,,

GUTMANN. I D E N T I T Y A N D DSMOCEACY
1 543

, , ,.

AMY GUTMANN

ries of justice ever do (Rawls 1971, 1999L; Carens 2000). In every existing
nonideal democracy, individuals identify themselves and are identified by
'
others,. especially
for public purposes,
with voluntary and involuntary
.
. .
groups defined by social markers such as nationality, ethnicity, gender,
'!'
race, age, disability, and political ideology. Even if none of these group
identities-nor all of them taken together-conipletely defines any individual, group identities both constrain and liberate individuals, depending
,
on the identitv.. the,individual. and the context f~ A ~ o i a h1996. 97-991.
Group
identities also play a central role in democratic politics, for better
" ,
'
and for worse, because most individuals can be politically influential only
in groups and some groups are far more justice friendlythan others.
..;) , ,,,
. The scholarship.on identity and democracy is internally divided over
: . :whether voluntary or involuntary group identities generally operate for the
better or the wane in democratic politics. The "school of culture" emplia,
'
sizes the essential contribution that cultural groups make to the lives of individuals in providing a sense of secure belonging and a set of scripts that
,,
'
give
meaning to individual lives. T h e school of culture therefore warns
,
against treating the ideal of the free and equal person as if actual individu,
als could be conceived independently of any and all cultural contexts. By
,; , , .
contrast, the "school of choice" emphasizes the value of individual freedoln
from involuntary groups, the freedom to criticize and revise culturally
;, .
given identities, and a correlative. right of free association. The school of
clloice therefore issues precisely the opposite warning from the school of
.,
'
cultu": Do not heat cu~turalgroups as if they were primordial, sovereign
,
authorities over individuals who should be accorded the civic standing of
free and equal Persons indemocraticsocieties.
,
,
: '
1" this essay, J propose a synthesis that avoids the temptation, on the
one hand, to elevate cultural groups over the individual, and, on the other
,
hand, to conceive of individuals free from socially given identities. I build
,,:
this synthesis on the insights offered by the schools of culture and choice at
.tl~eir
strongest, and I therefore criticize those claims that rest on a concep,
Lion of democratic societies as mere aggregations of either comprehensive
' ;
cultural groups or free and equal individuals. A synthetic penpecfive sib,' ,
,; ates the humanist ideals of freedom, opport~lnity,and civic equality for all
persons within nonideal democratic contexts and, by so doing, offen a per,.
spective on identity politics that is absent from ideal theories of justice. In
. the context of a society still suffering from a legacy of racial and gender dip
, , . crimination, for example, racial minorities and women often have no better political alternative than to engage in collective action with the aid of
,
identity groups and the aim of achieving greater civic equality and justice.
. . ,, For members of subordinated groups to eschew all identity associations
would be counterproductive to justice. Yet not all identity grot~psare jug
.
,
tice
friendly, and therefore a synthetic perspective needs to distinguish
.
,
: among different kinds of asciiptive identity politics. Without the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), for exam!

Identity and Democracy:

A Synthetic Perspective

..
,

Tile ever-growing attention to group identities and identity groups in normative political theory parallels their saliency in contemporav.democntic
politics. c~~~~~
of individuals l,ound together by a shared social identity
disability, or pb
such as nationality, ethnicity, gender, color, class,
litical ideology make political claims that range from exempting them.
selr,es from disproportionately burdensome laws to exercising sovereign^.
A large literature has developed over the past three decades centering
around the claims of identity groups in democratic politics, often begin;
ning with the premise that individual identities are socially constnlcted
(rather than essentialist) and then pursuing the political implications of srr
c.al construction. ~h~ idea ofthe social conshction ofidentity is so open
ended, however, that it has no political implications, leaving us with the
question of whether the use of identity in political analysis is at all meaningful (Bmbaker and Cooper 2000).
wllat is identity group politics7 is it reducible to interest group polis
tics? Are there any political implications of a shared group identity, for examp]e, for exemption from othewise valid laws or for group
criti&
of identity group politics often
it to tile free association of individ.
uals. Free association is thought to enable people to develop their identities
as they see lit, not as any group detemlines for them. Yet associational freedom permits group exclusivity, and exclusions based on ascriptive group
identity perpetuate a negative identity group politics, which leaves many
people-simply by virtue of their group identity-with less than equal free/
dam,
and civic standing. should democratic governnlenh
therefore constrain civic associations
to discriminate against
on
the basis of their group identities?
A growing and wide-ranging scholarship on group identity and associ.
ational freedom in nonideal democracies addresses this question. It suggests that ' W h o should decide what and how in democratic politics?"
cannot, be answered witllout taking more
of the political role of
group identities and civic associations in nonideal contexts than ideal the@

h:

, ,

..

pie, Nrican Americans would be worse off than they are today, whereas
without the Klu Kluv Klan (KKK) they would be better off, yet both are ascriptively based associations. To tell African America~lsthat they should
not identify as a grollp for the purposes of democratic politics is to tell
them to ignore both history and contemporary reality; to tell them that they
should only identify as an ascriptive group would be similarly misleadin8
Many commentators on identity politics condemn it without qualifiwhile many others uncritically applaud i t To understand and evaluate different kinds of identity groups and how they function in nonideal
delnocratic contexts, 1 begin by recognizing the irreducible tension'between individual freedom and. the shaping of i~~dividual
identities and
democratic politics by groups. When we recognize this irreducible tension,
we are in a better position to.understand the re1ationship:among group
identities, democratic politics, and the ideals of individual freedom, oppor!
tunity, and civic equality The first section asks what identity groups are;
and what is the relationship between identity and interest group politics,
Is interest
Can identity group politics be reduced to interest group
group politics, as commentators suggest, "an inherent part of the governing
fiocess ?f ademocracy" while identity group ~olitics"is antithetical to the
basic principle of one indivisible nation" (Connerly 1997)7 The next two
sections examine two opposing schools of thought on the role of group
identity in democratic politics: the schools of culture and of choice. The f i ~
nal section develops the implicatipns of a more synthetic perspectiveby r b
visiting the divisive issue of group rights and by raising the question of liow
missing identities might alter democratic landscapes.
I

Identifying Identity Group and Interest

G r o u p Politics
'

An identity group, as the name suggests, is bound up with who people are1
not merely with what they want, The distinctive and definingfeature oflan
identity group is the identification of its members as a certain kind of petson, and therefore its members' muti~alidentification with people of that
kind, where the kind is a consequential social category (Fearon 1999).This
mutual identification around a social category is independent of-yet alsa
clearly compatible with-the pursoih of instrumental ends by the group1
When a group of people who mutually identify around a social c
act in politics on the basis of a group identity-whether for the sak
gaining recognition for the group or furthering the interests of the group
they are part of identity group politics.
Identities and therefore identity groups are socially constructed.
this, however, is not to say much more than that genes and physiognolnie
do not determine our social identities. "People are limited by, but they~arb

not prisoners of, their genes, their physiognomies, and their histories in settling on their own identities. And ifpowerful social forces motivate idelltity
exploration-as they seem to do in our age-it is the constructivist face of
identity that seems the lhore real" (Laitin 1998a, 21). Almost everytl~ing
that informs our social identities-such as race, gender (as distinct from biological sex), etlinicity, and nationality-can be called social c o n s h c tions. To say that racial, gender, ethnic, and national identities are social
constmctions is not to say that they are any easier to change than our genetic inheritance or physiognomy. Most African Americans, women, and
deafpeople cannot '!passn for white, men, or hearing individuals; they can
reinterpret. these ascriptive identities but they cannot give them up. For
Some people, ethnic identities that are connected to a native language may
he somewhat easier to change, by a decisionto speak a second language
and give up certain customary ways of acting, but even an ethnic identity
can be difficultto alter except by generational change.
1 . Yet many people do change their ascriptive identities over time, somelimes quite deliberately and strategically. Tlle social conshuction of identity is most evident when identities are "constructed and reconstructed
as'social opportunities change" (Laitin 1998a, :20). To account for such
uhange, especially among ethnic minorities, political scientists propose a
raltibnal-choice theory about the social constmction of identity. A rationalhoice theory posits that people retain or change their social identities acording to what best satisfies their interests,~andwhat best satisfies their
interests depends in turn on the payoffs people predict from the alternate
identities that are available to them. According torational-choice theory, in
any given social context, people choose the available identity that they predict will best serve their interests. When identity change is possible, on this
theory, it is interest driven. Even ascriptive identity, wlien it is not simply a
social given, is one among many tools in the arsenal of interest-based politics. But this does not mean that identity politics is reducible to interest
pdlitics; what it meansis that identities and interests interact, and the twb
kihds of politics work together. Both need to be understood for what each
qontributesto understanding politics.
i l l ' , A rationalchoice theory that admits all kinds of actions as interest
based (by positing interests that conform to all the revealed preferences of
beople) is a hollow shell into which all actions can be fit and said to conford to its premise: people act in ways that reveal (and therefore reflect)
'?interests. Actions reveal people's preferences, and their interests are
to be their revealed preferences. All political action can be placed
such a rational-cl~oiceframework before it is analyzed. Used as an
lsifiable framework of analysis, a rationalchoice theory cannot claim
,identity.politics is reducible to interest group politics in any substan.meaningful sense. If we stipulate that all human behavior is interest
t h e n everything is redircible to interest group politics, but not in a
hy that informs our understanding of how democratic politics works. To

say that human behavior is interest driven is to say nothing, for example!,
understand actions that reflect group identification or moral commihn
on the part of people and those that reflect notliing more than a .
welfare goal. T h e most plausible alternative to reducing all identity pa
to interest politics does not deny that changes in identity areinteres
driven. Nor does it claim that identity politics conflicts with a politibs
based on interests. Rather it suggests that identities inform people's int
ests. Because identity often informs interest, identity cannot be reduced,
interest. Interests do not always, or even generally, precede identily inlb
way that would pennit an insightful observer to explain people's beha
by their prior interests, without knowing their identities.
How then is an identity group analytically.different from an interes
group? T h e ideal typeof interest group organizes around a shared instrul
mental interest of individuals (Olson 1971). T h e ideal type of iden '
group organizes around mutual identification among its members. In
litical practice, most organized groups are both identity and interest
groups. Members are drawn to the group because of their mutual ident
cation and because they share an instrumental interest pursued by
group. David Truman subsumes identity and interest groups, and eve
thing Madison called a "faction," into his definition ofinterest groups: "ad
group that. .:. makes certain claims upon other groups . . . for the est
lishment, maintenance or enhancement offorrns of behavior that are I
plied by the[ir] shared attitudes" (1971, 33). More analytical definitions or
identity a n d interest groups that are not so broad as to verge o
meaningless are preferable.
T h e defining features of identity and interest groups-the mutual
identification of people with one another, on the one hand, and the see
ing together of a shared inshumental goal, on the other-are often mu
allv reinforcing. Most identiw. nrouvs
- . .pursue instrumental interests of the1
members and thereby encourage more people to see their identities ,a$ '
bound up with a group. Many interest groups encourage people to join'bx :'
orienting themselves around some mutual identification that is broadei.
than the specific interests that they are pursuing at any given time. Some
interest group theorists call these solidary.incentives (Cigler.and Loomis
1995.9). T h e greater the role that identity plays illattracting and retainin
members, the more a group is a n interest group. T h e greater the role tha
the pl~rstlitof shared instrumental interests .ulavs
, in atiractine: and retain
ing members, the more a group is an interest group. Most groups that.adt
in democratic politics are a combination of both, and for two good reasons
First, people's identification with one another influences their sense
what they .want, and people's sense of what they want influences
whom they identify. Second, individuals who identify with others are b
able to organize politically, and organized groups can be far more p
cally effective than an equal number of ~~nilllied
citizens (Moe.1980). Th
observation provides the single most salient answer to the question olwl~y

identity matters so much, in democratic politics. Group identificawhether it be around gender, race, religion, sexual orientation, eth,nationality, age, disability, or i d e o I ~ ~ ~ - ~ r o v ino
d e less
s "real" a set
ns for people to organize politically than purely material incena.As important, the two kinds of reasons-identity and interest-are ofen mutually reinforcing.
I : , . Once we recognize the reality of identity group politics and its inter'ction with interest group politics, along with its social constniction, we
oid reification, which is the single most common charge of academic
ltics who suggest that analyzing identity politics as a real phenomenon
hntails approving o f " 'groupness' itself" (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, 31).
uite the contrary, we are now in a better position to consider two serious
alleliges that identity politics presents in democratic politics. First, illib
al i d e n t i t y ' g i ~ uerect
~ s obstacles to the civic equality ofsome members,
oftin women and disadvantaged minorities, who do not want to choose between their cultural group identity and their recognition as equal.citizens.
Must members of illiberal cultural groups be forced to choose? Second,
Juluntary groups claim the right to associate as their members see fit and
therefore the right to exclude those they deem unfit for membership.
hould civic associations that preiudicially exclude people associated with
~istorically disadvantaged identity groups be permitted to discriminate
eden at the cost of civic equality, equal liberty or opportunity for those who
t excluded? In examining how the schools of culture and choice address
ese challenges, I develop a more synthetic perspective on identity and
emocracy, which is consistent with furthering the ideals of civic equality,
'c liberty, and opportunib for all persons, regardless of their group iden-

,,

W'
Jj,.,.

I.

The School o f C u l t u r e : Q u e s t i o n i n g C l a i m s a b o u t
Comprehensiveness

'ocietal culture, or culture for s h o as

~ Will Kymlicka (1995b) describes
ally co;lsists of a common language, history, institutions of socialrange of occupations, lifestyles, and custom^.^ As commonly und by the school of culture, culture isnot a "continuously contested,

,.

i?'See Kymlicka 1995a, 18. What Kymlicka calls a societal cblture, Joseph Raz and
bUhii Margalit call a pervasive culture. A pe~vasiveculture "defines or marks a variety of forms or styles oflife, types ofactivity, occupation, pursuit, and relationship;
\J(ithnational groups we expect to find national cuisines, distinctive architectural
siyles, a common language, distinctive literary and artistic traditions, national music, customs, clress, ceremonies and holidays, etc. None of these is necessary:' Peoplecwlla share-or come close to sharing-a peniasive culture and whose "identiiy
lodetermined a t least in part by their culture" are "~erionscandidates for the right
to self-determination" in the account offered by Margalit and Raz (1994, 114).

.. , , 1!.,;
$,',

"

548

Set. 3

CITIZENSHIP,
IDENTITI,AND POLITICAL
PARTICIPATID~

imagined and reimagined melange" of disparate influences ( T U ~ 199

~Y
11; Waldron 1995, 105-8). Rather it is a coherent set that both informs
limits ,,,hat it is feasible for people to be and to imagine! Culhlre P
a con$haining context for meaningful choice, and an "anchor fo
identification and the safety of effortless, secure belonging" (Margalitan
Raz 1994.114).
~l~~ societal cultures of modern democratic soc
choices; they also shape people's desires an
and s ~ c t u r e
for sdcia] recognition. T h e 'bolitjcs of recognition" refers to the
need for individual identities to be politically recognized. People
e m sooiety, Charles Taylor famously argues, following Rouss
Hegel, "can flourish only to the extentthat [they] are recogniz
consciousness seeks recognition in another, and this is not a sign
of virtue" (1994, 50). Axel Honnetli, another theorist of culture,
with Taylor that peopleliave basic rights to living
means not being imposed on by an external autllority. Honne
guts, without any obvious ambivalence, that peopleneed to be
recognized by government for their deepest particularity (1
255-56)..
There is, as Taylor realizes, an unresolved anomaly in.th
recognition. People want to be recognized not only as generi
but also as culturally distinctive, and this laces seemingly i
mands on democratic governments that contain more than a singlediSi
tinctive culture within them. A democratic politics of recognition nedrli
both to respect deep cultural differences-by way o
and also protect the basic rights of individuals that includ
press, religion, suffrage, political participation, equal prote
process (Taylor 1994, 5 9 4 0 ) . T h e group rights must lea
tecting basic individ~lalrights, and vice versa. A defe
respect for individual and group rights makes it p
whether associated with a majority or minority cult
civic equal.
Why, theorists of choice ask, are group rights n
individual rights suffice for recognieing people as civic e
cultural identities? If everyone living within the prritori
democracy identified equally kith the dominant socie
Geated as a civic equal by it, then individual rights wo
ual rights are problematic because of a contingent fact
democratic sokie6 not every person identifies eql~al
cannot b e r 4
civic equal by the dominant societal culture. T h e
solved by finding a neutral societal culture, becaus
2. "Familiarity with a culture determines the boundari
ing in a culhrre, being part of it, determines the limits a
Raz 1994, 119).

CUTMANN
I D E N T ~ T YA N D DSMOCRICI

549

,neutral societal culture would not even be desirable, were it possible.

ople reasonably-and passionately-want to be reciprocally recognized
Itheir cultural particularity, not only as (culturally naked) human beings.
Ihey want to feel at home in their society, not like foreign visitors. T h e bias
societal culture solves this problem but creates another: i t disadvanto others and unfairly so because the disadvanis of ascriptive characteristics, not by virtue of
hing the person has voluntarily done. T h e more systematic and severe
isadvantages that accrue,to individuals whose identities are tied to a
nt culture, the less able democracies are to secure basic liberty, opct for all their citizens by a uniform set of india societal culture unfairly advantage or disadvantage differost democratic societies today Contain subordinate identity
membeis are identified with a different culture from the
Because the dominant culture is poblic, it affects the life
ryone who inhabits the society. Government conducts its
schools teach, and the mass media broadcast i n the domind in conformity with a culturally distinctive calendar.
rms to the dominant culture. Established business enterssociations favor people who identify with the dominant
from the dominant culturecarries with it economic, edBtitional, and social disadvantages, which originate not in voluntary
1811oices but in inherited identities. At the same time, democracies publicly
-deeply rooted in democratic thought (aly violated in practice)-that individuals should not be
nchosen attributes, such as a n ascriptive group identity.
s most acute with regard to what Kymlicka calls a "naouplike the QuBbBcois who have their own societal
':b~lturebut who live within a larger democracy (1995b, 1&12). But the
"'pkoblemalso applies to members of any ascriptive group who are disadvai:tdkedby the societal culture o f a democracy where they,settled in order to
'live a minimally decent life rather than because they considered it the best
Jofiseveral good choices. Immigration cannot be considered voluntary setvantages as if by the immigrants' consent. T h e
im of theschool of culture is that in die absence of
embers of societal cultures will have unequal freemake matters worse, a democratic government's
I measures is also reasonably perceived as disre1 T h e school of culture therefore defends some
of otherwise disadvantaged cultural groups.
Group rights present a prospect and a problem for democracy. T h e
,
rights may he able to provide a legitimate
dual rights and popular,rule-to pursue jusps who are otherwise unfairly disadvantaged.

Group rights that exempt members of some groups from pllblic pol
that impose unfairburdens and special aid to overco
vantages illustrate this prospect. The problem is.that other group
may violate basic individual rights. Group rights that
of individuals in order to protect an endangered cult
fend absolute sovereignty for the cultural group il
~h~ cllallenge is therefore to distinguish behveen
mate group rights (Levy 1997; Lukes 1997; William
The cotinby that is the theoretical home ofgr
example of the defensibility of special exemptions
unfair burdens on members of an identity group (because of their.
identity). Such special exemptions are meaningfully considered a k
group right, since they apply toindividuals only by virtue o f t
identity.' In 1990, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police decided to ex
a group from $ long-standing rule. They exempted
wide-brimmed hat that has long been part of their required ~m
exemption made it Possible for Sikhs to join the Mounties wi
up their identity as Sikhs. One might consider this decision i
the rule is far from earthshaking in its significance-but it is quite
of many rules that have raised public controv
Mounties' decision met with six years of protests,
to parliament signed by 210,000 Canadians and de
antiturban badges and antiSikh slogans and'ending with an ap
to the Canadian Supreme Court,which refused to hear tlie chal
(Winsor 1996).
i,
The Mounties'example illustrates hvo important but o
points: ( I ) no controversial claim about identity is needed to def
empting members of a group even from some rules that reflect no in
discriminate; and (2) somegroup rights can provideeffect
specting individual rights, which classical~liberal defender
rights have neglected but need not oppose. On a Lockea
nlent, thegovemment is not required to exempt minoriti
neutral laws that unequally burdentheir religious beliefs, but neithe
prohibited.from doing so as long as the exemption does not violate s
one else's rights.! A. crucial feature of this exemption is that it li
burdens (borne by members oTa group through no faultof their o
:

idua) rights. By contrast, other group rights-violate basic individual rights. No democratic
pective that takes the interests of individuals seriously can defend cul1 practices that violate basic individual rights, whether of members or
onmetnberi of a cultural group.5 Because the moral value of the group
es from the way it supports the interests of individuals over time,
taining a customary practice of the group at the expense of the basic
ies and opporlunities of individuals is morally indefensible (Blake
ands the right of self-governance over its customary
se practices include extensive discrimination. in
sic rights of some of its members (often women
(children), its demands are suspect to the extent that the larger society
IdothenCise protect those rights. The group may still have eaensive
ts' of self-govemment, but self-governing rights-like all rights-can
mpeting rights. Even when groups cannot have
emment, they may be justifiably guaranteed r e p
tion within a legislature that would otllenuise routinely pass dist the group, which the courts would uphold
teed representation f0r.a group is inore probdemocratic the group is and the more its. memedoms for their votes to be counted as part of the
emerge that call for a far more nuanced view of
lly offered: '(1) group rights of self-government
all or,nothing, and (2) group rights should be
ssedon the basis of how well they protect the.basic interests-includividuals compared to the available institutional
I

y do theorists of culture argue as if group rights of self-govemment

'or nothing? A starting premise of the school of culk~reis that societhe identity of their members and povide i
The authority of a group togovern itself is
t to follow from the idea that the self-governing group represents the
a culture to which its members belong. But thii idea presumes that
,,,

rle,c!ription of the practice of clitaridectomp on

misrepresented as analagous tb male circumcision,
...

.,

e aesthetic value of cultural practices is a differentissue, which I cannot adnmthis essay. Charles Taylor attributes to individualsan interest in their culurviving over time, since people want to be assured that their descendants will
the same culture as they do. This raises the difficult question ofwhat the barests (and therefore the basic rights) of individuals are and how they should
rmined (Taylor 1994, 51-7j); and folio sense of how heated the debate over
re can be, see David Biomwich, Michael Walzer, and Taylor in Dissent
. .

a single societal culture is comprehensive in constituting people:s identl

ties, which no major theorist of culhlre explicitly defends (because
indefensible). When a single culture is assumed to constitut
shared identity of members of a minority group, it is easy to conclud
any degree of government by the larger society-even when in defe
the basic rights of women, half the members of the minori
stitutes imposition by a "foreign" power. This conclusion is
leading because it assumes what it sets out to argue and its assum
indefensible. T h e assumption is that a single societal culture so
hensively constitutes the identities of individuals as to iustilj granting.
group comprehensive sovereign authority-to rule its "own" member@
at the price of violating their basic rights.,
Grant that some cultures are far more co~nprehensivet11an.otH
shaping people'; lives, and it is still not credible to assume that.on
only one societal culture exclusively encompasses the cultura
citizens of contemporary democracies? When this assr~mptionis a
Native American women, for example, the effect is to force wo
not men) to choose behveen membership in their Native Americariitribe
and equal democratic citizenship. Theoris$ of culture analogize inte~eri:,
tion by a democratic government to vindicate the rights of Native..Anreri+';,,
can women with foreign intervention into the affairs of anothe
(Kymlicka 1995a, 167). Kymlicka recognizes that the Santa Cla
wrongly violated women's rights, but lie defends its authority to
grounds that'no coulitry has any right to intervene in the affairs
, ,.
country in order to vindicate the rights of women.
T h e problem with this perspective is that it asst~mes~withbut
that the analogy with foreign countries supports the case for no
tion. But should a national goverliment be assumed to have suc
hensive sovereign authority that it may violate individual rights
established legal tribunal could prevent it from so doing without anpin*
lenbe7 If not, then even when no established hibunal exists, political thdd'
rists should explore the case for establishing one. A nationalism
writ large or.smal1-that unnecessarily alithorizes the systemati
of individual rights is not a nationalism.worthy ofdefense. Theo
lure like Kymlicka who agree that cultyres derive their moral value from,
aiding individuals,, not vice versa, have theresources to correct tlieir,oq
tendency to grant more sovereign authority to minority culture
would grant a similarly oppressive majority culture when peac
overcoming the oppression are available. , .
0 t h e r t h e o r i G of culture take arelativist view about what oppressidh
entails; they argue that the cultural identity of people determines, !hii
1.1,

7. To consider the single societal culture of a pluralistic democrat? to b

gregate of all the cultures within it would simply further confuse ma
"prove" the case by a misleading definition.

I'

as oppression. Many of .the group rights that are prominently dein contemporary politics-and also in political theory-threaten to
ate the subordination of half the world's population, namely
en. The cultural relativist view is that the cultural identity of women
s attached to these practices, which are not identified as oppressive
cause this interpretation is itself identified as foreign to the indigenous
tice. To try to obliterate the practices is viewed as tantamount to trying
rate these women, to do away with their cultural identities, with
are. T h e relativizing move here allows a cultural identity to go
1 and lets it block any vindication of the basic rights of
n. O n this analysis,, cultural identity precludes the vindication of
is as much of an imn's equal righti with men, but this
tlieoretical construct as any. A cc~lhtral identity is assumed-alever actually shown-to comprehend the entirety of a person's
nd a cultural identity is allowed to become morally imperial and
to deny basic rights to women. Group rights to enforce child
iriage,, forced marriage, polygamy (or, more accurately, polygyny), clictomy, discriminato~ydivorce, unequal schooling of girls and boys,
nequal property rights threaten the basic rights of women in a way
ument from cultural identity alone has ever been able to bvef
?ere any reason that the dominant members of cultural groups
ranted the right to resbict the basic rights of women?
I within the school of culture explicitly defends a broad culthin liberal democracies to restrict the basic rights of women.
alit and Moshe Halbertal argue that, "Protecting cultures out
right toculture may'take the form o f a n obligation [ofliberal
vernments] to support cultures that flout.the rights of the iniberal society" (1994,491). This defense of the right to culgoes s i far as to claim that liberal democracies have an
ibligation to support cultures in their midst that Rout the rights of women,
ndividnals. Ultra-Orthodox Jewish culture in 1srael;accoidment, must be suppoited by the state in its totality, which
g the rights ofwomen in schooling, divorce law, and inheiecting Ulha-Orthodox men as the guardians of the authora publicly supported cultural community (493). One
is treated as independent ofany particular culture and that
it a culh~ralc o m m u n i t y ? ~ ~ iiss the right that undermines
ral relativism. If individrlal identities are so comprehen'

fi,,.
,,

'

,~,For,~an
eltended discussion, see Okin, Moller, et al. 1999, Nussbaum and
Clover 1994, and Nussbaum 1997b.
e right of exit to a free market society is also the only right of individuals reced by Chandran Kukathas who clefends the right of minority groups-no mas
ow~illiheral-to be left aldne (1992, ,105-39). Wr a critiqueof Kukathas on the
gl~t~ofexit;see.Kymlicka,
199Sa; 190,.234-35, n. 18.

sively tied to a particl~larculture; then theorists of culture cannot co

tent]y defend even:this minimalist.right ofindividuals-toexitan OPPre
community. 1f.individual identities are not so comprehensivel~tied
particular culture, then far more than a.right to exit is needed to pr
the basic interests of individuals in living the lives of free and equal citlz
in the context of a multicultural democratic society.
. .
~h~ failureof the "nomore than a right toexit:' argument off@
sobering reminder of the dangers of tying individual i
prehensively to a single societal culture. Margalit an
culture creates a person's "personality!id
olaiming thateach
tity." TIley then claini that "every person has an ove
personality identity-that is, in preserving his way of life and the
are central identity components for him and the other membersof 1l;s:c
mral group" (505). ~f we accept this overriding interest of individua1s:i
theoretical room remains for an individual right t o exit. Ri
basic interests of individuals. An individual cannot-have a basic in
identity if her basic (an
in freeing herself from her
interest. is defined as, preserving her personality identity. B
of course begs the crucial question: Is there any.good reason to ass
that the basic and overriding interest, of all women lies in p r
pers~nalit~~identity
as defined by the other members of
group?10 , :
T h e basic tenets of the view that an,individualSj ovenidi
in preserving the entirety of her personality identity, where
given by her culture, are misleading. Many women8.(and,men'al
course) reasonably think that they do not have a basic intere
the cultural identity that has been imposed.on them
doubt that.a c~lture.creates-rather thaninfluences
"personality identity," Some womenreasonably think that.
culh~ralcommunity unjustifiably subordinates them t o m e
nates against them by denying them basic liberties and o~portuniti
able to men: They are thereby denied the equal civic and p
that is due them. As long as any woman reasonably thinks t
culture" argument fails1,as a defense of the authority of a
nity topreserve itself by denying women their basic liberty and opportv~i~:
rights and their status as civic equals, (The same argument applies:ta~to~::
person; the example of women is so striking because the violations!bf,Jlieir
I

'

10. One might revise the perspective to say thata person has
only in her personaliv identity asshe defines it, not as defined by other m
her cultural group. Tliis starting point would svpport many more col
pendent rights of individuals than the right h exit. In'dividtrals wbuld
fight to resist having a cultural group impose laws and rules
their personality iden6Hes:Buf this is not the view of personality identi
--I;+
...A
U..IL+-~ A-F~nrl T h ~ view
r
<In+$
not n ~ m i nnv:cleantdis
t

s,and so co~nmonlyexcused or even iustiiy isn't the formal right of exit an adequate antidote to granting cultuihl groups the authority to.heat their members in illiberal ways? Once
t to exit from cultural groups, they are imof individual consent and respect for perntly justify subordinating individuals in
tura1,groups that deprive them of the necessary conditions for makal right of exit can he an adequate
ich truly voluntary associations treat
present societal cultures-by the very
re not voluntary associations. When
~iasi-com~rehensivecultural groups violate rights withthe support of
tic governments, they greatly reduce the basicliberties and o p p o ~
hat their members would otherwise have to live a life oftheir own
sing either inside or outside t h e communily. An Ultra-Orthodox
an in Israel is not educated to support herself or her children outride
e'ultra-Orthodox community. She is not taught the legitimacy of
tioning her tightly circumscribed place in the Ulha-Orthodox com;
claim that she has an overriding interest in preserving a culturim that her overriding interest is to
ive set of laws over which she has no
reting or altering."This is not a claim thatanyond can make
.

claiming the subordination of women is jusinterest lies in being subordinated. For anyse, women, like men, must be given equal
want to live within therange of
om in the first place cannot validate
want or need this freedom. No theoretical
nation ofwomen within~culturesthdt deny .
al right of exit. For women to,Ilave
ler they want to remain within a culhra]
to exit thatgroup, a democraticsociety
ht to exit, an education for equal citizen.
r basic rights as well. An effective right to
ns at minimum being able to exit and still support oneself and
ildren. Securing women these rights means not ceding cultural
s within a democracy the authority to control schooling and family
as to effectively deny women the same basic liberties and opportuni,.

..

..!

era1 conflation of what a person's

r a critique of this conflation, see

'

556

sac. 3

CITIZENSHIP,
IDENTITI,

AND

POL~T~CAL
PAI~.IICIPATION,
:

ties as men. Democratic states may need to tolerate some violations of1
sic rig\lts when political intervention would make matters worse. bd
pragmatic argument of this kind denies any obligation on
democratic state to support cultural groups at the expense of vi
basic rights of individuals.
Taken at its strongest, the school of culture recognizes that ther
group right to subordinate individuals to a societal culture by via
their basic rig&. At its weakest, it erects indefensible obstacles to vin
jng the basic rights of members and nonmembers of cultural groups, E
if the societal culture of the Israeli Ultra-Orthodox Jewish communi
self-contained for members of that community, its effects on nonm
would still be morally and politically relevant. T h e ~oliticsof cultura
norities rarely can be isolated from a broader politics, which to extendt
~sraeliexample, profoundly affects the liberty and opportunity of Palesti
ans, Israeli Arabs, and non-Orthodox Israeli Jews.
T h e politics of cultural identity groups also shapes the identities
ture generations in ways that the school of culture assumes to be le
extensions of a group right to self-determination. Cultural groups w
democratic societies are a n intricately interdependent part of the
ety. They must be able to interact politically and often economicall
with people outside their groups, and people outside their groups wi
This interdependence, moreover, affects the liberty, opporh~ni
standing of both outsiders and insiders to these groups since each-dep
on the other to ensure the equal protection of rights. If some membe
cultural groups identify only with a single group, it is therefore not be
the comprehensive conditions of their lives are independent of the lar
ciety. (Ultra-Orthodox Jewsin Israel depend heavily on support fro
of society for their schools, police protection, and national securi
ben of culh~ralgroups also influence the larger politics of democra
eties as much as many other citizens, sometimes even more s o (
example also illustrates.) Members of distinctive cultural grou
ten more dependent on the larger society tosupport their distin
This is not a n argument against the dependency of cultural groups o
influence on the larger society Quite the contrary, it is an argument ?,
a politics or political theory that posits the comprehensiveness of societ
tures and therefore depends on denying the interdependence of cultur
cultural communities within democratic societies.

The School o f C h o i c e : Questioning the C o n d i t i

of Voluntariness

T h e basic premise of the school of choice is the freedom of individ

identify and live as they like, not as anyone else determines. T h e ma

Wlll

,person is "living as one likes, associating on one's own terms, engaging

oluntary relationships of all sorts, finding or trying to find pleasure in
, and also finding in them opportunities for many kinds of experi' (Kateb 1998, 37-39). Free people tolerate "being regulated only
rdeep constitutional regret."" They need to be politically recognized
tlfor their particular group identities but rather as bearers of equal
Htr." Among these rights are those that protect equal citizenship and
dom of association (Kateb 1994, 1998).
e freedom of individuals is limited by socialization and social
he school of choice at-its strongest recognizes this. Cultural
ocialization. I did not choose to be a Jewishd in India and born in the United States to a
nuJewish refugee father and Jewishamerican mother. This causally
ined cultural identity (scientists may soon be able to add a detailed
@ion of my genetic determination) is compatible with my freedom
entify as something more than a Jewish-American woman (with deterte genetic markers). I could also choose to identify as other than what
tified as, but not without a far greater struggle than were I born
er. Although I in fact identify as a Jewish-American woman, I also idenore than that, and more than the aggregation of all my ascriptive
put together. It is of course quite possible that my freedom to
as something more than my ascriptive identities is causally deterthe interaction between genetic capacities and social context.
nd of causal determination is compatible with the value that the
I of choice places on freedom of association.
i e balue of free association depends not on whether human identity
ependent of causality but rather on whether individuals are accorded
eedom within a democratic context to identify as they themselves see
otus government-or a similarly powerful a g o t in society-determines
' hem. This freedom in turn depends on whether individuals are free to
rtadd exit associations at their own will, rather than someone elseS,
prospects and problems for the school of choice, and for anyone
ation as a legitimate source of identity formasociation can create a democratic culture of
ry associations that are appropriate sites for recognizing a wide
f group identities. Voluntary associations, precisely because they are
tary, are places where a democratic culture of recognition as distinct
h .politics of recognition can flourish. A democratic culture is comis more general critique of a politics of recognition, see Kateb 1994,
Honneth, a theorist of culture, diverges from theorists of choice pn this
oint. Althouglr Honneth agrees that freedom means not being imposed on
emal authority, he argues tl~atpeople need to be politically recognized by
ment lor their deeput particularity (Honneth 1995. 255-56, 1996).

posed of many uncoordinated sites of recognition consisting of volunh

associations where people identify with one another in a multitude ofwars
A,, uncoordinated landscape of volontaty associations is also a
of many misrecognitions. Associations that prejudicially exclude peep
the basis of their race, gender, ethnicity, and other ascriptive character1
are a source of negative identity politics. Negative identity politics pas
to theorists of choice who claim that unregulated freedom of1
sociation liberates people from the social typecasting of their identities8
lives. unreylated civic associations in the United States simplistic
stereotped women and men; homosexuals and heterosexuals; Cllri
lews, and Muslims; African Americans and whites; and many more
categories of people. Before examining the challenge that thi
prejudice presents for the scliool of choice, we should also appreciate !ha
theorisb ofchoice view as the virtue in tolerating misrecognition. Any
ture that is free to be changed by the (necessarily imperfect) peoplejw
lives it shapes is also bound to mischaracterize and misunderstand ped$
Some degree of misrecognition-not every degree or the degree of thee
tus quo-is a price worth paying for freedom of associatioil and.fon
recopition that people are more than what public recognition
ety of human beings makes possible. This sometimes painrul reali
perhaps the hardest won insight of human freedom and the sc
thought that prizes freedom above all else.
Freedom of association still carries with it the prospect that all peo
can be publicly (but not authoritatively) recognized for some of theit1
ticularities if they so desire. To be publicly recognized in all of onds*
ticularity, friendship and love would become public projects. Tl~isliSII(
politics of recopition taken to its logical extreme. Love is n
shives to make itself public in all its particolarities; it is at best the
manifestation of love, which is a pale packaged imitation (as televisio
shows all too vividly reveal). A civic society that shives without patholo
satisfy the desire for public recognition cannot aspire to create a
ture of authenticity. Only people themselves, acting freely thro
sociational choices, can recognize each other for who they are a
thhn only imperfectly.
Yet some rnisrecognitions are houbling on the grounds o
self; they reflect the failure of a delilocratic society to secure the co
t~nderwhich memben of uniustlv
. . subordinated groups have as inun
fective freedom as their peers. T h e school of cioice cannot avoid
fronting the question of the social conditions under which some people
prevented from affirming their identities through their a
choices. Conditions olexit out of associations and entry into th
ical to assessing whether they support individual freedom. Let's
the issue of exit since it is the more shaiglitfonuard. ~ o l u n tjai a s
can be so called only ifpeople who choose to join them are not co
to remain members (Barry 2001, 155-93). It is almost as simp1

luntary associatio~iscannot prevent their members from leaving and still

etonsidered voluntary or the basis of free affirmation of identity by indiuals. Democratic governments therefore must guarantee that all people
eflectively free to exit any association that they are permitted to enter.
h:i!lUnder what conditions do individtlals have an effective right of exit7I5
ci question is not easy to answer in some cases because the freedom to
teran association that demands great commitment over time is prima fapart of what freedom ofassociation includes. This is especially evident
heh~weconsider the freedom of identity formation that civic associations
ir~bestcan protect. Religious associations, to take a central set of exes,,.may be attractive to many people precisely because they make
si-comprehensive demands on their identity and therefore not only on
r lives today but also into the future. But freedom of religious associatiincludes the right of individuals to change their religious association at
mocratic government therefore must, protect individuals against
ciations that effectively deprive their members of those condimake the right to exit effective. O n e of those conditions is ecodependence, which is missing when the price of exiting a civic
n is to be bereft of any property (Hofer v. Hofer, S.C.R. 958-92
1.tHow high can barriers to exit be and still be legitimate? From the
' tive:of choice, barriers to exiting an association are more suspect to
t that they resemble thebarriers to exiting a society, which cannot
'dered a voluntary association precisely because the barriers to exitohigh (for most people). Although drawing precise lines behveen
Ate and illegitimate barriers to exit will be difficult, the school of
upplies the grounds for saying tl~atfreedomof association is abncompatible with preventing people who want to exit a group

1 of choice also needs to address the issue of blocked entry.

hfreedom of association entails the freedom of groups to prevent
ople who want to join them from doing so, the riglit to exclude is^
Ute. To insist that associations include everyone who wan$ to join
their members' freedom to associate as they so choose. But to
nlimited freedom to exclude women and negatively stereoorities on prejudicial grounds entails limiting the effective freeomen and minorities, preventing them from associating and
a:bs tliev wish.I6 If exclusions were more or less random. falline

osenblum 1998a, lplff; Kymlicka 1995a, 234, n. 18. My discussion of the

choice refen more generally to Rosenblum's book, which is the most
sive statement b date of the relationship between identity, associational
d democracy by a theorist of choice.
they can form another group with pebple who want to associate with
!this is their second-bertscenario.The same also holds for the people who
dding them: if farced to include, the excluders canleave the association
m a new one.

on everyone more or less equally, and having no other signihcallt cividbF

fects, then absolute freedom of association might not be problematio fronl
a democratic perspective. Equal freedom and civic eq~~ality
could still plrei
vail. But the discriminatory policies of civic associations are problematid
when they deprive individuals associated with l~istoricallydisadvantaged
identity groups of valuable civic opportunities through no fault of th8?,
own. Accompanying this problem is another, lesscommonly notedolie
u.....
h i ~ hrlirectlv challenpes
claim
of assqd&
- ~ ~the~
. that
~ unregulated
~ - ~ freedom
~
,,it. .. -,tnnorts
-r r - - - the free &lic affirmation of ind;vidt~alidentity. Prejudiiiil ,
exc]usions of women and negatively stereotyped minoriti
membership in civic assbciations are yet another public expression.0
involuntary typecasting of identity to which tlie school of choice St
,
.
opposed.
T h e same perspective of choice that affirms the right of free a
tion also opposes the invpluntary typecasting of individualidentities
the same reasons and on tlie same grounds. Civic associatiails con
to a negative identity politics when they exclude entire groups ba
their ascriptive identities or relegate them to second-class mem
The question thereforearises: What limits may be placed by de
governments on which civic associations not to exclude people on t
sis of their race, gender, or other involuntary identities? Not all excl
from all associatipns are equal from the perspective of choice. Le
sition of membership on expressive associations-such as church
vocacy groups-would undermine their expressive purpose. M
impositions on intimate associations of family and friendship wo
mine the very meaning of intimacy. A blanket imposition of lib
cratic norms on all associations would violate the most basic
expression and intimate association, and therefore are consiste
by theorists of choice.
Associations that provide publid goods and are not primarily eupresdk
or intimate do not need to discriminate to cany out their prim
A strong case can be made for opening up their prejudic
enhies on grounds of freedom, opportunity, and civic eq
pre-judicial exclusion contributes to treating women and disadvd
minorities as secondclass citizens on any of these grounds (free
opportunity, or civic equality), then nondiscriminatioll laws are in,
[Rosenblum 1998b, 158-90). They can help equalize the effectiv
dom and opportunity of women and minorities, express their civic st
equals, and thereby also support their equal ability to identify as the
through association.
When do exclusions from civic assoilations riinforce skc
zenship? The school of choice is divided over particular case
idea of second-class citizenship is not self-interpreting and roomre
for reasonable disagreement A ~can
I agree that to require all associa
he nondiscriminatory would place unjustifiable limits on the free

~.

individuals to express themselve8 and pursue their particular identities by

free. association. All can also agree that to exempt all civic associations
would place an uniustifiable burden on members of groups who are syst.41natically discriminated against in society, effectively eviscerating their
$equal freedom to identify as they see fit rather than as dominant groups in
.&cietymtypecastthem. Second-class membership does not automatically
dntail second-class citizenship, but when the two are mutually reinforcing,
tlie school of choice can defend opening up prejudicially blocked entries
: t o civic associations through the enforcement of nondiscrimination laws."

..

Toward a H u m a n i s t Synthesis: Revisiting G r o u p

Rights a n d Considering Missing Identities
e the two schools of thought, but far less than either

. The school of choice explicitly rejects group rights. But

, as we have seen with the Sikh exemption from Mounport rather than impede the equal freedom and opportunity
eorists of choice can defend group rights that i t their
on donot inhere in groups but rather inhere in individuals
of their group identity. Theorists of choice can therefore view
roup exemptions as a way of fairly applying various individual
uch as religious freedom. Theorists of culture can view the same
ons as a way of respecting cultural differences, which cannot be
s ood purely on an individual level or as simply a manifestation of inm. The two scl~oolstherefore can converge inpolitical s u b
continue to dispute in political theory what counts as a
we leave the terminological dispute behind and instead
nsights of the two schools, we can see that both penpeceir shongest, depend on valuing individual freedom in the
cultural differences that are not themselves simply a matter of
e. We also see that both perspectives tend to neglect the
democratic processes, instihitions, and ideals play in iend mobilizing some group identities rather than others.
gas people are free agents, culh~rescannot be completely comin constituting their identities, and as long as societies socialize
lar ways, they cannot be completely voluntaristic agents
g their identities. Democratic processes and institutions add an
set of variables and values into any perspective that accepts the
e tension between individual and group. This synthesis raises a
nestions for further research, which are both empirical
ature. What group identities get selected by demdcratic
Nancy Rosenblum argues (199Ra, 172-76).

otive when they neglect these values. T h e school of culture is at its

citizens for political action, and why7 What role do democratic proceis
akest therefore when it falls back on the authority of cultural groups
and institutions ,,lay in making organization'and mobilization oftso
their members, as if a selfcontained societal culture constitutes the
group identities more or less likely? How do different democratic s w c t
of its members with a corresponding claim to sovereign nationofgovernance affect the mobilization and effectiveness of subordinated.
ven
limited democratic governance by the larger society in defense
nor,ties7 under different democratic conditions, what exemptionsfrq
~dividual
rights then becomes equivalent to foreign intervention into
facially nelltral laws are permissible or even necessary? What iden
in of a ~ e l f d e t e n n i n i nnation.
~
T h e school of choice at its weakest
are unfairly disadvantaged by different democratic processes and inst
political
rights
of
equal
citizenship,
which are amone" the basic
riehts
or
exemptions
help
address.differenb
tinnr
nna
how
"-..",
...~
o~~
~
'iijg!ltS.of individuals that can only be ,exercised in groups. Equal rights of
grees and typesof Llnfairness~ w h a t are tile.a~ternativesto group righ6,dti
1 ~ ~ : ~ 1 ' ' citiqensliip fail to be respected when more-powerful governments routinely
exemptions?
intkpene in theaffairs of less-powerful governments without due regard for
~~~i~~ the nor~nativetables, we also need to ask: When are group'!',,'
,
1tlf;equal political as well as civic rights of all penons. T h e basic rights of
rights nothing more than an unjustifiable assertion of the power o f a groyp
;,:,I,,. citizei~ship
,.
can be exercised by individuals only, in selfgoverning
When is identity politics , ; ' ,equal
over its members (or over outsiders to the
{youps,
and
thesovereignty
of all self-governing groups (not only the least
noteven a second hest in nonideal democraiies because broad-based issde:
powerful)
must
be
limited
to
make room for recognition of basic civil as
effective in moving in the direction of greater ius!,i$!
are
,, , 'eL(/:!l'
;S political rights (Habemas 1998a, 129-53, 203-36, 239-64; Rawls
Synthesizing the two sets of questions, we can ask: What broad-baseg $:R
,'1/71,228-30, 1996, 334-71, 381-96).
networks are mobilized independently or in cooperation with ide,dQk,,'
:,lil:lrhhen
they avoid some characteristic missteps from their basic premeffect for the liberty, opportunity, and civic.e~$g)$'
' '
groups, why, and to
:
,
,
~i~ks:'both
...,
I;.
schools
can agree that the purpose of right$-whether individual
, 1
ity of persons?
logroup-is
to
protect
the basic interests and respect the dignity of indi,A,~ tilese questions indicate, a synthetic perspective is not m~rally;n$/~ , , , , ,
b>i'dhlalsa8 civic equals. Group rights can meanin&lly refer to those rights
hal and does not thereFore claim to resolve all differences between thy.%k
, <which protect those basic interests of individuals which are (voluntarily or
sc~lools of thought, which are partly attributable to conflicting wejghl!'
of cultural belonging and individual freedom. AI$7$ , , lln%oluntarily)attached to a particular. group identity. T h e interests ultigiven to the
qately to be sewedby group rights are therefore individual interests. A synhetic penpective defends the idea that individual freedom is alwayf,gx?
tl~etic
perspective avoids conflating the identity of a community with that
cised within social constraints but those conshmints are not a statiq g\y$fi'
, ~~df~thaiindividuals
who are part of that community, but it also refuses to isothe constrainh can change over time with the exercise of indi~idua!~ft,e$
'
.Iafe~;individuals
from their social contexts, to rednce their interests to selfdam ofassociation, and this freedomin turn depends on interaction,ril!l:
welfare,(as opposed to an interest in or commitment to the well-being of
processes and institutions to be fully effective. A s~nt)::t/L;i,'
~bthers),or to assume that facially neutral laws suffice to protect the basic
perspective therefore not only criticizes some undefended mov?s.of,')]l)$
' ;'iihts-and civic equality of individuals. Democratic governments therefore
schools from their starting premises, it also merges the remaining (rflq(l!
and empirical) insights into a more nuanced and dynamic view of thej[$?; , ' lfebdto take into account particular group identities and exempt some cit,ize'ns~because of their group identities from some facially neutral policies.
tionship between group identity, democracy, and individual freedon!,,q~di
members of both schools move in the,dij~~; ,,,;!flthe
, ..
Same time, they must not grant groups rights-or assume group
civic equality. More
rights tl~e~nselves-that threaten the basic liberty, opportunity, or civic
tion of this synthesis. Taylor, for example, defends only those grouP!$l)!:
,
Cq~ialityof persons.
do not threaten the basic freedom and opportunity of individ~als:
, llriiluDeyond the issue of group rights, other implications of a humanistsynthose
prejudicial
exclusions
from
vo!u~[ai~
and Rosenblpm defends
Ibe8is:are worth exploring in far greater detail than is possible here. What I
which do not threaten the civic equality of members.ofilgn;
ca!t$he challenge of missing identities follows from recognizing the dyfairly disadvantaged groups. Taken at their strongest, both schools congrfi~' . '
M m / d interaction between individual freedom, group identity, and demoin defending the basic freedom, opportunity, and civic equality of ?!!qi:
i:ratib,
institutions and ideals. In brief, the challenge is to consider the
sons (Kymlicka 199%; Taylor 1994; Kateb.1998; Rosenblum 1998t));,
l~iirlanistgroup identities that are missing from democratic politics, or relsynthetic perspective that draws on an ideal of realizing basic freedomh#
atiCly underrepresented, whose addition would help move democracies in
portunity,.and civic equality for all persolls can be called humqnis\,li
llldidirection of greater justice. If group identities change over time in the
cause at its most fundamental level it heats all perso~~s-regardlessofthi
iiiterbction
between civil society anddemocratic politics, people commitgroup identity-with equal concern.
1cdlt0
humanist
values can ill afford to ignore the challenge of missing
of
thought
are
at
their
weakest
from
a
The two

,I

564

set., C

E N S ~ ~IpD ,E N T ~ T I ,A N D

GUTMANN IDENTITYA N D DEMOCRACY

1

POLITICAI.PA

P. The Pueblo's quashsovereign status was the basis onwhich

prerne Court concluded that the hibe had the authority to viw
a1 protection of women. Only Justice Byron .White, in dissent,
connection beheen being a quasi-sovereign nation and havl
rity to violate basic rights. Did Julia Martinez not have a basic
ated as a civic equal to her Pueblo male counterparti No one
arguing the Martinez case challenged her basic right to civic eqi~ality.
r standing as a U.S. citizen to vindicate her
timacy of the ICRA that explicitly grants her

identities. fie grolln,jwork for the challenge is laid in the foil

sional conclusions from our previous analysis:

'people are greater than any single culture can compre

sovereign authority can represent.
fiere
is no principle or even presumption against cult
change (clifford 1988,338). Such changes do not nec
moral loss (or evencultural loss, except by ta
the negative stereotyping of the group identiti
justly suhordjnated minorities, for example, W
from a humanist perspective, and possibly a cul
~ ~ , ! , , ~ governments
~ ~ a t i ~ may facilitate identi6 cha
for the better or worse. Citizens should be effective1
and reject the group identities into whi
pret,
,,ialized, partly through the procedural mechanism
governance.
m ~
b ~sovereignty
~ l ~claims
t of
~ cultural groups
prejudicial exclusions from powerful civic as
along
tiolls are among the injustices that ca1l:on the colle
democratic citizens to vindicate their rights to equ
tunity; and civic equality.
m Because collective action in demooratic politics is a con
moving in the direction of greater justice, iustic
are indispensable, and one way of buililingt
of a shared humanist identity, which partially constitutes the
muhlally identify with the. causelo
conception of people
creasing injustice and defending the basic rights of individua

that the Pueblo has the sovereign authority to violate the

men? It cannot be because the Pueblo are in fact sovereikn over.their own laws, since they are not. As we argued above, it cannot
herbecause societal cultures are self-contained and therefore have abso.
their members. The factual premise.of selfulty and, even. if true, the conclusion of absolute
-sequitur. The Martinez case vivifies the lack ofself1939 General Allotment Act that
Pueblo women and men, far from
quired the approval of the U.S. govem."seems to have been supported, if not influenced and
of the United States" (Resnik 1989,725). It is
: 'Why is it seen as a matter of cultural survival when
n:gUarantee exclusive access to Indian women as a requirement of hibal
dian woman attempts to claim that her family
choose who to make a family with, it's called a threat
acKinnon 1987, 67)?
hanging identities is to search for ways in which
d institutions can aid unjustly subordinated i d 1s in vindicating their basic rights, rather than taking established idenhite's dissent in the Martinez case illustrates one
en could have been aided in their just cause of
hip rules in an ascriptive group. White argued
ire the tribal government itself to revise the
at respects the equal rights of women. In so
eblo women whose identities had
authorities, the Court would have
tities in the direction of greater justice as had
CRA.Instead the Court helped to further enntities that established the discriminatory

..I

fiecllallenge of missing identities is neglected in ways that

of the.mjssteps taken by the school of culture when i
sovereignty over subordinated
change to what
possible. fiecharge of discrimination against women brotlght b
ti^^^, a
of thesanta Clara Pueblo hibe and U.S. citi
lushates the challenge of missing identities. The Pue
refused to vindicate Martinez's right to equa! protection
civil ~ i g h t ~ of 1968 (ICRA), which says that "no In
cising powen of self-government shall:. . .:deny to any p
risdiction the equal protection of its laws.'!r8 A 1939
tribe ind U.S. federal government, excludes interma
their
b l ~ not
t intermarrying men and their chi1
and thereforefrom the righb to hold tribal properv, vote in tribal.
tions, hold tribal office, and claim welfare benefits th
18.

U.S.Code, val. 25, sec.

1302 (8).

565

i
i

!
I

iI

;i

1
:j

:'i
!

!I

1
!

shates, rather than taking group identities as

ds to the dynamic interaction between pw
identities. Taking the interaction behveen
hoaracyand identity seriously means not assuming that the best way of

. .

fleet justice-friendly group identities. From the perspective of mobilizing

our cllerishe,j values is to repress challenges to them, rather
. .more people to identify, organize, and act together within democratic polthan to find ways of bringing those who disagree with us into a more equdl '
,, itics in justice-friendly ways, one problem with most of these organizations
and potentially conshuctive relationship (Hollinger 1995,84-85). A11 illusl .. , , ,:'
haevecase in point is the Rench government's policy of permitting MU^. ' ' , ,. is that they are what Robert Putnam calls "tertiaryn rather than "second.
ar~":most people participate only by credit card (Putnam 2000, 52). ~h~
lil,,
to immigrate ~ i t htheir multiple wives. Feminists ]lave criticized .:''
for being too permissi+e on the issue of polygamy and iPori% ; ' , , , , vast majority of homanists never meet together for the sake of mobilizing,
nthb burdens that this practice imposes on women and thgwamings d i ~ i ,,, , ' : Uemonshating, bargaining, lobbying, or campaigning for just csuses.
from the relevant cultures" (Okin et a!. 1999, 9-1"?P
. ;;i:s: There are important exceptions worth noting Iiowever. ~~~b~~~ of
serninated by
polygyny (which permits men but not women to have multiple spousesj" , , ' t h e U.N.Association, a genuine federation, meet together to pursrle hu.
:!II~'
,,
','manisticcauses. For humanists to have a greater impact in democratic pol.
pub important values of gender equality at risk.
~ , , itt does not follow that a democratic government should close i t s '
, itics, they .need to create more secondary associations that succeed in
borders to polygynous men and women from culti~reswhere the practic?;si'
,
, bringing people togetlier in politically effective ways. ~
~ m ~consis
~ i ~ t s
relevant question is how alternative Publj?
, . , : 'lgntly oppose identity politics that exacerbates injustices against groups,
legal. A lllorally and
hut otherwise have no reason to be critical of people for publicly identify.
policies are likely.to affect the equal freedom of PolYgYnous women ? $ ''
tlleir female cllildren over time. Prohibiting their entry into France ~ 0 ; ; ~
':;ingand associating with others on particularistic grounds. ~
~
~
almost certainly have made matters considerably worse from the Perspec* ,
'themselves can be politically most effective when their
identifica.
tive of those Muslim women and their female children who want to find'a:,'
tianlis shollg and their organization for political~pu~oses
correspondiiigly
mire eficient and effective., .
, .
way ofmovingtoward a condition of more equal freedom. An immigratihn
policy that a d n i b polygynous Muslims and tllen gives women the effekiih
, ,
~ ~ I > ;attending
~ B Y to the matter of missing identities, we highlight a lilgely
' '
'
ilmebognized bias of the identity politics of our time,
freedom to exit from their marriages, providing a social support
parallels the
: biaseof the earlier pluralistic politics ( ~ o n n o l l y1969). ~
~ t hand dew
them and their children, takes the interplay of identity and democracy'&
riously by recognizing democracy's potential to change identities for'Ihe
,
' : h a e n of identity politics tend to neglect problems arising from the
better.
. ,
1
' ' '
obhnepresentation of some identities and interesb in a democratic poli.
converse of the capacity of democratic politics to influencegropp '
/iosthat:is unavoidably driven by demands of identity and interest groups
identities over time is the capacity of group identities to influence!demi
I 'ibf'kmanykinds. In democratic politics, people are most influential in
' '
kroubs. Theorists therefore need to think about tile ways in which a poli.
cratic
over time. Democratic society can benefit from the additiai
','ickitlldt
I
necessarily depends on groups can work t~ better secure liberty
of some group identities t l ~ a tare now missing or relatively underfep'iii
senfed. T h e presence of some missing identities would push democdtY'l1 , ,; : '!liid;opportunityfor all individuals, not only for the more powerf~lgroups
!ir,!foifthemore powerfi~lmembers of less
the direction of greater justice. Many critics of identity politics arerohi: :
groups. ~h~
grjned at the ,'the decline of speciexentered discourse" (Hollinger'lQ'Ji
shi~;ibebeengroup identiQ,and democralicpolitics, I have argued, is
66). But a reversal of the decline of a certain discourse al~ne-hoi"e~<~ . d~oiecomplex than blanket critiques and defenses of identity politics sugw e ~ c o m e ~ w o unot
~ d make nearly as much political.difference as.anki11.
" '
SE$lrBlso ]lave arguedthat despite their strikingly different starting prem.
crease in llumanjst group identities and associations in democratic p?!im+
irdsl!:th'eorists of culture and choice can converge on
Democratic politics needs people who identify as humanists
id some characteristic missteps from their
purposes and are therefore prepared to act collectively and c
a more synthetic perspective. I have pre.
with humanist discourse. Many organizations already reflect th
umanist synthesis that integrates considera.
ness and ability of individuals to rally around a humanist ide
lture and choice and attends to the dynamic interplay bebeen
cause, rather than a narrower identity politics.
olitics. politjca] t ~ , igTlore
~ ~the~ i ~ ~
to the challenge of missing identities requires a reco&it;&l
~~~i~~
ie.peril of assuming that individuals must
dependency of democratic politics and justice on humanistit ASsl' '
now protected by oppressive groups, dip
ations, and their dependency in turn on various kinds of mutual iden66
nnical governments. These injustices can
tion among people, not only around a group identity but also,ata$li'
e human agency, not by cultural
cornplay
. . , .
humanistic ideology. T h e NAACP, National Organization for!W0+
. .
(NOW); the American and International Red Cross; Doctors of thelwo
and the United Nations Association-to name just a.few-suppo*a

ne