This article was downloaded by: [Adelphi University]

On: 22 August 2014, At: 23:39

Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer
House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal for

Psychoanalysis and the Neurosciences
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rnpa20

Response to Commentaries
Howard Shevrin
Published online: 09 Jan 2014.

To cite this article: Howard Shevrin (2002) Response to Commentaries, Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal
for Psychoanalysis and the Neurosciences, 4:2, 146-149, DOI: 10.1080/15294145.2002.10773393
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2002.10773393

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the Content) contained
in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no
representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of
the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,
and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied
upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall
not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other
liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or
arising out of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic
reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any
form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://
www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

146

Howard Shevrin

Response to Commentaries

Downloaded by [Adelphi University] at 23:39 22 August 2014

Reply to Bernstein and Loftus

Although not denying the evidence that appropriately trained judges can distinguish true
memories from false memories on the basis of
qualitative dierences, Bernstein and Loftus deny
that these ndings have any practical value and
thus they conclude that the nding is of limited
signicance. This conclusion ignores a critical
theoretical question at the heart of the memory
controversy to which the evidence cited is highly
relevant: What happens to the memory trace with
each retrieval, especially when false or misleading
information is suggested? The original position
taken by Loftus was that the original memory
trace is expunged and replaced by the new
distorted memory, and is thus irretrievable. When
the McClosky and Zaragoza (1985) research
demonstrated that this was not the case, that
the original memory trace had not been eaced
and was retrievable under appropriate conditions,
Loftus retreated to the position that one can
never know how the memory is really represented
and one must rely on recall in any case (Loftus,
Schooler, and Wagenaar, 1985). But McClosky
and Zaragoza had in fact relied on recall to
demonstrate the retrievability of the original
unchanged memory. The ndings support the
view that, while memory reports can change
because of suggestion, memory traces need not
change. Aside from practical implications, this is
an important contribution to memory theory.
But let us turn to the issue of practicality.
Bernstein and Loftus argue that the dierences
favoring the discrimination of false from true
memories are quite small even though statistically
signicant (52% vs. 46%). And even though there
is an interesting convergence between the content
cues and neurophysiological research concerning
the sensory character of true recall, this is of little
practical value. But this small dierence was
found with inexpert judges trained on the spot for
experimental purposes. One would be interested
to see how experts with considerable experience in
sorting truth from falsity in peoples' accounts such
as policemen, judges, and lawyers fare in doing the
same task. Ekman has reported that policemen do
a better job than laymen in detecting lying from
facial expressions. And perhaps psychoanalysts
who develop considerable knowledge and experience with a particular individual over years might
also show some aptitude in this direction. This
research remains to be done.

But this disconnect between the persistence

of the original memory trace in the face of
erroneous recall raises an important question.
Granted that a true memory leaves a ``sensory
signature'' (Fabiani, Stadler, and Wessels, 2000)
indicating that it is the result of a perception
rather than of a thought, memory, or, most
important from a psychoanalytic standpointof
a fantasy, why isn't that memory trace more often
available but seemingly remains silent and is
masked by erroneous recall? To my mind this is
the quintessential psychoanalytic question.
Between the activation of the true memory and
its temporary replacement by erroneous versions
a good deal can happen, including most prominently defensive operations of various sorts, nor
should the possibility be ignored that the shaping
of the erroneous memory is responsive to a desire
to please someone. From a psychoanalytic
standpoint, the ``false'' memory is a derivative
of the true memory and stands in some relationship to it, rather than simply eacing it.
Response to Smolen's Commentary
In her commentary, Smolen calls attention to ve
problems for further consideration:
1.
2.

3.
4.

5.

The distinction of interest to psychoanalysis

is not that between true and false memory,
but between reality and fantasy.
Psychoanalytic constructivist theoreticians
are quite willing to draw on cognitive
connectionist theory to account for the fact
that memories are constantly changing as
they are retrieved. Thus cognitive theory is
not only useful to classical psychoanalysts.
The role of development in memory formation, in particular from non-verbal to verbal
modalities, is overlooked in the target paper.
Fonagy's conception of transference based
on procedural enactments is more complex
than described in the target paper. It can be
used to explain the principle of repetition
compulsion and the painful reenactments of
posttraumatic stress disorder.
Cognitive psychology and psychoanalysis are
not interdependent sciences so that a change
in one becomes critical for the other. Rather
Freud turned his back on the psychology of
his time to found a unique and irreducible
science.

Downloaded by [Adelphi University] at 23:39 22 August 2014

Response to Commentaries
1. True and false memory; reality and fantasy
It is certainly the case that psychoanalysis is
concerned with reality and fantasy. But psychoanalysis is also concerned with true and false
memory. Moreover, psychoanalysis is especially
concerned with the relationship between true and
false memory, on the one hand, and reality and
fantasy on the other. The term fantasy covers a
wide territory, all the way from conscious daydreams to unconscious scenarios (that some
prefer to call phantasies to underscore the
dierence between these two extremes).
Although phantasies are responsive to our
desires, they are not constructed in isolation from
reality. And when we talk of reality we mean our
perceptions of it and the memories based on these
perceptions. Walter Mitty's daydreams are not
simply spontaneous wish fulllments, but have to
be appreciated against the background of his
inhibited existence. He perceives in fact that
women are sexually interested in him, but it is
precisely because of these perceptions which for
him spell danger that he inhibits his response to
them and repudiates his perceptions. The fantasies are safer eorts to make up for this lack of
gratication, or more technically, are eorts at
substitute gratications based on primary process
mechanisms. And this is the root of all fantasy
from the simplest to the most complex: in the face
of the absence of the need gratifying object and
thus of need gratication, the memory of the need
gratifying object is activated and is either directly
represented or is represented in some disguised
form. No matter how complex the fantasy it
shares this same essential structure. As we know
from clinical experience, it is not trivial whether
the object in question truly was absent, depriving,
or abusive, or whether it was the insatiability of
the individual's desires that is in question. Thus
whether at the root of a fantasy is a correct
perception of reality no matter how subsequently
disguised and distorted, or a correct perception
distorted by peremptory desires, is crucial to
understanding the ``meaning'' of the person's
fantasy. The cognitive neuroscience data cited in
the target article demonstrates that despite false
recollection the true perception has registered.
These ndings provides support for the psychoanalytic view that at the bottom of every
phantasy is some perception and memory of
reality that is in fact retrievable, and only through
that retrieval will the person be able nally to put
the past that is pathologically active in the present
to rest. Often the retrieval of that past is at best
circumstantial and, as we say, reconstructed, but
nevertheless remains crucial. For this important
reason I submit that the nature of phantasy

147
cannot be fully understand without consideration
of what reality, as perceived and remembered, it is
intended to deal with. Perception and memory
play vital roles in fantasy formation along with
our desires; otherwise fantasies are phantasms
emerging out of nowhere and responsive to
nothing.
These considerations apply whether one
subscribes to an oral anaclitic model or an
attachment model of early development because
attachment theory presupposes that the care
giving gure can be present or absent with very
dierent consequences.
2.

Psychoanalytic constructivism and cognitive

connectionism
Although Smolen is skeptical elsewhere in her
commentary as to how relevant cognitive psychology can be to psychoanalysis, she appears to
endorse the eorts of psychoanalytic constructivists to draw upon cognitive connectionism as a
way to account for the mercurial nature of
memory that according to this view changes with
every retrieval. Aside from the fact that the
evidence cited in the target article clearly repudiates this view, it is also the case that connectionism is a poor theory to rely on in this regard. The
nodes and links that make up connectionist
networks depend entirely on changing weights
assigned to the nodes, which then determine what
links are activated. Changes in these weights come
about through repeated identical inputs and must
be monitored by a knowing programmer; the
system is not autonomously correctable or
changeable. Thus if the person whose networks
are in question acts like the programmer, then he
or she knows why and how the weights are being
changed although there may be no consciousness
of these program changes. When this is added to
the empirical evidence that the original network
connections are not lost, then the changes
wrought by the self-programmer are intentional,
serving a purpose at the time, but not at the cost
of retrieving the original node weights and
connections which may be reinstated by the same
self-programmer to serve other intentions.
3. The role of development in memory formation
Smolen advances the hypothesis that the preverbal stage of early development, and the
subsequent vicissitudes of development substantially eect the nature of memory formation. The
main implication of her position appears to be
that procedural memory must be the prevalent
form of memory during that early preverbal
period, and declarative or episodic memory
appears much later with the advent of spoken

148

Downloaded by [Adelphi University] at 23:39 22 August 2014

language). These early procedural memories are

what emerge as enactments in the transference
and are thus not based on the repression of
episodic memories. They must then be dealt with
dierently in treatment. Unhappily for this
position the evidence from developmental research supports the view that declarative and
procedural memory are present side by side from
the rst two months. It has been demonstrated
through various studies relying on attention shift
and motor response paradigms that the particular
context within which the original learning takes
place plays a crucial role in retrieval. Context is a
key factor discriminating declarative episodic
memory from procedural memory. Moreover,
declarative episodic memories may form unconsciously and be retrieved unconsciously.
4.

Fonagy's conception of transference as procedural enactments is complex

As the response to the third point anticipated, if
episodic memories are formed fairly early in
development then it becomes dicult to argue
that preverbal procedural memories are the ones
enacted in the transference. It is equally if not
more likely that early episodic memories having
to do with particular important people in specic
contexts are the ones re-enacted in the transference. Smolen believes that transferences based on
procedural memory are highly resistant to
change. She further suggests that procedural
memories provide a way by which the principle
of repetition compulsion can be explained, as well
as the dramatic enactment involved in posttraumatic stress disorder. In view of the ndings
on infantile episodic memory, one would be hard
pressed to distinguish highly resistant episodic
reenactments from highly resistant procedural
enactments. But we do have some idea as to why
some episodic reenactments in the transference
are tough to changethe repression is strong.
With respect to procedural enactments presumably not based on repression one would be hard
pressed to come up with a reason as to why they
would be dicult unless one simply asserts that
habits are hard to change. But this does not tell us
why, a long-standing diculty with theories based
on habit. As for the principle of repetition
compulsion Freud asserted that it was a vicissitude of our instinctual life, by no means the
outcome of a habitual action or learned pattern.
One is free to identify the repetition compulsion
with a habitual action; but in that case one is
simply using a new term to refer to the same
thing. Rightly or wrongly, Freud was attempting
to oer an explanation of why we so often nd
ourselves in the same pickle, rather than asserting

Howard Shevrin
that we have a way of developing bad habits.
PTSD poses a real problem for procedural
explanations. The traumatic experience, rather
than being based on repeated enactments, is often
the outcome of one single experience. The
experience is unique and unrepeatable. The
repetition of the traumatic experience cannot be
explained as a procedural enactment since there
was no procedural learning present. In summary,
it is hard to see how procedural memory enacted
in the transference would help us understand why
certain transferences resist modication, or explain the repetition compulsion, or advance our
understanding of PTSD.
5.

Cognitive psychology and psychoanalysis are

not interdependent; psychoanalysis is a
unique and irreducible science.
Of the ve problems posed by Smolen this one is
perhaps the most sweeping. First, it is not the
case that Freud turned his back on the psychology of his time, or that when he did draw upon
this source it was often erroneous. From Wundt,
Freud took the concept of supercial associations
which played a big role in his hypotheses about
primary process mechanisms. Supercial associations in the form of phonemic or graphemic
associations continue to play an important role in
theories of language learning and reading. For
that reason Freud's monograph on aphasia
continues to be cited by people in the eld. From
Fechner and Herbart, Freud borrowed the
threshold concept, which plays an important role
in the topographic model, and continues to be
important to contemporary psychophysics as
well as in the eld of subliminal perception. The
relationship between memory and perception,
basic psychological concerns to this day, has
been close to the heart of Freud's thinking on the
reality and pleasure principle. These and other
links can readily be identied. Freud himself saw
psychoanalysis as a branch of psychology, and
never laid claim to psychoanalysis as being a
unique and irreducible science. What is unique is
its method; but this is not unusual in science.
Often a science is dened by its methods
developed to investigate a particular phenomenon. Astronomers use various kinds of
telescopes to study the material makeup of
stellar space; physicists use cyclotrons. But they
are studying highly related phenomena. Freud
took great interest in Poetzl's pioneering laboratory-based investigations of subliminal inuences on dreaming. He felt that the method
would provide new and exciting ndings about
the nature of dreaming. He did not dismiss
Poetzl's ndings because they were not based on

Response to Commentaries

Downloaded by [Adelphi University] at 23:39 22 August 2014

the psychoanalytic method; quite otherwise he

saw that as a potential strength. It is in fact good
news when dierent methods converge on the
same set of ndings. All this can be true without
cognitive psychology and psychoanalysis being
interdependent in the strong sense dened by
Smolen.

149
Finally, responding to the issues raised by
Smolen has served to clarify my own thinking
further and for this I am grateful to her for her
careful reading of my paper. I do not pretend that
I have laid her concerns to rest, but hope that a
continuing dialogue will further elucidate the
issues involved.