Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC

TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC

CITATION: 248 SCRA 300
FACTS:
Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in
Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant
Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in
St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she
taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952
to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the
House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos
when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a
voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in
San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won
presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San
Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor
of Metro Manila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the
First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same
position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the
Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional
requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote
seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words
"since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on
March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her
domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact
that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be
eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte.
HELD:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court
are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal residence or
domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months
residency in the district for the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of
origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of
domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and
establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the
absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to
continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term
residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When
Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and
merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired
right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon
returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of

origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence
certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act,
which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close
ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other
important milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary
residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the
First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May
7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is
hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner
as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest [G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for ViceMayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of
votes. However, his proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for
disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a citizen
of the Philippines but of the United States.
From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US
citizen.
The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said
elective position.
However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification
of the respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US
citizenship when he attained the age of majority and registered himself as a voter
in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August
31, 1998.
Thus the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the
philippines.
RULING:
The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A.
7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship
is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers
to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty
to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a
result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by

law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject
to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with
dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons
with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear
allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby
terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of
the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced
his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.
When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he
renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares
that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition
imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such
renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law
lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter
should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic.
No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and application.
The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to
renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he
might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is
a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another
country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and
bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental
reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he
may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines,
when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood,
received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past
elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking
made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for
declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate
proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the denial of entry
into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a
naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and
declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese
national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing
Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does
some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Maquiling v. COMELEC ( Sereno, April 16, 2013) Facts:

Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.

3
However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the
United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for
repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of
the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008.
4
On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition was issued in his favor.
5

On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states:

On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of

Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua),
another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to
cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections.
9

Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao

del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the
Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as
"USA-American."
10
To further bolster his claim of Arnados US citizenship, Balua presented in his
Memorandum a computer-generated travel record
11
dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport
No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines.

On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order

13
requiring the respondent to personally file his answer and memorandum within
three (3) days from receipt thereof.

After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default
and to present evidence ex-parte.

Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections
where Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently
proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer,
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION:

Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of

candidacy based on misrepresentation,
15
the COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification. The First
Division disagreed with Arnados claim that he is a Filipino citizen.
18
The Court ruled that Arnados act of consistently using his US passport after
renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of
Renunciation.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of

Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010
elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion
for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnados Amended Motion for
Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly
disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local
Government Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that
the cancellation of Arnados candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation,
Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful
votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC:
ruled in favor of arnado

Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado
qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a US passport, There
are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be addressed
seriatim as the subsequent questions hinge on the result of the first. Issues: 1.
whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case. 2. whether or not
the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to
undoing a renunciation earlier made. 3. whether or not the rule on succession in
the Local Government Code is applicable to this case.
SC:
1.

Intervention of a rival candidate in a disqualification case is proper when there

has not yet been any proclamation of the winner.
2.
The use of foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is a positive
and voluntary act of representation as to ones nationality and citizenship; it does
not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.

Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30
November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times,
actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed.
By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented
himself as an American,

Arnados category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is

acquired through a positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from
those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to
take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy
already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship.
39
Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only
the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally
renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public office.

By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado

was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American
citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code,
40
he was not qualified to run for a local electiv . 3. The rule on Succession under
LGC is not applicable.
Maquiling is not a second-placer as he obtained the highest number of votes from
among the qualified candidates.

Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes

45
which is the jurisprudential spring of the principle that a second-placer cannot be
proclaimed as the winner in an election contest. This doctrine must be reexamined and its soundness once again put to the test to address the everrecurring issue that a second-placer who loses to an ineligible candidate cannot
be proclaimed as the winner in the elections.


The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory
cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when
the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast
ballots."
47

This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court
was comparing "the effect of a

decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or

irregularities in the elections x x x with that produced by declaring a person
ineligible to hold such an office."

A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court
of First Instance is without jurisdiction to try a disqualification case based on the
eligibility of the person who obtained the highest number of votes in the election,
its jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the contestants has been
duly elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared that no one
had been legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general
election held in that town on 4 June 1912" where "the only question raised was
whether or not Topacio was eligible to be elected and to hold the office of
municipal president."

The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second
placer cannot be proclaimed in his stead. An ineligible candidate who receives the
highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express legal mandate, he could
not even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of
material time or any other intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might not
have been passed upon prior to election date. Consequently, he may have had
the opportunity to hold himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly
qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his
ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain
to his qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public
office. The number of ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to
qualify with the substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for public office.

The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the
candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the
deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the
Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and
renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.
51
(Emphasis supplied)


It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the
ballot by ensuring that its exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign
voice spoken through the ballot to trump constitutional and statutory provisions
on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or
republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the
electorates voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it
precisely serves as an open invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.
1wphi1

With Arnados disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election
as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.

We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC

54
and Jalosjos v. COMELEC
55
that a void COC cannot produce any legal effect.

Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all
in determining the winner of an election.

Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the
electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an
ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the
sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form
part of that voice and must also be respected.

There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC

56
that when the voters are well aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidates
disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible
candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected.
That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting
qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.

The electorates awareness of the candidates disqualification is not a

prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence
of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the
electorate of a candidates disqualification is not necessary before a qualified

candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the

winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the
qualified candidates.

That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed
office is of no moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive
ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only
the COC but also the proclamation.

The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnados candidacy involves his

citizenship. It does not involve the commission of election offenses as provided for
in the first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of
which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has
already been elected, from holding the office.

The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. With Arnado

being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus
rendered void from the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal
effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior
to the elections because he filed his answer to the petition when the elections
were conducted already and he was already proclaimed the winner.

Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches back to
the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate
at all in the May 201 0 elections.

Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been
counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the
highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local
Government Code will not apply.

G.R. No. 176947

February 19, 2009

GAUDENCIO M. CORDORA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and GUSTAVO S. TAMBUNTING, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
In EO Case No. 05-17, Gaudencio M. Cordora (Cordora) accused Gustavo S.
Tambunting (Tambunting) of an election offense for violating Section 74 in relation
to Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code. The Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) En Banc dismissed Cordoras complaint in a Resolution1 dated 18

August 2006. The present petition seeks to reverse the 18 August 2006 Resolution
as well as the Resolution2 dated 20 February 2007 of the COMELEC En Banc which
denied Cordoras motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
In his complaint affidavit filed before the COMELEC Law Department, Cordora
asserted that Tambunting made false assertions in the following items:
That Annex A [Tambuntings Certificate of Candidacy for the 2001 elections] and
Annex B [Tambuntings Certificate of Candidacy for the 2004 elections] state,
among others, as follows, particularly Nos. 6, 9 and 12 thereof:
1. No. 6 I am a Natural Born/Filipino Citizen
2. No. 9 No. of years of Residence before May 14, 2001.
36 in the Philippines and 25 in the Constituency where I seek to be
elected;
3. No. 12 I am ELIGIBLE for the office I seek to be elected. 3 (Boldface and
capitalization in the original)
Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local public office
because Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and residency requirements.
To disprove Tambuntings claim of being a natural-born Filipino citizen, Cordora
presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration which stated that, in two
instances, Tambunting claimed that he is an American: upon arrival in the
Philippines on 16 December 2000 and upon departure from the Philippines on 17
June 2001. According to Cordora, these travel dates confirmed that Tambunting
acquired American citizenship through naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii on 2
December 2000. Cordora concluded:
That Councilor Gustavo S. Tambunting contrary to the provision of Sec 74 (OEC):
[sic] Re: CONTENTS OF CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY: which requires the
declarant/affiant to state, among others, under oath, that he is a Filipino (No.
6), No. 9- residence requirement which he lost when [he was] naturalized as
an American Citizen on December 2, 2000 at [sic] Honolulu, Hawaii, knowingly
and willfully affirmed and reiterated that he possesses the above basic
requirements under No. 12 that he is indeed eligible for the office to
which he seeks to be elected, when in truth and in fact, the contrary is
indubitably established by his own statements before the Philippine Bureau of
Immigration x x x.4 (Emphases in the original)
Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he did not make any
misrepresentation in his certificates of candidacy. To refute Cordoras claim that
Tambunting is not a natural-born Filipino, Tambunting presented a copy of his birth
certificate which showed that he was born of a Filipino mother and an American
father. Tambunting further denied that he was naturalized as an American citizen.
The certificate of citizenship conferred by the US government after Tambuntings
father petitioned him through INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) merely
confirmed Tambuntings citizenship which he acquired at birth. Tambuntings
possession of an American passport did not mean that Tambunting is not a Filipino
citizen. Tambunting also took an oath of allegiance on 18 November 2003
pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), or the Citizenship Retention
and Reacquisition Act of 2003.
Tambunting further stated that he has resided in the Philippines since birth.
Tambunting has imbibed the Filipino culture, has spoken the Filipino language, and
has been educated in Filipino schools. Tambunting maintained that proof of his

loyalty and devotion to the Philippines was shown by his service as councilor of
Paraaque.
To refute Cordoras claim that the number of years of residency stated in
Tambuntings certificates of candidacy is false because Tambunting lost his
residency because of his naturalization as an American citizen, Tambunting
contended that the residency requirement is not the same as citizenship.
The Ruling of the COMELEC Law Department
The COMELEC Law Department recommended the dismissal of Cordoras
complaint against Tambunting because Cordora failed to substantiate his charges
against Tambunting. Cordoras reliance on the certification of the Bureau of
Immigration that Tambunting traveled on an American passport is not sufficient to
prove that Tambunting is an American citizen.
The Ruling of the COMELEC En Banc
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and the resolution of the COMELEC
Law Department. The COMELEC En Banc was convinced that Cordora failed to
support his accusation against Tambunting by sufficient and convincing evidence.
The dispositive portion of the COMELEC En Bancs Resolution reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED for
insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause.
SO ORDERED.5
Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento (Commissioner Sarmiento) wrote a separate
opinion which concurred with the findings of the En Banc Resolution.
Commissioner Sarmiento pointed out that Tambunting could be considered a dual
citizen. Moreover, Tambunting effectively renounced his American citizenship
when he filed his certificates of candidacy in 2001 and 2004 and ran for public
office.
Cordora filed a motion for reconsideration which raised the same grounds and the
same arguments in his complaint. In its Resolution promulgated on 20 February
2007, the COMELEC En Banc dismissed Cordoras motion for reconsideration for
lack of merit.
The Issue
Cordora submits that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared that there is no
sufficient evidence to support probable cause that may warrant the prosecution of
Tambunting for an election offense.
Cordoras petition is not an action to disqualify Tambunting because of
Tambuntings failure to meet citizenship and residency requirements. Neither is
the present petition an action to declare Tambunting a non-Filipino and a nonresident. The present petition seeks to prosecute Tambunting for knowingly
making untruthful statements in his certificates of candidacy.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit. We affirm the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc.
Whether there is Probable Cause to Hold Tambunting for Trial for Having
Committed an Election Offense

There was no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC En Bancs ruling that
there is no sufficient and convincing evidence to support a finding of probable
cause to hold Tambunting for trial for violation of Section 74 in relation to Section
262 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Probable cause constitutes those facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed. Determining probable cause is an intellectual activity premised on the
prior physical presentation or submission of documentary or testimonial proofs
either confirming, negating or qualifying the allegations in the complaint. 6
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code reads as follows:
Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall
state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated
therein and that he is eligible for said office; x x x the political party to which he
belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all
election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend
the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily,
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
xxx
The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix his latest photograph,
passport size; a statement in duplicate containing his bio-data and program of
government not exceeding one hundred words, if he so desires.
Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other hand, provides that
violation of Section 74, among other sections in the Code, shall constitute an
election offense.
Tambuntings Dual Citizenship
Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino mother and an American
father. Neither does he deny that he underwent the process involved in INS Form
I-130 (Petition for Relative) because of his fathers citizenship. Tambunting claims
that because of his parents differing citizenships, he is both Filipino and American
by birth. Cordora, on the other hand, insists that Tambunting is a naturalized
American citizen.
We agree with Commissioner Sarmientos observation that Tambunting possesses
dual citizenship. Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer
necessary for Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to acquire
American citizenship. The process involved in INS Form I-130 only served to
confirm the American citizenship which Tambunting acquired at birth. The
certification from the Bureau of Immigration which Cordora presented contained
two trips where Tambunting claimed that he is an American. However, the same
certification showed nine other trips where Tambunting claimed that he is Filipino.
Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of his certificate
of candidacy before the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual
citizenship did not disqualify him from running for public office. 7
Requirements for dual citizens from birth who desire to run for public
office

We deem it necessary to reiterate our previous ruling in Mercado v. Manzano,

wherein we ruled that dual citizenship is not a ground for disqualification from
running for any elective local position.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises
when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more
states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For
instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of
a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which
follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any
voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the
following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which
follow the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by
the laws of their fathers country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former
are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to
have renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without
performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are
clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While
dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals
volition.
xxx
[I]n including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional
Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who
maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.
Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854,
20 must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently, persons
with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike
those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict
process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates
with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate
their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their
condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different
states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the
Constitutional Commission, pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship is just a reality
imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other
countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is
considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our
control."
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear
allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby
terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of
the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced
his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the following discussion on 40(d)
between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:

SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17:
"Any person with dual citizenship" is disqualified to run for any elective local
position. Under the present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is
a citizen of the Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of
the Republic. There is no requirement that such a natural-born citizen, upon
reaching the age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to
the country of his or her father and one belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines, may such a situation disqualify the person to run for a local
government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment
when he would want to run for public office, he has to repudiate one of his
citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of
origin or the country of the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen,?
No one can renounce. There are such countries in the world.1avvphi1
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would,
in effect, be an election for him of his desire to be considered a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require
an election. Under the Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the
Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the
Gentlemans example, if he does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is
opening himself to question. So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing he
should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: "I am a Filipino citizen, and
I have only one citizenship."
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr.
President. He will always have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested
upon him or her in the Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will
prove that he also acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall
under this disqualification.8 (Emphasis supplied)
We have to consider the present case in consonance with our rulings in Mercado
v. Manzano,9 Valles v. COMELEC,10 and AASJS v. Datumanong.11 Mercado and
Valles involve similar operative facts as the present case. Manzano and Valles, like
Tambunting, possessed dual citizenship by the circumstances of their birth.
Manzano was born to Filipino parents in the United States which follows the
doctrine of jus soli. Valles was born to an Australian mother and a Filipino father in
Australia. Our rulings in Manzano and Valles stated that dual citizenship is
different from dual allegiance both by cause and, for those desiring to run for
public office, by effect. Dual citizenship is involuntary and arises when, as a result
of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person
is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Thus, like any other
natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a person with dual citizenship who seeks
public office to file his certificate of candidacy and swear to the oath of allegiance
contained therein. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, is brought about by the
individuals active participation in the naturalization process. AASJS states that,
under R.A. No. 9225, a Filipino who becomes a naturalized citizen of another
country is allowed to retain his Filipino citizenship by swearing to the supreme
authority of the Republic of the Philippines. The act of taking an oath of allegiance
is an implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizens foreign citizenship.

R.A. No. 9225, or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, was
enacted years after the promulgation of Manzano and Valles. The oath found in
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 reads as follows:
I __________ , solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby
declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and
will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation
upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
In Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual
citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. 12 Section 5(3)
of R.A. No. 9225 states that naturalized citizens who reacquire Filipino citizenship
and desire to run for elective public office in the Philippines shall "meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath" aside from the oath of allegiance
prescribed in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. The twin requirements of swearing to an
Oath of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship served as
the bases for our recent rulings in Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC,13 Velasco v.
COMELEC,14 and Japzon v. COMELEC,15 all of which involve natural-born Filipinos
who later became naturalized citizens of another country and thereafter ran for
elective office in the Philippines. In the present case, Tambunting, a natural-born
Filipino, did not subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another country.
Hence, the twin requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to him.
Tambuntings residency
Cordora concluded that Tambunting failed to meet the residency requirement
because of Tambuntings naturalization as an American. Cordoras reasoning fails
because Tambunting is not a naturalized American. Moreover, residency, for the
purpose of election laws, includes the twin elements of the fact of residing in a
fixed place and the intention to return there permanently,16 and is not dependent
upon citizenship.
In view of the above, we hold that Cordora failed to establish that Tambunting
indeed willfully made false entries in his certificates of candidacy. On the contrary,
Tambunting sufficiently proved his innocence of the charge filed against him.
Tambunting is eligible for the office which he sought to be elected and fulfilled the
citizenship and residency requirements prescribed by law.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections En Banc dated 18 August 2006 and 20 February 2007 in
EO Case No. 05-17.
SO ORDERED.

Lonzanida vs COMELEC [311 SCRA 602]

Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011
(Local Government, Disqualification: Exception to the 3 term limit rule)
Facts: Petitioner Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms
as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 1995 elections. In
the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and
was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties
thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was contested by his opponent who filed an
election protest. The court rendered a judgment declaring the results of the said

election last May 8, 1995, as null and void on the ground that there was a failure
of election.
In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy for
mayor of San Antonio and was proclaimed winner. Prior proclamation, His
opponent timely filed a petition to disqualify him from running on the ground that
he had served three consecutive terms in the same post.
The COMELEC found that Lonzanidas assumption of office by virtue of his
proclamation in May 1995, although he was later unseated before the expiration
of the term, should be counted as service for one full term in computing the three
term limit under the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Hence,
COMELEC issued a resolution granting the petition for disqualification
Petitioner Lonzanida challenges the validity of the COMELEC resolutions
maintaining that he was duly elected mayor for only two consecutive terms and
that his assumption of office in 1995 cannot be counted as service of a term for
the purpose of applying the three term limit for local government officials,
because he was not the duly elected mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995
elections.
The private respondent maintains that the petitioners assumption of office in
1995 should be considered as service of one full term because he discharged the
duties of mayor for almost three years until March 1, 1998 or barely a few months
before the next mayoral elections.
Issue: WON petitioners assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales
from May 1995 to 1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the
purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local government officials.
Held: No. Section 8, Art. X of the Constitution provides that, the term of office of
elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law
shall be three years and no such officials shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.
Section 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) restates the same rule,
that: No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms
in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
The petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term
because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term.
Pursuant to the constitutional provision above, voluntary renunciation of a term
does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit;
conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the
full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The
petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not
by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of
execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from
office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not
fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
Digest: Villaber vs COMELEC
By nutshellgirl Posted in Digest: PubCor, Lawschool Tagged digest, law school,
pubcor Leave a comment
PABLO C. VILLABER, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and REP.
DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, respondents.
Subject: Public Corporation
Doctrine: Disqualification (Sec 40, LGC; Moral Turpitude)
FACTS: Petitioner Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas were rival candidates
for a congressional seat in the First District of Davao del Sur during the May 14,
2001 elections. Villaber filed his certificate of candidacy for Congressman on
February 19, 2001, while Cagas filed his on February 28, 2001.

On March 4, 2001, Cagas filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor
of COMELEC Davao del Sur, a consolidated petition to disqualify Villaber and to
cancel the latters certificate of candidacy due to the fact that Villaber was
convicted by the RTC for violation of BP22 and was sentenced to suffer 1 year
imprisonment. The check that bounced was in the sum of P100,000.00. Cagas
further alleged that this crime involves moral turpitude; hence, under Section 12
of the Omnibus Election Code, he is disqualified to run for any public office. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision. Undaunted, Villaber filed with this Court
a petition for review on certiorari assailing the CAs Decision. However, in its
Resolution of October 26, 1992, this Court (Third Division) dismissed the petition.
On February 2, 1993, our Resolution became final and executory. Cagas also
asserted that Villaber made a false material representation in his certificate of
candidacy that he is Eligible for the office I seek to be elected which false
statement is a ground to deny due course or cancel the said certificate pursuant
to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
In his answer to the disqualification suit, Villaber countered mainly that his
conviction has not become final and executory because the affirmed Decision was
not remanded to the trial court for promulgation in his presence. Furthermore,
even if the judgment of conviction was already final and executory, it cannot be
the basis for his disqualification since violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not involve
moral turpitude.
After the opposing parties submitted their respective position papers, the case
was forwarded to the COMELEC, Manila, for resolution.
On April 30, 2001, the COMELEC finding merit in Cagas petition, issued the
challenged Resolution declaring Villaber disqualified as a candidate for and from
holding any elective public office and canceling his certificate of candidacy. The
COMELEC ruled that a conviction for violation of B.P Blg. 22 involves moral
turpitude following the ruling of this Court en banc in the administrative case of
People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda. Villaber filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied by the COMELEC en banc in a Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: The sole issue for our Resolution is whether or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22
involves moral turpitude.
HELD: The COMELEC believes it is. In disqualifying petitioner Villaber from being a
candidate for Congressman, the COMELEC applied Section 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code which provides:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent
authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for
subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office,
unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed
upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence
had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service
of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
As to the meaning of moral turpitude, we have consistently adopted the
definition in Blacks Law Dictionary as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity
in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and
woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
In In re Vinzon,the term moral turpitude is considered as encompassing
everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals.
We, however, clarified in Dela Torre vs. Commission on Elections that not every
criminal act involves moral turpitude, and that as to what crime involves moral
turpitude is for the Supreme Court to determine.We further pronounced therein
that:
in International Rice Research Institute vs. NLRC, the Court admitted that it
cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by

merely classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum. In the final

analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question
of fact and frequently depends on the circumstances surrounding the case.
In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the facts and circumstances
surrounding the commission of the crime. In effect, he admits all the elements of
the crime for which he was convicted. At any rate, the question of whether or not
the crime involves moral turpitude can be resolved by analyzing its elements
alone, as we did in Dela Torre which involves the crime of fencing punishable by a
special law.
Petitioner was charged for violating B.P. Blg. 22 under the following Information:
That on or about February 13, 1986, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and
issue to Efren D. Sawal to apply on account or for value Bank of Philippine Islands
(Plaza Cervantes, Manila) Check No. 958214 dated February 13, 1986 payable to
Efren D. Sawal in the amount of P100,000.00, said accused well knowing that at
the time of issue he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check, when
presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds, and
despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Efren D.
Sawal the amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment of the
same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice. (Emphasis ours)
The elements of the offense under the above provision are:
1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value;
2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have
sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in
full upon its presentment; and
3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit, or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.[19]
The presence of the second element manifests moral turpitude. We held that a
conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imports deceit and certainly relates to
and affects the good moral character of a person.Thus, paraphrasing Blacks
definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his
private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted
and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals.
In fine, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent COMELEC
in issuing the assailed Resolutions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Digest: Villaber vs COMELEC
By nutshellgirl Posted in Digest: PubCor, Lawschool Tagged digest, law school,
pubcor Leave a comment
PABLO C. VILLABER, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and REP.
DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, respondents.
Subject: Public Corporation
Doctrine: Disqualification (Sec 40, LGC; Moral Turpitude)
FACTS: Petitioner Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas were rival candidates
for a congressional seat in the First District of Davao del Sur during the May 14,
2001 elections. Villaber filed his certificate of candidacy for Congressman on
February 19, 2001, while Cagas filed his on February 28, 2001.
On March 4, 2001, Cagas filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor
of COMELEC Davao del Sur, a consolidated petition to disqualify Villaber and to
cancel the latters certificate of candidacy due to the fact that Villaber was
convicted by the RTC for violation of BP22 and was sentenced to suffer 1 year
imprisonment. The check that bounced was in the sum of P100,000.00. Cagas
further alleged that this crime involves moral turpitude; hence, under Section 12

of the Omnibus Election Code, he is disqualified to run for any public office. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision. Undaunted, Villaber filed with this Court
a petition for review on certiorari assailing the CAs Decision. However, in its
Resolution of October 26, 1992, this Court (Third Division) dismissed the petition.
On February 2, 1993, our Resolution became final and executory. Cagas also
asserted that Villaber made a false material representation in his certificate of
candidacy that he is Eligible for the office I seek to be elected which false
statement is a ground to deny due course or cancel the said certificate pursuant
to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
In his answer to the disqualification suit, Villaber countered mainly that his
conviction has not become final and executory because the affirmed Decision was
not remanded to the trial court for promulgation in his presence. Furthermore,
even if the judgment of conviction was already final and executory, it cannot be
the basis for his disqualification since violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not involve
moral turpitude.
After the opposing parties submitted their respective position papers, the case
was forwarded to the COMELEC, Manila, for resolution.
On April 30, 2001, the COMELEC finding merit in Cagas petition, issued the
challenged Resolution declaring Villaber disqualified as a candidate for and from
holding any elective public office and canceling his certificate of candidacy. The
COMELEC ruled that a conviction for violation of B.P Blg. 22 involves moral
turpitude following the ruling of this Court en banc in the administrative case of
People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda. Villaber filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied by the COMELEC en banc in a Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: The sole issue for our Resolution is whether or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22
involves moral turpitude.
HELD: The COMELEC believes it is. In disqualifying petitioner Villaber from being a
candidate for Congressman, the COMELEC applied Section 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code which provides:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent
authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for
subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office,
unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed
upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence
had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service
of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
As to the meaning of moral turpitude, we have consistently adopted the
definition in Blacks Law Dictionary as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity
in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and
woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
In In re Vinzon,the term moral turpitude is considered as encompassing
everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals.
We, however, clarified in Dela Torre vs. Commission on Elections that not every
criminal act involves moral turpitude, and that as to what crime involves moral
turpitude is for the Supreme Court to determine.We further pronounced therein
that:
in International Rice Research Institute vs. NLRC, the Court admitted that it
cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by
merely classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum. In the final
analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question
of fact and frequently depends on the circumstances surrounding the case.
In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the facts and circumstances
surrounding the commission of the crime. In effect, he admits all the elements of
the crime for which he was convicted. At any rate, the question of whether or not

the crime involves moral turpitude can be resolved by analyzing its elements
alone, as we did in Dela Torre which involves the crime of fencing punishable by a
special law.
Petitioner was charged for violating B.P. Blg. 22 under the following Information:
That on or about February 13, 1986, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and
issue to Efren D. Sawal to apply on account or for value Bank of Philippine Islands
(Plaza Cervantes, Manila) Check No. 958214 dated February 13, 1986 payable to
Efren D. Sawal in the amount of P100,000.00, said accused well knowing that at
the time of issue he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check, when
presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds, and
despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Efren D.
Sawal the amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment of the
same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice. (Emphasis ours)
The elements of the offense under the above provision are:
1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value;
2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have
sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in
full upon its presentment; and
3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit, or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.[19]
The presence of the second element manifests moral turpitude. We held that a
conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imports deceit and certainly relates to
and affects the good moral character of a person.Thus, paraphrasing Blacks
definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his
private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted
and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals.
In fine, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent COMELEC
in issuing the assailed Resolutions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Bantay vs COMELECFacts:
There were two consolidated petitions for
certiorari
and
mandamus
to nullify and set aside certainissuances of the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) respecting party-list groups which have manifestedtheir intention to
participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.In the first petition,
docketed as G.R. No. 177271, petitioners Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941,
forshort) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR, for short) assail the various
Comelec resolutionsaccrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to
participate in the forthcoming party-list electionson May 14, 2007 without
simultaneously determining whether or not their respective nominees possessthe
requisite qualifications defined in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, or the "Party-List
System Act" andbelong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector each
seeks to represent.In the second, docketed as G.R. No. 177314, petitioners Loreta
Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundationand Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn

Comelec Resolution 07-0724 dated April 3, 2007 effectivelydenying their request

for the release or disclosure of the names of the nominees of the fourteen
(14)accredited participating party-list groups mentioned in petitioner
Rosales previous letter
-requestWhile both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or
publish the names of thenominees of the various party-list groups named in the
petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR have theadditional prayers that the 33
private respondents named therein be declare[d] as unqualified to
participate in the party-list elections and that the Comelec be enjoined from
allowing respondent groupsfrom participating in the elections.
Issues:
1. Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the COMELEC to the
respondent party-list groupsnamed in their petition on the ground that these
groups and their respective nominees do not appear to bequalified?2. Whether
respondent COMELEC, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the
various party-list groups, has violated the right to information and free access to
documents as guaranteed by theConstitution; and3. Whether respondent
COMELEC is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the public the names
of said nominees.
Ruling:
1.The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UPLR for cancellation of accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition.
The exercise would require the Court tomake a factual determination, a matter
which is outside the office of judicial review by way of specialcivil action for
certiorari
. In
certiorari
proceedings, the Court is not called upon to decide factual issuesand the case
must be decided on the undisputed facts on record. The sole function of a writ of
certiorari
isto address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does
not include a review of the
tribunals evaluation of the evidence. (note that nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there
a requirement that the

qualification of a party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with the

accreditation of anorganization. )
2. COMELECs basis of its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of subject
party
-list groups,

Section 7 of R.A. 7941,which last sentence reads: [T

]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be
shown on the certified list is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to
deny the requested
disclosure. There is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec
from disclosing ore
ven publishing through mediums other than the Certified List of the names.
Assayed against the non-disclosure stance of the Comelec and the given
rationale therefor is the right toinformation enshrined in the self-executory
15
Section 7, Article III of the Constitution,
viz
:Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access toofficial records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, aswell to government research data used
as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.Complementing and going hand in hand
with the right to information is another constitutional provisionenunciating the
policy of full disclosure and transparency in Government. We refer to Section 28,
ArticleII of the Constitution reading:Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.It has been repeatedly
said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their
representatives

on the basis of an informed judgment. Hence the need for voters to be informed
about matters that have abearing on their choice While the vote cast in a partylist elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the

end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would
eventually sit in the House of Representatives. The Court frowns upon any
interpretation of the law or rules that would hinder in anyway the free and
intelligent casting of the votes in an election.3.COMELEC has a constitutional duty
to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-listgroups named
in the herein petitions. The right to information is a public right where the real
parties ininterest are the public, or the citizens to be precise, but like all
constitutional guarantees, however, the
right to information and its companion right of access to official records are not
absolute. The peoplesright to know is limited to matters of public concern and
is further subject to such limitation as may be
provided by law. But no national security or like concerns is involved in the
disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question.
Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the
legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the partylistgroups subject of their respective petitionsThe 1st petition is partly DENIED
insofar as it seeks to nullify the accreditation of the respondents namedtherein.
However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the

names of thenominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to

participate in the May 14, 2007elections, the 2 petitions are GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediatelydisclose and release
the names of the nominees of the party-list groups.

G.R. NO. 180048 JUNE 19, 2009DE GUZMAN VS COMELECFACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining orderassails the June 15, 2007 Resolution of the First
Division of COMELEC, disqualifying ROSELLER DE GUZMAN fromrunning as vicemayor in the May 14, 2007 elections.Petitioner was a naturalized American.
However, on January 25, 2006, he applied for dual citizenship under RA9225.
Upon approval of his application, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines onSeptember 6, 2006. Having reacquired Philippine citizenship, he
is entitled to exercise full civil and political rights.As such, qualified to run as vicemayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of
Guimba, Nueva Ecija inthe May 14, 2007 elections for having failed to renounce
his American Citizenship in accordance withRA 9225.HELD:
We find that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office in view of his
failure to renounce hisAmerican citizenship. RA 9225 was enacted to allow
reacquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for:1. Natural born citizens
who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization
ascitizens of a foreign country;2. Natural born citizens of the Philippines who after
the effectivity of the law, becomes citizens of aforeign country.The law provides
that they are not deemed to have reacquired or retained their
Philippinecitizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance.Petitioners oath of
allegiance and certificate of candidacy did not comply with section(5)2 of RA 9225
which furtherrequires those seeking elective public office in the Philippines to
make a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship. Petitioner failed to renounce his American citizenship; as such, he is
disqualified from running for vicemayor

Quinto V. COMELEC
Quinto V. COMELEC
COMELEC issued a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their
certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions.
FACTS:
Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition against the COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring
appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned
from their positions. In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it only copied the
provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid.

HELD:
NO.
In the Farias case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006 repealing Sec.
66 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for giving undue benefit to elective
officials in comparison with appointive officials. Incidentally, the Court upheld the
substantial distinctions between the two and pronounced that there was no
violation of the equal protection clause.
However in the present case, the Court held that the discussion on the equal
protection clause was an obiter dictum since the issue raised therein was against
the repealing clause. It didnt squarely challenge Sec. 66.
Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and elective officials.
Applying the 4 requisites of a valid classification, the proviso does not comply with
the second requirement that it must be germane to the purpose of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a
governmental position to promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous
or coercive influence of the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting
the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the
danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political
considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified
by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electorate arena, while
still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty
because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office
work.
Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without
distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government or not.
Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be considered as ipso facto
resigned once he files his certificate of candidacy for the election. This scenario is
absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the
government to wield influence in the political world.
The provision s directed to the activity any and all public offices, whether they be
partisan or non partisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal
or brgy. level. Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the
fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale.
Penera vs. Commission on Elections, et al.
G.R. No. 181613
25 November 2009
(motion for reconsideration)
Facts:
On 11 September 2009, the Supreme Court affirmed the COMELECs decision to
disqualify petitioner Rosalinda Penera (Penera) as mayoralty candidate in Sta.
Monica, Surigao del Norte, for engaging in election campaign outside the
campaign period, in violation of Section 80 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (the
Omnibus Election Code).
Penera moved for reconsideration, arguing that she was not yet a candidate at the
time of the supposed premature campaigning, since under Section 15 of Republic
Act No. 8436 (the law authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election
system for the process of voting, counting of votes, and canvassing/consolidating
the results of the national and local elections), as amended by Republic Act No.

9369, one is not officially a candidate until the start of the campaign period.
Issue:
Whether or not Peneras disqualification for engaging in premature campaigning
should be reconsidered.
Holding:
Granting Peneras motion for reconsideration, the Supreme Court En Banc held
that
Penera did not engage in premature campaigning and should, thus, not be
disqualified as a mayoralty candidate. The Court said
(A) The Courts 11 September 2009 Decision (or the assailed Decision)
considered a
person who files a certificate of candidacy already a candidate even before the
start of the campaign period. This is contrary to the clear intent and letter of
Section 15 of Republic Act 8436, as amended, which states that a person who files
his certificate of candidacy will only be considered a candidate at the start of the
campaign period, and unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall
take effect only upon the start of such campaign period.
Thus, applying said law:
(1) The effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a
candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the campaign
period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.
(2) Accordingly, a candidate is liable for an election offense only for
acts done during the campaign period, not before. In other words, election
offenses can be committed by a candidate only upon the start of the campaign
period. Before the start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be
so committed. Since the law is clear, the Court has no recourse but to apply it.
The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial measures,
is not the Court but the Legislature.
(B) Contrary to the assailed Decision, Section 15 of R.A. 8436, as amended, does
not
provide that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign
period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the start of the campaign
period. Neither does the law state that partisan political acts done by a candidate
before the campaign period are temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful upon
the start of the campaign period. Besides, such a law as envisioned in the
Decision, which defines a criminal act and curtails freedom of expression and
speech, would be void for vagueness.
(C) That Section 15 of R.A. 8436 does not expressly state that campaigning before
the start of the campaign period is lawful, as the assailed Decision asserted, is of
no moment. It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful unless expressly
declared unlawful by law. The mere fact that the law does not declare an act
unlawful ipso facto means that the act is lawful. Thus, there is no need for
Congress to declare in Section 15 of R.A. 8436 that partisan political activities
before the start of the campaign period are lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to
state that any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect
only upon the start of the campaign period. The only inescapable and logical
result is that the same acts, if done before the start of the campaign period, are
lawful.

(D) The Courts 11 September 2009 Decision also reversed Lanot vs. COMELEC
(G.R.
No. 164858; 16 November 2006). Lanot was decided on the ground that one who
files a
certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period.
This ground was based on the deliberations of the legislators who explained that
the early deadline for filing certificates of candidacy under R.A. 8436 was set only
to afford time to prepare the machine-readable ballots, and they intended to
preserve the existing election periods, such that one who files his certificate of
candidacy to meet the early deadline will still not be considered as a candidate.
When Congress amended R.A. 8436, Congress decided to expressly incorporate
the
Lanot doctrine into law, thus, the provision in Section 15 of R.A. 8436 that a
person who files his certificate of candidacy shall be considered a candidate only
at the start of the campaign period. Congress wanted to insure that no person
filing a certificate of candidacy under the early deadline required by the
automated election system would be disqualified or penalized for any partisan
political act done before the start of the campaign period. This provision cannot
be annulled by the Court except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality.
The assailed Decision, however, did not claim that this provision is
unconstitutional. In fact, the assailed Decision considered the entire Section 15
good law. Thus, the Decision was self-contradictory reversing Lanot but
maintaining the constitutionality of the said provision.

Aldovino VS COMELEC
FACTS:
Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for three
consecutive terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In September 2005,
during his third term of office, the Sandiganbayan issued an order of 90-day
preventive suspension against him in relation to a criminal case. The said
suspension order was subsequently lifted by the Court, and Asilo resumed the
performance of the functions of his office.
Asilo then filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in 2007. His
disqualification was sought by herein petitioners on the ground that he had been
elected and had served for three consecutive terms, in violation of the three-term
Constitutional limit.
ISSUE:
WON the suspensive condition interrupts the three-term limitation rule of
COMELEC?
RULING:
NO. The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their term for
purposes of the three-term limit rule under the Constitution and the Local
Government Code (RA 7160).
The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo for a fourth term in the
2007 elections was in contravention of the three-term limit rule of Art. X, sec. 8 of
the Constitution since his 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the preventive
suspension imposed on him, the SC granted the petition of Simon B. Aldovino,
Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong seeking Asilos disqualification.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of
service within a term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term
limitation, held the Court. It noted that preventive suspension can pose as a
threat more potent than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution itself
disallows to evade the three-term limit as it is easier to undertake and merely
requires an easily fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon
after a preventive suspension has been imposed.

ROQUE VS COMELEC

Facts:
This case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners of the
September 10, 2009 ruling of the Supreme Court, which denied the petition of H.
Harry L. Roque, Jr., et al. for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to nullify the
contract-award of the 2010 Election Automation Project to the joint venture of
Total Information Management Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic International
Corporation (Smartmatic).
In this MR, petitioners Roque, et al. are again before the Supreme Court asking
that the contract award be declared null and void on the stated ground that it was
made in violation of the Constitution, statutes, and jurisprudence. Intervening
petitioner also interposed a similar motion, but only to pray that the Board of
Election Inspectors be ordered to manually count the ballots after the printing and
electronic transmission of the election returns.
Petitioners Roque, et al., as movants herein, seek a reconsideration of the
September 10, 2009 Decision on the following issues or grounds:

1. The Comelecs public pronouncements show that there is a "high probability"

that there will be failure of automated elections;

2. Comelec abdicated its constitutional functions in favor of Smartmatic;

3. There is no legal framework to guide the Comelec in appreciating automated

ballots in case the PCOS machines fail;

4. Respondents cannot comply with the requirements of RA 8436 for a source

code review;

5. Certifications submitted by private respondents as to the successful use of the

machines in elections abroad do not fulfill the requirement of Sec. 12 of RA 8436;

6. Private respondents will not be able to provide telecommunications facilities

that will assure 100% communications coverage at all times during the conduct of
the 2010 elections; and

7. Subcontracting the manufacture of PCOS machines to Quisdi violates the

Comelecs bidding rules.

Note: (This digest would only deal with the procedural aspect of the MR.
Only those issues or
grounds wherein the Court made a ruling re: procedure would be
discussed here.)

Issue: Is the motion for reconsideration meritorious?

Ruling:

No.
Upon taking a second hard look into the issues in the case at bar and the
arguments earnestly pressed in the instant motions, the Court cannot grant the
desired reconsideration.
Petitioners threshold argument delves on possibilities, on matters that may or
may not occur. The conjectural and speculative nature of the first issue raised is
reflected in the very manner of its formulation and by statements, such as "the
public pronouncements of public respondent COMELEC x x x clearly show that
there is a high probability that there will be automated failure of elections"; "there
is a high probability that the use of PCOS machines in the May 2010 elections will
result in failure of elections"; "the unaddressed logistical nightmaresand the
lack of contingency plans that should have been crafted as a result of a pilot test
make an automated failure of elections very probable"; and "COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion when it signed x x x the contract for full
automation x x x despite the likelihood of a failure of elections."
Speculations and conjectures are not equivalent to proof; they have little, if any,
probative value and, surely, cannot be the basis of a sound judgment.
Petitioners, to support their speculative venture vis--vis the possibility of
Comelec going manual, have attributed certain statements to respondent
Comelec Chairman Melo, citing for the purpose a news item on Inquirer.net,
posted September 16, 2009.
Reacting to the attribution, however, respondents TIM and Smartmatic, in their
comment, described the Melo pronouncements as made in the context of
Comelecs contingency plan. Petitioners, however, the same respondents added,
put a misleading spin to the Melo pronouncements by reproducing part of the
news item, but omitting to make reference to his succeeding statements to arrive

at a clearer and true picture.

Private respondents observation is well-taken. Indeed, it is easy to selectively cite
portions of what has been said, sometimes out of their proper context, in order to
assert a misleading conclusion. The effect can be dangerous. Improper meaning
may be deliberately attached to innocent views or even occasional crude
comments by the simple expediency of lifting them out of context from any
publication.
Petitioners posture anent the third issue, i.e, there no is legal framework to guide
Comelec in the appreciation of automated ballots or to govern manual count
should PCOS machines fail, cannot be accorded cogency. First, it glosses over the
continuity and back-up plans that would be implemented in case the PCOS
machines falter during the 2010 elections. The overall fallback strategy and
options to address even the worst-case scenariothe wholesale breakdown of the
80,000 needed machines nationwide and of the 2,000 reserved unitshave been
discussed in some detail in the Decision subject of this recourse. The Court need
not belabor them again.
While a motion for reconsideration may tend to dwell on issues already resolved in
the decision sought to be reconsideredand this should not be an obstacle for a
reconsiderationthe hard reality is that petitioners have failed to raise matters
substantially plausible or compellingly persuasive to warrant the desired course of
action.
Significantly, petitioners, in support of their position on the lack-of-legalframework issue, invoke the opinion of Associate, later Chief, Justice Artemio
Panganiban in Loong v. Comelec, where he made the following observations:
"Resort to manual appreciation of the ballots is precluded by the basic features of
the automated election system," and "the rules laid down in the Omnibus Election
Code (OEC) for the appreciation and counting of ballots cast in a manual election
x x x are inappropriate, if not downright useless, to the proper appreciation and
reading of the ballots used in the automated system." Without delving on its
wisdom and validity, the view of Justice Panganiban thus cited came by way of a
dissenting opinion. As such, it is without binding effect, a dissenting opinion being
a mere expression of the individual view of a member of the Court or other
collegial adjudicating body, while disagreeing with the conclusion held by the
majority.
And going to another but recycled issue, petitioners would have the Court
invalidate the automation contract on the ground that the certifications submitted
by Smartmatic during the bidding, showing that the PCOS technology has been
used in elections abroad, do not comply with Sec. 1222 of RA 8436. Presently,
petitioners assert that the system certified as having been used in New York was
the Dominion Image Cast, a ballot marking device.
Petitioners have obviously inserted, at this stage of the case, an entirely new
factual dimension to their cause. This we cannot allow for compelling reasons. For
starters, the Court cannot plausibly validate this factual assertion of petitioners.
As it is, private respondents have even questioned the reliability of the website24
whence petitioners base their assertion, albeit the former, citing the same
website, state that the Image Cast Precinct tabulation device refers to the
Dominions PCOS machines.
Moreover, as a matter of sound established practice, points of law, theories,
issues, and arguments not raised in the original proceedings cannot be brought
out on review. Basic considerations of fair play impel this rule. The imperatives of
orderly, if not speedy, justice frown on a piecemeal presentation of evidence and
on the practice of parties of going to trial haphazardly.

Moving still to another issue, petitioners claim that "there are very strong
indications that Private Respondents will not be able to provide for
telecommunication facilities for areas without these facilities." This argument,
being again highly speculative, is without evidentiary value and hardly provides a
ground for the Court to nullify the automation contract. Surely, a possible breach
of a contractual stipulation is not a legal reason to prematurely rescind, much less
annul, the contract.
Finally, petitioners argue that, based on news reports,28 the TIM-Smartmatic joint
venture has entered into a new contract with Quisdi, a Shanghai-based company,
to manufacture on its behalf the needed PCOS machines to fully automate the
2010 elections.29 This arrangement, petitioners aver, violates the bid rules
proscribing sub-contracting of significant components of the automation project.
The argument is untenable, based as it is again on news reports. Surely,
petitioners cannot expect the Court to act on unverified reports foisted on it.
ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC
March 28, 2013 ~ vbdiaz
ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list
organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter
denied the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical
and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since their ways are
immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their
acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the
exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against
the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions
contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly,
and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines
international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete
and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition
was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the
LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA
7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it
alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELECs
field personnel.
Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal
grounds.
Held:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the
proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to
said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers,
and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly
ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, the
enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The
crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a
particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA
7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is government neutrality
in religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. We thus find that it was grave violation
of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the
Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action
must have a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or
why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC
condescended to justify its position that petitioners admission into the party-list
system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and
civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code
defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or
anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality, the
remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local
ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be
emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere
blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or
criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the
party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather
than a tool to further any substantial public interest.

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO versus FIDEL RAMOS (253 SCRA 559)

Facts:
The protestant, Miriam Defensor-Santiago ran for presidency and lost in the May
1992 election. In her Motion on the 16th day of August in the year 1995, reiterated
in her comment of the 29th of August of the same year, protestant DefensorSantiago prayed that the revision in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas be
dispensed with and the revision process in the pilot areas be deemed computed.

The Court deferred action on the motion and required, instead, the protestant and
protestee to submit their respective memoranda. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the election protest filed by Defensor-Santiago is moot and
academic by her election as a Senator in the May 1995 election and her
assumption of office as such on the 30th of June in the year 1995.

Held:

YES. The Court held that the election protest filed by Santiago has been
abandoned or considered withdrawn as a consequence of her election and
assumption of office as Senator and her discharge of the duties and functions
thereof.

The protestant abandoned her determination to protest and pursue the public
interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate.

Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would
dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential
elections, thereby enhancing the all too crucial political stability of the nation
during this period of national recovery.

Also, the PET issued a resolution ordering the protestant to inform the PET within
10 days if after the completion of the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas,
she still wishes to present evidence. Since DS has not informed the Tribunal of any
such intention, such is a manifest indication that she no longer intends to do so.

EFREN ARATEA v.COMELEC AND ESTELA ANTIPOLO

G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012, Carpio, J.
FACTS:
Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were
candidates for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National and
Local Elections. Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed apetition under Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to
cancel Lonzanidas certificate of candidacy on the ground th
at Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayorof San Antonio, Zambales for four
(4) consecutive terms immediately prior to the term for the May
2010elections.Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a false material
representation in his certificate of candidacy whenLonzanida certified under oath that
he was eligible for the office he sought election. Section 8, Article X of the1987 Constitution
and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code both prohibit a local elective
official from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for
the same position.
The COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolutionon 18 February 2010 cancelling
Lonzanidas certificate
of candidacy.
Lonzanidas motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Ban
c remained pending during the May 2010elections. Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea (Aratea)
garnered the highest number of votes and wererespectively proclaimed Mayor and ViceMayor. Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor before Regional Trial Court
(RTC) Judge of Olongapo. On thesame date, Aratea wrote the DILG and requested
for an opinion on whether, as Vice-Mayor, he was legally

required to assume the Office of the Mayor in view of Lonzanidas disqualification.

DILG stated that Lonzanida was disqualified to hold office by reason of his criminal
conviction, and as aconsequence, his office was deemed permanently vacant, and
thus, Aratea should assume the Office of the
Mayor in an acting capacity without prejudice to the COMELECs resolution of
Lonzanidas motion for
reconsideration.In another letter dated 6 August 2010, Aratea requested the DILG
to allow him to take the oath of office asMayor of San Antonio, Zambales. In his
response, then Secretary Jesse M. Robredo allowed Aratea to take anoath of office
as "the permanent Municipal Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales without prejudice however to
theoutcome of the cases pending before the COMELEC.On 11 August 2010, the
COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution disqualifying Lonzanida from running forM
ayor in the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Bancs resolution was based on two
grounds:

first
,Lonzanida had been elected and had served as Mayor for more than three
consecutive terms withoutinterruption; and
second
, Lonzanida had been convicted by final judgment of 10 counts of falsification
underthe Revised Penal Code. Lonzanida was sentenced for each count of
falsification to imprisonment of 4 yearsand 1 day of
prisin correccional
as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of
prisin mayor
as maximum. The judgment of conviction became final on 23 October 2009 in the
Decision of this Court in
Lonzanida v. People
, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009.The manner of filling
up the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales is
dependent upon the determination of Lonzanidas removal. Whether Lonzanida
was disqualified under Section
68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or made a false material representation under Section 78 of
the sameCode
that resulted in his certificate of candidacy being void
ab initio
, is determinative of whether Aratea or Antipolo is the rightful occupant to the
Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
HELD:
Antipolo, the alleged "second placer

," should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanidas certificate of

candidacy was void
ab initio
. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were

stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the
highest number of votes for theposition of Mayor.The grounds for disqualification
for a petition under Section 68
1
of the Omnibus Election Code are specifically enumerated. A petition for
disqualification under Section 68 clearly refers to "the commission of prohibited
acts andpossession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country."
All the offenses mentioned in Section 68refer to election offenses under the Omnibus Election
Code, not to violations of other penallaws
. There is absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68 that would justify
including violation of thethree-term limit rule, or conviction by final judgment of the crime
of falsification under the Revised Penal Code,as one of the grounds or offenses covered under
Section 68.On the other hand, Section 78
2
of the Omnibus Election Code states that a certificate of candidacy may bedenied
or cancelled when there is
false material representation of the contents of the certificate of candidacy
:Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code details
the contents of the certificate of candidacy
:
Sec. 74.
Contents of certificate of candidacy.

The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it

isannouncing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he
is eligible for said office
xxx
The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty of
prisin mayor

,
disqualifies himperpetually from holding any public office, or from being elected to any
public office
.
Thisperpetual disqualification took effect upon the finality of the judgment of conviction,
beforeLonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy
.The penalty of
prisin mayor
automatically carries with it, by operation of law, the accessory penalties
of temporary absolute disqualification and
perpetual special disqualification.
Under Article 30 of theRevised Penal Code, temporary absolute disqualification
produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to votein any election for any
popular elective office
or to be elected to such office.
T
he duration of temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the
principal penalty of
prisin mayor
.On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code,
perpetual special disqualification
meansthat "
the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of
hisdisqualification,

which is perpetually.
Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual specialdisqualification
constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office.
1

Sec. 68.
Disqualifications
.
Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by
final decision by a

competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having

(a) given money or other material consideration to influence,induce or corrupt the
voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of
terrorism to enhance hiscandidacy; (c)
s
pent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code;
(d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95,
96, 97 and 104; (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261,paragraphs d,
e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6
, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected,
fromholding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for anyelective office
under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident
or immigrant of a foreign country inaccordance with the residence requirement
provided for in the election laws.

Sec. 78.
Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.
A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation containedtherein as
required

under Section 74 hereof is false

. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from
thetime of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due
notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before theelection.

A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public
office, andcommits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy
that he iseligible to so run.

Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy

A cancelled certificate of candidacy void

ab initio

cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. As the
Comelec stated in their February 2011 Resolution:
Since Lonzanida was never a candidate for the position of Mayor [of] San Antonio,
Zambales, the votes cast for him should be considered stray votes.Consequently,
Intervenor Antipolo, who remains as the sole qualified candidate for the mayoralty post
and obtained the highest number of votes, should now be proclaimed as the duly
elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible or
not qualified to run forMayor.
1wphi1
Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is
immaterial because thecancellation on such ground means he was never a
candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void
ab initio.
There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections
- Antipolo, who therefore received the highest number of votes.Petition dismissed.