FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT of

ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), CATBALOGAN,

SAMAR, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MANUELA T. BABALCON,
and CONSTANCIO ABUGANDA, respondents.
Ponente: Quisumbing, J.
FACTS:
Two motor vehicles carrying illegally sourced lumber were seized and
impounded by the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR.
Abuganda and Gabon were the drivers. The two drivers failed to present proper
documents and/or licenses. Abuganda forcibly took the vehicle with a Plate No.
FCN-143 which was later apprehended again. It was again loaded with forest
products. Babalcon, the owner of the vehicle, and Abuganda filed a complaint
for the recovery of the two (2) impounded vehicles with an application for
replevin. It was granted by Regional Trial Court and later affirmed by Court of
Appeals.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the vehicle of Babalcon is in custodia legis.
(2) Whether the suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit
against the State
HELD:
(1) The vehicle of Babalcon is in custodia legis. Under the Revised Forestry Code, the
DENR is authorized to seize all conveyances used in the commission of an
offense in violation of Section 78. The mere possession of timber or other forest
products without the accompanying legal documents is unlawful and punishable
with the penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as prescribed in Articles 309-310
of the Revised Penal Code. The subject vehicles were found to have illegally
sourced forest products which violated the said provision. Hence, the seizure is in
accordance with law which made the vehicles in custodia legis. Being in custodia
legis, it cannot be the subject to an action for replevin.
(2) The suit agaist the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. A
suit against a public officer in the exercise of his function is a suit against the State
if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable. In the case at bar, the
petitioners who represent the DENR are being sued for the exercise of their official
duties. The State cannot be sued without the States consent.

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EPIFANIO LALICAN, petitioner, vs. HON. FILOMENO A. VERGARA,

Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 52, Puerto Princesa City and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Ponente: Romero, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner was caught in possession of lumber on board two (2) passenger
jeeps which was a violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 (The
Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines), as amended by Executive Order No.
277. Petitioner pleaded not guilty. He claimed that he is exempted from the crime
of illegal possession of timber because timber is different from lumber.
ISSUE:
Whether a charge of illegal possession of "lumber" is excluded from the
crime of illegal possession of "timber" as defined in Sec. 68 of P.D. 705, as
amended.
HELD:
Lumber is not excluded from the crime of illegal possession of timber as
defined in the said provision which states:
SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest
Products Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove
timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess
timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case
of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting,
gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens,
they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on
the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
Lumber is simply a processed log or processed forest raw material. The
Code defined lumber in its ordinary or common usage. Its dictionary meaning is
a processed log or timber. Even if lumber is not synonymous with timber,
petitioner is still liable because forest products is broad enough to encompass
lumber.

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PERFECTO PALLADA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondent.
Ponente: Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner, the general manager of Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation,
was convicted of the crime of illegal possession of lumber in violation of 68 of
P.D. No. 705, as amended. Petitioner contented that he had a Certificate of Timber
Origin (CTO) and timber included lumber. This makes his possession of
lumber legal.
ISSUE:
Whether the Certificate of Timber Origin make the possession of lumber
legal.
HELD:
The CTO should not be given credence. The law requires Certificate of
Lumber Origin (CLO) and not CTO as stated in BFD Circular No. 1083:
In order to provide an effective mechanism to pinpoint accountability and
responsibility for shipment of lumber . . . and to have uniformity in documenting
the origin thereof, the attached Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) . . . which
form[s] part of this circular [is] hereby adopted as accountable forms for official
use by authorized BFD officers. . . .
5. Lumber . . . transported/shipped without the necessary Certificate of
Lumber Origin (CLO) . . . as herein required shall be considered as proceeding
from illegal sources and as such, shall be subject to confiscation and disposition in
accordance with LOI 1020 and BFD implementing guidelines.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. ALFONSO DATOR

and BENITO GENOL, accused (Acquitted) PASTOR TELEN,
accusedappellant.
Ponente: De Leon, Jr., J.
FACTS:
Genol was caught driving an Isuzu cargo truck carrying pieces of lumber
without the required documents. Said truck and lumber were owned by Telen.
Telen testified that he needed lumber to be used in renovating the house of his
grandparents. Telen contended that he Leonor, Officer-in-Charge of the DENRCENRO assured him that he did not need a written permit to cut Dita trees which
are considered soft lumber in the private land of his mother. Appellant submits
that under the said DENR Administrative Order No. 79, no permit is required in
the cutting of planted trees within titled lands except Benguet pine and premium
species listed under DENR Administrative Order No. 78, Series of 1987, namely:
narra, molave, dao, kamagong, ipil, acacia, akle, apanit, banuyo, batikuling, betis,
bolongeta, kalantas, lanete, lumbayao, sangilo, supa, teak, tindalo and manggis.
Telen was convicted of illegal possession of lumber while Dator and Genol
were acquitted.
ISSUE:
Whether the cutting of lumber on a private land is a violation of Sec.68 of
P.D. 705, as amended.
HELD:
Concededly, the varieties of lumber for which the appellant is being held
liable for illegal possession do not belong to the premium species enumerated
under DENR Administrative Order No. 78, Series of 1987. However, under the
same DENR administrative order, a certification from the CENRO concerned to
the effect that the forest products came from a titled land or tax declared alienable
and disposable land must still be secured to accompany the shipment. This the
appellant failed to do, thus, he is criminally liable under Section 68 of Presidential
Decree No. 705 necessitating prior acquisition of permit and legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations.

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PICOP RESOURCES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. AUGUSTUS L. CALO,

Presiding Judge, RTC of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, 10 th Judicial
Region, Branch 5, Butuan City, HON. VICTOR A. TOMANENG, Acting
Presiding Judge, RTC of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, 10th Judicial
Region, Branch 5, Butuan City, EDUARDO CASIA, ROGELIO CASTILLO,
ULDARICO
CASINGINAN,
ELADIO
GALANO,
CATALINO
VIRTUDAZO, RICARDO BALADON, JOEL VILLAREAL, TIBURCIO
IMPUERTO, HILARIO FERNANDEZ, ANDREA VASQUEZ, SPOUSES
REMELITO CODERA and MARILYN RANOSOCODERA, and FLORIO
JOSAFAT, JR., for himself and in representation by way of a class suit the
Members of the UNIFIED FARMERS ASSOCIATION OF BISLIG (UFAB),
respondents.
Ponente: Tinga, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner was designated a DENR depository and custodian for
apprehended forest products and conveyances within its concession under a
memoranda. The respondents, those who were apprehended, questioned the
legality of said memoranda. The trial court held that the memoranda were valid.
However, the trial court ordered for the release of the confiscated logs and vehicles
to the owners. PICOP questioned the release and filed a petition for certiorari with
prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of injunction
before the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed the said petition.
ISSUE:
Whether PICOP has the right to exercise control over its concession area
pursuant to its duty as DENR depository.
HELD:
PICOP has no right to exercise control over its concession area pursuant to
its duty as DENR depository. The transfer of custody of the confiscated products
and conveyances will not in any way place petitioner at a disadvantage. Petitioner
is merely a depository and the release of the conveyances and products to the
government agencies concerned has to be done but only in compliance with lawful
court orders.

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G.R. No. 79538 October 18, 1990

FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., petitioner, vs. THE DEPUTY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF
FOREST DEVELOPMENT and TWIN PEAKS DEVELOPMENT AND
REALTY CORPORATION, respondents.
Taada, Vivo & Tan for petitioner.
Antonio E. Escober and Jurado Law Office for respondent Twin Peaks
Development Corporation.
Ponente: Courts, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner entered into a timber license agreement with the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. However, the Director or the Bureau of Forest
Development, Director Cortes, issued a memorandum prohibiting logging
operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces. Petitioner sent a letter to the
Ministry of Natural Resources seeking: the reinstatement of its timber license
agreement which was cancelled. The MNR denied the petitioners request. The
Ministry ruled that a timber license was not a contract within the due process
clause of the Constitution, but only a privilege which could be withdrawn
whenever public interest or welfare so demands, and that petitioner was not
discriminated against in view of the fact that it was among ten concessionaires
whose licenses were revoked in 1983.
ISSUE:
Whether the decision of the MNR is final.
HELD:
It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders
of administrative agencies have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a
final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. These decisions
and orders are as conclusive upon the rights of the affected parties as though the
same had been rendered by a court of general jurisdiction. The rule of res judicata
thus forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by competent authority
acting within their exclusive jurisdiction.

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VIRGILIO BON, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondent.
Ponente: Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged of Section 68, P.D. No. 705, as amended for cutting,
manufacturing and gathering four (4) Narra trees, one (1) cuyaoyao tree, and one
(1) amugis tree, with an approximate volume of 4,315 bd. ft. and valued at
approximately P25,000.00, without the knowledge and consent of the owner
Teresita DangalanMendoza and without having first obtained from proper
authorities the necessary permit or license and/or legal supporting documents, to
the damage and prejudice of the Government and the owner in the aforementioned
amount of P25,000.00. Witnesses testified that petitioner gave an extrajudicial
admission of the commission of the crime. In defense, petitioner stated that his
admission is inadmissible as evidence because it is considered as hearsay.
ISSUE:
Whether the witnesses testimony is considered as hearsay.
HELD:
The testimonies of the witnesses are not considered as hearsay. Section 36 of
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states the rule on hearsay evidence:
Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge hearsay
excluded. A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise
provided in these rules. Under the above rule, any evidence whether oral or
documentary is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal
knowledge of the witness, but on that of some other person who is not on the
witness stand. Hence, information that is relayed to the former by the latter before
it reaches the court is considered hearsay.
In the case at bar, Lascano and Dangalan testified they heard petitioner
admit to having ordered the cutting of the trees for three reasons. First, they are at
a hearing distance when petitioner made the admission. Second, the admission
came from the petitioner himself. Third, even if the testimonies are hearsay, the
petitioner failed to object at the time it was offered to said testimonies. This failure
constitutes as a waiver for his right to object.

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ALFREDO Y. CHU, complainant, vs. JUDGE CAMILO E. TAMIN, Presiding

Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Ninth Judicial Region, Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur, respondent.
Ponente: Carpio, J.
FACTS:
Complainant alleged respondent judge had issued a search warrant for the
fifth time under questionable procedure. The search warrants were issued for the
reason that complainant is alleged to be in possession of forest products in
violation of section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended. Complainant alleged that the
records of the four warrants did not also contain any transcript of the required
examination of witnesses. In response, judge Tamin stated that the records were
misfiled by his legal researcher.
ISSUE:
Whether the issued search warrants are valid.
HELD:
The search warrants are invalid. Section 5, Rule 126[6] of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form
of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the
record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted.
There is failure to produce the transcript required to be in writing. The
alleged legal researcher, who presumably also prepared the second certified copy,
could not have committed the same mistake twice in a row, within two days of
each other.

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G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed
OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA
OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents
CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and
PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents
ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor,
represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II
and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by
their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN,
minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE
MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA
VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor,
represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA
DESAMPARADO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA
DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by
his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA.
MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE,
all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and
AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE
and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents
MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE
VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents
BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all
surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and
MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed
CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA
CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all
surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and
MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH
JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE
MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL
and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents
FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE
ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE
ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66,
respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
Ponente: Davide, Jr., J.
FACTS:
The petitioners, as a taxpayers class suit, instituted a complaint and
alleged that the they are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers,
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and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure
that is the countrys virgin tropical forests. The complaint was filed for
themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said
resource but are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the
court. The petitioners also stated that they represent not only their generation but
also the generations yet unborn.
Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
...ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in
his behalf to
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting
in his behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs . . . such other reliefs just and equitable under
the premises.
The petitioners also asserted that the adverse and detrimental consequences
of continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that
the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the case for the reason that the said
petitioners have no cause of action against him.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners have a cause of action.
HELD:
The court held that the petitioners have a cause of action. Under Sec.16, Art.
II of the 1987 Constitution which states, The State shall protect and advance the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm
and harmony of nature. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and
general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines.
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a
class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only
be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter
expounded, considers the rhythm and harmony of nature. Nature means the
created world in its entirety.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty
or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with
grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology
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hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed
or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of
the other and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative
obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of
said legal right.
In view of the foregoing, the court found that there is a cause of action for
the petitioners.

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G.R. No. L46772

February 13, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF QUEZON (BRANCH VII), GODOFREDO ARROZAL AND
LUIS FLORES, respondents.
Felipe B. Pagkanlungan for private respondents.
Ponente: Medialdea, J.
FACTS:
The private respondents violated section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705,
as amended. It was alleged that they committed the crime in a private land.
However, the private respondents argued that the property was owned by the State.
The trial court dismissed the case for insufficiency of information on the ownership
of the land to determine whether there was lack of consent.
ISSUE:
Whether the information is sufficient to charge an offense.
HELD:
There was sufficient information to charge the offense. The elements of the
crime of qualified theft of logs are:
(1) That the accused cut, gathered, collected or removed timber or other forest
products
(2) that the timber or other forest products cut, gathered, collected or removed
belongs to the government or to any private individual and
(3) that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removing was without authority
under a license agreement, lease, license, or permit granted by the state.
The elements of the crime does not require the lack of consent of the owner
in order to be charged as long as it was done without the authority of the State
whether it was a private land or a land of the public domain.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle, vs. WILSON B. QUE,

accused-appellant.
Ponente: Puno, J.
FACTS:
Que was charged of the violation section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended.
Que was the owner of the cargo and truck caught carrying coconut slabs and
lumber. He only had a certification from the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Sanchez Mira, Cagayan that he legally
acquired the coconut slabs. Que also claimed that he had a letter from CENRO
allowing him to transfer lumber. Therefore, Que argued that since the cutting,
gathering, collecting, and removal of the forest products are legal, he cannot be
charged.
ISSUE:
Whether the possessor cannot be held liable if he proves that the cutting,
gathering, collecting or removal of such forest products is legal.
HELD:
First, the letter allowing Que to transfer lumber came from a polluted
source. The lumber was placed in such a way that the coconut slabs hid them.
The fact showed that he knew he needed to proper documents to transfer lumber
but could not acquire one which made him conceal the lumber. Second, section 68
of P.D. No. 705 punishes the Possession of timber or other forest products without
the legal documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.
Therefore, Que can be held liable.

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[G.R. No. 152989. September 4, 2002]

ROLDAN, JR. vs. HON. MADRONA, et al.
FACTS:
Roldan applied for a Private Land Timber Permit (PLTP) from the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources in order to cut some trees for a
proposed road and poultry farm in his property. He paid the required fees and
alleged that he was informed by some employees from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) that he could proceed with the
cutting of trees even though his application was still awaiting approval. Thus, he
started cutting trees without the approval. Three weeks later, the place of the
petitioner was raided. He was charged in violation of section 68 of P.D. No. 705
ISSUE:
(1) Whether the owner of a private land is criminally liable under Section 68 of
PD 705 for cutting trees within his own property.
(2) Whether the owner of a private property is administratively liable under
Section 14 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-21 despite the fact that
he did not transport the logs out of his property and used them for his own
agricultural purposes.
HELD:
(1) Roldan is liable. The owner of a private land may be criminally liable under
the said law because ownership is immaterial. The said law does not even
distinguish whether or not the person who commits the punishable acts
under the aforementioned law is the owner of the property, for what is
material in determining the culpability of a person is whether or not the
person or entity involved or charged with its violation possesses the required
permit, license or authorization from DENR at the time he or it cuts, gathers
or collects timber or other forest products.
(2) The administrative order considers the mere act of transporting any wood
product or timber without the prescribed documents as an offense which is
subject to the penalties provided for by law.

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EN BANC
G.R. No. 167707
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
DENR-REGION VI, REGIONAL TECHNICAL, DIRECTOR FOR LANDS,
LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI PROVINCIAL,
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO,
AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, DIRECTOR OF LAND, REGISTRATION
AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM, SECRETARY, DIRECTOR
OF PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY, Petitioners,
- versus MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and
ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and Promulgated: in behalf of all those
similarly situated, Respondents. October 8, 2008
G.R. No. 173775
DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO, joined by THE
LANDOWNERS OF BORACAY SIMILARLY SITUATED NAMED IN A
LIST, ANNEX A OF THIS PETITION, Petitioners,
- versus THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR
FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI,
PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER,
KALIBO, AKLAN, Respondents.
Ponente: Reyes, J.
FACTS:
Respondents-claimants alleged that Presidential Proclamation No. 1801
issued by President Marcos raised doubts to secure title. PP No. 1801 declared
Boracay island as tourist zones and marine reserves. Repondent-claimants argued
that said proclamation did not place Boracay outside the commerce of man.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), stated that Boracay Island was an
unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands
classified as public forest, which was not available for disposition pursuant to
Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code, as
amended.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favour of the respondents-claimants
right to title the land they are occupying. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling
of the RTC. Thus, a petition for certiorari was requested.
During the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Macapagal-Arroyo
issued PP No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of
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reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100
(628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable).
Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation
reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor
timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of
1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act.[32] Thus, their
possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not
have a vested right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an
unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being
public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the
subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive
department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public
domain into alienable and disposable lands.
Since the two petitions involved similar issues, the two were consolidated.
ISSUE:
Whether unclassified lands are presumed to belong to the State.
HELD:
Unclassified lands are presumed to belong to the State. The Regalian
Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the
State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony. The Executive has the vested right to classify or
reclassify lands. The Court has time and again emphasized that there must be
a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying
inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. In
fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to those
lands which have been officially delimited and classified.
Respondents-claimants cannot register the lands under PP No. 1801 because it did
not expressly stated that the lands in Boracay are alienable and disposable.
Furthermore, private claimants cannot apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under Proclamation No. 1064 because they have not proved that they are in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay
since June 12, 1945.

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