Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Paolo Crivelli
time, let us utterer be an individual, and let speakingtruly and speaking-falsely be universals.2 Suppose that
u is an assertion produced by us utterer over an interval
comprising k, and suppose that there is at most one
assertion produced by us utterer over an interval comprising k. Also suppose that u is a singular affirmative
predicative assertion, that the predicate of u (an utterance of speaking falsely) signifies the universal
speaking-falsely, and that the subject of u (an utterance
of I) signifies that individual who is us utterer. Since
u is a singular affirmative predicative assertion, by
Aristotles theory of truth we have that u is true at all
and only the times at which speaking-falsely holds of
us utterer. Since k is a time, u is true at k just in case
speaking-falsely holds of us utterer at k.
For the argument to develop, the universals speakingtruly and speaking-falsely must be defined. To this end,
suppose that for every time t and every individual s,
speaking-truly holds of s at t just in case every assertion produced by s over an interval comprising t is true
at t; analogously, suppose that for every time t and every
individual s, speaking-falsely holds of s at t just in case
some assertion produced by s over an interval comprising t is false at t.
The final supposition is that for every time t and
every individual s, either speaking-truly holds of s at t
or speaking-falsely holds of s at t. Note that if Bivalence
holds (i.e., if every assertion is always either true or
false), this final supposition follows from the last
paragraphs definitions.
Since k is a time and us utterer is an individual, the
following hold: first, speaking-truly holds of us utterer
at k just in case every assertion produced by us utterer
over an interval comprising k is true at k; second,
speaking-falsely holds of us utterer at k just in case
some assertion produced by us utterer over an interval
comprising k is false at k; third, either speaking-truly
or speaking-falsely holds of us utterer at k.
62
PAOLO CRIVELLI
63
64
PAOLO CRIVELLI
similar should be going on with T2s sophistical refutation which is precisely what is happening if T2s
sophistical refutation is not the real Liar, but an easygoing argument like the one put forward by the second
reconstruction.24
However, several considerations suggest that T2s
sophistical refutation should be different from the
second reconstructions easygoing argument:
(iii.i) Aristotle regards T2s sophistical refutation not
only as analogous to those from T1, but also as harder:
it is only about T2s sophistical refutation that Aristotle
says that it appears troublesome (180b5). Now, this
is the only passage from Sophistici Elenchi containing
, 180b5).25 The
the adjective troublesome (
use of this adjective indicates that T2s sophistical
refutation is special. If T2s sophistical refutation were
an easygoing argument like the one favoured by the
second reconstruction, there would be nothing special
about it: it would be in the same league as those from
T1. This circumstance provides some evidence for
assuming that T2s sophistical refutation should not be
an easygoing argument like the one favoured by the
second reconstruction, but the real Liar, which is much
harder.26
(iii.ii) A passage from Chrysippus Logical
Investigations handed down on a badly damaged
papyrus seems to discuss the Liar:
T327 Other arguments also tell against the preceding claim
[sc. the claim that the same man will both keep and break
his oath]28 and the claim that they will be speaking falsely
and speaking truly at the same time. In all claims of this
sort on one occasion there are things said absolutely, on
another with something further being expressed together
in addition. (PHerc 307 [= FDS 698] col. X 1825).29
] (col. X 2021)32 is
almost a literal quotation of Aristotles phrase the same
man is speaking falsely and is speaking truly at the same
`
`
`
time [
]
(180b23).33
(iii.ii.iii) Chrysippus phrase in all claims of this sort
[
,
sc. ]
(col. X 2223)
]
which Aristotle uses shortly before
and immediately after T2 (at 180a32 and 180b8).34
Chrysippus, who lived one century after Aristotle,
surely had more information available about Aristotle
than we. If Chrysippus regarded Aristotles discussion
in T2 as an attempt to solve the real Liar, T2 probably
was such an attempt.
(iii.iii) Theophrastus wrote a work in three books On
the Liar.35 Its content is unknown, but it is at least clear
that Theophrastus was aware of the importance of the
Liar. We do not know whether Theophrastus addressed
the real Liar or some easygoing strain of it. However,
in his list of Chrysippus writings Diogenes Laertius
(VII 197) mentions a work (now lost) whose title was
Solution according to the Ancients. The context of
Diogenes Laertius report suggests that the solution
announced by this title was a solution for the real Liar
(for the works which in Diogenes Laertius list come
immediately before and immediately after were
probably about solutions for the real Liar). So
Chrysippus, who lived one century after Aristotle,
probably thought that a certain solution for the real Liar
had been formulated so long before as to deserve the
label solution according to the ancients. Later texts
often refer to the early Peripatetics as the ancients, and
it is tempting to think that this later usage originated
with Chrysippus.36 So there is some plausibility in
assuming that the solution for the real Liar which
Chrysippus describes as solution according to the
ancients was endorsed by the early Peripatetics.37 This
provides evidence for thinking that Theophrastus
addressed the real Liar. This, in combination with
Theophrastus close association to Aristotle in logic as
well as in other fields,38 makes it plausible to assume
that Aristotle himself had views about the real Liar. But
T2 is the only Aristotelian passage that can be taken to
be about the Liar.
(iv) None of the above considerations is decisive. We
cannot confidently claim that T2s sophistical refutation
65
66
PAOLO CRIVELLI
and
applied to human beings).43 Why
(
67
68
PAOLO CRIVELLI
Notes
* An earlier draft of this paper was presented in Liverpool in the
Autumn of 2001: I am grateful to the members of that audience for
comments and questions that contributed to improve on that draft. I
am also grateful to Walter Cavini, Paolo Fait, Annamaria
Schiaparelli, and an anonymous referee, who read other early drafts
of this paper and identified mistakes and gaps in some arguments.
The responsibility for the remaining deficiencies is of course only
mine. This paper is a part of a larger study, due to be published in
the form of a book, on Aristotles views on truth and falsehood.
1
The ancient Liar probably turned on utterances of I am speaking
` )
falsely (
(cf. Alex.Aphr. in Top. 188.1928; Cavini
1993, pp. 89 and 99), not of This assertion is false. The same Greek
verb ( ) can be used to say of a man both that he is
speaking falsely and that he is lying.
2
I normally refer to a universal by simply using a linguistic expression that signifies it (if this linguistic expression is a phrase, I hyphen
it); I avoid referring to a universal by italicizing, or enclosing in
quotation marks, a linguistic expression that signifies it. E.g., I
normally refer to universals by means of expressions like the
universal man or the universal biped-terrestrial-animal; I avoid
referring to universals by means of expressions like the universal
man or the universal man .
3
Elsewhere Aristotle says that a refutation is a syllogism of the
contradictory: see APr. II 20, 66b11; SE 6, 168a3637; 9, 170b12
(cf. 8, 169b2728; 10, 171a15).
4
Here, as elsewhere in Sophistici Elenchi, syllogism denotes not
only those arguments with two premisses constructed from three
terms which are examined in the Prior Analytics, but also other valid
arguments (cf. Gobbo 1997, pp. 330333).
5
Cf. Berti 1996, pp. 6162; Gobbo 1997, pp. 333334; Hitchcock
2000, p. 209.
6
See SE 1, 164a2021; 8, 169b1823 (cf. 10, 171a45).
7
See SE 10, 171a57 (cf. Hitchcock 2000, p. 209).
8
See Top. I 1, 100b2325; 101a14; VIII 12, 162b35; SE 8,
169b1823; 11, 171b711; b1819; 18, 176b3133; Rh. II 24,
1400b3435.
9
+ acc. (dependent on) construction in
I understand the
(4, 165b30),
`
`
`
`
Aristotles formulas
`
`
(4, 166a6), etc. on the model of
` (4, 165b25): the
+ acc. con
struction introduces the factor on which the production ()
of appearance () depends.
10
Cf. SE 4, 166b2223.
11
Arguments dependent on the absolute or qualified sense of
expressions are discussed by Aristotle also in other passages, both
in Sophistici Elenchi (4, 166b2223; 5, 166b37167a20; 6,
168b1116; 7, 169b912) and elsewhere (Top. II 11, 115b1135;
Rh. II 24, 1402a329).
12
At EN VII 3, 1146a2127 Aristotle perhaps mentions the Liar.
However: (i) The text is dubious: most eds. agree with Coraes that
at 1146a22 should be
the crucial occurrence of
expunged as a dittograph from 1146a21. (ii) Even if the crucial
occurrence of were retained, the passage could still be
speaking (not of the Liar, but) of the treacherous character of all
sophistical arguments (cf. Zell 1820, vol. II, pp. 258260). (iii) Even
if the crucial occurrence of were retained and did refer
References
Algra, K. A. A. et al. (eds.): 1999, The Cambridge History of
Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Baldassarri, M.: 198587, La logica stoica: Testimonianze e frammenti, ed., trans., and comm., Como: Libreria Noseda.
Barnes, J.: 1999a, Aristotle and Stoic Logic in Ierodiakonou 1999,
pp. 23-53.
Barnes, J.: 1999b, Logic: I The Peripatetics in Algra et al. 1999,
pp. 7783.
Becker, O.: 1957a, Zwei Untersuchungen zur antiken Logik,
Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.
Becker, O.: 1957b, Chrysippos ber den Lgner in Becker 1957a,
pp. 5052.
Berti, E.: 1996, La logica dellargomentazione filosofica tra
Aristotele e Ryle in Guetti/Pujia 1996, pp. 5968.
Bobzien, S.: 2000, Wholly Hypothetical Syllogisms, Phronesis 45,
87137.
Bochenski, I. M.: 1951, Ancient Formal Logic, Amsterdam: NorthHolland.
Bochenski, I. M.: 1962, Formale Logik, 2nd ed., Freiburg and
Mnchen: Karl Alber.
69
70
PAOLO CRIVELLI
New College
Oxford University
U.K.
E-mail: Paolo.Crivelli@new.oxford.ac.uk