Professional Documents
Culture Documents
A. Source
The following material is excerpted from a guide on Directors' Responsibilities and Liabilities by Osler Hoskin
& Harcourt LLP.
The role of directors is one of stewardship. Directors are responsible for managing or, under
some statutes, supervising the management of, the corporation. If the Board of Directors is
dissatisfied with company management, its recourse is through the company's CEO. If the
CEO is not performing as expected, the Board may replace him. 1
Shareholders make a financial investment in the corporation, which entitles those with
voting shares to elect the directors. Shareholders do not normally have any rights to be
involved directly in company management. Their connection to company management is
typically via the Board of Directors as described above. If shareholders are not satisfied
with the performance of the directors, they may remove the directors or refuse to re-elect
them.
Except for certain fundamental transactions or changes, shareholders normally do not participate directly in
corporate decision-making and while, as a practical matter, boards want to know the views of the
shareholders, strictly speaking, directors are not normally required to solicit or comply with the wishes of
shareholders.
C. Duties of Directors
A director's duty is owed first and foremost to the corporation. This duty is grounded in basic principles of
good faith, stewardship and accountability. Requirements imposed both by common law and various statutes
seek to establish the parameters of this duty without limiting the flexibility of these principles.
1. To Whom are Directors Accountable?
Directors are required by corporate statutes to discharge their duties with a view to the best interests of
the corporation. Traditionally, this phrase has been interpreted to extend only to the shareholders as a
whole. However, in reaching their decisions, directors are often confronted with a number of competing
interests. In recent years, some courts have been prepared to give directors more scope in considering the
interests of different persons affected by corporate acts without encroaching on the principle of acting in the
corporation's best interests.
The courts recognize that acting with a view to the best interests of the corporation does not mean that
directors must disregard the interests of stakeholders such as employees, creditors, and the community or
country in which the corporation carries on business who may be affected by the actions of the corporation.
Considering these interests is often in the long-term best interests of the corporation. Nevertheless, no court
has ever recognized a duty to such stakeholders.
2. Directors Duty to the Interests of the Shareholders
Courts have held that directors owe a duty to the corporation and not its individual shareholders. In many
instances, the distinction is not significant, since what is good for the corporation will also benefit its
shareholders. Maximizing the return to shareholders is also, in many cases, consistent with the best
Directors who are also substantial shareholders of the corporation are not automatically in a position of
conflict. Such directors must, however, separate their role as directors from their interests as shareholders.
In voting on matters in their capacity as shareholders, those directors may, of course, vote without regard
for the interests of other shareholders. In voting as directors, however, they must still act in the best
interests of the corporation in respect of any matter before them.
The corporate statutes require directors to disclose in writing to the corporation their interest in any material
contract or to request that the interest be entered in the minutes of a meeting of the board.
Whether the contract is material will be determined with reference to the materiality threshold of the
corporation.
The nature of a director's interest must be disclosed in sufficient detail to allow the other directors to
understand what the interest is and how far it goes. A director's interest must also be disclosed within the
timeframe prescribed by the relevant corporate statute.
2. Voting and Abstaining from Voting
Directors cannot normally vote on a contract in which they have a material interest. There are exceptions for
contracts that involve the directors' remuneration or an indemnity in which they have an interest. Exceptions
are also made if the contract in question relates to security for money lent to the director or obligations
undertaken by the director for the benefit of the corporation or if it relates to an affiliate of the corporation.
As a result of this last exception, directors who serve on boards of affiliated corporations are not required to
refrain from voting on contracts between the two corporations that they serve.
Two results may flow from a director's failure to disclose an interest in a material contract or, in some cases,
from voting when not entitled to do so. First, the director may be required to account to the corporation or
its shareholders for any gain or profit realized from the contract. Second, the corporation, its shareholders
or, in some cases, securities regulators, may apply to the court to have the contract set aside. Under some
statutes, the director may nevertheless avoid these results if the contract is confirmed or approved by
special resolution of the shareholders after appropriate disclosure of the director's interest in the contract. If
the director failed to make the necessary disclosure and the contract was not reasonable and fair to the
corporation at the time it was approved by the shareholders, there is no protection for the director under the
corporate statute.
Directors should be aware that the specific provisions in the corporate statutes dealing with a director who is
in a position of conflict apply only in relatively limited circumstances. They apply only to certain contracts or
proposed contracts with the corporation and would, arguably, not include litigation, for example. Further,
these provisions apply only to contracts that are material to the corporation, not to contracts that do not
meet this threshold.
In practice, however, most directors apply the rules broadly. They do not confine the restrictions to the
statutory requirements, but concern themselves with the issue of perceived, and actual, conflict and what
seems to be the right thing to do. In practice, directors will take themselves completely out of the
consideration of a particular matter where there may be a perception of conflict or a perception that they
may not bring objective judgment to the consideration of the matter. In appropriate circumstances, directors
will declare their position and absent themselves not only from the vote, but also the discussion. However,
directors should be aware that abstaining from voting, except in certain limited circumstances, may not
protect them from liability under the corporate statutes. In particularly difficult situations, it may be
necessary or appropriate for a director to resign.
Adding or removing any restrictions on the business that the corporation may carry on;
If a fundamental change affects holders of certain series of classes of shares differently than others, the
change must also be approved by a majority of the series or class of shares whose existing rights may be
affected by the change, whether or not the shares otherwise carry voting rights.
As noted above, public corporations must also comply with the requirements of the provincial securities
commissions and the stock exchanges which impose requirements for shareholder approval.
Finally, there may be issues which the directors determine should be put to the shareholders as a matter of
good corporate governance, whether or not they are legally required to do so. The issue of whether
shareholder approval was necessary to put a shareholder rights plan in place was commonly debated when
shareholder rights plans first came into use in Canada. A number of boards of directors determined that the
advice of the shareholders through a shareholders' vote was essential well before the view of the regulators
to the same effect was known. Similar considerations will certainly arise in the future in the context of other
decisions facing public companies.
2. Shareholder Ability to Change the Board
Shareholders who are dissatisfied with how the directors are running the corporation may remove the
directors or refuse to re-elect them. In practice, this may be a difficult course to take, particularly where the
shares of the corporation are widely held.
Although the corporate statutes require a corporation to provide a list of shareholders to any shareholder
who requests it, thereby enabling shareholders to mount a proxy battle over the election of directors, many
shareholders do not have the time or resources required to counter a management proposal. The exceptions
are large institutional investors who have, on occasion, made their voices heard at annual meetings or in
private meetings with representatives of a corporation prior to a shareholder meeting.
Occasionally, proxy battles do occur which result in the replacement of the board of directors.
Note: Especially in private companies involving venture capital investment, it is not uncommon for certain
decisions that are normally made by the Board of Directors to require venture capital investor approval. A
common example are key management decisions and financing decisions.
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