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Islam and the Medieval Mediterranean

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?Abbsid Intrigues: Competing for Influence at the

Caliph's Court
Letizia Osti
Online Publication Date: 01 March 2008
To cite this Article: Osti, Letizia (2008) '?Abbsid Intrigues: Competing for Influence
at the Caliph's Court', Al-Masaq, 20:1, 5 15
To link to this article: DOI: 10.1080/09503110701823502
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Al-Masaq, Vol. 20, No. 1, March 2008

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6Abbasid Intrigues: Competing for Influence at the

Caliphs Court

LETIZIA OSTI

This paper looks at the array of counsellors and advisors jostling for power and
influence at the court of the 6Abbasid caliph al-Muqtadir (r. 295/908-320/932). Both
historical and adab sources often describe such conflicts in detail through reported
conversations and (first- or second-hand) opinions. Authors/compilers usually have a large
amount of such material at their disposal; their choices in selecting and using it reveal
different attitudes to particular problems and occasional attempts at advising the current
ruler.
ABSTRACT

Keywords: 6Abbasid caliphate; Al-Muqtadir; 6Abbasid caliph; Baghdad, Iraq

6Abbasid caliphate; Arabic literature historiography; Al-Suli, chronicler;
_
Miskawayh, chronicler
Introduction
If people had not given their opinion to the Commander of the Faithful, if
they had not strayed from his will, people would have had an easy life and
excellent conditions under him. Because, what can we say of a caliph who
prays most of the night, and fasts far beyond the required time? But
opinions abound, and following those he strays from his own disposition,
because hes a youth, not used to preside over an assembly (majlis), or to
deal with the State affairs [. . .].1
This remark, uttered by the chamberlain Nasr al-Qushuri,2 concerns the 6Abbasid
_
caliph al-Muqtadir, who ruled the Muslim empire, or at least part of it, from 295/
908 to 320/932. A State led by a very young caliph such as al-Muqtadir is the ideal
breeding ground for interested advice and intrigue: around the young ruler, a
committee of more or less officially appointed advisors jostled for power and
influence, ultimately contributing, in the opinion of some observers, to a loss of
authority for the institution itself. This period is considered to be the beginning of
Correspondence: Letizia Osti, Dipartimento di Lingue e Culture Contemporanee, Universita degli Studi
di Milano, Piazza I. Montanelli, 1, I-20099 Sesto S. Giovanni, Milano. E-mail: letizia.osti@unimi.it
1

Abu Bakr al-Suli (d. 335/947), Ma lam yunshar li awraq al-S uli (akhbar sanawat 291315 h), ed. Hilal
_
_
Naji (Beirut: 6Alam al-kutub, 2000), p. 31.
2
He held the office of chamberlain from shortly after the accession of al-Muqtadir until his own death
in 317/929.
ISSN 09503110 print/ISSN 1473348X online/08/010005-11 2008 Society for the Medieval Mediterranean
DOI: 10.1080/09503110701823502

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Letizia Osti

the end for the political power of the 6Abbasid caliphs: Baghdad was rapidly losing
authority over the provinces, and eventually even in the capital itself the caliph
became a symbolic figure, without a treasury or an army at his direct disposal. A few
centuries after the death of al-Muqtadir, his image in the sources is crystallised as
that of a pliable boy, given to every kind of vice and prey to the influence of women
and servants, i.e. the courtiers and the harim, who ruled de facto in his stead,
_
draining the treasury, oblivious to matters of public interest and focussed
exclusively on an internecine strife for power and money. The sources also
illustrate how administrators and military leaders looked after their own private
interest instead of that of the State.
In the early twentieth century, the edition and translation of several primary
sources made it possible to investigate the caliphate of al-Muqtadir closely. Harold
Bowens portrayal of the period through the biography of one of its protagonists3
sanctioned the evaluation conveyed by most medieval sources: the caliphate of alMuqtadir, starting with the very events which led to his accession, had been the
battlefield of a war between good and evil, impersonated by the several-times viziers
6Ali b. 6Isa and Ibn al-Furat respectively, with various members of the court and the
army as secondary characters.4 Eventually, 6Alis fairness and honesty had not been
able to repair the damage done by greedy and corrupted Ibn al-Furat and his
cronies and the State, led by a young and inept caliph, had suffered blows from
which it would never recover.
The period around the caliphate of al-Muqtadir is currently enjoying renewed
scholarly attention. Looking into these troubled years can not only help to identify
causes for the decadence of the 6Abbasid caliphate; it can also unveil the inner
workings of the different social groups involved and their particular methods for
pursuing personal gain.5 As has already been noted in this context, it would be
nave to reduce all the problems of the caliphate to a series of petty struggles at
court between the civil administration and the army. There were global reasons
for the decline of the 6Abbasid caliphate which could never have been stopped
completely even by an old and experienced caliph who paid no heed to bad advice
and had no drinking and spending habits to feed. However, it would be difficult to
ignore that the sources which we have at our disposal do devote large amounts of
space to information on exactly such topics. An old-fashioned dichotomy is rearing
Harold Bowen, The Life and Times of 6Ali b. 6Isa, the Good Vizier (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1928).
4
See, for instance, Amedrozs introductory remarks to his edition of Hilal: Hilal b. al-Muhassin al-Sabi8,
_
_
Tuhfat al-umara8 fi ta8rikh al-wuzara8; the historical remains of Hilal al-S abi8 1st part of his Kitab al-wuzara
_
_
(Gotha Ms. 1756) and fragment of his history 389393 A.H. (B.M. Ms, add. 19360), ed. H.F. Amedroz
(Beyruth: s.n., 1904), p. 10.
5
An example of the first approach is Hugh Kennedy, The Decline and Fall of the First Muslim
Empire, Der Islam, 81 (2004): 330. On more specific aspects see, for instance, Maaike van Berkel,
The young caliph and his wicked advisors. Women and power politics under Caliph al-Muqtadir (r.
295320/908932), al-Masaq, 19 (2007): 315; Letizia Osti, The Wisdom of Youth: Legitimising the
Caliph al-Muqtadir, ibid.: 1727; eadem, Defending the Caliph: Abu Bakr al-Suli and the Virtues of
_
al-Muqtadir, in Abbasid Studies: Occasional Papers of the School of Abbasid Studies, Leuven, 27 June 1
July 2004, ed. John Nawas (Leuven: Peeters, forthcoming); Nadia El-Cheikh, Gender and politics in
the harem of al-Muqtadir, in Gender in the Early Medieval World. East and West, 300-900, ed. Leslie
Brubaker and Julia Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 147161; eadem,
Servants at the Gate: Eunuchs at the Court of al-Muqtadir, Journal of the Economic and Social History
of the Orient, 48 (2005): 234252.
3

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Competing for Influence at the Caliphs Court

its head here, that opposing entertaining to serious material (i.e. fact to
fiction); should a scholar then dismiss all entertaining material a not worthy of
investigation? There is only one way out: taking into account that, through the
telling of mundane little stories, some sources may want to communicate their view
on the present situation, which they are not equipped (or willing) to express more
openly (more seriously). In other words, many of these accounts are gossip, but
they are gossip worth listening to.
To exemplify this, this paper shall look at two events in the caliphate of
al-Muqtadir and compare the way in which they are told in two different annalistic
chronicles. The two sources in question are al-Sulis Akhbar al-Muqtadir6 and
_
Miskawayhs Tajarib al-umam.7 While al-Suli is a contemporary of al-Muqtadir, he
_
does not enjoy a great reputation as historian, as he tends to intersperse his prose
with superfluous poetry and has a penchant for gossip, especially in and around
the court. On the other hand, Miskawayh, who writes a century later, is a katib
himself and focuses his politically acute perspective on the civil administration.
The two events chosen as examples are the appointment of al-Muqtadir as caliph
in 295/908 and the appointment of Hamid b. al-6Abbas as vizier in 306/918. In
_
looking at how al-Suli and Miskawayh relate these events, we shall focus on how
_
they describe decision processes and how they apportion blame; in other words, we
shall look at whom our sources deem in charge, and whom they think is responsible
for certain situations.
The succession to al-Muktaf i
When Ja6far b. al-Mu6tadid was appointed caliph, with the name of al-Muqtadir,
_
in 295/908, he became the first under-age (or barely-of-age) leader of the umma.
Therefore, the events which led to his appointment are given particular attention by
many sources. All of these agree that in 295/908 the caliph al-Muktafi, who had no
direct descendants fit to succeed him, became very ill. However, there are different
versions of how al-Muktafis younger brother Ja6far came to be caliph. We shall now
examine the versions offered by al-Suli and Miskawayh
_

Al-S uli: Family first

_

Al-Suli reports that, while al-Muktafi was on his deathbed, he lost consciousness for
_
some time. On that occasion Safi al-Hurami (d. 298/910), the head of the harim,
_
_
_
removed the signet ring from the caliphs finger and brought it to the vizier, al-6Abbas
b. al-Hasan (d. 296/908). The latter made preparations to appoint a cousin of the
_
caliph, Muhammad b. al-Mu6tamid. Al-Muktafi, however, regained consciousness
_
before dying long enough to overrule this decision and appoint his younger brother
Ja6far as his successor, after making sure that he was of age, and then died shortly
afterwards. Al-Suli also illustrates how the main preoccupation of al-Muktafi was
_
that, had he designed a cousin as his successor, none of the descendants of his father
would ever become caliph again. Al-Suli himself, then a boon companion at court,
_

See above, note 1.

Miskawayh (d. 421/1030), Tajarib al-umam, ed. H.F. Amedroz, transl. D.S. Margoliouth, volumes I-II
(Oxford, 19201921). Quotations are from Margoliouths translation, but the spelling of transliterated
words has been changed into the current standard.
7

Letizia Osti

Narratives on the succession to al-Muktafi

Al-S uli8

Miskawayh9

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Al-Muktafi falls ill and loses consciousness

The vizier negotiates with Muhammad
The vizier asks for advice on
_
b. al-Mu6tamid
whom to appoint caliph next; he takes
Ibn al-Furats advice to appoint Ja6far,
which coincides with al-Muktafis
testament
Muhammad falls ill al-Muktafi regains
_
consciousness and, after some
deliberation, appoints Ja6far
Al-Muktafi dies
Ja6far is installed as al-Muqtadir
The vizier changes his mind and thinks of
appointing Muhammad b. al-Mu6tamid
_
The vizier negotiates
with Muhammad
_
and begins preparations to dethrone
al-Muqtadir
Muhammad falls ill
_
Muhammad dies
_

had given his own contribution by relating to al-Muktafi examples of previous caliphs
who were succeeded by their brother. The possibility of designating Muhammad b.
_
al-Mu6tamid as successor had, therefore, never come close to being realised, and
Muhammad had fallen ill and died shortly afterwards. To be sure, al-Suli does state
_
_
that the vizier considered the option of Muhammad as a successor to al-Muktafi.
_
However, this option would have come into being only if the caliph had not regained
consciousness before dying, taking matters in his own hands.
Miskawayh: The power of bureaucrats
Miskawayhs account of events, on the other hand, places all the weight of the
decision on the vizier. The crucial point of his version comes when Ibn al-Furat,
then an aid to the vizier al-6Abbas b. al-Hasan, advises the latter that Ja6far b.
_
al-Mu6tadid will be a good choice as caliph because, being very young, he will
_
be pliable and leave the bureaucrats in charge of affairs:
For Gods sake do not appoint to the post a man who knows the house of
one, the fortune of another, the gardens of a third, the slave-girl of a fourth,
the estate of a fifth, and the horse of a sixth; not one who has mixed with
people, has acquired experience of affairs, has gone through his
apprenticeship, and made calculations of peoples fortunes. [. . .] Why
should we nominate a man who will issue orders and prohibitions, who
knows our resources, who will administer affairs himself and regard himself
as independent? Why not deliver the empire to a man who will leave you
to administer it?10
8

Al-Suli, 2123.
_
Miskawayh, 24.
10
Miskawayh, 3.
9

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Competing for Influence at the Caliphs Court

Such attitude is in stark contrast to that of 6Ali b. 6Isa who, asked by the vizier to give
an opinion on who the next caliph should be, categorically refused to answer.
Miskawayh does state that the final appointment of Ja6far was made by the caliph
al-Muktafi, but such a strong commentary by Ibn al-Furat leaves the lingering
impression that, in general, it was the bureaucrats who in fact decided and, in
particular, Ibn al-Furat was the real influence behind al-Muqtadirs appointment.
Such a feeling is mirrored by modern historical sources: when speaking of the
succession of al-Muktafi, an empirical survey reveals that most of the secondary
sources quote Ibn al-Furats comment from Miskawayh word by word, to
summarise the reasons for the appointment of Ja6far. The fact is that this version
makes a coherent story, and it is also consistent with the role which Ibn al-Furat
plays later during the reign of al-Muqtadir, especially as it is portrayed by
Miskawayh himself.

Chance or conspiracy?
As mentioned above, it is easy to overlook that Miskawayh admits freely that the
appointment of al-Muqtadir conformed to the instructions left by the late alMuktafi:
[the vizier] inclined to Ibn al-Furats view, and with this there coincided the
testament of al-Muktafi, which assigned to his brother Ja6far the succession
to the caliphate.11
This information, however, is obscured by the detailed description of the viziers
consultations and eventual decision, which takes the place occupied by al-Muktafis
decision process in al-Sulis account. A final, crucial difference lies in the physical
_
arrangement of accounts, as can be seen in the synopsis above: whereas al-Suli
_
places negotiations with Muhammad before the death of al-Muktafi, while the
_
latter is unconscious, Miskawayh places them after it, automatically making the
vizier appear much more powerful to establish who the next ruler should be.
A courtiers court is being hinted at early in the narrative.
Both these versions of events are rife with intrigue and calculation on the part of
many individuals (one could perhaps go so far as to call these lobbies or pressure
groups). However, while al-Sulis is chaotic and almost purposeless, Miskawayhs is
_
coherent and has the markers of a proper conspiracy theory. Therefore it is the
preferred one, the lectio facilior. In other words, both these versions are essentially
gossip, but while the former is primitive, the latter is sophisticated gossip and
therefore it persuades more easily. The basic information provided by both
accounts, remains the same: on his deathbed al-Muktafi appointed his brother Ja6far
to succeed him, and his instructions were followed, although perhaps grudgingly,
by the vizier.12
11

Miskawayh, 3.
None of the other sources for this event offer dramatically different versions from the one illustrated
here. Cf. 6Arib (d. ca. 380/970), S ila tarikh al-T abari, ed. M.J. de Goeje (Leiden: Brill, 1897),
_
_
pp. 1921, Hilal, 114117, al-Hamdani (d. 521/1127), Takmila ta8rikh al-T abari, ed. A.Y. Kan6an
_
2
(Beirut: al-Matba6a al-Kathulikiyya, 1961 ), p. 4.
12

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Letizia Osti

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An inept vizier
The story of the appointment of al-Muqtadir is handled by all sources in exactly the
same way on one issue at least: al-Muqtadir is a dummy character he is not asked
whether he would like to be caliph (whereas his older cousin Muhammad is) and
_
never even speaks or is shown acting himself until after his accession. The old
caliph, however, is handled differently by the two sources: in Miskawayh he is as
passive and absent as his younger brother, whereas al-Suli shows him well able to
_
take decisions and give orders, while at the same time being open to the advice and
counsel of his faithful servant, al-Suli himself.
_
In our second case, on the other hand, al-Muqtadir takes a more active role. The
second example is the vizierate of Hamid b. al-6Abbas (in office 306/918-311/923),
_
the reasons for his appointment and his general incompetence. These events take
place in the central years of the caliphate of al-Muqtadir; the Commander of
the Faithful, now in his twenties, has children and appears more prominently in the
sources than he did on his accession. At this stage of al-Muqtadirs caliphate, the
treasuries are quite empty, many of the provinces have stopped paying revenues,
and the collection of taxes from even the closer territories is entrusted not to State
officials any more, but to tax farmers who will employ any means to obtain as much
as possible without giving much thought to the maintenance of the land. The next
step in the process is that, naturally, these usually uncouth individuals will expect
to become viziers themselves, despite their ignorance of the administration. Hamid
_
represents such a case.13
Miskawayh: The vizierate as an escape route
In 306/918 Ibn al-Furat is vizier for the second time, while 6Ali b. 6Isa is kept
imprisoned in the Palace, having been deposed a few months before to make place
for his arch-rival. An expensive military expedition against the rebel Ibn Abi l-Saj,14
however, causes some unrest in Baghdad; Miskawayh opens his chronicle for the
year with the arrest of Ibn al-Furat and explains it as follows:
The ostensible cause for the dismissal of the vizier Ibn al-Furat on this
second occasion was that he had delayed payment of the stipends due to
the cavalry who were with the captains. He alleged in excuse the financial
difficulty due to the expenditure on the campaign against Ibn Abi l-Saj, and
to the reduction in the revenue owing to the seizure by this rebel of the
money due from Rayy. At the commencement of 306 the cavalry mutinied,
and went to the Oratory. Ibn al-Furat requested of al-Muqtadir an advance
of 200,000 dinars from the Private Treasury to which he would add
200,000 himself to be expended on the cavalry. Muqtadir was incensed by
this demand, and wrote to him reminding that he (Ibn al-Furat) had
undertaken to meet all public expenses as he had done in his first ministry,
13

For an illustration of this mechanism, see H. Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates
(London: Longman, 20042), pp. 188189.
14
This is the governor Yusuf Ibn Abi l-Saj, who was eventually captured and brought to Baghdad by the
army commanded by Mu8nis al-Muzaffar in 307/919. Ibn Abi l-Saj had been supported by Ibn al-Furat
_
initially. See C.E. Bosworth in EI2, Sadjids.

Competing for Influence at the Caliphs Court

11

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and in addition to pay a definite sum to the caliph personally; so he never

imagined that Ibn al-Furat would make so audacious a demand.15
At this point, when the vizier is in desperate need of money and therefore very
vulnerable, several minor characters are introduced: an aid to Ibn al-Furat,
6Abdallah b. Jubayr, knows that Hamid, the tax farmer for Wasit, has kept for
_
_
himself a large part of the revenue which he has farmed. With the viziers
permission, he contacts Hamid to enquire about his wealth and see whether it could
_
be used to help Ibn al-Furat. On receiving this message, Hamid becomes afraid that
_
his less than honest ways will be exposed, so he decides to strike first and conspires
to become vizier himself: he negotiates secretly with the chamberlain Nasr, who is a
_
known enemy of Ibn al-Furat at court, and with Shaghab, the caliphs mother. The
conspiracy is successful:
His intrigues and his offers were helped by Nasrs distrust of Ibn al-Furat
_
coupled with fear of him, and the financial stress which had compelled
Ibn al-Furat to apply to the Caliph for the advance. These various
circumstances combined to bring about what Hamid designed. A message
_
was sent to Hamid bidding him to quit Wasit and proceed to the
_
_
metropolis, giving notice of his departure by carrier pigeon. When
al-Muqtadir received the news thus brought, he sent his freedman Shafi6
and Nasr the Chamberlain to arrest Ibn al-Furat [. . .]16
_

However, no sooner is the new vizier installed than he is found glaringly

inadequate:
Hamid sat talking and displayed to the captains and all the courtiers of
_
al-Muqtadir his irascibility [hiddatahu] and ignorance of a viziers duties
_
[qillat khibratihi bi-amr al-wizara]. Al-Muqtadir, being told of this,
summoned Abu l-Qasim Ibn al-Hawari and remonstrated with him for
_
nominating Hamid to the office; Ibn al-Hawari urged in reply Hamids vast
_
_
_
wealth, his undertaking to extract fines, the respect felt for him by his
officials, his personal character, and the number of his armed retainers. In
the course of his conversation he suggested to al-Muqtadir to give 6Ali b.
6Isa his liberty, and make him president of all the bureaux, where he might
act as Hamids deputy.17
_

Al-Muqtadir is at first reluctant to recall 6Ali unless this is specifically requested by

Hamid, but Ibn al-Hawari manages to talk the vizier into making such request and,
_
_
the request being granted, 6Ali takes de facto control of all diwans and the vizier
loses all interest in his daily duties.
While al-Muqtadir shows his righteous anger with Ibn al-Furat for not
keeping his financial promises, he does not seem to be taking part in the
decision process on how to replace the vizier, and appears surprised as well as
angry that such an unworthy candidate was chosen. The idea of using 6Ali as an
15

Miskawayh, 56.
Miskawayh, 57.
17
Miskawayh, 58.
16

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12

Letizia Osti

assistant comes, again, not from the caliph but from a counsellor, who seems to
add a new layer to the already numerous machinations. In Miskawayhs account,
blame is distributed evenly: Ibn al-Furat is rightly dismissed for not keeping his
promise to cover the expenses of court and army, a promise with which he had
managed to oust 6Ali b. 6Isa from the job; Hamid seeks the office of vizier to save
_
himself, and all those who conspire in his favour have their personal motives to
do so; the caliph is quickly angry but does not seems to be able to take action
on his own. It only remains for 6Ali b. 6Isa to run to the rescue of the
administration, putting his skills selflessly at the disposal of the rich but
unworthy new vizier.

Al-S uli: A difficult list

_

Al-Suli, as well as Miskawayh, opens his chronicle for the year 306 H on a grim
_
note: the news reaching Baghdad that the commander Mu8nis has been defeated by
Ibn Abi l-Saj. After this account, however, the tone lightens considerably, and a few
paragraphs later we read of al-Muqtadir electing the estate of al-Zubaydiyya as his
residence for a time, and moving part of his womenfolk and the army there. One
Saturday, says al-Suli, al-Muqtadir dined with the commanders and gave presents
_
to several of them, then he drank with his women and distributed money among
those, too. Al-Suli composed a poem on the beauty of that day and received 5000
_
dirham in return. Al-Suli reports all the thirty-two lines of the qasida which earned
_
_
him such a handsome present. It is at the end of the poem that he introduces his
concise account of Ibn al-Furats demise:
Says Abu Bakr: When Ibn Abi l-Saj defeated Mu8nis, people spread
calumnies [arjafa] about Ibn al-Furat. I wrote a note [riqa, with a list of
names] on which 6Ali b. 6Isa could be consulted, naming to him several
people so that the one he indicated would be made vizier. The last of the
list was Ibrahim b. 6Isa and he wrote under his name greedy and not
appropriate [for this office]; under the name of Ibn Bistam he wrote a
_
secretary who is a shedder of blood; under the name of Ibn Abi l-Baghl he
wrote he is unfair and has no religion; under the name of al-Husayn b.
_
Ahmad al-Madhara8i he wrote I know nothing about him, but its enough
_
to know whats in his family. Under the name of Hamid b. al-6Abbas he
_
wrote a wealthy and honest governor, already old. Under the name of
Ahmad b. 6Ubayd Allah, brother of al-Khaqani, he wrote silly and
_
thoughtless. Under the name of Sulayman b. al-Hasan b. Makhlad he
_
wrote a young secretary. Under the name of Ibn al-Hawari he wrote
_
there is only one God. So it was agreed [ajma6a l-ra8y] to appoint Hamid
_
b. al-6Abbas to the vizierate. This was helped by the Chamberlain Nasr,
_
18
who thought it was the right thing to do.

Al-Suli, 120. 6Arib, 7273, quotes this account entirely. Hilal reports a version of the story told by 6Ali
_
himself, where he is asked about several potential viziers and gives his opinion. He is informed that,
however, the caliph has already appointed Hamid, who has revealed himself inadequate, and accepts to
_
act as his advisor (pp. 3133). al-Hamdani summarises Miskawayh (pp. 1920).
18

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Competing for Influence at the Caliphs Court

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Hamid was sent for, while in the meantime Ibn al-Furat and his son al-Muhassin
_
_
were arrested. Hamid arrived in Baghdad and was invested by the caliph, but here
_
the problems began:
The caliph and those around him realised the weakness [d u6f] of Hamid b.
_
_
al-6Abbas and his old age and understood that he definitely needed an
helper, so 6Ali b. 6Isa was taken out of imprisonment and was sent to the
vizier Hamid b. al-6Abbas with a letter from the caliph to him.19
_

In the letter, the caliph tells Hamid that he must, for his own good, appoint 6Ali as
_
head of his various offices. Hamid reads the letter and then asks 6Ali, who still does
_
not know why he has been summoned, to become his assistant. 6Ali accepts.
While the list presented to 6Ali b. 6Isa does not seem to contain a completely
satisfactory candidate, it seems that 6Alis comments make Hamid virtually the only
_
viable option. Was it 6Alis intention all along to have a weak vizier appointed,
so that he could hold the reins of the affairs from a comfortable back seat? Al-Suli
_
does not consider this question, nor does he elaborate on the criteria for his
selection of names. Moreover, most of the narration is in the passive and it is left
vague where responsibilities lay for the decisions that were taken, as if there were
no conspiracies and everything happened casually. However, some pointers do
indicate how al-Suli evaluates the situation, and where he thinks the blame ought to
_
be placed.

Placing the blame

The two versions presented by al-Suli and Miskawayh are not, in theory, mutually
_
exclusive, as they do not coincide in any of the details, except for a general
remarking of Hamids ineptitude.20 However, each version throws a different light
_
on the individuals involved.
Al-Sulis Ibn al-Furat has a completely passive role, and in fact he is disgraced
_
not because of a mistake he has committed, but because of unspecified slandering
rumours. Miskawayh, on the other hand, pitilessly describes Ibn al-Furats failure
to keep his word and his inadequate excuses. As for 6Ali b. 6Isa, neither historian
makes it clear whether the former vizier accepts his new post as yet an act of
self-sacrifice for the greater good, or whether he is actively seeking a way to regain
power. Al-Sulis account of the annotated list of candidates portrays a more active
_
participant in the decision-process.
It seems that our sources describe two different Hamids altogether: while
_
al-Sulis main criticism is that he is old and weak (the latter certainly not a
_
physical quality in this context, but still not a very precise clarification of what is
wrong with him as a vizier), Miskawayh describes in detail the ways in which Hamid
_

19

Al-Suli, 121.
_
In fact, Bowen does take both accounts as true and works them into a coherent narrative (pp. 158
160), concluding that 6Ali must have been consulted twice, once before Hamids appointment and a
_
second time after Hamids shortcomings had come to light fully. Of course, both versions belong to one
_
same process in that, while Miskawayh is very probably aware of al-Sulis account, he chooses not to take
_
it into consideration and opts for a more sophisticated account, where every action is taken for a precise
reason and every actor has a hidden agenda.
20

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14

Letizia Osti

was not appropriate for the office and is clear about his motives for seeking it in
the first place.
Al-Muqtadir also gets a different treatment: whereas in Miskawayhs version his
righteous anger at being failed by his vizier obscures the fact that he is refusing to
release money from his private treasury, in al-Sulis the caliph is barely present,
_
and money is not mentioned at all. However, the account of Ibn al-Furats
dismissal comes after the lengthy description of a party at the Zubaydiyya estate,
where the caliph is seen spending lavishly. The smart reader can draw her own
conclusions.
Minor advisors are only hinted at by al-Suli (only Nasr is mentioned), whereas
_
_
they occupy much space in Miskawayhs account.
Finally, while Miskawayh presents a coherent illustration of events, al-Suli does
_
not seem to mind leaving his reconstruction full of holes. However, al-Sulis hints
_
seem to indicate that he blames al-Muqtadirs spending habits as well as Nasrs bad
_
judgement, while thinking that Ibn al-Furat was unfairly maligned. On the other
hand, Miskawayh blames Ibn al-Furat for his fate, despises Hamid for his
_
dishonesty and uncouthness and blames Nasr not only for his bad judgement but
_
for actively helping dealing the office of vizier, and with it the kuttab as a category, a
hard blow.
To sum up: while both sources describe a complicated situation where several
factors are at play, al-Suli explains events as a mixture of chance and bad
_
judgement, whereas Miskawayh illustrates a complex net of conflicting interests,
helped by several layers of conspiring and counter-conspiring. The factual end
result is the same, but the reasons and motivations are profoundly different, as in
the case of al-Muktafis succession.

Conclusions
As far as the reconstruction of actual events is concerned, the present analysis has
yielded diverse results: on the one hand, a comparative reading of al-Suli and
_
Miskawayh on the succession to al-Muktafi has cast reasonable doubts on the
reliability of the latters account, which is usually accepted as the standard version
of events. On the other, the same exercise applied to the appointment of Hamid b.
_
al-6Abbas as vizier has indeed added details to the story, but has not helped to clarify
events; on the contrary, a parallel reading of our two sources adds a fresh layer of
complications and unanswerable questions. However, this exercise has not simply
been looking for the elusive kernel of truth hidden in a succession of accounts.
More importantly, it has illustrated two different attitudes towards al-Muqtadir and
the time of his caliphate, which influence the ways in which al-Suli and Miskawayh
_
record events in their chronicles.
The later source, Miskawayh, presents us with a sophisticated network of
allegiances and power groups, divided into two main camps. The caliph
al-Muqtadir, who on his accession is too young to play any significant role in the
running of his State, grows up to be not a super partes authority, but a player in the
struggle for power, almost on a level with those whom he is supposed to rule,
moving from one camp to the other according to necessity and whim. The decision
process is completely out of his hands: in both our cases, Miskawayh gives the main
role to bureaucrats who plot and conspire, although their motivations are different.

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Competing for Influence at the Caliphs Court

15

In fact, while some individuals are only after their personal gain (Hamid), or that of
_
their category (Ibn al-Furat), 6Ali b. 6Isa is obviously driven by fairness and concern
for the State.
Abu Bakr al-Sulis portrayal of the situation is more fragmented: he points at the
_
motivations of some individuals (al-Muktafis reasons for appointing his brother,
Nasrs dislike of Ibn al-Furat) but, especially in our second example, he does not
_
work out a general framework in which causes and effects fit snugly, but rather
leaves the reader to make sense of his accounts. In al-Sulis narrative, the
_
impression is that each agent in the events follows an immediate necessity which
does not always correspond to a greater design or ideal: al-Sulis characters, in other
_
words, are just trying to cope with the present situation as best they can, while
Miskaways have precise, overarching aims and ideals. The al-Muqtadir portrayed
by al-Suli has his own responsibilities, as shown in the case of Hamid, but his faults,
_
_
as those of all other characters, seem to have more to do with bad judgement and
naivety than with conscious striving to obtain certain results and the allegiance to
a precise faction.
The difference in attitude between al-Suli and Miskawayh can be ascribed to
_
several factors: besides the different time of composition, which gives al-Suli a lack
_
of perspective and Miskawayh the benefit of hindsight, there are certainly different
personal allegiances, and probably a fear, on the part of al-Suli, of upsetting his
_
patron, the caliph al-Radi, son of al-Muqtadir, or other individuals who were still
_
alive. Moreover, leaving aside the contingencies of the present examples for
analysis, our two sources provide us with two almost opposite, at times
complementary perspectives, which reveal altogether different ideas of the craft
of the chronicler and his general aims: to describe events (apparently) naively, or to
openly make sense of them? To nudge ones reader with subtle hints, or to
manipulate her with the great conspiracy theory? To describe the court as a group
of individuals thrown together casually, each trying to survive a chaotic situation, or
to present it as the battlefield for two groups divided along moral lines?
There is virtually no documentary evidence for Baghdad at the time of
al-Muqtadir; all that we know today comes from textual sources such as the ones
analysed here. In such a situation, having sources as different as Miskawayh and
al-Suli should be exploited fully: in order to research this period as transparently
_
as possible, the modern historian cannot place either approach above the other, but
must use both against one another, not so much in order to collect details and
uncover the facts, but in order to investigate the mentalities and motivations of
classical historians and those they described.