595799

research-article2015

RAC0010.1177/0306396815595799Race & ClassShroufi

SAGE
Los Angeles,
London,
New Delhi,
Singapore,
Washington DC

The Gates of Jerusalem: European

revisionism and the populist
radical Right
Omran Shroufi

Abstract: In late 2010, the European Freedom Alliance, a group of four European
politicians from populist radical right parties: Heinz-Christian Strache, Chairman
of the Austrian Freedom Party (FP); Filip Dewinter, a senior leader in Belgiums
Vlaams Belang (VB); Ren Stadtkewitz, founder of Germanys Die Freiheit;
and Kent Ekeroth, the International Secretary for the Sweden Democrats (SD),
travelled to Israel and the West Bank. Their trip culminated in the signing of the
Jerusalem Declaration, a document conveying their staunch support for Israel
and its right to defend itself against Islamic aggression. The author analyses key
interviews and the Declaration to demonstrate how the event is indicative of a
reformed and realigned populist radical Right. Open anti-Semitism, he argues,
has been replaced by calls to prevent Islams supposed contamination of the
nations cultural heritage and new positions are being adopted on post-national
cooperation and European identity. Also, wider transformations in Western
European politics have resulted in the populist radical Right increasingly framing
the electorates insecurities as evidence of the cultural erosion of the nation state.
Through comparing the experiences of Israelis with those of non-Muslims living
in Europe, the Alliance argues for the need to toughen Europes defence against
a common enemy.

Omran Shroufi is an MA Political Science graduate from the Freie Universitt Berlin, where he
specialised in anti-racism, European identity and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Race & Class
Copyright 2015 Institute of Race Relations, Vol. 57(2): 2442
10.1177/0306396815595799 http://rac.sagepub.com

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Shroufi: The Gates of Jerusalem25

Keywords: anti-Semitism, European Freedom Alliance, European identity,
Filip Dewinter, Heinz-Christian Strache, integration, Islam, Israel, Jerusalem
Declaration, Palestine, populist radical Right

While under normal circumstances a group of European politicians travelling

to Israel and the West Bank would be rather unremarkable, the European
Freedom Alliance in 2010 was no ordinary delegation. It was made up of representatives from four European populist radical right parties:1 Heinz-Christian
Strache, Chairman of the Austrian Freedom Party (FP); Filip Dewinter, a
senior leader in Belgiums Vlaams Belang (VB); Ren Stadtkewitz, founder of
Germanys Die Freiheit; and Kent Ekeroth, the International Secretary for the
Sweden Democrats (SD). For most onlookers, it is nothing short of extraordinary to hear politicians on the populist radical Right, some of whom belong to
parties with well-documented anti-Semitic roots, align themselves with Israel.
Yet the trip follows a long list of declarations of support from like-minded politicians for a state that divides public opinion like no other. Ever since Gianfranco
Fini, leader of the Italian post-fascists and deputy prime minister, visited Israel
in 2003 to mark his solidarity with the country as part of a wider process of
modernisation and reorientation,2 politicians on the realigned Right have been
falling over one another to lavish praise on Israel as a beacon of light3 and an
outpost of democracy.4 Indeed, as Fekete points out, for those incessantly
obsessed with the threat of Islamofacism, defending Israel is now virtually of
doctrinaire importance.5 But ignoring the less-than-subtle revisionism contained in such sentiments, this newfound love of Israel offers a revealing insight
into a reformed and realigned populist radical right and the changing nature of
conflict in Western European politics.
The European Freedom Alliance
The European Freedom Alliance,6 the banner under which the delegation travelled to Israel and the West Bank and the name of the Swiss-based thinktank that
helped organise the trip, represents a converging of like-minded populist radical
right parties with increasingly anti-Muslim positions.7 Following the 2005 departure of the partys charismatic leader Jrg Haider, the FP, under HeinzChristian Straches leadership, has moved away from traditional FP topics
such as revisionism and anti-Semitism and has begun to place a larger emphasis
on Islam-related issues.8 This mirrors developments within Vlaams Belang, the
party that succeeded the disbanded Vlaams Blok, which was convicted of breaching the Belgian law against racism in 2004. VB has softened its xenophobic stance
and demands for forced repatriation, instead calling for the repatriation of those
who reject, deny or combat our culture and certain European values;9 a coded
form of anti-Muslim prejudice reflecting the partys focus towards Muslims and

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26 Race & Class 57(2)

Muslim immigrants. Ren Stadtkewitz, a former member of the Berlin state parliament for the Christian Democratic Party, founded Die Freiheit10 in October
2010 after his former party distanced itself from his outspoken criticism of Islam
and support for Geert Wilders. During the partys foundation, Stadtkewitz
stressed the need to stop Blaming Sarrazin for supposedly highlighting the
problem of Muslim immigration.11 And while the SDs historical lineage lies in
racism and neo-Nazism, the party has similarly attempted to transform itself
since then.12 The party no longer adheres to classic biological racism and instead
argues that a safe and harmonious society depends on a high degree of ethnic
and cultural likeness among the population.13 This new cultural racism fits well
to the partys anti-Muslim rhetoric and Jimmie kesson, the partys current
leader, wrote in 2009, I see this [Islam and Muslims in Sweden] as our biggest
foreign threat since World War II, and I promise to do everything in my power
to reverse the trend.14
Trip to Israel and the West Bank
During the trip the politicians were received in the Israeli Knesset, where they
met with Israeli parliamentarians, including Member of Knesset (MK) Rabbi
Nissim Zeev from the Shas Party, ex-Deputy Minister MK Ayoob Kara from the
Likud Party and also Eliezer Cohen, the ex-MK and ex-Air Force Officer who
initiated the visit.15 While in Israel itself, the delegation visited Yad Vashem,
Jerusalems much-revered Holocaust Memorial, the city of Ashkelon, which lies
on the northern border of the Gaza Strip, and the city of Sderot and its Qassam
Museum, which displays the Qassam rockets that have been fired at Israel from
the Gaza Strip. Guided through the West Bank by Gershon Mesika, previously
head of the Shomron Regional Settlement Council, the Alliance visited the Israeli
settlement Ariel and, according to one report, drove through Palestinian villages
in a bulletproof bus to meet Jewish settlers in the desolate West Bank outpost of
Har Bracha.16 To conclude their trip, the four politicians published the Jerusalem
Declaration, a statement of the groups absolute recognition of Israels right to
self-defence in the face of Islamic terrorism. Whilst on their trip, the politicians
also gave extended interviews17 to the Islam-critical and self-declared pro-Israeli18
German online platform Politically Incorrect. Needless to say, the trip was not
without its controversies.19
Analysis of the trip
A close analysis20 of the Politically Incorrect interviews with Strache, Dewinter,
Stadtkewitz and Ekeroth as well as the Jerusalem Declaration, reveals fascinating
insights into the delegations shared values and political objectives. What follows
is a summary of how the Alliance in both individuals interviews and the
Declaration itself describes and frames European identity, the threats facing
Europe, how to protect Europe, and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
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Shroufi: The Gates of Jerusalem27

On European identity
In his interview, Strache describes a Europe that is set apart by its Germanic,
Hellenistic culture,21 which has been born out of the enlightenment, [and] out of
a Judeo-Christian consciousness (Wertebewusstsein). Islam, however, seemingly
has little relation to Europes history and identity. Dewinter defines Islam as
essentially opposed to European values, commenting that I know that some
naive politicians think in Europe that they can organise a sort of enlightened
Islam, a European Islam. I will tell you, the only thing that will happen is not
that we will have a European Islam but that is that [sic] Europe will be Islamised.
Also incompatible with Europe, according to Strache, is the oppression of women
[and] the oppression of people of a different religion, practices that do not belong
in Europe, in an enlightened society. By implicitly attributing these non-European practices to Islam, Strache defines Europe as liberal (through its acceptance
of other religions and its non-oppression of women) and Islam, by default, as
illiberal.
The Jerusalem Declaration states, [t]he basis of our political activities is our
steadfast recognition of western civilisations set of values, which are based on
the spiritual heritage of the Greek-Roman antiquity, on Judeo-Christian cultural
values, on Humanism and on the enlightenment. Portraying European identity
in this manner couples the values celebrated by the four politicians with a strong
historical lineage, defining Europes identity through its past and accounting less
importance to the present. Strache adds a disclaimer to this portrayal of European
history, declaring that we have regrettably experienced various totalitarian aberrations in Europe, but weve left them behind us and that the Holocaust was a
tragedy, which is completely unimaginable for todays generation.
On threats facing Europe
Dewinter argues that the mere presence of Muslims in Europe is in itself a danger: If Turkey becomes a member of the European Union that will mean once
again eighty million Muslims, who will join the European Union, that means that
Europe will come to about one hundred and twenty, one hundred and thirty million Muslims. Then its over and out for Europe. Put otherwise, for Europe to
survive, the Muslim population needs to be kept to a minimum. Strache characterises this particular aspect of the Muslim demographic threat in a similar fashion, stating that:
[T]he established parties dont invest in a family policy (Familienpolitik) for
European peoples, instead they get immigrants from the Middle East, from
Islamic countries and bring them to Europe and we are [now] threatened to
become a minority and thus I say, now we are faced with the situation, either
the downfall of Europe or the salvation of Europe and I am fighting for the
salvation of Europe (die Rettung Europas).

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28 Race & Class 57(2)

Hence the proposition is that any large increase in the number of Muslims living
in Europe is per se dangerous. In both instances, Dewinter and Strache position
themselves as individuals determined to save Europe, framing their reaction as
the position any sensible person would take. It is implied that their irresponsible opposites at home are unwittingly or perhaps even knowingly endangering Europes future. Dewinter later elaborates on the supposed consequences of
an increased Muslim presence in European cities:
I think within eh eh 2 years, next local elections in 2012, we will be confronted
with the first Muslim mayors in those districts, in different cities in our country. And we already see that whole neighbourhoods became Muslim neighbourhoods The last Flemish people leaving those districts and thats what
the Muslims want, they want to create islands for themselves in our big cities,
thats their strategy and when they are when they have a majority over
there, then they are in power they install the Sharia and eh well these are sort
of little Muslim republics into our own cities, and well I think this is only the
beginning, because they eh will not stop, for them its not only too important
to have small Muslims islands, where they have a majority, where they are in
power in our cities, they want to be in power in the city as a whole. They want
to be in power in our country as a whole. They want to be in power in Europe
as a whole, thats their main aim, they want to conquer, they want to conquer
Europe for Islam, for the prophet Muhammad, for Allah.
Here the Muslim threat relates to a seemingly innate trait within Muslims to
always want more. Unless stopped, they will allegedly continue to conquer.
Not just Muslim immigrants, but Islam itself is perceived by Dewinter to be a
danger: No Islam is not moderate! And there are no two or three or five different
types of Islam, Islam is Islam and thats it. And we have to understand that the
Koran is the Koran eh and Islam is Islam. Islam thus becomes essentialised and
non-changing. Elsewhere in the interview, Dewinter claims that Islam is not a
religion but a political ideology and that it is not Islamic fundamentalists or certain followers of Islam who pose a threat; it is the (one and only) Islam that is
aggressively threatening Europe:
[I]ts more dangerous than National Socialism, why? Because National
Socialism, Fascism, also Communism, these were political ideologies. Islam is
a political ideology and also a religion so it makes it even danger more dangerous than the totalitarian ideologies we knew in eh Europe in eh the thirties
and forties.
Later in the interview, the comparison of Islam to Nazism is expanded upon:
[I]f you wanted to know what Hitler wanted to do with the Jews you only had
to read Mein Kampf Well if you want to know what Muslims uh no Islam is

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Shroufi: The Gates of Jerusalem29

going to do eh well read the Koran, its all in the Koran, so read the Koran. A
vivid and dangerous image of Islam is depicted, which rather than resembling
totalitarian ideologies of the past actually outweighs them. This equation of
fundamentalist Islam with totalitarianism is also to be found in the Jerusalem
Declaration:
After the totalitarian systems of the twentieth Century were overcome, humanity is now faced with a new worldwide totalitarian threat: the fundamentalist
Islam. We consider ourselves as part of the worldwide battle of defenders of
democracy and human rights in the face of all totalitarian systems and their
accomplices. As such we stand at the forefront of the battle for the Westerndemocratic community of values.
Besides Muslim immigrants and Islam, Islamic institutions are assigned distinctly
threatening attributes. According to Strache, Europe has witnessed the growth of
Muslim parallel and counter-societies [Gegen-Gesellschaften], which, as alien to
European society, are spreading non-European values. Likewise Mosques represent the political abuse of a religion because they are places, where religion,
politics, societal and legal systems are connected with one another.
The threat posed by Muslims contrasts with the framing of Jews, whose
behaviour or religious traditions are not explicitly criticised. Rather, it is the
threats facing Jews that characterise Jewish existence in Europe. Consider the following comment from Strache:
[T]here are mass demonstrations in Vienna with 10,000, up to 10,000 Turks,
who hold placards which have also been photographically documented
with Hitler wake up on them and monstrous anti-Semitic developments,
and we are the only party in Austria, which strongly criticises and also
fights this.
Such imagery suggests that Austrian Jews have much to fear in a city where thousands of Turkish anti-Semites are calling for Hitlers return. Interestingly the FP
is framed as being firmly on the side of Austrias Jewish population, unlike its
political rivals. Also Dewinter suggests that the supposed totalitarian nature of
Islam threatens the safety of the Jewish people:
Interviewer: We have seen the cruelty that happened in the Nazi time against
the Jews. There are some people who say Islam is a similar danger, not for
not only for all unbelievers, especially for the Jewish people. What do you
think about that?
Dewinter: Well I think they are right, people who say that, Im saying it also, I
think that eh Islam is the green fascism, eh its also a totalitarian ideology.

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30 Race & Class 57(2)

On protecting Europe
The reiterated West versus Islam bloc character of the supposed clash results in
calls for post-national lines of defence. Dewinter argues:
I want to stress this that we should unify, we should work together, we cant
stop Islamisation on our own. Only when we work together with all those
Islam critical parties, with all those patriotic right-wing conservative parties in
Europe, we have a chance to win. Look, the Muslims, even when they are
divided in Sunnis, in Shiites and eh they are divided in all sorts of eh groups
and so on and so on, if it really matters, they work together, they are first of all
Muslim; the moderates and the radicals, the Sunnis and Shiites, the whatever,
they work together. We should do the same, we should stand together for our
common struggle against [sic] Islamisation of Europe.
Ekeroth makes similar remarks: [I]ts important not only Sweden or Belgium or
whatever deals with the problem of Islamisation but we need to have a Europe
thats free of Islam/Islamisation, so I think its important to work together and
its a um a good place to start. In this manner, Islamisation is presented as both a
domestic and European danger; hence it is not only domestic opposition that is
called for, but Europe-wide resistance. A dividing line appears between
Islamisation and Europe, with Dewinter describing the Muslim opposition as
a superficially divided but in reality largely united bloc, requiring a counterweight of similar make-up. Opposition to Islam and mass immigration, in
Ekeroths view, also helps to unite political parties of differing persuasions:
We have differences of course in our policies but what were talking about is the
commonalities we have and also again regarding mass immigration, Islamisation
and in those views we have pretty much the same views, eh whats important
for us is obviously democracy and its humanism, the western values, which we
all share, so I think we have a lot in common there and a lot to work with.
Inspiration for such a pan-European movement, according to Strache, is also to be
found in the founder of Zionism:
Theodor Herzl who was a German-conscious (Deutsch-bewusster) eh citizen
with Jewish roots, actually founded Zionism out of this German national, free
and liberal movement and one should also indeed realise, there are many
many similarities in the historical development and I say, perhaps we need
again a Theodor Herzl for the development of European, for the development
of European Fatherlands, which are federally structured, where the diversity
of the European peoples and the diversity of the cultures and the identities
remains preserved.

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Shroufi: The Gates of Jerusalem31

Leaving aside the rather questionable assertion that Herzls inspiration was born
out of the freedom offered to him by a free and liberal German movement, parallels seem to be drawn between a Zionist movement which sought a safe haven for
Jews and a possible solution to safeguard Europes future. It is worth noting that
Strache claims that, Theodor Herzl lived in Austria, was a member of a student
fraternity (Waffenstudent) like me, we are, I mean, I am often vilified. He thus
portrays himself as a Herzl-like figure fighting for the survival of Europe.
On top of these general calls for Europe-wide resistance, the European Freedom
Alliance details how this resistance ought to be implemented. There are calls
from Strache to deal with Islamism in a decidedly tough manner: Tolerance of
the intolerant, that cannot be allowed. And if in Islamism one is fully intolerant of
those of another religion and of Christians and of Jews, well then one cant be
tolerant of the intolerant. Dewinter comments that diplomacy is of little use:
I think it was Winston Churchill, who once said, those who keep on feeding
the crocodile the only thing that will happen [sic] that [they] will be eaten the
last but they will be eaten, so dont feed the crocodile, kill the crocodile
Islam is a predator and a predator goes for the weakest victim, and we are
weak, we Europeans we are weak because we dont we no longer believe
in ourself [sic], we dont we no longer believe in our own believe in our
culture, in our civilisation, in our own moral values, and thats what makes
us very weak, that makes us a victim, a weak victim for the predator that is
Islam.
Described as a predator, Islam is depicted not only as a primitive and savage
religion, but the term suggests that any attempts to fend it off would require
some force. In contrast, contemporary European society is negatively portrayed
as a weak victim, insinuating that it needs to be strengthened. Also Stadtkewitz
comments that those, who believe, that one can establish peace through looking
away, through evasiveness, they are mistaken. Hence the interviewees are at
odds with those naive individuals who apparently do not fully apprehend the
danger posed by fundamentalist Islam. Besides abstract calls for a tougher
approach, there are demands for concrete steps to be taken. Dewinter, for instance,
calls Muslim voting rights into question:
In my country [the] progressive socialist and green parties will do everything to please the Muslim community in our countries, and thats very very
dangerous, its not as they say over here in Israel land for peace, its eh Muslim
rights for votes and well thats not the way eh we should do it, not at all.
It is inferred that the Socialist and Green Parties, which seek the votes of Muslims,
accommodate demands that are presumably dangerous for Belgium. Using the
metaphor of Land for peace, invokes an additional element of danger in Muslim
votes. Earlier in the interview Dewinter remarks:

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32 Race & Class 57(2)

I know that eh the policy of the Israelian [sic] state was land for peace but they
gived [sic] the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip land, autonomy, their own state
and what did the Israelians [sic] get back? Peace, not really, because until today,
almost every day there are mortar attacks coming out of the Gaza [sic].
On the Palestinian-Israeli conflict
Much can be discerned from the following excerpts from Straches interview:
It was great [to be here] in Israel We visited the West Bank in order to speak
with the settlers living there and also to personally witness some of the difficulties facing the settlers we [had] a very very open and warm dialogue here
in Israel and eh have finally also through observing the local problems also, I
believe, developed a stronger and better understanding of the problems there.
[I]t was also certainly interesting for once to hear the Settlers side [of the argument] We have discovered that the 300,000 Jewish settlers are not eh living
over there in eh some kind of hmm well temporary-like buildings, um they are
actually long terms projects with permanent homing and eh also settlements,
which have been sustainably built, [and] have also contributed something to
the region.
In his description, the Israeli settlers as well as the local problems are identified
as going unnoticed by others (one can presume the mainstream parties and
media). The settlers are depicted as responsible individuals who have positively
contributed to the region. Ekeroth similarly describes a situation in which the
reality of life in Israel is little known or misunderstood:
Well its hard to get an impression how hard it is to live in Sderot just being
there for an hour or so, eh but of course to have rockets fired at you, no other
country in the world would tolerate it, but Israel is expected to from the international community which I think is wrong. I think its in their right and I
think its their obligation to defend themselves against attacks from the Arabs.
The international community and leftwing parties are characterised through
their opposition to Israel and their lack of understanding of life in the country,
whilst supposedly also denying Israel the right to defend itself. Indeed Dewinter
claims, [the Israelis] know who are their allies and who are their enemies. We are
their allies; the left-wing parties in Europe are their enemies.
Rather than taking sides, support of Israel is framed as the logical outcome of
a deep understanding of the conflict. An act of reasonableness, against which,
claims Stadtkewitz, no right-minded person could object: [I] can only say, if each
of us is prepared to clearly position themselves, to stay on the side of Israel,
then I can hardly fathom, what one can have against that. Similarly the Jerusalem

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Shroufi: The Gates of Jerusalem33

Declaration claims that, Israel as the only genuine democracy in the Middle East
is an important counterpart in this troubled region, while Strache comments that
any reasonable person can understand Israels actions:
10,000 rockets have been fired at Israeli territory in the last years and if as
father or mother one must daily fear to lose their child, that well these are
circumstances, which nobody in Europe or in the world can imagine, and every
reasonable person, who is confronted with such problems, ultimately [wants]
it to end.
This sentiment is echoed in the Jerusalem Declarations support for Israels right
of self-defence against all aggression, especially against Islamic terror.
The politicians interviewed, to varying degrees, all position Israel and themselves on the same side of the same struggle. Consider Dewinters summary of
the trip to Israel:
[T]his was a unique eh opportunity to come to Israel and to show our solidarity
and to express also our solidarity towards the Jewish people eh in our common
struggle against Islamisation. Look, the Israelians [sic] they are an outpost of
this struggle, this struggle, this clash of civilisations, eh and we in Europe,
were fighting the same battle: the battle against radical Islam against
Islamisation.
Strache invokes the same thesis, claiming that Israel represents a frontline in this
conflict, if you like, in Samuel Huntingtons Clash of Civilizations, which is
actually taking place.22 In addition, Ekeroth alleges, Israel is in the same struggle
as we are and they are in the forefront of it eh so Id say we are very much in the
same struggle. The apparent similarity of the threat facing both Europe and
Israel, according to Stadtkewitz, even has the potential to unite those Europeans
who otherwise have their differences:
[E]ach party of course has its own ideas, its goals, also has differences, [thats]
quite clear, in other areas of policy for sure much more um, but we are united
in this respect, in this point and I believe that [as] the result of the collective
experience of the danger posed by Islam that one inevitably comes to the
conclusion that Israel, as a country, which is on the frontline of this confrontation, um is a partner for us and that Israels freedom is also our own freedom.
It is a similarity that prompts calls for similar tactics of defence. Stadtkewitz states
that, we also need to keep it [Islamic terrorism] at bay and the same also goes for
Israel: do not yield one millimetre to this Islamic terror, not one millimetre to the
Jihad, not one millimetre to the ideology of Islam.
Still, the problems facing Israel and Europe are portrayed as containing some
distinguishable elements. Dewinter describes the diverging situations as such:

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34 Race & Class 57(2)

Over here [in Israel] you have the military Jihad, you have the Jihad of the violence, in Europe we also had some terror attacks, but have the cultural Jihad, we
have the demographical Jihad, we have the immigration Jihad. Ekeroth in a similar fashion claims that, Israel suffe is suffering from the onslaught of Islam in
a very concrete sense with rockets and so on and so forth, we have it in a more of
a subtle way in Europe.
Whilst Europe and Israel are considered to be remarkably similar, the lives of
Palestinians are of little interest to the European Freedom Alliance. Indeed, rather
than refer to Palestinians as such, a variety of other terms are employed in the
texts. Strache, for instance, does not once refer to Palestine or Palestinians in his
interview. Instead he refers to the Arab world, conjuring up an image of a large
uniform group of Arabs. Also Ekeroth, who was interviewed in the Israeli settlement Ariel, a settlement some 16km east of the Green Line23 and thus situated
inside the West Bank, comments without irony: its always interesting to see how
close they [the settlements] are to the Arab villages. The Palestinians become
Arabs who live in villages, denoting a degree of simplicity to their lives while
simultaneously reducing their presence in size. There is no mention made of the
fact that the proximity of the Arab villages owes much to the fact that the West
Bank is recognised by most parts of the international community as Palestinian
territory. Ekeroth elaborates on this point further, stating, I actually read up on
the legal status of Judea, Samaria, and also Gaza, and eh and from my point of
view, from what Ive learned, its a [sic] legal settlements and eh its not a
Palestinian territory in the first place eh since theres never been a Palestinian
people or a state.24 Note the use of the words Judea and Samaria; biblical terms
to refer to the West Bank, used by, among others, the Israeli authorities. Dewinter
refers to the so-called West Bank, the so-called occupied territories, they [the
Israelis] call it Judea, Samaria. And Stadtkewitz highlights the exclusive historical connection between the West Bank and the Israelis who live there: well, eh it
is the wrong wording if one says the Jews calls it Samaria and Judea. It is Samaria
and Judea and it is for my, in my opinion clearly the land of the Jewish people.
Hence the Alliance characterises the West Bank as a non-Palestinian entity with
little or no connection to the non-Jews who live there. Seen in this light, Palestinian
ownership of the West Bank makes little sense. Or in Dewinters words, [a] solution will not be found eh in taking away the land of the Jews by taking away
Samaria and Judea from the Jews.
In response to the question, would it perhaps be the best solution, a large
Israeli state with full rights for the Muslim-Arabic population?, Stadtkewitz
answers, I believe that would actually be the best solution, it is naturally difficult
for us to understand, we would presume that everyone [would] rather live in a
free democratic society than allow themselves to be dominated by an ideology.
In his portrayal, some Palestinians irrationally favour domination over democracy; if they did not, then they surely could have no problem with Israel controlling all of the West Bank. Put otherwise, Israeli control of the West Bank is the
only rational and sensible option.

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Shroufi: The Gates of Jerusalem35

As opposed to the unqualified recognition of the right to existence offered to
Israel, Palestine is neither referred to nor is its existence mentioned in the
Jerusalem Declaration. The individual politicians, however, take a more nuanced
stance. Stadtkewitz considers the creation of a state for the Palestinians absurd,
because that means the end of Israel in the long run. While Dewinter does
acknowledge that Palestinians have the right to self determination, he qualifies
this statement by claiming that, at this moment, I think that this right of selfdetermination is abused by eh organisations like Hamas, Fatah, Islamic Jihad,
and maybe even the PLO, for um their fundamentalistic Islamic eh agenda eh
and thats a pity.
From nationalist anti-Jewish hatred to European philo-Semitism
When one considers recent transformations that have taken place within populist
radical right parties in Western Europe, the results of the analysis are not wholly
surprising. Far-right nationalists and social conservatives have indeed long
treated Europes Jews with contempt and hatred. But following the horrors of the
Holocaust, there is a perception that anti-Semitism has lost much of its credibility in post-war Western Europe. As Mudde points out: Despite different interpretations of the war period between and within countries, there exists a strong
consensus that the Holocaust was the epitome of evil and that anti-Semitism is
unacceptable.25 This is not to claim that anti-Semitism has disappeared26 or to
dismiss the very real racism facing Jews in Western Europe. Rather, as Bunzl
argues, the message of all political parties with any degree of influence, is based
neither on anti-Semitism or on anti-Zionism, but on their conjoined repudiation.27
In fact, as Williams in her analysis of the populist radical Right in Western Europe
writes, Jews have become a highly desired constituent for some far right parties
seeking to expand their legitimacy and also to expand their base of electoral support.28 Similarly others observe an increasing number of acknowledgments by
some extreme-right parties of the Jewish contribution to European culture,29
whereby references to Europes Judeo-Christian heritage are crude manifestations of a cultural realignment in which Jews are increasingly constructed as allies
in the struggle over Europes future.30
While it is certainly of some comfort that hatred of Jews is no longer in vogue,
Betz sadly reminds us that the disavowal of anti-Semitism is intricately linked to
the Western European populist rights broader anti-Islamic ideological turn,
which targets Western Europes Muslim migrant community as the main enemy,
eclipsing any other (including the Jews).31 In the process, Islam is erased from
European history along with centuries of anti-Jewish persecution. Prejudice
against and exclusion of Muslims, however, is based not on biological superiority, but on the need to protect against cultural contamination at the hand of backward and alien cultures.32 It is a narrative often reflected in government policies
and media campaigns,33 resulting in an ever-wider audience becoming receptive
to the populist radical Rights strong cultural opposition to Islam.34

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36 Race & Class 57(2)

It is also noteworthy that criticism of an ineffective and bureaucratic Brussels
does not necessarily reduce its support for a strong set of European nation states.35
Western Europe has become a battleground for European rightwing nationalists,
a contested space in which like-minded populist radical Right parties are increasingly joining forces.36 Likewise debates surrounding Turkeys possible accession
to the EU are characterised in much the same way, with Ankaras exclusion
demanded on the basis of its supposed non-European and Islamic character.37As
Bunzl notes, Islamophobes are not particularly worried whether Muslims can be
good Germans, Italians or Danes. Rather, they question whether Muslims can be
good Europeans. Islamophobia, in other words, functions less in the interest of
national purification than as a means of fortifying Europe.38
Cultural conflict and the populist radical Right
Whilst Western European populist radical Right parties have developed a cultural identity less at odds with contemporary norms and ideals, wider transformations in the political sphere have led to other strategic changes. Kriesi et al.
and Bornschier argue that a detailed reading of Western European political systems reveals a weakening of traditional class and religious divisions.39 As a result
of the processes of globalisation, these conflicts have transformed into disputes
over global market integration on the one hand and contrasting conceptions of
cultural identity on the other. The traditional pro-state position has become more
protectionist while the pro-market position now favours the enhancement of
national competitiveness on world markets. Contrasting visions of community
and national identity have come to underscore the cultural line of conflict,
whereby universalistic conceptions of community and individual autonomy are
pitted against calls to preserve traditional communities supposedly threatened
by a multicultural society. The socio-economic conflict culminates in calls for protection against global economic competition, while the cultural conflict results in
demands for protection from cultural competition, i.e. from foreign cultures that
are supposedly challenging citizens life styles, their everyday practices and their
fundamental position in society.
The problem is that mainstream parties, formed in terms of earlier conflicts, no
longer speak to large segments of the electorate, particularly those who seek further economic and cultural protection. Added to this is the difficulty of convincingly integrating these two modified lines of conflict, as well as the prevailing
neoliberal consensus that overshadows alternative economic ideas. As a result,
the electorates insecurities are increasingly translated into issues of culture, a
situation which provides the populist radical Right with fertile ground to reap
new successes. Carving out an uncompromising stance on cultural issues, the
lowest common denominator for the mobilisation of its potential voters, the populist radical Right has exploited an electoral niche by playing to its strengths.
The Left, though open to economic protectionism, adopts a culturally open stance
that is detrimental to its success in highly charged debates on cultural issues.

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Shroufi: The Gates of Jerusalem37

A situation ensues in which the electorate is increasingly voting on the basis of
cultural values, even if matters of economics still continue to hold a great deal of
influence over their political convictions. Or as Magnus Marsdal, in his analysis
of the Norwegian Progress Party summarises:
The political demobilizing of class conflicts does not take place because most
voters have come to emphasize value issues more than class, which they have
not, but rather because, under the neo-liberal lite consensus on class issues,
confrontation on moral and cultural issues (values) has become the only available means of party-political and ideological demarcation.40
Hence questions of culture, values and identity are vital for the future success of
the populist radical Right.
Conclusion
With a large consensus in Western Europe repudiating Nazism, biological racism
and anti-Semitism, reference to Europes Jewish heritage during the Alliances
visit to Israel and the West Bank helps disassociate it from extremist rightwing
factions. Yet, the interviewees go one step further. Rather than simply disassociate themselves from past totalitarian digressions, they frame Islam as the new
totalitarian threat facing Europe and insinuate that it is not Nazis that Europes
Jews have to fear, but Muslims. Positioning Muslims as Europes (new) anti-Semites results in a novel othering of Islam. As a supposedly totalitarian and antiSemitic religion, it is the antithesis of the European Freedom Alliances
non-totalitarian and Judeo-Christian Europe.
With regard to the threats facing Europe and its peoples, the Alliance utilises
the fears of concerned citizens in a rapidly changing world. By referring to
mosques as hotbeds of extremism, comparing the Quran to Mein Kampf, and
alluding to the supposed existential threat that Muslim immigration poses to
Europe, the delegation reinforces the perception that citizens lifestyles are indeed
at risk, enhancing the parties position as the only ones standing up for endangered local communities. Staking out an explicit cultural and religious identity,
and linking it inextricably with Europes lineage, is undoubtedly helpful in furthering the politicians credentials as bearers of tradition. The consensus among
the interviewees regarding pan-European co-operation accentuates the seriousness of this apparent danger.
In terms of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, while the dangers facing Israelis
are allegedly ignored and dismissed by the mainstream parties, it is the
European Freedom Alliance that is willing to defend and relate to those otherwise disregarded. Portraying themselves as the defenders of the undefended,
the politicians are then sending out a clear message to others who may similarly
feel unfairly treated by those in power. The existence of a Palestinian polity is
either not recognised or dismissed as a hoax and Palestinian demands for

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38 Race & Class 57(2)

self-determination are viewed as little more than a means to an end, namely the
destruction of Israel. Depicted as having no historical connection to the lands
where they live, Palestinians are expected to either assimilate to life in Israel, or
find somewhere else to go. Offering them concessions would supposedly only
help other Arabs to use Palestinian territory to attack Israel. The delegations
repudiation of Palestinian existence mirrors the same patterns of exclusion with
regard to Europe: their traditions belong elsewhere; they must assimilate or
leave; they harbour plans to conquer us. Indeed, the politicians go to great
lengths to emphasise the similarities between Israel and Europe. First, both
supposedly share the same cultural fabric, history and values. Second, the dangers facing Europe and Israel are highly similar, if not the same. That is to say,
Israel is a European state and what applies to Israel de facto applies to Europe
(and vice versa).
This is of some significance. By implicitly equating the anxieties of Israelis with
those of the electorate in their home countries, the European Freedom Alliance is
thus attempting to redefine the character of the political conflict in their home
countries. By transporting the contours of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict onto the
situation in Europe, the actions proposed by the Israeli government could, thus,
be justifiably applied by European governments. As Sutcliffe observes:
Avigdor Liebermans Israel Beitenu party advocates from within government policies what few European far-Right groupings dare openly avow for
their own societies. However, the appeal of the notion of the expulsion of Arabs
undoubtedly surpasses its expression, and the unchallenged circulation of
such ideas in one country facilitates their freer ventilation elsewhere.41
By reiterating Israels legitimate and reasonable exercise of force, the politicians
validate their own fierce proposals (no votes for Muslim rights; expulsion for
those who do not wish to assimilate) for solving a supposedly indistinguishable
problem in Europe. In a sense, to paraphrase Fekete, they are removing Muslims
from their immediate environment and linking them to a homogenous and
repressive global Islam.42
While this analysis is admittedly centred on the trip itself, it sheds some further
light on the wider phenomenon of Western European populist radical right parties increasing support for Israel. Through contextualising and interpreting the
trip to Israel and the West Bank in line with wider developments in Western
European politics, I have attempted to detail the manner in which the European
Freedom Alliance utilised the simmering animosities underlining the PalestinianIsraeli conflict to further its own agenda. Taken more broadly, it suggests that the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict is serving as a vehicle with which the populist radical
right can illustrate not only their disavowal of anti-Semitism and the contours of
their new enemy, but can also mobilise support for their uncompromising conception of Europe and more protectionist policies against Muslim communities,
now deemed Europes Palestinians.
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Shroufi: The Gates of Jerusalem39

References
1 The term populist radical Right is borrowed from Muddes research. While it may not be
perfect, I think the term embodies the three central tenets of populist parties on the Right, i.e.
they are distinctly populist, are radically opposed to state-sponsored pluralism and adhere to a
rightist conception of the nation state. At the same time, it is important to recognise that these
parties differ from fascist and neo-Nazi groupings in that they reflect a large consensus within
Western European society which supports democracy and is opposed to biological racism.
Others using the term radical Right or new Right are largely analysing the same phenomenon. See C. Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 2007).
2 A. Sutcliffe, The unfinished history of philosemitism, Jewish Quarterly (Vol. 58, no. 1, 2011),
p. 68. As Sutcliffe also mentions, Fini declared in 2008 that the burning of the Israeli flag by
left-wing protesters in Turin was much more serious than the murder of a young Italian by
skinhead gangs on the same day, ibid.
3 Speech by Geert Wilders, Tel Aviv (5 December 2010), available at: http://www.geertwilders.
nl/index.php/in-english-mainmenu-98/in-the-press-mainmenu-101/77-in-the-press/1731speech-geert-wilders-tel-aviv-december-5-2010#sthash.JaNvGD4p.dpuf.
4 In an interview with the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, Filip Dewinter claimed in 2005 that Israel
is a sort of outpost for our Western society, an outpost of democracy, of freedom of speech, of
protecting common values within a hostile environment; see A. Schwartz, Between Haider
and a hard place, Haaretz (28 August 2005), available at: http://www.haaretz.com/printedition/features/between-haider-and-a-hard-place-1.168287.
5 L. Fekete, The Muslim conspiracy theory and the Oslo massacre, Race & Class (Vol. 53, no. 3,
2012).
6 Not to be confused with the European Alliance for Freedom, see below.
7 The trip to Israel is just one instance of cross-national alliances between the parties in recent
years. In 2005, the FPs thinktank, Die Freiheitliche Akademie, organised an international
conference with the FP, the Front National and the VB in attendance. Also Cities against
Islamization brought together the FP, VB, and the German movement pro-Kln. The FP,
VB and the SD previously worked together alongside other like-minded parties such as Geert
Wilders Partij voor de Vrijheid in the pan-European European Alliance for Freedom, an
officially recognised grouping in the European Parliament (EP) from 2011 until 2014. Outmanoeuvred by UKIPs Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy, the group failed to secure
the support of members from seven member states following the 2014 EP elections and is no
longer officially represented.
8 For instance, a 2008 policy position paper argued that the occidental Christian culture must be
defended against Islam. Similarly a 2009 European election slogan called for the Occident in
hands of Christians, as cited by S. Rosenberger and H-A. Leila, Anti-Islamic mobilization of
the extreme eight in Austria, in A. Mammone, E. Godin and B. Jenkins, eds, Varieties of RightWing Extremism in Europe (Abingdon, Routledge, 2013), p. 153.
9 As cited by J. Erk, From Vlaams Blok to Vlaams Belang: the Belgian far-right renames itself,
West European Politics (Vol. 28, no. 3, 2005), p. 495.
10 The current chairperson of Die Freiheit is Michael Strzenberger, who incidentally also interviewed the European Freedom Alliance on behalf of Politically Incorrect. Indeed he makes very
little attempt to hide his political views in many of the questions he puts to the interviewees.
For instance, in his interview with Dewinter he asks: Tell us a bit more about the situation in
Belgium. We hear in Brussels the most em popular name of newborn babies is Muhammad.
Ehm how is the state of Islamisation in Belgium nowadays?
11 As cited by B. Schellenberg, Developments within the Radical Right in Germany: discourses,
attitudes and actors, in R. Wodak, M. Khosravinik and M. Brigitte, eds, Right Wing Populism

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40 Race & Class 57(2)

in Europe: politics and discourse (London, Bloomsbury, 2013), p. 154. Thilo Sarrazin is the controversial ex-board member of the German Federal Bank who claimed Muslims in Germany
were both integrationsunwillig (unwilling to integrate) as well as integrationsunfhig (unable to
integrate).
12 Mikael Jansson, then leader of the SD, wrote an article in 2000 titled, Our loathing of Nazism,
see S. Oja and B. Mral, The Sweden Democrats came in from the cold: how the debate about
allowing the SD into media arenas shifted between 2002 and 2010, in Wodak et al., ibid.,
p. 280.
13 As cited by A. Widfeldt, Party change as a necessity the case of the Sweden Democrats,
Representation (Vol. 44, no. 3, 2008), p. 272.
14 As cited by D. Mulinari and A. Neergaard, We are Sweden Democrats because we care for others: exploring racisms in the Swedish extreme right, European Journal of Womens Studies (Vol.
21, no. 1, 2014), p. 48.
15 A. Primor, The unholy alliance between Israels Right and Europes anti-Semites, Haaretz (12
December 2010), available at: http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/the-unholyalliance-between-israel-s-right-and-europe-s-anti-semites-1.330132.
16 S. Theil, Far-Right politicians find common cause in Israel, Newsweek (27 February 2011), available at: http://www.newsweek.com/far-right-politicians-find-common-cause-israel-68583.
17 For the four interviews with Politically Incorrect, see Israeli Reise - Interview Ren Stadtkewitz,
Jerusalem (8 December 2010), available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ch-CLIMThHQM; Israeli Reise - Interview Filip Dewinter, Jerusalem (8 December 2010), available at: http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=BcqgXFLpPSY; Israeli Reise - Interview Heinz-Christian Strache,
Jerusalem (7 December 2010), available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mkhq60hXz0; Israeli Reise - Interview Kent Ekeroth, Settlement of Ariel (6 December 2010), available at:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ksDmYmvgE3E. The Jerusalem Declaration is available (in German) at: http://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20101207_OTS0199/fpoestrache-jerusalemer-erklaerung.
18 The platforms motto is: News Against the Mainstream Pro-American Pro-Israeli Against
the Islamisation of Europe for Constitution and Human Rights.
19 According to Der Spiegel, during the visit to Yad Vashem, Strache chose to wear a cap that
identified him as a lifelong member of the right-wing student fraternity Vandalia, a student
fraternity long associated with Pan-German nationalism and anti-Semitism; see W. Mayr,
Right-Wing Populists on the Rise: Austrias Freedom Party goes from strength to strength,
Spiegel Online (14 July 2011), available at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/rightwing-populists-on-the-rise-austria-s-freedom-party-goes-from-strength-to-strength-a-774255.
html; See also Thiel, op. cit.
20 Adapting Reisigl and Wodaks approach to discourse analysis, the Discourse Historical Approach,
which was developed specifically to investigate anti-Semitism in Austria to show how individuals establish and reaffirm racist images and concepts, I analysed the nomination, predication and
framing strategies employed by the European Freedom Alliance in their interviews and in the
Jerusalem Declaration itself. Note that Reisigl and Wodak also analyse two additional strategies:
argumentation and intensification/mitigation. See M. Reisigland and R. Wodak, Discourse and
Discrimination: rhetorics of racism and anti-Semitism (London, Routledge, 2001).
21 This and all following translations from German to English are mine the interviews with
Strache and Stadtkewitz took place in German.
22 Strache, however, in contrast to the other participants on the trip, takes extra measures to stress
his partys apparent neutrality, evident in his amendment to the Jerusalem Declaration: [I]t is
important to stress the Austrian neutrality and the political tradition since Bruno Kreisky
and we feel bound to this neutral position.
23 BTselem, Ariel Settlement Fact Sheet (2012), available at: http://www.btselem.org/settlements/20100830_facts_on_the_settlement_of_ariel.

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Shroufi: The Gates of Jerusalem41

24 It is unclear what Ekeroth is referring to; since 2005 there are in fact no Israeli settlements in the
Gaza Strip. Such a statement calls into question his earlier assertion that I actually read up on
the legal status of Gaza.
25 Mudde, op. cit., p. 80.
26 For instance, a Pew Global Attitudes Project survey in 2008 showed that 20 per cent of respondents in France, 25 per cent in Germany and 46 per cent in Spain still harboured prejudice
against Jews, cited by Williams, op. cit., p. 125. Similarly the situation in Eastern Europe differs
somewhat, where populist radical right parties in, for instance, Hungary or Poland, are much
more openly anti-Semitic.
27 M. Bunzl, Anti-semitism and Islamophobia: hatreds old and new in Europe (Chicago, Prickly
Paradigm Press, 2007), p. 29. See also H. Ansari and F. Hafez, Islamophobia: an introduction,
in H. Ansari and F. Hafez, eds, From the Far Right to the Mainstream: Islamophobia in party politics
and the media (Frankfurt am Main, Campus, 2012), p. 23.
28 Williams op. cit., p. 128.
29 J. Zquete, The European Extreme-Right and Islam: new directions?, Journal of Political
Ideologies (Vol. 13, no. 3, 2008), p. 329.
30 This is also true of populist radical Right parties in highly secularised societies, with parties like
the Danish Peoples Party combining secular liberal values with traditional Judeo-Christian
ones, see H-G. Betz and S. Meret, Revisiting Lepanto: the political mobilization against Islam
in contemporary Western Europe, Patterns of Prejudice (Vol. 43, no. 34, 2009), p. 333. For an
excellent account of the populist radical Rights newfound love of Judeo-Christian culture, see
Bunzl, op. cit.; see also Zquete, op. cit., p. 330.
31 H-G. Betz, Mosques, minaret, burqas and other essential threats: the populist rights campaign
against Islam in Western Europe, in Wodak et al., op. cit., p. 79.
32 See L. Fekete, Enlightened fundamentalism? Immigration, feminism and the right, Race &
Class (Vol. 48, no. 2, 2006), pp. 712.
33 For a rigorous overview of how government policies and media campaigns in a post 9/11
world have been quick to interpret any unrest within predominately Muslim communities as a
sign of cultural difference, see L. Fekete, A Suitable Enemy: racism, migration and Islamophobia in
Europe (London, Pluto Press, 2009), pp. 4373.
34 A 2012 poll in Britain showed that 37 per cent of respondents would likely vote for a political
party were it to halt Muslim immigration and reduce the presence of Islam in society; cited
in M. Townsend, Voters more likely to back an anti-Muslim party than reject it poll, The
Observer (16 September 2012), available at: http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/sep/16/
voters-support-anti-immigrant-party.
35 As suggested in slogans like the Front Nationals No to Maastricht yes to a Europe of
Fatherlands, cited in Mudde op. cit., p. 165; similarly, in a 2008 speech, Strache said: We say:
Patriots of all the countries of Europe, unite! Because only together will we solve our problems, cited in EU Far-Right Groups to Form Party, BBC News (25 January 2008), available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7210036.stm.
36 See Mudde op. cit., pp. 1747.
37 Such sentiments are not limited to the populist radical Right and also appear in the comment
pages of European broadsheet newspapers.
38 Bunzl, op. cit., p. 13.
39 I borrow heavily here from the work of Kriesi et al. and Bornschier and their analyses of contemporary Western European politics. They suggest that political actors now operate within
a space more differentiated than the classical left versus right division of politics. What is
particularly interesting is the link they draw between the salience of cultural conflict and the
success of the populist radical Right. See S. Bornschier, Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right:
the new cultural conflict in Western Europe (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 2010); H.
Kriesi, E. Grande, R. Lachat, M. Dolezal, S. Bornschier and T. Frey, eds, West European Politics

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42 Race & Class 57(2)

in the Age of Globalisation (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008); H. Kriesi, E. Grande,
M. Dolezal, M. Helbling, D. Hglinger, S. Hutter and B. West, eds, Political Conflict in Western
Europe (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012).
40 M. E. Marsdal, Loud values, muffled interests: third way social democracy and right-wing
populism, in Wodak et al., op. cit.
41 Adam Sutcliffe, Power and the politics of prejudice, in Matti Bunzl, ed., Anti-semitism and
Islamophobia: hatreds old and new in Europe (Chicago, Prickly Paradigm Press, 2007).
42 Fekete (2009), op. cit., p. 125.

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