Naval Operations in the South Channel of Corcyra 435-433 B. C.

Author(s): N. G. L. Hammond
Source: The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 65 (1945), pp. 26-37
Published by: Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/626337
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NAVAL

OPERATIONS

IN THE SOUTH

CHANNEL

OF CORCYRA

435-433

B.C.

[PLATESI-III]
SUCH attention as the battle of Sybota has received has resulted rather in criticism of
Thucydides than in clarification of the battle; yet, as the greatest naval battle between Greek
and Greek before the Peloponnesian War, it is of some interest to the naval historian. My
attempt to reconstruct the battle is based on the belief that Thucydides' account is accurate,
though cursory in some respects, and contains enough topographical clues for my purpose. In
interpreting these clues I have drawn upon the results of travels in Epirus, which I hope to
publish elsewhere; the relevant data are adduced here in brief. The paper falls into two
parts, a topographical introduction and the study of Thucydides' narrative.'
I.

TOPOGRAPHY

OF THE SOUTH CHANNEL

The South Channel of Corfu is contained between the almost parallel coasts of Corfu and
Epirus. The Corfu coast between Cape Lefkimo and Cape Bianco is low-lying with sandy
beach and shallow water inshore; but south of St. Theodoro Point sunken rocks make approach
dangerous, especially off Cape Bianco, where the Bianco Shoal stretches both south and east
into the Channel. Thus in modern times the only area suitable for beaching is between
Cape Lefkimo and St. Theodoro Point. There is no evidence of any general change since
antiquity in the coastline or sea-level; 2 and as this coast is sheltered from .heavy seas the
extent of the Bianco Shoal and the sunken rocks is likely to have been more or less constant.
The stretch of coast between Cape Lefkimo and St. Theodoro Point is alluvial and may therefore have encroached slightly on the sea since antiquity. The Cape Leukimme of Thucydides
should be identified with Cape Lefkimo; apart from the persistence of the ancient name, it
alone affords the beaching facilities required for a naval base.3
The Epirus coast between Hieronisi and the mouth of the Paramythia stream is mainly
precipitous with deep water inshore; there is no reason to suppose that there has been any
change since antiquity. The best anchorage in the Channel is Port Mourzo, where Leake
lay in a Russian brig of war in May, 18o6; sheltered by the Sivota islands and with shallow
water inshore, it is probably suitable for beaching (the MediterraneanPilot is silent on this point
and I have not visited the port). To the south there are two bays with shelving, sandy beaches,
Arilla Bay and that at the mouth of the Paramythia stream, and between them a small bight,
Stavrolimeno; the two bays, which I have visited, are suitable for beaching. The silt deposited
by the Paramythia stream may have diminished the anchorage at its mouth, but only to a
small extent since ancient times. This group of anchorages, being exposed to the west, is
secondary to Port Mourzo. Within the Channel the Sivota group of islands marks the
narrowest part of the Channel; between the two main islands there is an anchorage which
may be entered only from the north, a reef barring the southern entry. The islands are
rocky and covered with thick scrub. With the possible exception of the Sivota islands, there
is water close to the above anchorages. The identification of the ancient Sybota islands
with the Sivota group is certain; and 'mainland Sybota' should be identified with Port
1I am indebted to Professor Adcock for his help and
criticism.
2 J. Partsch, Die
Insel Korfu, Petermanns Mitteilungen
Erganzungsband, xix. (1887), p. 39 and 43, with geological map.
3 This accords with Strabo vii. 7, 5, who, describing the
coast from north to south, mentions Buthrotum and then

the Sybota islands Kcrr& -r6

o4ov
AEvKi~IPAt KEIrEvat; sailing south

&KpOV-ris

one sights

KopKVpaias

Cape

rilv

Lefkimo

and not Cape Bianco. The latter should be identified

with Ptolemy's Cape Amphipagos, cf. Leake, Travels
in North Greece (1835) I 94, rather than Gomme,

Historical Commentary on Thucydides (i945)

places it on the west coast of Corcyra.

26

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183 n. I, who

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH CHANNEL

OF CORCYRA 27

Mourzo, being immediately adjacent to the islands and also affording the best anchorage in
the Channel.4
On the southern approaches to the Channel the Paxos group has good anchorage at
Port Gayo. Three miles off the port the Madonna Shoal is dangerous, being sometimes dry
'
but usually submerged.
According to the MediterraneanPilot III 131 preference should
be given to the passage eastward of the Madonna Shoal and in a sailing ship the mainland
should be kept aboard particularly towards sunset, as at night the wind is almost certain to be
off the land; the current also sets to the northward along this coast.' The Epirus coast south
of Paramythia stream falls away towards the east, running almost due east between Parga and
Agios Ioannes, and then resumes its general S.S.E. direction. Between Paramythia stream
and Parga the coast is precipitous and forbidding, rising like a wall as one sails close inshore.
In this stretch there is no salient promontory; Cape Varlam appears on the Admiralty chart,
for which Leake gives a variant name Formajo, and Cape Trophale is added by the Greek
Staff map. Yet in itself this stretch of coast is a salient feature in entering the South Channel;
here the mainland closes in to form the Channel, and the high point 499 m. between the two
capes affords a landfall to the voyager from the south. It is also dangerous for small vessels,
being exposed to rough seas from the west through the gap between Paxos and Corfu and to
the dangerous north wind of the Corfu Channel. The anchorages of Parga, Agios Ioannes
and Splantza lie off the main route to the Channel (cf. Plate I and IIIa). Of these Parga is the
best, although open to the south except for a small beach in the north-west corner; Splantza,
also known as Phanari, is difficult of egress against a west wind; Agios Ioannes, remote in
its angle of the coast, affords safe anchorage in stormy weather, but the coast is rocky and steepto. Parga and Splantza are suitable for beaching triremes, but Agios loannes is not; all
three have facilities for watering.5
On the Epirus coast the only large site lies just south of the Paramythia stream. The
acropolis, which is half-an-hour's distance from the bay, is defended by a strong ring-wall
enclosing some 130o,ooo square metres; a single long wall extends down the slope towards the
bay, and this slope is covered with many ancient building remains; beside the bay there are
remains of an ashlar tower and a polygonal wall, and the modern chapel of Agia Maria rests
on ancient foundations. By analogy with other sites in Epirus I consider this site, named
Vemokastro on the Greek Staff map, to have been a major town in Hellenistic times; and
doubtless it controlled the bays of Arilla and the Paramythia stream (cf. Plate IIIb). On
the cliff at the southern side of the bay of Splantza there are the remains of a small fort, some
150 m. long by 40 m. wide, and an -abundance of coarse pottery sherds; this fort evidently
controlled the port of Splantza in Hellenistic times, but it numbered few inhabitants. The
swamps, which cut off Splantza from the hinterland, must have contributed then as now to its
lack of importance. Agios Ioannes possesses neither ancient nor modern remains; at Parga
some antiquities of the Roman period have been found, and the remains of an ancient quay
in the north-west corner of the bay probably belong to that period. While Port Mourzo has
no ancient remains, there is a Hellenistic acropolis in the hills behind near Koutsi; smaller
in extent than that of Vemokastro, it represents a small town, which would be served on the
coast by Port Mourzo.
The distribution of Hellenistic sites shows Vemokastro playing the r6le of the modern
Parga; that is to say, Vemokastro was the main coastal town and port on the routes between
Preveza and Corfu, and also served the rich hinterland of the Acheron valley. The reason in
Hellenistic times for preferring Vemokastro to Parga, which has held undisputed sway since
Roman times, cannot be found in the nature of its territory or in overland routes; both possess
fertile land and olive groves, and there is little to choose between the routes from them into the
I. 50, 3, og-rt 8 TrrXipora
4 Thuc.
tris OEEWrpcoTri8o at Port Mourzo, it was uninhabited. Thuc. III. 76:
'pip.os; 52, I; and 54, I, iv
'v -T 1TrEipct) Alcidas anchored at mainland Sybota; he was then free
Apv
"ro!s
to choose the best anchorage in the Channel.
Vup36ro1s. Later authors mention only the islands Sybota,
under which the anchorages both west and east of St.
5 Insets of these harbours will be found in Admiralty
Nicolas Isle may have been comprised. When Leake lay Chart 206 (1912).

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N.

28

G. L. HAMMOND

hinterland plains. The reason must be sought in considerations of coastal trade. If such trade
looks south towards Preveza (near the site of Roman Nicopolis) then Parga is the natural port
for this part of Epirus; if it looks north towards Corcyra, Vemokastro and Mourzo are the
natural ports, and they have the great advantage over Parga that they lie north of the dangerous
coast on either side of Cape Varlam. In regard to the main trade route from Greece to Italy,
Vemokastro lies on that route, whereas Parga lies off it; but Hellenistic Epirus would be concerned more with local trade routes than the main trade route. If Vemokastro had this
importance in Hellenistic times, it may be assumed to have been preferred to Parga in the fifth
century B.c., when Corcyra's supremacy in trade led her to dispute the naval supremacy of the
north-west route. At that time Vemokastro deserved the description given in 1819 to Parga'the Ear and Eye of Corfu' 6; Plate IIa and b give the views from Vemokastro and Plate

IIIa shows the coast from Splantza to Cape Trophale.

In describing the topography of the operations of 435 to 433 B.c., Thucydides could
draw upon the evidence of eye-witnesses of the operations and upon the general knowledge
of mariners who used the north-west route to the Adriatic, Italy and Sicily, the latter being
summarised in the nautical handbooks or Periegeseisof the time; in either case the description
was given from the viewpoint of the sailor. In 434 B.C., the Corinthians established posts for
naval and land forces, Trri'AK-rTqKcidTrEpi-rT XEiJptov Trs eEOwrrpcoTirG0,in order to protect
Leucas and other friendly states from raids by the Corcyraean squadrons; the Corcyraeans
encamped ' opposite' with naval and land forces at Cape Leukimme (I. 3o, 3-4).7 The post
at Actium could check raids on Ambracia Anactorion and Leucas or further south; that at
Cheimerion opposite Cape Leukimme must have been intended to report Corcyraean movements through the Channel and to harass Corcyraean raiders either sailing thence or returning.
The stretch of coast' opposite ' Corcyra is that between Hieronisi and Cape Varlam, for further
south one loses sight of Corcyra; -rT XEIpipov riqSOEaTrpC0oriosshould then be found on
this stretch of coast, and it should be noted that Thucydides' phrase suggests an area rather
than a place such as Actium. In 433 B.C. the Corinthian fleet sailing from Leucas made land
on the mainland 'opposite' Corcyra and came to anchor at Cheimerion in Thesprotis 8;
here too Cheimerion must be placed north of Cape Varlam and, since the Corcyraeans occupy
the Sybota islands, south of Port Mourzo.
At this point Thucydides introduces a digression:
-T
WrrEp iTroO
Axi'rv, Kcii -rr6AIT5
E"rl
V
6i
Tfs
S
~iria
KEiTral Tro60ahdxAU&q rTi 'EAcxTaTribi
EaTrpcoTi'O'E)prl"
-~rcap' Mc-riv
ailiv
6E riS ?Espcp-oriboS 'AXipcov roTrcqaps ov EapdAAElMt
iES e6?aacaav*
'AXEPouciVa
"
E
aiT00 raorc~6o,TsV
edU KCi
cxc' oJ KCi T-TiV
ETrCAV4dicV
6picoV
cravIvTv,
PaEE
EXE1"
EEoTrpco'risba
oi0v
EVTaJOaC
KCi KE-rpivIv, Cv EVTb fl) QKpc QV(XEiT6
Kopivio TrT
XEiptIov. ri0TrrEfpoU
oi p~v
TE KCi
This
shows
that
there
was
(I. 46, 4-5).
passage
6pli30vCTai
rTOriaV-VTo.
a Cape CheimerionCrTp(T6TrEov
between the mouths of the rivers Thyamis and Acheron, and also a harbour
of the same name which was inhabited.9 The identification of Cape Cheimerion with Cape
Varlam admits of little doubt; the description of its position between the two river-mouths is
clearly that of the mariner, who changes course at Cape Varlam where the Corfu Channel is
lost to sight and Port Splantza comes into view; the fact that it is some seven miles closer to
the mouth of the Thyamis is immaterial, as Thucydides is not giving precise measurements.
Moreover this identification explains the landfall of the Corinthian fleet (I. 46, 3), which
would be guided to the coast opposite Corcyra by the high point 499 m. above Cape Varlam.
The port Cheimerion should be close to the Cape Cheimerion and ' opposite Corcyra,' that is
6

C. P. de Bosset, Proceedingsin Parga (1819), 46.

S'AvTEcTrpaTO-TE8EjovTSo 'i Kai ol KEpKUpalot irif riT AEuKhI

i Solt, &?O& -r6
rE KCi TTE3C]. ITTrTEOV 8 OOjUITEpO1
vaXi
1&k
Opos-ro
d&VTKCtE36CIEVO1 XEtpvo
srl
'86 &VEXcp1pToav Tr' OiKoU
"OT
?K&rTEpOl. In both cases the meaning of dv-rt- appears to be

'opposite.' in the geographical sense. In the bay west of

Cape Lefkimo there is excellent anchorage, according to
the Mediterranean Pilot.
8 'E-rEti
S

T8 -poCaEPtaV

"-T

Kc"r&
KapKupotv

rvTEripc

&T-r

AEUK65O0 ThrOVTE~, 6pli3OVTaI

(I. 46, 3).

9 Jowett

translates

iS XEt~ptov

T~is OE(arnpCS8O yi5

bU

'Cheimerion

is a

t'iv
gaort
harbour' and adds a footnote 'or " here there is a harbour " '; I prefer the former translation, which is supported
by the analogous sentence at 50, 3, ga-frt rd X0Pora ris
Mhlv ipfiPos. I assume it was inhabited from
OeE-rpOTrip0oS
Thucydides' silence, since in the case of mainland Sybota
he states it to be uninhabited.

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NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH CHANNEL OF CORCYRA 29

north of Cape Varlam; the two possibilities are the bay of the Paramythia stream and Arilla
Bay. As the former lies closer to Cape Cheimerion and served the Hellenistic town at Vemokastro, we may identify Port Cheimerion with the bay of the Paramythia stream.
The digressionof Thucydides contains much informationwhich is irrelevant to his purpose,
the locating of Cheimerion, and the style resembles that of Ionian geographers. Pearson has
suggested that in this passage Thucydides was drawing upon some Periegesis'perhaps even
Hecataeus '; he has seen the same influence in Thucydides' other descriptionsof Epirus and
Acarnania.o1 Some support may be lent to Pearson's suggestion by comparing I. 46, 4 with
5 To
Strabo VII. 7, 5, Esloi5E
s -r X poarca,fiS i v 'HTTEipoulKpV aITrXoCa?Il,KTa-rad
vris5E
Ecov

&Kpov T-rl KopKupcias -'v

AEvKippwav

KEip[EVa.

Kcd &AAat

E'Ev Trc TrapaT\rCp

vT1r0i5ES

C lC(1 pvlprl.
E0iv OlK
K DFUK0'SAlv Eis 6vEIPp&?OEl6 'AXEPcpv
&pac
XEp~MpoV
EiTEl-rrCM
cOTEKCi
VS KCI5EX6Epsvos
To-rap6dcs,
5PCEwv
~KTi'S 'AXEpouacis
Mp
TXEiousToT-ra~po's,
y\JUKdCivEtv

0
Tbv K6h'rrOV"PEi 5i KcI Ol6c(ptiS

8E

1n'tlCiOV.

UiTrpKEITa

TOUTOU p~Ev

TOJ

K66nrrov KiXupos, ri

Trp6T-rpov
"Equpac,1r6ALsOEcrTrpcTrov,
Too
sKa
KcrQ BoupcorT6vl oviKrl. YIylS iA Tr
KiXopouv
TohiXv0ov BouX~Tlov........
TXp' "ro K6TroU. lET
KcQilKE1cOT-rv
l
Xcpcr'

5io &Ahoi AlVEaVS.Leake 11 pointed out that Strabo appears

65 FUVK'vAlIVa ~(PEi EUiC1
to echo Thucydides in the reference to the Acheron river, Ephyre, and the Thyamis river;

this echo is at first sight striking, because the relevance of including the Thyamis in each case
is not obvious. But there is a reason in one case. Thucydides locates Cheimerion between
the Thyamis and Acheron rivers, two better-known landmarks on this coast; the mention of
the Thyamis is essential to his argument. Strabo adds nothing to his explanation of the
Glykys Limen by introducing the Thyamis; he has already mentioned Buthrotumin its proper
place between Poseidion and Sybota, and described Buthrotum as the seat of a Roman colony.
It therefore seems likely that Strabo found in the source which he used for the Glykys Limen
a reference to the Thyamis, Ephyre and Phoinike near Buthrotum, and included it here despite
his earlier mention of Buthrotum. Was Strabo drawing here on Thucydides or on a source
common to Thucydides ? It is a prioriimprobable that Strabo would use Thucydides when
he could draw on Periegeseis;and in this case he would find nothing in Thucydides about the
Glykys Limen. There is thus good reason to believe that Thucydides and Strabo were drawing
on the same Periegesis,probably that of Hecataeus, which was more detailed for this part of
Epirus than either of the citations made by the two authors.

If my deduction is correct, the Periegesisincluded the Thyamis mouth, the Sybota islands,

some islets Ev T~
Strabo did not care to describe),12 Cape Cheimerion and
Tapdtr\cp (which
Limen
thus

at the Acheron mouth. Cape Cheimerionwas

a landmarkbetween Sybota
Glykys
and Glykys Limen, and may be identified without reference to the naval operations of 435-

433 B.c. as Cape Varlam, at which point Sybota is unsighted and Glykys Limen comes into

view.l3 The Periegesisalso described the hinterland where lay the famous Acherusian Lake
and Ephyre. It is probable that Strabo keeps closer to the Periegesisin describing Ephyre as
c
inland of the bay into which
the Acheron flows
(dGrrpKElTr
TOthO'erOU
pIvTaOK6hprOuKiXvpos,
than Thucydides, who describesit as inland of the port
41Trp6rTapov
"Equpa,-rdatSOsEcatlrporcv)
Cheimerion
TT Tr6 @~
5 Av
Jrr5 p cQ6TOOKEiT
TT)
(o'rrn ~ Alilv, KcI Tr621
08A&cc
"r 'EAtaldrrn5t
?EowrpcorTios
'Egiaprl). Both descriptions are correct in the sense that the Acheron valley
plain, beside which Ephyre probably lay, was served by the ports on the coast, whether
Cheimerion, Glykys Limen or in modern times Parga.
It is possible that the same Periegesisis the source of another reference to Cheimerion;
s.v.
Stephanus
XEe~iptov
cxKpaGEorprrpoTics
-rcT evOvTbv
XeriEptel'-s. The existence of an ethnic

10 CQ xxxiii. (I939)
52, and Early Ionian Historians
(1939) 50.
11 NG iii 7 n. I.
12
Islets between Sybota and Cape Cheimerion are
Megalo and Mikro Mourtemeno, Peramos and Katsonisi.
13 For this stretch of coast two other names are handed
down. Scylax gives the corrupt EAEAfor the harbour at
the mouth of the Acheron. Today it is named Phanari

after the name of the region and Splantza after the village
of twenty hovels; in antiquity it may equally have had two
names, Glykys Limen and that of Scylax, the latter being
associated either with the fort on the south side or with the
swamps which cut the harbour off from the interior.
Ptolemy III. 14, 5 and Plutarch Antony62 give Torone or
Toryne, which is generally identified with Parga and came
into use in the Roman period.

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N.

30

G. L.

HAMMOND

in reference to the Cape rather than to the harbour or town (the latter probably dating from
Hellenistic times), implies that there was an area called Cheimerion, of which the inhabitants
were named Cheimerieis; there are analogies in the Kestrine and Elaiatis areas which Thucydides mentions, and we have already seen some reason in Thuc. I. 30, 3 for believing Cheimerion to be the name of an area. The name would best apply to the coast and hinterland
between Agios Ioannes and Sybota, which juts out as the eastern bastion of the Corfu Channel
in the eyes of a mariner from the south; and the meaning of the name' stormy' well fits this
dangerous and rocky coast.
The last mention of Cheimerion is in Pausanias VIII. 7, 2, yAIUK0S 05r0p EK 8c Xa'carls
T XEIPptov
8iHov io-riv ivTraJc -rE dvitvt v -r 'ApyoMibt Kci v TI" OEoT-rpcoTri8l
Kcrx -r
in
not
the
freshet
was
is
discovered
source
known;
1847 in the bay
KcaOOJP[EVov.Pausanias'
of Agios Ioannes.14 To a modern geographer Pausanias' description of its position 'off Cheiseems to confess; but
merion so-called' has a vagueness which his qualification KaAhooJEVOV
it should be remembered that Pausanias could not describe a position with the precision of
modern geographers. Rather, his qualification is added because he is referring to a littleknown canton in Thesprotis in Epirus.
Prior to the discovery of the freshet at Agios Ioannes, Leake had identified the cape
and harbour of Cheimerion with Cape Varlam and Arilla Bay. But after its discovery Bursian,
followed by Gomme, used the evidence of Pausanias to identify the harbour of Cheimerion
with Agios Ioannes; Bursian and Gomme were then compelled to align the evidence of
Thucydides and Strabo with this identification.15 There are, however, cogent reasons for
refuting their view. The phrase of Pausanias is not capable of such precise application. If
it were, we should have to find near to Agios Ioannes a Cape Cheimerion which forms a
notable landmark between Sybota and the Acheron mouth. Bursian suggests the spur on
the south side of the bay; but this is neither a cape nor a landmark, and the bay with its
environs lies off the sea-route between Sybota and the Acheron or Sybota and the south. It
is therefore hardly possible to make the evidence of Strabo comply with this identification.
When we come to Thucydides, the difficulties are still greater. To define the bay of Agios
Ioannes as between the mouths of the Thyamis and Acheron is little short of nonsense. Nor
is it suitable as a naval and land base in 434 and 433 B.C.; the coast is rock-bound, so that
beaching of triremes is impossible, and the immediate hinterland is barren.16 And the
operations of 435 to 433 B.C. give further reason for rejecting Bursian's and Gomme's identification.

II.

THE

NARRATIVE

OF THUCYDIDES

Of the importance of the Battle of Sybota Thucydides leaves us in no doubt; his account
is detailed and graphic. In accordance with his statement of method a few chapters earlier
(I. 22), we may assume his sources to have been the best available eye-witnesses; he could
consult the Athenian participants after the battle of Sybota, and it is probable that either
before the Peloponnesian War or during his exile he could consult Corinthian eye-witnesses
for the battles of Leukimme and Sybota. Nor can we exclude the possibility of his hearing
some account from the Corcyraeans. His narrative was probably composed early, in my
view before 41I5 B.c. at the latest.17 We have thus every reason to expect a clear and trustworthy account.
The dispute over Epidamnus involved at first only Corcyra and Corinth with her colonies
Ambracia and Leucas; the expedition sent overland by Corinth occupied Epidamnus, but
was blockaded by the Corcyraean navy and Corcyra's Illyrian allies. Thus, open war became
likely between Corcyra and Corinth, a war in which not only Epidamnus was at stake but the
JGS. xviii 139 f.
Alud&vt).Walking from Splantza to Parga I found no
Leake, NG. III 6;
Bursian, Geographie Griech. people near Agios Ioannes, except one shepherd a mile
inland where a small dell afforded grazing.
(1862) I 28; Gomme, op. cit. 180.
16 A
17 CQ. xxxiv. (i94o) 146 f.
caique skipper with whom I sailed described the
T
harbour as adequate in a storm (&vEX1&aV'yKrl aao-rdCEl
14
15

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NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH CHANNEL

OF CORCYRA 31

naval supremacy of the north-west route to the Adriatic and South Italy; for Corinth could
not relieve Epidamnus without challenging the Corcyraean fleet of 12o triremes (I. 25, 4).
In preparing her forces Corinth secured the aid of Megara, Pale in Cephalonia, Epidaurus,
Hermione, Troezen, Elis, Thebes and Phleius, in addition to the original participants, Ambracia and Leucas; Corcyraean envoys, accompanied by envoys from Sparta and Sicyon,
failed to persuade Corinth to use arbitration rather than force. In 435 B.c. the allied fleet of
seventy-five sail, to which Corinth contributed thirty, sent an envoy ahead to declare war on
Corcyra, and assembled at Actium; there they were met by a Corcyraean envoy with the
demand not to sail against Corcyra, which they refused. The Corcyraeans meanwhile manned
a fleet of eighty sail (a squadron of forty being engaged in the blockade of Epidamnus), and
putting to sea defeated the Corinthian fleet decisively. The trophy was set up at Cape Leukimme; this suggests that the battle was fought within sight of Leukimme and probably in the
South Channel, which Corcyra could claim to be her home waters. The Corcyraeans executed
all their prisoners, except the Corinthians; on the day of the naval battle Epidamnus fell,
releasing the Corcyraean squadron of forty ships. Exploiting its supremacy the Corcyraean
fleet ravaged the territory of Leucas and Cyllene in Elis; Corinth, unable to challenge Corcyra's
fleet, endeavoured in summer 434 B.c.18 to check the Corcyraean raiders by establishing posts
of naval and military forces on the mainland coast. The post at Actium safeguarded the
Ambraciote Gulf and Leucas town, and constituted a threat to Corcyraean raiders sailing to
the south of Leucas. The other post was established in the canton of Cheimerion in Thesprotis, opposite Corcyra; Thucydides does not give the exact location of the post, but two sites
may be suggested-either the natural fortress, on which the Hellenistic site known as Vemokastro was later built, with the adjacent bay as anchorage for the naval force, or the hill of
Arpitza, 344 m., with the Bay of Arilla as anchorage.19 This post in any case overlooked the
South Channel and could report by beacon signal the movement of Corcyraean ships; it
could also harass any small Corcyraean squadrons leaving or returning to the Channel. The
Corcyraeans encamped with naval and military forces at Cape Leukimme opposite the Corinthian post; as the northern part of the Cape is swampy, I have placed the camp as on the map.
Neither side attacked the other and in the winter both withdrew (I. 30) ; the tactics of Corinth
had succeeded.
In 433 B.c. both Corcyra and Corinth sent envoys to Athens; the result was a defensive
alliance between Athens and Corcyra. Shortly afterwards an Athenian squadron of ten ships
sailed for Corcyra with precise orders to engage the Corinthians only if they intended to land
on Corcyraean territory or possessions.20
Neither the size nor the orders of the Athenian
can
have
these
orders meant that the Athenians would not
squadron
pleased Corcyra. For
the
of
contest
the
Corinthian
fleet
into Corcyraean waters, but was liable to
necessarily
entry
into
action
when
intention
to
land
on
go
only
Corcyraean soil was proved; if the Corcyraeans
waited upon the Athenians to act, there was nothing to prevent a Corinthian fleet from passing
the narrows of the South Channel and gaining the wider waters opposite Corcyra town, where
their presence might precipitate a revolution or lead to a naval engagement under conditions
favourable to Corinth.
Since the battle of Leukimme the Corinthians had been building and equipping a large
fleet, for which they hired additional rowers from the Peloponnese and elsewhere (I. 31, i).
In late August or early September 433 B.c21 the armada of I50 ships set out for Corcyra; the
Corinthian squadrons totalled ninety ships, and the remaining squadrons were supplied by
18 The
chronology of Gomme, op. cit. 197, is followed
throughout.
19
Supplies could be provided by the area of Arpitza (a
village of 6oo families) and the hinterland plain of Margariti; as the post lay at the mouth of the South Channel,
communication by sea with Actium was not endangered
by the Corcyraeans. The two posts may have been linked
for signalling by beacons, as in 427 B.c. when Alcidas lay
at mainland Sybota and was warned of an Athenian fleet

sailing from Leucas (III. 80, 2).

& cKEVOV
so I. 45, , rriKipuvpav.... . . is -Ov
TiTXcpflV,
cf. 53, 4 may refer to the territory on the mainland which
Corcyra held (III. 85, 2); the vagueness of the phrase,
which is probably quoted from the original order, may be
intended to cover Epidamnus also.
21 The evidence for the month is in IG I 2 295 = GHI.
55, cf. Gomme loc. cit.

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32

N.

G. L. HAMMOND

Elis, Megara, Leucas, Ambracia and Anactorion; the allied squadrons were each under
separate command. Sailing from Leucas they made land on the mainland opposite Corcyra
and came to anchor at Cheimerion in Thesprotis, where they formed an encampment; they
were joined here by a large force of barbarianswho had come up to help them, the mainlanders
of these parts being friendly to Corinth. The Corcyraeanson learning of their approach had
manned I Io ships and camped on one of Sybota islands, the Athenian squadron accompanying
them; the Corcyraean land force, accompanied by Iooo Zacynthian hoplites, took up position
on Cape Leukimme (I. 46-47).
The direct course from Leucas to Port Cheimerion, keeping east of the Madonna Shoal,
is forty-seven miles which is slightly more than the modern estimate of a trireme's normal
range in one day on a calm sea.22 The arrival of the barbarian land force at the rendezvous
was presumably arrangedin advance by Ambracia; the rich hinterland could provide supplies
for the force, there were beaching and watering facilities for the fleet, and the position overlooked the South Channel and the coast of Corcyra. The camp was probably beside the
beach for the convenience of the fleet, for there was no danger of attack by land. The Corcyraean fleet at the Sybota islands could lie in the anchorage between the two main islands
and, if necessary, in the anchorage of Port Mourzo; encamping on one of the islands the
Corcyraeans could ferry supplies from Cape Leukimme and water, if there was none on the
islands, from Cape Leukimme or from the uninhabited Port Mourzo. In this position the
Corcyraean fleet enjoyed two advantages: the only all-weather anchorage in the South
Channel and a base for patrolling the narrowest part of the Channel, between the Sybota outer
island and the Bianco Shoal; in these, the only narrow waters between the Corinthian fleet
and Corcyra town, the Corcyraean fleet could hope to force an engagement. The Athenian
squadron accompanied the Corcyraeans; but its orders did not authorise action in defence of
Corcyraeanwaters. In quality, the newly built Corinthian triremeswere the best in the allied
fleet, and in general the ninety Corinthianships were probably superiorto those of their allies.23
The Corcyraeanfleet of 12o ships in 435 B.c. had included some old vessels which were strengthened for the battle of Leukimme (I. 29, 3); on this occasion Corcyra posted at Sybota i Io
ships. As the proportion of slave to free among the prisoners taken by Corinth was 8oo to
250 (I. 55, 1), the Corcyraean rowers were predominantly, if not entirely, slaves and were
likely to be inferior in skill to the enemy rowers. For naval manoeuvre the Corcyraean fleet
may thus be judged weaker than the Corinthian allied fleet; but at this period battle tactics
were based on the use of marines for boarding rather than on manoeuvre for ramming. The
Athenian squadron was in a class by itself both in seamanship and in battle tactics; but it was
doubtful if it would go into action.
'When their preparationswere complete, the Corinthians with three days' provisions put
out to sea ready for action from Cheimerion by night, and at dawn as they were sailing they
sighted the Corcyraean fleet not only out at sea but sailing towards them. When they perceived each other, they formed order of battle facing one another. The Athenian ships lay on
the right wing of the Corcyraeans, whose main line was held by three squadrons. Of the
Corinthians the right wing was held by the ships of Megara and Ambracia, and in the centre
lay the individual squadrons of the other allies; the left wing was held by the Corinthians
themselves, with their best sailers facing the Athenians and the Corcyraean right. When the
signals were raised on each side, they joined battle and fought, both sides having on their decks
many heavy infantry and many archers and javelin men, since at this time they were still
equipped rather clumsily in the archaic manner. The battle was fought with more obstinacy
than tactics, its general nature being more akin to battle on land. For whenever they charged
22
Gomme, op. cit. 20, following K6ster; under sail a
trireme could cover up to ninety miles. Miles are here and
below to be understood as sea miles. The direct course
was probably that usually taken; in 427 B.c. Alcidas
followed the coast from mainland Sybota to the isthmus of
Leucas, in order to avoid the Athenian fleet which would

take the direct route (III. 81, I).

23 To man her fleet Corinth also hired rowers who could
be trained into good crews; for her Sicilian expedition
Athens raised rowers from her empire to man the fleet
which is so highly praised by Thucydides.

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NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH CHANNEL

OF CORCYRA 33

one another they did not easily disengage, owing to the multitude and crush of vessels; also,
their hopes of victory lay rather in the heavy infantry on their decks, who stood firm and fought,
the ships being stationary. The manoeuvre of breaking the line was not used, but they fought
with more spirit and vigour than science. Everywhere tumult reigned and the battle was
confused; in the course of it the Athenian ships, coming up wherever the Corcyraeanswere
being pressed, caused alarm to the enemy, but did not engage, the generals being deterred by
their instructionsfrom Athens. The right wing of the Corinthiansespecially was in difficulty;
for the Corcyraeans with twenty ships routed them, and pursuing the scattered ships to the
mainland sailed up to their camp, where, disembarking, they fired the deserted tents and
plundered the stores. In this part then the Corinthians and their allies were worsted and the
Corcyraeanswere in the ascendant; but where the Corinthians themselves were, on the left,
they were far superior,for of their inferiornumbers the Corcyraeanshad the twenty ships absent
on pursuit. The Athenians, seeing the Corcyraeanshard pressed, began now to give support
more unequivocally; at first indeed they refrained from ramming any opponent, but when
the rout was becoming complete and the Corinthianswere pressing on, then indeed everyone
went into action without any further distinction, the exigencies of the situation being such that
hostilities occurred between Corinth and Athens.' (I.
48-49).
The fleets at Cheimerion and Sybota lay six and a half miles part, and during daylight
each could be kept under observation by the other (cf. Plate IIb). The Corinthians presumably sailed at night in order to escape observation; and their object may have been to
exploit the fact that the Corcyraeanfleet was nine miles distant from the Corcyraeanland force.
For, if the Corinthian fleet could gain position to the westward of Sybota, it would cut off the
Corcyraean fleet from the Corcyraean land force; and, if the Corinthian land force moved
up to occupy the coast east of Sybota, the Corinthians could attack the enemy fleet under
favourable conditions. Either before or after attacking the enemy fleet the Corinthians could
sail on Corcyra town, which they would reach more rapidly than the Corcyraean land force
marching overland from Cape Leukimme.24 This possibility may have caused the Corinthian
fleet to take on board provisionsfor three days. If this was the Corinthianplan, the fleet would
sail for the western part of the Channel in order to escape observation from Sybota; their
probable course is indicated on the map. However, dawn found the Corcyraeanfleet not only
at sea but heading towards the Corinthian fleet, and at no great distance apart as the fleets
deployed on sighting one another. We may suppose that the Corcyraeanshad either anticipated or been informed of the Corinthian move; they would then sail for the narrows of the
Channel, which they could best hold. The probable course and battle-position of each fleet
is shown on the map, action I. The-distance covered by the leading ships before deploying
was eight miles from Cheimerion and four miles from the Sybota anchorage. In navigating
their night course from Cheimerion the Corinthians may be assumed to have put their best
sailers ahead, and on deploying these formed the left wing; for if the Corinthianscould gain a
victory on this wing, they might yet cut off the Corcyraeansfrom their land base at Leukimme.
It was equally vital for the Corcyraeansto safeguard their right wing. They thereforeplaced
there the Athenian squadron as an outlier, highly manoeuvrable and much feared by the
enemy; moreover the Ath'enianswere defended by their diplomatic status, for it was unlikely
that the Corinthians would take the initiative in attacking them. Being faced by superior
numbers the Corcyraeanscould either observe the same interval between ships as the enemy,
in which case their wings would be enveloped, or extend their line by thinning out the centre
and keeping the wings strong; the course of the battle suggests that they adopted the latter
alternative.25

24 It may be assumed that the Corinthians knew of the

land base at Leukimme either from information or by
observation from Cheimerion (cf. Plate IIa and b).
25 In the map I have put the Corinthian line at three
miles in length. The nature of the battle indicates that
both sides formed a single line for boarding tactics (the
Athenians alone acting as a mobile reserve); for I50 ships

JHS.-VOL.

a line of three miles allows forty yards per ship. Taking

the dimensions of the trireme at IIo feet long and fifty feet
wide from oar-tip to oar-tip, the interval of clear water
between ship and ship sailing ahead would be twenty-four
yards and between ship and ship turning broadside for
boarding would be four yards. As boarding tactics only
were employed in this battle, this seems to be a reasonable

LXV.

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34

N. G. L. HAMMOND

The Corcyraean victory over the enemy right wing occurred early in the battle, for
Thucydides comments on the absence of the pursuing squadron when the main Corcyraean
force was being hard pressed. As the direct course from their left wing to Cheimerion was
according to my reconstructioneight miles, we must allow some one and a half hours for these
ships to reach the camp at Cheimerion. The time being shortly afterdawn, they were probably
not visible to the main Corinthian fleet when they were halfway to Cheimerion, sailing into the
rising sun with a high and shadowed coast as a background. Meanwhile the Corinthians on
the left half of the line 26 were defeating their opponents; the outlying Athenian squadron
manoeuvred freely to help the Corcyraeanright, and finally went into action to cover the rout
of their allies, who would naturally make for the land base at Leukimme. The extent of the
Corcyraeandefeat appears later in the narrative (I. 54, 2) ; of the ninety ships remaining when
the squadron was pursuing to Cheimerion, some seventy were put out of action, so that of the
Corcyraean centre and right wing only some twenty ships reached Leukimme, escorted by the
intact Athenian squadron of ten."2

' After the rout the Corinthians did not take in tow the hulls of the
ships they had sunk,28
but turned to the men whom as they sailed among the wrecks they slew rather than took
prisoner, even in ignorance killing their own friends, for they had not perceived the defeat of
those on the right wing. As there were many vessels on both sides and they extended over a
large area of sea, once they were engaged with one another it was difficult to distinguish who
were vanquishing or being vanquished; for in number of ships this was the greatest battle to
date between Greek and Greek. When the Corinthians had pursued the Corcyraeans to the
land, they turned to the wrecks and their own dead, and recoveringmost of them conveyed them
to Sybota whither the land force of the barbarianshad come up to aid them; Sybota is an
uninhabited harbour of Thesprotis. Thereafter they mustered anew and sailed against the
Corcyraeans. They, together with the Athenian squadron, sailed out against them with the
ships that were fit for action and as many as were left to them, for they feared an attempt to
land on their territory. It was already late and the Paean had been sung for sailing in to close
quarters, when the Corinthianssuddenly began to back water having escried twenty Athenian
ships sailing towards them; these ships had been sent out subsequently by the Athenians to
reinforce the squadron of ten, for they feared-as did happen-that the Corcyraeansmight be
defeated and their ten ships prove too few to protect them. The Corinthiansthen, seeing these
estimate; even so two ships turning broadside simul- twenty (51, I), and the considerations which dissuaded the
taneously would require skilful handling, for it was import- Corinthians from accepting battle on the next day (52,
ant to save one's own oars and timbers and to damage the This establishes a presumption that Thucydides did give2).a
enemy's. During the Peloponnesian War the tactics of high figure for the Corcyraean losses, and, if we accept his
breaking the line and ramming required a closer order in figure thirty for the Corinthian losses, seventy for the
the line for defence; thus one cannot apply to Sybota Corcyraean losses need not be suspected; as the Corinthians
deductions drawn, for instance, from the battle of Arginusae. killed survivors in the water (50,
I), the 1050 prisoners taken
On the Corcyraean side the Athenian squadron might by them (55,
I) lend some support to the figure seventy.
more
sea
order
in
to
its
freedom
of
room,
occupy
If we allow that the figure seventy was written by Thucykeep
manoeuvre; even so the Corcyraean ships would be spaced dides and is not a MS error, is there any probability that he
more widely than the Corinthian, probably between forty- was correct ? He qualifies the numbers of losses with
-rEpi
five and fifty yards per vessel on the average. Thucydides
and patwora,but the general trustworthiness of his account
I. 50, 2, 7TONN65vy&p VE6yV
rFs
rri
that
these
numbers
o0aCSv&po-rEpcov
Kal
should be respected. In the
suggests
7rroXO'
rlS TEXOUa&Sv,suggests that the line was unusually
Peloponnesian War losses in naval engagements were not so
ea?,Xaas
long. Cf. Rodgers Greekand RomanNaval Warfare(I937)
in
to
the
of
size the fleet as those of Corcyra
high
proportion
47 and 187 (Arginusae), and Koster, Antike Seewesen(1923) at Sybota; but in the naval victory over Aegina c. 458 B.c.
the Aeginetan losses were seventy ships (I. io5, 2) whereas
137 f.
26 I. 49, 6 I
oaEroiiaav ol Kopivetot,hTriTC EOC.)covvpP,their fleet was probably smaller than that of Corcyra (I. 50,
,8 Corinthians presumably held with their 2. Thuc. notes Sybota was the greatest battle to date between
rrohO
~iKCov; the
ninety ships the left centre as well as the left wing. At Greek and Greek). It seems likely that the archaic tactics
48, 4 the order of battle is given from right to left by employed at Sybota caused higher loss in ships than the
national squadrons and I take it that the twenty-one ships manoeuvring and ramming of the
Peloponnesian War; all
of Elis Leucas and Anactorion occupied the right centre or ships engaged, the fighting was bitter,
and after charging
part of it.
another
was
difficult (49, 3). Thus
one
disengagement
27 Gomme, op cit. 194, and others have doubted the
withdrawal was less easy than it later became.
28 &S KTaOrabaElav, Sunk in the sense of waterlogged;
accuracy of the figure seventy. Thucydides' narrative
suggests that the Corcyraean losses were very high; he when a ship was carried by boarding, it was presumably
mentions the great superiority of the Corinthians (49, 6) the holed to put it out of action. The towing in of
waterlogged
Corcyraeans' effort to muster ships in offering battle in the hulls must have been a slow process, which helps to explain
evening (50o, 4), the withdrawal of the Corinthians who the interval between the dawn engagement and the action
feared the second Athenian squadron numbered more than which broke off in the
evening.

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NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH CHANNEL

OF CORCYRA 35

ships first and suspecting them to be from Athens but in larger numbers than they saw, began
to withdraw. They were not seen by the Corcyraeans, for in their case they were sailing up
from an unseen quarter, and the Corcyraeanswere surprisedat the Corinthiansbacking water,
until some saw and cried that there were ships there sailing up. Then they also began to withdraw; for it was already getting dark, and the Corinthians turning away broke off the action.
So they parted from one another, and the battle ended at nightfall. The Corcyraeanswere in
camp at Leukimme when these twenty ships from Athens, commanded by Glaukon son of
Leagros and Andokides son of Leogoras, bore down through the corpses and wreckage and
sailed up to the camp not long after they were sighted. The Corcyraeans, for it was night,
feared they were enemy vessels, and then knew them; and they came to anchor' (I.
50-51).
In killing the men in the water Corinth and her allies were revenging the execution
of
prisonersby the Corcyraeansin 435 B.c. Thucydides accounts for the failure of the Corinthians
to perceive their defeat on the right wing, but he tells us nothing more of the twenty victorious
Corcyraeanships. As the Corcyraeanswere prepared to fight again in the evening, these ships
must have regained the base at Leukimme. So long as they hugged the coast, they could move
up the Channel without being observed from the scene of the main action; it therefore seems
likely that, while the Corinthians killed the survivors, pursued the Corcyraeans to land and
were collecting their dead and the wrecks, the twenty ships passed north of Sybota on the east
side of the Channel and then raced across to Leukimme. For the pursuit to Cheimerion, the
pillaging of the camp and the voyage to the latitude of the Sybota isles, we may allow some
three hours 29; during that time the Corinthianscould well have been engaged on their operations in the westward part of the Channel. The barbarian land force was not at Cheimerion
an hour or two after dawn, when the Corcyraeans pillaged the empty camp; it must have
been already on the way to mainland Sybota (Port Mourzo), and the synchronisation of its
departure with that of the fleet must have been part of the Corinthian plan of action. The
pursuit by the Corinthiansof the Corcyraeans' to the land ' was clearly to Corcyraeanterritory,
and in this case to the coast near Leukimme where the land force of the Corcyraeans could
cover them from further attack. When assembled at mainland Sybota, the Corinthian fleet
had lost thirty ships; of the 120 left a number would be in need of repair, which was impossible
in a deserted place (52, 2), and the losses in oars and crews could probably not be replaced (if
the Corinthians had brought a supply of oars, they would have been fired at Cheimerion by
the Corcyraeans). It seems improbable that when they offered battle in the evening they
mustered as many as 120 ships. The Corcyraeansprobably had spare oars and timber at their
Leukimme base and could also fill gaps in their crews from the land force; the forty ships which
had survived the battle were probably thus an effective force. The phrase 6aorliaav ?otrrai
(50, 4), if not pleonastic, must refer to ships reserved at Leukimme 30; as the official strength
of the Corcyraean fleet was MIo and of these I 10 were engaged in the morning, the reserved
ships may have numbered ten vessels too old and slow for manoeuvre. Even if we put the
Corcyraean total including the Athenian squadron at sixty ships and the Corinthian total at
less than I20 ships, the Corinthians still far outnumbered the Corcyraeans; therefore the
Corcyraeanswould not venture far from the cover of the land force. The probable position of
the fleets for action 2 is shown on the map. In this position the Corinthians would see the
second Athenian squadron rounding Cape Bianco, before it was visible to the Corcyraeans.
The course of this squadron is sketched on my map; knowing of the presence of the Corinthian
fleet in these waters the squadron would sail west ofPaxos to escape observation and enter the
29 Allowing one and a half hours for the pursuit (8 miles),
a half hour for pillaging the camp which would be on the
beach, and one hour to reach the Sybota group (6 miles);
for speeds cf. K6ster, Klio Beiheft 32 (I934) 87, who
estimates that the Corinthian fleet in the second action
against Phormio covered three to four miles in half-an-hour.
30 Thucydides uses TrXcbOios
in a specialised sense at 29,
3, 3iEOavr m T&
Evat, where
"aTrErrXcofipouv
is ' fitT"rasai&&
for manoeuvre in action '; here ' the
the meaning -"rE
ships remaining' appear to be those not fit for action

by normal standards, but used now in emergency. At 52,

I when the Athenian second squadron had arrived the
Corcyraeans only employed the ships that were fit for action
6oatl

TrWcbt'oticav.

Jowett

translates

65zr
atieav

hoitraf

' any others which they had in their docks '; as the docks
would be at Corcyra town, it is doubtful if there was time
to bring ships thence to Leukimme (fifteen miles); it seems
more likely that ships not up to battle standard in formation
at open sea were posted at Leukimme as a possible reserve.

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36

N.

G. L. HAMMOND

Channel before dusk, keeping to the west side but clearing the snags of the Bianco Shoal, in
the hope of slipping through from there to Leukimme. When south of the eastern headland
of Cape Bianco they were five miles distant from the Corinthian left wing; if not under sail,
they would be sighted at about the extreme range of visibility, the conditions being good with a
setting sun on their beam and a calm sea (54, I : a wind rose during the night)a31 The Athenian
ships sailing on a north to north-east course would not enter the Corcyraeanfield of vision for a
matter of perhaps ten minutes; this would be sufficient time to justify Thucydides' distinction
in time between 6p4 (50, 5) and (UVEoK6TrTCE
(51, 2), for in Greece the shadows fall fast after
sundown. The passage of the squadron through the wreckage supports my suggested location
of the morning engagement; there was probably wreckage also further up the Channel
on the line of the Corcyraean rout, and the current, as I shall show later, would drift the
wreckage northwards up the Channel. The squadron would take an hour or so to row from
the entry of the Channel, where they were sighted, to Leukimme; by then it was night and the
Corcyraeanshad beached their ships and were in camp.
' On the next day the thirty Athenian
ships and such of the Corcyraean ships as were fit
for action sailed towards the harbour at Sybota, where the Corinthianslay, to see if they would
fight. The Corinthianslaunched their ships and forming line out at sea lay quiet, not intending
to initiate a battle willingly, for they saw not only that ships had arrived from Athens fresh and
undamaged, but also that they themselves were faced by many embarrassments,the guarding
of the prisoners whom they had on board and the lack of means to refit the fleet in a desert
place; their concern was rather with providing for their voyage homewards, for they were
afraid that the Athenians might consider the hostilitiesa breach of the treaty and not allow them
to sail away' (I. 52). After hearing Corinthian envoys the Athenians agreed to the Corinthians
sailing in any direction save that of their ally Corcyra (I. 53). ' On receiving this reply the
Corinthians prepared for the voyage home and set up a trophy at mainland Sybota; the
Corcyraeanstook up the wrecks and dead, carried out to them by the current and wind, which
arising in the night had scattered them widely, and set up a trophy at Sybota on the island as
victors. The grounds on which each side claimed the victory were these: the Corinthianshad
prevailed in battle till nightfall, being able to secure most of the wrecks and dead, and held
more than Iooo prisoners and had sunk some seventy ships, and so set up a trophy; the Corcyraeans had destroyed some thirty ships, and after the arrival of the Athenians had taken up
the wrecks and dead in their area, whereas the Corinthianson the day before had backed water
and withdrawn on seeing the Athenian ships and after their arrival had not sailed out of
Sybota to engage them, and accordingly they set up a trophy' (I.
54).
The unwillingness of the Corinthians to engage the enemy fleet
of some seventy sail 32
that
their
effective
force
well
below
120
The
implies
was
ships.
presence of the prisoners on
board, when the land force could have guarded them, indicates that the Corinthiansintended
to fight their way through if necessary and sail for home. The probable position of the fleets
is shown on the map, action 3, the Corinthians not advancing far from their land force. Of
the current in the Corfu Channel the Mediterranean
Pilot writes ' the general direction of the
current is northerly, but there is ordinarily a surface current depending on the force and
direction of the wind; in strong winds it attains a rate of one and a half to twioknots.' The
wind which arose in the night was likely at this season to be southerly.33 Thus the drifting of
31 K6ster, Antike Seewesen 138, n. 3, holds that at a
distance of five miles low-lying land can be escried by a
look-out with his eye five metres above sea level. This
applies to the present case; a hull on an open horizon is
as easy to pick up as low-lying land, and since K6ster
estimates the storm deck of a trireme at 2-20 m. high the
Aphlaston (stern poop) is seen from reliefs to be at least 5
m. above sea level (cf. illustration at p. 141).
32 Cf. n. 30 above.
Assuming that the forty ships which
survived the main action were fit for action, these with the
Athenian
thirty
ships make up a total of seventy.

Pilot III. 132 (current) and 509 weather

33 Mediterranean
at Corfu:
Calm N. N.E. N.W. W. E. S.E. S. S.W.
8
August
35 10
14 Io 5
7 6
5
12
8
September

32

Io

Io

Io

Io

The N.W. wind may be excluded from the reckoning for the
South Channel, which is sheltered in that quarter by the
island of Corfu; the incidence of southerly to northerly
winds is I8 to I8 in August and 30 to 12 in September. As
the battle occurred at the turn of the month, the predominant wind then was southerly in the South Channel.

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NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH CHANNEL

OF CORCYRA 37

the wreckage some three or four miles northwardsup the Channel from the scene of action I to
waters covered by the Corcyraeansin action 3 is in accord with the local conditions.
The reconstruction which I have attempted is based on the topographical conclusions
drawn in Part I of this paper. If it accounts satisfactorilyfor such factors as the unobserved
pursuit and return of the victorious Corcyraeansquadron in action i, the sighting of the second
Athenian squadron by the Corinthians first and by the Corcyraeans later, the passage of this
squadron through the wreckage, and the drifting of the wreckage to waters covered by the
Corcyraeans in action 3, then it serves to support my topographical identifications and to
clarify Thucydides' narrative. The only serious omission by Thucydides concerns the return
of the Corcyraean squadron from the camp at Cheimerion; if his sources were only Athenian
and Corinthian, he may not have known the course it took, but we should expect him to have
stated whether or not it rejoined the fleet before action 2. In order to make my paper less
difficult to read, I have not included in the text the views of Beloch and Gomme 34; I intend
thereby no discourtesy to the latter, to whose commentary I owe much.

N. G. L.

34 Beloch, Griech, Gesch. (1916) II. 2 222 f. rejects the

figures of Thucydides for the fleets and their losses; his
view has been well refuted by Gomme, op. cit. 191 f.
Beloch also considers Thucydides' narrative to be a conflation of two accounts from different sources; in one of these
Cheimerion was the base from which the first action was
delivered, and in the other mainland Sybota was the base.
In his argument Beloch misrepresents Thucydides as stating
that huts were erected and stores shipped to mainland
Sybota. Beloch is here carried away by his quest for
doublets, and we need not follow him.
Gomme takes Agios Ioannes as Cheimerion harbour and
camp, Cape Varlam or Trophale as Cheimerion cape, and
Arilla Bay as mainland Sybota (18o f. and I86); finding
it difficult to fit into this picture the pursuit and return of
the victorious Corcyraean squadron, he argues that the
pursuit was in fact to mainland Sybota and not Cheimerion,
and concludes 'this is the principal error of Thucydides '
(195). He considers Agios Ioannes ' excellently placed
for a fleet that was to hinder the Kerkyraians operating
further south' in 434 B.c. (I8i); in my opinion it is
unsuitable either for observation or for forays by a small
squadron capable of relatively small speeds. He finds the
Corcyraean camp at Sybota islands improbable (194 and
182), as the landing place is small and the islets too rocky to
provide sleeping-quarters; but on a campaign comfort and
convenience are not primary considerations. 'There
seems to be no reason why the Kerkyraians should have
chosen them (the Sybota islands) as an advanced base
instead of waiting for the Corinthians to attack them off

HAMMOND.

Leukimme. The farther they could make the Corinthians

row before battle, the better for them; and if the enemy
passed Sybota, sailing along the coast to threaten the town
of Kerkyra, they could easily keep pace with them along the
eastern shores of the island' (182). My view on the
strategy of the Corcyraeans is given above; the Corcyraean
land force could not keep pace on land with a fleet sailing
direct to Corcyra town. In differing with Pearson
(I79)
Gonime does not take Strabo into account, although he
refers to Strabo subsequently, and so concludes that
Thucydides 'did not fully understand' his informant,
'perhaps a Corinthian.' The camp of the Corcyraean
land force is put by Gomme west of Cape Lefkimo (183
and 187); I can see no advantage in putting it west rather
than south of the actual point, and it raises difficulties for
Thucydides' description of the camps as ' opposite ' in 434
B.c. and for the sighting of the second Athenian squadron
in action 2. At 50, 1-3 Gomme detects 'a detail which
came to Thucydides' notice after he had written his main
account of the battle, and so from another source,' and
questions whether s a-rv yfiv refers to Sybota or Corcyra
near Leukimme (I85). I have given my reason in the
text for the Corinthian order of actions and attribute it
to one and the same source, presumably Corinthian; in
its immediate context I consider ir -riv yiv can only mean
Corcyraean territory, that is Leukimme.
I also express my gratitude to the Oxford Philological
Society and to Professor Gomme who have given me the
benefit of their criticism.

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-P~
)

,2
,(Leul<
camp+.

SOUTHCH
CORFU& SOUTH

S,
a'

CLePhimo

--

Hieronisi

on Admira

3Based

o
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GSt Theodoro

CORFU

Sea Mi

oa

inFath
Depths
in metres

(C0 RCYRA)+.//oIas
.-

SMainand

+172

L KouTSI -

PORTMOURZO
e

,n
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,\-0

Sybota

tSybo
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yb.L.

(b

Isles

Heights
Corcyraean Fleet

Sunken rock

'-*

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.ARPITSA

4,,Katsonisi
Sn-4344

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Ay

4ly

Arilla

IiS

b3

Bay

131

Stavrolimeno
PORT CHEIMERION4,3 Camp

St

aa

oa/MAR

225VEMOKASTRO
~I

4499

,C.

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Varamrn

(Cheimerion)

C.Trophale

cn

9OAGIOS

PAXOS
Madonna
GAYO

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PARGA(Toryn

PLATE 11

a.

b.

CAPE

LEUKIMME FROM VEMOKASTRO.

SYBOTA AND CORCYRA FROM VEMOKASTRO.

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PLATE III

a.

LOOKING NORTH-WEST

FROM THE ACHERON

b.

PLAIN TOWARDS CAPE

CHEIMERION.

VEMOKASTRO BAY AND PAXOI.

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