Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Growth Unsustainable
Economic collapse inevitable- resources are limited, and renewables actually make the
problem worse
Tverberg, Casualty Actuarial Society fellow, 13
[Gail, American Academic of Actuaries Member, M.S. in Mathematics from University of Illinois, 3/29/13, Our
Finite World, How Resource Limits Lead to Financial Collapse, http://ourfiniteworld.com/2013/03/29/howresource-limits-lead-to-financial-collapse/, 7/6/15, AEG]
Resource limits are invisible, so most people dont realize that we could possibility be approaching them. In fact, my
analysis indicates resource limits are really financial limits, and in fact, we seem to be approaching those limits right
now.
Many analysts discussing resource limits are talking about a very different concern than I am talking about. Many
from the peak oil community say that what we should worry about is a decline in world oil supply. In my view,
the danger is quite different: The real danger is financial collapse, coming much earlier than a decline in oil supply.
This collapse is related to high oil price, and also to higher costs for other resources as we approach limits (for
example, desalination of water where water supply is a problem, and higher natural gas prices in much of the world).
The financial collapse is related to Energy Return on Energy Invested (EROEI) that is already too low. I dont see
any particular EROEI target as being a thresholdthe calculations for individual energy sources are not on a systemwide basis, so are not always helpful. The issue is not precisely low EROEI. Instead, the issue is the loss of
cheap fossil fuel energy to subsidize the rest of society.
If an energy source, such as oil back when the cost was $20 or $30 barrel, can produce a large amount of energy in
the form it is needed with low inputs, it is likely to be a very profitable endeavor. Governments can tax it heavily
(with severance taxes, royalties, rental for drilling rights, and other fees that are not necessarily called taxes). In
many oil exporting countries, these oil-based revenues provide a large share of government revenues. The
availability of cheap energy also allows inexpensive roads, bridges, pipelines, and schools to be built.
As we move to energy that requires more expensive inputs for extraction (such as the current $90+ barrel oil), these
benefits are lost. The cost of roads, bridges, and pipelines escalates. It is this loss of a subsidy from cheap fossil fuels
that is significant part of what moves us toward financial collapse.
Renewable energy generally does not solve this problem. In fact, it can exacerbate the problem, because the
cost of its inputs tend to be high and very front-ended, leading to a need for subsidies. What is really needed is
a way to replace lost tax revenue, and a way to bring down the high cost of new bridges and roadsthat is a way to
get back to the cost structure we had when oil (and other fossil fuels) could be extracted cheaply.
for agriculture (or in our case, finding ways fossil fuels could be used). A civilization experiences Growth for 100+
years as the population is able to grow with the new resource available to it.
Eventually the civilization reaches a Stagflation period. This happens when the civilization starts reaching limits.
Population is much higher, the size of the governing class is much larger, and feedbacks like erosion and soil
depletion start to play a role. In my view, Stagflation period began for the United States around 1970, when US oil
production began to fall.
Turchin and Nefedov found that during the Stagflation period, population growth slows and wages stop rising. Wage
disparity increases, and debt grows. The cost of food and other resources becomes more variable, and begins to
spike. The level of required taxes grows, as the number of government administrators grows and as armies increase
in size. (Joseph Tainter refers to this growth in government services as a product of increased complexity.)
Eventually, after 50 or 60 years, a Crisis Phase begins, when it is no longer possible to raise taxes enough to
cover all of the governmental costs. In this period, wages of commoners drop to such a low level that nutrition
declines, leading to epidemics and a higher death rate. Commoners often revolt, leading to government collapses.
Wars for resources are sometimes fought. The Crisis Phase lasts a variable length of time, typically 20 to 50 years,
with the length of time seeming to be shorter in the more recent cycles analyzed. There is considerable die-off from
illness and warfare in the Crisis Phase.
It seems to me that the United States, most of Europe, and Japan are now very close to the point where they will
enter the Crisis Phase of a similar cycle.
Environment Turns
Biodiversity 1NC
Economic growth causes biodiversity loss, climate change, deforestation, fishery depletion,
ocean acidification, ozone depletion and pollutionguarantees extinction unless the
economy collapses
Rees, Institute for Resources, Environment and Sustainability PHD, 10
[William E., June, Journal Of Cosmology, Growth and Sustainability Dont Mix,
http://journalofcosmology.com/ClimateChange108.html, accessed 7/7/15, DA]
Unless economic growth can be reconciled with unprecedented rates of decarbonization (in excess of 6% per year), it is
difficult to envisage anything other than a planned economic recession being compatible with stabilization at or
below 650 ppmv CO2e (Anderson and Bows 2008, italics added). Anderson and Bow's model refers to total greenhouse gas
(GHG) concentrations of 650 parts per million by volume of carbon dioxide equivalents. Note that 650 ppmv implies a
catastrophic four Celsius degree increase in mean global temperatures. In early 2010, the CO2 level alone is 390 ppmv, up from a preindustrial
level of 280 ppmv and rising at an accelerating rate in excess of 2.3 ppm per year. This unusually direct extension of scientific angst into the
policy arena assumes an unambiguous connection among climate change, the role of economic growth, the necessary political response and
consequences for global development. Needless to say, not everyone accepts this connection. Andersons and Bows warning, and the equally
alarming findings of many other scientists and organizations (Cairns 2010; NAS 2010a,b,c), are going largely unheeded in the political arena.
Talk of a planned economic recession in the midst of a chaotically unplanned one is dismissed as lunacy. Techno
industrial society remains in deep denial of the global ecological crisis and when, occasionally, decision-makers are
pricked by a sense of urgency they fall back on market forces and humanitys demonstrated technological wizardry
in hopes of maintaining the growth-bound status quo. But there is a problemtechnology pressed to new limits has
become an unreliable if not treacherous ally in the sustainability wars , particularly if sustainability is defined as
sustaining the status quo. British Petroleum's (BP) drilling rig explosion in April of 2010, and the inability to cap the the subsequent oil
well blow off in the depths of the Gulf of Mexico, are just the most recent reminders. According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration over 40,000 barrels a day are gushing into the ocean (with some scientists estimating over 100,000). A worst case scenario
includes the killing of fish breeding areas and coral reefs, and consequent effects of depleting and reducing oxygen
to levels so low that it may kill off much of the sea life near the plumes and create vast dead zones. Perhaps
compounding the damage is BP's unprecedented use of toxic chemical dispersants, over 700,000 gallons, as of May 20, 2010, which could pose a
significant threat to the Gulf of Mexico's marine life. Thus, the "technical fix" is not a fix at all, but may only add to the
catastrophe. After reviewing available technological options for confronting climate change Moriarty and Honnery (2010) reasonably
conclude that the time has, in fact, come to rethink modern societys addition to economic growth.. This commentary unreservedly supports
Moriartys and Honnerys (2010) conclusion on fundamental grounds. My argument starts from two indisputable premises not even directly
related to climate change: 1) By modern interpretations of the second law of thermodynamics, the human economy is a self-organizing far-fromequilibrium dissipative structure (Prigogine 1997) that grows and maintains itself by extracting low-entropy energy/matter (exergy) from its
environment and by injecting degraded waste by-products back into the environment (Schneider and Kay 1994, 1995; Kay and Regier 2000). 2)
The human enterprise is a fully contained, open, dependent, growing sub-system of a materially closed, non-growing, finite ecosphere (Daly
1991a, 1992; Rees 1995). Taken together, the economic and ecological implications of these premises are profound. The sustainability of humans
and their economies depend entirely on continued access to pre-existing stocks/gradients of energy and matter (exergy) found in nature and on the
viability of the productive ecosystems of which humans are a part (Rees 2003; 2006a,b). Ironically, however, the human enterprise, as a subsystem of the ecosphere, can produce itself and grow (ascend far-from-equilibrium) only by consuming and dissipating those same gradients
and ecosystems. This biophysical reality anticipates or explains virtually all the so-called environmental problems
confronting modern society. Fisheries collapse, tropical deforestation, biodiversity loss, falling water tables, soils
depletion, peak oil, etc. (Cairns 2010; Singer 2010), show that even current rates of consumption by humans exceed rates
of resource renewal or replenishment in nature; rising carbon emissions (and anthropogenic warming), ozone depletion,
ocean acidification, chemical contamination of food-websin fact, all forms of pollutionshow that humanitys
dissipative output already exceeds the assimilative capacity of the ecosphere. This should not be a surprisethere are no
exemptions from the second law. Beyond a certain point, sustaining the human enterprise necessarily comes at the expense
of increasing the entropy of the ecosphere. Humanity is now living, in part, by consuming and permanently
dissipating natural capital essential to its own existence. As this pathology deepens, the behaviour of vital life-support
systems will become increasingly erratic and unpredictable. Pushed far enough some systems will succumb
completely to overuse and degradation. All of which brings us to the question of growth. Prevailing economic reasoning sees no
significant constraints on material growth because it externalizes the ecosphere and ignores the second law. Indeed, neoliberal economic models
are so abstracted from biophysical (and social) reality that they can make only marginal contributions to the sustainability debate (Daly 1991b).
That said, we can use micro-economic logic to make the theoretical case for zero growth, even economic contraction, at
the macro scale (Figure 1). Everyone recognizes that economic activity produces valuable goods and services (material benefits). These
benefits are easy to identify and quantify with market prices. At the same time, every act of production and consumption generates
costs, many of which are difficult to identify and harder to price in dollar terms (e.g., the costs associated with increasing
entropy). Conventional
reasoning also accepts that there will be diminishing returns from growthi.e., as the scale of the
human enterprise increases, the marginal value of growth will gradually decline. Meanwhile, the marginal costs
resource depletion, ecosystem degradation and pollution, community disruptionwill generally increase. This convergent
relationship implies that at some point on the growth trajectory, the value of an additional increment of growth will be negated by the
corresponding costs.
Biodiversity 2NC
Increasing the economy destroys the environment and national security
Speth, former Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies dean, 8
[James Gustave, co-chair of the Democracy Collaboratives Next System Project and a co-founder of the New
Economy Coalition, 09/18/08, The Nation, Global Warming and Modern Capitalism,
http://www.thenation.com/article/global-warming-and-modern-capitalism/, 7/6/15, AEG]
It is no accident that environmental crisis is gathering as social injustice is deepening and growing inequality is
impairing democratic institutions. Each is the result of a system of political economytodays capitalismthat is
profoundly committed to profits and growth and profoundly indifferent to nature and society. Left uncorrected, it is
an inherently ruthless, rapacious system, and it is up to citizens, acting mainly through government, to inject human
and natural values into that system. But this effort fails because progressive politics are too feeble and Washington is
more and more in the hands of powerful corporations and great wealth. The best hope for change in America is a
fusion of those concerned about the environment, social justice and strong democracy into one powerful progressive
force. This fusion must occur before it is too late.
Sadly, while environmentalists have been winning many battles, we are losing the planet. Half the worlds tropical
and temperate forests are gone. The rate of deforestation in the tropics is about an acre a second. Half the planets
wetlands are gone. An estimated 90 percent of the large predator fish are gone and 75 percent of marine fisheries are
overfished, fished to capacity or depleted, up from 5 percent a few decades ago. Twenty percent of the corals are
gone; another 20 percent severely threatened. Species are disappearing about 1,000 times faster than normal. The
planet has not seen such a spasm of extinction in 65 million years, since the dinosaurs disappeared. Each year
desertification claims a Nebraska-sized area of productive capacity worldwide. Toxic chemicals can be found by the
dozens in essentially every one of us.
Earths ozone layer was severely depleted before the change was discovered. Human activities have pushed
atmospheric carbon dioxide levels up by more than a third and have started the most dangerous change of all
planetary warming and climate disruption. Earths ice fields are melting. Industrial processes are fixing nitrogen,
making it biologically active, at a rate equal to natures; one result is the development of hundreds of dead zones in
the oceans because of overfertilization. Withdrawals of fresh water consume more than half of accessible runoff, and
water shortages are multiplying here and abroad. The following rivers no longer reach the oceans in the dry season:
the Colorado, Yellow, Ganges and Nile, among many others.
The United Statesresponsible for about 30 percent of the carbon dioxide added to the atmosphereis, of course,
deeply complicit in these global trends, and four decades of environmental effort have not stemmed the tide of
decline. The United States is losing 6,000 acres of open space every day, and 100,000 acres of wetlands every year.
Forty percent of US fish species are threatened with extinction, a third of plants and amphibians, 15 to 20 percent of
birds and mammals. Half of US lakes and a third of the rivers still fail to meet the standards that the 1972 Clean
Water Act said should be met by 1983, and a third of Americans live in counties that fail to meet EPA air-quality
standards. We have done little to curb our wasteful energy habits or our steady population growth.
All we have to do to destroy the planets climate and biota and leave a ruined world to our children and
grandchildren is to keep doing exactly what we are doing, with no growth in the human population or the world
economy. Just continue to release greenhouse gases at current rates, impoverish ecosystems and release toxic
chemicals at current rates, and the world in the latter part of this century wont be fit to live in. But human activities
are not holding at current levelsthey are accelerating dramatically.
The world economy has more than quadrupled since 1960 and is projected to quadruple again by mid century. At
recent rates of growth, it will double in fifteen to seventeen years. It took all of human history to grow the $7 trillion
world economy of 1950. We now grow by that amount in a decade. Societies face the prospect of enormous
environmental deterioration just when they need to be moving strongly in the opposite direction.
The escalating processes of climate disruption, biotic impoverishment and toxificationwhich continue despite
decades of warnings and earnest effortare a severe indictment of capitalism. Capitalism as it is constituted today
produces an economy and politics that are highly destructive to the environment. An unquestioning
commitment to economic growth at any cost, powerful corporations whose overriding objective is to grow by
generating profits (including profits from avoiding the environmental costs they create, from amassing deep
subsidies and benefits from government and from continued deployment of technologies designed with little regard
for the environment), markets that fail to recognize environmental costs unless corrected by government,
government that is subservient to corporate interests and the growth imperative, rampant consumerism spurred by
sophisticated advertising and marketing, all economic activity so large in scale that it alters the fundamental
biophysical operations of the planetcombine to deliver an ever growing world economy that is undermining the
ability of the planet to sustain life.
Mainstream environmentalism has proved largely incapable of coping with these forces. It works within the system
raising public awareness, offering responsive policies, lobbying and litigating. America has run a forty-year
experiment on whether this environmentalism can succeed, and the results are in. The full burden of managing
accumulating environmental threats has fallen to the environmental community, both in and outside government.
But that burden is too great. The system of modern capitalism will grow in size and complexity and will generate
ever larger environmental consequences, outstripping efforts to cope with them. Indeed, the system will seek to
undermine those efforts and constrain them within narrow limits. Working only within the system will, in the end,
not succeed. Transformative change in the system itself is needed.
The fundamental questions thus are about transforming capitalism as we know it. Can it be done? If so, how? And if
not, what then? The good news is that there are a variety of prescriptions to take the economy and the environment
off a collision course and to transform economic activity into something benign and restorative. The most important
of these prescriptions range far beyond the traditional environmental agenda.
Market failure can be corrected by government, perverse subsidies can be eliminated and environmentally honest
prices can be forged. The laws, incentives and governance structures under which corporations operate can be
transformed to move from shareholder primacy to stakeholder primacy. But even more vital is the need to
challenge economic growth and the consumerism it depends on. This challenge is as relevant to addressing social
problems as environmental ones.
The never-ending drive to grow the economy undermines families, jobs, communities, the environment, a sense
of place and continuity, even national securitybut we are told that, in the end, we will somehow be better off.
America has not applied its growth dividend to meeting social and environmental needs. There is good evidence that
increased incomes do not lead to greater satisfaction with life. In affluent countries we have what might be called
uneconomic growth, to borrow Herman Dalys phrase, where, if one could total up all the costs of growth, they
would outweigh the benefits.
global emissions have only continued to rise. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Changes recent fifth report says that to
have a reasonable chance of keeping global temperature rise below 2 degrees Celsius we must reduce net
anthropogenic emissions to zero well before 2050. Despite rosy projections for running the world on renewable energy alone, my analysis shows, in detail, that
replacing fossil fuels with renewable energy sources would not be affordable because of the built-in redundancy and
energy-storage capability that would be required. Economic growth. These kinds of figures show that major global problems cannot be
solved unless the wealthiest countries face up to enormous reductions in per-capita resource use. However, these countries are
obsessed with raising levels of production and consumption as fast as possible, and without any upper limit. The supreme, never-questioned goal is continuous
economic growth. But for the worlds population to achieve Australian living standards by 2050, given an annual economic growth rate of 3 percent, total world production and
danger level,
consumption would have to be more than 30 times as great in 2050 as they are now. In addition to the problem of unsustainable resource and ecological impacts, there is the extremely unjust
nature of the global economy. It operates mainly according to market principles, which means that scarce goods go to those who can pay most for them, rather than to those in greatest need. Even
more important, in a market economy what is developed is what is most profitable in the market, not what is most needed. So the development that takes place in the Third World is mostly of
industries that benefit corporations and rich-world consumers, rather than the billions of people living in poverty. Simply put, it is not possible to have a just and sustainable consumer-capitalist
society that provides all people with increasingly affluent lifestyles. Unless the fundamental structures and systems of modern society are scrapped and replaced, the problems they are causing
The magnitude of the over-consumption problem calls for a radical alternative to consumer-capitalist
society, which I label The Simpler Way. This would involve people organizing frugal but sufficient material lifestyles within mostly local economies made up of small farms and firms,
using local resources and labor to meet local needs. There would be no economic growth, and the GDP would be a small fraction of its present level. The biggest changes would
have to be in the political and cultural realms, including participatory self-government to ensure that the local economy would be geared to providing a high quality
cannot be solved.
of life for all. The Simpler Way could not be run from afar, so it is incompatible with big-state socialism. Most problematic of all, it could not work without the willing acceptance of frugal and
self-sufficient lifestyles, strong collectivism, and a desire to give and to nurture. These are not predictions, and they are not utopian dreams. If the limits are as coercive as I have argued, a
sustainable and just world cannot be conceived other than in terms of some kind of Simpler Way. The literature supporting this limits to growth perspective has become overwhelmingly
it. Hardly anyone recognizes that the pursuit of affluence and growth
is an enormous, suicidal mistake. Even if the magnitude and nature of the change required was recognized, modern political institutions and
cultural traditions are not up to the task. In our winner-take-all society there is little willingness to share the costs of the readjustment fairly or sensibly. It is not
convincing in recent decades, but the mainstream refuses to attend to
surprising, therefore, that proposals for relatively minor reforms are resisted fiercely. What, then, are the chances of making enormous changes such as phasing out all fossil fuel power
It is likely that we will continue to accelerate toward catastrophic collapse. However, there are people
working to build the beginnings of a simpler way in their communities, with the hope that these groups will be sufficiently well established to provide a base for
reconstruction when existing systems begin to fail. There are small but thriving Transition Towns, and movements known as Voluntary
Simplicity, Permaculture, and the Slow Movement. At this stage, most of these are only implementing reforms within consumer-capitalist society, but they
provide the best hope for developing communities that will eventually take control of their own fate and build highly
self-sufficient local economies.
generation?
economic
growth experienced since the industrial revolution have been largely due to the available abundance of cheap energy in the forms of coal,
gas, and especially oil. Fossil fuels are finite resources, however, and energy analysts since Marion King Hubbert (1956) have known that at some time the production of
finite fossil fuels will peak and, after a plateau, eventually enter decline. The concern here is that, while production may plateau, demand is
still expected to increase (Hirsch et al, 2010), thereby putting an upward pressure on the price of fossil fuels, even as the energy return on investment declines (Murphy and
Hall, 2011). This phenomenon seems to be underway already in relation to oil , with crude oil production entering a plateau
around 2005, causing the price of oil to increase from around $25 per barrel, historically, to an average price of $110 since 2011 (IEA, 2013a: 2). In a world that
consumes 90 million barrels of oil every day, such sharp price rises have significant economic implications, by sucking
close connection between energy use and economic activity (Hall and Klitgaard, 2012). From this view sometimes called biophysical economics the unprecedented levels of
discretionary expenditure and investment away from the rest of the economy. Indeed, some analysts argue that expensive oil is at least part of the reason the global economy, which is so
renewable energy, of course; the suggestion is merely that growth-orientated consumer societies could not be sustained if the world rapidly decarbonised to run solely or primarily on renewable
sources of energy (Hopkins and Miller, 2013). A transition to 100% renewable energy, therefore, may well imply consuming significantly less energy, and in the highly developed regions of the
energy descent would probably mean transitioning to some post-growth economic paradigm via a process of planned
economic contraction, or degrowth. Kevin Andersons work is particularly important here (see Anderson, 2013), for he is one of the only climate scientists who recognises
(or is outspoken enough to say) that the worlds shrinking carbon budget requires degrowth and reduced consumption in high consumption
societies. That is not an implication many are prepared to accept , even amongst many or even most participants in the broad environmental movement.
world,
Indeed, this blindness it might even be wilful blindness is arguably the environmental movements greatest short-coming.
Short-term collapse of the global economy is the only way to avoid catastrophic warming--delay locks in catastrophic emissions
Holmgren, Australian environmental designer & ecological educator, 14
[David, 01/20/14, Resilience, Crash on Demand: Welcome to the Brown Tech Future,
http://www.resilience.org/stories/2014-01-20/crash-on-demand-welcome-to-the-brown-tech-future, 7/9/15, AEG]
Many climate
policy professionals and climate activists are now reassessing whether there is anything more they can do to
help prevent the global catastrophe that climate change appears to be. The passing of the symbolic 400ppm CO2 level certainly has seen
some prominent activists getting close to a change of strategy. As the Transition Town movement founder and permaculture activist Rob Hopkins
says, the shift in the mainstream policy circles from mitigation to adaptation and defence is underway (i.e. giving up).13 While political deadlock
remains the most obvious obstacle, I believe at least some of that deadlock stems from widespread doubt about whether greenhouse gas
emissions can be radically reduced without economic contraction and/or substantial wealth redistribution. Substantial redistribution
of wealth is not generally taken seriously perhaps because it could only come about through some sort of global revolution that would itself lead
to global economic collapse. On the other hand, massive economic contraction seems like it might happen all by itself, without necessarily
leading to greater equity. The predominant focus in the "climate professional and activist community" on policies, plans and projects for
transition to renewable energy and efficiency has yet to show evidence of absolute reductions in greenhouse gas
emissions that do not depend on rising greenhouse gas emissions in other parts of the global economy. For example, the
contribution of renewable technology installation to reduced GGE in some European countries appears to be balanced by increased GGE in China
and India (where much of the renewable technologies are manufactured). The Jevons'
reductions in GGE[Greenhouse Gas Emissions] adequate to prevent dangerous climate change without considering a
powerdown of the growth economy . The ideas of degrowth16 are starting to get an airing, mostly in Europe, but the chances of these
ideas being adopted and successfully implemented would require a long slow political evolution if not revolution. We don't have time for the first,
and the second almost certainly crashes the financial system, which in turn crashes the global economy. IS TIME RUNNING OUT FOR
BOTTOM UP ALTERNATIVES? Like many others, I have argued that the bottom up creation of household and community economies, already
proliferating in the shadow of the global economy, can create and sustain different ways of well-being that can compensate, at least partly, for the
inevitable contraction in centralised fossil fuelled economies (now well and truly failing to sustain the social contract in countries such as Greece
and Egypt). When the official Soviet Union economy collapsed in the early '90s it was the informal economy that cushioned the social impact.
Permaculture strategies focus on the provision of basic needs at the household and community level to increase resilience, reduce ecological
footprint and allow much of the discretionary economy to shrink. In principle, a major contraction in energy consumption is
possible because a large proportion of that consumption is for non-essential uses by more than a billion middle class people.
That contraction has the potential to switch off greenhouse gas emissions but this has not been seriously discussed or
debated by those currently working very hard to get global action for rapid transition by planned and co-ordinated processes. Of course it is more
complicated because the provision of fundamental needs, such as water, food etc., are part of the same highly integrated system that meets
discretionary wants. However, the time available to create, refine and rapidly spread successful models of these bottom-up solutions is running
out, in the same way that the time for government policy and corporate capitalism to work their magic in converting the energy base of growth
from fossil to renewable sources.17 If the climate clock is really so close to midnight what else could be done? Economic
crash as hell or salvation For many decades I have felt that a collapse of the global economic systems might save humanity
and many of our fellow species great suffering by happening sooner rather than later because the stakes keep
rising and scale of the impacts are always worse by being postponed . An important influence in my thinking on
the chances of such a collapse was the public speech given by President Ronald Reagan following the 1987 stock market crash. He said "there
won't be an economic collapse, so long as people don't believe there will be an economic collapse" or words to that effect. I remember at the time
thinking; fancy the most powerful person on the planet admitting that faith (of the populous) is the only thing that holds the financial system
together. Two decades on I remember thinking that a second great depression might be the best outcome we could hope for. The
pain and suffering that has happened since 2007 (from the more limited "great recession") is more a result of the ability of the
existing power structures to maintain control and enforce harsh circumstances by handing the empty bag to the public, than any
fundamental lack of resources to provide all with basic needs. Is the commitment to perpetual growth in wealth for the richest the only
way that everyone else can hope to get their needs met? The economy is simply not structured to provide all with their basic needs. That
growth economy is certainly coming to an end ; but will it slowly grind to a halt or collapse more rapidly? The fact that
the market price for carbon emissions has fallen so low in Europe is a direct result of stagnating growth. Past economic recessions and more
serious economic collapses, such as faced by the Soviet Union after its oil production peaked in the late 1980's,18 show how greenhouse
gas emissions can and have been reduced, then stabilizing at lower levels once the economy stabilized without any
planned intention to do so. The large number of oil exporters that have more recently peaked has provided many case studies to show the
correlation with political upheaval, economic contraction and reductions in GGE. Similarly many of the countries that have suffered the greatest
economic contraction are also those with the greatest dependence on imported energy, such as Ireland, Greece and Portugal. The so-called Arab
Spring, especially in Egypt, followed high food and energy prices driven by collapsed oil revenues and inability to maintain subsidies. The radical
changes of government in Egypt have not been able to arrest the further contraction of the economy. The effects of peak oil and climate change
have combined with geopolitical struggles over pipeline routes to all but destroy the Syrian economy and society.19 Slow Contraction or Fast
Collapse The fragility of the global economy has many unprecedented aspects that make some sort of rapid collapse of the
global economy more likely . The capacity of central banks to repeat the massive stimulus mechanism in response to the
2008 global financial crisis, has been greatly reduced, while the faith that underpins the global financial system has
weakened , to say the least. Systems thinkers such as David Korowicz20 have argued that the inter-connected nature of the global
economy, instantaneous communications and financial flows, "just in time" logistics, and extreme degrees of economic and technological
specialisation, have increased the chances of a large scale systemic failure , at the same time that they have mitigated (or at least
reduced) the impact of more limited localised crises. Whether novel factors such as information technology, global peak oil and climate change
have increased the likelihood of more extreme economic collapse, Foss and Keen have convinced me that the most powerful and fast-
acting factor that could radically reduce greenhouse gas emissions is the scale of financial debt and the longsustained growth of bubble economics stretching back at least to the beginnings of the "Thatcherite/Reaganite revolution" in the early
1980s. From an energetics perspective, the peak of US oil production in 1970, and the resulting global oil crises of 73 and 79, laid the foundations
for the gigantic growth in debt that super accelerated the level of consumption, and therefore GGE. Whatever the causes, all economic bubbles
follow a trajectory that includes a rapid contraction, as credit evaporates, followed by a long-sustained contraction, where asset values decline to
lower levels than those at the beginning of the bubble. After almost 25 years of asset price deflation in Japan, a house and land parcel of 1.5ha in
a not too isolated rural location can be bought for $25,000. A contraction in the systems that supply wants are likely to see simultaneous problems
in the provision of basic needs. As Foss explains, in a deflationary contraction, prices of luxuries generally collapse but essentials of food and fuel
do not fall much. Most importantly, essentials become unaffordable for many, once credit freezes and job security declines. It goes without saying
that deflation rather inflation is the economic devil that governments and central banks most fear and are prepared to do almost anything to avoid.
Giving credence to the evidence for fast global economic collapse may suggest I am moving away from my belief in the more gradual Energy
Descent future that I helped articulate. John Michael Greer has been very critical of apocalyptic views of the future in which a collapse sweeps
away the current world leaving the chosen few who survive to build the new world. In large measure I agree with his critique but recognise that
some might interpret my work as suggesting a permaculture paradise growing from the ashes of this civilisation. To some extent this is a
reasonable interpretation, but I see that collapse, as a long drawn-out process rather than resulting from a single event.21 I still believe that energy
descent will go on for many decades or even centuries. In Future Scenarios I suggested energy descent driven by climate change and
peak oil could occur through a series of crises separating relatively stable states that could persist for decades if not
centuries. The collapse of the global financial system might simply be the first of those crises that reorganise the world.
The pathways that energy descent could take are enormously varied, but still little discussed, so it is not surprising that discussions about descent
scenarios tend to default into ones of total collapse. As the language around energy descent and collapse has become more nuanced, we start to
see the distinction between financial, economic, social and civilisational collapse as potential stages in an energy
descent process where the first is fast changing and relatively superficial and the last is slow moving and more fundamental. In Future
Scenarios I suggested the more extreme scenarios of Earth Steward and Lifeboat could follow Green Tech and Brown Tech along the stepwise
energy descent pathway. If we are heading into the Brown Tech world of more severe climate change , then as the energy
sources that sustain the Brown Tech scenario deplete , and climate chaos increases, future crises and collapse could lead to
this scenario, no matter how fast or extreme the reductions in GGE due to economic collapse,
we still end up in the climate cooker , but with only the capacity for very local, household and communitarian organisation. If the climate
crisis is already happening, and as suggested in Future Scenarios, the primary responses to the crisis increase rather than reduce GGE, then it is
probably too late for any concerted effort to shift course to the more benign Green Tech energy descent future . Given
the Lifeboat Scenario. In
that most of the world is yet to accept the inevitability of Energy Descent and are still pinning their faith in "Techno Stability" if not "Techno
Explosion", the globally cooperative powerdown processes needed to shift the world to Green Tech look unlikely. More fundamental than any
political action, the resurgent rural and regional economies, based on a boom for agricultural and forestry commodities, that structurally
underpins the Green Tech scenario, will not eventuate if climate change is fast and severe. Climate change will stimulate large investments in
agriculture but they are more likely to be energy and resource intensive, controlled climate agriculture (greenhouses), centralised at transport
hubs. This type of development simply reinforces the Brown Tech model including the acceleration of GGE. While it may be too late for
the Green Tech Scenario, it still may be possible to avoid more extreme climate change of a long drawn out
Brown Tech Scenario before natural forcing factors lock humanity into the climate cooker of 4-6 degrees and
resource depletion leads to a collapse of the centralised Brown Tech governance and a rise of local war lords (Lifeboat Scenario). The novel
structural vulnerabilities highlighted by David Korowicz, and the unprecedented extremity of the bubble economics highlighted by Nicole Foss
suggest the strong tendencies towards a Brown Tech world could be short lived. Instead,
scenario of recreated bioregional economies based on frugal agrarian resources and abundant salvage from the
collapsed global economy and defunct national governance structures.
politicians and central bankers across the globe have worked tirelessly to return the global economy to a path of growth. We need more jobs, we are told; we need economic growth, we need
more people consuming more things. Growth is the ever-constant word on politicians' lips. Official actions amounting to tens of trillions of dollars speak to the fact that this is, in fact, our
the consensus coming out of Copenhagen is that carbon emissions have to be reduced by a vast
amount over the next few decades. These two ideas are mutually exclusive. You can't have both. Economic growth
requires energy, and most of our energy comes from hydrocarbons - coal, oil, and natural gas. Burning those fuel sources releases carbon.
Therefore, increasing economic activity will release more carbon. It is a very simple concept. Nobody has yet articulated how it is that we will reconcile
both economic growth and reduced use of hydrocarbon energy. And so the proposed actions coming out of
Copenhagen are not grounded in reality, and they are set dead against trillions of dollars of spending. There is only
one thing that we know about which has curbed, and even reversed, the flow of carbon into the atmosphere, and that
is the recent economic contraction. This is hard proof of the connection between the economy and energy. It should
serve as proof that any desire to grow the economy is also an explicit call to increase the amount of carbon being
expelled into the atmosphere. The idea of salvation via the electric plug-in car or other renewable energy is a
fantasy. The reality is that any new technology takes decades to reach full market penetration, and we haven't even
really begun to introduce any yet. Time, scale, and cost must be weighed when considering any new technology's
potential to have a significant impact on our energy-use patterns. For example, a recent study concluded that another
20 years would be required for electric vehicles to have a significant impact on US gasoline consumption. Meaningful Numbers of Plug-In Hybrids Are Decades
number-one global priority. But
Away The mass-introduction of the plug-in hybrid electric car is still a few decades away, according to new analysis by the National Research Council. The study, released on Monday, also found
according to the report, which was financed with the help of the Energy Department. Twenty to thirty years is the normal length of time for any new technology to scale up and fully penetrate a
this study, as good as it was in calculating the time, scale, and cost parameters of technology innovation
and penetration, still left out the issue of resource scarcity. Is there enough lithium in the world to build all these
cars? Neodymium? This is a fourth issue that deserves careful consideration, given the scale of the overall issue. But even if we did manage to build hundreds of millions of plug-in
vehicles, where would the electricity come from? Many people mistakenly think that we are well on our way to substantially providing
our electricity needs using renewable sources such as wind and solar. We are not. Renewable timetable is a long
shot Al Gore's well-intentioned challenge that we produce "100 percent of our electricity from renewable energy and truly clean carbon-free sources within 10 years" represents a widely held
large market. But
delusion that we can't afford to harbor. The delusion is shared by the Minnesota Legislature, which is requiring the state's largest utility, Xcel Energy, to get at least 24 percent of its energy from
wind by 2020. One of the most frequently ignored energy issues is the time required to bring forth a major new fuel to the world's energy supply. Until the mid-19th century, burning wood
powered the world. Then coal gradually surpassed wood into the first part of the 20th century. Oil was discovered in the 1860s, but it was a century before it surpassed coal as our largest energy
Texas has three times the name plate wind capacity of any other state 8,000-plus megawatts. The Electric Reliability Council of Texas manages the Texas electric grids. ERCOT reports that its
unpredictable wind farms actually supply just a little more than 700 MW during summer power demand, and provide just 1 percent of Texas' power needs of about 72,000 MW. ERCOT's 2015
forecast still has wind at just more than 1 percent despite plans for many more turbines. For the United States, the Energy Information Administration is forecasting wind and solar together will
energy technologies as well. So where will all the new energy for economic growth come from? The answer, unsurprisingly, is from the already-installed carbon-chomping coal, oil, and natural
gas infrastructure. That is the implicit assumption that lies behind the calls for renewed economic growth. It's The Money, Stupid As noted here routinely in my writings and in the Crash Course,
we have an exponential monetary system. One mandatory feature of our current exponential monetary system is the need for perpetual growth. Not just any kind of growth; exponential growth.
Without that growth, our monetary system shudders to a halt and shifts into
reverse, operating especially poorly and threatening to melt down the entire economic edifice . This is so well understood, explicitly
That's the price for paying interest on money loaned into existence.
or implicitly, throughout all the layers of society and in our various institutions, that you will only ever hear politicians and bankers talking about the "need" for growth. In fact, they are correct;
our system does need growth. All debt-based money systems require growth. That is the resulting feature of loaning one's money into existence. That's the long and the short of the entire story.
The growth may seem modest, perhaps a few percent per year ('That's all, honest!'), but therein lies the rub. Any continuous percentage growth is still exponential growth. Exponential growth
means not just a little bit more each year, but a constantly growing amount each year. It is a story of more. Every year needs slightly more than the prior year - that's the requirement. The Gap
Nobody has yet reconciled the vast intellectual and practical gap that exists between our addiction to exponential growth and the carbon reduction rhetoric coming out of Copenhagen. I've yet to
see any credible plan that illustrates how we can grow our economy without using more energy. Is it somehow possible to grow an economy without using more energy? Let's explore that
concept for a bit. What does it mean to "grow an economy?" Essentially, it means more jobs for more people producing and consuming more things. That's it. An economy, as we measure it,
consists of delivering the needs and wants of people in ever-larger quantities. It's those last three words - ever-larger quantities - that defines the whole problem. For example, suppose our
economy consisted only of building houses. If the same number of houses were produced each year, we'd say that the economy was not growing. It wouldn't matter whether the number was four
hundred thousand or four million; if the same number of new homes were produced each year, year after year, this would be considered a very bad thing, because it would mean our economy was
not growing. The same is true for cars, hair brushes, big-screen TVs, grape juice, and everything else you can think of that makes up our current economy. Each year, more needs to be sold than
stuff each year? Out of Service It's not that 3% is the right number for the land or the people who live upon it. The target of 3% is driven by our monetary system, which needs a certain rate of
exponential growth each year in order to cover the interest expense due each year on the already outstanding loans. The needs of our monetary system are driving our economic decisions, not the
needs of the people, let alone the needs of the planet. We are in service to our money system, not the other way around. Today we have a burning need for an economic model that can operate
tolerably well without growth. But ours can't, and so we actually find ourselves in the uncomfortable position of pitting human needs against the money system and observing that the money
system is winning the battle. The Federal Reserve exists solely to assure that the monetary system has what it needs to function. That is their focus, their role, and their primary concern. I
assume that they assume that by taking care of the monetary system, everything else will take care of itself. I think their assumption is archaic and wrong. Regardless, our primary institutions
and governing systems are in service to a monetary system that is dysfunctional. It was my having this outlook, this lens, more than any other, that allowed me to foresee what so many
economists missed. Only by examining the system from a new, and very wide, angle can the enormous flaws in the system be seen. Economy & Energy Now let's get back to our main problem
of economic growth and energy use (a.k.a. carbon production). There is simply no way to build houses, produce televisions, grow and transport grape juice, and market hair brushes without
consuming energy in the process. That's just a cold, hard reality. We need liquid fuel to extract, transform, and transport products to market. More people living in more houses means we need
we can be more efficient in our use of energy, but unless our efficiency gains are exceeding the rate of
economic growth, more energy will be used, not less. In the long run, if we were being 3% more efficient in our use
of fuel and growing our economy at 3%, this would mean burning the same amount of fuel each year.
Unfortunately, fuel-efficiency gains are well known to run slower than economic growth. For example, the average
fuel efficiency of the US car fleet (as measured by the CAFE standards) has increased by 18% over the past 25
years, while the economy has grown by 331%. Naturally, our fuel consumption has grown, not fallen, over that
time, despite the efficiency gains. So the bottom line is this: There is no possible way to both have economic growth
(as we've known it in the past) and cut carbon emissions. At least not without doing things very differently.
more electricity. Sure,
War Turns
War 1NC
Growth causes great power warstats are conclusive
Trainer, University of Sydney social rules PhD, 2
[Ted, Conjoint Lecturer in the School of Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, 2002, Taylor & Francis
Group, If You Want Affluence, Prepare for War, p. 282-3, Democracy & Nature, 7/9/15, AEG]
If we are determined to maintain let alone increase the rich world's high material "living standards" and its commitment to everincreasing levels of economic turnover then we must maintain the empire. We cannot have these living standards unless we get much
more than our fair share of the world's resource wealth. Therefore these living standards are incompatible with global economic justice or with
enabling all Third World people to use their own resources to meet their own needs. It is a zero growth game; if all that land growing our export
crops was diverted to growing basic foods for Third World people we would get far less coffee and pork. If more of their labour was to go into
producing things they need we would get fewer cheap shirts and TV sets. There are no where near enough resources for all people
to rise to our affluence so if we are going to maintain our levels of material consumption they will have to go on getting a miniscule share
and go on seeing most of their resources flow to us. The limits to growth perspective. As is the case with the other major problems confronting
the planet, such as environmental destruction , it is essential to understand the problem of global peace and conflict from the
"limits to growth" perspective. This analysis focuses on the fact that the present living standards of the rich countries involve levels of
production and consumption that are grossly unsustainable. Just to note two of the lines of argument documented in the large literature from the
limits perspective, if all 9 billion people likely to live on earth by 2070 were to have the present rich world lifestyle and "footprint" we would
need about 12 times the area of productive land that exists on the entire planet. Secondly if we were to cut greenhouse gas emissions sufficiently
to prevent the carbon content of the atmosphere from increasing any more world per capita energy consumption would have to be cut to about
one-eighteenth of its present amount If all 9 billion people likely by 2070 were to have the present rich world per capita resource consumption,
resource production would have to be about 8 times the present rate. These multiples underline the magnitude of the overshoot. Sustainability will
require enormous reductions in the volume of rich world production and consumption. Yet its supreme goal is economic growth, i.e., to increase
the levels of production and consumption and GDP, constantly, rapidly and without any limit. That the absurdity of this is never recognised in
conventional economic and political circles defies understanding. If we in rich countries average 3% economic growth to 2070 and by then all the
worlds people had risen to the "living standards we would have by then, the total world economic output would be 60 times as great as the
present grossly unsustainable level. If this limits to growth analysis is at all valid the implications for the problem of global peace and
conflict and security are clear and savage. If we all remain determined to increase our living standards, our level of
production and consumption, in a world where resources are already scarce, where only a few have affluent living standards
but another 8 billion will be wanting them too, and which we the rich are determined to get richer without any limit, then nothing
is more guaranteed than that there will be increasing levels of conflict and violence. To put it another way, if we insist on
remaining affluent we will need to remain heavily armed. Increased conflict in at least the following categories can be expected.
Firstly the present conflict over resources between the rich elites and the poor majority in the Third World must increase, for example as
"development" under globalisation takes more land, water and forests into export markets. Secondly there are conflicts between the
Third World and the rich world, the major recent examples being the war between the US and Iraq over control of oil.
Iraq invaded Kuwait and the US intervened, accompanied by much high-sounding rhetoric, (having found nothing unacceptable about
Israel's invasions of Lebanon or the Indonesian invasion of East Timor.) As has often been noted, had Kuwait been one of the
world's leading exporter of broccoli, rather than oil, it is doubtful whether the US would have been so eager to come to its defence. At the time of
writing the US is at war in Central Asia over "terrorism". Few would doubt that a "collateral" outcome will be the establishment of regimes that
will give the West access to the oil wealth of Central Asia. Following are some references to the connection many have recognised between rich
world affluence and conflict. General M.D. Taylor, U.S. Army retired argued "...U.S. military priorities just be shifted towards insuring a steady
flow of resources from the Third World." Taylor referred to "...fierce competition among industrial powers for the same raw
materials markets sought by the United States" and "... growing hostility displayed by have-not nations towards their
affluent counterparts."62 "Struggles are taking place, or are in the offing, between rich and poor nations over their share of the world
product; within the industrial world over their share of industrial resources and markets".63 "That more than half of the people on this planet are
poorly nourished while a small percentage live in historically unparalleled luxury is a sure recipe for continued and even escalating international
conflict."64 The oil embargo placed on the US by OPEC in the early 1970s prompted the US to make it clear that it was prepared to go to war in
order to secure supplies. "President Carter last week issued a clear warning that any attempt to gain control of the Persian Gulf
would lead to war." It would "be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States."65 "The US is ready to take
military action if Russia threatens vital American interests in the Persian Gulf, the US Secretary of Defence, Mr. Brown, said
yesterday."66 Klare's recent book Resource Wars discusses this theme in detail, stressing the coming significance of water as a source of
international conflict. "Global demand for many key materials is growing at an unsustainable rate." "the incidence of conflict over vital
materials is sure to grow." "The wars of the future will largely be fought over the possession and control of vital economic
goods." "resource wars will become, in the years ahead, the most distinctive feature of the global security environment."67 Much of the rich
world's participation in the conflicts taking place through out the world is driven by the determination to back a faction that will then look
favourably on Western interests. In a report entitled, "The rich prize that is Shaba", Breeze begins, "Increasing rivalry over a share-out between
France and Belgium of the mineral riches of Shaba Province lies behind the joint Franco-Belgian paratroop airlift to Zaire." "These mineral riches
make the province a valuable prize and help explain the Wests extended diplomatic courtship,..."68 Then there is potential conflict between the
rich nations who are after all the ones most dependent on securing large quantities of resources. "The resource and energy intensive modes of
production employed in nearly all industries necessitate continuing armed coercion and competition to secure raw materials."69 "Struggles are
taking place, or are in the offing, between rich and poor nations over their share of he world product, within the industrial world over their share
of industrial resources and markets"70 Growth, competition, expansionand war. Finally, at the most abstract level, the struggle for greater
wealth and power is central in the literature on the causes of war. "...warfare appears as a normal and periodic form of competition within the
capitalist world economy." "...world wars regularly occur during a period of economic expansion."71 "War is an
inevitable result of the struggle between economies for expansion."72 Choucri and North say their most important
finding is that domestic growth is a strong determinant of national expansion and that this results in competition
between nations and war.73. World Wars I and II can be seen as being largely about imperial grabbing. Germany, Italy
and Japan sought to expand their territory and resource access. But Britain already held much of the world within its empirewhich it had
previously fought 72 wars to take! "Finite resources in a world of expanding populations and increasing per capita demands create a situation ripe
for international violence."74 Ashley focuses on the significance of the quest for economic growth. "War is mainly explicable in terms of
differential growth in a world of scarce and unevenly distributed resources" "expansion is a prime source of conflict. So long as
the dynamics of differential growth remain unmanaged, it is probable that these long term processes will sooner or
later carry major powers into war."75
War 2NC
Growth causes larger wars than declinelow growth rates make leaders more cautious
Boehmer 7Charles, Assistant Professor of Political Science at The University of Texas at El Paso The Effects of Economic Crisis,
Domestic Discord, and State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict Politics & Policy, Volume 35, No. 4 (2007): 774-809
I have theorized in this study that economic growth should be positively related to militarized interstate conicts while at the
same time it should reduce the risk of domestic regime changes. I also expected that domestic conict would reduce the risk of interstate conict.
The research design used here specically allows for a comparison of the relative probabilities of both interstate conict and regime changes. I
nd only partial support for both my theory and the conclusions often made in studies of diversionary conict that lower
rates of economic growth should lead to interstate conict, although in cases where this occurs, this is in fact followed by some form of
regime change, suggesting that diversion was not successful or the only tactic politically necessary.
In fact, the alternative theory presented here was supported in regard to the most severe interstate conicts. Higher
levels of economic growth are positively related to the onset of deadly interstate conicts. However, the results
concerning domestic conict are interesting and both support and contradict my theory. Indeed, domestic conict increases the threat of both
regime changes and interstate conict, but only to a point. The effects of protest and rebellion are generally nonlinear where only the middle
levels contribute to interstate conict. The highest levels of protest and rebellion actually reduce the risk of interstate
conict. This suggests that state leaders may attempt diversion as long as protest and rebellion are not so severe ,
although beyond some middle-range threshold leaders shy away from especially the most severe interstate conicts.
One post hoc rationale could be that leaders are insulated from domestic opponents to some degree and are not
constrained until domestic conict reaches a certain threshold.
An alternative explanation, and one also suggested by the results here, is that the risk of regime change rises much more quickly with higher
levels of protest and rebellion, but especially the former, relative to the opportunity to initiate a foreign conict. Probabilistically, the opportunity
to divert decreases as the chance to be toppled or institutionally altering the government increases rst. While the results show that some leaders
initiate interstate conicts and then undergo regime change, a likely outcome for those facing high levels of domestic conict is that they are
removed before they can pull the trigger on a gambling-for-resurrection strategy. The results also show that this would be a very, very rare
behavior on the part of democratic leaders, given the results of the democracy variable and the low probabilities of the events measured. Of the
755 country-years where a militarized interstate conict was initiated, 79 of these foreign conicts (11 percent) were related somehow to regime
change. This means that some attempts to divert (if they were so) failed, while others following MIDs may be completely unrelated to
diversionary behavior or possibility even a penalty for it. Moreover, these MID initiations likely include many conicts which most
would agree were not diversionary, such as U.S. interventions into Bosnia or Afghanistan, which is the common problem
associated with this theory. This means that the risk of regime change for states under duress is probably even higher than the results show, which
would be the times leaders would most prefer to divert.
In summary, this study shows circumstantial evidence that supports aspects of diversionary conict theory. At least some domestic conict
appears to increase the risk of interstate conict. Yet, the results here present a more complex picture than other studies in that diversionary
strategies (1) appear to occur less often than regime change, or (2) regime change occurs anyway after a foreign conict has been initiated.
Lower economic growth and domestic conict both seem to lead to desperate situations where interstate conicts are
initiated, but again seem unsuccessful. Diversionary attempts appear quite rare and desperate in nature.
Still, the results here show a more complex picture that partly contradicts aspects of diversionary theory. First, the odds are actually higher that
states with domestic problems will be a target of foreign aggression than they would be an aggressor. This nding suggests predatory behavior on
the part of other states. Moreover, leaders facing domestic problems associated with domestic conict and poor economic
growth avoid foreign conicts that entail the loss of life. Instead, states are more likely to become involved in such
violent disputes when economic growth is high and state leaders and their regimes appear secure, meaning they face
manageable levels of internal protest and rebellion.
Access to resources is the key to great power warit only happens during economic expansionthat means
we control conflict escalationtry or die neg by 2030
Cashman 14Greg, Professor @ Salisbury University, What Causes War?: An Introduction to Theories of
International Conflict Pg 445
Goldstein's explanation for the link between K-waves and war is twofold First, increasing production produces a
greater demand for resources, which in turn leads to international competition for these resources and to greater
conflict over markets Second, this increased competition occurs during a period when production increases have
made increased supplies of war materiel available to the military sector, drastically increasing the probability of
war The first argument is essentially a lateral pressure argument without the emphasis on population growth The second argument is
essentially a resource theory of warwars are most likely when states have the resources to pursue them.'** War is most
likely to occur, then, near the end of the long-wave upswing, when resources arc most abundant w Note, how ever, that Goldstein falls back
on state-level argument (the presence of economic wherewithal! to help explain a theory based on systemic-level factors(K-waves).
Goldstein initially argued that the hegemonic cycle and the economic long-wave cycle, though they are not in phase with each other, operate
in conjunction Thus, hegemonic decline does not by itself lead to war. it is only dangerous when it coincides with
an expansionary phase of the economic cycle Economic expansion by itself is not dangerous either, it must be accompanied by
hegemonic stagnation. For example, the economic expansion of the 1960s was not associated with major wars because of the strong
in the
K-wave
upswing
(i.e.
model does not predict who the next hegemon will be. Rather it designates that there will be structural
forces in motion that will favor the construction of a new hierarchy. Historical particularities and the unique
features of the era will shape the outcome and select the winners and losers. If it were possible for the
current system to survive the holocaust of another war among core states, the outcome of the war would be
the main arbiter of hegemonic succession. While the hegemonic sequence has been a messy method of
future
possible disaster that motivates this effort to understand how the hegemonic sequence has occurred in the
past and the factors affecting hegemonic rivalry in the next decades. What are the cyclical processes and
secular trends that may affect the probability of future world wars? The world-system model is presented in
Figure 1. This model depicts the variables that I contend will be the main influences on the probability of war
among core states. The four variables that raise the probability of core war are the Kondratieff cycle,
hegemonic decline, population pressure (and resource scarcity) and global inequality. The four variables that
reduce the probability of core war are the destructiveness of weaponry, international economic
interdependency, international political integration and disarmament. The probability of war may be high
without a war occurring, of course. Joshua Goldstein's (1988) study of war severity (battle deaths per year)
in wars among the "great powers" demonstrated the existence of a fifty-year cycle of core wars. Goldstein's
"war wave" tracks rather closely with the Kondratieff long economic
cycle over the past 500 years of world-system history. It is the future of this war cycle that I am
study shows how this
trying to predict. Factors that Increase the Likelihood of War Among Core States The proposed model divides
variables into those that are alleged to increase the probability of war among core states and those that
decrease that probability. There are four of each. Kondratieff waves The first variable that has a positive
effect on the probability of war among core powers is the Kondratieff wave -- a forty to sixty year cycle of
economic growth and stagnation. Goldstein (1988) provides evidence that
theory of war."
we see no
evidence for this idea in economic shocks, even when looking at the friendliest cases: fragile and unconstrained
states dominated by extractive commodity revenues. Indeed, we see the opposite correlation: if anything, higher
rents from commodity prices weakly 22 lower the risk and length of conflict. Perhaps shocks are the wrong test. Stocks of
lie at the center of the most influential models of conflict, state development, and political transitions in economics and political science. Yet
resources could matter more than price shocks (especially if shocks are transitory). But combined with emerging evidence that war onset is no more likely even with
rapid increases in known oil reserves (Humphreys 2005; Cotet and Tsui 2010) we regard the state prize logic of war with skepticism.17 Our main political economy
models may need a new engine. Naturally, an absence of evidence cannot be taken for evidence of absence. Many of our conflict onset and ending results include
sizeable positive and negative effects.18 Even so, commodity price shocks are highly influential in income and should provide a rich source of identifiable variation in
instability. It is difficult to find a better-measured, more abundant, and plausibly exogenous independent variable than price volatility. Moreover,
other timelike rainfall and foreign aid, exhibit robust correlations with conflict in spite of suffering similar
empirical drawbacks and generally smaller sample sizes (Miguel et al. 2004; Nielsen et al. 2011). Thus we take the absence of
evidence seriously. Do resource revenues drive state capacity?State prize models assume that rising revenues raise the value of the capturing the state, but
varying variables,
have ignored or downplayed the effect of revenues on self-defense. We saw that a growing empirical political science literature takes just such a revenue-centered
approach, illustrating that resource boom times permit both payoffs and repression, and that stocks of lootable or extractive resources can bring political order and
stability. This countervailing effect is most likely with transitory shocks, as current revenues are affected while long term value is not. Our findings are partly
consistent with this state capacity effect. For example, conflict intensity is most sensitive to changes in the extractive commodities rather than the annual agricultural
crops that affect household incomes more directly. The relationship only holds for conflict intensity, however, and is somewhat fragile. We do not see a large,
consistent or robust decline in conflict or coup risk when prices fall. A reasonable interpretation is that the state prize and state capacity effects are either small or tend
to cancel one another out. Opportunity cost: Victory by default?Finally, the inverse relationship between prices and war intensity is consistent with opportunity cost
accounts, but not exclusively so. As we noted above, the relationship between intensity and extractive commodity prices is more consistent with the state capacity
view. Moreover, we shouldnt mistake an inverse relation between individual aggression and incomes as evidence for the opportunity cost mechanism. The same
correlation is consistent with psychological theories of stress and aggression (Berkowitz 1993) and sociological and political theories of relative deprivation and
anomie (Merton 1938; Gurr 1971). Microempirical work will be needed to distinguish between these mechanisms. Other reasons for a null result. Ultimately,
however, the fact that commodity price
shocks have no discernible effect on new conflict onsets , but some effect on ongoing conflict,
suggests that political stability might be less sensitive to income or temporary shocks than generally believed. One
possibility is that successfully mounting an insurgency is no easy task. It comes with considerable risk, costs, and coordination challenges. Another possibility is that
the counterfactual is still conflict onset. In poor and fragile nations, income shocks of one type or another are ubiquitous. If
findings should heighten our concern with publication bias in the conflict
literature. Our results run against a number of published results on commodity shocks and conflict, mainly because of
select samples, misspecification, and sensitivity to model assumptions, and, most importantly, alternative measures
of instability. Across the social and hard sciences, there is a concern that the majority of published research findings are false (e.g. Gerber et al. 2001). Ioannidis
(2005) demonstrates that a published finding is less likely to be true when there is a greater number and lesser pre-selection
of tested relationships; there is greater flexibility in designs, definitions, outcomes, and models; and when more
teams are involved in the chase of statistical significance. The cross-national study of conflict is an extreme case of
all these. Most worryingly, almost no paper looks at alternative dependent variables or publishes systematic robustness
checks. Hegre and Sambanis (2006) have shown that the majority of published conflict results are fragile, though they focus on timeinvariant regressors and not the
time-varying shocks that have grown in popularity. We are also concerned there is a file drawer problem (Rosenthal 1979). Consider this decision rule: scholars that
discover robust results that fit a theoretical intuition pursue the results; but if results are not robust the scholar (or referees) worry about problems with the data or
empirical strategy, and identify additional work to be done. If further analysis produces a robust result, it is published. If not, back to the file drawer. In the aggregate,
the consequences are dire: a lower threshold of evidence for initially significant results than ambiguous ones.20
The cases investigated in this article, however, raise doubts about the
strength of the diversionary hypothesis as well as the empirical validity of arguments based on diversionary
mechanisms, such as Mansfield and Snyders theory about democratization and war.126 In Argentina and Turkey, the hypothesis fails to pass two
most likely tests. In neither case was domestic unrest a necessary condition for the use of force as proponents of diversionary theory
must demonstrate. Instead, external security challenges and bargaining over disputed territory better explain Argentine and Turkish
decision making. The historical record, including leadership statements and reasoning, offers stronger evidence for a
standard realist model and the dynamics of coercive diplomacy. Drawing definitive conclusions about diversion from just two cases is impossible. Nevertheless, the modified
identify a more complete set of causal mechanisms underlying international conflict.
most likely research design used in this article weakens confidence in the strength of diversionary arguments. Diversion as a principal or primary source of some conflicts may be much less
frequent than scholars assert. These two episodes should be among the easiest cases for diversion to explain. Not only did embattled leaders escalate disputes into crises and then use force, but
scholars have also viewed these cases as being best explained by diversionary mechanisms. If diversion cannot account for these decisions, it is unclear what the hypothesis can in fact explain.
research is required, several factors should be considered. First, the rally effect that leaders enjoy from an international crisis is generally brief in duration and unlikely to change permanently a
publics overall satisfaction with its leaders.128 George H. W. Bush, for example, lost his reelection bid after successful prosecution of the 1991 Gulf War. Winston Churchill fared no better after
a
selection effect may prevent embattled leaders from choosing diversion. Diversionary action should produce the
largest rally effect against the most powerful target because such action would reflect a leaders skills through coercing a superior opponent. At the same
time, leaders should often be deterred from challenging stronger targets, as the imbalance of military forces
increases the risk of defeat and thus the probability of losing office at home. Although the odds of victory increase
when targeting weaker states, success should have a much more muted effect on domestic support, if any, because
victory would have been expected.130 Third, weak or embattled leaders can choose from a wide range of policy options
to strengthen their standing at home. Although scholars such as Oakes and Gelpi have noted that embattled leaders can choose repression or economic development in
addition to diversionary action, the range of options is even greater and carries less risk than the failure of diversion . Weak
leaders can also seek to deepen cooperation with other states if they believe it will strengthen their position at
home. Other studies, for example, have demonstrated that political unrest facilitated dtente among the superpowers in
the early 1970s, Chinas concessions in its many territorial disputes, support for international financial
liberalization, and the formation of regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian States and the Gulf
Cooperation Council.131
the Allied victory in World War II.129 Leaders have little reason to conclude that a short-term rally will address what are usually structural sources of domestic dissatisfaction. Second,
Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new
interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in
nationalism. More likely would be a worsening
of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism,
undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers
are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to
contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not
be reversed states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if
the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without
building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their
countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that
people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the
financial crisis, an
optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic
down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about
greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.
Transition
decades, if global capitalism fails to accommodate the growing demands of the non-western working classes while maintaining social peace in the core zone of the world system, then
shift lies in the fact that it is in relation to progress. That is, it is changing the very nature of what progress
means.
surest path to widespread cultural change is a cataclysmic event that profoundly affects shared values
and delegitimizes the status quo and existing leadership. The Great Depression is a classic example. I believe that both
9/11 and Hurricane Katrina could have led to real cultural change in the United States, both for the better, but America lacked the inspired leadership needed. The most
thorough look at this issue from the perspective here is Thomas Homer-Dixons The Upside of Down. He argues that our circumstances today are surprisingly like
Romes in key ways. Our societies are also becoming steadily more complex and often more rigid. This is happening partly because
were trying to manageoften with limited successstresses building inside our societies, including stresses arising from our gargantuan appetite for energy. . . .
Eventually, as occurred in Rome, the
stresses may become too extreme, and our societies too inflexible to respond, and some
kind of economic or political breakdown will occur. . . . People often use the words breakdown and collapse synonymously. But in my view,
although both breakdown and collapse produce a radical simplification of a system , they differ in their long-term consequences.
Breakdown may be serious, but its not catastrophic. Something can be salvaged after breakdown occurs and perhaps rebuilt better than before. Collapse, on the other
hand, is far more harmful. . . . In coming years, I believe, foreshocks are likely to become larger and more frequent. Some could take the
form of threshold eventslike climate flips, large jumps in energy prices, boundary-crossing outbreaks of new infectious disease, or international financial crises.23
Homer-Dixon argues that foreshocks and breakdowns can lead to positive change if the ground is prepared . We need to prepare to
turn breakdown to our advantage when it happensbecause it will, he says.24 Homer-Dixons point is critically important. Breakdowns, of course, do not
necessarily lead to positive outcomes; authoritarian ones and Fortress World are also possibilities. Turning a breakdown to advantage will require both inspired
leadership and a new story that articulates a positive vision grounded in what is best in the societys values and history. A congressman is said to have told a citizens
group, If you will lead, your leaders will follow. But it doesnt have to be that way. Harvards Howard Gardner stresses this potential of true leadership in his book
Changing Minds: Whether they are heads of a nation or senior officials of the United Nations, leaders of large, disparate populations have enormous potential to
change minds . . . and in the process they can change the course of history. I have suggested one way to capture the attention of a disparate population: by creating a
compelling story, embodying that story in ones own life, and presenting the story in many different formats so that it can eventually topple the counterstories in ones
are held along with other strongly felt and often conflicting values, and we are all pinned down by old habits, fears, insecurities, social pressures, and in other ways. A
new story that helps people find their way out of this confusion and dissonance could help lead to real change.
for capitalism to exist and function, it requires certain necessary historical conditions. Capitalism would
remain viable (and therefore reformable) only to the extent the necessary historical conditions required for its normal
operations are present. But the development of capitalism inevitably leads to fundamental changes in the underlying historical
conditions. Sooner or later, a point will be reached where the necessary historical conditions are no longer present, and
capitalism as a historical system will cease to exist. If one compares the current systemic crisis with earlier instances
of systemic crisis, what are some of the major differences? First, in previous periods of crisis, the worlds natural
resources remained relatively abundant and the global environment remained largely intact. Today, the global
ecological system is literally on the verge of complete collapse. The impending climate catastrophe is only one
among many aspects of global environmental crisis. Global capitalism has already exhausted the environmental space for further capital accumulation.
Secondly, the successful operations of the capitalist world system require it be regulated by an effective hegemonic
power at the systemic level. However, with the decline of the US hegemony, no other big power was in a position to replace
the US to become the new hegemonic power. Without an effective hegemonic power, the system would be unable to
pursue its own long-term interest and solve system-wide problems. Thirdly, in the past the capitalist system had
managed to survive crisis through social reforms. In essence, social reform is for the system to buy off certain opposition groups by making limited concessions.
The concessions have to be limited so that they do not undermine the essential interest of the ruling class. Today, the system has run out of its historical
space for social compromise. In virtually all the advanced capitalist countries, now a restoration of favorable conditions for capitalist accumulation would require nothing
other social system,
short of large and sustained declines of working class living standards. Will the western working classes simply surrender and give up their entire historical gains since the 19th century? If not,
Western Europe and North America will again become major battlegrounds of class struggle in the coming decades. Fourthly,
stage of proletarianization. Marx famously predicted that the proletariat would become the grave diggers of capitalism. For the entire 19th and much of 20th century, the process
of proletarianization was largely limited to the West (the advanced capitalist countries). In the neoliberal era, as capital is relocated from advanced
capitalist countries to the rest of the world to exploit the reserve army of cheap labor force, there have been large
formations of industrial working classes in the non-western world. Over time, the non-western working classes will have developed the
organizational capacity and demand a growing range of economic, social, and political rights. For the capitalist world system, if its economic and
ecological resources are already so limited that it is no longer possible to accommodate the historical demands of the
western working classes, what is the chance for the system to accommodate the demands of the much larger nonwestern working classes? If the system can no longer survive by buying off its potential oppositions, can it simply survive by repression, and for how long? How will the
combination of these trends play out in the coming decades? Will the current structural crisis turn out to be the terminal crisis of
capitalism? One thing is clear. If capitalism does survive the current crisis, there is probably not much hope for the
humanity to survive the coming global climate catastrophe. For the humanitys sake, end capitalism before we
are ended by capitalism.
growth.
the primary factor driving greenhouse gas emissions and other environmental ills. The growth machine has
pushed the planet well beyond its ecological carrying capacity, and unless constrained, can only lead to human
extinction and an end to complex life. With every economic downturn, like the one now looming in the United States, it becomes more difficult and
Yet this growth is
less likely that policy sufficient to ensure global ecological sustainability will be embraced. This essay explores the possibility that from a biocentric viewpoint of
needs for long-term global ecological, economic and social sustainability; it
population, renewable energy and emission reductions could be taken now at net benefit to the economy. Yet, the losers -- primarily fossil fuel industries and their
bought oligarchy -- successfully resist futures not dependent upon their deadly products. Perpetual
collapse now means humanity and the Earth ultimately survive to prosper again. Human suffering -- already the norm for many, but
hitting the currently materially affluent -- is inevitable given the degree to which the planet's carrying capacity has been exceeded. We are a couple decades
at most away from societal strife of a much greater magnitude as the Earth's biosphere fails . Humanity can take the
bitter medicine now, and recover while emerging better for it; or our total collapse can be a final, fatal death swoon.
discuss this at length in A Theory of Power, but the basic fact is that
moment, we should remember that this equation fits our data quite wellevery civilization that has ever existed has, in fact, collapsed. Our present global civilization is, or course, the sole
exception. A look back at the contemporary chroniclers of history shows that
every great civilization thinks that they are somehow different, that
history will not repeat with themand their hubris is shared with gusto by members of the present global
civilization. Of course, as discrete empires and societies grow ever more cumbersome they do not always collapse in the spectacular fashion of the Western Roman Empire. If they exist
in a peer-polity situationthat is, they are surrounded by competitors of similar levels of complexitythen they will tend to be conquered and absorbed. It is only in the case of a power
vacuumlike the Chacoans or Western Romansthat we witness such a spectacular loss of complexity. In the modern world, we have not witnessed such a collapse as we exist in a global
peer-polity continuum. When the Spanish empire grew too cumbersome the British were there to take over, and the mantel has since passed on to America, with the EU, China and others waiting
eagerly in the wings. In the modern world there can no longer be an isolated collapseour next experience with this will be global. In fact, the modern civilization continuum has existed
for so long without a global collapse because we have managed to tap new energy sourcescoal, then oileach with a higher energy surplus than the last. This has
buoyed the marginal return curve temporarily with each discovery, but has not changed the fundamental dynamics of collapse. Perhaps we should take a step
have 3 options: 1. Continue business as usual, accepting declining marginal returns on investments in complexity
(and very soon declining overall returns) until an eventual, inevitable collapse occurs globally. Continuation of
present patterns will continue the escalating environmental damage, and will continue to grow the human
population, with population levels in increasing excess of the support capacity of a post-collapse Earth (i.e. more
people will die in the collapse). 2. Locate a new, more efficient energy source to subsidize marginal returns on our investments in
complexity. This does not mean discover more oil or invent better clean coal technologythese, along with solar or wind power still provide lower marginal returns
than oil in the heyday of cheap Saudi oil. Only the development of super-efficient fusion power seems to provide the ability to delay the decline of marginal returns
any appreciable amount, and this
will still serve to only delay and exacerbate the eventual return to option #1. 3. Precipitate a
global collapse now in order to reap the economic benefits of this action while minimizing the costs of the
collapse that will continue to increase with the complexity and population of our global civilization . When combined
with a strategy to replace hierarchy with rhizome, as outlined in A Theory of Power, Chapter 9, this may even represent a long-term sustainable
strategy. Whoa. Am I seriously suggesting the triggering of a global collapse? For the moment Im just suggesting that we explore the idea. If,
after deliberation, we accept the totality of the three options as outlined above, then triggering collapse stands as the only
responsible choice. It isadmittedlya choice that is so far outside the realm of consideration of most people (who are strongly invested in
the Myth of the West) that they will never take it seriously. But critically, it does not necessarily require their consent These may seem like the
ramblings of a madman. But in the late Western Roman Empire, there is a fact that is simply not taught today because it is too far outside our
tolerance for things that run counter to the Myth of the West: The citizens of Rome wanted to end the Empire, to dissolve its cumbersome
structure, but could not reverse its pre-programmed course. Manyperhaps mostwelcomed the invading barbarians with open arms. So
should collapse be triggered now, or should we wait as long as possible? If we accept the inevitability of
collapse, then it should be triggered as soon as possible, as the cost of implementing a collapse strategy is
continually growing Throughout history, when collapse has occurred, it has been a blessing. The mainstream
continues to cling to the beliefs that collapse will be a terrible loss, and that it is not inevitable. Even with all of our
cultural brain-washing, do we really have so much hubris as to hold on to the tired mantra that this time, in our
civilization, things will be different?
future could await us if we didn't continue "the fight". Your letter continues mining this Hobbesian vein . We have to
"fight on" because without modern industrial civilisation the psychopaths will take over, and there will be "mass
starvation and war". Leaving aside the fact that psychopaths seem to be running the show already, and millions are
suffering today from starvation and war, I think this is a false choice. We both come from a western, Christian
culture with a deep apocalyptic tradition. You seem to find it hard to see beyond it. But I am not "yearning" for some archetypal End of Days,
because that's not what we face. We face what John Michael Greer, in his book of the same name, calls a "long descent": a series of ongoing
crises brought about by the factors I talked of in my first letter that will bring an end to the all-consuming culture we
have imposed upon the Earth. I'm sure "some good will come" from this, for that culture is a weapon of planetary
mass destruction. Our civilisation will not survive in anything like its present form, but we can at least aim for a
managed retreat to a saner world. Your alternative to hold on to nurse for fear of finding something worse is in
any case a century too late. When empires begin to fall, they build their own momentum. But what comes next doesn't have to be
McCarthyworld. Fear is a poor guide to the future.
show already, and millions are suffering today from starvation and war, I think
with a deep apocalyptic tradition. You seem to find it hard to see beyond it. But I
Collapse is guaranteed which makes all their offense inevitable---only question is whether it
happens now as a result of economic decline, or later as a result of ecological collapse--direct response to Monbiot
Kingsnorth, Co-founder of the Dark Mountain Project, 9
[Paul, 8/17/09, The Guardian, Is there any point in fighting to stave off industrial apocalypse?
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cif-green/2009/aug/17/environment-climate-change, 7/7/15, AEG]
George , On the desk in front of me is a set of graphs. The horizontal axis of each represents the years 1750 to 2000. The graphs show, variously, population levels,
CO2 concentration in the atmosphere, exploitation of fisheries, destruction of tropical forests , paper consumption, number of motor vehicles, water
use, the rate of species extinction and the totality of the human economy's gross domestic product . What grips me about these
Dear
graphs (and graphs don't usually grip me) is that though they all show very different things, they have an almost identical shape. A line begins on the left of the page, rising gradually as it moves
The
root cause of all these trends is the same: a rapacious human economy bringing the world swiftly to the brink of
chaos. We know this; some of us even attempt to stop it happening. Yet all of these trends continue to get rapidly worse, and there is no sign of that changing soon. What these graphs make
clear better than anything else is the cold reality: there is a serious crash on the way . Yet very few of us are prepared to look honestly at the message this reality is
screaming at us: that the civilisation we are a part of is hitting the buffers at full speed , and it is too late to stop it . Instead, most of us and I include
to the right. Then, in the last inch or so around 1950 it veers steeply upwards, like a pilot banking after a cliff has suddenly appeared from what he thought was an empty bank of cloud.
in this generalisation much of the mainstream environmental movement are still wedded to a vision of the future as an upgraded version of the present. We still believe in "progress", as lazily
We still believe that we will be able to continue living more or less the same comfortable lives
if we can only embrace "sustainable development" rapidly enough; and that we can then extend it
to the extra 3 billion people who will shortly join us on this already gasping planet. I think this is simply denial . The writing is on the wall for industrial
society, and no amount of ethical shopping or determined protesting is going to change that now. Take a civilisation built on the myth of human exceptionalism and a deeply embedded
defined by western liberalism.
cultural attitude to "nature"; add a blind belief in technological and material progress; then fuel the whole thing with a power source that is discovered to be disastrously destructive only after we
without a fight. Some people perhaps you believe that these things should not be said, even if true, because saying them will deprive people of "hope", and without hope there will be no
chance of "saving the planet". But false hope is worse than no hope at all. As for saving the planet what we are really trying to save, as we scrabble around planting turbines on mountains and
shouting at ministers, is not the planet but our attachment to the western material culture, which we cannot imagine living without.
of locked-in shopping mall consumers, more so given the biological - evolutionary - roots of selfish, conspicuous
consumption. First, since this is a common - and easy -criticism, let me make clear that the hunter-gatherer or the
caveman are not the ideal human subjects of degrowth. In my view, it is the convivial yet simple and content, enlightened
human (my own preference goes for Kazantzakis* fictional hero Alexis Zorbas"). Degrowth does not imagine turning back the
clock to an idealized past that may have never existed, but using the capacities we have developed to create a mature
future of being content with little material, but abundant relational, goods (Latouche. 2009). The desire for a simpler,
secure and more communal life resonates with a large part of the population, well beyond radical environmentalists.
Whereas social positioning and the desire for differentiation might as well be programmed in our genes, this does
not need to take necessarily the shape of an endless rivalry for material accumulation . Ceremonial sport
competitions are a much nobler and cleaner way to channel rivalry and status differentiation for testosterone-filled
males. Anthropologists document the multiple forms rivalry has taken in human societies from gift-giving to selfsacrifice as the ultimate honour. Conditioned by genes, cultures still decide. Our capitalist culture does select for material
possession, but the driving force is the structural imperative of the system to grow or die. not the genes of the people . The positional quest
for wealth in our "affluent society" is linked to state policies that have shifted investments from public to private
goods (Galbraith, 1998). in order to maintain at all costs private accumulation. Precisely because there are "complex factors of
lock-in" (van den Bergh, 2011). we need to plan systemic change. People were alright without shopping malls and televisions a
few decades back, and rest sure they will so be if they have to live without them in the future.
changes, and some of them will require capital, which will be harder to get. But some will thrive in conditions of
declining capital, which will make them newly attractive. Saving money is the same as making money (sometimes better)
and its almost always less destructive ecologically. Some of the necessary changes will bring joy and happiness. Some will
demand harder and smarter workwhich may be good for our health. A lot of the changes, its crucial to note, will involve the creation of many new jobs: the
renewable-energy industry (solar and wind, mainly) already provides more jobs in the United States (about 88,000) than coal mining (about 81,000); intensive
agriculture has higher outputs per acre than commercial fossil-fuel-driven farming, but it requires more labor. This is good. While some
changes will
require massive technological innovations, many will spring up and spread by ordinary cussed human determination ,
like the gardening thats taking over areas of Detroit and Flint, Michigan, that General Motors has abandoned. Some
innovations are within the power of present-day corporations, financed by our existing financial institutions : rooftop
solar if we adopt German feed-in tariffs, plug-in cars, more efficient appliances. Some changes will happen faster if helped along by governments: incandescent
lightbulbs are now illegal to import into the European Union, which is consequently far ahead of the United States in adopting compact fluorescents. A stable
or
shrinking economy will still be tumultuous, full of opportunities for entrepreneurs and jobs for all kinds of people .
The standard work week may shrink too, as in France and more recently in Germanya kind of job sharing. Some industries will contract
drastically, as airlines and construction are doing now; but others will grow, like medical services. The huge energy
throughputs of the Internet can be reduced, and participant sports (not spectator sports) can grow. Battery building and other types of energy storage will
thrive, while internal-combustion-engine manufacturing will decline. Wind turbines will become a big business (they already are), while coal- and nuclear-plant
construction will collapse. There
people adopt such a strategy, it would be imperative to 'prefigure' the alternative society as far as possible too, not merely withdraw support from the existing society. Again, one must not
The Cuban crisis, for example, entailed much hardship. But it does expose the mechanisms by
which crisis can induce significant societal change in ways that, in the end, are not always negative. In the face of a
global crisis or breakdown, therefore, it could be that elements of the deep green vision (such as organic agriculture, frugal living, sharing, radical recycling, postoil transportation, etc.) come to be forced upon humanity, in which case the question of strategy has less to do with avoiding a
deep crisis or collapse (which may be inevitable) and more to do with negotiating the descent as wisely as possible .
romanticise such theories or transitions.
This is hardly a reliable path to the deep green alternative, but it presents itself as a possible path.
War Turns
United States continues to be the world's power balancer of choice. It is the only regional balancer
against China in Asia, Russia in eastern Europe, and Iran in the Middle East. Although Americans rarely think about this role and
foreign leaders often deny it for internal political reasons, the fact is that Americans and non-Americans alike require these services . Even
Russian leaders today look to Washington to check China. And Chinese leaders surely realize that they need the U.S. Navy
and Air Force to guard the world's sea and trading lanes. Washington should not be embarrassed to remind others of the costs and risks of the
United States' security role when it comes to economic transactions. That applies, for example, to Afghan and Iraqi decisions about contracts for their natural
resources, and to Beijing on many counts. U.S. forces maintain a stable world order that decidedly benefits China's economic growth, and to
date, Beijing has been getting a free ride. A NEW APPROACH In this environment, the first-tier foreign policy goals of the United States should be a strong economy
and the ability to deploy effective counters to threats at the lowest possible cost. Second-tier goals, which are always more controversial, include retaining the military
power to remain the world's power balancer, promoting
risks from various environmental and health challenges, developing alternative energy supplies, and advancing U.S. values such as democracy
human rights. Wherever possible, second-tier goals should reinforce first-tier ones: for example, it makes sense to err on the side of freer trade to help boost the
economy and to invest in greater energy independence to reduce dependence on the tumultuous Middle East. But no overall approach should dictate how to pursue
these goals in each and every situation. Specific applications depend on, among other things, the culture and politics of the target countries. An overarching vision
helps leaders consider how to use their power to achieve their goals. This is what gives policy direction, purpose, and thrust--and this is what is often missing from
U.S. policy. The organizing principle of U.S. foreign policy should be to use power to solve common problems. The good old days of being able to command others
by making military or economic threats are largely gone. Even the weakest nations can resist the strongest ones or drive up the costs for submission. Now, U.S. power
derives mainly from others' knowing that they cannot solve their problems without the United States and that they will have to heed U.S. interests to achieve common
goals. Power by services rendered has largely replaced power by command. No matter the decline in U.S. power, most nations do not doubt that the United States is
the indispensable leader in solving major international problems. This problem-solving
has to be the
main driver for current policy, as nations calculate power more in terms of GDP than military might. U.S. GDP will
be the lure and the whip in the international affairs of the twenty-first century. U.S. interests abroad cannot be
adequately protected or advanced without an economic reawakening at home.
global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major,
medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic
conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of
trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic
conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits
from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future
trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases,
as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for
decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4
Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level.
Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly
during periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and
prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn
returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and
external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked
with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill
across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting
government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting
governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag'
effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing
that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani
and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than
autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office
due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic
performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the
use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in
the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict
at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has
not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.
region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider
pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between
the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity
conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between
those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance
capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning
of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight
times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense,
potentially leading to escalating crises. Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over
resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist
practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future
access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access
to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war,
however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and
modernization efforts, such as Chinas and Indias development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these
countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to
increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in
protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is
likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.
Environment Turns
which "include a mix of price-based instruments (for instance environmentally-related taxes)and non-market instruments such as regulations, technology support policies and voluntary
Making and implementing such institutional changes will be a difficult political process . Firstly, there is the normal
there will be active resistance
and lobby- ing from powerful incumbent interests aimed at hindering institutional change or creating loopholes that
reduce the effectiveness of policies. Corporate interests have much influence as Levy and Newell (2000: 14) note: 'The European commission undertakes business
approaches".
problem of reluctance to change, related to institutional inertia and institutional path dependence (Pierson. 2000; Barbier, 2011). Secondly,
roundtables on a regular basis to consult with leading industrialists. The European Roundtable of Industrialists, made up of chief exec- utive officers from 45 leading European companies, is
arguably the most influential interest group in Brussels. (...) Although environmental groups may exercise influence in setting the agenda, when the point of decision is reached, large
As green
innovations begin to compete with existing regimes, it is likely that incumbent players will flex their economic and
political muscles even more to protect their interests. Following a useful distinction by Hall (1993). this political struggle will be played out at three levels: (a)
multinational companies and the organizations that represent them have key access to members of the commission, ministers, and heads of government in mem- ber states."
The precise setting of policy instruments: there will be struggles over the strictness of environ- mental regulations, height of carbon taxes etc. (b) The kinds of policy instruments; many industries
and policymakers have a preference for market- based instruments rather that regulatory instruments, and have actively lobbied for the former in the last 10 years. But since some of these marketbased instruments (e.g. European emissions trading) have not delivered what was promised, struggles may ensue about the implementation of other policy instruments. (c) The overall goals that
guide policies in particular fields and the associated belief systems (what Hall calls a policy paradigm). In the last few decades, many (Western) governments operated on the basis of a neo-liberal
policy paradigm. Both
the financial crisis and exacerbating environmental problems have given rise to doubts about the
efficiency and capacity of markets to deliver with regard to public goods. Hence, there are pleas for changes in
governance structures and a stronger role for governments in sustainability transitions. Scrase and MacKerron (2009: 232-233)
claim that: "Market efficiency and driving down costs have their place, but governments must now become much more active in steering societies
through the necessary transitions to a low carbon future." And Meadowcroft (2011: 71) argues that: "State intervention and
governance reform are essential. To put this in another way: markets may drive the uptake of the iPhone(...). but they will not
produce a carbon emission-free energy system (...). Changes to law - modifying the regula- tory frameworks within
which economic actors conduct their affairs (for example, by introducing a carbon tax of a GHC emissions cap and
trade system) - and a significant expenditure of social revenue (for example, to accelerate development and deployment of new technologies and to ease
societal adjustment to new patterns of production and consumption) are essential to encourage sustainability transitions ." The third challenge in
the take-off phase entails securing wider public support and cultural legit- imacy (Geels and Verhees. 2011). This is instrumentally important
because "whatever can be done through the State will depend upon generating widespread political support from
citizens" (Giddens, 2009: 91). Urgent demands from public opinion can offer politicians incentives to jockey for green agendas (Burnstein, 2003). Major policy shifts are
therefore often accompanied by shifts in public opinion and cultural discourse, which, in turn, are shaped by social
movements, media, industry asso- ciations, and special-interest groups (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988). The literature on issue-attention cycles offers
interesting ideas in this respect. The basic proposition is that social problems ('issues') have dynamics of their own and go through several phases. Concerns about social
problems tend to emerge in civil society, then affect public opinion, subsequently spill over to political debates, and
possibly lead to policies (Fig. 6). The introduction of substantive legislation often coincides with a peak in public concern (Y-axis in Fig. 6). Issue-attention cycles do not
necessarily progress linearly through all phase. Public attention and concern may also decline before substantive legislation is introduced. Downs (1972) warned that such
declines may happen when publics realize that the costs of solving the problem are very high or may require
sacrifices by large groups in the population. This realization may cause three reactions: "Some people just get discouraged. Others feel positively threatened
by thinking about the prob- lem: so they suppress such thoughts. Still others become bored by the issue" (p. 40). He also notes that attention to issues may
decline because of competition with other prominent issues (see also Hilgartner and Bosk. 1988. who developed a conceptual model in which social
problems compete for attention in public arenas). These considerations may be relevant for contemporary sustainability tran- sitions,
where the financial-economic crisis is potentially an issue that competes with sustainability concerns.
Growth Sustainable
Infinite growth is possible
Harford, Senior columnist for the Financial Times, 14
[Tim, 1/24/14, FreakNomincs Can Economic Growth Continue Forever? Of Course!
http://freakonomics.com/2014/01/24/can-economic-growth-continue-forever-of-course/ Accessed 7/7/15 JMB]
Can economic growth continue forever? The internet seems to be full of physicists explaining that economists are clueless on this topic. Theres the late Albert
Bartletts hugely popular videos or Tom Murphys article Exponential Economist Meets Finite Physicist .
all
becomes trouble eventually, because each little bit of growth will itself be multiplied by growth in the future. As Albert
Einstein, yet another physicist, is famously said to have declared (but probably did not), the most powerful force in the universe is compound
interest. The implication for economic growth seems obvious. Our economy grows at a few percent a year. That hasnt
presented many insuperable problems so far. But growth of a few per cent a year is nevertheless exponential growth, and eventuallythe physicists worry
well reach a square on the economic chessboard that we just cant fill. Economists understand this point perfectly well. One of the very
first people to be called an economist was the Reverend Thomas Malthus, who died almost two hundred years ago. Malthus was worried about exponential population
growth, and his math was incontrovertible. Fortunately, in
the short term technological progress was faster than population growth.
More recently population growth has been slowing down dramatically. Theres every reason to believe that the
population of the planet is going to stabilize. I dont think anybody believes zero population growth is unsustainable .
You might well respond that even if population growth stops, growth in the economy in GDP will continue, and fall foul of the rice-on-the-chessboard problem.
a serious gap in the logic of the exponential doomsayers. Theyre looking at exponential growth
in physical processesthings like heating, cooling, lighting, movement. This is understandable, because they are, after all, physicists.
Tom Murphys blog post is particularly startling on this point. He points out that if our energy consumption grows at 2.3 percent a year less
But I think that here we find
than historical rates but enough to increase energy consumption tenfold each centurythen the entire planet will reach boiling point in just four centuries. Its not the
greenhouse effect at work; its irrelevant to Professor Murphys point whether the energy comes from fossil fuels, solar power or fairy dust. This is simply about the
waste heat given
off, inevitably, when we use energy to do useful work. And its pretty hard to argue with the laws of
thermodynamics. The calculation sounds shocking, but its just the rice on the chessboard all over again. Heres the
logic lapse: energy growth is not the same as economic growth. GDP merely measures what people are willing to
pay for, which is not necessarily connected to the use of energy, or any other physical resource. True, since the
beginning of the industrial revolution the two have tended to go hand in hand, but theres no logical reason why that
tendency needs to continue. Indeed, it appears to have stopped already. Would you like to take a guess at energy
growth per person in the United States over the last quarter of a century? Its not just less than 2.3 percent. Its less
than zero. The same is true for other developed economies such as Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom. Now
this is partly due to offshoring to China but the offshoring effect just doesnt seem big enough to explain what is
going on. Its also about the changing nature of what is bought and sold in a modern economy
zero. That it would be very difficult to convince nations to voluntarily reduce economic welfare should be a fairly
uncontroversial notion. Roberts, to his credit, knows how fantastical his proposal sounds. In his book, The Climate Fix, Roger Pielke Jr.
formulates an Iron Law of Climate Policy, which states that even if people are willing to bear some costs to reduce emissions,
they are only willing to go so far. In other words, when policies on emissions reductions require reduced economic welfare, public
tolerance for such policies will be extremely limited. Societies do sometimes opt to pay slightly higher energy prices for cleaner air, domestic
energy production, or other intangible goals. But acceptance of such policies always comes after a big fight, and it can only be sustained if the
economic impacts of these policies are limited. But acceptance of such policies always comes after a big fight, and it can only be sustained if the
economic impacts of these policies are limited. In other words, a climate strategy that hinges on significant, voluntary economic
contraction is going to be a steep uphill battle that at best results in marginal results and at worst will expend
significant political capital on a proposition that will almost certainly lose. Roberts counters that the only way his approach
works is through an intense climate communications effort. But it still seems all but certain that something like the Iron Law of Climate Policy
holds even under an intense PR push by climate advocates and the most charismatic and courageous political leadership. Public tolerance for
voluntary economic contraction in the name of climate mitigation will be extremely limited at best. But lets play devils advocate: say an intense
climate communications effort convinces the rich world that we are already far too wealthy for our own good and should happily begin a
substantial reduction in our incomes and GDP. Is this a core climate solution? The short answer is no. The math just doesnt add up. Lets work
through a thought experiment. Current global GDP per capita is roughly $9,000 per person and the global population is about 7 billion. Let us
assume for this exercise that around $15,000 per capita constitutes a happiness threshold where real improvements in welfare and happiness
stops being strongly correlated with increased wealth, as some social researchers contend. If global wealth were somehow perfectly redistributed
to each person equally (this is clearly a thought experiment!), we would therefore need to see per capita GDP increase by 67 percent by 2050 in
order for each of the worlds inhabitants to reach incomes consistent with this happiness threshold. But at the same time, global population is
expected to rise to at least 9 billion people by 2050, an increase of 28 percent. Using our Kaya Identity terms, we can see that global GDP would
then have to rise by over 100 percent (+67% per capita GDP * +28% population = +114% GDP). In other words, even if we were to
achieve this perfect redistribution of global wealth at exactly the ideal happiness threshold, global GDP would still
have to more than double by mid-century, at the same time that global carbon emissions should be cut by half or
more. Clearly, this is also the most optimistic thought experiment possible, with perfect global wealth redistribution.
Per capita GDP would fall in the richer parts of the world to $15,000 per person (down to about half of todays per capita GDP in
OECD nations) and rising in the poorer parts of the world to $15,000 per person. You be the judge as to how likely this
scenario is, or how happy you would be to see your income fall to around $15,000. Any real-world scenario that resembles Roberts proposal
for voluntary economic contraction in the developed world is likely to have far more modest outcomes and will certainly lack the perfectly
equal distribution of global wealth in this example. Meaning unless were going to try to condemn the emerging economies to
permanent poverty as well, were going to see global GDP far more than double over the next four decades.
Economic contraction is thus a non-solution to significantly reduce emissions: it simply cannot result in the kind of
substantial absolute decline in (at least) one of the Kaya Identity terms above. We will not bend global carbon
emissions rapidly downward through even the most humane vision of voluntary economic contraction and global
wealth redistribution. Returning to our Kaya Identity, we can thus be clear: both the population and GDP per capita terms of
our equation are going to rise steadily through at least the next half century, whether we see voluntary economic
contraction in the worlds rich nations or not. That leaves us with just one key strategy to drive emissions
towards zero: we must accelerate the decarbonization of the global economy to significantly reduce the C/GDP term of our
equation. Thus, if we must drive carbon emissions towards zero as quickly as possible, there is only one core climate lever that can get the job
done: we must decarbonize the economy as quickly as possible. As well argue in Part 3 of this series, the most important thing we can do to
greatly accelerate the global adoption of clean energy technologies and the decarbonization of the global energy supply is to accelerate the pace
of energy innovation and make clean energy cheap.
[Cameron and Alex, October, Center for Climate Change and Economic Policy, Prosperity with growth: Economic
growth, climate change and environmental limits, http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wpcontent/uploads/2014/02/WP93-prosperity-with-growth-climate-change.pdf, accessed 7/7/15, GE]
The conclusion is that even halting economic growth does not produce absolute decoupling (as ( > 0), and it
certainly does not deliver , as required to restrain temperature increases to less than 2oC. Achieving this, under
Jacksons zero growth scenario, would still require a radical, structural shift in technology to T/T=-5.6%, implying a
dramatic reduction in the emissions intensity of GDP. Indeed, it is precisely this sort of structural shift that Jackson
rules out to justify his no growth world. It is clear to a very large number of scholars and others that shifting from
0.7% to 7% p.a. is an extreme challenge. However, reducing to 5.6% while simultaneously is reduced to 0% is
even more difficult economically (observe the relationship between affluence, R&D investment and the potential for
a structural shift), and impossible politically, and is socially undesirable. The consequences of sharply slowing (let
alone stopping) growth are observable in the West at present: high unemployment, increased levels of crime and
mental illness, large-scale strikes and so on show the social damage wrought by an economic contraction. Our point
is that both paths involve Herculean challenges, and a no growth world does not solve the problem of climate
change or other environmental problems. Rather, for the sake of prosperity and indeed the likelihood of success, it is
better to drive increases in technological progress, leading to reductions in intensity, to generate absolute decoupling
along with stable growth. Instead of trying to work out how to stop growth at least cost, the significant and
important question is how to stimulate a structural shift and a radical change in T. We need green growth, not no
growth.
Transition Answers
Once a machine civilization has been in operation for some time, the lives of the people within the society become
dependent upon the machines. The vast interlocking industrial network provides them with food, vaccines,
antibiotics, and hospitals. If such a population should suddenly be deprived of a substantial fraction of its machines
and forced to revert to an agrarian society, the resultant havoc would be enormous. Indeed, it is quite possible that a
society within which there has been little natural selection based upon disease resistance for several generations, a society
in which the people have come to depend increasingly upon surgery for repairs during early life and where there is
little natural selection operating among women, relative to the ability to bear children--such a society could easily
become extinct in a relatively short time following the disruption of the machine network. The modern global
economy is like a shark; it has to move forward or it dies. The widespread adoption of just-in-time inventory has
resulted in acute vulnerabilities from even very short disruptions. The modern global machine now requires continuous
inputs of energy and materials and continuously operating global freight transportation or it starts to break
down. Even partial destruction, say, 15 to 20 percent of the industrial plant in the world, might be enough to make
the global economic system inoperable. Because self-sufficiency has become a dirty word in our free-trade crazed
political culture, countries have become so specialized in their manufacturing that it might not be possible to
reproduce the necessary facilities nearer home quickly enough to prevent a global systemic breakdown. We would not
simply revert back to the level of economic activity of, say, the 1950s. Instead, we could experience a total
breakdown that leads to our inability to restart modern technical civilization after even a limited nuclear war.
Try or die for growtheconomic collapse is worse for all their impactscauses extinction
of every other species and then humans
Monbiot, Oxford visiting fellow, 9
[George, 8/17/9, Theguardian, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cif-green/2009/aug/17/environmentclimate-change Accessed 7/9/15 JMB]
The interesting question, and the one that probably divides us, is this: to what extent should we welcome the likely collapse of industrial
civilisation? Or more precisely: to what extent do we believe that some good may come of it? I detect in your writings, and in the conversations
we have had, an attraction towards almost a yearning for this apocalypse, a sense that you see it as a cleansing fire that will rid the world of a
diseased society. If this is your view, I do not share it. I'm sure we can agree that the immediate consequences of collapse would be
hideous: the breakdown of the systems that keep most of us alive; mass starvation; war . These alone surely give us
sufficient reason to fight on, however faint our chances appear. But even if we were somehow able to put this out of our minds, I believe that
what is likely to come out on the other side will be worse than our current settlement. Here are three observations: 1 Our species (unlike most of
its members) is tough and resilient; 2 When civilisations collapse, psychopaths take over; 3 We seldom learn from others' mistakes. From the first
observation, this follows: even if you are hardened to the fate of humans, you can surely see that our species will not become extinct
without causing the extinction of almost all others. However hard we fall, we will recover sufficiently to land another
hammer blow on the biosphere. We will continue to do so until there is so little left that even Homo sapiens can no
longer survive. This is the ecological destiny of a species possessed of outstanding intelligence, opposable thumbs and an ability
to interpret and exploit almost every possible resource in the absence of political restraint. From the second and third observations, this
follows: instead of gathering as free collectives of happy householders, survivors of this collapse will be subject to the will of
people seeking to monopolise remaining resources. This will is likely to be imposed through violence. Political accountability will be
a distant memory. The chances of conserving any resource in these circumstances are approximately zero. The human and ecological
consequences of the first global collapse are likely to persist for many generations, perhaps for our species' remaining time on earth. To
imagine that good could come of the involuntary failure of industrial civilisation is also to succumb to denial . The
answer to your question what will we learn from this collapse? is nothing. This is why, despite everything, I fight on. I am not fighting to
sustain economic growth. I am fighting to prevent both initial collapse and the repeated catastrophe that follows.
However faint the hopes of engineering a soft landing an ordered and structured downsizing of the global economy might be, we must keep
this possibility alive. Perhaps we are both in denial: I, because I think the fight is still worth having; you, because you think it isn't.
impacts on local community resilience revolve in particular around four inter-connected processes: economic
globalization, the spread of global capitalism, the increasing importance of Anglo-American neo-liberal economic
ideologies, and the increasingly powerful role of multinational corporations.
Economic globalization refers to the increasingly global economic interlinkages between geographical spaces, the
embeddedness of (almost all) local communities within complex financial and monetary flows, and processes
associated with increasingly uniform patterns of economic interconnectedness and embeddedness (Harvey, 2005). A
hundred or so years ago many communities still had some level of economic autonomy i.e. key decisions affecting
economic capital at community level were taken within the community itself. Macro-economic lock-ins of communities in the 18th and 19th
centuries were thus less pronounced as global economic flows were characterized by internationalization (extension of global economic activities
across national boundaries) rather than economic globalization which, since the 20th century, has meant the economic
integration of even the remotest communities into the global economy (Castree, 2008). Before the 20th century, economic
integration of communities was therefore more shallow based primarily on arm's length trade in goods and services, while today's
globalized communities are characterized by a much deeper degree of community economic integration and
indeed economic dependency based upon interconnected configurations of economic production (Gray, 2002).
This suggests that even if communities wish to disengage from global economic flows and retake control over
processes related to economic capital, it is increasingly difficult for them to break free of the shackles of
economic globalization (Davidson, 2010). Local Exchange Trading Systems (LETS), as an example of community-level
attempts to partly disengage from transitional corridors associated with economic globalization, have only partly
been successful (relatively low levels of public acceptance). LETS schemes may struggle to compete with the efficiency,
choice and global reach of the formal economy, and may be abandoned or never taken up by more mobile and
globalized community members. Alternative economic models at community level can therefore not hide the fact that
most communities where these alternative currencies have been used continue to be firmly embedded ideologically
and practically in globalized economic pathways that define most community actions. Gray (2002) therefore emphasized
that, because of economic globalization processes, economic capital at community level is mainly shaped by
exogenous forces, which increasingly shoehorn communities into macro-economic lock-ins. This suggests that almost
all of humanity is now within the same macro-economic capitalist transitional corridor of economic
globalization with all its advantages and disadvantages for raising local community resilience.
Economic globalization is closely interlinked with the spread of global capitalism during the 20th century affecting even
the remotest communities on the globe. Global capitalism as a macro-economic lock-in for many communities is closely associated
with ideological lock-ins (see above), especially as capitalism is not just an economic system but also an ideology that
permeates all aspects of modern life which, with its profit-driven maxim and ideology of continuous expansion and
economic growth, influences decision-making at all geographical levels (Harvey, 2005). Community resilience is often
negatively affected by the spread of global capitalism, precisely because of the specific attributes associated with
capitalism in the form of greed, profit-maximization, selfishness and the increasing need for community members to
integrate vertically (i.e. with the global economy) rather than horizontally (i.e. with an emphasis on economic interlinkages within and
between the community itself) (Gray, 2002).
The downfall of the Soviet empire in 1990 and what some have hailed as the ideological victory of the capitalist West has meant
that almost all communities on Earth increasingly including formerly staunchly socialist countries such as China are now
embedded within transitional corridors defined by global capitalist dictates, with often few economic alternatives
(Gray, 2002). Yet, the spread of capitalism is by no means uniform. For example, emerging economies like China are facing
geographically differentiated impacts with regard to the influence of capitalism. While local communities in most
Chinese urban areas have begun wholeheartedly to embrace capitalism (islands of capitalism), communities in rural
China still remain largely in a sea of subsistence hardly touched by capitalist influences (Wilson, 2012a). This has
pronounced implications for the embeddedness of Chinese communities within capitalist transitional corridors.
Chinese communities in urban areas, for example, have begun to be locked into capitalist decision-making structures,
including profit-maximization, greed, belief in private enterprise and a dramatic move away from past socialist
ideologies, with concurrent changes in economic, social and environmental capital at community level. Economic
capital tends to increase (through vertical rather than horizontal interlinkages), social capital is gradually eroded (many
residents in the rapidly growing urban areas are migrants from rural areas with little social embeddedness in urban
networks) and environmental capital is often reduced (e.g. large-scale pollution in most cities) (Wilson, 2012b).
The post-2008 global economic crisis has highlighted how almost all communities are affected by similar economic
processes that may have, until recently, been perceived to be rather distant (e.g. unscrupulous lending of banks leading to
bankruptcy of many community-level businesses). The spread of both global capitalism and economic globalization is the
main reason why the formerly clearer geographical boundaries of communities have become increasingly blurred
and more globally than locally orientated. The latter also largely explains why community relocalization movements
have, so far, not shown much tangible success, as almost all members of the relocalization process at community
level are simultaneously embedded within the global capitalist system through their dependencies on jobs, pensions
(especially through globally operating pension funds), and economic exchanges with often global customers, such as Internetbased firms/individuals that, although operating from within a geographical community, are economically more interlinked
with global customers (Bailey et al., 2010). In the absence of an alternative global economic model and ideology (at
least for the moment), the transitional corridor imposed by the spread of global capitalism is therefore likely to
continue to exert a substantial impact on the range of decision-making options available at community level
for the foreseeable future.
degrowth as a political strategy is unlikely to be taken serious by economists and politicians, or even a
significant group of citizens. Arguing in favor of degrowth runs a serious risk of preaching to the choir, i.e.
convincing only already-believers. In Section 4 it was argued why the pessimism about the political feasibility of
environmental policies as a motivation to support degrowth is unfounded. I am much more optimistic about the political feasibility of
environmental (including climate) policies, but these things simply need time. We should be patient even though we are running out of time which
does not deny that we should do everything in our power to speed up the realization of climate agreements and environmental policies. For me this includes trying to
convince the mainstream of shifting to an a-growth strategy, ignoring GDP, relaxing about growth rather than be unconditionally in favor or against growth. This may
alter the balance in trading-off costs and benefits (in a broad sense) of climate policies (van den Bergh, 2010a).
the
benefits of globalization became manifest, and the damage wrought by autarkic policies also became evident,
policymakers in the East began to appreciate that their anti-globalization stance had been a mistake . But then fear of
globalization moved to the West. The East had feared that it could not gain from trade with the West, which had superior infrastructure and human capital; now, the
West had come to fear that it would lose from trade with the East, which had abundant, cheap labor. The longstanding stagnation in wages for unskilled labor was
attributed to low-cost, labor-intensive imports, ignoring the corollary that Western workers consumption of labor-intensive Asian goods offset the effect on real
East worried about a brain drain of professionals to the West, where opportunities seemed to be
West is witnessing anti-globalization opposition from members of professional groups, who fear
the loss of their jobs to foreign counterparts. Rudyard Kipling famously wrote in The Ballad of East and West: Oh, East is East, and West is
West, and never the twain shall meet. Given the ironic reversal of globalization fears, Kipling is still right: convergence has continued
to elude East and West. The current crisis did not create the debate about globalization now heard in the West; it only made it slightly more salient.
Yet the crisis may be tilting Western policy outcomes in favor of globalization. For example, on trade, there has been a
remarkable commitment to efforts largely successful to avoid significant backsliding into protectionism . Moreover,
the G-20 leaders have continued to express the need to conclude the Doha Round of multilateral trade-liberalization negotiations. There
more plentiful. Today, the
are also initiatives such as the appointment by the governments of Britain, Germany, Indonesia, and Turkey of a High-Level Expert Trade Group, with Peter
Sutherland, former Director General of GATT and the WTO, and myself as co-chairs. The four governments will report at this years World Economic Forum in
Davos on how to conclude Doha this year. In other words, Kipling could yet be proved wrong. A reversal
The transition is impossible, but attempting it causes disaster. Their argument is wishful
thinking.
Barnhizer, Professor of Law @ Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, 06
[David, 4/06, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Waking from Sustainabilitys Impossible Dream: The
Decision-Making Realities of Business and Government, http://ssrn.com/abstract=878405 Accessed 7/9/15 JMB]
Some advocates of sustainability think they can slow the world down to a point of elegant stasis. n48 Because such
people are invariably humane, I conclude they simply do not understand the consequences to human societies and
the ordinary residents of those societies that would flow from their positions if the nightmare that they mistake for a
dream were accomplished. The naive attitudes underlying [*614] such positions are similar to the "deep ecology"
movement where nature is accorded only benign intentions. n49 The fact that we inhabit a savage and unheeding
natural world in which species consume each other, earthquakes destroy, tsunamis overwhelm, and volcanoes spread
ash, creating years without summers, is conveniently ignored. Sustainability represents a wide and diverse variety
of functions, methods, and values that on many levels are incompatible. On the idealized plane this includes the
values of ecological, economic, social, and political harmony. These values are used to support an argument in favor
of a form of economic and social stasis writ large on the global stage. As an ideal, this form of sustainability stands
for such principles as the precautionary principle and embodies the warnings about overuse of resources found in
Garrett Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons, the Club of Rome's Limits to Growth, or Lester Brown's Twenty-Ninth
Day, where Brown argued that an exponential progression in abuse and overuse of natural resources will generate a
catastrophic collapse of systems. n50 These predictions of disaster are well worth heeding, but there are
countervailing social disasters that can result if we take too aggressive a stance in our efforts to prevent the
ecological harms. These trade-offs include the need to generate wealth sufficient to sustain existing social justice
and equity obligations and the need to create jobs and opportunities to alleviate the tragedy of abject poverty
and denial of fair opportunity.
Economy DAs
Links EU Standards
Federal legislation on privacy laws always fails only the businesses can make standards
thatre meaningful to customers and dont hamper business.
Davenport, Harvard Business School Visiting Professor, 13
[Thomas H., 3/10/13, Wall Street Journal, No: Stronger Privacy Rules Could Squelch
Innovation http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324338604578328393797127094,
accessed 7/7/15 CWS]
A push by the European Union to make its already-tough privacy laws even tougher, and to extend them to any
company that collects data on EU citizens, has sparked renewed debate about whether the U.S. needs stronger
data-privacy laws, too.
The U.S. now has fairly restrictive rules governing the collection and distribution of health and financial data,
but few constraints in areas such as online marketing. Some people believe the U.S. needs to emulate Europe's
approach and regulate the collection and trafficking of all types of personal data.
I think that's a bad idea. Although I'm not a committed believer in the eternal wisdom of markets, in this case
the market-based approach has advantages.
To be sure, sensitive health-care and financial information must continue to be heavily restricted. I'd even argue for
greater penalties for data breaches than we have today. Privacy laws and penalties for breaches for children's data
also should remain strong. But before we rush to restrict the use of all kinds of personal information, we have to
consider that there is both a downside to stronger and more consistent privacy legislation and an upside to
leaving it relatively weak.
We Can't Trust Them
The downside to stronger laws is that the current Washington incumbentsparticularly those in Congress
can't be trusted to do a good job of crafting privacy legislation. If they can't pass a budget or a debt-ceiling
increase, they have no business venturing into complex online privacy issues. It is unlikely that Congress
could achieve consensus, but if it did, I suspect the outcome would be a bad law. The White House last year
proposed a Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, but it's only a voluntary code of conduct. Its very existence implicitly
acknowledges that effective legislation from Congress is unlikely.
The upside of lax privacy regulation, meanwhile, is innovation. The promise of using online data for
marketing has always been that consumers would receive targeted benefits of value to them. Granted, it's
pretty rare to receive offers we really value, but it happens.
Caesars Entertainment Inc., for example, has very extensive information on its customers' gambling habits
and vacation preferencesmore than most loyalty programs, and certainly more than most online sites. Yet
Gary Loveman, the company's chief executive officer, says customers never complain about how the information
is used. Why? Because Caesars provides value in its offersfree dinners and shows if you're a frequent, valuable
customer, and incentives to get to the next level of play if you aren't. Many of us would be happy to trade a little
privacy in return for offers that really meet our needs, but companies like Caesars might have to abandon
them altogether under more stringent legislation.
And let's face it, Americans don't seem too worried about the negative consequences of lax online privacy. Yes,
it's easy to find out a lot about almost anyone online, but many of us make it easier with Facebook profiles,
tweets and blog posts.
the text, taken together, may outlaw the processing of aggregated customer data that provides advertisers
crucial information about the effectiveness of their ads". This, it says, will turn back the clock not help to
adapt EU rules to the internet age.
Second, the new regulation will expose companies to the risk of punitive fines in even inadvertent breaches of
the rules, including for data processing that causes no meaningful privacy risk to users, or for cloud
computing companies that simply provide the platform for others to run their organisations.
Finally, the idea of the 'one-stop shop' principle that was the centrepiece of the original proposal, which
meant that instead of dealing with 28 different national privacy regulations, organisations would be able to
work with just a single data protection authority, has been ditched.
"This one-stop shop would have increased efficiency and represented a major advance in Europe's quest to
create a functioning digital single market. But today's text gives any 'concerned' authority the power to object to
a decision taken by another national regulator," claimed IAB Europe.
"The current approach is blunt and indiscriminate a far cry from the supposed objective of making EU
rules fit for purpose in the internet age," said Townsend Feehan, CEO of IAB Europe. "The future regulatory
framework needs to enable digital advertising to fund the informational, educational, entertainment and Ecommerce services that European users enjoy online at little or no cost.
"That is not what is on the table right now. It is no exaggeration to say that a draconian regulation could
drive small and medium-sized companies responsible for much of the innovation we see in the industry today
out of Europe.
1NC
NSA scandal is letting China capture huge amounts of tech market shares---the plan
reverses this
Aziz, Economics and Business correspondent, 13
[John, the week, 11/14/13, How the NSA is hurting America's tech industry and helping China's,
http://theweek.com/articles/456426/how-nsa-hurting-americas-tech-industry--helping-chinas date accessed 7/6/15,
Evann]
So as we move toward a new era in computing and server technology the so-called "internet of things," a realm
projected to be worth up to $8.9 trillion by 2020, in which American companies like Cisco are in hot competition
against Chinese companies like Huawei and ZTE it would not be surprising if American companies fell behind
in market share simply because customers wanted to avoid being spied on by the NSA. Countries, companies, and
communities that don't want to be surveilled are even starting to talk about building separate self-contained internets
for critical infrastructure.
But companies' and countries' aversion to the NSA seems to miss the bigger picture. Certainly, Edward Snowden's
revelations have disclosed a lot about the scope and shape of the NSA's spying activities. But there hasn't been a
comparable level of disclosure about the activities of intelligence agencies in foreign countries, including Brazil,
Russia, and China. Consumers moving away from American networking companies out of a desire to avoid
surveillance, and adopting Chinese networking technology instead, could be jumping out of the frying pan and
into the fire. China is still an authoritarian one-party state in which dissidents are routinely put to death.
China ranks among the countries of the highest income inequality in the world at a time when China has dismantled
its social welfare state, leaving hundreds of millions of citizens without any or adequate provision of healthcare,
unemployment insurance, and a variety of other social services. Meanwhile, China has become one of the worlds
most polluted countries. The crisis has worsened as Chinas economic growth is slowing.
As the worsening economic, social, and environmental problems cause deep discontent across society and lead
many people to take to the streets in protest, China has entered a period of deepening social tensions. Apparently,
Beijing is frightened and has relied more and more on coercive forces. The cracking up moment could come when
economic growth has significantly slowed, and Beijing is unable to sustain the regimes legitimacy with its
economic performance.
problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a
A recent report on Chinese investments in research and development organisations in the US indicates Beijing's
desire to leverage US-based research to generate new patents. This is part of China's concerted long-term effort
to become the global leader in technology and it is clearly setting its sights on hi-tech, high-value-added
industries on an ever-increasing scale.
Although there is widespread scepticism about China's capacity to be a global tech leader, it has three distinct
advantages that should enable it to claim leadership in two to three decades.
First is China's rapidly growing domestic market. Already the world's second largest, the Chinese economy is likely
to overtake the US economy by 2020 or soon after. It is well known that market size is a powerful indicator of
demand, and that growing demand for new products and services drives innovation.
Indeed, China is now the world's largest producer in nearly a third of the most important industrial sectors, and leads
the world in producing steel, cement, automobiles and fertiliser.
The second big advantage lies in its autocratic model of governance. Few developed or newly emerging economies
are growing under governments that enjoy the latitude China has to shape industrial and business policy. Fuelled by
a 20 per cent annual growth in research and development investments, China is encouraging "indigenous
innovation". Having doubled the share in gross domestic product of R&D expenditure since 1999, it is on pace to
triple that rate by 2020. Say what you will about China's approach to governance, it can channel public funding and
facilities to spur growth where it sees fit.
Finally, China will continue to reap the benefits of globalisation for the foreseeable future. This means, on the
one hand, that China can acquire innovative technologies on the global market without having to foot the total bill
for the R&D and commercialisation of such technologies. Examples of China's increasing presence in the global
marketplace include the acquisition by BAIC Group of the intellectual property of Swedish automaker Saab, and
Geely's acquisition of Volvo in 2010.
On the other hand, globalisation means China will be increasingly attractive to foreign firms seeking new markets,
creating what economists call spillover effects.
Foreign companies will increasingly invest in and partner Chinese firms to cash in on the nation's growth.
Foreign firms are also increasingly deploying state-of-the-art technology in China and even seeking patents there,
with corresponding technological spillovers to Chinese firms.
Chinas tech industry is thriving and will boost the global markets.
Stratfor, geopolitical intelligence firm, 15
[George Friedman founded Stratfor in 1996 to bring customers an incisive new approach to examining world affairs,
6/12/15, China's Outward Push in High-Tech Investment and Innovation,
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/chinas-outward-push-high-tech-investment-and-innovation date accessed 7/6/15]
China's rapid expansion into high-tech sectors, both domestically and abroad, will continue to accelerate as
the Chinese economy particularly its technology sector matures.
Concerns about the true intentions behind Beijing's overseas investment goals will persist.
As increased technological capabilities move China up the value chain both at home and abroad, the country will
initially be perceived as an imitator rather than an innovator, but signs are emerging that it will overcome this
perception.
A decade ago, Chinese electronics company Lenovo bought out IBM's personal computer arm for $1.75 billion in
what was China's first major overseas acquisition in the technology sector. The deal cemented Lenovo's status as one
of the world's biggest PC manufacturers (it now ranks as the largest), and it launched China's journey to becoming
one of the world's largest foreign investors in the technology sector. That process has accelerated exponentially; in
2014, for example, Chinese direct investment in the U.S. information and communications technology industry
accounted for about half of all Chinese investment into the United States. In some areas, such as semiconductors,
biotechnology and green energy, investment came almost entirely from private Chinese investors.
This expansion abroad differs from traditional Chinese outward investment patterns. Chinese state-owned
companies dominate overseas acquisitions in most sectors, but high-tech areas are the domain of companies with
weak or no ties to the government. Despite the relative lack of Chinese state involvement, the growth of investment
will still raise concerns among Western companies and governments, particularly in the United States, over Beijing's
investment strategy and the impact Chinese companies could have on those markets. Meanwhile, China is becoming
more innovative itself and evolving into a world leader in some high-tech areas. China's aptitude in a number of
tech-related sectors will only increase, and given China's size, incremental changes in its capabilities can have a
significant impact on world markets.
NSA Link
Chinese tech corporations directly capitalize off of surveillance policies from the NSA.
Dou, Wall Street Journal, 14
[Eva, writes about China's technology industry, 7/29/14, NSA Concerns Give Chinese Server Maker a Boost,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/nsa-concerns-give-chinese-server-maker-inspur-a-boost-1406653858?mg=id-wsj date
accessed 7/6/15, Evann]
BEIJINGA Chinese company that once made computer accessories is seeking to rival International Business
Machines Corp. as a top provider of big-ticket computer servers in China.
Its strategy, in part: Bring up Edward Snowden.
Inspur Group Co. is using Chinese worries about U.S. gear as part of its effort to take market share from IBM,
Hewlett-Packard Co. and other foreign rivals. U.S. technology companies fell under a cloud in China last year after
the former U.S. National Security Agency contractor disclosed that the U.S. government was collecting sensitive
data from American companies.
Inspur Chairman Sun Pishu, a member of the country's legislature, proposed measures this year to review critical
technology purchases and accelerate the shift toward homegrown gear. The company unveiled a marketing program
called I2IIBM to Inspuraimed at convincing businesses to switch from Big Blue.
Since the NSA controversy began, Inspur, which started out in the 1960s making computer accessories in China's
northeast Shandong province, has seen domestic server sales soar. It overtook Dell Inc., China's Huawei
Technologies Co. and H-P in the first quarter to top China's charts for server shipments, according to data from
researcher Gartner.
The boom in China has also lifted Inspur to the No. 5 spot globally. U.S. vendors Dell, H-P and IBM all saw marketshare declines in China and globally during the same period.
A spokesman for Dell declined to comment. Representatives at IBM and H-P didn't respond to a request for
comment.
But neither Inspur nor Huawei are in the top five list globally when it comes to revenue, and even in China, they lag
behind their U.S. rivals. That means foreign companies still have a firm hold on the market for the most
sophisticated and expensive machines needed to run the country's big banks and other important areas, Gartner says.
Inspur's rapid growth showcases the successes and challenges for Beijing's long-running push to shed its dependence
on the likes of IBM, Oracle Corp., Cisco Systems Inc. and other Western companies for high-tech equipment. China
eventually hopes to replace Western equipment running the critical functions in major state-run banks and other
government-controlled companies, though experts say that day is far off.
Beijing's push has been accelerated by rising tensions between the U.S. and China over cybersecurity threats. In
recent months, major U.S. tech firms like Apple Inc. and Microsoft Corp. have been in the cross hairs of Chinese
state media, which questioned the security of their technologies.
China is also pursuing antitrust investigations of both Microsoft and Qualcomm this year, showing that its officials
are taking a harder line against foreign firms.
China has worked for decades to develop homegrown technologies to wean itself off its dependence on U.S. firms.
Since 1986, the government has used something called the 863 Program to fund technology development in sectors
deemed strategic, ranging from spacecraft to automation. Most recently, the country is pouring $5 billion into its
microchip industry, as well as encouraging the development of homegrown software to compete with Microsoft's
Windows and Google Inc.'s Android.
The NSA harms US tech companies and simultaneously allows China to benefit.
Pestano, United Press International, 15
[Andrew, 6/10/15, Report: Government surveillance costs U.S. tech companies billions,
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2015/06/10/Report-Government-surveillance-costs-US-tech-companiesbillions/9371433932573/ date accessed 7/9/15, Evann]
WASHINGTON, June 10 (UPI) -- The competitiveness of the U.S. technology sector has been harmed by the
"pervasive" use of government surveillance and the ineffective debate surrounding it, according to a new report.
The Information Technology & Innovation Foundation estimated in 2013 that U.S. companies' foreign market share
for cloud computing could drop because of U.S. surveillance concerns following the revelations by former National
Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden.
The organization's "Beyond the USA Freedom Act: How U.S. Surveillance Still Subverts U.S. Competitiveness"
report released Tuesday states it underestimated the damage of the effects of government surveillance on U.S.
tech companies.
The organization previously estimated a drop of between $21.5 billion and $35 billion by 2016.
"Since then, it has become clear that the U.S. tech industry as a whole, not just the cloud computing sector, has
underperformed as a result of the Snowden revelations," according to the report. "Therefore, the economic impact of
U.S. surveillance practices will likely far exceed ITIF's initial $35 billion estimate."
NSA digital surveillance programs have led foreign customers to "shun U.S. companies" and even allowed foreign
governments, including China, to use the fear of digital surveillance to force companies to relinquish valuable
intellectual property.
"In the short term, U.S. companies lose out on contracts, and over the long term, other countries create protectionist
policies that lock U.S. businesses out of foreign markets," the report states. "A failure to sufficiently reform U.S.
surveillance policies is hurting U.S. technology companies, costing American jobs, and weakening the U.S. trade
balance."
Surveillance empowers the Chinese government to use its tech industry to boost its
economy
Castro, M.S. in Information Security Technology and Management from Carnegie Mellon University, and
McQuinn, B.S. in Public Relations and Political Communications from Texas-Austin, 15
[Danie Castro Vice President of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation(ITIF), BS in foreign service
from Georgetown, and Alan Mcquinn, research assistant at ITIF, June 2015, ITIF report, eyond the USA Freedom
Act: How U.S. Surveillance Still Subverts U.S. Competitiveness, accessed from http://www2.itif.org/2015-beyondusa-freedom-act.pdf?_ga=1.182454886.1744347471.1433849593 date accessed 7/9/15, Evann]
Protectionist policies in China have further strained the U.S. tech industry. In January 2015, the Chinese government
adopted new regulations that forced companies that sold equipment to Chinese banks to turn over secret source
code, submit to aggressive audits, and build encryption keys into their products.38 While ostensibly an attempt to
strengthen cybersecurity in critical Chinese industries, many western tech companies saw these policies as a shot
across the bow trying to force them out of Chinas markets. After all, the Chinese government had already launched
a de-IOE movementIOE stands for IBM, Oracle and EMC to convince its state-owned banks to stop buying
from these U.S. tech giants.
To be sure, the Chinese government recently halted this policy under U.S. pressure.40 However, the halted policy
can be seen as a part of a larger clash between China and the United States over trade and cybersecurity. Indeed,
these proposed barriers were in part a quid pro quo from China, after the United States barred Huawei, a major
Chinese computer maker, from selling its products in the United States due to the fear that this equipment had back
doors for the Chinese government.41 Since the Snowden revelations essentially gave them cover, Chinese
lawmakers have openly called for the use of domestic tech products over foreign goods both to boost the
Chinese economy and in response to U.S. surveillance tactics. This system of retaliation has not only led to a
degradation of business interests for U.S. tech companies in China, but also disrupted the dialogue between the U.S.
government and China on cybersecurity issues.42
new course that balances economic interests with national security interests. The cost of inaction is not only shortterm economic losses for U.S. companies, but a wave of protectionist policies that will systematically weaken U.S.
technology competiveness in years to come, with impacts on economic growth, jobs, trade balance, and national
security through a weakened industrial base. Only by taking decisive steps to reform its digital surveillance activities
will the U.S. government enable its tech industry to effectively compete in the global market.
Now is key, sustained innovation elevates long term growth and party legitimacy.
Magnus, Associate at Oxford Universitys China Center, a senior economic adviser at UBS Financial Services,
15
[George, reporting by John Mauldin, Equities, Is This a Do-or-Die Moment for China's Ruling Communist Party?
http://www.equities.com/editors-desk/international-investing/asia/is-this-a-do-or-die-moment-for-chinas-rulingcommunist-party date accessed 7/7/15, Evann]
In the longer-term, economic reforms have to go much further now that Chinas potential to derive growth from the
deployment of physical labour, or from limitless capital accumulation is diminishing quickly. A different sort of
economic growth is required for China to grow its per capita GDP strongly as well as its nominal GDP. This would
be based much less on the dominance of state institutions, and more on innovation, higher educational
attainment standards, stronger productivity, and entrepreneurship. This is all the more relevant because Chinas
working age population share of the population is declining, and rising wage costs and digital technologies are
encouraging foreign companies to go home or to cheaper manufacturing nations in Asia, such as Vietnam,
Cambodia, Bangladesh, and now perhaps Modis India.
Chinas leaders are well aware that the growth and development model has to change. The anti-corruption
campaign is essential to securing the reforms that would lead to that change. But, as argued, the campaign has
weaknesses and shortcomings. Reforms, especially to create robust and inclusive institutions that would really put
China on course to become a high income country are most likely incompatible with the central philosophy of Party,
which is to rule unchallenged. A purified Party is no substitute for political reforms in which the Party has no
interest.
We can understand the resulting insecurity that seems to pervade the behaviour of the leadership, which has
manifested itself in fear, distrust, and a major crackdown on opponents, critics, liberals, and most recently, Western
values and influences. The government has forbidden universities from teaching or discussing universal values,
press freedom, civil society, civil rights, historical errors of the Party, capitalism and an independent judiciary
collectively known as the seven donts. Ironically, allowing these donts would go much further in purging the
country of corruption than an extra-legal campaign of going after tigers and flies that by comparison, seems quite
limited.
New technological innovation for China is necessary to solidify its economic take-off.
Hengyuan, Associate professor at Tsinghua University's School of Economics and Management, 15
[Zhu, vice chair at the Department of Innovation, Entrepreneurship and Strategy, Caixin Online, 7/6/15, China Is
Poised for Technology Takeoff, http://english.caixin.com/2015-07-06/100825666.html date accessed 7/6/15,
Evann]
For the past 20 years, "Made in China" has driven global economic growth, with Chinese manufacturing
contributing to more than one-fifth of total output worldwide. But it is stuck in an awkward position now, as
developed countries roll out measures to win back high-end manufacturers while poorer countries offer cheap labor
as a comparative advantage.
The "Made in China 2025" strategy announced on May 19 is the central government's response to the problem. Its
goal is to promote the country's industrial transformation and upgrading by shifting emphasis from raw materials
to innovation and added-value.
This is not a new prescription. The fifth full meeting of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party in 2006
raised the idea of building an innovation-driven country, but little progress was made. The situation feels different
this time around because businesspeople have taken center stage in discussions and the ideas they propose are
realistic. In fact, before the government's recent call for innovation, start-ups had already appeared to provide, for
example, "smart" technologies, meaning Internet-based, highly automated devices and systems. The emptying pool
of cheap labor in the Yangtze River Delta, in the east, and the south's Pearl River Delta two traditional hubs of
labor-intensive manufacturing have been replacing workers with robots on a large scale. This is also a sign that
China is about to take off technologically.
The phrase "science and technology takeoff" is used to describe a phenomenon that sees developed countries
intensify investment in research and development, measured as a share of a country's GDP. It often takes a long
time for the level to reach 1 percent, but after that, it takes off, growing quickly to 2 percent and then stabilizing.
This process took the United States 10 years from 1950 to 1960, Germany 11 years from 1951 to 1962 and Japan 19
years from 1959 to 1978. South Korea did it in only five years, from 1983 to 1988. Regardless of the length of the
period, once a country embarks on this path, innovation spreads, new businesses grow and its products
become dominant.
China's economy has grown rapidly since reform and opening up to the outside world started in the late 1970s, but it
has lagged in terms of innovation. From the 1980s to the 1990s, its level of R&D investment was always below 1
percent of GDP, sometimes dipping to 0.5 percent. In 2000, it hit 1 percent for the first time, then took off, growing
to 2.08 percent in 2013.
This was a watershed. By the United Nations' definition, China is an upper-level middle-income country, but its
R&D investments have been stronger than those of its peers and on par with some developed countries. Its national
spending on R&D ranked behind only the United States, and nearly four-fifths of it was carried out by companies.
China has the most R&D engineers in the world and recently their number has been growing by nearly 1 million
every year. The numbers of Chinese research papers and patents filed are also among the most in the world. The
country is now a hotbed for innovation.
There is, of course, legitimate concern that these numbers are exaggerated, but they are still reasons for believing
that a great pool of resources has been built for innovation to grow. Innovation requires practice. All of the countries
that escaped the middle-income trap have, at some point, relied on imitation and then moved on to innovation. Over
the past decade, many multinational corporations have started moving their R&D capabilities to China, a reflection
of their confidence in the market's potential. Given the right circumstances and conditions, innovation will blossom.
China has started getting these circumstances and conditions right. Its national per capita GDP has reached US$
7,500, and a more demanding middle class is fueling consumption. A research report by the consultancy McKinsey
& Co. said that about three-quarters of all Chinese households will become middle class by 2020. That is roughly
the same as in Europe. Even better, this new middle class will see its spending capacity grow by 20 percent annually.
This will provide the market that foreign companies urgently need and also encourage domestic innovation.
China also a complete system of manufacturing industries, which means that in every field it has the factories to
turn ideas into products. A bustling e-commerce industry can break geographic boundaries and better connect the
country. In other words, the threshold has been significantly lowered for innovation and commercialization.
This is the setting for China's industrial transformation and why opportunities abound.
Monthly pay in the capital Guangzhou increased 22.2 percent to 1,895 yuan (U.S. $305), the official news agency
said.
But higher wages have added to China's manufacturing costs.
As of last year, costs of labor and social insurance in Vietnam were less than half of those in China. In India, the
costs were 22 percent of China's, consultants Dezan Shira amp; Associates in Hong Kong said.
Exchange rates and regional tension
While cost comparisons are pushing low-wage exporting to other countries, exchange rates have also been playing a
part.
China's yuan has been virtually pegged to the U.S. currency all year, trading in a narrow range of around 6.2 to the
dollar. But as the greenback has strengthened, so has the yuan against other currencies, making China's goods less
competitive in many markets.
Through April, China's exports to the United States were up 9 percent in dollar value, but exports to the European
Union were down 1 percent.
Regional tensions with Japan have also hurt China's trade. Imports from and exports to Japan have been falling since
2013.
In the first four months of this year, imports and exports were both down by over 12 percent, the Japan External
Trade Organization (JETRO) said.
Ironically, China's trade growth was stronger when the world economy was weaker during the global downturn of
2008-2010.
Hufbauer said that may have been due to longer-term supply contracts and investments that kept exports flowing.
Lower wage costs and weaker currency may also have played a part.
But clearer readings of China's trade data may be clouded by past inflows of "hot money." The illicit moves by
currency speculators, disguised as payments for phantom exports with fake invoices, have skewed official growth
rates for years.
Interpretations of the import slide are also complicated by commodities like crude oil and iron ore that have risen in
volume but fallen in value as prices have plunged.
As of April, oil imports have climbed 7.8 percent by volume this year, but the U.S. dollar value has dropped by over
43 percent, driving trade totals down.
Government response
China's government has promoted several remedies for the declining trade trends, including its "belt and road"
initiatives to establish modern versions of historic Silk Road trade routes.
Premier Li Keqiang has pushed innovation, high-tech exports and services to reduce reliance on traditional
manufacturing and assembly operations, where China has lost competitive ground.
"Previously known as the low-cost factory of the world, China is no longer satisfied with low-value manufacturing,"
Xinhua said in May.
Jessica Perkinson, Master School Of International Service American University, The Potential For
Instability in the PRC: How The Doomsday Theory Misses the Mark
In order
to maintain stability on the Peninsula and prevent the North Koreans from
becoming desperate, China continues to export both luxury goods and basic commodities into
intervene in a country violating international laws, pervasive malnutrition has led to up to one million excess deaths since the 1990s.155
North Korea. For example, in 2005, China accounted for 53% of North Koreas international commerce. However, this has increased rapidly since sanctions
have become stricter and have increased pressure in the country. In 2009, China accounted for 79% in North Koreas international commerce and as of
China
has been a facilitator of the Six-Party Talks, the primary international diplomatic forum for
handling tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Countries involved in the Six-Party Talks include China, North Korea,
2010 was up to 83% of North Koreas $4.2 billion in trade156 in order to ease the effect of the existing international sanctions. In addition,
Russia, the United States, South Korea and Japan, and the first round of talks was initiated and hosted by China, taking place in Beijing in August 2003.157
example, on November 23, 2010, North Korea fired dozens of missiles onto the Souths Yeonpyeong Island, killing two South Korean soldiers, significantly
of $207.2 billion, up 32.6% over 2009.162 In other words, both North and South Korea rely heavily on China not only for their continued economic
a small event to the international community, but what was viewed by the Chinese as a grave threat to their sovereignty. In 1995, then-US President Bill
Clinton allowed Taiwanese President Lee Teng-Hui to come and visit his alma-mater at Cornell University. Though the visit alone sparked some controversy
between the US, China and Taiwan, the remarks made at Cornell by Lee Teng-Hui during an address tipped the security balance on the Taiwan Strait. In his
address, Lee referred to Taiwan as the Republic of China on multiple occasions, and made references to nation and country.163 These events led the
Chinese leadership to believe that the US was making overtures toward Taiwanese independence from the mainland. The following year, the PLA fired
missiles off the coast of Taiwan, nearly drawing the international community including the US into a conflict on the Strait.164 Some scholars argue this
was to deter the US from developing closer ties with Taiwan.165 However, since that incident, the Strait has remained relatively calm and stable, as the
Taiwanese leadership under Ma Ying-jeou has remained very moderate in their stance on China-Taiwan relations and has been very careful not to make any
China and Japan was $18.1 million. That amount spiked to $344.9 million in December, 2011 (an 1808.1% increase)167, a clear indicator that China and
gas resources that both countries want to develop. For example, it is estimated that the Japanese side of the disputed East China Sea area contains up to
500 million kiloliters of crude oil volume.168 As China is the worlds second-largest consumer of oil and Japan third, with Chinese demand for oil expected
message on the status of these disputed territories, though tense and combative for the Japanese, have at least lent a level of predictability to Chinas
government-in-exile. In 1962, the PLA invaded India through the Arunachal Pradesh region, laying claim to portions of the Himalayas that had previously
been under Indian control in what became known as the Sino-Indian War. Though the Chinese eventually called a cease-fire and withdrew from the
region171, the conflict over it remains tense for a number of reasons, including access to water resources, forestry resources and Chinas enduring theme
China has labeled the Dalai Lama and his government-in-exile a separatist force working to separate Tibet from mainland China, India has provided the
group sanctuary in Dharamsala, India.172 Abroad, the Dalai Lama continues to draw supporters from around the world, occasionally attracting Tibetans
inside Tibet to make the treacherous journey across the Himalayas to Dharamsala. China, in turn, has taken up guarding this area in an attempt to prevent
growing their bilateral trade in the last three decades. Though this has served to promote peace in the region and between the two giants in particular, it
has also made India increasingly reliant on Chinas continued stability for its economic prosperity. For example, in 1990, trade between India and China
had bottomed out at near $0. However, this figure shot up drastically between 2000 and 2008 to around $35 billion174, with no sign of leveling off. It is
obvious from these statistics that the two nations continue to build their trade dependency and that Indias economy is deeply intertwined with Chinas.
The consistency of Chinas message on the contested border area, as well as the fairly stable environment surrounding the Tibetan dispute, lend at least
these disagreements could change, and cause aggression from either side,
destabilizing the region and India economy in the process . Outside of Chinas immediate vicinity,
there exist a number of countries that would be challenged by political instability
in China. Due to intense and growing economic and military integration between
China, the East Asian region and the world, these other countries have a significant
reliance on the continued stability of the CCP. Chief among these global concerns are Chinas growing integration
with European countries and its continued commitment of foreign direct investment (FDI) into developing countries, primarily on the African continent.
The CCP would lash out for power, and they would use bioweapons
Renxin 05
Renxin, Journalist, 8-3-2K5 (San, CCP Gambles Insanely to Avoid Death, Epoch Times,
www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-8-3/30931.html)
Since the Partys life is above all else, it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the
use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to postpone its life. The CCP,
that disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, coupled with
seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. The speech, free of all disguises, lets
the public see the CCP for what it really is: with evil filling its every cell, the CCP intends to fight all of
mankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. And that is the theme of the speech. The theme is
murderous and utterly evil. We did witness in China beggars who demanded money from people by threatening to
stab themselves with knives or prick their throats on long nails. But we have never, until now, seen a rogue who
blackmails the world to die with it by wielding biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Anyhow, the bloody
confession affirmed the CCPs bloodiness: a monstrous murderer, who has killed 80 million Chinese people, now
plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives. As the CCP is known to be a clique with a
closed system, it is extraordinary for it to reveal its top secret on its own. One might ask: what is the CCPs purpose
to make public its gambling plan on its deathbed? The answer is: the speech would have the effect of killing three
birds with one stone. Its intentions are the following: Expressing the CCPs resolve that it not be buried by either
heaven or earth (direct quote from the speech). But then, isnt the CCP opposed to the universe if it claims not to
be buried by heaven and earth? Feeling the urgent need to harden its image as a soft egg in the face of the Nine
Commentaries. Preparing publicity for its final battle with mankind by threatening war and trumpeting violence. So,
strictly speaking, what the CCP has leaked out is more of an attempt to clutch at straws to save its life rather than
to launch a trial balloon. Of course, the way the speech was presented had been carefully prepared. It did not
have a usual opening or ending, and the audience, time, place, and background related to the speech were all
kept unidentified. One may speculate or imagine as one may, but never verify. The aim was obviously to create a
mysterious setting. In short, the speech came out as something one finds difficult to tell whether it is false or true.
take China to ITLOS over its efforts to convert reefs into islands and claim exclusion zones that could interfere with
the right of free passage -- a major U.S. interest.
But, because China has ratified UNCLOS and the U.S. respects it as customary international law, there is a basis for
serious direct negotiation over clarification of the ambiguous nine-dashed line and the preservation of freedom of
the seas. With properly managed diplomacy, a U.S.-China conflict in the South China Sea can and should be
avoided.
No zero sum
The thesis of technological competition is false, growth in US benefits China and viseversa.
Kakaes, fellow at New America, 12
[Konstantin, 1/9/12, No One Can Win the Future,
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2012/01/u_s_scientists_are_not_competing_with_china_or_a
ny_other_country_.single.html date accessed 7/5/15, Evann]
Obama and the Republicans might disagree on the answers, but they agree on the question: "How can America
compete with the rest of the world, especially China?" But this is the wrong question to be asking. We are not
actually engaged in economic or technological competition with China or with anyone else. Absent a state of
open war, our economic growth helps that of other countries, and vice versa. New technology developed in the
United States will benefit the rest of the world, and vice versa.
The extremely complicated interactions between countriesgoods, people, culture, and ideas all flowing back and
forthare not akin to a sporting competition. To pretend that we are all engaged in a giant worldwide track meet
for economic domination serves the interest of business above individuals. To pretend that there is a field event for
technological domination actually hurts American business by imposing futile regulations on technology exports.
This deeply entrenched misunderstanding about the nature of technological innovation leads to unnecessary
tax breaks and prioritizes trendy metrics of performance (where putative relative success can be measured) over
the fundamentals necessary to shaping a better society. By thinking we are racing with China, or Europe, we will
end up worse off.
The case that we are in competition is often linked to the claim that the United States is somehow falling behind.
A July report by the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation that ranked countries on the basis of how
innovative they are typifies this perspective: It is worth reiterating that in 2000 the United States ranked first, a
position it likely held for the majority of the post-war period, but in a decade it has fallen to fourth. At this rate,
where will the United States rank at the end of the next decade? The United States was behind Singapore,
Finland, and Sweden. Comparing a country of 300 million people with a city-state and a couple of Nordic countries
whose combined population is less than that of Los Angeles doesnt mean much. But it lets ITIF sound the trumpets
of alarm and claim that drastic action is needed.
On the surface, there is a sort of international competition over jobs. Commerce Department data show that U.S.based multinationals cut 2.9 million domestic jobs during the first decade of the century and added 2.4 million jobs
abroad. But look more closely, as in a November report from the Commerce Department, and youll see that of those
new jobs abroad, only 8.9 percent involved sales to U.S customersthe overwhelming number of new jobs abroad
were related to economic growth abroad. It looks like jobs moved from the U.S. to other countries, since the
numbers are about the same size.
But the truth is that jobs were lost in the U.S. for many reasons: technological change, corporate consolidation, and a
sluggish economy. The jobs that were created abroad are, by and large, different jobs than the jobs lost in the United
States. As Paul Krugman wrote in an essay for Foreign Affairs in 1994, it is simply not the case that the world's
leading nations are to any important degree in economic competition with each other, or that any of their major
economic problems can be attributed to failures to compete on world markets. Its easy to blame todays bleak
economic outlook on a failure to compete. But doing so is just finding a scapegoat for domestic shortcomings.
The bible of the competitiveness crowd is a National Academy of Sciences report called Rising Above the Gathering
Storm. (In terms of melodramatic white paper titles, the United States is surely a world leader. The report was first
issued in 2005; a 2010 revision was subtitled: Rapidly Approaching Category 5.) The 2010 report notes, 30 years
ago the United States had 30 percent of the worlds college students. Today we are at 14 percent and falling. This is
cited as evidence of a decline in American competitiveness. But thats like saying the United States has a smaller
percentage of the worlds well-nourished people than it did 30 years ago. It is good for people around the world to
go to college and be well-fed. Neither takes anything away from the United States.
The competition rhetoric is almost always linked with calls for increased investment in research. But as Argentino
Pessoa of the University of Porto, among others, has pointed out, there is a slight negative correlation between
R&D intensity and GDP growthin other words, spending more on research doesnt necessarily make you richer.
Amar Bhide, in his book The Venturesome Economy, cites the example of Norway, which isnt even in the top 20
countries ranked by share of scientific papers published, but has the highest labor productivity in the world.
Knowledgeof which technology is a kindgets shared widely. A Dec. 7 New York Times article called China
Scrambles for High Tech Dominance gets it exactly wrong. If the future of the Internet is already in China, is the
future of computing there as well? The future of the Internet isnt in China any more than the present of the Internet
is in the U.S. Technonationalists (as Bhide calls the competitiveness caucus) like to trumpet the fact that Google is
an American company. But the benefits of quartering Googles corporate headquarters are dwarfed by the benefits of
using Google (and its peers, like Baidu, a Chinese search engine) and other revolutionary technologies. And those
benefits get spread widely. The Internet, for example, was invented in the United Statesbut that does not mean we
get the most benefit from it.
Indisputably, more scientific research is going on in China today than 30 years ago. But lets do a simple thought
experiment. Imagine that someone in a lab in China cured cancer tomorrow. Technology spreads quicklythat
cancer cure would be applied in the United States (and throughout the world) with tremendous benefit for human
welfare. In no way would we be worse off. Sure, a Chinese pharmaceutical company would make money. But so
would the pharmacist who sold the drug in the United States and the doctor who prescribed it. American researchers
would build on the Chinese discovery. American workers would be more productive, and American families would
have their sarcoma-ridden loved ones futures restored to them. The money made by the notional Chinese
pharmaceutical firm is inconsequential compared with the worldwide effect of the miracle cure.
Link Turn
Chinese tech firms are harmed by NSA surveillance. Data localization is ultimately worse.
Griffiths, University of Liverpool Bachelor of Laws, 15
[James, South China Morning Post, 7/3/15, Two years after Snowden, NSA revelations still hurting US tech firms
in China: report, http://www.scmp.com/tech/enterprises/article/1831657/nsa-spy-revelations-damaging-us-techfirms-competitiveness-china date accessed 7/6/15, Evann]
Cloud computing firms and data centres have been some of the worst hit, with foreign companies choosing to avoid
storing their data in the US following revelations about the NSA's digital surveillance programmes.
A 2014 survey of British and Canadian businesses by Vancouver-based Peer 1 Hosting found that 25 per cent of
respondents planned to pull data out of the US due to fears relating to data privacy.
In February, Beijing dropped a number of major American tech firms from its official state procurement list,
including network equipment maker Cisco Systems, Apple, and security firm McAfee.
"The Snowden incident, it's become a real concern, especially for top leaders," Tu Xinquan, associate director of the
China Institute of WTO Studies in Beijing, told Reuters in April.
"In some sense, the American government has some responsibility for that. [China's] concerns have some
legitimacy."
The White House and US International Trade Administration declined to comment on the matter, when contacted by
the Post.
IBM, Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard have all reported diminished sales in China as a result of the NSA revelations,
which first emerged in the summer of 2013.
The NSA was found to have tapped into the servers of major internet players like Facebook, Google and Yahoo to
track online communication, among other forms of digital surveillance.
Chinese firms have also suffered due to security concerns, particularly in the US.
In 2012, a Congressional committee said that smartphone makers Huawei and ZTE were a national security threat
because of their alleged ties with the Chinese government.
In April, US officials blocked technology exports to Chinese facilities associated with the Tianhe-2 supercomputer
project, a blow to Intel and other hardware suppliers.
Both countries are looking into restrictions because of security, that's not a good idea for either of them," said
Castro.
The ITIF paper recommends establishing international legal standards for government access to data, and
developing what it terms a "Geneva Convention on the Status of Data".
"We need to take certification out of the national level and move it to the international level. We don't want each
country to set security standards," Castro said.
He warned that China's pursuance of "protectionist" policies in the name of security could backfire if other
countries follow suit and adopt standards that favour domestic over foreign firms for key infrastructure projects.
"China doesn't want every other country to say We have security concerns about you and refuse to buy your
products, he added.
Castro pointed to China's new security legislation, passed by the country's top legislature on Wednesday, to shore up
his argument that Beijing is "still going down that path".
The sweeping law defines the scope of national security in far-reaching terms, ranging from finance, economy,
politics, the military and cybersecurity to culture, ideology and religion.
One clause deals with establishing systems "for the protection of cyber and information security".
Washington must respond if China keeps pursuing such protectionist policies but this will be problematic
until concerns about NSA spying have been addressed, Castro said.
"At the end of the day, it is very hard to say with a straight face that you should buy US tech products, if the [US]
government is not willing to stand up and say We will not use this as a way to conduct surveillance in your
countries."
on some reform proposals, like liberalization of criminal law, conflict has emerged. But do these
disagreements reveal cracks in the party leadership, as Chang implies? Probably not. First, these are practical differences among
technocrats who are after the same thing: stability via steady growth. Second, policy disputes are also a sign that Chinas decision making
is more consultative and decentralized than before. As the hukou example above illustrates, once delegated certain powers, provinces and
municipalities can innovate on a smaller scale than the central government, as in the U.S. federal system. Finally, interest groups and factions are
nothing new to Chinese politics. Thus, its unrealistic to think factional tension could paralyze party leadership,
military and police at the same time that protesters agitate and show potential for violence and greater
lawlessness. Whats more, scholarly work on factional politics over recent decades, often with a focus on China, has shown how factions can coexist
and even thrive by nearing some sort of competitive equilibrium. This may explain the relative quietude of
Chinese elite politics since 1989. Why China Wont Fall The political must be analyzed alongside the economic. Chinas institutions are
still significantly ahead of the demands of its society. Beijings apparent influence by Huntingtons theories is not surprising, as his works are
popular among the PRC-establishment intellectuals, especially those on the government payroll. Meanwhile, the authoritarian CCP junta keeps
the trains running fast and on time. This means a lot to the swaths of Chinas massive, aging population. Hard
landing or soft, dont look for the Beijing to suffer any hits to the head in 2012. Collapse theories are rooted in
idealism, but theyre no more likely to pan out because of it.
system didn't collapse then, and it won't collapse now. The key reason such dire predictions are taken
seriously -- especially in the West -- is that non-democratic regimes are seen to lack legitimacy. A political regime that is morally justified
in the eyes of the people must be chosen by the people. In the case of China, the political leadership is a self-selected elite. Such mode of rule is fragile, as the Arab
Spring has shown. But
this view assumes the people are dissatisfied with the regime. In fact, the large majority of Chinese
people support the single-party state structure. Since the 1990s, scholars in the West and China have carried out many
large scale surveys into the legitimacy of Chinese political power and by now they have virtually arrived at a consensus: the
degree of legitimacy of the Chinese political system is very high. Surveys have been modified to prevent people
from telling lies and the results are always the same. To the extent there is dissatisfaction, it is largely directed at the lower levels of government.
The central government is viewed as the most legitimate part of the Chinese political apparatus. How can it be that
the Chinese government managed to achieve a high level of political legitimacy without adopting free and fair competitive elections for the country's leaders?
However paradoxical it may sound to Westernears, the Chinese government has succeeded by drawing upon sources of non-democratic legitimacy. The first source of
non-democratic legitimacy can be termed performance legitimacy, meaning that the government's first priority should be the material well-being of the people. This
idea has long roots in China -- Confucius himself said the government should make the people prosperous -- and the Chinese Communist Party has also put poverty
alleviation at the top of its political agenda. Hence, the government derives much, if not most, of its legitimacy by its ability to provide for the material welfare of
Chinese citizens. It has substantially increased the life expectancy of Chinese people, and the reform era has seen perhaps the most impressive poverty alleviation
achievement in history, with several hundred million people being lifted out of poverty. The second source