HSM

Guide
An introduction to HSMs.

Authors
Chris Snow
Colin Cook
Nick Bitounis
Juris Lacis
Zeeshan Ahmad
Other contributors ...

Book License
CC0 1.0 Universal

Preface
About this book
A primary role of a HSM is the secure management of digital keys. This book introduces digital key
management concepts and reinforces those concepts with exercises that the reader can perform on an open
source Thales HSM Simulator.
The reader should have a basic understanding of symmetric and asymmetric cryptography. Appendix A,
Introductory Books in Cryptography provides a list of introductory books in cryptography for those wishing to
learn the basics or just wanting to refresh their knowledge in the field of cryptography.
This book is developed by the community - please send me your contributions.
The source of this book is available here (https://github.com/snowch/hsm-guide/blob/master/book.md)
You can view the print version of the book here (https://gitprint.com/snowch/hsm-guide/blob/master/book.md)

Audience
Undergraduate and graduate students should find that this book supplements their studies in the theoretical
concepts of cryptography with practical applications.
Software Engineers and Architects designing and building security solutions using the Thales brand of HSM
will learn concepts and patterns of key management that can be applied to their designs

Book Organisation
Chapter 1, Introduction describes the role fulfilled by a HSM. The Thales series of HSM's are then introduced
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with a short history of their evolution. Finally, an open source Thales Simulator project is presented, with
hands on exercises for the reader to install the Simulator and then connect to it from Java, C#, and ruby
clients.
Chapter 2, Theory covers the cryptography basics, different types of cryptographic functions and algorithms.
That chapter includes the basic information of encryption and message authentication functions used in
cryptography. TODO finish about Chapter 2
Chapter 3, HSM Local Master Keys (LMKs) covers in detail the concept of the LMKs. The knowledge gained in
this chapter is fundamental to your understanding of the Thales HSM. Almost all other chapters depend on
you understanding the material covered in this chapter. This chapter concludes with exercise with the Thales
Simulator to help instill the concepts of LMKs.
Chapter 4, Key Concepts describes general key concepts that you need to know in addition to the material
covered in the previous chapter about LMKs. The knowledge in this chapter is of vital importance when
interacting with the Thales HSM. Exercises are provided with the Thales Simulator to put the concepts learnt
in this chapter into practise.
Chapter 5, Secure Key Exchange two sites that are secured with HSMs need to have a set of keys that are
shared between the HSMs. This chapter describes how keys are created and shared. Exercises are given to
setup two demo sites with the Thales Simulator and generate and share keys between the demo sites.
Chapter 6, Dynamic Key Exchange
TODO describe other chapters

Introduction
Overview
A primary role of a HSM is the secure management of digital keys. This document describes digital key
management concepts, and also describes some key management patterns for solving specific problems.
Other acronyms for Hardware Security Modules include:
HSM : Hardware Security Module / Host Security Module
TRSM : Tamper Resistant Security Module
SCD : Secure Cryptographic Devices
TODO: Why digital key management? Life without a HSM? TODO: Thales Simulator project overview.

Thales HSM History and Versions

TODO provide a brief history of THales HSMs and an overview of current HSM versions.

Thales HSM interaction

There are two usage patterns for interacting with the HSM:

Console Commands
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Console commands fall into the categories:

HSM diagnostics
Creating Keys
TODO what else?

Host Commands
Host commands fall into the categories:
TODO

Theory
TODO introduction to this section

Bits, Bytes and Hex

TODO write some information on bits, bytes and hex representation of data

Cryptographic functions
Cryptographic functions fall into two main classes called encryption and message authentication functions.
Encryption functions are used to transmit data securely. Encryption functions are two way functions and have
both encryption and decryption algorithms. The sender encrypts the message to be sent with the encryption
algorithm and the cryptographic key. After receiving the encrypted data the recipient uses a decryption
algorithm and cryptographic key to decrypt the encrypted data received:

Authentication functions are used to ensure that the message was not modified during transmission. The
message authentication function result is not reversable. The sender calculates a check sum of the message
and sends it together with plaintext or encrypted message. The sender, using the same message
authentication algorithm can verify the check summ received together with the message. If the check sum is
valid, the receiver can be sure that the message was not modified during transmission:

Encryption functions
Encryption functions are divided into two classes, symmetric and asymmetric.
Symmetic encryption algorithms uses the same key for both encryption of plaintext data and decryption of
ciphertext. Usually, the decryption algorithm is completely reversed encryption algorithm. The symmetric
encryption can use stream ciphers or block ciphers. This document covers only block cipher encryption.
Block cipher algorithms operate with fixed length blocks of bits on input, if the plain text message can not be
split into blocks of the required length before encryption, it has to be padded with additional bytes to meet the
required length.
Some of the most commonly used symmetric algorithms are:
Data Encryption Standard (DES / 3DES)
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Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

Blowfish
Twofish

Asymmetric, also known as public-key algorithms use different keys (key pairs) for data encryption and
decryption, these are called the private key and public key. Both the private and public keys are mathematicaly
linked. The asymmetric encryption and decryption algorithms are also different. Before communication the
receiver generates the pair of keys and keeps private key secret. The public key is distributed with other parties
involved in data exchange. The public key used to encrypt data can't be used to decrypt it. Data can only be
decrypted with the private key.
Some of the most commonly used asymmetric algorithms are:
Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA)
Diffie-Hellman
Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)
ElGamal
Elyptic Curve Cipher (ECC)

TODO - brief paragraph to say when to use symmetric and when to use assymetric?

Message authentication functions

Authentication functions are divided into 2 classes, hash and MAC.
Hash functions are message authentication functions wich produce a fixed length output sum (hash) of
variable length input data. The hash functions do not use the encryption functions to produce hashes. Usually
in cryptography, hash functions are applied on plain text messages before encryption, so that secrets are not
used to produce a hash of the message. Atacker can generate the hashes free for modified messages, because
of that no reason to use hash functions on encrypted messages or on plaintext messages without encryption
of them.
Some of the most commonly used hash functions:
MD5
SHA-1
SHA-2

MAC functions also called keyed hash functions are cryptographic based message authentication functions to
produce the short output check sum over the message used to ensure, that the message was not modified
during transmission. In contrast to hash functions, MACs are generated using cryptographic algorithms and
secret keys. The MAC can be securely applied to plain text messages without message encryption because it
uses cryptographic keys to produce MAC.
The most commonly used MAC algorithms are defined in ISO-9797 standard.
TODO - can we list some of the algorithms?

TODO - brief paragraph to say when to use hash and when to use mac?

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Padding
TODO - Introduction to paddings

Symmetric block cipher paddings

In a case of symmetric block ciphers, padding is used to complete the message till the full block length. For
example, if the message to be encrypted with DES algorithm has only 31 byte of data, it must be filled with
additional 1 byte to be 32 bytes long, since DES algorithm needs 8 bytes of input plaintext data.
PKCS#5 padding
PKCS#5 padding is the most common type of padding applied to message during encryption. The padding
must be removed from message after decryption to restore the original message content. PKCS#5 padding fills
message with bytes with padding length as value. If message meets length requirements, additional full block
of padding must be added to the end of message.
The example of PKCS#5 padding for incomplete message:

The example of PKCS#5 padding for complete 8 byte message:

The example of PKCS#5 padding on Java:

/*
* since different symmetric algoritms have different input data block sizes
* the blockSize variable is passed to the methods
*/
p u b l i c s t a t i c b y t e [ ] p k c s 5 P a d ( b y t e [ ] block, i n t blockSize) {
i n t padLen = blockSize - block. length % blockSize;
i f ( padLen = = 0) {
padLen = blockSize;
}
i n t padVal = ( b y t e ) padLen;
b y t e [ ] paddedBlock = n e w b y t e [ block. length + padLen] ;
System. arraycopy( block, 0, paddedBlock, 0, block. length) ;
f o r ( i n t k = 0; k < padLen; k+ + ) {
paddedBlock[ ( block. length + k) ] = ( b y t e ) padVal;
}
r e t u r n paddedBlock;
}
p u b l i c s t a t i c b y t e [ ] p k c s 5 U n p a d ( b y t e [ ] paddedBlock) {
i n t padLen = paddedBlock[ ( paddedBlock. length - 1) ] ;
i n t plainLen = paddedBlock. length - padLen;
b y t e [ ] plainBlock = n e w b y t e [ plainLen] ;
System. arraycopy( paddedBlock, 0, plainBlock, 0, plainLen) ;
r e t u r n plainBLock;
}
ISO-9797 Method 1 padding
ISO-9797 Method One padding is used for message MACing. This method adds zero bytes to the end of
message until it meets the length requirements. It is not necessery to add an additional block of padding if a

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message meets length requirements. Method One padding can not be used for message encryption because it
is impossible to differentiate padding bytes from the message content.

The example of ISO-9797 Method 1 padding on Java:

/*
* since different symmetric algoritms have different input data block sizes
* the blockSize variable is passed to the methods
*/
p u b l i c s t a t i c b y t e [ ] i s o 9 7 9 7 M e t h o d 1 P a d ( b y t e [ ] block, i n t blockSize) {
i n t padLen = blockSize - block. length % blockSize;
i f ( padLen = = blockSize) {
padLen = 0;
}
b y t e [ ] paddedBlock = n e w b y t e [ block. length + padLen] ;
System. arraycopy( block, 0, paddedBlock, 0, block. length) ;
r e t u r n paddedBlock;
}
ISO-9797 Method 2 padding
ISO-9797 Method Two padding is used for message padding for MAC calculation, but it can be used, also, for
message encryption. The padding applied to the message adds one byte vith value 0x80 (a singe bit with value
1) and, if necessery, adds zero bytes until the message meets length requirements. If that padding method is
used for message MACing, it is not necessery to add additional block of padding if message is complete, but in
a case of message encryption it must be.
Example of ISO9797 Method 2 padding for incomplete message

Example of ISO9797 Method 2 padding for complete message

The example of ISO-9797 Method 2 padding on Java:

/*
* since different symmetric algoritms have different input data block sizes
* the blockSize variable is passed to the methods
*/
p u b l i c s t a t i c b y t e [ ] i s o 9 7 9 7 M e t h o d 2 P a d ( b y t e [ ] block, i n t blockSize, b o o l e a n forMacing) {
i n t padLen = blockSize - block. length % blockSize;
// if padding is used for MACing, we do not need to add additional block
// in a case of complete message length (multiple of blockSize)
i f ( forMacing & & padLen = = blockSize) {
padLen = 0;
}
b y t e [ ] paddedBlock = n e w b y t e [ block. length + padLen] ;
System. arraycopy( block, 0, paddedBlock, 0, block. length) ;
i f ( padLen ! = 0) {
paddedBlock[ block. length] = ( b y t e ) 0x80;
}
r e t u r n paddedBlock;
}

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p u b l i c s t a t i c b y t e [ ] i s o 9 7 9 7 M e t h o d 2 U n p a d ( b y t e [ ] paddedMsg) {
i n t padIdx = 0;
f o r ( i n t i = paddedMsg. length - 1; i > 0; i- - ) {
i f ( paddedMsg[ i] = = ( b y t e ) 0x80) {
padIdx = i;
}
}
b y t e [ ] message = n e w b y t e [ paddedMsg. length - padIdx] ;
System. arraycopy( paddedMsg, 0, message, 0, message. length) ;
r e t u r n message;
}

Asymmetric cipher paddings

In the most cases asymmetric cipher paddings are used to randomise the output. Usualy, asymmetric
paddings have fixed length and is placed in plaintext message in the predefined position.
PKCS#1 v1.5 padding
PKCS#1 v1.5 padding is used to randomise the ciphertext output dirung RSA encryption to avoid some types of
attacks. The message length to be encrypted using RSA-PKCS#1 scheme must meet the condition mLen <= k 11, where mLen is plaintext message length and k is the public key length. The padding must be at least 11 bytes
long and contain at least 8 non-zero random bytes. The scheme below shows the padding structure:

When the ciphertext is decrypted, the padding structure must be validated. In a case of structure mismatch the
error should be returned. The conditions of valid padding are:
1st byte must be 0x00;
2nd byte must be 0x02;
Encrypted message must have a byte with value 0x00 separating random byte octet from message;
Random byte octet must be at least 8 non-zero bytes long.
The example of PKCS#1 v1.5 padding on Java:
/*
* The example below adds PKCS#1 padding of length to make message the same
* size as pubic key.
*/
p u b l i c s t a t i c b y t e [ ] p k c s 1 P a d ( b y t e [ ] message, i n t keyLen) {
java. util. Random r = n e w java. util. Random( ) ;
i n t padLen = keyLen - message. length - 3;
b y t e [ ] rand = n e w b y t e [ padLen] ;
b y t e [ ] paddedMsg = n e w b y t e [ message. length + padLen + 3] ;
paddedMsg[ 0] = ( b y t e ) 0x00;
paddedMsg[ 1] = ( b y t e ) 0x02;
paddedMsg[ padLen + 2] = ( b y t e ) 0x00;
i n t n = 0;
f o r ( i n t i = 0; i < padLen; i+ + ) {
n = r. nextInt( 256) ;
i f ( n = = 0) {
i- - ;
c o n t i n u e ;
}
rand[ i] = ( b y t e ) n;

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 }
System. arraycopy( rand, 0, paddedMsg, 2, rand. length) ;
System. arraycopy( message, 0, paddedMsg, padLen + 3, message. length) ;
r e t u r n paddedMsg;
}
p u b l i c s t a t i c b y t e [ ] p k c s 1 U n p a d ( b y t e [ ] paddedMsg)
t h r o w s javax. crypto. BadPaddingException {
i n t sepIdx = n e w String( paddedMsg) . indexOf( "\0", 1) ;
i f ( paddedMsg[ 0] ! = ( b y t e ) 0x00 | |
paddedMsg[ 1] ! = ( b y t e ) 0x02 | |
sepIdx = = - 1 | |
sepIdx < 10) {
t h r o w n e w javax. crypto. BadPaddingException( "Padding does not meet required conditions") ;
}
b y t e [ ] message = n e w b y t e [ paddedMsg. length - sepIdx - 1] ;
System. arraycopy( paddedMsg, sepIdx + 1, message, 0, message. length) ;
r e t u r n message;
}
PKCS#1 OAEP padding
PKCS#1 OAEP (Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding) padding is used to randomise the ciphertext output
dirung RSA encryption to avoid some types of attacks. The message length to be encrypted using RSA-OAEP
scheme must meet the condition mLen <= k - 2hLen - 2, where mLen is plaintext message length, k is a public
key length, hLen is the length of hash function output.
TODO - to finish.

Exercises
Asymmetric cipher paddings
1) To verify the PKCS#1 v1.5 padding the following Java code can be used:
i m p o r t java.security.KeyPair;
i m p o r t java.security.KeyPairGenerator;
i m p o r t java.security.PrivateKey;
i m p o r t java.security.PublicKey;
i m p o r t javax.crypto.Cipher;
p u b l i c c l a s s R S A P a d d i n g T e s t {
p r i v a t e s t a t i c String b y t e 2 h e x ( b y t e bs[ ] ) {
// refer to Appendix A for that method code
}
/*
* Method generates the private and public RSA key pair
*/
p r i v a t e s t a t i c KeyPair g e n e r a t e K e y P a i r ( i n t keyLen) t h r o w s Exception {
KeyPairGenerator kpg = KeyPairGenerator. getInstance( "RSA") ;
kpg. initialize( keyLen) ;
KeyPair kp = kpg. genKeyPair( ) ;
r e t u r n kp;
}

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 /*
* Method encrypts passed message with RSA public key applying
* PKCS1Padding to plaintext message
*/
p r i v a t e s t a t i c b y t e [ ] e n c r y p t ( String msg, PublicKey publicKey) t h r o w s Exception {
Cipher cipher = Cipher. getInstance( "RSA/ECB/PKCS1Padding") ;
cipher. init( Cipher. ENCRYPT_MODE, publicKey) ;
b y t e [ ] ciphMsg = cipher. doFinal( msg. getBytes( ) ) ;
r e t u r n ciphMsg;
}
/*
* Method decrypts passed cipher text with RSA private key and do not remove
* padding from plaintext message
*/
p r i v a t e s t a t i c b y t e [ ] d e c r y p t ( b y t e [ ] ciphMsg, PrivateKey privateKey) t h r o w s Exception {
Cipher cipher = Cipher. getInstance( "RSA/ECB/NoPadding") ;
cipher. init( Cipher. DECRYPT_MODE, privateKey) ;
b y t e [ ] plainMsg = cipher. doFinal( ciphMsg) ;
r e t u r n plainMsg;
}
p u b l i c s t a t i c v o i d m a i n ( String[ ] args) {
String msg = args[ 0] ;
i n t keyLen = Integer. parseInt( args[ 1] ) ;
t r y {
KeyPair kp = generateKeyPair( keyLen) ;
PublicKey publicKey = kp. getPublic( ) ;
PrivateKey privateKey = kp. getPrivate( ) ;
b y t e [ ] ciphMsg = encrypt( msg, publicKey) ;
b y t e [ ] plainMsg = decrypt( ciphMsg, privateKey) ;
System. out. println( byte2hex( plainMsg) ) ;
} c a t c h ( Exception e) {
e. printStackTrace( ) ;
}
}
}
The code above can be compiled with command:
javac RSAPaddingTest.java
Run with command:
java RSAPaddingTest <message> <key length>
The output will be as follows:
$ java JavaRSA 34234234234 512
0002570D03777D36E4B335597EFCDB68FA076D6B7DFD210B727C9A088D351D52846185F9C03826B35062C1EFB3644C190B
E6DDC2003334323334323334323334
The output abowe shows, that Java adds a random byte PKCS#1 padding to message making it the same length
as a public key. In the example public key (modulo) is 512 bits long.
00 - 1st byte is 0x00
02 - 2nd byte is 0x02
570D03777D36E4B335597EFCDB68FA076D6B7DFD210B727C9A088D351D52846185F9C03826B35062C1EFB3644C190BE6DDC2
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- random bytes (50)

00 - padding separator, 0x00;
3334323334323334323334 - plaintext message

Introduction to the Thales Simulator

Thales Simulator Exercises
This section provides some exercises to get hands on experience using the Thales Simulator.

Setting up the Thales Simulator

In this exercise, you will download, install and run the Thales Simulator on a Windows machine. The purpose
of this exercise is to get the Thales Simulator setup and ready for use in later chapters.
Download and Install the Thales Simulator
1. Download ThalesSim.Setup.0.9.6.x86.zip from: http://thalessim.codeplex.com/releases/view/88576
(http://thalessim.codeplex.com/releases/view/88576)

2. Unzip the downloaded file and execute the file ThalesWinSimulatorSetup.msi, accepting the default
options.
Starting the Thales Simulator
1. Navigate to the folder where you installed the Simulator (E.g. C:\Program Files (x86)\NTG\Thales
Simulator\)
2. Execute ThalesWinSimulator.exe (if your are running Windows 7, right click the file and select Run As
Administrator)
3. Click the Start Simulator button:
4. In the Application Events window, the simulator will inform you that it could not find a file containing
the LMK keys so it will create a new set of keys for you. The Simulator will always create the same keys.

Using the Simulator Console

In this section, we will connect to the HSM Console and run a basic command, Query Host (QH) to test
connectivity to the HSM.
For a full list of console commands, you will need to refer to the Console Reference Manual which is available
from Thales.
Note: The Thales Simulator only implements a subset of the commands. A list of implemented console
commands can be found here (http://thalessim.codeplex.com/wikipage?title=list%20of%20supported%20console%20commands)
.
Connecting with the Simulator Console

In this section, we ... TODO describe what we are doing here

1. Start the simulator as described in Starting the Thales Simulator (./book.md#starting-the-thales-simulator)
2. Click The Console button
3. In the console window click Connect to Console.

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4. Enter the console command QH followed by ENTER.

5. You should see something similar to this
In this exercise, we executed a console command QH against the simulator and observed the response that was
displayed by the simulator.
Connecting with a Python Client

See Appendix (TODO) to see instructions for:

installing python
running python code
i m p o r t binascii
i m p o r t socket
i m p o r t sys

# open a connection to the Thales Simulator

sock = socket. socket(socket. AF_INET, socket. SOCK_STREAM)
server_address = ('localhost', 9998)
sock. connect(server_address)
# the command we need to send
command = b'0006303030304e43'
# convert the hex string to binary
command = binascii. a2b_hex(command)
# send a command
sock. send(command)
# receive the command response
recv_data = sock. recv(1024)
# printout response
sys. stdout. buffer. write(recv_data)
# close the connection
sock. close()
The code simply opens a TCP connection to a Thales Simulator listening on localhost on port 9998. Next the
python client converts the string 0006303030304e43 from its hexidecimal format to binary and sends it to the
Thales Simulator. Finally the code receives the response and prints it to standard output.
To understand the meaning of the string 0006303030304e43, it can be broken down as follows (in reverse
order):
4e43 is the 2 byte command NC as hex
30303030 adds a 4 byte header 0000 as hex
0006 represents the length in hex of the comamnd and header (i.e. the length of 0000NC)
The command should output a response similar to the following:
! 0000ND007B44AC1DDEE2A94B0007- E000
The response from HSM can be broken down as follows:
! actualy is 0021, it is software header returned by HSM, actual response length

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0000 is HSM response header which is set the same as for received command
ND the response code. The response from HSM always is command code with incremented second letter
00 error code, 00 means that no errors occured during command processing
7B44AC1DDEE2A94B Local Master Key (see corresponding chapter) check value
0007-E000 means the HSM firmware revision number
Each command has its own response specification, see "Host command reference manual" for more details.

HSM Local Master Keys (LMKs)

Local Master Keys (LMKs) are a central concept for HSMs. This section describes LMKs in more detail.

LMK Overview
Local Master Keys are a sets of 40 DES keys. They are stored securely in the HSM making it very difficult for an
attacker to gain access to them. LMKs are the only keys that are stored in the HSM.
LMKs are not used for encrypting data, but are instead used to encrypt and decrypt other keys as these enter or
leave the HSM. LMKs are used to ensure that even if the data traffic between the HSM and an application is
recorded, the clear values of any exchanged keys are not compromised.
LMKs come in pairs and the Thales HSM contains several LMK pairs. Different LMK pairs are used to
encrypt/decrypt different types of security keys. LMK pairs are identified by two numbers, for example LMK
pair 04-05, LMK pair 14-15, etc. See the diagram below.

Each LMK pair is assigned a code. LMK pair 04-05 is assigned code 00, while LMK pair 14-15 is assigned code
02. The full list of HSM key pairs are listed in Table 2.1, LMK Key Pairs, below. Note that HSM key pairs do
not start at 00-01, instead the numbering starts at 04-05, and runs non-contiguously to 38-39.
Key Pair

Code

04-05

00

06-07

01

14-15

02

16-17

03

18-19

04

20-21

05

22-23

06

24-25

07

26-27

08

28-26

09

30-31

10

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Key Pair

Code

32-33

11

34-35

12

36-37

13

38-39

14

Each HSM has a unique set of LMK pairs that can be either randomly generated or loaded from smart cards.
HSM users jealously guard the LMKs because the integrity of the key management security scheme depends
upon them.

LMK Variants
Back when the HSM had only a handful of LMK pairs, more than the type of keys that had to be encrypted, a
way had to be found to ensure that different key types can be used but also provide a way to identify parity
errors with these key types. Variants are an easy way to pseudo-multiply your LMK pairs. (TODO validate this)
Keys are encrypted under LMK pairs using either the clear value of the LMK or a variant of the LMK. An LMK
variant is created by performing a XOR operation with a value on the LMK key. For example, variant 1 of an
LMK is created by XORing the LMK with the value 000000000000000000000000000000A6. The Thales HSM
supports 10 variants for each LMK pair, with variant 0 being the clear LMK itself. The full list of variant
calculation functions can be seen in the Table below.

Variant number

Variant Calculation Function - XOR LMK with:

Not applicable - use clear value of LMK

000000000000000000000000000000A6

0000000000000000000000000000005A

0000000000000000000000000000006A

000000000000000000000000000000DE

0000000000000000000000000000002B

00000000000000000000000000000050

00000000000000000000000000000074

0000000000000000000000000000009C

000000000000000000000000000000FA

Exercises
TODO - what exercises could be performed on the Simulator around LMK Concepts? Could we walk through
the default keys with the HSM simulator and how to change those keys?

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Key Concepts
Key Types
Each different key supported by the Thales HSM has a unique code called the key type code. The key type is a
three-digit number and is made up from the code of the LMK pair and the LMK variant. Therefore, keys
encrypted under LMK pair 04-05 using a variant 1 will have a key type equal to 00 + 1 = 001. It is important
to understand key types since several Thales commands expect key type codes as parameters. The full list of
key types can be seen in the table below.
LMK Key Pair

LMK Code

Variant

Key Type Code

Key Type

04-05

00

000

ZMK

06-07

01

001

ZPK

14-15

02

002

PVK, TMK, TPK

14-15

02

402

CVK, CSCK

16-17

03

003

TAK

22-23

06

006

WWK

26-27

08

008

ZAK

28-29

09

009

BDK1

28-29

09

109

MK-AC

28-29

09

209

MK-SMI

28-29

09

309

MK-SMC

28-29

09

409

MK-DAC

28-29

09

509

MK-DN

28-29

09

609

BDK2

28-29

09

709

MK-CVC3

28-29

09

809

BDK3

30-31

0A

00A

ZEK

32-33

0B

00B

DEK

32-33

0B

30B

TEK

In the latest payShield9000 and HSM8000 firmwares Thales has introduced second, PCI-HSM standard
compliant, key type table with the changes around 002 key type - PVK, TMK, TPK. The changes moves TMK
and TPK to different LMK pair and Variants leaving PVK the only key of 002 type:
LMK Key Pair

LMK Code

Variant

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Key Type Code

Key Type

LMK Key Pair

LMK Code

Variant

Key Type Code

Key Type

14-15

02

002

PVK

36-37

0D

70D

TPK

36-37

0D

80D

TMK

Key Check Value

The check value of a key is derived by DES encrypting 16 zeroes (8 zero bytes) using that key. For example, the
KCV for key 0123456789ABCDEF is D5D44FF720683D0D
The purpose of a KCV is to ensure that a key has been correctly transmitted between different parties and that
they key is also configured correctly in systems. It is common practice to transmit the KCV of a key along with
the key itself. Sometimes, the complete result of the DES encrypt operation is used, but typically only the first
six digits are used (in the example, D5D44F).

Key Formats
The Thales HSM uses two major formats when processing security keys. These are Variant and ANSI.
The variant concept is similar to the one used to form LMK variants: a key is XORed with a value to form the
key variant. Double-length keys are XORed with the value:
00000000000000A6 000000000000005A
and triple-length keys are XORed with the value:
00000000000000A6 000000000000005A 000000000000006A
TODO: how does the variant concept differ to the LMK variant concept?
The ANSI format is much simpler: a key is used as-is without performing any additional operations on it.

Key Scheme
Depending on their length and key format, keys are designated by a key scheme that helps to quickly identify
the nature of a key. Key schemes are the following:
Key Scheme

Description

Single-length ANSI keys

Double-length variant keys

Triple-length variant keys

Double-length ANSI keys

Triple-length ANSI keys

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Exercises
TODO - what exercises could be performed on the Simulator around LMK Concepts?

Secure Key Exchange

Overview
To securely exchange information between two users using the DES encryption scheme, it is vital to securely
share a set of initial keys. This role is fulfilled by the Zone Master Keys. Unlike an LMK which does not leave
the HSM, ZMKs are intended to be shared between sites to create secure Zones. The ZMK is distributed
manually between the sites. The ZMK allow future (data encrypting) keys to be automatically shared between
sites by encrypting those future keys with the ZMK. In that regard, they work very much like the LMKs with
the important exception that they can be shared between users.
ZMKs have a key type code of 000 (they are encrypted under LMK pair 04-05 with a variant of 0).
TODO diagram
The transfer of the ZMK between sites is performed manually. The ZMK is shared in parts (components) so
that no one person will see the key.
TODO diagram
The data encryption key is a Zone PIN Key (ZPK). The ZPK was historically used to encrypt PINs for transfer
between sites (e.g. between Acquirer and Issuer).
For local storage (e.g. on the application server using the ZMK), the ZMK is encrypted under one of the LMK
keys.

Example - Secure Key Exchange

Two parties want to exchange a ZMK. One party generates a random ZMK using three clear components which
are the following:
2CBF0D8FA4E66ECE 6B239E25B9BAD934
B60825E3790D31CE 4A4AA74397461C13
29BFE3C1D0C1E50B CD7038A42CFB160B
TODO: describe what is meant by clear components
Each of these clear components are kept by a separate custodian that works for the first party and are
delivered to different custodians of the second party. To create the complete ZMK, each custodian enters their
component to the HSM which combines them to form the ZMK. Most typically, the clear components are
simply XORed to form the ZMK. In the example, the ZMK value is:
B308CBAD0D2ABA0B EC1901C20207D32C
When generating the ZMK, the first party also gives the KCV of the ZMK to the second party (for the example
key the KCV is 6CE4CF). That way, the second party can verify the correct reception and data entry of the ZMK
components.
TODO: See Exercise Creating a ZMK for hands on experience creating a ZMK.

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Exercises
Creating a Zone Master Key (ZMK)
In this exercise, we create a Zone Master Key (ZMK) using console commands.
The ZMK is distributed manually as components. To create the ZMK, we first create three ZMK components.
Generate the ZMK Components
Generate three ZMK components using the console command Generate Component (GC). Repeat the
command three times as shown below:
GC # User input
Key length [1,2,3]: 2 # User input
Key Type: 000 # User input
Key Scheme: U # User input
Clear Component: 79CD 2380 9B4F C1C4 7F9E FB2A DF2A 674A
Encrypted Component: U 1BA5 185A FCF1 5A1B 274B E1E0 03B4 7C2A
Key check value: 7A5B C7
GC # User input
Key length [1,2,3]: 2 # User input
Key Type: 000 # User input
Key Scheme: U # User input
Clear Component: 0157 B3DF 6116 3402 372C 54FD 62F2 1C91
Encrypted Component: U FCE4 7AF7 FFF8 9F40 2407 A35A F063 D3E1
Key check value: 1E79 CB
GC # User input
Key length [1,2,3]: 2 # User input
Key Type: 000 # User input
Key Scheme: U # User input
Clear Component: 7AEA B5A4 1A9E 9B68 EF80 494C 0819 4ADA
Encrypted Component: U EE8D 4F9E C8B2 ADF4 9CD2 F0D2 7F5C 95C5
Key check value: 277A 5F
Description

We are generating a Double-length key, so we choose a Key Length of 2. See Key Schemes for a list of the key
schemes.
We are generating ZMK keys, so we use the Key Type 000. See Key Types for a list of the key types.
We are generating a Double-length variant key, which has a Key Scheme of U. See Key Schemes for a list of the
key schemes.
TODO: refer to a section that describes how to decide which scheme and type of key is most suitable for your
particular encryption requirements? E.g. why have we chosen Double-length variant key and not Single-length
ANSI keys for this example?
Generate the ZMK from the components
This step uses the FK command to generate the ZMK from the three ZMK components previously generated:
TODO: describe the various command options and how to choose which option values to use.
FK # User input
Key length [1,2,3]: 2 # User input
Key Type: 000 # User input
Key Scheme: U # User input
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Component type [X,H,E,S]: X # User input

Enter number of components (2-9): 3 # User input
Enter component #1: 1BA5185AFCF15A1B274BE1E003B47C2A # User input from GC response: U 1BA5 185
A FCF1 5A1B 274B E1E0 03B4 7C2A
Enter component #2: FCE47AF7FFF89F402407A35AF063D3E1 # User input from GC response: U FCE4 7AF
7 FFF8 9F40 2407 A35A F063 D3E1
Enter component #3: EE8D4F9EC8B2ADF49CD2F0D27F5C95C5 # User input from GC response: U EE8D 4F9
E C8B2 ADF4 9CD2 F0D2 7F5C 95C5
Encrypted key: U 104C 4216 A751 FEEE FF55 698B 26C5 7789
Key check value: BA0F C3
The description of the Key length, Key Type and Key Scheme values are described in the Description for
Generate the ZMK Components.
The Component type is either:
X = XORed clear components. The useversal way and the most commonly used, to exchange the keys
between different parties.
H = Clear Half or Third Key (key splitted into 2 or 3 blocks, each block is entered as separate component).
Like XORed clear components, this is applied way to exchange keys between any parties.
E = Components encrypted under LMK. HSM forst decrypts the components and XORs decrypted
components. Such components can be used only localy since 3rd parties do not have an access to
component encryption LMK pair. This is the way to store keys in components in secure manner.
S = Components stored on smartcards. Can only be used to exchange keys between Thales HSMs.

Dynamic Key Exchange

Overview
TODO: Why dynamic key exchange?

Zone PIN Key (ZPK)

The Zone PIN Key (ZPK) is a data encrypting key. It is used to encrypt the data that is transmitted in a security
zone. For transfer between sites, the ZPK is encrypted under the ZMK. When stored locally (e.g. on the
application server), the ZPK is encrypted using one of the LMK Keys.
ZPKs have a key type code of 001 (encrypted under LMK pair 06-07 with a variant of 0).
TODO: See Exercise Creating a ZPK for hands on experience creating a ZPK.

Example - Dynamic Key Exchange

Assume that the ZMK presented in the previous example has been exchanged between two parties. One party,
then, generates a random ZPK equal to:
ADD3B5C7B576D3AE 38B90B7C0EB67A7C, KCV = CB59C0
The party then encrypts this ZPK under the ZMK to safely transmit this to the other party. The ZPK under the
ZMK is:
C9A62E96ADFB52A7 815BE8D7E730B24E, KCV = CB59C0

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Key Translation
In our previous example, the value C9A62E96ADFB52A7 815BE8D7E730B24E represents the randomly created
ZPK encrypted under the previously created ZMK. But imagine that one of the parties that have exchanged this
ZPK needs to transmit it to another party with which they share a different ZMK which well call ZMK2 . To
properly transmit the ZPK to the other zone that is secured with ZMK2, the ZPK has to be:
Decrypted under ZMK.
Encrypted under ZMK2.
This process is called key translation. Key translation does not happen with specific key types as the ZMK that
was used in the previous example but is a more general process - for example it is possible to translate a key
from encryption under the ZMK to encryption under an LMK.
Key translation always takes place within the HSM to avoid exposing the clear value of the key being
translated.

Translating a ZPK (between ZMK encryption and LMK encryption)

The HSM provides functionality to translate a ZPK between ZMK and LMK. This is used when a ZPK is received
by Site B. In this case, Site A sends the ZPK encrypted with the ZMK to Site B. Site B translates the ZPK to LMK
encryption.
The ZPK under LMK encryption is used for encrypting/decrypting the data sent between the sites.
TODO: insert diagram

Exercises
Creating a Zone PIN Key (ZPK)
In this exercise, we create a Zone PIN Key (ZPK) using console commands.
When prompted for the ZMK, use the encrypted ZMK value from the section called Creating a Zone Master
Key (ZMK).
KG
Key length [1,2,3]: 2
Key Type: 001
Key Scheme (LMK): U
Key Scheme (ZMK) [ENTER FOR NONE]: X
Enter encrypted ZMK [ENTER FOR NONE]: U 104C 4216 A751 FEEE FF55 698B 26C5 7789
Enter ZMK check value [ENTER TO SKIP CV TEST]:
Key under LMK: U 8586 51EC 83AF CA66 8175 804F 5B7D CD6B
Key encrypted for transmission: X BAA5 18AA D10D 28A2 D32A 5688 317F 44EB
Key check value: 6543 F4

PIN block creation (clear PIN blocks)

PIN block encryption and security zones. ZPKs and
TPKs
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PIN translation
MACing
CVV/CVV2/iCVV
Appendix A - Commonly used code in examples
p r i v a t e s t a t i c String b y t e 2 h e x ( b y t e bs[ ] ) {
i n t i;
String s = n e w String( ) ;
String hex_digits = "0123456789ABCDEF";
b y t e c;
i f ( bs = = n u l l | | bs. length = = 0) {
r e t u r n s;
}
f o r ( i = 0; i < bs. length; + + i) {
c = bs[ i] ;
s + = hex_digits. charAt( ( c > > 4) & 0xf) ;
s + = hex_digits. charAt( c & 0xf) ;
}
r e t u r n s;
}

Appendix B - Some other usefull code peaces

Appendix C - Introductory Books in Cryptography
Appendix - Installing Python
Download and install the latest version of python from https://www.python.org/download/
(https://www.python.org/download/)

Appendix - Connecting to the HSM using different

languages
Connecting with a Perl Client

In this exercise, we execute a host command against the Thales Simulator.

If you have perl installed, you can run the NC (Perform diagnostics) host command against the HSM as follows:
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 #!/usr/bin/env perl
u s e IO::Socket::INET;
m y $sock = n e w IO::Socket::INET(PeerAddr= > "localhost:9998") o r die;
$sock- > send(pack "H*","0006303030304e43");
$sock- > recv($data, 1024); p r i n t $data;
The command should output a response similar to the following:
! 0000ND007B44AC1DDEE2A94B0007- E000
The response from HSM can be broken down as follows:
! actualy is 0021, it is software header returned by HSM, actual response length
0000 is HSM response header which is set the same as for received command
ND the response code. The response from HSM always is command code with incremented second letter
00 error code, 00 means that no errors occured during command processing
7B44AC1DDEE2A94B Local Master Key (see corresponding chapter) check value
0007-E000 means the HSM firmware revision number
Each command has its own response specification, see "Host command reference manual" for more details.
Connecting with a Java Client

In this session, we connect to the HSM over TCP/IP using Java. When we connect using Java, we can send
Host Commands to the HSM.
In the code example, below, we send the command Perform Diagnostics (NC), and print the response to
System.out.
For a full treatment of Host Programming the Thales HSM, refer to the Thales documentation Host
Programmers Manual. For a full list of Host Commands, refer to the Thales documentation Host Command
Reference Manual
i m p o r t java.io.BufferedOutputStream;
i m p o r t java.io.InputStream;
i m p o r t java.io.OutputStream;
i m p o r t java.net.Socket;
i m p o r t java.nio.ByteBuffer;
p u b l i c c l a s s M a i n {
p u b l i c s t a t i c v o i d m a i n ( String[ ] args) t h r o w s Exception {
Socket socket = n e w Socket( "localhost", 9998) ;
String command = "0006303030304e43";
// the following line converts the hex command string to a byte array
b y t e [ ] bytes = ByteBuffer. allocate( 8) . putLong( Long. parseLong( command, 16) ) . array( ) ;
OutputStream out = socket. getOutputStream( ) ;
BufferedOutputStream bufferedOut = n e w BufferedOutputStream( out, 1024) ;
bufferedOut. write( bytes) ;
bufferedOut. flush( ) ;
InputStream in = socket. getInputStream( ) ;
i n t result;
w h i l e ( ( result = in. read( ) ) ! = - 1) {
System. out. print( ( c h a r ) result) ;
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 }
socket. close( ) ;
}
}
See the description from Connecting with a perl client (/book.md#connecting-with-a-perl-client) for the format of the
command: 0006303030304e43.
Connecting with a Unix client

If you have netcat (nc) installed, you can run a command by using echo convert a hex string to binary and send
it to the Thales simulator using netcat.
Here we send the Thales command NC which asks the Thales Simulator to Perform Diagnostics and return the
result:
$ echo - ne '\x00\x06\x30\x30\x30\x30\x4e\x43' | nc localhost 9998
! 0000ND007B44AC1DDEE2A94B0007- E000
See the description from Connecting with a perl client (/book.md#connecting-with-a-perl-client) for the format of the
command: 0006303030304e43.
Connecting with a PL/SQL client

If you want to call HSM using PL/SQL you can use the UTL_TCP package as in example procedure below:
C R E A T E O R R E P L A C E P R O C E D U R E call_hsm I S
v_to_hsm VARCHAR2(255);
n_length NUMBER(2);
v_from_hsm VARCHAR2(255);
rw_from_hsm RAW(100);
c utl_tcp.c o n n e c t i o n ;
B E G I N
c := utl_tcp.open_connection('192.168.229.1', '9998', N U L L , N U L L , N U L L , N U L L , N U L L , N U
L L , 1);
v_to_hsm := '0000' | | 'NC';
v_to_hsm := CHR(0) | | CHR(L E N G T H (v_to_hsm)) | | v_to_hsm;
v_from_hsm := utl_tcp.write_text(c , v_to_hsm);
n_length := utl_tcp.available(c , 1);
n_length := utl_tcp.read_raw(c , rw_from_hsm, 100);
S E L E C T SUBSTR(C A S T (rw_from_hsm A S VARCHAR2(255)), 5)
I N T O v_from_hsm
F R O M dual;
v_from_hsm := utl_i18n.raw_to_char(v_from_hsm);
dbms_output.put_line(v_from_hsm);
utl_tcp.close_connection(c );
E N D ;

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