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Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal

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Advice to Psychoanalysts: Cognitive Psychology Is

Good for You: Commentary by Andr Green (Paris)
a

Andr Green
a

9 avenue de lObservatoire, Paris 75006, France, e-mail:

Published online: 09 Jan 2014.

To cite this article: Andr Green (2001) Advice to Psychoanalysts: Cognitive Psychology Is Good for You: Commentary
by Andr Green (Paris), Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal for Psychoanalysis and the Neurosciences, 3:1,
16-19, DOI: 10.1080/15294145.2001.10773328
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16
Schweiger, A., & Brown, J. W. (1989), Minds, models and
modules. Aphasiology, 2:531-543.
Whitehead, A. N. (1929-1978), Process and Reality, rev.
ed., ed. D. Griffin & D. Sherburne. New York: Free
Press.

Andre Green
Jason Brown
66 East 79th Street
New York, NY 10021
e-mail: drjbrown@hotmail.com

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Advice to Psychoanalysts: "Cognitive Psychology Is Good for You":

Commentary by Andre Green (Paris)

Carlo Semenza, in his paper "Psychoanalysis and

Cognitive Neuropsychology," quotes my work several times. Probably his European situation enables
him to be informed of my wor k, which I suppose is
more accessible to an Italian than to a scientist who
lives in North America and speaks only North American English. North American English, the presumed
language for scientific communication, is assumed to
be familiar to non-English-speaking writers. Semenza's attempt to communicate with psychoanalysts-moreover, European psychoanalysts-is to be
commended for its willingness to establish a dialogue.
But, if we read carefully, we notice a difference between the tone of the article and the tone of the conclusion. The latter bears witness to a prescriptive attitude.
Semenza decides what is good and what is bad for
psychoanalysis. This attitude is becoming common
among scientists who wish to reform psychoanalysis.
They have decided what psychoanalysis should look
like. What would one say of psychoanalysts advising
neurologists? Needless to say, Semenza presents his
conception of psychoanalysis. "Psychoanalysis does
not need unconstrained theorizing" (p. 9), he writes.
Semenza proposes himself as a proper "constrainer"
for us. Leaving neurology aside, he adds: "[Freud]
may have unwittingly set the scene for a kind of perversion" (p. 9). Are most psychoanalysts unwitting
perverts? Are Winnicott, Bion, Loewald, and Searles,
among many others, supposed to be "wild speculators"? On the contrary, their writings are based on
Andre Green, M.D., is a training and supervising analyst at the Paris
Psychoanalytic Society.
Though the author's bibliography mentions two works of mine, one
published in Neuro-Psychoanalysis (1999), the other in Psyche (1997), an
Italian journal, I have also dealt extensively with some of the problems
mentioned in this paper in two related books: L'avvenire della psicoanalisi
e la causalita psichica (1995), and La causalite psychique (1995), both of
which are neglected by Semenza.

their clinical experience. Only Peter Fonagy deserves

to be accepted in Semenza's personal academy. Semenza is in favor of psychoanalysis's engagement in
poetry. So far as Winnicott and Bion are concerned,
I know that they thought nothing was above poetry for
expressing a knowledge of the human soul. Semenza
stands on the side of a theory of the mind. But for him
the only meaning of "mind" is that of the so-called
philosophers of mind. Many are probably excluded
from his definition, such as the pre-Socratic thinkers,
Plato, Spinoza, and Kier kegaard, to mention a few of
them. At least, I assume so, from what Semenza
writes.
Unfortunately, Semenza's position on Freud is
similar to that of many other scientists. In summary,
it is as if he says: "What a genius Freud was, most
progressive at the time when he dared writing his book
On Aphasia (1891) and also, his 'Project for a Scientific Psychology' (1895), which, miraculously, was
saved, against his will, from fatal oblivion. What a
pity that such a brilliant scientific mind turned its back
on science and invented that most uncertain discipline
named psychoanalysis!" I shall not weep with Semenza because I think that, even if Freud's work in
the field of neuropsychology can be considered brilliant, his genius was even more important in the invention of psychoanalysis. Freud's correspondence with
Fliess deserves clarification. When he decided to contact Fliess in order to work with him, Freud thought
that such an association could be useful. He thought
of dividing the task to be accomplished: He would
take care of the psychological aspects of the mind,
expecting that Fliess would provide the neurobiological counterpart. He then became aware of Fliess' s misunderstanding of his own hypotheses, and had to write
a paper of his own to explain to Fliess what he expected from him. And that was the reason for the

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Psychoanalysis and Cognitive Neuropsychology

"Project." The "Project" was written hastily and
carelessly (part of it on a train). And although I find in
it many thought-provoking ideas, there is no possible
comparison between the richness of the "Project" of
1895 and the breakthrough of The Interpretation of
Dreams (1900). The "Project" was considered by
Freud to be irrelevant and wrong and he strongly opposed its publication (Freud, 1895, p. 176). The book
on dreams was, in fact, the right way to think through
psychic problems, in his view.
Undoubtedly, scientific knowledge of the brain
was very limited in Freud's time, compared with what
we now know. But we can repeat the question Freud
already asked in his Outline of Psycho-Analysis
(1940): What do we know about the gulf between
brain studies and consciousness?! I believe that Semenza thinks we know a lot. For him, bridging the
gap between psychoanalysis and neuropsychology can
benefit both, "undoubtedly." So, both have a "common aim." I was nevertheless surprised to read the
following: "We may be satisfied with the fact that
most of the new neuropsychological theoretical and
methodological apparatus of cognitive neuroscience
can be easily and profitably incorporated into theoretical psychoanalysis without any cost" (p. 3). Moreover, Semenza thinks that psychoanalysis has nothing
to lose and much to gain from such exchange. I must
confess that to me such a statement is highly questionable.
In following the author's development, I read his
intention to: "Derive laws of behavior from observation." Here's the rub. Behavior, whether one is a behaviorist or not, is the main reference for
neuropsychologists and neurophysiologists. This is a
crucial point that is frequently overlooked in the debates. Psychoanalysts are not interested in behavior,
but in a combined intrapsychic and intersubjective relationship. Strictly speaking, behavior is what can be
observed from the outside, as with animals. Neither
intrapsychic nor intersubjective relationships can be
said to be known by external observation.
It is a very fashionable idea that there is nothing
to learn about mental functions from the field of pathology, only laboratory experiments and observation
being of some use. This point of view, which tends to
dissociate pathology and normality, comes mostly
from those who have no experience with the clinical
teachings of pathology. Invariably they have confined
themselves to their laboratories, where they conduct
ISemenza confesses: "To be fully honest, we do not even know the
register on which to match psychology and neurology" (p. 4). Never mind!

17
experiments in "ideal" conditions, far removed from
the natural conditions of existence. If we turn to the
animal world, there is a great difference between experimentation and ethology. It will not be surprising
if psychoanalysts think they have a lot to learn from
ethology, even more than from experiments. But let
us agree with Semenza that "in all cases, the ultimate
filter is the observer's theory, which may be more or
less correct." Semenza is convinced that we now possess the sort of psychology that may' 'ultimately mediate between psychoanalysis and neuroscience (i.e.,
cognitive science.") He even says that Freud was very
close to cognitive science and found many affinities
between the two disciplines. Obviously Semenza's
reading of Freud and my own are not identical.
Let us now examine Semenza's basic notions
about cognitivism:
1. We could be in agreement on the usefulness of
the concept of representation, except that words do
not necessarily have the same meaning for the two of
us. Semenza thinks of mental representation, as many
scientists do (referring to the model of Turing's machine), as different from Freud's concept, which distinguishes between psychical representatives of the
drives; object representations (things and words); and
representations of reality in the mind (ideas and judgments). What Semenza is seeking is "an analysis of
behavior at the neurological leveL"
I am surprised to see that Semenza considers the
computer metaphor useful when so many today consider that the mind has nothing to do with the computer
model. In such a view, meaning consists of the assignment of symbols in such a language as to correspond
exactly with entities or categories in the world defined
by singly necessary and jointly sufficient criteria (classical categories). Thus, a specification for the rules by
which representations are manipulated (constituting a
syntax), if complete, can be carried out by a computational device. The brain in this view is a kind of computer.
Acceptance of this view, or versions of it, is
widespread in psychology, linguistics, computer science, and artificial intelligence. It is one of the most
remarkable misunderstandings in the history of science. Indeed, not only is it in discordance with the
known facts of human biology and brain science, but
it constitutes a major category error as well (Edelman,
1992, p. 228). It is interesting to note that I may find
myself more in agreement with an immunologist
(Edelman) than with a neurologist. But obviously, Semenza is in disagreement with Edelman's opinion,
finding that cognitive psychology is not adequately

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18
represented by him. Though Edelman questions the
intellectual fairness of cognitivists, I do believe in
brain studies, when they are well conducted with appropriate principles. But I cannot take seriously any
scientific approach that would deny the evolutionary
aspects of the brain and their relationship to psychical
activity. A computer is a homogenized inert system;
the brain is composed of systems that appeared during
the evolutionary processes. Because parts of it are heterogeneous and must work in coordination, conflicts
arise. No computer can be compared to a living brain.
We now find ourselves in a very common situation:
"Your word against mine," having to choose between
two theories presented by scientists of high status. Is
the Nobel Prize jury making gross mistakes? I am not
seeking Edelman's authority, I just find his ideas more
convincing, having been trained in neuropsychiatry.
2. The next point concerns the temporary deemphasis of affect, context, culture, and history. What
would Semenza say if I asked him to accept a deemphasis of consciousness, unconscious memory, reason,
imagination, passion, and so on in a new conception
of mind? He would surely say that I was depriving
man of what is most essential in him. This is exactly
what he is doing for the sake of information theory.
Information about what? About what he thinks essential "in order to keep the field of investigation clear"?
Here, we find again the illusion of the purity of laboratory researchers. Life, by contrast, seems too often full
of dirty things for Semenza. What about the work of
the scientists on affect, deploring the ignorance of this
topic by other brain researchers! Should we continue
to ignore the findings of Damasio, LeDoux, Panksepp,
Vincent, and many others? I am not interested in
cleaning the field of mental investigation, but I am
instead concerned with giving a faithful picture of patients' minds, however dirty they might be. And what
is more dirty than sexuality? So, we can understand
that Semenza has a nostalgia for Freud's concern with
aphasia or scientific psychology, keeping sexuality out
of the mind. But for Semenza, I am afraid, sexuality
is probably old-fashioned and irrelevant to present
knowledge: Motivation, intentionality, and cognitive
science should be sufficient to provide a clear idea of
what we have inside our skulls.
Dupuy (1994) writes about the history of difficult
relationships, in the early cognitive sciences, between
the representatives of science and the representatives
of psychoanalysis (Lawrence Kubie, at that time). Kubie was regularly mocked and ridiculed. But Semenza
would say that such things belong to the past. Nevertheless, Semenza in some instances admits to the inad-

Andre Green
equacy with which cognItIve scientists have
confronted psychoanalytic theory. In fact, this is not
by chance. A training in scientific methods is, by definition, opposed to the type of training required for the
psychoanalytic understanding of patients' communication.
If a dialogue can be successfully established in
an interdisciplinary approach, which includes psychoanalysis, it needs a serious revision of the principles
at work in science. Today, hypercomplexity (Morin,
1990) seems to be an adequate theory, but it is
largely ignored.
In fact, as I have shown in Clinical and Observational Psychoanalytic Research: Roots of a Controversy (Green and Stern, 2000, pp. 41-77),
psychoanalysts are divided into families of thought.
Psychoanalysis covers such a vast field, and so many
interpretations of its object are given, that one has to
choose one's kinship (brothers, cousins, relatives) in
the vast tribe of modern psychoanalysts. In spite of
many disagreements, I am closer to my Kleinian colleagues than to those who pretend to make psychoanalysis "scientific." So, for Semenza, Fonagy's
work seems quite compatible with his thinking. I am
not surprised by this choice; because I, on the other
hand, disagree with Fonagy' s way of thinking! His
understanding of psychoanalysis and mine are at the
two extremes of the epistemological field.
I am surprised to read, at the end of Semenza's
paper, that he uses the practice of skiing as an example
of the functioning of the mind. I confess that I would
have expected a less motor-oriented and more mentaloriented example. I will not compare the merits of the
Austrian and French schools and their instructors. But
on the other hand, I will compare the French school
of psychoanalysis to some others that are more ready
to compromise with nonanalytic scientists in order to
gain some kind of respectability. I remain open to a
discussion about what is specific to psychoanalysis
and the way in which science of any kind may contribute to its understanding. I greatly appreciate the work
of Edelman, Atlan, Varela, Vincent, and others, with
whom I share some basic assumptions. I have even
had fruitful exchanges with Rene Thorn. I am afraid
that Semenza's references, in psychoanalysis as well
as in science, are different from mine. What I need to
know is what Semenza's clinical experience of psychoanalysis is. I must confess that, in my practice as
a psychoanalyst and in my understanding of my patients' communications, the distinction between declarative and procedural memory is completely
useless. Dreams mix up very recent memories and

19

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Psychoanalysis and Cognitive Neuropsychology

very remote ones, and this has to be discovered
through the analysis of free association.
I wish I could agree with Semenza on the engagement between psychoanalysis and neuropsychology,
blessed in a marriage to come. It is not a question of
"leaving neurology aside" but of trying to define the
specific space of psychical mechanisms. The relation
between neurology and psychical activity is not direct.
The only suggestion I have for expanding the debate
between psychoanalysis and neuropsychology is the
creation of discussion groups wherein psychoanalysts
report a series of sessions and ask scientists for their
interpretation. Imagination is needed to fill the gaps.
Semenza complains about wild speculations, but he
does not seem to realize that his wild reductionism,
even if he protests otherwise, is a gross misrepresentation of psychoanalysis. Imagination is also desirable
in the scientific literature about psychical activity. One
must admit that a Shakespearean quotation can be
more enlightening for a psychoanalyst than a ton of
scientific literature! Evidence for the value of the
imagination may be seen in the fact that scientific
findings are frequently outdated two years after they
are issued, whereas people continue writing on Hamlet
400 years after its creation. I am less interested in
keeping up scientific standards than grasping the complexities of psychical truth. Freudian psychoanalysis
has a double origin. One origin is rooted in science;
the other in art, mostly literature. Both aspects are
necessary to form the clinical approach. The exclu-

sively scientific attempt was wrong, and led Freud to

reject his own "Project for a Scientific Psychology"
and to write instead The Interpretation of Dreams. It
is impossible to go backwards.

References
Dupuy, J. P. (1994), Aux origines des sciences cognitives.
Paris: Editions La decouverte.
Edelman, G. M. (1992), Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the
Matter of Mind. New York: Basic Books.
Freud, S. (1891), On Aphasia. New York: International
Universities Press, 1953.
- - - (1895), Project for a scientific psychology. Standard Edition, 1:281-396. London: Hogarth Press, 1966.
- - - (1900), The Interpretation of Dreams. Standard
Edition, 4&5. London: Hogarth Press, 1953.
- - - (1940), An Outline of Psycho-Analysis. Standard
Edition, 23:139-207. London: Hogarth Press, 1964.
Green, A., & Stern, D. (2000), Clinical and Observational
Psychoanalytic Research: Roots of Controversy. London: Karnac Books.
Morin, E. (1990), Introduction a la pensee complexe. Paris:
ESF Editeur.
- - - (2000), Les sept savoirs necessaires a l'education
du Futur. Paris: Seuil.
Andre Green
9 avenue de l'Observatoire
Paris 75006
France
e-mail: andregreen@compuserve.com

Theoretical and Methodological Problems of Psychoanalysis and Cognitive Psychologies:

Commentary by Eduardo B. Issaharoff (Buenos Aires)

In order to foster a partnership between psychoanalysis and cognitivism, so that they may work together,
it is essential to ask ourselves what trend in cognitivism and what trend in psychoanalysis we should
choose to participate in this partnership. Both sciences
have various schools of thought, each of which advocates positions using terms that have very different
meanings for each group, and in turn, each group has
divergent ideas about the nature of the mind.
In the case of cognitivism, we shall consider two
positions related to computation in mental processes.
Eduardo Issaharoff, M.D., is a Training and Supervising Analyst of
the Argentine Psychoanalytic Society.

There are currently two main schools of psychoanalysis: One school conceives of the mind as a system of
meanings that must be understood by means of hermeneutic procedures; the other considers meaning as having biological structures supported by specific
functions. Only the laws of language and discourse
apply in the first case; in the second, the laws of the
biological sciences complete the explanation of the
functions of the mind.
Cognitivism was born from and grew through the
contribution of many techniques and theories. Neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, experimental psychology,
and computer science are the basic sciences, while
psychophysics, computer programs of operations on