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G.R. No.

93654 May 6, 1992


FRANCISCO
U.
DACANAY, petitioner,
vs.
MAYOR MACARIO ASISTIO, JR., CITY ENGR.
LUCIANO SARNE, JR. of Kalookan City, Metro
Manila, MILA PASTRANA AND/OR RODOLFO
TEOFE, STALLHOLDERS AND REPRESENTING
CO-STALLHOLDERS,respondents.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
FACTS
MMC Ordinance No. 79-02 was enacted by the
Metropolitan Manila Commission, designating certain
city and municipal streets, roads and open spaces as
sites for flea markets. Pursuant, thereto, the Caloocan
City mayor opened up seven (7) flea markets in that
city: "Heroes del '96" where the petitioner lives. Upon
application of vendors, the respondents city mayor
and city engineer, issued them licenses to conduct
vending activities on said street.
Antonio Martinez, as OIC city mayor of Caloocan City,
caused the demolition of the market stalls on Heroes
del '96, V. Gozon and Gonzales streets. To stop so,
stallowners filed an action for prohibition against the
City of Caloocan, in the Regional Trial Court, praying
the court to issue a writ of preliminary injunction
ordering these city officials to discontinue the
demolition of their stalls during the pendency of the
action.
The court issued the writ prayed for. However, on
December 20, 1987, it dismissed the petition and lifted
the writ of preliminary injunction which it had earlier
issued.
The trial court found that Heroes del '96, Gozon and
Gonzales streets are of public dominion, hence,
outside the commerce of man:
However, shortly after the decision came out, the city
administration in Caloocan City changed hands. City
Mayor Macario Asistio, Jr., as successor of Mayor
Martinez, did not pursue the latter's policy of clearing
and cleaning up the city streets.
Invoking the trial court's decision, Francisco U.
Dacanay, who resides on Heroes del '96 Street, one of
the affected streets, called the Mayors attention to the
illegally-constructed stalls on Heroes del '96 Street
and asked for their demolition. Yet, there was no
response.
As the stallholders continued to occupy Heroes del '96
Street, through the tolerance of the public
respondents, and in clear violation of the decision it
Civil Case No. C-12921, Dacanay filed the present
petition for mandamuson June 19, 1990, praying that
the public respondents be ordered to enforce the final
decision in Civil Case No. C-12921 which upheld the
city mayor's authority to order the demolition of market
stalls on V. Gozon, Gonzales and Heroes del '96
Streets and to enforce P.D. No. 772 and other
pertinent laws.
ISSUE
May public streets or thoroughfares be leased or
licensed to market stallholders by virtue of a city
ordinance or resolution of the Metro Manila
Commission?
HELD
1. Jurisprudence applicable to property of public
dominion

The streets, being of public dominion must be outside


of the commerce of man. Considering thenature of the
subject premises, the following jurisprudence
co/principles are applicable on thematter: (1) They
cannot be alienated or leased or otherwise be the
subject matter of contracts; (2) They cannot be
acquired by prescriptionagainst the state. Even
municipalities can notacquire them for use as
communal lands against the state; (3) They are not
subject to attachment and execution; (4) They cannot
be burdened by any voluntaryeasement
5. Occupation of private individuals of public places
devoted for public use a nuisance
The occupation and use of private individuals of
sidewalks and other public places devoted for public
use constitute both public and private nuisances and
nuisance per se, and this applies toeven case
involving the use or lease of public places under
permits and licenses issued bycompetent authority,
upon the theory that such holders could not take
advantage of their unlawful permits and license and
claim that the land in question is a part of a public
street or a public place devoted to public use, hence,
beyond the commerce of man.
7. Public street cannot be made subject to a lease
A public street is property for public use hence outside
the commerce of man (Arts. 420, 424.Civil Code).
Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be the
subject of lease or other contract. The disputed areas
from which the market stalls aresought to be evicted
are public streets, as found by the trial court in Civil
Case C-12921.
8. Lease or licenses null and void for being contrary to
law
As the stallholders pay fees to the City Government
for the right to occupy portions of the publicstreet, the
City Government, contrary to law, has been leasing
portions of the streets to them.Such leases or licenses
are null and void for being contrary to law. The right of
the public to usethe city streets may not be bargained
away through contract. The interests of a few should
not prevail over the good of the greater number in the
community whose health, peace. safety, goodorder
and general welfare, the respondent city officials are
under legal obligation to protect. TheExecutive Order
issued by the Acting Mayor authorizing the use of
Heroes del '96 Street as avending area for stallholders
who were granted licenses by the city government
contravenes thegeneral law that reserves city streets
and roads for public use. The Executive Order may
notinfringe upon the vested right of the public to use
city streets for the purpose they were intendedto
serve: i.e., as arteries of travel for vehicles and
pedestrians

G.R. No. 104732 June 22, 1993


ROBERTO A. FLORES, DANIEL Y. FIGUEROA,
ROGELIO T. PALO, DOMINGO A. JADLOC,
CARLITO
T.
CRUZ
and
MANUEL
P.
REYES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Executive Secretary,
and RICHARD J. GORDON, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Paragraph (d) reads
(d) Chairman administrator The President shall
appoint a professional manager as administrator of
the Subic Authority with a compensation to be
determined by the Board subject to the approval of
the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex
oficio chairman of the Board and who shall serve as
the chief executive officer of the Subic
Authority: Provided, however, That for the first year
of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the
mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as
the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic
Authority (emphasis supplied).
Petitioners maintain that theproviso in par. (d) of Sec.
13 herein-above quoted in italics infringes on the
following constitutional and statutory provisions: (a)
Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which
states that "[n]o elective official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any
public officer or position during his tenure," 3 because
the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official
and the subject posts are public offices; (b) Sec. 16,
Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that "[t]he
President shall . . . . appoint all other officers of the
Government
whose
appointments
are
not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he
may be authorized by law to appoint", 4 since it was
Congress through the questioned proviso and not the
President who appointed the Mayor to the subject
posts; 5 and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (g), of the Omnibus
Election Code, for the reason that the appointment of
respondent Gordon to the subject posts made by
respondent Executive Secretary on 3 April 1992 was
within the prohibited 45-day period prior to the 11 May
1992 Elections.
ISSUE:
The principal question is whether the proviso in Sec.
13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 which states, "Provided,
however,That for the first year of its operations from
the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of
Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and
chief executive officer of the Subic Authority," violates
the constitutional proscription against appointment or
designation of elective officials to other government
posts.
HELD:
(1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution
Provides: No elective official shall be eligible
for appointment or designation in any capacity
to any public office or position during his
tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by
the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,

including government-owned or controlled


corporations or their subsidiaries. The subject
proviso directs the President to appoint
an elective official i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo
City, to other government post (as Chairman
and CEO of SBMA). This is precisely what the
Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a
situation where a local elective official will work
for his appointment in an executive position in
government,
and
thus
neglect
his
constitutents.
The proviso violates the constitutional proscription
against appointment or designation of elective officials
to other government posts.In full, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of
the Constitution provides:No elective official shall be
eligible for appointment or designation in anycapacity
to any public office or position during his
tenure.Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the
primary functions of hisposition, no appointive official
shall hold any other office or employment in
theGovernment or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, includinggovernment-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.In the
case at bar, the subject proviso directs the President
to appoint an elective official, i.e. ,the Mayor of
Olongapo City, to other government posts (as
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of
SBMA). Since this is precisely what the constitutional
proscription seeks to prevent, there is not doubt to
conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first
par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. In any case, the
view that an elective official may be appointed to
another post if allowed bylaw or by the primary
functions of his office, ignores the clear-cut difference
in the wording of the two(2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art.
IX-B, of the Constitution. While the second paragraph
authorizes holding of multiple offices by an appointive
official when allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to
be more stringent by not providing any exception to
the rule against appointment or designation of an
elective official to the government post, except as are
particularly recognized in the Constitution itself.
WHEREFORE, the proviso in par. (d), Sec. 13, of R.A.
7227, which states: ". . . Provided, however, That for
the first year of its operations from the effectivity of
this Act, the Mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be
appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer
of the Subic Authority," is declared unconstitutional;
consequently, the appointment pursuant thereto of the
Mayor of Olongapo City, respondent Richard J.
Gordon, is INVALID, hence NULL and VOID.
However, all per diems, allowances and other
emoluments received by respondent Gordon, if any,
as such Chairman and Chief Executive Officer may be
retained by him, and all acts otherwise legitimate done
by him in the exercise of his authority as officer de
facto of SBMA are hereby UPHELD.
SO ORDERED.

MUNICIPALITY OF PARANAQUE, petitioner, vs. V.M.


REALTY CORPORATION, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95,
Series of 1993,[6] the Municipality of Paraaque filed on
September
20,
1993,
a
Complaint
for
expropriation[7] against Private Respondent V.M. Realty
Corporation over two parcels of land(Lots 2-A-2 and 2-B-1
of Subdivision Plan Psd-17917), with a combined area of
about 10,000 square meters, located at Wakas, San
Dionisio, Paraaque, Metro Manila, and covered by Torrens
Certificate of Title No. 48700. Allegedly, the complaint was
filed for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions
of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless
through a socialized housing project. [8] Parenthetically, it
was also for this stated purpose that petitioner, pursuant to
itsSangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of 1991,
[9]
previously made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of
the property with private respondent, which the latter did not
accept.[10]
Finding the Complaint sufficient in form and substance,
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134, issued an
Order dated January 10, 1994,[11] giving it due
course. Acting on petitioners motion, said court issued an
Order dated February 4, 1994, [12] authorizing petitioner to
take possession of the subject property upon deposit with
its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its
fair market value based on its current tax declaration.
On February 21, 1994, private respondent filed its
Answer containing affirmative defenses and a counterclaim,
[13]
alleging in the main that (a) the complaint failed to state
a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a
resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160
(the Local Government Code); and (b) the cause of action,
if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. On
private respondents motion, its Answer was treated as a
motion to dismiss.[14] On March 24, 1994,[15] petitioner filed
its opposition, stressing that the trial courts Order dated
February 4, 1994 was in accord with Section 19 of RA
7160, and that the principle of res judicata was not
applicable.
Thereafter, the trial court issued its August 9, 1994
Resolution[16] nullifying its February 4, 1994 Order and
dismissing the case. Petitioners motions for reconsideration
and transfer of venue were denied by the trial court in a
Resolution dated December 2, 1994.[17] Petitioner then
appealed to Respondent Court
ISSUES:
1. A resolution duly approved by the municipal council has
the same force and effect of an ordinance and will not
deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of action.
HELD:
Resolution Different from an Ordinance
Petition is without merit.
The power of eminent domain is lodged in the
legislative branch of government, which may delegate the
exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public
utilities.[25] An LGU may therefore exercise the power to
expropriate private property only when authorized by
Congress and subject to the latters control and restraints,
imposed through the law conferring the power or in other
legislations.[26] In this case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which
delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain, also lays
down the parameters for its exercise.
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur
before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative
council authorizing the local chief executive, in
behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of
eminent domain or pursue expropriation
proceedings over a particular private property.

2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for


public use, purpose or welfare, or for the
benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as
required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously
made to the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
[27]

In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to


exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a
resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no
compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be
authorized through an ordinance. RA 7160, [31] the present
Local Government Code which was already in force when
the Complaint for expropriation was filed, explicitly required
an ordinance for this purpose.
A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An
ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration
of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a
specific matter.[32] An ordinance possesses a general and
permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in
nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a third
reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a
resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all
the Sanggunian members.[33]
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise
eminent domain through a mere resolution, it would have
simply adopted the language of the previous Local
Government Code. But Congress did not. In a clear
divergence from the previous Local Government Code,
Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the local
chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance. Indeed,
[l]egislative intent is determined principally from the
language of a statute. In the instant case, there is no
reason to depart from this rule, since the law requiring an
ordinance is not at all impossible, absurd, or unjust.
Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily
involves a derogation of a fundamental or private right of
the people.[35] Accordingly, the manifest change in the
legislative language -- from resolution under BP 337 to
ordinance under RA 7160 -- demands a strict
construction. No species of property is held by individuals
with greater tenacity, and is guarded by the Constitution and
laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of
inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right
and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of
an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the
law should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation. [36]
Article 32, Rule VI requires that, in exercising the
power of eminent domain, the chief executive of the LGU
must act pursuant to an ordinance.
In this ruling, the Court does not diminish the policy
embodied in Section 2, Article X of the Constitution, which
provides that territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy
local autonomy. It merely upholds the law as worded in RA
7160. We stress that an LGU is created by law and all its
powers and rights are sourced therefrom. It has therefore
no power to amend or act beyond the authority given and
the limitations imposed on it by law. Strictly speaking, the
power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is in reality
not eminent but inferior domain, since it must conform to
the limits imposed by the delegation, and thus partakes only
of a share in eminent domain.[38] Indeed, the national
legislature is still the principal of the local government units,
which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.[39]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED without
prejudice to petitioners proper exercise of its power of
eminent domain over subject property. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-24670 December 14, 1979


ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, plaintiffappellant, vs.
FEATI
BANK
AND
TRUST
CO., defendant-appellee.
SANTOS, J.:
FACTS:
Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing
and selling lots to the public, particularly the Highway
Hills Subdivision along EDSA, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
On March 4, 1952, plaintiff entered into separate
agreements of sale with Augusto Padilla y Angeles
and Natividad Angeles over 2 parcels of land (Lots
Nos. 5 and 6, Block 31, of the Highway Hills
Subdivision). On July 19, 1962 the vendees
transferred their rights and interests over the said lots
to Emma Chavez. The plaintiff executed the
corresponding deeds of sale in favor of Emma Chavez
upon payment of the purchase price. Both the
agreements and the deeds of sale thereafter executed
contained the stipulation that the parcels of land
subject of the deeds of sale shall be used by the
Buyer exclusively for residential purposes. The
restrictions were later annotated in the Transfer
Certificates of Titles covering the said lots issued in
the
name
of
Chavez.
Eventually, defendant-appellee acquired Lots No. 5
and 6 with the building restrictions also annotated in
their corresponding TCTs. Lot No.5 was bought
directly from Chavez free from all liens and
encumbrances while Lot No.6 was acquired through
a Deed of Exchange from Republic Flour Mills.
Plaintiff claims that the restrictions were imposed as
part of its general building scheme designed for the
beautification and development of the Highway Hills
Subdivision which forms part of its big landed estate
where commercial and industrial sites are also
designated
or
established.
Defendant maintains that the area along the western
part of EDSA from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River,
has been declared a commercial and industrial zone,
per ResolutionNo.27 of the Municipal Council of
Mandaluyong. It alleges that plaintiff completely sold
and transferred to third persons all lots in said
subdivision facing EDSA and the subject lots
thereunder were acquired by it only on June 23, 1962
or more than 2 years after the area xxx had been
declared a commercial and industrial zone.
On or about May 5, 1963, defendant-appellee began
construction of a building devoted to banking
purposes but which it claims could also be used
exclusively for residential purposes. The following day,
the plaintiff demanded in writing that the construction
of the commercial building be stopped but the
defendant refused to comply contending that the
construction was in accordance with the zoning
regulations.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid
exercise
of
police
power.
2. Whether the said Resolution can nullify or
supersede the contractual obligations assumed by
defendant-appellee.
HELD:
1. Yes. The validity of Resolution No.27 was never
questioned. In fact, it was impliedly admitted in the

stipulation of facts, when plaintiff-appellant did not


dispute the same. Having admitted the validity of the
subject resolution, plaintiff-appellant cannot now
change
its
position
on
appeal.
However, assuming that it is not yet too late to
question the validity of the said resolution, the posture
is
unsustainable.
Municipalities are empowered by law through Sec.3 of
RA 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) to to adopt zoning and
subdivision ordinances or regulations for the
municipality. The law does not restrict the exercise of
the power through an ordinance. Therefore, granting
that Resolution No.27 is not an ordinance, it certainly
is a regulatory measure within the intendment of the
word
regulation
under
the
provision.
An examination of Sec.12 of the same law reveals that
the implied power of a municipality should be liberally
construed in its favor and that any fair and
reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power
should be interpreted in favor of the local government
and it shall be presumed to exist. An exception to the
general welfare powers delegated to municipalities is
when the exercise of its powers will conflict with
vested rights arising from contracts. The exception
does not apply to the case at bar.
2. While non-impairment of contacts is constitutionally
guaranteed, the rule is not absolute since it has to be
reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power.
Invariably described as the most essential, insistent
and illimitable of powers and the greatest and most
powerful attribute of government, the exercise of
police power may be judicially inquired into and
corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, there having been a denial of due
process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guarantee.
Resolution No.27, S-1960 declaring the western part
of EDSA from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as
an industrial or commercial zone was passed by the
Municipal Council of Mandaluyong in the exercise of
police power to safeguard/promote the health, safety,
peace, good order and general welfare of the people
in the locality. Judicial notice may be taken of the
conditions prevailing in the area, especially where
Lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located. EDSA supports an
endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity,
noise and pollution which are hardly conducive to the
health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route.
The Municipality of Mandaluyong was reasonably
justified under the circumstances in passing the
subject resolution.
Thus, the state, in order to promote the general
welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupations. Persons
may be subjected to all kinds of restraint and burdens,
in order to secure the general comfort, health and
prosperity of the state, and to this fundamental aim of
the Government, the rights of the individual are
subordinated.

BIENVENIDO
O.
MARQUEZ,
JR., petitioner, as to embrace those who merely were facing criminal
vs.
charges. They finally came out with Article 73 of the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDUARDO T. IRR of Local Government Code 1991.
RODRIGUEZ, respondents.
Art. 73. Disqualifications. The following persons
VITUG, J.:
shall be disqualified from running for any elective
local position:
FACTS:
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political
Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate for the
cases here or abroad. Fugitive from justice refers to
elective position in the Province of Quezon in the 11th
a person who has been convicted by final judgment.
May
1992
elections
filed
this
petition Private respondent reminds us that the construction
for certiorari praying for the reversal of the resolution placed upon law by the officials in charge of its
of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") which enforcement deserves great and considerable weight.
dismissed his petition for quo warranto against the The Court certainly agrees; however, when there
winning candidate, herein private respondent Eduardo clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling
Rodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive from justice.
law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written.
It is averred that at the time private respondent filed An administrative rule or regulation can neither
his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against expand nor constrict the law but must remain
him for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand congruent to it. The Court believes and thus
theft of personal property was still pending before the holds, albeit with some personal reservations of
Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, the ponente, that Article 73 of the Rules and
County of Los Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A Regulations Implementing the Local Government
warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term
claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the
on account of his alleged "flight" from that country.
fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment."
Before the 11th May 1992 elections, a petition for is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.
cancellation (SPA 92-065) of respondent's certificate Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any
of candidacy, on the ground of the candidate's definite finding on whether or not, in fact, private
disqualification under Section 40(e) of the Local respondent is a "fugitive from justice" as such term
Government Code, was filed by petitioner with the must be interpreted and applied in the light of the
COMELEC. On 08 May 1992, the COMELEC Court's opinion. The omission is understandable since
dismissed the petition.
the COMELEC dismissed outrightly the petition
Petitioner's subsequent recourse to this Court (in G.R. for quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the
No. 105310) from the 08th May 1992 resolution of Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight
COMELEC was dismissed without prejudice, however, Committee. The Court itself, not being a trier of facts,
to the filing in due time of a possible post-election quo is thus constrained to remand the case to the
warranto proceeding against private respondent.
COMELEC for a determination of this unresolved
Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of factual matter.
Quezon on 29 May 1992. Forthwith, petitioner WHEREFORE, the questioned resolutions of the
institutedquo warranto proceedings (EPC 92-28) Commission on Elections are REVERSED and SET
against private respondent before the COMELEC. In ASIDE, and the case is hereby REMANDED to the
its 02 February 1993 resolution, the COMELEC Commission which is DIRECTED to proceed and
(Second Division) dismissed the petition. The resolve the case with dispatch conformably with the
COMELEC En Banc, on 02 December 1993, denied a foregoing opinion. No special pronouncement on
reconsideration of the resolution.
costs.
Hence, this petition for certiorari
SO ORDERED.
ISSUE:
whether private respondent who, at the time of the
filing of his certificate of candidacy (and to date), is
said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign
court and evading a warrant for his arrest comes
within the term "fugitive from justice" contemplated by
Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code and,
therefore, disqualified from being a candidate for, and
thereby ineligible from holding on to, an elective local
office.
HELD:
The law needs no further interpretation and
construction. Section 40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160,
is rather clear and it disqualifies "fugitive from justice"
includes not only those who flee after conviction to
avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being
charged flee to avoid prosecution.
The Oversight Committee evidently entertained
serious apprehensions on the possible constitutional
infirmity of Section 40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160 if
the disqualification therein meant were to be so taken

G.R. No. L-29993 October 23, 1978


LAUDENCIO TORIO, GUILLERMO EVANGELISTA,
MANUEL DE GUZMAN, ALFONSO R. MAGSANOC,
JESUS MACARANAS, MAXIMO MANANGAN,
FIDEL MONTEMAYOR, MELCHOR VIRAY, RAMON
TULAGAN, all Members of the Municipal Council
of
Malasiqui
in
1959,
Malasiqui,
Pangasinan, petitioners,
vs.
ROSALINA, ANGELINA, LEONARDO, EDUARDO,
ARTEMIO, ANGELITA, ANITA, ERNESTO, NORMA,
VIRGINIA,
REMEDIOS and ROBERTO, all
surnamed FONTANILLA, and THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
MUOZ PALMA, J.:
FACTS:
The Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan,
passed Resolution No. 159 to manage the 1959
Malasiqui town fiesta celebration The 1959
Malasiqui Town Fiesta Executive Committee was
created, which, in turn, organized a sub-committee on
entertainment
and
stage.
A zarzuela troupe, of which Vicente Fontanilla was a
member, arrived for their performance on January 22.
During the zarzuela, the stage collapsed and
Fontanilla was pinned underneath. He was
immediately hospitalized, but died the following day.
Fontanillas heirs filed a complaint to recover damages
against the Municipality of Malasiqui, its Municipal
Council and all the Councils individual members.
The municipality invoked inter alia the defense that as
a legally and duly organized public corporation it
performs sovereign functions and the holding of a
town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental
functions from which no liability can arise to answer
for the negligence of any of its agents.
The councilors maintained that they merely acted as
the municipalitys agents in carrying out the municipal
ordinance and as such they are likewise not liable for
damages as the undertaking was not one for profit;
furthermore, they had exercised due care and
diligence in implementing the municipal ordinance.
After trial, the RTC dismisses the complaint,
concluding that the Executive Committee had
exercised due diligence and care in selecting a
competent man for the construction of the stage, and
the collapse was due to forces beyond the control of
the committee. Consequently, the defendants were
not liable for the death of Vicente Fontanilla. Upon
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts
decision and ordered all the defendants-appellees to
pay jointly and severally the heirs of Vicente Fontanilla
the sums of P12,000.00 by way of moral and actual
damages:P1200.00 its attorneys fees; and the costs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Municipality of Malasiqui may be
held liable.
HELD:
Yes.
Under Philippine laws, municipalities are political
bodies endowed with the faculties of municipal
corporations to be exercised by and through their
respective municipal governments in conformity with
law, and in their proper corporate name, they may
inter alia sue and be sued, and contract and be

contracted
with.
The powers of a municipality are two-fold in character:
public, governmental or political on the one hand; and
corporate, private, or proprietary on the other.
Governmental powers are those exercised by the
corporation in administering the powers of the state
and promoting the public welfare. These include the
legislative, judicial public, and political. Municipal
powers, on the other hand, are exercised for the
special benefit and advantage of the community.
These include those which are ministerial, private and
corporate.
This distinction of powers are necessary in
determining the liability of the municipality for the acts
of its agents which result in injury to third persons.
If the injury is caused in the course of the performance
of a governmental function/duty, no recovery can be
had from the municipality unless there is an existing
statute on the matter, nor from its officers, so long as
they performed their duties honestly and in good faith
or that they did not act wantonly and maliciously.
With respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule is
that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third
persons ex contract or ex delicto. They may also be
subject to suit upon contracts and its tort.

G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995


JUANITO
MARIANO,
JR.
et
al., petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY
OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE MUNICIPAL
TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF
MAKATI, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
FACTS:
G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and
declaratory relief filed by petitioners. Of the petitioners, only
Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are
residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as
taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51,
and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the
land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and
bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section
10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7
and 450 of the Local Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart
the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective
officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7,
Article VI of the Constitution.
3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:
(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by
special law (the Charter in violation of the constitutional
provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be
passed by Congress within three (3) years following the
return of every census;
(b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed
in the title of the bill; and
(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is
not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census),
the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.
G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H.
Osmea as senator, taxpayer, and concerned citizen.
Petitioner assails section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 as
unconstitutional on the same grounds as aforestated.
ISSUES:
1.Whether Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land
areas of the proposed city of Makati violating sections 7
and 450 of the Local Government Code on specifying
metes and bounds with technical descriptions
2.Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides
with Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution stressing that they new citys acquisition of a
new corporate existence will allow the incumbent mayor
to extend his term to more than two executive terms as
allowed by the Constitution
3.Whether the addition of another legislative district in
Makati is unconstitutional as the reapportionment cannot
be made by a special law
HELD/RULING:
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 states that:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati
shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known
as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City,
which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality
of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has
jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and
beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of
Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and
Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the
Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of
Manila.
Emphasis has been provided in the provision under dispute.
Said delineation did not change even by an inch the land
area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. It
must be noted that the requirement of metes and bounds

was meant merely as a tool in the establishment of LGUs.


It is not an end in itself.
Furthermore, at the time of consideration or R.A. No. 7854,
the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati
and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation.
Out of becoming a sense of respect to co-equal department
of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left
to the courts to decide.
Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 provides that:
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent
elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue
as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their
powers and functions until such time that a new election is
held and the duly elected officials shall have already
qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city
will acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive
officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues
exercising their functions and duties and they shall be
automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of
Makati.
Section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution provide the following:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall
be three years and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall
be elected for a term of three years which shall begin,
unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth
day of June next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.
This challenge on the controversy cannot be entertained as
the premise on the issue is on the occurrence of many
contingent events. Considering that these events may or
may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical
issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or
controversy. Moreover, only Mariano among the petitioners
is a resident of Taguig and are not the proper parties to
raise this abstract issue.
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution clearly provides
that the Congress may be comprised of not more than two
hundred fifty members, unless otherwise provided by law.
As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress
from increasing its membership by passing a law, other
than a general reapportionment of the law.

Heirs of Juancho Ardona vs. Reyes


GR L-60549, 60553 to 60555; 26 October 1983]
Facts: The Philippine Tourism Authority filed 4 complaints
with the Court of First Instance of Cebu City for the
expropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling land situated
in barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City, under PTA's
express authority "to acquire by purchase, by negotiation or
by condemnation proceedings any private land within and
without the tourist zones" for the purposes indicated in
Section 5, paragraph B(2), of its Revised Charter (PD 564),
more specifically, for the development into integrated resort
complexes of selected and well-defined geographic areas
with potential tourism value, specifically for the construction
of a sports complex (basketball courts, tennis courts,
volleyball courts, track and field, baseball and softball
diamonds, and swimming pools), clubhouse, gold course,
children's playground and a nature area for picnics and
horseback riding for the use of the public. The petitioners
filed their oppositions, and had a common allegation in that
the taking is allegedly not impressed with public use under
the Constitution; alleging that there is no specific
constitutional provision authorizing the taking of private
property for tourism purposes; that assuming that PTA has
such power, the intended use cannot be paramount to the
determination of the land as a land reform area; that limiting
the amount of compensation by legislative fiat is
constitutionally repugnant; and that since the land is under
the land reform program, it is the Court of Agrarian
Relations and not the Court of First Instance (CFI), that has
jurisdiction over the expropriation cases.The Philippine
Tourism Authority having deposited with the Philippine
National Bank, Cebu City Branch, an amount equivalent to
10% of the value of the properties pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 1533, the lower court issued separate orders
authorizing PTA to take immediate possession of the
premises and directing the issuance of writs of possession.
The Heirs of Ardona, et. al. filed a petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the expropriation of parcels of land for the
purpose of constructing a sports complex, including a golf
course, by the Philippine Tourism Authority be considered
taking for public use.
Held: There are three provisions of the 1973 Constitution
which directly provide for the exercise of the power of
eminent domain. Section 2, Article IV states that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. Section 6, Article XIV allows the State, in the
interest of national welfare or defense and upon payment of
just compensation to transfer to public ownership, utilities
and other private enterprises to be operated by the
government. Section 13, Article XIV states that the
Batasang Pambansa may authorize upon payment of just
compensation the expropriation of private lands to be
subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to
deserving citizens. While not directly mentioning the
expropriation of private properties upon payment of just
compensation, the provisions on social justice and agrarian
reforms which allow the exercise of police power together
with the power of eminent domain in the implementation of
constitutional objectives are even more far reaching insofar
as taxing of private property is concerned. The restrictive
view of public use may be appropriate for a nation which
circumscribes the scope of government activities and public
concerns and which possesses big and correctly located
public lands that obviate the need to take private property
for public purposes. Neither circumstance applies to the
Philippines. The Philippines has never been a laissez faire
State, and the necessities which impel the exertion of
sovereign power are all too often found in areas of scarce
public land or limited government resources. There can be
no doubt that expropriation for such traditional purposes as
the construction of roads, bridges, ports, waterworks,

schools, electric and telecommunications systems,


hydroelectric power plants, markets and slaughterhouses,
parks, hospitals, government office buildings, and flood
control or irrigation systems is valid. However, the concept
of public use is not limited to traditional purposes. Here as
elsewhere the idea that "public use" is strictly limited to
clear cases of "use by the public" has been discarded. The
Philippine Tourism Authority has stressed that the
development of the 808 hectares includes plans that would
give the Heirs of Ardona, et. al. and other displaced persons
productive employment, higher incomes, decent housing,
water and electric facilities, and better living standards. The
Courts dismissal of the petition is, in part, predicated on
those assurances. The right of the PTA to proceed with the
expropriation of the 282 hectares already identified as fit for
the establishment of a resort complex to promote tourism is,
therefore, sustained.

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