Generalissuesincognitivemusicology329

General issues in cognitive

musicology
A semiotic approach to music
NicolasMees
Conservatoire Royal de Musique de Bruxelles, Belgium
Contemporary Music Review,
1993,Vol.9,Parts1&2,pp.305310
Photocopyingpermittedbylicenseonly

1993HarwoodAcademicPublishersGmbH
PrintedinMalaysia

Thepurposeofthispaperistosketchasemioticapproach
tomusicthatavoidsrelyingonlinguisticmodels.Peirces
triadicdescriptionofthesignisdrawnintoalandscapein
whichanysignisviewedasanodeinalatentnetworkof
potential intersemic relationships. Whenever a sign is
uttered, in speech or in musical performance, it activates
an area of the emitters and the receivers semiotic
network;thefelicityoftheexchangedependsonthelevel
of similitude between the networks. Basic musical
techniquessuchasrepetition,variationordevelopmentare
the means of structuring the listeners network. The
musical discourse tentatively controls the listeners
meanderingthroughthesemioticnetwork,andthescoreis
anotationofthediscursivestrategy.
KEY WORDS: Semiotics, network (semiotic),
intersemicrelationships,discursivestrategy.

Musical semiotics as an approach to a general semiotics

The purpose of this paper is to sketch a semiotic approach to music that would avoid
relyingonlinguisticmodels;itproceedsfromtheconvictionthatthesemodels,especially
thatofverbalcommunication,arenotsuitableforthedevelopmentofatruesemioticsof
music. The need to distinguish what is particular to language from what belongs to a
generalsemioticshadbeenstressedalreadybyFerdinanddeSaussurewhenheproposed

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his programmatic description of the task of the linguist, to define what makes the
languageaspecialsystemwithinthesetofsemiologicalfacts(1916/1972:33).Butthis
programme has not been fulfilled, and a certain confusion reigns today between
linguisticsandsemiotics.
Ageneralsemioticsbydefinitionshouldaccountfornon-linguisticsemioticfactsas
well as for linguistic ones. Music, by reason of its particular position with respect to
language,analogoustoitinseveralways,essentiallydifferentinmanyothers,mayfor
the time being form a better model than language for a general semiotic theory. The
present discussion, therefore, indirectly aims attesting thepossibilityofsuchageneral
semiotics.
It is a common prejudice that communication should form a primary concern of
semiotics.Semiology,writesBuyssens,canbedefinedasthestudyoftheprocessesof
communication(1967:11).Thisisthepositionofthefunctionalistsforwhomsemiotics
is concerned with signs only insofar as they have communication as their function
(Prieto, 1966; Mounin, 1968, 1970). Jean-Jacques Nattiez, however, show that
communicationisbutaparticular caseofthevariousmodesofexchange,oneamong
the possible consequences of the processes of symbolization (1987:39). This is not to
saythatthematterofcommunicationisofnoimportance,butmerelythatitwouldforma
rather uncomfortable premisefortheconstructionofamusicalsemiotics.Evenifthere
mayexistin music a fructuous coincidencebetweentheintention,thestructureofthe
workandtheexpectationsofthelisteners(D.Stockmann,quotedinNattiez,1987:40),it
cannotbedecideda priorithatthiscoincidencenecessarilyamountstoaninter-personal
communicationinthestrictsenseoftheterm.
Mostoftheproblemsofextendingalinguisticsemioticstonon-linguisticsignsexist
attheinterfacebetweenthesemioticsystemproperanditssurroundings:problemsarise
whensignshavetoberelatedtotheirmeaning,theirreference,ontheonehand;tothings
or states of the world, their referent, on the other hand.And despite Ecos claim (Eco,
1977), the theory of codes, which is a theory of the relationship between signs and
meanings,istoomuchorientedtowardslanguagetoformthebasisofageneralsemiotic
theory. The tendency to consider signs as consisting of form and content (Saussure,
1917/1972:25ss.,98,andpassim;Hjelmslev,1943/1971:65ss.)hasalinguisticbasis.
At the same time, it must be realized that the preponderance of linguistic
considerationsinthesemioticdebateisnotmerelytheresultofsomeexcessivearrogance
onthepartoflinguistics.Thestudyofthemeaningofnon-linguisticsignsoftensupposes
a verbalization; because language is the main vehicle of thought, introspection usually
requires the use of words; also, as language remains the best vehicle for interpersonal
communication, sharing a semiotic experience seems to demand some form of
verbalization.AsBarthessaid,maniscondemnedtoarticulatelanguage(1967/1981:9).
Ageneralsemioticsthereforemustkeeplanguageamongitsmodelsbutthat,needless
tosay,isnotatallthesamethingasmakinguseoflinguisticmodels.
Itisnecessarytoreturntothehardstoneofsemiotics,theformalstudyofsignsandof
theirrelationshipswithinasinglesemioticsystem.Mattersofintersystemicrelationships
(e.g. correspondences between musical and verbal signs) or of the relation of signs to
extrasemioticsystems(includingsystemsofreferents)maybeconsideredlesspressing,if
notlessimportant.

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The semiotic network

Peircestheories,becausetheycentreonsignsassuch,offerausefuldeparturepointfor
thepresentundertaking.Peircestriadicdescriptionofthesignisnowwellknown(see
Eco,1979/1985:68ss;Nattiez,19791980);inasomewhatsimplifiedpresentation,itmay
be summarized as follows: a sign, a representamen, is something which stands for
something,itsobject,andprojectsanequivalentsign,itsinterpretant(cf2.228).1Whatis
perhapslessobviousisthat,inPeircesconception,boththeobjectandtheinterpretant
aresignsthemselves.Theinterpretant,therefore,cannotbeidentifiedwiththemeaning
(see Deledalle in Peirce, 1978:222), nor with Saussures signifi, nor with Ogden and
Richardsreference.ThePeirceanobject,similarly,isnottobeconfusedwithOgdenand
Richardsreferent(OgdenandRichards,1923/1966:10s.).
Theobjectofarepresentation,writesPeirce(whomeansamentalrepresentation,a
representamen), can be nothing buta representationofwhichthe first representationis
theinterpretant().Theinterpretantisnothingbutanotherrepresentationtowhichthe
torchoftruthishandedalong;andasrepresentation,ithasitsinterpretantagain(1.339;
see also 1.538542). The objects form an endless series of representations, each
representingtheonebehindit(1.339),andthesigndetermines()itsinterpretantto
refertoanobjecttowhichitselfrefers()inthesameway,theinterpretantbecomingin
turnasign,andsoonad infinitum(2.303).Peircesdescriptionoffersanunlimitedchain
ofsigns,eachofwhichdeterminesitsdown-streamneighbour,itsinterpretant,toreferto
itsup-streamneighbour,itsobject.
Peircestressesthatthetriadicrelationcannotconsistinanyactualeventthatevercan
have occurred; for in that case there would be another actual event connecting the
interpretanttoaninterpretantofitsownofwhichthesamewouldbetrue;andthusthere
wouldbeanendlessseriesofeventswhichcouldhaveactuallyoccurred,whichisabsurd.
Forthesamereasontheinterpretantcannotbeadefiniteindividualobject.Therelation
mustthereforeconsistinapoweroftherepresentamentodeterminesomeinterpretantto
beingarepresentamenofthesameobject(1.542).Therelation,inotherwords,remains
potential until realized by a process of semiosis. But it is clear that, before an actual
semiosisoccursanysignpotentiallyrelatesto severalsigns-objectsandtomanysignsinterpretants.
Peirces theory of an unlimited semiotic chain may therefore be extended to a
conception in which any sign is viewed as a node in a latent network of potential
intersemicrelationships.Theideaofthisnetworkisnotentirelynew:Ecospokeofthe
network of interconnected properties that form the Global Semantic Field
(1979/1985:112);Nattiezdefinesasymbolicformasasignorasetofsignstowhich
is attached an infinite complex of interpretants (1987:30); and there are obvious
correspondencesbetweentheideaofasemioticnetworkandthoseofcognitiveframesor
networks.
Whenever a representamen comes to the mind, either in a mental process or as the
result of an external solicitation, it activates the surrounding network, defining an upstream part of it as the Peircean object and a down-stream part as the Peircean
interpretant.Butthenetworkmustbepreexistent,ifonlyinalatentform:TheSigncan
only represent the Object and tell about it. It cannot furnish acquaintance with or
recognitionofthatObject;forthatiswhatismeant()bytheObjectofaSign;namely,

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that with which it presupposes an acquaintance in order to convey some further

informationconcerningit(2.231).
Peirce did notprovideaverycoherent theory ofmeaning; we sawthatthe meaning
cannot be equated with the interpretant.2 A sign alone has no meaning (Hjelmslev,
1943/1971:62); it acquires significance only when triadically related to one or several
objects and to one or several interpretants. The latent relations of a sign to possible
objects and interpretants, i.e. the area of the semiotic networksurroundingit, therefore
establishfortheinterpretertherangeofitspossiblesignifications.Inthisconception,the
signification of a sign is amanire d tre, a syntactic quality of the semiotic network
aroundit.Itisinthissensethatthesignificationofapieceofmusicmaybethoughtto
reside entirely in its syntax. The signification so defined may relate to an external
meaning,toaconcept;thestudyofthispossiblerelationshipisthefieldofsemantics.But
itmightbearguedthattherelationtoanexternalmeaningisnecessaryonlyinthecaseof
language.

Interpersonal semiotic exchanges

Theabovedescriptionexpressesanessentiallyabstractconceptioninwhichthesemiosis
is described as a process within an individuals semiotic network. The case of the
interpersonalsemioticexchangemustnowbeconsidered;itmaybeviewedasaprocess
ofsocializationoftheindividualsemiosis.Wheneverasignisbroughtforthinanactual
utterance, as in speech or in musical performance, it not only activates an area of the
semioticnetworkoftheemitter,butmayalsoactivateasimilarsignandacorresponding
areainthereceiversnetwork:theemissionofthesignthattriggeredthesemiosisinthe
emittersnetwork allowsit totrigger asimilarsemiosis inthe receiversnetwork.This
exchangedoesnotnecessarilyimplythecommunicationofamessage,since,asremarked
above,thetriadicsemioticrelationdoesnotnecessarilyconveyanexternalmeaning.But
itisclearthatthesuccess,thefelicityoftheexchangedependsonalevelofsimilitude
betweentheindividualsemioticnetworks;itisthesimilitudebetweenthenetworksthat
hasbeendescribedasinvolvingacode.
Let us first envisage the case of a verbal exchange. The structure of the semiotic
networksinthiscaseisstronglydeterminedandregulatedbythemeaningofthesigns:
thesyntacticstructureissubordinatedtothesemanticone;thedepthofactivationofthe
interlocutorsnetworks,i.e.thenumberofactivedenotativeorconnotativeinterpretants,
is also largely determined by the semantic structure. The success of the exchange
therefore supposes both a syntactic and a semantic validity of the statement uttered.
Syntactically valid, in the present context, means belonging to the interlocutors
semioticnetworks.
Musical exchanges may be quite similar, in some cases, to verbal ones. An often
quotedexampleisthatoftheWagnerianLeitmotive,whichmayconveyaconventional
meaning.Thisis,possible,ofcourse,onlyifthelistenerisawareoftheconvention;that
is,iftheparticularsignifieroftheMotivebelongstothelatentintersemicrelationshipsin
that listeners own semiotic network. Two points must be noted in this respect. One is
that the signification considered here almost inescapably involves a verbalization: the
networkoftheWagnerianinitiatemustincludeapotentialrelationofthemusicalmotifto

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verbal interpretants, and it is this connotative relation which gives way to the motifs
particular meaning. The second point is that this relation to verbal interpretants is not
necessarilyactivatedwhenthemotifsareheard:thelistenermaynotnoticethemassuch,
ormaynotwanttothinkoftheminthisparticularsense.Thisdemonstratestheabsence
ofinnernecessityinthelatentrelationshipsthatmakeupthesemioticnetwork.
But the semiotic function of Wagnerian Leitmotive cannot be considered
representative of a musical semiotics at large. Although any musical sign may connote
verbal interpretants,3 it is the syntax of musical signs themselves that must engage us
here. A non-linguistic syntax, because it is largely independent from any external
meaning,ingeneralhasamuchhigherdegreeoffreedomthanalinguisticone.
In the case of music, it appears that the work itself often provides the means for
structuringthelistenersnetwork.Basicmusicaltechniquessuchasrepetition,variation,
development, etc., are techniques which state intersemic relationships before building
upon them.Tonal music,similarly, often begins with astatement ofthe principal tonal
functions, tonic, subdominant and dominant, in what Sadai (1980) calls a functional
cycle;thisinitialstatementestablishesessentialsemioticrelationshipsbeforemakinguse
oftheminasemiosisthattriggersevermoredistantinterpretants.Astheconventionality
of the musical style increases, the need for such initial statements lessens; this is
particularlyobviousinlatetonalmusic,inthesecondhalfofthe19thcentury,wherethe
initial tonal statement at times completely disappears. But even in such works, the
musical structure remains based on stated or implied intersemic relations. Modern
techniquesinmusicanalysisaimatidentifyingthiswhentheystressamusicallinearity,
whentheyilluminatemusicalimplicationsandtheirrealization,orwhentheyevidencea
paradigmaticstructureofthework.
A musical style may be defined as involving a predetermined semiotic network. A
style,writesNattiez,istheidentificationofrecurrentfigures.Butthesefiguresarenotthe
sametoeveryone,becausestyleitselfisasemiologicfact:thecomposerwroteawork,an
ensembleofworks,andfromthesetracesthelistenershaveformedamoreorlessprecise
image of what the style of Wagner or Debussy may be (1975:88). This more or less
precise image consists in an awareness of the particular syntactic validity of some
intersemic relationships, i.e. in a competence inscribed in ones individual semiotic
network. But the theory of the semiotic network also explains how the awareness of a
particularmusicalstylemaybeaverypersonalcompetenceandwhy,evenintheabsence
of this competence (e.g. in intercultural exchanges), a true musical experience remains
possible.
A discourse, be it musical or verbal, tentatively controls the listeners meanderings
through her own semiotic network; a certain feedback is possible in conversation or
perhaps in musical improvisation. In the case of a written text or of a musical score,
however, the emitter controls the uttered signs only and can but hope that the
interpretants that they trigger in the receivers network are similar to those in his own
network.Someofthesenon-utteredsignsdependoncontext,ontopic,oncircumstances:
they may be called the pragmatic objects and the pragmatic interpretants. The
persuasiveness of a discourse consists either in rendering it as independent as possible
from pragmatic signs, that is in uttering signs whose relation to their objects and
interpretants is as unambiguous as possible, or in making correct hypotheses about

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pragmaticrelationshipsthatmaybetriggeredinthereceiversnetwork.Itgoeswithout
sayingthattheco-textualityoftheutteredsignsisafactorinremovingambiguity.
Thewayinwhichatheoryofthesemioticnetworkmayfitwithinthetripartitionof
MolinoandNattiez(seeMolino,1975)mustnowbrieflybeconsidered.Ascore,ormore
generallyatext,isthenotationofastrategyofpersuasion.Thepoeticworkbywhichthe
strategy is elaborated usually involves tests carried bythe emitter on his own semiotic
network. Morethan onceduringthe creativeprocess,the artist mustputhimselfinthe
positionofthereceiver:thecomposermustlistentohiswork,thepaintermuststepback
toembracehercanvasinonelook.Sodoing,theyleavetheirsemioticnetworkasfreeas
possible to develop pragmatic interpretants, in order to form some idea of how the
semiosis may unfold in the receivers network. In this sense, the poesis involves an
activityinmanywayscomparabletoanaesthesis.Inthecaseofmusicalperformance,the
performer filters the musical text through his own pragmatic objects and pragmatic
interpretants,producinganacousticimagethatagainisastrategy.Finally,onthesideof
the receiver, the aesthesis again involves an activation of pragmatic objects and
interpretants,anactivitywhichresemblespoesis.
The poesis could be described as a semiosis that utters signs, the aesthesis as one
triggered by external signs. But both poesis and aesthesis are essentially individual
processes,involvingdarkerareasoftheindividualsemioticnetworks.Thetext,thescore
(oritsacousticimage)isthematerialtraceofthesemioticexchangeand,assuch,thefirst
andthemainobjectofstudy.Itrevealslittle,however,ofthesemioticprocessesproper,
whichoccurinthesecrecyoftheindividualsemioticnetworks.

Notes
1.Followingtheusage,referencestoPeircesCollected Papers(19311960)consistinthe
numberofthevolumefollowedbythenumberoftheparagraph.
2.Themostextendeddiscussionofmeaningisin5.475ss.Atfirstreading,itmightseemthat
Peirceequatesmeaningwithinterpretant.Buthecanonlybethinkingoftheinterpretantasit
relatestotherepresentamen,andthisrelation,beingtriadic,necessarilyinvolvesthat
betweensignandobject:Peircesconception,therefore,issimilartotheoneproposedhere.
3.Therearereasonstobelieve,however,thattheverbalizationofmusictookonaparticular
importanceduringarelativelyshortperiodinthehistoryofoccidentalmusical,namelyfrom
theendofthe16thcenturyorthebeginningofthe17th,whenrhetoricconsiderations
becamenormativeincomposition,untiltheendofromanticism.Verbalizationmaybeless
developedinpre-Baroquemusic,asinsomenon-Europeancultures.

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