United Nations Peace Missions in Africa: Transformations and Determinants

Author(s): Assefaw Bariagaber

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Source: Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 38, No. 6 (Jul., 2008), pp. 830-849
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UnitedNationsPeace
Missionsin Africa

Journalof Black Studies

Volume38 Number6
My 2008 830-849
2008 Sage Publications
10.1177/0021934708314990
http://jbs.sagepub.com
hostedat
http://online.sagepub.com

Transformations
and Determinants
AssefawBariagaber

SetonHall University
The author
examinesthetrajectory
thatUnitedNations(UN) peaceoperations
in Africahave takenoverthepast 10 yearsand providesan answerto the
followinginterrelated
questions:Whyhave UN peace missionsin Africa
andscopeinthepast10 years,whenAfrica
dramatically
growninfrequency
has becomeincreasingly
peaceful,andwhichvariableshavebeencriticalto
thisdramatic
Theauthor(a) empirically
demonstrates
thequantitative
growth?
and qualitativegrowthof UN peace missionsin Africaand (b) identifies
to
and individual-level
variablesthatcontributed
continental-,
systemic-,
thisgrowth.The authorarguesthattheconvergence
of thesevariablesat
for
different
levels has providedthe conditionsnecessaryand sufficient
in
in
Africa
the
and
of
UN
missions
nature,
changes
frequency,
scope
peace
overthepast10 years.
Keywords: UnitedNations; Africa;political conflict;peace missions;
transitional
intervention;
periods;ripeness
forconflict
KofiAnnan

intheinternational
hasbecomethecenterofattention
community.
inthe
Thisattention
cameaboutpartly
becauseoftheexisting
instability
areasoftheMiddleEastandthegrowing
ofAfrica
oil-producing
recognition
as an alternative
sourceof thiscommodity
and partlybecauseofAfrica's
in
in
investments
As a result,
strategic
importance thewaron terror.
foreign
the oil sector,foreignaid, and bilateralmilitary
with
other
agreements
increases.
nations,especiallythe UnitedStates,have shownsignificant
More important,
therehave been significant
increasesin UnitedNations
in Africaoverthepast 10 years.These increases
(UN) peace operations
coincidedwiththeorganizational
challengestheUN faced,includingthe
but
so
far
to expandtheSecurityCounciland the
futile
ongoing
attempts
role(orlackthereof)
theUN playedbeforeandafterU.S. andalliedtroops
folinvadedIraq. These increasesalso coincidedwith,or immediately
in
of
the
and
setbacks
the
UN
suffered
lowed,many
challenges
operational
830

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Bariagaber/UN Peace MissionsinAfrica 831

thosein Somalia,Rwanda,theforitspeace missionsworldwide,

including
theDemocratic
merYugoslavia,
RepublicoftheCongo(DRC), andso on.
The UN therefore
faceschallengesat twolevels.At theorganizational
andhigherlevels,thechallengesinvolveUN reinvention
to makethebody
intheyearsahead.Cognizantofthis,theUN hasproducedvarious
relevant
thatunderscore
thecentrality
ofthisissue.One suchinfluential
documents
and widelyread monograph
A More
documentis theUN-commissioned
SecureWorld:Our SharedResponsibility
(UnitedNations,2004a). At the
andlowerlevels,thechallenges
involvethemoreeffective
manoperational
of
UN
Africa.
The
worldwide,
operations
agement
peace
including
secretarytotheSecurity
andthePromotion
Council,CausesofConflict
report
general's
inAfrica(UnitedNations,
ofDurablePeace and SustainableDevelopment
1998),andthemoreextensive
ReportofthePanelon UnitedNationsPeace
theongoingdebateon
(UnitedNations,2000a) bothunderscore
Operations
thenatureandchallengesofUN peace operations.
This studyjoins theongoingdebatenot so muchto prescribepolicy
to explainthetrajectory
anddeterminants
of
optionsfortheUN butrather
inAfricaoverthepast10 years.At themoregeneral
UN peace operations
transformations
thatinternational
level,thisstudyinterrogates
organizationssuchas theUN undergoduringtransitional
periods.Indeed,given
underpressure
(a) theorganizational
challengestheUN faces,(b) itsretreat
fromSomaliaand Rwandain themid-1990s,and (c) thepersistent
probin manyof itspastand current
lemsit has encountered
peace missionsin
thosein SierraLeone,theDRC, andEritrea-Ethiopia,
one
Africa,including
in existwouldhaveexpectedtheUN to pauseorcutbackitsinvolvement
theUN has added
ingmissionsuntilthedebateis settled.On thecontrary,
in Sudan in March2005 and Cote d'lvoireand
new missionsrecently,
ithas expandeditsinvolvement
in existBurundiin May 2004. Moreover,
ingmissions,suchas in theDRC, andhadto pressSudanto accepta joint
AfricanUnion (AU)-UN peace missionin Darfur.These developments
raisetwocriticalquestions:WhyhaveUN peace missionsinAfricagrown
andqualitatively
whentheaboveindicators
bothquantitatively
suggestothofwarfare
andinterstate)
erwise,especiallywhenthemagnitude
(intrastate
Whatvariableshavecontributed
to theUN's
inAfricahas beendeclining?
inAfrica,especiallyafteritsillnewlyfoundresolveinitspeaceoperations
in RwandaandSomaliain themid-1990s?
fatedattempts
I examinetheparadoxthesequestions
raise.I arguethatthe
In thisstudy,
andindividual-level
ofsystemic,
variables
sincethe
continental,
convergence
theconditions
andsufficient
latter
halfofthe1990shas provided
necessary
initspeacemissions.
Thesevariables
arethe
fortheUN tobe morevigorous

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832

ofBlackStudies
Journal

natureoftransitional
increased
forconflict
intervention,
periods,"ripeness"
and the
resolvewithin
Africato deal withsecurity
issuesin thecontinent,
I
effectiveness
ofKofiAnnanas secretary-general
oftheUN. First,however,
demonstrate
the quantitative
of
and qualitative
UN
growth
peacekeeping
missions
andshowthatthereis noempirical
forthealterempirically
support
nativeexplanation
thatincreases
inUN "deployment
ofpeacesupport
forces
inAfrica[sincetheendofthecoldwarwere]necessary"
becauseof"significantincreaseinthenumber
ofconflicts"
2000,p. 84).
(Bonyongwe,

PoliticalConflictand UN Peace Operations

in AfricaAftertheCold War
I definea peace missionas "thedeployment
of a UnitedNationspresenceinthefield,hitherto
withtheconsentofall thepartiesconcerned,
norUnited
Nations
and/or
mally involving
military
police personneland
civilians
as
well"
1992,p. 11). I proposethatthe
(Boutros-Ghali,
frequently
transformation
of
in Africaafterthecold war,
such
missions
quantitative
after
the
ill-fated
and
Somalia
Rwanda
particularly
peace missionsof the
is
better
understood
in
of UN
none
other
than
thefrequency
mid-1990s,
intervention.
from
to
of 22
1945
the
UN
a
total
Indeed,
1991,
approved
missions
of
which
or
0.13
worldwide,
6,
peace
approximately
peace
missionsperyear,wereinAfrica.Theremaining
0.30
14,orapproximately
missions
were
undertaken
in
the
world.
rest
of
the
Of
the
6
peace
peryear,
in Africa,5 wereapprovedonlytowardtheend of thecold war (United
NationsDepartment
of PeacekeepingOperations,
n.d.).Therefore,
except
fortherobustUN peace missionin theCongo approvedin 1960,theUN
did notundertake
a peace operation
inAfricaforalmost30 years,extendfrom
1960
to
the
end
of
the
1980s.
ing
From1992 to 2007, however,
theUN approved18 peace missionsin
1.2 missionsperyear.Thisrepresents
a ninefold
Africa,or approximately
increasein thenumber
ofmissionsperyearcomparedwiththeUN's peace
missionsin Africaduringthecold war.On theotherhand,it approved20
orapproximately
1.33peryear,intherestoftheworld.This
peacemissions,
than
a
fourfold
increaseinthenumber
ofmissions
represents
slightly
greater
the
same
time
the
of
Therefore,
peryearduring
period.
frequency UN peace
missionsinAfricagrewatmorethantwicetheratefortherestoftheworld.
Itis also important
tonotethatofall themissionstheUN approved
after
the
coldwar,almost1 in 2 was inAfrica(18 of 38), comparedwithabout1 in
4 (6 outof 22) duringthecold war.More important,
theUN approveda
totalof 11 missionsinAfricaafteritsfailedmissionsin Somaliain March

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Bariagaber/UN Peace MissionsinAfrica 833

it approvedforthe
1995 andRwandain March1996,equal to thenumber
thequantitative
increases
in UN peacemissions
restoftheworld.Therefore,
in Africa,evenwhencomparedwiththeincreasesin missionselsewhere,
cannotbe contested.
The qualitativechangesin UN peace missionssince the debaclesin
intermsofthe
SomaliaandRwandainthemid-1990sarebetter
understood
natureand scope of UN intervention.
First,althoughearlierinterventions
had occurredwiththeconsentof all partiesto theconflicts,
somerecent
without
thisneededconsent.Theseincludethe
interventions
haveoccurred
movement
refusedto
UN missionin Burundi,wherethePalipehutu-FNL
inBurundi,
(UnitedNationsOperation
join thepeaceprocessuntilrecently
2005), and in the DRC, wherevariousmilitiashave long resistedUN
to intervene
in
involvement.
Also, the UN had threatened
unilaterally
reinsintheJanjaweed
militias.
Sudan's
Darfur,
Sudan,unlessthegovernment
in theformofa
recentreluctant
acceptanceofa compromise
arrangement,
case in point.This,in conjunction
with
AU-UNmission,is another
hybrid
in December2001 ofResponsibility
toProtect(International
thepublication
ResearchCentre,
thatan international
individ2001),indicates
Development
whichchallenges
thesovereignty
ofthepost-Westphalian
ual rights
regime,
Indeed,as LawsonandRothchild
state,is gradually
(2005,p. 229)
emerging.
will havea "right,
stated,normsunderwhichtheinternational
community
aregradually
in
evena duty,
tointervene"
takingshape,andthisis manifest
inAfrica.
someoftherecentUN interventions
ceasefires
Second, UN mandateshave usuallyincludedmonitoring
theUN has expanded
however,
parties.Recently,
agreedto by conflicting
to includestatereconstruction,
itsscope of activities
combatant
reintegradeemednecestion,borderpatrols,miningclearance,and otheractivities
peace.Examplesoftheseabound:The UN mandatein
saryforsustainable
thepolice
SierraLeone includedestablishing
courts,training
magistrates'
to helpthestateexertcontroloveritsterriforce,andothersuchactivities
tories(UnitedNations,2002). The samemaybe saidofthemissionsin the
DRC andLiberia.As LawsonandRothchild
(2005) succinctly
putit,"the
missiontoday[hasbecome]state(re)formation"
(p. 235).
when
Third,theUN has doneitsbestto be, or appearto be, impartial
in thepast.Recently,
ithas gradually
abandonedany
however,
intervening
Its role in SierraLeone has been to assistthe
semblanceof impartiality.
in controlling
itsterritory.
whichis a partytotheconflict,
The
government,
betweenUN troopsandCongolesearmyunits
conductofjointoperations
to controlIturi(in northeastern
Congo)is also a case in pointbecausethe
was a partyto the conflict.Such behaviorwas
Congolesegovernment

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834

Journal
ofBlack Studies

unthinkable
a fewdecadesearlier.
in 1960,Dag Hammarskjold
Forexample,
moveUN
to
to
opposedsending troops Katanga suppressa secessionist
mentbecauseof theUN's presumedneutrality
in thedomesticpoliticsof
theCongo(Gibbs,2000).
therulesof engagement
haveundergone
fundamental
Fourth,
changes.
UN
could
fire
to
kill
in
self-defense.
howPreviously, troops
only
Recently,
to firenotonlyin self-defense
butalso to
ever,theyhavebeenpermitted
innocent
civilians.TheongoingUN missionintheDRC andthejust
protect
missionin SierraLeonearesuchcases (UnitedNations,2004b).
completed
In addition,theUN has authorized
otherpowersto use massiveforceto
establishpeace and security
on its behalf.This has been thecase in the
peace missionsin SierraLeone andtheDRC, wheretheUnitedKingdom
and France,respectively,
used lethalforceand savedthepeace missions
fromprobablecollapse. Franceis also activelyengagedin the peace
missionin Cote d'lvoire,with strongsupportfromthe UN Security
Council.Thatis, theUN has relaxeditsrestrictive
on theuse
requirement
offorcebyitstroopsandhas calledon majorpowerstouse overwhelming
forceon itsbehalf,andthisis a recentdevelopment.
theUN has successively
increaseditstroopstrength
tomeetadded
Fifth,
a
challenges.Forexample,in SierraLeone,it increaseditstroopstrength
recordfourtimesin a littleover a year fromapproximately
6,000 in
2000 to approximately
in the
17,500by March2001. Similarly,
February
at leastfourtimesfromabout4,300in
DRC, itincreaseditstroopstrength
April2003 to morethan16,000in about2 years.Nowhere,andatno time,
hadtheUN increaseditstroopstrength
to suchlevelsin such
successively
a shortperiodoftime.At present,
Africahosts54,775uniformed
UN personnel(excludingciviliansupport
staff
total
outofan estimated
members)
of 82,871of all uniformed
of
UN personnel(UnitedNationsDepartment
about66% of all uni2007). This constitutes
PeacekeepingOperations,
formed
UN personnel
deployedaroundtheglobe.
Finally,and muchrelatedto thechangesdescribedabove,theoriginal
mandate
ofpre-1992
on thewhole,hadremained
peacemissions,
unchanged
fortheduration
ofthosemissions.Lately,however,
variousmandates
have
beenprogressively
revisedandexpandedto meettheneedson theground.
In otherwords,as in Somalia,eachhas becomecharacterized
by "mission
creep"(Freeman,Lambert,& Mims,1993). However,unlikein Somalia,
whereit retreated
underfire,theUN has stayedthecourseand progresIn other
sivelyexpandeditsmissionmandatesdespiterecurring
problems.
in therestof theworld,theUN's
words,comparedwithits involvement
current
and recentinvolvement
in Africais notonlyhigherin termsof

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Bariagaber/UN Peace MissionsinAfrica 835

in termsof scopeandmoreintensive
in
butalso moreextensive
frequency
termsresolve.
to underscore
thatbothduringandafterthecold war,the
It is important
ofpolitical
andthescopeandfrequency
of
UN
frequency
peace operations
in Africawerenotsystematically
correlated.
for
conflict
Except theUN's
in
the
did
not
launch
in
the
UN
1960,
Congo July
peaceoperations
operation
constant
increaseinthemagnitude
fornearlythreedecadesdespitea "fairly
inAfricaduring
theColdWar/decolonization
ofwarfare
period,1946-1989"
2005,p. 2, especiallysee Figure1). Thatis,UN peaceoperations
(Marshall,
in Africadid notincreasebecauseof increasesin warfare
totals,intrastate
cold
war.
it
was
the
increase
the
andinterstate,
Perhaps
exponential
during
of
inthe1970sandthe1980sandthereluctance
inconflict
onthecontinent
in Somaliain theearly1990sthatpushed
theUN to respondto theconflict
in Bosniato referto theconflict
BoutrosBoutros-Ghali
Secretary-General
with
to
which
the
international
community
responded
urgency,
Herzegovina,
as a "richman'swar"(GlobalPolicyForum,1996).
theUN becamemoreinvolvedin peace
Afterthecold war,however,
missionsin Africa(and therestof theworld),and thistoo did notreflect
of politicalconflict
on thecontinent.
increasesin thescope and frequency
Wallensteen
andSollenberg
Forexample,
(2001,p. 632,especiallyseeTable
in
of armedconflicts
thatbetween1993 and 2000,thenumber
3) reported
between14 and 15, exceptfor 1995,whenit was 13.
Africafluctuated
itspeace missionsinAfrica,the
as theUN was busyincreasing
Therefore,
Marshall
remainedalmostconstant.
on thecontinent
numberof conflicts
increasesin
that"since1993 thetrend[in conflict
(2005) also established
ofwardecreasedto about
andthegeneralmagnitude
Africa]ha[d]reversed
halfitspeak value [of 1992] by 2004" (p. 6, especiallysee Figure1). He
in recentyears"to the
this"observeddeclinein armedconflict
attributed
and peacekeepingoperain peace negotiations
"multilateral
engagement
. . . and a moreactivistAfrican
tionsby Africanregionalorganizations
notedthatthe"recentsteepdeclinein the
Union"(p. 3). Marshallfurther
trendssincetheearly1990s [italicsadded]indicatesthat
war magnitude
warshavebeenended,such
someofAfrica'smostseriousand protracted
Liberia"(p. 8).
as thewarsinMozambique,Ethiopia(Eritrean
separatism),
increasesin UN peace missionsin Africaafterthecold war,
Therefore,
especiallyafterthefailedmissionsin Somaliaand Sudan,coincidedwith
and
in themagnitude
ofinterstate
decreases(or,atbest,withnonincreases)
In otherwords,thereis no empirical
warfareon thecontinent.
intrastate
thatincreasesinUN peaceoperations
forthealternative
explanation
support
ofthe
correlated
withthemagnitude
thecoldwarweredirectly
inAfricaafter

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836

Journal
ofBlackStudies

conflicts
on thecontinent.
forsuchincreasesmustbe soughtin
Explanations
theconvergence
ofdifferent
as shownbelow.
variables,

Variables
Systemic-and Continental-Level
One of themostremarkable
in recentyearsis theconverdevelopments
of
factors
that
UN
resolve
in
gence
encouraged
security
dealingwithAfrican
issues.Notwithstanding
thedifficulties
itfacesin manyofitscurrent
peace
missionsinAfrica,theUN has in factrefusedto seriouslyconsiderhiring
whoareseenas moreefficient
andfreefroman overprivate
peacekeepers,
to
And
much
likethemultilevel
archingloyalty anyentity(Deen, 2004).
the
faces
UN
at
there
are
variables
at different
levels,
challenges
present,
and
individual-level
thatexplain
continental-,
variables,
including
systemic-,
theUN's newlyfoundresolve.As statedearlier,
thesevariablesare (a) the
natureof transitional
for
(c)
periods,(b) ripeness conflictintervention,
increased
resolvewithin
Africato dealwithsecurity
issueson thecontinent,
and(d) theeffectiveness
ofKofiAnnanas secretary-general
oftheUN.

The NatureofTransitionalSystems
transitional
twodifferent
structures
of
System
periodsareperiodsbetween
an international
scientists
differentiate
between
three
Often,
system.
political
important
systemstructures:
unipolar,in whichone statedominatesand
as GreatBritain
didinthe1800s;multipolar,
in
imposesitsvalueson others,
whichthreeormorestatesarealmostequallypowerful
butnonehasthemilandeconomiccapabilities
toimposeitsvaluesontherest,as intheyears
itary
between
WorldWarI andWorldWarII; andbipolar,
inwhichtwostatesdominateandimposetheirvalueson somebutnotall states,as theUnitedStates
andtheSovietUniondidafter
WorldWarII. Gilpin(1981)notedthatchanges
insystem
structure
between
usuallyoccurwhentheredevelopsa "disjuncture
theexisting
ofthesystem
andthedistribution
ofpowerinthesysgovernance
tem"(p. 186).Thatis,theexisting
whichhas provided
hegemon,
leadership
and stability,
becomesprogressively
weakerbecauseoftheenormous
costs
entailsandis challenged
a
leadership
by a risingpowerbenton instituting
its increasednationalcapability.
In general,theconsystemthatreflects
is resolvedthrough
frontation
war"(p. 197).
"hegemonic
afterhegemonicwars is unstable,
However,the periodimmediately
becauseno clearleaderwillingandcapableof establishing
has
hegemony
thereis clearrejection
oftheearlier
yetemerged.In otherwords,although
thereis also uncertainty
of thefuture,
and theemerging
systemstructure,

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Bariagaber/UN Peace MissionsinAfrica 837

its influence.
Indeed,looking
hegemonusuallyhesitatesbeforeasserting
backateventsinworldpoliticsandtherolesinternational
have
organizations
in
one
notices
that
the
aftermath
of
well-structured
wars,
large-scale
played,
international
and/ornonstructured
international
organizations
regimesare
orremade,to helpfillthevoid.Suchorganizations
and/or
created,
regimes
rolesin shapingthefuture
oftheinternational
all in
playimportant
system,
toavoidfuture
inthefollowing.
an effort
wars,as illustrated
AttheCongress
ofViennain 1815,Europewasreorganized
toa
according
theemergence
of a hegemon
stricter
balance-of-power
approachto prevent
warslikeNapoleondid.The prevailing
in
capableofunleashing
atmosphere
the"recurrence
of thoseevilsfrom
Europerequiredthemeansto prevent
whichthe[then]existing
had so grievously
suffered"
(Webster,
generation
ofViennaandtheperiodfollowing
1965,p. 74). TheCongress
it,theConcert
toa territorial
settlement
whichwas defensible
ofEurope,gave"permanence
of balanceof power"(p. 102),andthissignificantly
solelybytheprinciple
to Europeansecurity.
In fact,therewereno large-scale
contributed
warsfor
almost100years,untilthebeginning
ofWorldWarI, a periodlongenoughfor
ofthebalanceofpower,
HansMorgenthau,
toclaimthat
proponents
including
thebalanceofpowerwasfarmoreconducive
topeacethanothersystem
strucin termsof theequal or
tures.Thisis becausepower"balance,"understood
of power,discourages
a statefrominitiating
almostequal distribution
war
areonlyabout50%.
giventhatitschancesofwinning
theendofWorldWarI brought
abouttheestablishment
ofthe
Similarly,
in which
League of Nations,based on theprincipleof collectivesecurity
was seenas subordinate
to worldpeace.The newconcept
nationalinterest
of thebalance-of-power
was a totalrepudiation
approachandtheprimacy
of nationalinterest,
Wilsonof theUnited
which,accordingto President
Statesandfellowidealists,madeWorldWarI possible.Andwhencollecdidnotworkthewayitwas hoped,failingto prevent
tivesecurity
another
discardedin favorofa newsecurity
war,ittoo was summarily
regimeand
a neworganization
tohelpmanageinternational
Indeed,
peaceandsecurity.
aftertheendofWorldWarII, theUN was createdon therecognition
that
and thesovereignty
of nationswereparamount,
nationalinterest
and the
ofinternational
victorsweremadeguardians
peace andsecurity.
thatalthough
theendofthecold wardidnot
It is no surprise,
therefore,
itdidin factcreateconditions
organization,
giveriseto a newinternational
inthemanagement
ofinternational
fortheUN tobe morevigorous
peaceand
forover40 years,the
bysuperpower
rivalry
Havingbeenparalyzed
security.
of the
UN setoutto fillthevacuumcreatedas a resultof thedissolution
oftheUnitedStates.Undertheleadership
SovietUnionandtheretrenchment

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838

Journal
ofBlack Studies

ofSecretary-General
its
theUN setouttofulfill
themandate
Boutros-Ghali,
fathers
in
the
was
not
envisioned.
Unlike
the
UN
however,
founding
past,
war
fortwomainreasons:(a) nolarge-scale
replacedbyanother
organization
occurred
toendthebipolarsystem,
and(b) theUnitedStates,as theapparent
wasinfacttheprimary
actorinestablishing
theUN, andthecharter
of
victor,
theUN reflected
thevalueson whichtheUnitedStateswasfounded.
Thatis,
to discredit
the
UN skeptics
despitecontinuous
attempts
bysomeAmerican
anditssecretary-general
(see, e.g.,Gardiner,
2004),a stronger
organization
UN was seenas complementary
toU.S. efforts
andinterests.
Itis important
tonotethatinaddition
totheriseofneworreinvented
institransitions
fromone structure
tothenexthavebeenaccompanied
tutions,
by
newideas,issues,and norms.The lasttransition
to such
gaveprominence
issuesas peacekeeping,
international
terrorism,
weaponsofmassdestruction,
to cut
crime,economicdevelopment,
globalepidemics,
organized
programs
levels,and so on. As variedas theissuesbecame,themeansof
poverty
themalso wentbeyondthetraditionally
state.
addressing
all-capablenationIt is nowwidelyacceptedthateffective
solutions
to theseissuesrequirethe
combined
efforts
ofstates,nongovernmental
organizations,
intergovernmental organizations,
and others.Each of theseentities
maybe moresuitedto
dealwithoneissuecompared
withothers.
Forexample,statesaremoresuited
tousemassiveforcetoeffect
regimechange,as inIraq.However,
theydo not
havethepostconflict
statemanagement
theUN is wellknownfor.
expertise
In short,theexistingmultipleissuesrequiremultiplechannelsto address
themeffectively,
andthishascontributed
toUN reinvigoration.
It is also criticalto observethecontention
the
thatas an organization,
UN's becomingmoredetermined
to deal withinternational
peacekeeping
does notdiminish
thefactthatmajorpowers,especiallytheUnitedStates,
havecontrolofwhattheUN Security
Councildoes.However,
theproliferationof ethnically
based conflicts
in thelate 1980s and early1990s and
othertransnational
suchas international
crime,drugtrafficking,
problems,
thethreat
of thespreadof weaponsof massdestruction,
and so
terrorism,
on,leftmajorpowerswithlittleoptionbuttolettheUN do thejob. Indeed,
as U.S. Presidential
ReviewDirective13 indicates,
changesin U.S. particfrom"justwhentheUnitedStatescouldmake
ipationin UN peacekeeping
a uniquemilitary
contribution"
to a U.S. "commitment
to usingmilitary
forceinconcert
withothernationsrather
thanunilaterally"
cameaboutonly
aftera lengthy
debatein thehighestechelonsof U.S. policymakingover
the"bestresponse[italicsadded]to a worldfullof post-ColdWarethnic
and subnational
conflicts"(Smith& Preston,1993). Thatis, U.S. policy
withrespectto UN peace operations,
adjustments
includingthepossible

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Bariagaber/UN Peace MissionsinAfrica 839

of the
placementof U.S. troopsunderUN command,were a function
realities
and
the
readiness
of
the
to
fill
UN
the
void.
emerging
geopolitical
Presidential
Review Directive13 was laterrevisedintoPresidential
Decision Directive25 because of oppositionfromsome membersof
Congress,especiallyafterAmericansoldierswere killedin Somalia in
a retreatfroma policyof
October1993. The new directiverepresented
multilateralism"
of
the
Presidential
ReviewDirective13 to a
"aggressive
on
"caution
and
based
2001, pp. 240-241).
(Cohen,
prudence"
policy
Americanapprehension
Becauseofthisandalso becauseoftheincreasing
therewas a lull in
at theleadershipof Secretary-General
Boutros-Ghali,
new peace missionsfor a few years.For example,the UnitedStates
forcethatcould
toprovidefunding
to a proposedUN intervention
"refused
have stoppedthe civil war" in Congo-Brazzavillein 1966 (p. 241).
to freshmissionsdid notlastlong,andtheUN
However,U.S. opposition
enviresumeditspeacemissionsinearnestinpartbecausetheinternational
demandedit and in partbecauseKofiAnnanhad becomesecreronment
theexplanation
thatpost-coldwarsurgein
in 1997.Therefore,
tary-general
was due to U.S. foreign
UN peace operations
policychanges,whichwere
is onlypartial.
morereactivethanproactive,
is a stateof "system
In summary,
by itsverynature,systemtransition
when
(Gilpin,1981,pp. 10-15)andis riskprone.However,
disequilibrium"
until
viewedas rationalactors,statesareriskaverseand chooseto retreat
to createnewinterthedustsettles.Thisenvironment
opensopportunities
nationalorganizations
or,in thecase ofexisting
ones,toemergefromtheir
toplayan imporAndtheUN didemergefromitshibernation
hibernation.
in a fastchanging
world.
tantrolein peace operations

in Africa
RipenessforConflictIntervention
has revolvedaroundthe
The notionof ripenessforconflictresolution
realization
partiesthatit cannotwin;therefore,
by each of theconflicting
willnotpay off.This stageis usuallyreached
of theconflict
continuation
in thecostlydead-end"and
wheneachpartybegins"tofeeluncomfortable
thatmayfollow(Zartman,
stalemate"
a "hurting
1989,p. 268). Hence,each
mediation.
Implicitassumppartybecomesmorereceptiveto third-party
has lasteda longtime;(b) the
tionsin thisnotionare that(a) theconflict
mediationshouldtakeplace; and
partiesin conflictalone decidewhether
their
servicesonlywiththeconsentof
(c) thirdpartiesareneutral,
lending
The
literature
also
thepartiesin conflict.
suggeststhatthechancesof a
in
if
themediator
is a stakeholder
in
mediation
increase
outcome
successful
&
theconflict
(Crocker,
Hampson, Aall, 1999).

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840

Journal
ofBlack Studies

in Africa,and how and whytheUN interLookingat recentconflicts

in manyof
revealsthefollowing:
vened,however,
(a) The UN intervened
theconflicts,
suchas thosein SierraLeone,Liberia,theDRC, and Cote
wererelatively
fresh(comparedwith
d'lvoire,earlyon,andtheseconflicts
theintractable
conflicts
the
cold
war
at
the
timeofintervention;
era)
during
without
theconsentofall thepartiesto theconflicts
(b) theUN intervened
afterstakeholding
suchas theEconomicCommunity
regionalorganizations,
of WestAfricanStates(ECOWAS), failedto further
advancethepeace
becauseitassistedgovernments,
which
process;(c) theUN was notneutral,
werepartiesto theconflicts,
in buildingthecapacitiesof thestates,as in
SierraLeone,andtheDRC; and (d) theUN did nothavea wellBurundi,
definedstakein theconflicts
as muchas neighboring
statesdid.Therefore,
as discussedbelow,themorepertinent
theconflicts
questionis notwhether
wereripeforresolution
butrather
as ripe
whytheUN saw theenvironment
forintervention.
Theeconomicproblems
Africafacedinthe1970sandthe1980sandthe
further
it suffered
becauseof increasedglobalization
exacmarginalization
erbated
thepolitical,
andsocialproblems
itfaced,so muchso that
economic,
minimalservicesto theircitizenry.
manystatessimplystoppedproviding
- thegovernment,
themainconstituencies
within
thesestates
the
Therefore,
and thegeneralpublic have come to accept,and evenwelopposition,
becausetheysee itas theonlywaytoresolvethe
come,foreign
intervention,
conflicts.
in suchstates,whichwerereluctant
to invite
First,governments
UN intervention
in priordecades,nowwelcomeUN intervention
because
theyno longerhavetheunqualified
support
majorpowersprovidedduring
thecoldwar.Atthesametime,theyareunableto solvetheirproblems
from
within
becauseofeconomicproblems
andotheradditional
stresses
brought
aboutbyglobalization.
orevencontain,
thesmallTheyareunabletodefeat,
est armedopposition.
The decisionsof thegovernments
of SierraLeone,
andtheDRC to "gratefully
Liberia,Burundi,
[accept]a broadUN interventionin theirinternal
affairs"
arecases in point(Lawson& Rothchild,
2005,
behaviorsuchas thiswouldhave been difficult
to
p. 229). Government
a fewdecadesago. Of course,thisdoes notreferto bilaterally
contemplate
such as Cuba in Angola;
agreedinterventions
by friendly
governments
Francein Francophone
Africa;andCuba,theSovietUnion,andYemenin
theOgadenWarbetweenEthiopiaandSomalia.
Second,oppositiongroups,as always,readilywelcomeintervention
becausetheyaretoo weakto achievetheiraimsof government
controlby
forcein a relatively
shortperiodoftime.Atthesametime,theinternationalizationof the conflictsprovidesthemwiththe legitimacytheyhave

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Bariagaber/UN Peace MissionsinAfrica 841

neededto participate
in thepeace process,including
alwaysdesperately
elections.Third,thegeneralpublic,whichsuffers
themostin civilwars
becauseof theincreasing
with
which
armed
combatants
violate
impunity
therightsof unarmedcivilians,is themosteagerforsomekindof mesThe joy withwhichMonroviansgreetedAmericans
sianic intervention.
whentheyintervened
in Liberiain August2003 contrasts
highlywiththe
and
form
between
when
of
intervention
1960
was suspect
1990,
period
any
of theneedsof the
(Itano,2003). Hence,thereexisteda rareconvergence
in thetargetcountry,
maindomesticconstituencies
and thisgave theUN
In otherwords,theinternational
addedreasonsto intervene.
community
neededforpeaceoperations,
andAfrica
was willingtosupplytheresources
was a willingandgrateful
recipient.

IncreasedResolveWithinAfricato Deal
WithAfricanSecurityIssues
andthecreation
of newinstitutional
The linkbetweensystemtransition
to manageinterstate
interactions
seenat thesystemic
levelearlier
structures
at
the
continental
level.
Once
statesin
also
be
independent
applicable
may
Africaappearedin the late 1950s and early 1960s,Africanstatesmen
of AfricanUnity(OAU) and approvedthe
establishedtheOrganization
thehardwon
charter
on
May 25, 1963,to help"consolidate
organization's
as
well
as
the
African
.
.
.
and
to
[of
nations]
sovereignty
fight
independence
theOAU on the
Union,1969).Although
(African
againstneo-colonialism"
colonialism
wholesucceededin helpingbringabouttheendof Portuguese
as
in
the
former
Rhodesia
and
South
it
andsettler
Africa,
apartheid
regimes,
in itspeacekeeping
andpeacemaking
efforts
in conwas notas successful
inthe1960s
andbetween
African
states.Despitemanyconflicts
flictswithin
andthe1970s,as in Somalia-Ethiopia,
Sudan,Nigeria,andWestern
Sahara,
itsestablishment
beforetheOAU couldlaunchits
ittooksome17 yearsafter
in 1980 in Chad.Thiseffort
was fraught
firsteverpeacekeeping
operation
and otherproblems,
and themission
withoperational,
financial,
logistical,
tookcontrolof thecountry
endedafterHisseneHabreforcibly
(Berman&
on
Sams,2003). It tookalmosta decadeafterthatbeforetheOAU ventured
missionin Rwandain 1990.
a secondpeacekeeping
theendofthecoldwar,however,
realities
after
Withthenewgeopolitical
in fourpeace endeavors
the OAU becamemoreactiveand participated
(Berman& Sams,2003,pp.40-42).Atthesametime,regional
organizations,
andpeacemaking
suchas ECOWAS,havetakenmajorstepsinpeacekeeping
in
inLiberia,SierraLeone,andso on.Andsinceitscreation
intheconflicts

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842

Journal
ofBlackStudies

issues.Thus,
African
2001,theAU hastakenmajorrolesinresolving
security
since1992,African-led
inno fewerthana dozenconforceshaveintervened
ofwhichthefollowing
intheCentral
aremostnotable:(a) theconflict
flicts,
African
to
which
Burkina
Faso,
Chad,
Gabon,
Mali,
Republic,
Senegal,and
the
Interin
African
Force
the
Central
African
Togo,through
Republic,sent
in
the
conflicts
in
and
Sierra
Coted'lvoire,
1997;
Leone,
Liberia,
(b)
troops
to whichECOWAS senttheMilitary
Forcein the1990sandearly
Observer
in Burundi,
forwhichtheAU established
theAfrican
2000; (c) theconflict
UnionMissionin Burundiin 2002; (d) theconflict
in Darfur,
forwhichthe
AU established
theAfrican
UnionMissioninSudanin2004;and(e) themore
recentconflict
in Somalia,forwhichtheAU established
theAfrican
Union
Missionin Somaliain 2007. In otherwords,thereis nowincreased
resolve
withinAfricato find'Africansolutionsto Africanproblems"because"a
ofAfrican
number
countries
no longerviewedstatesovereignty
as
growing
sacrosanct"
(Berman& Sams,2003,pp. 36-37).
In mostof theseinterventions,
takenover
the UN has subsequently
forthepeace operations.
However,therole playedby the
responsibility
African-led
missionsis widelyrecognized
as havingbeencriticalinmaking
UN interventions
moreconducive.Major powers,includingthe United
States,Canada,theEuropeanUnion,and eventheNorthAtlanticTreaty
have noticedthecooperation
betweentheUN and African
Organization,
and have promisedfundsand logisticalsupportto help Africa
partners
shoulder
itssecurity
In fact,theAU has nowestablished
the
responsibility.
CouncilofAfricatodealwithemerging
intheconthreats
Security
security
tinent.Therefore,
recentdevelopments
in Africaencouragedthe UN to
workin tandemwiththeAU andotherregionalorganizations,
becausethe
likelihoodof successfuloutcomesof peace endeavorsin Africaincreases
whenauthentically
Africanpartners
areinvolvedin peace processes.

Individual-LevelVariables
The systemicandcontinental-level
variablesdescribedaboveprovided
a fertile
fortheUN to actthewayitdid.However,
environment
theremust
be eager,receptive,
andpurposeful
on theotherendtotransorganizations
late attitudes
intoconcreteprogramsof action.In otherwords,thesystemicand continental-level
variablesin and of themselves
maynotfully
thewayit did,becausetheyonlyprovide
explainwhytheUN intervened
conditions
withindividualnecessaryforUN behavior.
Theymustinteract
levelvariablesto completetheequationneededto producethequantitative

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/UN Peace MissionsinAfrica 843

Bariagaber

transformations
of UN peace operations
in Africa.Indeed,
and qualitative
UN readinesstoundertake
newmissionstooka quantum
leapwiththeelectionofKofiAnnan,thefirstsecretary-general
oftheUN fromsub-Saharan
Africa.His electionas a leaderoftheUN putAfricansecurity
needsat the
he
not
because
came
from
the
continent
but
also
as the
because,
top only
underfor
the
in
Rwanda,
secretary-generalpeaceoperations
during genocide
he carriedalongwithhima senseoforganizational
andpersonalguiltatnot
Rwanda
its
time
of
need.
during
helping

KofiAnnanas Secretary-General
oftheUN
in theliterature
thatnationalleadershavea
It has beenwellestablished
greatdegreeof influenceon politicaland otherevents.The "great-man"
theory(and someempiricalevidence)suggeststhatnationalleaderschart
theirforeign
ofthenationalas
policieson thebasisoftheirinterpretations
environments
consistent
withbeliefstheyhold dear
well as international
twoleaders,eveniftheyaresubjected
(Ray& Kaarbo,2005).Accordingly,
to thesamenationaland international
are expectedto have
environments,
different
hierarchies
ofpriorities
becauseofidiosyncratic
orpersonally
relevantcharacteristics,
theirupbringing,
socioeconomic
including
religions,
riskaverse,leaders
status,and so on. Becausehumanbeingsaregenerally
settheirpriorities
onthebasisoffamiliar
issuesinan effort
tominimize
the
riskassociatedwiththeunknown.
addsto
Indeed,clingingto thefamiliar
one's senseof security.
in assessingthedegreeofinfluThe"greatman"theory
maybe relevant
of theUN has on peace operations.
ence a secretary-general
By virtueof
thepositionhe or sheholds,thesecretary-general
servesin twocapacities:
or "chiefadministrative
as secretary,
and as general,or "chief
officer,"
2003,p. 53). In thelatterrole,thesecre(Gourevitch,
politicaloperative"
use a given windowof opportunity
can prudently
in the
tary-general
in policyissues,includingpeace
SecurityCouncilto makea difference
Forexample,Secretary-General
is said to have
Hammarskjold
operations.
oftenled theUN in his capacityas "general"andis consideredthe"printopresent-day
efforts"
[UN] peacekeeping
(Gibbs,2000,
cipalinspiration
thattheUN was uniquelypositioned
to contribute
p. 361). His conviction
to international
flewto the
peace was so deepthatin 1960,he "personally
into [Katanga]"
Congo and escortedseveralunitsof Swedishinfantry
(Gibbs,2000,p. 366).
of theUN
JavierPerezde Cuellar,thefirstsecretary-general
Similarly,
fromLatinAmerica,gave the"negotiations
[in El Salvador]thepriority,

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844

Journal
ofBlack Studies

andwas instrubacking,anddegreeofpoliticalcommitment
theyrequired"
mentalin thefirst-ever
in a conflict
in LatinAmerica
UN peace operation
1992,
(Crockeretal., 1999,p. 683). Undera peaceaccordsignedinJanuary
the government
of El Salvador and FrenteFarabundoMarti Para la
LiberationNacional agreedto hold elections,whichthe UN Observer
Missionin El Salvadorwas mandatedto monitor.
The resolution
of the
Salvadoranconflictwiththe activeinvolvement
of the UN came about
aboutby changedinternapartlybecauseof U.S. policychangesbrought
- theUnitedStatesdidnotpushitslong-held
tionalenvironment
opposition
- andpartly
toanyintervention
because,as the
bytheUN inLatinAmerica
firstsecretary-general
fromLatinAmerica,de Cuellargave thenecessary
attention
to security
issueson thecontinent.
It is especiallyinstructive
to
notethattheimpending
ofde Cuellaron December31, 1992,and
departure
a "privatesignalfrom[his]successor"thattheSalvadoranissuewouldno
settlelongerbe givenpriority
gave addedurgencyto reacha negotiated
ment(de Soto,1999,p. 379). As Crockeret al. (1999) aptlynoted,"witha
different
castofpersonalities
theUnitedNationsmaynothavebeenableto
role"(p. 683). Indeed,whena groupofAfrican
playsuchaneffective
diplomatsat the UN demandedthathe do something
whenthe civil war in
Liberiabrokein 1990,de Cuellarrepliedthattherewas nothing
he could
do because "he was not authorizedto intervene
in domesticmatters"
(Goulding,1999,p. 160).
After
thedeparture
ofde Cuellarin December1992,however,
therewas
certain
fromthenewSecretary-General
...
[BoutrosBoutros-Ghali]
pressure
formorepeacekeeping
inAfrica.He was thefirst
AfricanSecretary-General,
withdeep experienceofAfrica. . . [andunlikede Cuellar]thismadehim
sensitive
to complaints
thatAfricawas notgetting
itsfairshare

ofUN attention
of
(Goulding,1999,p. 163).Therefore,
secretaries-general
theUN do haveinfluence
in whattheorganization
does,including
peacekeepingoperations.Did Annan,like his predecessorsabove, influence
peace operations?
Annanhas beendescribedas "persuasive"
anda "skilledbuilderofconsensuson theSecurityCouncil"(Shawcross,2000, p. 409). Unlikeother
who have "becomeidentified
withtheU.N. bureausecretaries-general,
Annanhas madehis
cracy[perhapswiththeexceptionof Hammarskjold],
as an honestbrokeramongworldleaders"andhas actedmoreas
reputation
"general"duringhistenure(Maniatis,2001,p. 44). Forexample,whenthe
CouncildebatedtheU.S.-sponsored
resolution
thatdemanded
that
Security

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Bariagaber/UN Peace MissionsinAfrica 845

access to weaponsinspectorsor face military

Iraq provideunrestricted
attack,he "personallyensuredthe unanimousvote [italicsadded]- he
- by lobbyingSyria'sPresident
wantedIraq to see a worldunited
Bashir
al-Assad,thelastholdout"(Meisler,2003, p. 35). It is also truethatthe
CouncilgaveAnnanwhathe wantedwhenhe requested
thatcomSecurity
and reintegration
batantdemobilization
of
UN
programs
peace operations
fromassessedbudgets(UnitedNations,2000b).This is espebe financed
forsuchendeavors
becausepreviousfunding
was sought
ciallynoteworthy,
contributions
fromvoluntary
only.
Unlikewhatmanyoriginally
whenhe assumedleadership
ofthe
thought
UN inJanuary
1997,Annan"waswillingtotakechancesandmovebeyond
of peace,"andhe usuallyescapedunscathed
normalboundsin theinterest
evenif his standon issueswerenotpopular(Meisler,2007, p. 168). For
contemplated
takinga tripto Iraq to convince
example,whenhe seriously
theIraqigovernment
to allowarmsinspectors
in,theUnitedStatesadvised
himto thecontrary.
this,Annanmadethedecisionto take
Notwithstanding
thetrip,andtheUnitedStatesturnedaroundand supported
his trip.Upon
to New York,theUnitedStates"joinedthefourteen
Annan'sreturn
other
oftheSecurity
theagreement
andcongratumembers
Councilin approving
when
latingAnnanforhis mission"(Meisler,2007, p. 166). Similarly,
thesovereign
Annanmadea speechat theUN questioning
noninterference
in a statethatviolatedtherightsofitscitizens,manydelegates"roseup to
theproposalfirmly
denouncetheheresy.
However,
[he]succeededinputting
unscathed"
on theglobalagenda,andwhat'smore,he survived
(Williams,
GermanchancellorHelmutKohl putit, "When
2000, p. 20). As former
[Annan]approachesyou ... it is notpossibleto keep up anybarriers"
quality
(quotedin Ramo,2000). In otherwords,Annanhas a disarming
othersandoftenhadthecouragetoactas generalintheinterwhenmeeting
to thewishesofthemajorpowers.
estofpeace,evenifthiswentcontrary
one wouldhaveexpectedGeneralDallaire,forcecommander
Similarly,
of the UN AssistanceMissionto Rwandain 1993 and 1994, to blame
was headoftheUN
AnnanforUN inactioninRwanda,giventhatthelatter
of PeacekeepingOperations(UNDPKO). On the contrary,
Department
GeneralDallaire(2003) puttheblameon theSecurityCounciland wrote
and dedicationto theplightof others
that"Annanprojecteda humanism
thatI haverarelyexperienced"
(p. 92). Others,suchas RichardHolbrooke,
of Annanas
who becameU.S. ambassadorto theUN in 1998,thought
his
someonewho has a "nearlymagicalabilityto movepeople through
personalcharm"(quotedin Maniatis,2001,p. 44). Giventhesequalities,
one may
and the evidenceprovidedin the previoustwo paragraphs,

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846

Journal
ofBlackStudies

concludethatAnnanhadwhatittooktogetmajorpowerssupinescapably
missions,
portpeace
duringhis tenure.Indeed,
perhapshis top priority
in
confidence
the
UN
had
increased
afterAnnanbecame
majorpower
in
All
in
1997.
the
Council
all,
secretary-general
Security
approved10
in
Africa
Annan's
and
all of them
tenure,
peace operations
10-year
during
occurredat a timewhenAfricawas becomingincreasingly
morepeaceful.
It is also instructive
to notethattheSecurity
Councilhad approveda new
peace mission,theUN ObserverMissionin Angola,in June1997,onlya
fewmonthsafterAnnanbeganhistenure,
andthisoccurredaftera 3-year
hiatusduringthetenureofBoutros-Ghali.
As mentioned
earlier,Annanservedas head of UNDPKO whenthe
Srebrenica
massacreandtheRwandangenocideoccurred.
After
he became
Annanrepeatedly
secretary-general,
apologizedonbehalfoftheUN andon
hisbehalfforfailingtoact.Thispersonalas wellas organizational
senseof
tohavesomeimpacton hisbehavioratthehelmoftheUN.
guiltcontinued
It is important
to note,as Annanhas stated,thattheRwandangenocide
"had influenced
manyof his laterdecisionsas secretary
general"("UN
Chief'sRwandaGenocideRegret,"
hispersonality
traits,
2004). Therefore,
his character
and leadershipstyle,thecontinent
fromwhichhe
including
inRwandaas headofUNDPKO provide
came,andhisnegative
experience
additional
forthetrajectory
inAfrica
ofUN peace operations
explanations
duringthepast10 years.

Conclusion
The systemic-,
and individual-level
continental-,
variables,in and of
do notprovidea completeexplanation
as to whyUN peace
themselves,
missionsin Africahave undergonequantitative
and qualitativetransformations
overthepast10 years.Indeed,on thewhole,thesystemicand
continental-level
variableswere presentduringthe tenureof SecretaryGeneralBoutros-Ghali,
as therewasincreased
readiness
onthepartofmajor
theUnitedStates,tolettheUN undertake
increased
powers,including
peace
missionsand on thepartofAfricans
to welcomethosemissions.In other
nexusofpeaceoperations
was present.
words,thedemand-supply
However,
didnothavethepersonality
Boutros-Ghali
traits
thatAnnanhad.Thereis no
doubtBoutros-Ghali
to makea
was moreof a generaland was committed
in Africa.ButtheUnitedStatesincreasingly
difference
disenchanted
grew
withhis leadership
and did notendorsehimfora secondterm.This was
unusualin thehistory
of secretaries-general
oftheUN. In otherwords,the
individual-level
variableconduciveto morevigorousUN involvement
was

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Bariagaber/UN Peace MissionsinAfrica 847

Indeed,eithersensingthenegalackingbeforeAnnanassumedleadership.
of
cold warorbecausetheydid
tiveinternational
environment
the
political
nothavethecharismathatAnnanhad,UN secretaries-general
at thetime
to servemoreas chiefadministrative
founditmoreprudent
officers
during
theirtenure.
On theotherhand,theinternational
durpoliticalenvironment
old's
tenure
was
more
similar
to
that
of
Annan:
both
They
ingHammarskj
servedduring
transitional
needed
periods.Also,bothpossessedthecharisma
to influence
theSecurity
fora "chiefpoliticaloperative"
Council.The parallels betweenthetenuresof thetwo secretaries-general
thatmanyhave
Shawcross(2000) and Meisler(2003), maybe explained
drawn,including
ofthesystemic-,
andindividual-level
varicontinental-,
bytheconvergence
ablesduring
theirrespective
tenures.
one mayborrowthemathematical
term"necessary
and
Quiteusefully,
sufficient
conditions"
to establishtherelationship
betweenthedependent
in UN peace missions)andtheindependent
variable(transformations
variincreasedresolvewithinAfrica,
ables (thenatureof transitional
systems,
andcontinental-level
variablesmaybe viewedas havetc.).The systemicfortheUN to be moreinclinedto internecessary
ingprovidedconditions
theequationforactualUN intervention.
vene,buttheydo notcomplete
They
mustbe complemented
variable,whichprovideda
by theindividual-level
sufficient
to effect
intervention.
thethreetypesofvaricondition
Together,
inthisstudyprovided
thenecessary
andsufficient
ablesidentified
conditions
inAfricaoverthepast10 years.
formorevigorousUN intervention

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Assefaw Bariagaber is a professorand chair in the Departmentof Diplomacyand
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School,SetonHall University.
Relations,
and theRefugeeExperience:Flight,Exile
FalolaAwardfortheBestBook onAfrica(Conflict
in theHornofAfrica,Ashgate,2006) by a memberof theAssociationof
and Repatriation
ofthe2006 LawrenceDunbarReddickMemorialScholarship
ThirdWorldStudiesandwinner
Awardforthebestarticleon Africapublishedin theJournalofThirdWorldStudiesin 2006.
He servesas associateeditorofEritreanStudiesReview.

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