Demetria, et al vs. Hon.

Alba, et al

Ruling

GR # 71977
February 27. 1987

Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly overextends the privilege

granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately
transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive
Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office
included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment,
without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually
savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the
transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be
made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental
law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise
goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the
provision in question null and void.

Facts

Petitioners, as concerned citizens, and as members of the National

Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as parties
with general interest common to all the people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers
filed petition for prohibition against respondent Hon. Alba, then Minister of the
Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree 1177 or the Budget
Reform Decree of 1977.

Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Section 44(1) of PD 1177 or the Budget

Reform Decree of 1977 which states that The President shall have the authority to
transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and
agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General
Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau,
or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment alleging that it is contrary to the Constitution on the following grounds:
o

It violates Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution which states
that No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations,
however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may
by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations
law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations."
It amounts to undue delegation of legislative powers to the executive

Respondents, through the Solicitor General, refuted the petition by:

o

Questioning the legal standing of the petitioners

Averring that there is no justiciable controversy involved

Contending that the Section 44(1) of PD 1177 was enacted pursuant to

Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution

prohibition will not lie from one branch of the government against a
coordinate branch to enjoin the performance of duties within the latter's
sphere of responsibility.

Stating that issue has become moot and academic due to the abrogation
of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution.

Issue

Whether or not Section 44(1) of PD 1177 is unconstitutional

Yes, Section 44(1) of PD 1177 is unconstitutional.

SC also ruled that the petitioner, as taxpayers, have sufficient interest in preventing
the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore question
the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys.

SC ruled that although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless
cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not only for the
vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as
a restraint upon the future.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree

No. 1177 is hereby declared null and void for being unconstitutional.

Philippine Constitution Association, et al vs Hon. Enriquez, et al

education that is entitled to the highest funding,

invoking Section 5(5), Article XIV

GR # 113105
o

August 19, 1994

GR 113105 and 113174

Facts

House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was
passed and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. GAB
1994 imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the
proposed budget previously submitted by the President. It also authorized
members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the "pork barrels" allotted
to them and to realign their respective operating budgets.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, making it as Republic
Act No. 7663, entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER
THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES"
(GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto
Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed
certain conditions. Congress did not override the presidential veto.
Petitioners
o

Petitioners claim that the President cannot veto the Special

Provision on the appropriation for debt service without vetoing
the entire amount of P86,323,438.00 for said purpose

GR 113174, 113766 and 113888

Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the presidential

veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA of
1994 for the AFP and DPWH

Petitioners raised the issue of constitutionality of the

conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of
certain appropriations for the CAFGUs, DPWH, and National
Highway Authority.

Issue

Whether or not the President and Congress acted within the scope of their powers

Ruling

GR 113105

Petitioners claim that the power given to the members of

Congress to propose and identify the projects and activities to
be funded by the Countrywide Development Fund is an
encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said
power in an appropriation act is in implementation of a law.
They argue that the proposal and identification of the projects
do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and
amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by
the Constitution.

In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted within its power. In
the Taada petitions the SC dismissed the other petitions and granted the others.
o

Veto on special provisions

Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of

Congress to realign his allocation for operational expenses to
any other expense category (Rollo, pp. 82-92), claiming that this
practice is prohibited by Section 25(5) Article VI of the
Constitution.

Petitioners argue that the Senate President and the

Speaker of the House of Representatives, but not the
individual members of Congress are the ones
authorized to realign the savings as appropriated.
Petitioners urged that Congress cannot give debt
service the highest priority in the GAA of 1994
because under the Constitution it should be

The president did his veto with certain conditions and

compliant to the ruling in Gonzales vs Macaraig. The president
particularly vetoed the debt reduction scheme in the GAA of
1994 commenting that the scheme is already taken cared of by
other legislation and may be more properly addressed by
revising the debt policy. He, however did not delete the
P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation therefor. Taada et al
averred that the president cannot validly veto that provision
w/o vetoing the amount allotted therefor. The veto of the
president herein is sustained for the vetoed provision is
considered inappropriate; in fact the Sc found that such
provision if not vetoed would in effect repeal the Foreign
Borrowing Act making the legislation as a log-rolling legislation.

Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs

The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUCs),

the President vetoed special provisions which authorize the use
of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of
revolving funds was likewise vetoed. The reason for the veto is
that there were already funds allotted for the same in the
National expenditure Program. Taada et al claimed this as

unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the veto is valid for it is in

compliant to the One Fund Policy it avoided double funding
and redundancy.
o

According to the President, the grant of retirement and

separation benefits should be covered by direct appropriations
specifically approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1)
of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the
authority to use savings is lodged in the officials enumerated in
Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. The SC retained
the veto per reasons provided by the president.

Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGUs

Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGUs including

the payment of separation benefits. The President declared in
his Veto Message that the implementation of this Special
Provision to the item on the CAFGUs shall be subject to prior
Presidential approval pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No.

In his veto message: The said condition is consistent with the

Constitutional injunction prescribed under Section 8, Article IXB of the Constitutional which states that no elective or
appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional,
double, or indirect compensation unless specifically authorized
by law. I am, therefore, confident that the heads of the said
offices shall maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully adhere to
the
well-established
principle
on
compensation
standardization. Taada et al claim that the conditions imposed
by the President violated the independence and fiscal
autonomy of the Supreme court, the Ombudsman, the COA and
the CHR. The SC sustained the veto: In the first place, the
conditions questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB by
Congress itself, not by the President. The Veto Message merely
highlighted the Constitutional mandate that additional or
indirect compensation can only be given pursuant to law. In the
second place, such statements are mere reminders that the
disbursements of appropriations must be made in accordance
with law. Such statements may, at worse, be treated as
superfluities.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED, except with respect with respect to
1.

G.R. Nos. 113105 and 113766 only insofar as they pray for the annulment of the
veto of the special provision on debt service specifying that the fund therein
appropriated "shall be used for payment of the principal and interest of foreign and
domestic indebtedness" prohibiting the use of the said funds "to pay for the
liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators", and

2.

G.R. No. 113888 only insofar as it prays for the annulment of the veto of:

Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds

As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said
condition and prohibition violate the Constitutional mandate of
non-impairment of contractual obligations, and if allowed,
shall effectively alter the original intent of the AFP
Modernization Fund to cover all military equipment deemed
necessary to modernize the AFP. The SC affirmed the veto.
Any provision blocking an administrative action in
implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of
executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and
substantive bill. Therefore, being inappropriate provisions.

Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc

The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may

result to a breach of contractual obligations. The funds if
allotted may result to abandonment of some existing contracts.
The SC ruled that this Special Provision in question is not an
inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is
not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on
the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended
70% by administrative and 30% by contract. The 1987
Constitution allows the addition by Congress of special
provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which
cannot be vetoed separately from the items to which they
relate so long as they are appropriate in the budgetary sense.
The veto herein is then not valid.

Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military

equipment

Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road

maintenance

6758. The SC ruled to retain the veto per reasons provided by

the president. Further, if this provision is allowed then it would
only lead to the repeal of said existing laws.

a)

the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item of

appropriation for the Department of Public Works and Highways (GAA of
1994, pp. 785-786); and

b)

Special Provision No. 12 on the purchase of medicines by the Armed

Forces of the Philippines (GAA of 1994, p. 748), which is GRANTED.

Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty vs Secretary of Budget and Management

GR # 164987

Whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is

unconstitutional and illegal

April 24, 2012

Ruling

Facts

The special provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or

direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen
for the funding of projects. It does not empower individual Members of
Congress to propose, select and identify programs and projects to be
funded out of PDAF.

The possibility of constitutional violations in the implementation of PDAF surely

involves the interplay of legal rights susceptible of judicial resolution. For LAMP,
this is the right to recover public funds possibly misapplied by no less than the
Members of Congress. Hence, without prejudice to other recourse against erring
public officials, allegations of illegal expenditure of public funds reflect a concrete
injury that may have been committed by other branches of government before the
court intervenes. The possibility that this injury was indeed committed cannot be
discounted. The petition complains of illegal disbursement of public funds derived
from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a definite,
concrete, real or substantial controversy before the Court.

The implementation of the provision is flawed because it runs afoul

against the principle of separation of powers because in receiving and,
thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects; the Members of
Congress in effect intrude into an executive function.

Respondents, on the other hand:

o

contended that the petition miserably lacks legal and factual grounds.
Although they admit that PDAF traced its roots to CDF, they argue that
the former should not be equated with "pork barrel," which has gained a
derogatory meaning referring "to government projects affording political
opportunism." In the petition, no proof of this was offered and thus, case
should be dismissed for lack of actual case or controversy.

invoked Philconsa v. Enriquez, where CDF was described as an

imaginative and innovative process or mechanism of implementing
priority programs/projects specified in the law. In Philconsa, the Court
upheld the authority of individual Members of Congress to propose and
identify priority projects because this was merely recommendatory in
nature. In said case, it was also recognized that individual members of
Congress far more than the President and their congressional colleagues
were likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective
constituents and the priority to be given each project.

Issues

In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged

unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. According to LAMP, the practice
of direct allocation and release of funds to the Members of Congress and the
authority given to them to propose and select projects is the core of the law's
flawed execution resulting in a serious constitutional transgression involving the
expenditure of public funds. Undeniably, as taxpayers, LAMP would somehow be
adversely affected by this. A finding of unconstitutionality would necessarily be
tantamount to a misapplication of public funds which, in turn, cause injury or
hardship to taxpayers. This affords "ripeness" to the present controversy.

Petitioner LAMP, a group of lawyers who have banded together with a mission of
dismantling all forms of political, economic or social monopoly in the country, filed
petition for the issuance of TRO against respondents from complying with the
provisions of the questioned law and for certiorari, questioning the
constitutionality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.)9206 or the General
Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004) on the following grounds:
o

Whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are met
in this case

Yes, the mandatory requisites for judicial review are met.

Anent locus standi, "the rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a
statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The gist of
the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions." In the claim that PDAF funds have been
illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.
Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with
paramount public interest. The ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional
spending of PDAF deserves the consideration of the Court, warranting the
assumption of jurisdiction over the petition.

No, the implementation of the PDAF provision under the GAA of 2004 did not
violate the Constitution or the laws.
Every statute is presumed valid. The presumption is that the legislature
intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates
no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of
the law. Every presumption should be indulged in favor of the

constitutionality and the burden of proof is on the party alleging that

there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.

The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was

presented showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to
the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their
sole discretion. Not even a documentation of the disbursement of funds
by the DBM in favor of the Members of Congress was presented by the
petitioner to convince the Court to probe into the truth of their claims.

Hence, absent a clear showing that an offense to the principle of

separation of powers was committed, much less tolerated by both the
Legislative and Executive, the Court is constrained to hold that a lawful
and regular government budgeting and appropriation process ensued
during the enactment and all throughout the implementation of the GAA
of 2004.

As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that

individual Members of Congress receive and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF.
Although the possibility of this unscrupulous practice cannot be entirely
discounted, surmises and conjectures are not sufficient bases for the Court to strike
down the practice for being offensive to the Constitution. Moreover, the authority
granted the Members of Congress to propose and select projects was already
upheld in Philconsa. This remains as valid case law. The Court sees no need to
review or reverse the standing pronouncements in the said case. So long as there is
no showing of a direct participation of legislators in the actual spending of the
budget, the constitutional boundaries between the Executive and the Legislative in
the budgetary process remain intact.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.