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SOCIAL CONTROL AND

POLITICS IN EVERYDAY LIFE


Methodological approaches

FEBRUARY 7, 2013
MARTIN PEDERSEN STUB
Cultural sociology Law, Power & Social Justice

University of Southern Denmark, Esbjerg

Februar 7. 2014

Methodological approaches
Table of Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 2
What is Power?.............................................................................................................................. 2
References .................................................................................................................................... 4

Martin Pedersen Stub

University of Southern Denmark, Esbjerg

Februar 7. 2014

Introduction
In the first week of class we have been presented to three theorists Foucault, Nader and
Lefebvre.

What is Power?
This the main question that separates Foucault from the others. Since Foucault has a high level of
abstraction and thus a philosophical approach to his studies he first considers the proper basis for
analysis. Thou never directly associated to any particular philosophy of science Foucaults choice
of objectivizing power in order to analyze it, clearly affiliates him with the thinking of Mingers Critical
Realism (2004) and maybe even a derivation of Habermas redefinition of Critical Theory, as
discussed by Mendelson in 1979, except for the lack of emancipation. Separating power from the
subject allows Foucault to study power in any setting, with the restriction that it happens between
subjects, as it is still a social phenomenon. This separation of power from subject is also a separation
from time and space, allowing Foucault to apply his preferred method of genealogy. The ability
to analyze power in separate, temporal, geographical, cultural and contextual situations and
afterwards bringing it together has the benefit of supplying an abundance of possible data, and
keeping generalizability as a goal. The downsides of genealogy is however a matter of
presentation. Supporting theoretical claims by use of historical instances, is based on the choice
of which historical instances. Are the chosen instances the best representatives of the analyzed
object, or are there other who contradicts the chosen theory/hypothesis? Using history as an
endless pool of supporting arguments makes it difficult to evaluate validity as histories totality is
almost incomprehensible. Therefor genealogy creates seemingly generalizable analysis with a
high level of perceived validity, but whether or not this is the case rests to a high degree on the
ethics of, and trust in, the researcher. The benefits of genealogy are however also very high. The
possibilities of combining detailed exemplifications with a critical perspective alternating between
the specific and the whole provides the tools for historical and yet new observations of powers
theoretical evolution through time and between subjects. Foucault shows this with the
transference of pastoral power to the modern-/capitalist-/service society. Not questioning
Foucaults level of competence genealogy as a whole can be a fruitful analytical method with
an abundance of pitfalls.
Nadars approach to analyzing power also utilizes historical data as supportive exemplification. It
is however used in a more hands on approach as multiple ethnographic surveys, including
Nadars own work, also add to the main goal of showing that native power structures tend to be
taken for granted and overlooked in anthropological studies of power dynamics. Again this goal

Martin Pedersen Stub

University of Southern Denmark, Esbjerg

Februar 7. 2014

relates to the proud Marxist tradition of critical theory, reminding the researcher that he/she is
schooled in and by the society he/she live in. This ultimately relates to the earlier mentioned
evolved communicative emancipatory edition of Habermas critical theory. I now throw in
Bourdieus double rupture for the sake of name-dropping. The result of the analysis is however
fundamentally different. Since the goal is not to analyze power in itself it is never objectified, and
thus happens to, or is preformed by, a subject. This means that neither the historical data or the
referenced surveys are free of temporal, geographical, cultural or contextual attributes, making it
impossible to generalize or universalize power as a concept. This is not an analytical fault, as it is
not the goal of the analysis, but a fundamental difference from the approach of Foucault.
In Gardiner presenting Lefebvre, the link to Marxism is a bit more explicit. His critique of everyday
life falls between the two other discussed texts, as the veils concealing the erosion of human
power by the bureaucratic superstructures must be removed to emancipate humanity and grant
access to an idealized future. This time closer to traditional Marxism than Habermass critical theory.
The methodological approach is this time similar to that of Foucaults genealogy, depicting
multiple examples from everyday life to strengthen the argument, that we are all surrounded by
invisible power structures, draining, controlling and dominating us. A difference worth mentioning
is that Lefebvres examples are more contemporary, as his main focus is the dissection and analysis
of everyday society around us/him. Therefore power is as intangible to Lefebvre, as it is to Nadar.
Again power is sensitive to context, time, etc. as it is performed by the oppressor on the oppressed.
The above show us three things.
1) Whether or not one is fond of critical realism and the objectification of abstracts, Foucault shows
its unique methodological merits through his creative application of history for increased
generalizability and validity.
2) As it keeps emerging in the text, Critical theory, both pre and post Habermas, must be on to
something when it comes to analyzing the biasness of societal power structures.
3) When all you got is a hammer every problem looks like a nail.

Martin Pedersen Stub

University of Southern Denmark, Esbjerg

Februar 7. 2014

References
Mendelson, Jack (1979). The Habermas-Gadamer Debate. New German Ctitique. No. 18 s. 44-73
Mingers, J. (2004). Real-izing information systems: critical realism as an underpinning philosophy for
information systems. Information and Organization. Vol. 14 s. 87-103
The three texts for Monday.

Martin Pedersen Stub

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