FACTS

BENTIR V. LEANDA April 12, 2000

On May 15, 1992, respondent Leyte Gulf Traders, Inc. (herein referred to as
respondent corporation) filed a complaint for reformation of instrument,
specific performance, annulment of conditional sale and damages with prayer
for writ of injunction against petitioners Yolanda Rosello-Bentir and the
spouses Samuel and Charito Pormida. Respondent corporation alleged that it
entered into a contract of lease of a parcel of land with petitioner Bentir for a
period of twenty (20) years starting May 5, 1968. According to respondent
corporation, the lease was extended for another four (4) years or until May 31,
1992. On May 5, 1989, petitioner Bentir sold the leased premises to petitioner
spouses Samuel Pormada and Charito Pormada.

ISSUE/ RULING
Issue: Whether the complaint for reformation filed by respondent Leyte Gulf
Traders, Inc. has prescribed
Whether it is entitled to the remedy of reformation sought

Held:
The remedy of reformation of an instrument is grounded on the principle of
equity where, in order to express the true intention of the contracting parties,
an instrument already executed is allowed by law to be reformed. The right of
reformation is necessarily an invasion or limitation of the parol evidence rule
since, when a writing is reformed, the result is that an oral agreement is by
court decree made legally effective. The remedy, being an extraordinary one,
must be subject to limitations as may be provided by law. Our law and
Respondent corporation questioned the sale alleging that it had a right of first jurisprudence set such limitations, among which is laches.
refusal. Rebuffed, it filed Civil Case No. 92-05-88 seeking the reformation of the
expired contract of lease on the ground that its lawyer inadvertently omitted A suit for reformation of an instrument may be barred by lapse of time. The
to incorporate in the contract of lease executed in 1968, the verbal agreement prescriptive period for actions based upon a written contract and for
or understanding between the parties that in the event petitioner Bentir leases reformation of an instrument is ten (10) years under Article 1144 of the Civil
or sells the lot after the expiration of the lease, respondent corporation has the Code. Prescription is intended to suppress stale and fraudulent claims arising
right to equal the highest offer.
from transactions like the one at bar which facts had become so obscure from
the lapse of time or defective memory. In the case at bar, respondent
corporation had ten (10) years from 1968, the time when the contract of lease
was executed, to file an action for reformation. Sadly, it did so only on May 15,
1992 or twenty-four (24) years after the cause of action accrued, hence, its
cause of action has become stale, hence, time-barred.
The prescriptive period of ten (10) years provided for in Art. 1144 applies by
operation of law, not by the will of the parties. Therefore, the right of action
for reformation accrued from the date of execution of the contract of lease in
1968.
The rationale of the doctrine is that it would be unjust and unequitable to allow
the enforcement of a written instrument which does not reflect or disclose the
real meeting of the minds of the parties. However, an action for reformation
must be brought within the period prescribed by law, otherwise, it will be
barred by the mere lapse of time.
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AINZA V. PADUA June 30, 2005

ISSUE: Whether Antonio is barred from questioning the validity of the sale. YES.

Concepcion Ainza alleged that respondent-spouses Eugenia and Antonio Padua

owned a 216.40 sq. m. lot with an unfinished residential house located in
Project 2, Quezon City. Sometime in April 1987, she bought 1/2 of an
undivided portion of the property from her daughter, Eugenia and the latters
husband, Antonio, for P100,000.00.

HELD: In this case, there was a perfected contract of sale between Eugenia and
Concepcion. The contract of sale was consummated when both parties fully
complied with their respective obligations. Eugenia delivered the property to
Concepcion, who in turn, paid Eugenia the price of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00), as evidenced by the receipt.

No Deed of Absolute Sale was executed, but cash payment was received by the
respondents, and ownership was transferred to Concepcion through physical
delivery to her attorney-in-fact and daughter, Natividad Tuliao (Natividad).
Concepcion authorized Natividad and the latters husband, Ceferino Tuliao
(Ceferino) to occupy the premises, and make improvements on the unfinished
building.

The verbal contract of sale between Eugenia and Concepcion did not violate
the provisions of the Statute of Frauds. When a verbal contract has been
completed, executed or partially consummated, as in this case, its
enforceability will not be barred by the Statute of Frauds, which applies only to
an executory agreement. Thus, where one party has performed his obligation,
oral evidence will be admitted to prove the agreement.

Thereafter, Concepcion alleged that without her consent, respondents caused

the subdivision of the property into three portions and registered it in their
names. On the other hand, Antonio averred that he merely allowed Natividad
and Ceferino to occupy the premises temporarily. In 1994, they caused the
subdivision of the property and three (3) separate titles were issued.

The contract of sale between Eugenia and Concepcion being an oral contract,
the action to annul the same must be commenced within six years from the
time the right of action accrued. Eugenia sold the property in April 1987 hence
Antonio should have asked the courts to annul the sale on or before April
1993. No action was commenced by Antonio to annul the sale, hence his right
to seek its annulment was extinguished by prescription.

Thereafter, Antonio requested Natividad to vacate the premises but the latter
refused, claiming that Concepcion owned the property. Antonio thus filed an
ejectment suit. Concepcion, represented by Natividad, also filed on May 4,
1999 a civil case for partition of real property and annulment of titles with
damages.
On January 9, 2001, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Concepcion. The
CA reversed the decision of the RTC, and declared the sale null and void.
Applying Article 124 of the Family Code, the CA ruled that since the subject
property is conjugal, the written consent of Antonio must be obtained for the
sale to be valid. It also ordered the spouses Padua to return the amount of
P100,000.00 to petitioners plus interest.

Even assuming that the ten (10)-year prescriptive period under Art. 173 should
apply, Antonio is still barred from instituting an action to annul the sale
because since April 1987, more than ten (10) years had already lapsed without
any such action being filed.
In sum, the sale of the conjugal property by Eugenia without the consent of her
husband is voidable. It is binding unless annulled. Antonio failed to exercise his
right to ask for the annulment within the prescribed period, hence, he is now
barred from questioning the validity of the sale between his wife and
Concepcion. Petition is GRANTED.

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ABALOS V. HEIRS OF TORIO

Issue:
Whether the petitioners became the owners of the subject property by virtue
On July 24, 1996, the heirs of Torio filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession of acquisitive prescription. NO
and Damages with the MTC of Pangasinan against Jaime Abalos and the Held:
spouses Salazar. Respondents contended that they are the heirs of Vicente
Torio who died intestate on the year 1973. They stated that Mr. Vicente In the instant case, it is clear that during their possession of the property in
allowed Jaime and Spouses Salazar to stay on his land (2,950sq.m.) at question, petitioners acknowledged ownership thereof by the immediate
Pangasinan.
predecessor-in-interest of respondents. This is clearly shown by the Tax
Declaration in the name of Jaime for the year 1984 wherein it contains a
After the death of Vicente, the respondents still allowed petitioners to stay. statement admitting that Jaime's house was built on the land of Vicente,
On1985, respondents requested Mr. Vicente and Salazar to vacate the subject respondents' immediate predecessor-in-interest.
lot but the latter refused.
Petitioners never disputed such an acknowledgment. Thus, having knowledge
Respondents filed a complaint against petitioners. Jaime and the Spouses that they nor their predecessors-in-interest are not the owners of the disputed
Salazar filed their Answer with Counter claim and stated that respondents' lot, petitioners' possession could not be deemed as possession in good faith
cause of action is barred by acquisitive prescription. They also alleged that as to enable them to acquire the subject land by ordinary prescription.
they are in actual, continuous and peaceful possession of the subject lot as
owners since time immemorial. They also said that they have been paying real In this respect, the Court agrees with the CA that petitioners possession of the
property taxes and have been introducing improvements on the said and.
lot in question was by mere tolerance of respondents and their predecessorsin-interest. Acts of possessory character executed due to license or by mere
On December10, 2003: MTC issued a Decision ordering herein petitioners to tolerance of the owner are inadequate for purposes of acquisitive prescription.
vacate the subject lot and turnover said property to the heirs of Vicente Torio.
Possession, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, should be
Jaime and the Spouses Salazar appealed the Decision of the MTC with the
adverse, if not, such possessory acts, no matter how long, do not start the
RTC of Lingayen, Pangasinan. On June14, 2005: RTC ruled in favor of Jaime and running of the period of prescription.
the Spouses Salazar, holding that they have acquired the subject property
through prescription. Accordingly, the RTC dismissed herein respondents' Moreover, the CA correctly held that even if the character of petitioners'
complaint.
possession of the subject property had become adverse, still falls short of the
required period of thirty (30) years in cases of extraordinary acquisitive
Heirs of Vicente Torio filed a petition for review with the CA assailing the
prescription.
Decision of the RTC. On June30, 2006: CA granted the petition of the
respondents.
Records show that the earliest Tax Declaration in the name of petitioners was
in 1974. Reckoned from such date, the thirty-year period was completed in
2004. However, herein respondents' complaint was filed in1996, effectively
interrupting petitioners' possession upon service of summons on them.

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MERCADO V. ESPINOCILLA
Doroteo Espinocilla owned a parcel of land, Lot No. 552, with an area of 570
sq. m., located at Magsaysay Avenue, Zone 5, Bulan, Sorsogon. After he died,
his five children, Salvacion, Aspren, Isabel, Macario, and Dionisia divided Lot
No. 552 equally among themselves. Later, Dionisia died without issue ahead of
her four siblings, and Macario took possession of Dionisias share. In an
affidavit of transfer of real property dated November 1, 1948, Macario
claimed that Dionisia had donated her share to him in May 1945.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners action to recover the subject portion is barred by

prescription. YES
HELD:
Petitioner himself admits the adverse nature of respondents possession with
his assertion that Macarios fraudulent acquisition of Dionisias share created
a constructive trust. Prescription may supervene even if the trustee does not
repudiate the relationship.

Respondents uninterrupted adverse possession for 55 years of 109 sq. m. of

Thereafter, on August 9, 1977, Macario and his daughters sold 225 sq. m. to Lot No. 552 was established. Macario occupied Dionisias share in 1945
his son Roger Espinocilla, husband of respondent Belen Espinocilla and father although his claim that Dionisia donated it to him in 1945 was only made in a
of respondent Ferdinand Espinocilla.
1948 affidavit.
On March 8, 1985, Roger Espinocilla sold 114 sq. m. to Caridad Atienza. Per Macarios possession of Dionisias share was public and adverse since his
actual survey of Lot No. 552.
other co-owners, his three other sisters, also occupied portions of Lot No. 552.
Petitioner Celerino Mercado sued the respondents to recover two portions:

The 1977 sale made by Macario and his two daughters in favor of his son Roger
confirms the adverse nature of Macarios possession because said sale of 225
sq. m. was an act of ownership over Macarios original share and Dionisias
an area of 28.58 sq. m. which he bought from Aspren
28.5 sq. m. which allegedly belonged to him but was occupied by share.
Macarios house.
It was only in the year 2000, upon receipt of the summons to answer
His claim has since been modified to an alleged encroachment of only 39 sq. petitioners complaint, that respondents peaceful possession of the remaining
m. that he claims must be returned to him. He avers that he is entitled to own portion (109 sq. m.) was interrupted. By then, however, extraordinary
and possess 171 sq. m. of Lot No. 552, having inherited 142.5 sq. m. from his acquisitive prescription has already set in in favor of respondents.
mother Salvacion and bought 28.5 sq. m. from his aunt Aspren. Since the area
he occupies is only 132 sq. m. he claims that respondents encroach on his share An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust
prescribes in 10 years from the time the right of action accrues.
by 39 sq. m.
Respondents claim that they rightfully possess the land they occupy by virtue Petitioners action for recovery of possession having been filed 55 years after
of acquisitive prescription and that there is no basis for petitioners claim of Macario occupied Dionisias share, it is also barred by extinctive prescription.
The CA while condemning Macarios fraudulent act of depriving his three
encroachment.
sisters of their shares in Dionisias share, equally emphasized the fact that
On May 15, 2006, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of petitioner and Macarios sisters wasted their opportunity to question his acts.
held that he is entitled to 171 sq. m. RTC also held that Macarios 1948 affidavit
is void and is an invalid repudiation of the shares of his sisters Salvacion,
4|P a g e

Aspren, and Isabel in Dionisias share. Accordingly, Macario cannot acquire

said shares by prescription.
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision and dismissed petitioners
complaint on the ground that extraordinary acquisitive prescription has
already set in in favor of respondents. The CA found that Doroteos four
remaining children made an oral partition of Lot No. 552 after Dionisias death
in 1945. And since petitioners complaint was filed only on July 13, 2000, the
CA concluded that prescription has set in.

VIRTUCIO V. ALEGARBES

ISSUE: Whether the period for acquisitive prescription was interrupted. NO

Respondent Jose Alegarbes filed a homestead application for a 24-hectare HELD:

tract of unsurveyed land. His application was approved on January 23, 1952.
Article 1155 of the New Civil Code refers to the interruption of prescription of
actions. Interruption of acquisitive prescription, on the other hand, is found in
In 1955, however, the land was subdivided into three (3) lots -- Lot Nos. 138, Articles 1120-1125 of the same Code.
139 and 140, Pls-19 - as a consequence of a public land subdivision. Lot 139
was allocated to Ulpiano Custodio (Custodio) while Lot 140 was allocated to Thus, Virtucios reliance on Article 1155 for purposes of tolling the period of
petitioner Jesus Virtucio (Virtucio).
acquisitive prescription is misplaced. The only kinds of interruption that
effectively toll the period of acquisitive prescription are natural and civil
Alegarbes opposed the homestead applications filed by Custodio and Virtucio, interruption. Civil interruption takes place with the service of judicial summons
claiming that his approved application covered the whole area, including Lot to the possessor. When no action is filed, then there is no occasion to issue a
Nos. 139 and 140. On October 30, 1961, the Director of Lands rendered a judicial summons against the respondents. The period of acquisitive
decision denying Alegarbes' protest and amending the latter's application to prescription continues to run.
exclude Lots 139 and 140. Only Lot 138 was given due course.
In this case, Virtucio claims that the protest filed by Alegarbes against his
Alegarbes appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, who homestead application interrupted the thirty (30)-year period of acquisitive
dismissed the appeal. On appeal to the Office of the President, the latter prescription. The law, as well as jurisprudence, however, dictates that only a
affirmed the dismissal order. Thus, an order of execution was issued by the judicial summons can effectively toll the said period. Only in cases filed before
Lands Management Bureau of the DENR. It ordered Alegarbes and all those the courts may judicial summons be issued and, thus, interrupt possession.
acting in his behalf to vacate the subject lot, but he refused.
Records show that it was only in 1997 when Virtucio filed a case before the
On September 26, 1997, Virtucio then filed a complaint for recovery of RTC. The CA was, therefore, correct in ruling that Alegarbes became ipso jure
possession and ownership before the RTC. The RTC ruled infavor of Virtucio. owner of Lot 140 entitling him to retain possession of it because he was in
open, continuous and exclusive possession for over thirty (30) years of
The CA reversed the RTC and ruled that Alegarbes became ipso jure owner of alienable public land.
Lot 140 by virtue of acquisitive prescription.
5|P a g e

Aggrieved, Virtucio filed this petition. He argues that the period of acquisitive
prescription was interrupted on October 30, 1961 when Alegarbes filed a
protest before the Director of Lands. Virtucio further claims that since 1954,
several extrajudicial demands were also made upon Alegarbes demanding that
he vacate said lot. Those demands constitute the "extrajudicial demand"
contemplated in Article 1155, thus, tolling the period of acquisitive
prescription.
SOUTH CITY HOMES, INC. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can acquire lot no 5005 by tacking his
APPEALS
possession to the previous owners of the two lots.
The subject of this dispute is a strip of land between two lots owned by the HELD: NO.
petitioner. It has an area of 613 square meters and is situated in Calabuso,
Bian, Laguna. It was discovered only in 1983 after a survey conducted by the Its submission is that its possession of the lot dates back to "time immemorial,"
Bureau of Lands and is now identified as Lot No. 5005 of the Binan Estate.
by which tired phrase it is intended to convey the idea that the start of such
possession can no longer be recollected. Indeed, it can be. The petitioner's
The two lots bordering the subject property are Lot No. 2381, containing an possession does not in fact go back to "time immemorial," but only to the
area of 36,672 square meters, and Lot No. 2386- A, containing an area of recent remembered past.
32,011 square meters. Both are now registered in the name of the petitioner.
The petitioner presented only two witnesses whose testimony regarding its
On August 27, 1981, Lot 2386-A was sold by the Garcias to the applicant South supposed possession of Lot No. 5005 is essentially hearsay and inherently
City Homes, Inc.
inadequate.
Lot 2381 was on February 25, 1977 sold by Fidel M. Cabrera, Sr. to Koo Jun Eng The testimony falls short of establishing the manner and length of possession
who in turn assigned the property to the petitioner in February of 1981.
required by law to vest prescriptive title in the petitioner to Lot No. 5005.
It is the position of the petitioner that Lot No. 5005 should be registered in its
name for either of two reasons. The first is that the disputed strip of land really
formed part of Lots 2381 and 2386-A but was omitted therefrom only because
of the inaccuracies of the old system of cadastral surveys. The second is that
it had acquired the property by prescription through uninterrupted
possession thereof in concept of owner, by itself and its predecessors-ininterest, for more than forty years.

By the testimony of the two witnesses, the petitioner obviously meant to tack
the possession of the two lots by the previous owners to its own possession.
There was no need for this because the petitioner acquired ownership of Lot
No. 2381 by assignment and Lot No. 2386-A by purchase; and such ownership
includes the right of possession. The petitioner is not claiming prescriptive
rights to these two lots, which had previously been registered in the name of
the transferors.
The lot it is claiming by prescription is Lot No. 5005, which it did not acquire
The Republic argues that the elongated piece of land between the two lots now from the owner of the other two lots, or from any previous private registered
owned by the petitioner used to be a canal which could not have been owner of the lot, as there was none.
appropriated by the purchasers of the adjacent lots or their successors-in6|P a g e

interest. Neither could it be deemed included in the lots now owned by the
petitioner because their respective technical descriptions indicate otherwise.
Prescription is also not applicable because the petitioner has not established
the requisite possession of the lot, as to manner and length, to justify judicial
confirmation of title in its name.

Lot No. 5005 was not part of either of the two lots. The simple reason is that
the possession of the said lot was not and could not have been transferred to
the petitioner when it acquired Lots Nos. 2381 and 2386-A because these two
lots did not include the third lot. Article 1138 of the Civil Code provides that

(1)
The present possessor may complete the period necessary for
The petitioner insists it is patrimonial property of the State, being part of the prescription by tacking his possession to that of his grantor or predecessor- in
so-called Friar Lands, while the Republic maintains it is part of the public interest.
domain and cannot therefore be acquired by a private corporation.
However, tacking of possession is allowed only when there is a privity of
contract or relationship between the previous and present possessors. In the
absence of such privity, the possession of the new occupant should be
counted only from the time it actually began and cannot be lengthened by
connecting it with the possession of the former possessors.
It should also be noted that, according to Article 1135 of the Civil Code:
In case the adverse claimant possesses by mistake an area greater, or less, than
that expressed in his title, prescription shall be based on the possession.
This possession, following the above quoted rulings, should be limited only to
that of the successor-in-interest; and in the case of the herein petitioner, it
should begin from 1981 when it acquired the two adjacent lots and occupied
as well the lot in question thinking it to be part of the other two.
It follows that when the application for registration of the lot in the name of
the petitioner was filed in 1983, the applicant had been in possession of the
property for less than three years. This was far too short of the prescriptive
period required for acquisition of immovable property, which is ten years if the
possession is in good faith and thirty years if in bad faith, or if the land is public.

SIMEON MIGUEL v. FLORENDO CATALINO

The Court finds it unnecessary to determine whether the land is patrimonial in

nature or part of the public domain.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioners are barred from recovering the subject
property by virtue of laches. YES

On January 22, 1962, appellants Simeon, Emilia and Marcelina Miguel, and
appellant Grace Ventura brought suit in the Court below against Florendo RULING: The judgment in favor of defendant-appellee Florendo Catalino must
Catalino for the recovery of the land situated in the Barrio of San Pascual, be sustained. For despite the invalidity of his sale to Catalino Agyapao, father
7|P a g e

Municipality of Tuba, Benguet, Mountain Province and contains an area of

39,446 square meters, more or less. Plaintiffs claiming to be the children and
heirs of the original registered owner, and averred that defendant, without
their knowledge or consent, had unlawfully taken possession of the land,
gathered its produce and unlawfully excluded plaintiffs therefrom.

of defendant-appellee, the vendor Bacaquio suffered the latter to enter,

possess and enjoy the land in question without protest, from 1928 to 1943,
when the seller died; and the appellants, in turn, while succeeding the
deceased, also remained inactive, without taking any step to reivindicate the
lot from 1944 to 1962, when the present suit was commenced in court.

Defendant answered pleading ownership and adverse possession for 30 Even granting appellants' proposition that no prescription lies against their
years, and counterclaimed for attorney's fees.
father's recorded title, their passivity and inaction for more than 34 years
(1928-1962) justifies the defendant-appellee in setting up the equitable
After trial the Court dismissed the complaint, declared defendant to be the defense of laches in his own behalf.
rightful owner, and ordered the Register of Deeds to issue a transfer certificate As a result, the action of plaintiffs-appellants must be considered barred and
in lieu of the original.
the Court below correctly so held.
Plaintiffs appealed directly to this Court, assailing the trial Court's findings of Courts cannot look with favor at parties who, by their silence, delay and
fact and law.
inaction, knowingly induce another to spend time, effort and expense in
cultivating the land, paying taxes and making improvements thereon for 30
The plaintiff-appellant Grace Ventura2 is the only child of Bacaquio by his first long years, only to spring from ambush and claim title when the possessor's
wife, Debsay, and the other plaintiffs-appellants, Simeon, Emilia and efforts and the rise of land values offer an opportunity to make easy profit at
Marcelina, all surnamed "Miguel", are his children by his third wife, Cosamang. his expense.
He begot no issue with his second wife, Dobaney. The three successive wives
have all died.
In the case at bar, Bacaquio sold the land in 1928 but the sale is void for lack
of the governor's approval. The vendor, and also his heirs after him, could have
Bacaquio sold it to Catalino Agyapao, father of the defendant Florendo instituted an action to annul the sale from that time, since they knew of the
Catalino, for P300.00 in 1928. No formal deed of sale was executed, but since invalidity of the sale, which is a matter of law; they did not have to wait for 34
the sale in 1928, or for more than 30 years, vendee Catalino Agyapao and his years to institute suit. The defendant was made to feel secure in the belief that
son, defendant-appellee Florendo Catalino, had been in possession of the land, no action would be filed against him by such passivity, and also because he
in the concept of owner, paying the taxes thereon and introducing "bought" again the land in 1949 from Grace Ventura who alone tried to
improvements.
question his ownership; so that the defendant will be plainly prejudiced in the
event the present action is not held to be barred.
On 1 February 1949, Grace Ventura, by herself alone, "sold" anew the same
land for P300.00 to defendant Florendo Catalino.
Since the plaintiffs-appellants are barred from recovery, their divestiture of all
the elements of ownership in the land is complete; and the Court a quo was
In 1961, Catalino Agyapao in turn sold the land to his son, the defendant justified in ordering that Bacaquio's original certificate be cancelled, and a new
Florendo Catalino.
transfer certificate in the name of Florendo Catalino be issued in lieu thereof
by the Register of Deeds.

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AGRA v. Philippine National Bank

ISSUE: Whether petitioners may invoke the defense of laches, considering that
PNBs claim had not yet prescribed. NO

On August 30, 1976, an action for collection of a sum of money was filed by the
PNB against Fil-Eastern Wood Industries, Inc. (principal debtor) and Petitioners HELD: The defense of laches applies independently of prescription. Laches is
(sureties).
different from the statute of limitations. Prescription is concerned with the fact
of delay, whereas laches is concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription is a
In its complaint, PNB alleged that on July 17, 1967 Fil-Eastern was granted a matter of time; laches is principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim
loan in the amount of P2,500,000.00. To secure the payment of the said loan to be enforced, this inequity being founded on some change in the condition
Fil-Eastern as principal and sureties Ferreria, Atienza, Novales, Agra, and Gamo of the property or the relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches
executed a Surety Agreement whereby the sureties, jointly and severally with is not. Laches applies in equity; whereas prescription applies at
the principal, guaranteed to PNB prompt payment of the subject law. Prescription is based on fixed time, laches is not.
obligations. Notwithstanding repeated demands, the Petitioners refused and True, prescription is different from laches, laches is principally a question of
failed to pay their loans.
equity. Necessarily, there is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or
staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular
The Sureties claimed among others that:
circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of
a) They only signed the Surety Agreement with the understanding that the court and since laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled
the same was a mere formality required of the officers of the by equitable considerations
corporation.
.
b) They did not benefit from the said loan.
Petitioners, however, failed to show that the collection suit against sureties
c) The extension of time of payment of the loan, released the defendants was inequitable. Remedies in equity address only situations tainted with
from any liability under the Surety Agreement.
inequity, not those expressly governed by statutes. Indeed, the petitioners
d) The Surety Agreement is null and void from the beginning due to a failed to prove the presence of all the four established requisites of laches, viz:
defect in the consent of the defendants; and
(1) conduct on the part of the defendant or one under whom he claims, giving
e) That the cause of action of the complainant is barred by laches and rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the complainant
estoppel in that PNB with full knowledge of the deteriorating seeks a remedy;
financial condition of Fil-Eastern did not take steps to collect from (2) delay in asserting the complainants right, the complainant having had
said defendant corporation while still solvent.
knowledge or notice of defendants conduct and having been afforded an
opportunity to institute a suit;
(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the
complainant would assert the right on which he bases his claim; and
(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the
complainant, or the suit is not held barred.
First element (exists). Neither Fil-Eastern nor the sureties, herein petitioners,
paid the obligation under the Surety Agreement.
Second element (inexistent). Although the collection suit was filed more than
seven years after the obligation of the sureties became due, the lapse was
9|P a g e

within the prescriptive period for filing an action. In this light, we find
immaterial petitioners insistence that the cause of action accrued on
December 31, 1968, when the obligation became due, and not on August 30,
1976, when the judicial demand was made. In either case, both submissions
fell within the ten-year prescriptive period. In any event, the fact of delay,
standing alone, is insufficient to constitute laches.
Third element (inexistent). It is absurd to maintain that petitioners did not
know that PNB would assert its right under the Surety Agreement. It is
unnatural, for banks to condone debts without adequate recompense in some
other form. Petitioners have not given us reason why they assumed that PNB
would not enforce the Agreement against them.
Forth element (inexistent). The circumstances do not justify the application of
laches. Rather, they disclose petitioners failure to understand the language
and the nature of the Surety Arrangement. They cannot now argue that the
Surety Agreement was merely a formality, secondary to the assignment of 15
percent of the proceeds of the sale of Fil-Easterns logs to Iwai and Co.,
Ltd. Neither can they rely on PNBs failure to collect the assigned share in the
sale of the logs or to make a demand on petitioners until after Fil-Eastern had
become bankrupt.
Although the contract of a surety is in essence secondary only to a valid
principal obligation, his liability to the creditor or promisee of the principal is
said to be direct, primary, and absolute; in other words, he is directly
and equally bound with the principal. The surety therefore becomes liable for
the debt or duty of another although he possesses no direct or personal
interest over the obligations nor does he receive any benefit therefrom.
When petitioners signed as sureties, they expressly and unequivocally agreed
to the stipulation that the liability on this guaranty shall be solidary, direct and
immediate and not contingent upon the pursuit by the creditor, its successors,
indorsees or assigns, of whatever remedies it or they have against the principal
or the securities or liens it or they may possess.
If they had mistaken the import of the Surety Agreement, they could have
easily asked for its revocation.
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BANEZ JR V. CONCEPCION August 29, 2012

ISSUE: Whether the filing of the complaint for specific performance to recover
the 1,233 square meter lot has prescribed. NO

This case originated from a Civil Case No. 3287-V-90 entitled Leodegario B.
Ramos v. Rodrigo Gomez, a.k.a. Domingo Ng Lim.
HELD:
On October 9, 1990, before the Valenzuela RTC could decide Civil Case No. Civil Case No. 722-M-2002 was really an action to revive the judgment by
3287-V-90 on the merits, Ramos and Gomez entered into a compromise compromise dated October 9, 1990 because the ultimate outcome would be
agreement. The RTC approved their compromise agreement through its no other than to order the execution of the judgment by compromise.
decision rendered on the same date.
The petitioners defense of prescription to bar Civil Case No. 722-M-2002
The petitioner, being then the counsel of Ramos in Civil Case No. 3287-V-90, presents another evidentiary concern. Article 1144 of the Civil Code requires,
assisted Ramos in entering into the compromise agreement "to finally indeed, that an action to revive a judgment must be brought before it is barred
terminate this case.
by prescription, which was ten years from the accrual of the right of action.
One of the stipulations of the compromise agreement was for Ramos to It is clear, however, that such a defense could not be determined in the hearing
execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of Gomez respecting the parcel of land of the petitioners motion to dismiss considering that the complaint did not
with an area of 1,233 square meters.
show on its face that the period to bring the action to revive had already lapsed.
Another stipulation was for the petitioner to issue post-dated checks totaling
P 110,000.00 to guarantee the payment by Ramos of his monetary obligations
towards Gomez as stated in the compromise agreement broken down as
follows: (a) P 80,000.00 as Ramos loan obligation to Gomez; (b) P 20,000.00
for the use of the loan; and (c) P 10,000.00 as attorneys fees.

An allegation of prescription, as the Court put it in Pineda v. Heirs of Eliseo

Guevara, "can effectively be used in a motion to dismiss only when the
complaint on its face shows that indeed the action has already prescribed,
[o]therwise, the issue of prescription is one involving evidentiary matters
requiring a full blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in a mere
motion to dismiss."

Of these amounts, only P 80,000.00 was ultimately paid to Gomez, because

the petitioners check dated April 23, 1991 for the balance of P 30,000.00 was At any rate, the mere lapse of the period per se did not render the judgment
dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
stale within the context of the law on prescription, for events that effectively
suspended the running of the period of limitation might have intervened. In
Gomez meanwhile died on November 7, 1990. He was survived by his wife other words, the Estate of Gomez was not precluded from showing such
Tsui Yuk Ying and their minor children (collectively to be referred to as the events, if any.
Estate of Gomez). The Estate of Gomez sued Ramos and the petitioner for
specific performance in the RTC in Caloocan City to recover the balance of P Verily, the need to prove the existence or non-existence of significant matters,
30,000.00 (Civil Case No. C-15750).
like supervening events, in order to show either that Civil Case No. 722-M-2002
was barred by prescription or not was present and undeniable. Moreover, the
Ramos failed to cause the registration of the deed of absolute sale pursuant petitioner himself raised factual issues in his motion to dismiss, like his
to the second paragraph of the compromise agreement of October 9, 1990 averment of full payment or discharge of the obligation of Ramos and the
despite the Estate of Gomez having already complied with Gomezs waiver or abandonment of rights under the compromise agreement. The proof
undertaking. Nor did Ramos deliver to the Estate of Gomez the owners
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duplicate copy of TCT No. T-10179 P(M) of the Registry of Deeds of thereon cannot be received in certiorari proceedings before the Court, but
Meycauayan, Bulacan, as stipulated under the third paragraph of the should be established in the RTC.
compromise agreement of October 9, 1990. Instead, Ramos and the petitioner
caused to be registered the 1,233 square meter portion in Ramoss name
under TCT No. T-13005-P(M) of the Registry of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan.
On July 6, 1995, the Estate of Gomez brought a complaint for specific
performance against Ramos and the petitioner in the RTC in Valenzuela in
order to recover the 1,233 square meter lot. However, the Valenzuela RTC
dismissed the complaint on April 1, 1996 on the ground of improper venue and
recourse.
On appeal to CA, the RTC decision was affirmed.
On September 20, 2002, the Estate of Gomez commenced Civil Case No. 722M-2002 in the Valenzuela RTC, ostensibly to revive the judgment by
compromise rendered on October 9, 1990 in Civil Case No. 3287-V-90.
The petitioner was impleaded as a party-defendant because of his having
guaranteed the performance by Ramos of his obligation and for having
actively participated in the transaction.
On January 8, 2003, the petitioner moved for the dismissal of Civil Case No.
722-M-2002, alleging that the action was already barred by res judicata and
by prescription; that he was not a real party-in-interest; and that the amount
he had guaranteed with his personal check had already been paid by Ramos
with his own money.
On March 24, 2003, the RTC reversed its first ruling that the right of action had
already prescribed due to more than 12 years having elapsed from the approval
of the compromise agreement on October 9, 1990, citing Article 1143 (3) of the
Civil Code (which provides a 10-year period within which a right of action based
upon a judgment must be brought from. It held that the filing of the complaint
for specific performance on July 6, 1995 in the Valenzuela RTC had
interrupted the prescriptive period pursuant to Article 1155 of the Civil Code.

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REPUBLIC V. ESPINOSA
ISSUE: Whether Espinosas application has satisfied the legal requirements for
Respondent Domingo Espinosa filed with the MTC of Consolacion, Cebu an registration over the subject property which warrants the granting of the
application for land registration covering a parcel of land with an area of 5,525 decree of registration.
sq. ms. situated in Barangay Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu.
HELD: NO. Espinosa failed to comply with the other legal requirements for its
In support of his application Espinosa alleged that: (a) the property is alienable application for registration to be granted.
and disposable; (b) he purchased the property from his mother, Isabel, on July
4, 1970 and the latters other heirs had waived their rights thereto; and (c) he Applying Section 14(1) of P.O. No. 1529 and Section 48(b) of the PLA, albeit
and his predecessor-in-interest had been in possession of the property in the improper, Espinosa failed to prove that: (a) Isabel's possession of the property
concept of an owner for more than 30 years
dated back to June 12, 1945 or earlier; and (b) the property is alienable and
disposable.
Petitioner opposed Espinosas application, claiming that: (a) Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 otherwise known as the "Public Land Act" had not On the other hand, applying Section 14(2) of P.O. No. 1529, Espinosa failed to
been complied with as Espinosas predecessor-in-interest possessed the prove that the property is patrimonial. As to whether Espinosa was able to
property only after June 12, 1945; and (b) the tax declarations do not prove prove that his possession and occupation and that of Isabel were of the
that his possession and that of his predecessor-in-interest are in the character character prescribed by law, the resolution of this issue has been rendered
and for the length of time required by law
unnecessary by the foregoing considerations
REMMAN ENTERPRISES V. REPUBLIC
ISSUE:
The petitioner, through its authorized representative Ronnie P. Inocencio
(Inocencio), filed with the RTC on June 4, 1998 an application for registration
of the subject properties situated in Barangay Napindan, Taguig, Metro
Manila, with an area of 27,477 square meters, 23,179 sq m and 45,636 sq m.

HELD:
Dismissal of petitioners application for original registration was proper
considering the latter's failure to sufficiently establish that the subject
properties were already declared alienable and disposable by the
government.

The State, through the OSG, interposed its opposition to the application.
During the initial hearing of the case on May 4, 1999, the petitioner presented The present rule on the matter then requires that an application for original
and marked documentary evidence to prove its compliance with jurisdictional registration be accompanied by: (1) CENRO or PENRO Certification; and (2) a
requirements.
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified
as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records, x x x.[20 (Citations
Inocencio, the petitioner's sales manager, testified that the subject properties omitted and emphasis in the original)
were purchased on August 28, 1989 by the petitioner from sellers Magdalena
Samonte, Jaime Aldana and Virgilio Navarro. The properties were declared for Given the foregoing, the dismissal of the petitioner's application for
taxation purposes on August 9, 1989. After the sale, the petitioner occupied registration was proper. Under pertinent laws and jurisprudence, the
the properties and planted thereon crops like rice, corn and vegetables. petitioner had to sufficiently establish that: first, the subject properties form
part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; second, the
applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, the
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Serquina, a caretaker of the property, alleged that no person other than the possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
applicant and its predecessors-in-interest had claimed ownership or rights over earlier.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
the subject properties.
Without sufficient proof that the subject properties had been declared
On November 27, 2001, the RTC granted the petitioner's application.
alienable and disposable, the Court finds no reason to look further into the
petitioner's claim that the CA erred in finding that it failed to satisfy the nature
Dissatisfied, the State appealed to the CA by alleging substantive and and length of possession that could qualify for land registration.
procedural defects in the petitioner's application. It argued that the identity of
the subject properties was not sufficiently established. The State further
claimed that the character and length of possession required by law in land
registration
cases
were
not
satisfied
by
the
petitioner.
CA reversed the RTC decision. The CA explained that the survey plans and
technical descriptions submitted by the petitioner failed to establish the true
identity of the subject properties. The petitioner should have also submitted a
certification from the proper government office stating that the properties
were already declared alienable and disposable.
The CA further cited a failure to establish that the petitioner and its
predecessors-in-interest possessed the subject parcels of land under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
MANGASER V. UGAY December 3, 2014

ISSUE: Whether respondent acquired ownership of the subject property by

virtue of acquisitive prescription. NO

On October 30, 2007, petitioner Anacleto Mangaser filed a complaint for

Forcible Entry with Damages against respondent Dionisio Ugay (respondent) HELD:
before the MTC of Caba, La Union.
In the case at bench, the Court finds that petitioner acquired possession of the
subject property by juridical act, specifically, through the issuance of a free
In his complaint, petitioner alleged that he was the registered owner and patent under Commonwealth Act No. 141 and its subsequent registration with
possessor of a parcel of land situated in Santiago Sur, Caba, La Union, with an the Register of Deeds on March 18, 1987.
area of 10,632 square meters; that on October 31, 2006, petitioner, discovered
that respondent stealthy intruded and occupied a portion of his property by The issuance of an original certificate of title to the petitioner evidences
constructing a residential house thereon without his knowledge and consent; ownership and from it, a right to the possession of the property flows. Wellthat he referred the matter to the Office of Lupong Tagapamayapa for entrenched is the rule that a person who has a Torrens title over the property
conciliation, but no settlement was reached, hence, a certification to file action is entitled to the possession thereof.
was issued by the Lupon; and that demand letters were sent to respondent but
he still refused to vacate the premises, thus, he was constrained to seek judicial Moreover, his claim of possession is coupled with tax declarations. While tax
remedy.
declarations are not conclusive proof of possession of a parcel of land, they are
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Respondent denied the material allegations of the complaint.

He argued that:
he had been a resident of Samara, Aringay, La Union, since birth and
when he reached the age of reason,
that he introduced more improvements on the property by cultivating
the land, and in March 2006, he put up a "bahay kubo";
that in October 2006, he installed a fence made of "bolo" to secure
the property;
that he knew the boundaries of petitioner's property because he knew
the extent of the "iron mining" activities done by a company on the
said property;
that petitioner was never in actual possession of the property
occupied by him, and it was only on October 31, 2006 when he
discovered the intrusion;
that it was not correct to say that he refused to vacate and surrender
the premises despite receipt of the demand letters because in his
letter-reply, he assured petitioner that he would voluntarily vacate the
premises if he would only be shown to have intruded into petitioner's
titled lot after the boundaries were pointed out to him;
and that instead of showing the boundaries to him, petitioner filed an
action for forcible entry before the MTC.
On April 26, 2011, the MTC ruled in favor of respondent. It stated that
petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to prove that the lot occupied by
respondent was within his lot titled under OCT No. RP-174 (13 789). It also
explained that petitioner failed to prove his prior physical possession of the
subject property.
The OCT No. RP-174(13789) registered under petitioner's name and the Tax
Declaration were not proof of actual possession of the property.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the RTC of Bauang, La Union. The RTC
reversed the MTC decision and ruled in favor of petitioner. That possession of
the land did not only mean actual or physical possession but also included the
subject of the thing to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal
formalities established for acquiring such right.

good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right
mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or
constructive possession.
Against the Torrens title and tax declarations of petitioner, the bare allegations
of respondent that he had prior, actual, continuous, public, notorious,
exclusive and peaceful possession in the concept of an owner, has no leg to
stand on. Thus, by provisionally resolving the issue of ownership, the Court is
satisfied that petitioner had prior possession of the subject property. When
petitioner discovered the stealthy intrusion of respondent over his registered
property, he immediately filed a complaint with the Lupong Tagapamayapa
and subsequently filed an action for forcible entry with the MTC. Instead of
taking the law into his own hands and forcefully expelling respondent from his
property, petitioner composed himself and followed the established legal
procedure to regain possession of his land.
Petitioner proved that he was deprived of possession of the property by
stealth.
The complaint was also filed on October 30, 2007, within the one year
reglementary period counted from the discovery of the stealthy entry by
respondent to the property on October 31, 2006.

For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiffs must allege and prove: (a) that
they have prior physical possession of the property; (b) that they were
deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth;
and, (c) that the action was filed within one (1) year from the time the owners
or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of the physical possession of
the property.
As a rule, the word "possession" in forcible entry suits indeed refers to nothing
more than prior physical possession or possession de facto, not possession de
Jure or legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law. Title is not the
issue, and the absence of it "is not a ground for the courts to withhold relief
from the parties in an ejectment case."

The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. It emphasized that
petitioner must allege and prove that he was in prior physical possession of the
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property in dispute. The word "possession," as used in forcible entry and Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are acts to which the law
unlawful detainer cases, meant nothing more than physical possession, not gives the force of acts of possession. Examples of these are donations,
legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law.
succession, execution and registration of public instruments, inscription of
possessory information titles and the like.33 The reason for this exceptional
The CA wrote that petitioner was not in physical possession despite the rule is that possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has
presentation of the OCT No. RP-174(13789) and his tax declarations. It to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that
reiterated that when the law would speak of possession in forcible entry cases, he is in possession.
it is prior physical possession or possession de facto, as distinguished from
possession de Jure. What petitioner proved was legal possession, not his prior
physical possession.

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