,

S.,

(1851),

Aint

Woman?,

available

http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/sojtruth-woman.asp Last Accessed: May 6th 2012.


Zizek, S., (2008), The Ticklish Subject (2nd ed.), London: Verso.

at:

You might also like