I. Cases relating to the Civil Code Provisions on Environment (R.A. No.

386)
G.R. No. L-65935 September 30, 1988
FILINVEST
CREDIT
CORPORATION,
petitioner,
vs.
THE
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and NESTOR B. SUGA JR.,
respondents.
Labaguis, Loyola, Angara Law Offices for petitioner.
Juan C. Navarro, Jr. for private respondent.
Ponente: Sarmiento, J.
FACTS:
Nestor B. Sunga, Jr. filed in the trial court a case for damages. Sunga
alleged that he purchased a minivan from Motor Center, Inc. on March 21, 1978
and executed a promissory note to cover the amount of P62, 592.00 payable
monthly in the amount of P2,608.00 for 24 months due and payable the 1st day of
each month starting May 1, 1978 thru and inclusive of May 1, 1980. In addition,
he also executed a chattel mortgage in favour of the Motor Center, Inc. The chattel
mortgage was assigned to the Filinvest Credit Corporation which was confirmed
by the Sunga.
On October 21, 1978, the minivan was seized by the Filinvest Credit
Corporation on account of Sungas delinquency on account of a balance which was
already past its due. Sungas accounts were verified and it was found out that said
accounts are in order and the minivan was, therefore, returned to Sunga.
The following was the trial courts decision:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby renders judgment
as follows, to wit:
(1) ORDERING the defendant Filinvest Credit Corporation to pay the
plaintiff Nestor Sunga Jr. the following damages, to wit:
(a) Moral Damages P30,000.00
(b) Loss on Income of the minibus for three days 600.00
(c) Actual damages 500.00
(d) Litigation expenses 5,000.00
(e) Attorney's Fees 10,000.00
(2) And to pay the costs.
The Filinvest Credit Corporation filed an appeal to the Intermediate
Appelate Court (now Court of Appeals). The Intermediate Appelate Court
affirmed the decision of the trial court except with regard to moral damages. Said
court increased the moral damages from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00. Thus, the
Filinvest Credit Corporation filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court stating that the respondent court committed a grave abuse of
discretion in increasing extravagantly the award of moral damages.

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ISSUE:
Whether the Intermediate Appelate court committed a grave abuse of
discretion in increasing extravagantly the award of moral damages.
HELD:
According to the court, "Well settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that
whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case an appellee who has not himself
appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than
the ones granted in the decision of the court below." The respondent court
disregarded the said rule by increasing the moral damages which is an indication of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the court held
that the Intermediate Appelate court committed a grave abuse of discretion in
increasing extravagantly the award of moral damages. The court granted the
petition and modified the questioned decision of the Intermediate Appelate Court.
The award of moral damages is REDUCED to P10,000.00.

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G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, Presiding Judge RTC, Branch
127, Caloocan City, HON. MACARIO A. ASISTIO, JR., City Mayor of
Caloocan and/or THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN, respondents.
Alberto N. Hidalgo and Ma. Teresa T. Oledan for petitioner.
The City Legal Officer & Chief, Law Department for Mayor Macario A. Asistio,
Jr. and the City Government of Caloocan.
Ponente: Romero, J.
FACTS:
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) received a complaint from the
Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin,
Caloocan City against the dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay
Camarin authorized by the City Government because such open garbage dumpsite
endangers the health, safety, and welfare of the residents therein and the sanitation
and quality of the water in the area brought about by exposure to pollution. Thus,
LLDA conducted an investigation on the site and found that the City Government
of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite without securing an
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environmental and Natural
Resources, as required under Presidential Decree No. 1586, and clearance from
LLDA as required under Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 813 and Executive No. 927, series of 1983.
Acting on the complaint, LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order ordering
the City Government of Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila Authority, their
contractors, and other entities, to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping
any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite. The
City Government complied but later on, resumed the dumping of garbage.
The City Government assailed the authority of LLDA in its capacity to issue
a Cease and Desist Order against it. The Court of Appeals affirmed the position of
the City Government stating, the Laguna Lake Development Authority has no
power and authority to issue a cease and desist order under its enabling law,
Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive No. 927, series
of 1983. Hence, LLDA filed a petition for review of certiorari.
ISSUES:
A. Does the LLDA, under its Charter and its amendatory laws, have the
authority to entertain the complaint against the dumping of garbage in the
open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin?
B. Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist"
order under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws?

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HELD:
A. Yes. The court held that the adjudication of pollution cases generally
pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where
the special law provides for another forum. It must be recognized in this
regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically
mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out
and make effective the declared national policy of promoting and
accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area
and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San
Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and adequate
provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the
quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue
ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad
grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter,
obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna
Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the
discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In carrying out the
aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others, to
pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects
proposed by local government offices/agencies within the region, public
corporations, and private persons or enterprises where such plans, programs
and/or projects are related to those of the LLDA for the development of the
region.
LLDAs jurisdiction under its charter was validly invoked by the
filling of the letter-complaint from the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our
Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.
B. Yes. The court held that The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA
requiring the City Government of Caloocan to stop dumping its garbage in
the Camarin open dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been done in
violation of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, and other relevant
environment laws, cannot be stamped as an unauthorized exercise by the
LLDA of injunctive powers. By its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as
amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983,
authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or modify order requiring the
discontinuance or pollution." (Emphasis supplied) Section 4, par. (d)
explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in
the exercise of its jurisdiction.

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G.R. Nos. L-66870-72

June 29, 1985

AGAPITO MAGBANUA, INENIAS MARTIZANO, CARLITO HERRERA,

SR., PAQUITO LOPEZ, AND FRANCISCO HERRERA, petitioners, vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (SECOND SPECIAL CASES
DIVISION), EDUARDO, BUTCH, DIEGO AND NENA All Surnamed
PEREZ, respondents.
Romulo A. Deles for petitioner.
Jose Valmayor for respondents.
Ponente: Abad Santos, J.
FACTS:
The petitioners claimed that they were share tenants of the defendants. The
defendants diverted the free flow of water from their farm lots which caused
portions of their landholdings to dry up to their great damage and prejudice. The
petitioners were also told to vacate their respective areas for they could not plant
palay any longer due to lack of water. The petitioners prayed that the defendants
be ordered to pay attorneys fees and damages.
The trial court granted the petition. The trial court stated that, under the
law, the landowner has an obligation to keep the tenant in the peaceful and
continuous cultivation of his landholding. A disturbance of possession, such as the
act complained of, is violative of the law.
The trial court rendered held that:
WHEREFORE, coherent with the foregoing, this Court, in judgment, hereby:
1) Declares all the plaintiffs in the above-entitled cases to be maintained as
agricultural lessees in peaceful cultivation in their respective landholdings;
2) Prohibits defendants from closing and/or disrupting the free flow of water
supplying plaintiffs' landholdings;
3) Declares the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued on February 23, 1982 to
be permanent;
4) Orders plaintiffs to seek the assistance of the Ministry of Agrarian Reforms
in the fixing of their lease rentals;
5) Orders the defendants to pay all the six plaintiffs in the above-entitled cases
individually moral and exemplary damages in the sum of TEN THOUSAND
(P10,000.00) PESOS, each;
6) Orders the defendants to pay the attorney's fees in the amount of P5,000.00;
and
7) Dismiss all other claims and counterclaims of the parties for lack of merit
(Rollo, pp. 28-29.)
The defendants herein appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. The
Intermediate Appellate Court stated, We are not inclined to sustain the award of
moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees. There is no evidence
showing that, in dealing with plaintiffs, defendants acted fraudulently or in bad
faith. There is no showing either that attorneys fees are recoverable under Art.
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2298, Civil Code. Thus, the petitioners prayed for the reinstatement of the moral
and exemplary damages and the attorneys fees.
ISSUE:
Whether the plaintiffs should be awarded moral and exemplary damages and
the attorneys fees.
HELD:
The court held that the petitioners should be awarded moral and exemplary
damages and the attorneys fees. Article 2219 of the Civil Code permits the award
of moral damages for acts mentioned in Article 21 of the same code and the latter
stipulates that: Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damage. The act of the defendants for denying the irrigation
water was done for the petitioners to vacate their areas. Thus, the defendants
violated the rights of the petitioners and caused prejudice to the latter. The
petitioners are also entitled to exemplary damages because the defendants acted in
an oppressive manner. (See Art. 2232. Civil Code.) They are also entitled to
attorneys fees in view of the foregoing.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the decision under review is
modified and each of the plaintiffs is entitled to the following to be paid by the
defendants jointly and severally:
Moral damages
Exemplarly damages
Attorney's fees

P1,000.00
P500.00
P1,000.00
P2,500.00

The costs shall be assessed against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed
OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA
OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents
CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and
PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents
ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor,
represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II
and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by
their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN,
minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE
MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA
VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor,
represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA
DESAMPARADO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA
DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by
his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA.
MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE,
all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and
AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE
and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents
MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE
VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents
BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all
surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and
MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed
CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA
CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all
surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and
MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH
JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE
MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL
and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents
FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE
ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE
ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66,
respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
Ponente: Davide, Jr., J.
FACTS:
The petitioners, as a taxpayers class suit, instituted a complaint and
alleged that the they are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers,
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and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure
that is the countrys virgin tropical forests. The complaint was filed for
themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said
resource but are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the
court. The petitioners also stated that they represent not only their generation but
also the generations yet unborn.
Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
...ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in
his behalf to
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting
in his behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs . . . such other reliefs just and equitable under
the premises.
The petitioners also asserted that the adverse and detrimental consequences
of continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that
the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the case for the reason that the said
petitioners have no cause of action against him.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners have a cause of action.
HELD:
The court held that the petitioners have a cause of action. Under Sec.16, Art.
II of the 1987 Constitution which states, The State shall protect and advance the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm
and harmony of nature. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and
general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines.
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a
class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only
be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter
expounded, considers the rhythm and harmony of nature. Nature means the
created world in its entirety.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty
or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with
grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology;
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hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed
or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of
the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative
obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of
said legal right.
In view of the foregoing, the court found that there is a cause of action for
the petitioners.

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G.R. No. 74816

March 17, 1987

ERNESTO R. RODRIGUEZ, JR., ERNESTO LL. RODRIGUEZ III, SACHA

DEL ROSARIO, JOSE P. GENITO, ZENAIDA Z. RODRIGUEZ, and
ENECERIO MONDIA, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT and DAYTONA CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
Pelaez, Adriano & Gregorio Law Office for petitioners.
Balgos & Perez Law Office for respondents.
Ponente: Paras, J.
FACTS:
Plaintiffs filed an action for abatement of public nuisance against the
Daytona Construction and Development Corporation. Said defendant is a domestic
corporation which received a business permit from the City Government. The
business permit was issued for the manufacture of road and building concrete
materials such as concrete aggregates, with cement batching plant. Among the
conditions set forth in the permit are that the said batching plant shall (1) institute
measures to prevent dust emission during the manual charging of cement from
bags to the receiving hopper of the bucket elevator of the batching plant; (2)
remove all sediment deposit in the settling of tank for process water and proper
maintenance should be observed at all times. While the original permit issued to
the defendant stated that its operation at the place shall `not (be) beyond Dec. 31,
1979 xxx it was somehow allowed to operate way beyond said period.
According to the plaintiffs who live near the construction site, they suffered
from the pollution caused by the corporation. Their plants, trees, pets, and they,
themselves, are in distress. Thus, they filed an action for abatement of public
nuisance in the Trial Court. In response, the defendant filed a petition to dismiss
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and cause of action despite being granted four
extensions in the filing of their answers. The Intermediate Appellate Court ruled in
favour of the defendant.
ISSUE:
Whether the action for abatement of public nuisance should be granted.
HELD:
The court ruled in favour of the plaintiffs. The action for abatement of public
nuisance was therefore granted. The defendants actions are tainted with fraud.
The defendant intended to delay the case in order for it to continue its operation.
Thus, the court reinstated the decision of the trial court, Declaring the operation of
the cement batching plant of the defendant corporation as a nuisance and ordering
its permanent closure.

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II. General Environmental Laws

G.R. No. 94759

January 21, 1991

TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, HON. NARCISO T. ATIENZA as Presiding Judge, Bulacan, RTC,
and HON. VICENTE CRUZ, Acting Mayor and the MUNICIPALITY OF
STA. MARIA, BULACAN, respondents.
Diosdado P. Peralta for petitioner.
Ponente: Gancayco, J.
FACTS:
Plaintiff is a domestic private corporation engaged in the manufacture and
export of charcoal briquette. It was called upon by the acting mayor Cruz who
ordered the full cessation of the operation and requested the plaintiff to bring to
bring the following: a) Building permit; b) Mayor's permit; c) Region IIIPollution of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit; and of
other document. The plaintiff complied with all but one of the requirements. The
corporation failed to obtain the Mayors permit. In response, respondent acting
mayor ordered the Municipality's station commander to padlock the premises of
petitioner's plant, thus effectively causing the stoppage of its operation.
The plaintiff prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction alleging therein that the closure order was issued in grave abuse of
discretion. The trial court granted the issuance of the writ. Thus, the herein
defendants filed a petition on review for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether the corporation should be allowed to continue.
HELD:
The court ruled that the corporation should not be allowed to continue. No
mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of determining
whether there is a pollution of the environment that requires control if not
prohibition of the operation of a business is essentially addressed to the then
National Pollution Control Commission of the Ministry of Human Settlements,
now the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, it must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much
responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue of his police
power, he may deny the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise
close the same unless appropriate measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury
to the health of the residents of the community from the emissions in the operation
of the business. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an
investigation was made by Marivic Guina who in her report of December 8, 1988
observed that the fumes emitted by the plant of petitioner goes directly to the
surrounding houses and that no proper air pollution device has been installed.
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G.R. No. 145328 March 23, 2006

EDUARDO F. HERNANDEZ, MA. ENCARBACION R. LEGASPI, JAIME
BLANCO, JR., ENRIQUE BELO, CARLOS VIAPLANA, CARL FURER,
VIVENCIO TINIO, MICHAEL BRIGGS, ROSA CARAM, FAUSTO
PREYSLER,
ROBERT
KUA,
GEORGE
LEE,
GUILLERMO
LUCHANGCO, PETER DEE, LUISA MARQUEZ, ANGELITA LILLES,
JUAN CARLOS, HOMER GO, AMADEO VALENZUELA, EMILIO
CHING, ANTONIO CHAN, MURLI SABNANI, MARCOS ROCES,
RAYMUNDO FELICIANO, NORMA GAFFUD, ALF HOLST, LOURDES P.
ROQUE, MANUEL DY, RAUL FERNANDEZ, VICTORIA TENGCO, CHI
MO CHENG, BARANGAY DASMARIAS, and HON. FRANCISCO B.
IBAY, petitioners vs. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, respondent
Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J.
FACTS:
National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) began construction of 29
decagon-shaped steel poles or towers with a height of 53.4 meters to support
overhead high tension cables in connection with its 230 Kilovolt Sucat-AranetaBalintawak Power Transmission Project in 1996. Out of concern, the plaintiffs,
residents of Dasmarias Village, researched for the possible effects of the said
construction. They found out that there are health risks linked to exposure to
electromagnetic radiation. They filed a writ of preliminary injunction against
NAPOCOR to stay the latter from energizing and transmitting high voltage
electric current through its cables erected from Sucat, Paraaque to Araneta Ave.,
Quezon City. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favour of them. However,
NAPOCOR appealed assailing that the Regional Trial Court cannot issue a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction under Presidential Decree
No. 1818. Court of Appeals ruled in favour of NAPOCOR.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court may issue a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction.
HELD:
The court ruled in affirmative. Sec. 15, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution
states that, The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people
and instill consciousness among them. What Presidential Decree No. 1818 aims
to avert is the untimely frustration of government infrastructure projects,
particularly by provisional remedies, to the detriment of the greater good by
disrupting the pursuit of essential government projects or frustrate the economic
development effort of the nation. Presidential Decree No. 1818, however, was not
meant to be a blanket prohibition so as to disregard the fundamental right to health,
safety and well-being of a community guaranteed by the fundamental law of the
land

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G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987

VALENTIN L. LEGASPI, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
respondent.
Ponente: Cortes, J.
FACTS:
The petitioner invoked the right to be informed under the Constitution. The
petitioner seeks to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and
Mariano Agas who are employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of
Cebu City. The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to
information of public concern is a recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of
ideas and information in a democracy (Baldoza v. Dimaano, Adm. Matter No.
1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 17 SCRA 14). In the same way that free discussion enables
members of society to cope with the exigencies of their time (Thornhill vs.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,102 [1939]), access to information of general interest aids
the people in democratic decision-making (87 Harvard Law Review 1505 [1974])
by giving them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation.
But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public
concern is not absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information.
Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to
limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law
may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as
those affecting national security (Journal No. 90, September 23, 1986, p. 10; and
Journal No. 91, September 24, 1986, p. 32, 1986 Constitutional Commission). It
follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular public record
must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of
public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by
law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.
ISSUE:
Whether the information sought is of public interest or public concern.
HELD:
The court ruled in affirmative. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to
determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or
importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the
claim of certain government employees that they are civil service eligibles for the
positions to which they were appointed. The Constitution expressly declares as a
State policy that:
Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness
to be determined, as far as practicable, and except as to positions which are policy
determining, primarily confidential or highly technical, by competitive
examination. (Art. IX, B, Sec. 2.[2]).
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Public office being a public trust, [Const. Art. XI, Sec. 1] it is the legitimate
concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service
eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles. Public officers are at all
times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their respective
positions. The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and
in the absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the register of
civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent Commission to
confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position
becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies.
WHEREFORE, the Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its
register of eligibles for the position of sanitarian, and to confirm or deny, the civil
service eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, for said position in the
Health Department of Cebu City, as requested by the petitioner Valentin L.
Legaspi.

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