Els: Constitutional Law 2 Cases Batch 4: Adong To Abra Twenty19 1

ELS: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
Cases Batch 4: Adong to Abra
Twenty19 1
Section 5, Article III

1. Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee 43 Phil 43
Digest:
Facts:
Cheong Boo, a native of China died in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands on August 5,
1919 and left property worth nearly P100,000 which is now being claimed by two parties - (1)
Cheong Seng Gee who alleged that he was a legitimate child by marriage contracted by
Cheong Boo with Tan Bit in China in 1985, and (2) Mora Adong who alleged that she had been
lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan, Philippine Islands and had two daughters
with the deceased namely Payang and Rosalia. The conflicting claims to Cheong Boos estate
were ventilated in the lower court that ruled that Cheong Seng Gee failed to sufficiently
establish the Chinese marriage through a mere letter testifying that Cheong Boo and Tan Bit
married each other but that because Cheong Seng Gee had been admitted to the Philippine
Islands as the son of the deceased, he should share in the estate as a natural child. With
reference to the allegations of Mora Adong and her daughters, the trial court
reached the conclusion that the marriage between Adong and Cheong Boo had been
adequately proved but that under the laws of thePhilippine Islands it could not be held to be a
lawful marriage and thus the daughter Payang and Rosalia would inherit as natural children.
The lower court believes that Mohammedan marriages are not valid under the Philippine
Islands laws this as an Imam as a solemnizing officer and under Quaranic laws.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Chinese marriage between Cheong Boo and Tan Dit is
valid.
2. Whether or not the Mohammedan marriage between Cheong Boo and Mora Adong is valid
HELD:
The Supreme Court found the (1) Chinese marriage not proved and Chinaman Cheong
Seng Gee has only the rights of a natural child while (2) it found the Mohammedan marriage to
be proved and to be valid, thus giving to the widow Mora Adong and the legitimate children
Payang and Rosalia the rights accruing to them under the law. The Supreme Court held that
marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract but it is a new relation, an instruction in
the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. The presumption as to marriage is
that every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together
inapparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of counter-presumption or evidence
special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be
living in the constant violation of decency of the law. As to retroactive force, marriage laws is in
the nature of a curative provision intended to safeguard society by legalizing prior marriages.
Public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriages and should retard acts intended to
invalidate marriages. This as for public policy, the courts can properly incline the scales of their
decision in favor of that solution which will most effectively promote the public policy.
That is the true construction which will best carry legislative intention into effect. Sec. IV of
the Marriage law provides that all marriages contracted outside the islands, which would be
valid by the laws of the country in which the same were contracted, are valid in these islands.
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To establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this comity provision, it is first necessary to
prove before the courts of the Islands the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact, and
it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence. A Philippine
marriage followed by23 years of uninterrupted marital life, should not be impugned and
discredited, after the death of the husband through an alleged prior Chinese marriage, save
upon proof so clear, strong and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence
of such impediment. A marriage alleged to have been contracted in China and proven mainly
by a so-called matrimonial letter held not to be valid in the Philippines.
2. Gerona v. Secretary of Education 106 Phil 2
DIGEST
FACTS:
1. Petitioners belong to the Jehovas Witness whose children were expelled from their
schools when they refused to salute, sing the anthem, recite the pledge during the conduct of
flag ceremony. DO No. 8 issued by DECS pursuant to RA 1265 which called for the manner of
conduct during a flag ceremony. The petitioners wrote the Secretary of Education on their
plight and requested to reinstate their children. This was denied.
2. As a result, the petitioners filed for a writ of preliminary injunction against the Secretary and
Director of Public Schools to restrain them from implementing said DO No. 8.
3. The lower court (RTC) declared DO 8 invalid and contrary to the Bill of Rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not DO 8 is valid or constitutional
DO 8 is valid. Saluting the flag is not a religious ritual and it is for the courts to determine, not a
religious group, whether or not a certain practice is one.
1. The court held that the flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines,
an emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty
which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the complete separation of
church and state in our system of government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious
significance. Saluting the flag consequently does not involve any religious ceremony.
After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious ceremony must rest
with the courts. It cannot be left to a religious group or sect, much less to a follower of said
group or sect; otherwise, there would be confusion and misunderstanding for there might be
as many interpretations and meanings to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are
religious groups or sects or followers.
2. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean
exemption form or non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and
regulations promulgated by competent authority. In enforcing the flag salute on the
petitioners, there was absolutely no compulsion involved, and for their failure or refusal to obey
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school regulations about the flag salute they were not being persecuted. Neither were they
being criminally prosecuted under threat of penal sacntion. If they chose not to obey the flag
salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being maintained at the
expense of their fellow citizens, nothing more. According to a popular expression, they could
take it or leave it. Having elected not to comply with the regulations about the flag salute, they
forfeited their right to attend public schools.
3. The Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious veneration; rather it is symbol of the
Republic of the Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of freedom, liberty and national unity;
that the flag salute is not a religious ceremony but an act and profession of love and allegiance
and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for; that by authority of the
legislature, the Secretary of Education was duly authorized to promulgate Department Order
No. 8, series of 1955; that the requirement of observance of the flag ceremony or salute
provided for in said Department Order No. 8, does not violate the Constitutional provision
about freedom of religion and exercise of religion; that compliance with the non-discriminatory
and reasonable rules and regulations and school discipline, including observance of the flag
ceremony is a prerequisite to attendance in public schools; and that for failure and refusal to
participate in the flag ceremony, petitioners were properly excluded and dismissed from the
public school they were attending.
3. TAADA and FERNANDO 101 PHIL 399
Digest:
FACTS:
In the course of its ministry, American Bible Societys Philippine agency has been
distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions thereof (since 1898, but except during
the Japanese occupation) throughout the Philippines and translating the same into several
Philippine dialects. On 29 May 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed
the Society that it was conducting the business of general merchandise since November1945,
without providing itself with the necessary Mayors permit and municipal license, in violation of
Ordinance 3000, as amended, and Ordinances 2529, 3028 and 3364, and required the Society
to secure, within 3 days, the corresponding permit and license fees, together with compromise
covering the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2ndquarter of 1953, in the total sum of
P5,821.45.
On 24 October 1953, the Society paid to the City Treasurer under protest the
said permit and license fees, giving at the same time notice to the City Treasurer that suit
would be taken in court to question the legality of the ordinances under which the said fees
were being collected, which was done on the same date by filing the complaint that gave rise
to this action. After hearing, the lower court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
Plaintiff is engaged in the distribution and sales of bibles and religious articles. The City
Treasurer of Manila informed the plaintiff that it was conducting the business of general
merchandise without providing itself with the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license,
in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, and
required plaintiff to secure the corresponding permit and license. Plaintiff protested against this
requirement and claimed that it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not said Ordinances are constitutional and valid.
HELD:
It is true the price asked for the religious articles was in some instances a little bit higher
than the actual cost of the same, but this cannot mean that plaintiff was engaged in the
business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reasons, the provisions
of City Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, which requires the payment of license fee for
conducting the business of general merchandise, cannot be applied to plaintiff society, for in
doing so, it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and
worship, as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs. Upon the other hand, City
Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, which requires the obtention of the Mayors permit before
any person can engage in any of the businesses, trades or occupations enumerated therein,
does not impose any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor
tax the exercise of religious practices? Hence, it cannot be considered unconstitutional, even if
applied to plaintiff Society. But as Ordinance No. 2529 is not applicable to plaintiff and the City
of Manila is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff society involved herein, for the
reasons above stated, Ordinance No. 3000 is also inapplicable to said business, trade or
occupation of the plaintiff.
4. IGLESIA NI CRISTO v. GIRONELLA 106 SCRA 1
DIGEST:
FACTS:
Teofilo C. Ramos, Sr., in behalf of Iglesia Ni Cristo, contends that there was no need for
the statement of the respondent Judge who referred to their actions in court as a gimmick.
Judge Leopaldo B. Gironella is being charged with ignorance of the law and conduct
unbecoming member of the bench. Respondent argues that charges against him are unfair and
unfounded. He alleges that such statements complained of are his honest appraisal and
evaluation of the evidence presented.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Judge is guilty of ignorance of the law and conduct
unbecoming member of the bench
HELD:
The use of of the word gimmick could offend the sensibilities of the members of
Iglesia ni Cristo. It is not inaccurate to state that as understood by popular sense, it is not
exactly complimentary. It may indicate lack of sincerity. It is a ploy or device to persuade others
to take a course of action, which without it may not be acceptable. While it would be going too
far to assert that intentional deceit is employed, it could have the effect. The Latin maxim,
suggestio falsi est suppresio veri, comes to mind. It is to be expected that a religious sect
accused of having to resort to a gimmick to gain converts would certainly be far from
pleased. Freedom of religion implies respect for every creed. No one, much less of a public
official, is privileged to characterize the actuation of its adherents in a derogatory sense. It
should not be lost of sight of either that the attendance at a trial of many members of a
religious sect finds support in a Constitution. The right to a public trial is safeguarded by the
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public law. No adverse implication can arise from such concurrence. It goes without saying that
if their presence would create disorder, it lies within the power of a trial judge to maintain
proper decorum.
5. EBRALINAG v. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU 219 SCRA 256
DIGEST
FACTS:
Petitioner were expelled from the by the school authorities in Cebu for refusing to
salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by
Republic Act No. 1265 of July 11, 1955, and by Department Order No. 8 dated July 21, 1955
of Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory
in all educational institutions.
Jehovahs Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the national
anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are acts of worship or
religious devotion (p.10 of, Rollo) which they cannot conscientiously give . . . to anyone or
anything except God. They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State
ISSUE:
Whether school children who are members of a religious sect known as Jehovahs
Witnesses may be expelled from school for disobedience or R.A. No. 1265 and Department
Order No. 8, series of 1955.
HELD:
Court held that exemption are accorded to the Jehovahs Witnesses with the regard to
the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs, however bizarre
those beliefs may seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag
ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercise. Religious freedom is a
fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among
human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. Also, the expulsion of
members of Jehovahs Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled violates their right
as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to protect and promote the right of all
citizens to quality education, and to make such education accessible to all (Sec. 1, Art. XIV).
6. LONG v. BASA GR 134963-64
DIGEST:
FACTS:
Joseph Lim, Liu Yek See, Alfredo Long and Felix Almeria, petitioners, were members of a
religious group known as "The Church In Quezon City (Church Assembly Hall), Incorporated"
which was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1973. The members of
the said Church vested upon their Board of Directors the absolute power to admit and expel a
member of the Church. As early as 1988, the Board of Directors observed that certain members
of the church including petitioners herein exhibited conduct which was dishonorable, improper
and injurious to the character and interest of the Church. They warned petitioners that if they
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persist in their highly improper conduct, they will be dropped from the membership of the
Church. However, petitioners ignored their repeated admonitions. Alarmed that petitioners'
conduct will continue to undermine the integrity of the principles of faith of the Church, the
Board of Directors, during its August 30, 1993 regular meeting, removed from the membership
list certain names of members, including the names of herein petitioners. On September 29,
1993, petitioners and others questioned their expulsion by filing with the SEC Securities
Investigation and Clearing Department a petition seeking mainly the annulment of the August
30, 1993 membership list and the reinstatement of the original list, on the ground that it was
made without prior notice and hearing. Subsequently, SEC Hearing Officer Manuel Perea ruled,
among others, that the expulsion was in accordance with the Church By-laws.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the expulsion is valid
HELD:
No. The provision on expulsion under the Church By-Laws, as phrased, may sound unusual and
objectionable to petitioners as there is no requirement of prior notice to be given to an erring
member before he can be expelled. It must be stressed that the basis of the relationship
between a religious corporation and its members is the latter's absolute adherence to a
common religious or spiritual belief. Once this basis ceases, membership in the religious
corporation must also cease. Thus, generally, there is no room for dissension in a religious
corporation. And where, as here, any member of a religious corporation is expelled from the
membership for espousing doctrines and teachings contrary to that of his church, the
established doctrine in this jurisdiction is that such action from the church authorities is
conclusive upon the civil courts.
The courts will likewise exercise jurisdiction to grant relief in case property or civil rights are
invaded, although it has also been held that involvement of property rights does not
necessarily authorize judicial intervention, in the absence of arbitrariness, fraud, and collusion.
Another specific instance when intervention by the courts becomes warranted is when the
proceedings in question are violative of either the by-laws of the society itself or the basic law
of the land, such as when there is a violation of the fundamental right to due process of law.
7. PROVINCE OF ABRA v. HERNANDO 107 SCRA 104
DIGEST:
FACTS:
The provincial assessor of Abra levied taxes on the real property of the Catholic Bishop
of Bangued. The latter filed for relief on the ground that the Constitution grants tax exemption
on properties exclusively, directly and actually used for religious or charitable purposes. Judge
Hernando, after a summary hearing granted the relief out right and without hearing the side of
petitioner, stating that the CBB without a doubt falls within the said Constitutional exemption.
The case is submitted to the SC on certiorari
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge erred in denying the petitioners motion to
question the exemption being claimed by the CBB
HELD:
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The Supreme Court granted the certiorari, stating that it is only right to seek proof that
the said properties fall within tax exemption granted by the Constitution.
The Constitution provides that charitable institutions, mosques and non-profit cemeteries and
required that for the exemption of lands, buildings, and improvements, they should not only
be exclusively but also actually and directly used for religious or charitable purposes.
The exemption from taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so that if granted it must
be strictly construed against the taxpayer. In this case, there is no showing that the said
properties are actually and directly used for religious or charitable uses.
It was wrong for the judge not to let the petitioner seek proof as to whether CBB really not only
exclusively, but also actually and directly use the said properties for religious or charitable
purposes so that they would fall within the exemption granted by the Constitution.
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4TH BATCH MARCOS TO CAMARINES SUR
Copy of Rae Gammad
Marcos V.Manglapus
Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members
of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights,
specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of
the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their
right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed
particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to
other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially,
the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under international
law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rightstreat the right to freedom of movement and abode
within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and
distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the
borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom
to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be
restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of
others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate
to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the
liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered view that the
right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and under our
Constitution as part of the law of the land.
The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the
return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President
Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains
achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime.
The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the
instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
8. Baldoza V. Dimaano
Facts:
In a verified letter-complaint dated September 9, 1975, the Municipal Secretary of Taal, Batangas, charges
Municipal Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano, of the same municipality, with abuse of authority in refusing to allow
employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine the criminal docket records of the Municipal Court to secure data
in connection with their contemplated report on the peace and order conditions of the said municipality.
Dimaano, in answer to the complaint, stated that there has never been an intention to refuse access to official
court records; that although court records are among public documents open to inspection not only by the
parties directly involved but also by other persons who have legitimate interest to such inspection, yet the same
is always subject to reasonable regulation as to who, when, where and how they may be inspected. He further
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Copy of Rae Gammad
asserted that a court has unquestionably the power to prevent an improper use or inspection of its records and
the furnishing of copies therefrom may be refused where the person requesting is not motivated by a serious and
legitimate interest but acts out of whim or fancy or mere curiosity or to gratify private spite or to promote public
scandal. The case was thereupon referred to Judge Francisco Mat. Riodique for investigation and report. At the
preliminary hearing on 16 October 1975, Taal Mayor Corazon A. Caiza filed a motion to dismiss the complaint to
preserve harmony and cooperation among officers in the same municipality. This motion was denied by the
Investigating Judge, but after formal investigation, he recommended the exoneration of Dimaano.
Issue: Whether the rules and conditions imposed by Judge Dimaano on the inspection of the docket books
infringe upon the right of individuals to information.
Held: Judge Dimaano did not act arbitrarily in the premise. As found by the Investigating Judge, Dimaano allowed
the complainant to open and view the docket books of Dimaano under certain conditions and under his command
and supervision. It has not been shown that the rules and conditions imposed by Dimaano were unreasonable.
The access to public records is predicated on the right of the people to acquire information on matters of public
concern. Undoubtedly in a democracy, the public has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political
significance. The New Constitution expressly recognizes that the people are entitled to information on matters of
public concern and thus are expressly granted access to official records, as well as documents of official acts, or
transactions, or decisions, subject to such limitations imposed by law. The incorporation of this right in the
Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can
be no realistic perception by the public of the nation's problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if
they are denied access to information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society
to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of such information
depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either process is interrupted, the
flow inevitably ceases." However, restrictions on access to certain records may be imposed by law. Thus, access
restrictions imposed to control civil insurrection have been permitted upon a showing of immediate and
impending danger that renders ordinary means of control inadequate to maintain order.
9. Bel Air Village Association, Inc. v. Dionisio
Bel Air Village Association, Inc. vs Virgilio Dionisio
G.R. L-383454 June 30, 1989
Facts:
The Transfer Certificate of Title covering the subject parcel of land issued in the name of Virgilio Dionisio, the
petitioner contains an annotation to the effect that the lot owner becomes an automatic member of Bel-Air
Village Association, the respondent, and must abide by such rules and regulations laid down by the Association
in the interest of the sanitation, security and the general welfare of the community.
The petitioner questioned the collection of the dues on the following grounds: the questioned assessment is a
property tax outside the corporate power of the association; the association has no power to compel the
petitioner to pay the assessment for lack of privity of contract; the questioned assessment should not be enforced
for being unreasonable, arbitrary, oppressive, confiscatory and discriminatory; the respondent association is
exercising governmental powers which should not be sanctioned.
Issue:
Whether or not the association can lawfully collect dues
Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It held that the purchasers of a registered land are
bound by the annotations found at the back of the certificate of title covering the subject parcel of land. The
petitioners contention that he has no privity with the respondent association is not persuasive. When the
petitioner voluntarily bought the subject parcel of land it was understood that he took the same free of all
ecumbrances except annotations at the back of the certificate of title, among them, that he automatically
becomes a member of the respondent association. One of the obligations of a member is to pay certain amounts
for the operation and activities of the association.
The mode of payment as well as the purposes for which the dues are intended clearly indicates that the dues are
not in the concept of a property tax as claimed by the petitioner. They are shares in the common expenses for
necessary services. A property tax is assessed according to the value of the property but the basis of the sharing
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Copy of Rae Gammad
in this case is the area of the lot. The dues are fees which a member of the respondent association is required in
hiring security guards, cleaning and maintaining streets, street lights and other community projects for the
benefit of all residents within the Bel-Air Village. These expenses are necessary, valid and reasonable for the
particular community involved.
The limitations upon the ownership of the petitioner do not contravene provisions of laws, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy. The constitutional proscription than no person can be compelled to be a
member of an association against his will applies only to governmental acts and not to private transactions like
the one in question.
The petitioner cannot legally maintain that he is compelled to be a member of the association against his will
because the limitation is imposed upon his ownership of property. If he does not desire to comply with the
annotation or lien in question, he can at any time exercise his inviolable freedom of disposing of the property and
free himself from the burden of becoming a member of the association.
10. Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) V. Secretary of Labor
Facts:
The Registrar of Labor Relations rendered a decision cancelling the SSSEAs Registration Certificate due to
its failure to submit reports of finances, names, postal addresses and non-subversive affidavits of its officers despite
postponements and extensions of the period to appear and submit the aforementioned documents. Petitioners now
assails the proceedings conducted and the decision of the Registrar alleging that Section 23 of Republic Act No.
875 violates their freedom of assembly and association; that respondents have acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in promulgating beyond the 30-day period provided in Section 23(c)
of Republic Act No. 875.
Issues:
1. Does Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875 violate their freedom of assembly and association by requiring
the submission of certain documents?
2. Did the Registrar act without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating beyond the 30-day period provided in Section 23(c) of Republic Act No. 875?
Laws Applicable:
Section 23(b) of Republic Act No. 875:
Any labor organization, association or union of workers duly organized for the material,
intellectual and moral wellbeing of its members shall acquire legal personality and be
entitled to all the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations
within thirty days of filing with the office of the Secretary of Labor notice of its due
organization and existence and the following documents, together with the amount of five
pesos as registration fee, except as provided in paragraph d of this section:
11.
A copy of the constitution and by-laws of the organization together with a list of all officers
of the association, their addresses and the address of the principal office of the organization;
12.
A sworn statement of all officers of the said organization, association or union to the effect
that they are not members of the Communist Party and that they are not members of any
organizations which teaches the overthrow of the Government by force or by any illegal or
unconstitutional method; and
13.
If the applicant organization has been in existence for one or more years, a copy of its last
annual financial report.
Section 23(c) of Republic Act No. 875:
If in the opinion of the Department of Labor the applicant organization does not appear to
meet the requirements of this Act for registration, the Department shall, after ten days
notice to the applicant organization, association or union, and within thirty days of receipt
of the abovementioned documents, hold a public hearing in the province in which the
principal office of the applicant is located at which the applicant organization shall have the
right to be represented by attorney and to cross-examine witnesses; and such hearing shall
be concluded and a decision announced by the Department within thirty days after the
announcement of said hearing; and if after due hearing the Department rules against
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Copy of Rae Gammad
registration of the applicant, it shall be required that the Department of Labor state
specifically what data the applicant has failed to submit as a prerequisite of registration. If
the applicant is still denied, it thereafter shall have the right within sixty days of formal
denial of registration to appeal to the Court of Appeals, which shall render a decision within
thirty days, or to the Supreme Court.
Ruling:
The theory to the effect that Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875 unduly curtails the freedom of assembly
and association guaranteed in the Bill of Rights is devoid of factual basis. The registration prescribed in paragraph
(b) of said section is not a limitation to the right of assembly or association, which may be exercised with or
without said registration. The latter is merely a condition sine qua non for the acquisition of legal personality by
labor organizations, associations or unions and the possession of the "rights and privileges granted by law to
legitimate labor organizations". The Constitution does not guarantee these rights and privileges, much less said
personality, which are mere statutory creations, for the possession and exercise of which registration is required to
protect both labor and the public against abuses, fraud, or impostors who pose as organizers, although not truly
accredited agents of the union they purport to represent. Again, the 30-day period invoked by the petitioners is
inapplicable to the decision complained of. Said period is prescribed in paragraph (c) of Section 23, which refers to
the proceedings for the "registration" of labor organizations, associations or unions not to the "cancellation" of said
registration, which is governed by the above quoted paragraph (d) of the same section.
Opinion:
The enumeration of requirements provided in Section 23 of RA 875 is for the labor organization to acquire
legal personality and be recognized as the legitimate labor organization of a certain business or company. It is a
valid exercise of the police power because the activities in which labor organizations, associations and union of
workers are engaged affect public interest, which should be protected. Furthermore, the obligation to submit
financial statements, as a condition for the non-cancellation of a certificate of registration, is a reasonable regulation
for the benefit of the members of the organization, considering that the same generally solicits funds or
membership, as well as oftentimes collects, on behalf of its members, huge amounts of money due to them or to the
organization.
14. People V. Ferrer

Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of
1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co
for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of
contempt and insult to public officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo
Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow
the Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The
trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by
pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of
organizational guilt by being members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness.
The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act tooutlaw the CPP and similar associations
penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being although a
political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence
but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the
security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is
punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made
prior to filing of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section 7
provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the
renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of
the statute and its valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and association.
ELS: CONSTI2
Issues:
Copy of Rae Gammad
(1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law.

(2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression
Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957.
A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of
judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of
attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute
is applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.)
In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to
other organizations having the same purpose and their successors. The Acts focus is on the conduct not person.
Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that membership was acquired with the
intent to further the goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the element of MEMBERSHIP with
KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required proof of a members direct participation. Why is membership
punished. Membership renders aid and encouragement to the organization. Membership makes himself party to
its
unlawful
acts.
Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after approval of the act.
The members of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is given an opportunity to escape
liability by renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis
mutandis or that the necessary changes having been made.
The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine Government should not
be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL
justifies the limitation to the exercise of Freedom of Expression and Association in this matter. Before the
enactment of the statute and statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The
court further stresses that whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is excluded in the prohibition
of membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY.
The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition to proving
circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the following elements must also be established:
1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the organization purpose is to overthrow the
present Government of the Philippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN POWER. Membership is willfully
and knowingly done by overt acts.
2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose. Membership is willfully and knowingly done
by overt acts.
The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The Supreme Court set aside
the resolution of the TRIAL COURT.
SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
CALTEX FILIPINO MANAGERS AND
SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION,
Petitioner,
-versus-
G.R. Nos. L-30632-33

April 11, 1972
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., W. E.
MENEFEE and B. R. EDWARDS,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VILLAMOR, J.:
This is an Appeal by the Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors
Association from the resolution en banc dated May 16, 1969 of the
Court of Industrial Relations affirming the decision dated February
26, 1969 of Associate Judge Emiliano G. Tabigne, Associate Judge
Ansberto P. Paredes dissented from the resolution of the majority on
the ground that the Industrial Court in a representation case cannot
take cognizance of the issue of illegality of a strike and proceed to
declare the loss of the employee status of employees inasmuch as that
matter ought to be processed as an unfair labor practice case. Judge
Tabignes decision covers two cases, namely, Case No. 1484-MC(1) in
which he declared the strike staged on April 22, 1965 by the

Association as illegal with the consequent forfeiture of the employee
status of three employees (Jose J. Mapa, President of the Association;
Dominador Mangalino, Vice-President; and Herminigildo Mandanas)
and Case No. 4344-ULP filed against Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Ben F.
Edwards and W.E. Menefee which Judge Tabigne dismissed for lack
of merit and substantial evidence.
chanroblespublishingcompany
The following proceedings gave rise to the present appeal:

The Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors Association is a
labor organization of Filipino managers and supervisors in
Caltex (Philippines), Inc., respondent Company in this
proceeding. After the Association was registered as a labor
organization it sent a letter to the Company on January 21, 1965
informing the latter of the formers registration; the Company
replied inquiring on the position titles of the employees which
the Association sought to represent. On February 8, 1965 the
Association sent a set of proposals to the Company wherein one
of the demands was the recognition of the Association as the
duly authorized bargaining agency for managers and
supervisors in the Company. To this the Company countered
stating that a distinction exists between representatives of
management and individuals employed as supervisors and that
it is the Companys belief that managerial employees are not
qualified for membership in a labor organization; hence, it
suggested that the Association institute a certification
proceeding so as to remove any question with regard to position
titles that should be included in the bargaining unit. The
Association felt disinclined to follow the suggestion of the
Company[1] and so on February 22, 1965 the Company initiated
a certification proceeding docketed as Case No. 1484-MC.
On March 8, 1965 the Association filed notice to strike giving the

following reasons:
Refusal to bargain in good faith and to act on demands, a copy
of which is enclosed; resort to union-busting tactics in order to
discourage the activities of the undersigned association and its
members, including discrimination and intimidation of officers
and members of the association and circulation of promises of

immediate benefits to be given by the company to its
employees, officers and members of this association or those
intending to join the same, if the employees concerned in due
course will vote against the selection of this association as the
exclusive collective bargaining unit for managers and
supervisors of the Company in the petition for certification the
latter filed. (Annex A of Annex A, Petition).
On March 29, 1965, during the hearing of the certification

proceedings, Judge Tabigne cautioned the parties to maintain the
status quo; he specifically advised the employees not to go on strike,
making it clear, however, that in the presence of unfair labor practices
they could go on strike even without any notice.[2]
On the basis of the strike notice filed on March 8, 1965 and in view of
acts committed by the Company which the Association considered as
constituting unfair labor practice, the Association struck on April 22,
1965, after the efforts exerted by the Bureau of Labor Relations to
settle the differences between the parties failed. Then, through an
Urgent Petition dated April 26, 1965 filed as Case No 1484-MC(1),
or as an incident of the certification election proceedings (Case No.
1484-MC), the Company prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays this Honorable

Court that:
1. The strike of respondent Caltex Filipino Managers and
Supervisors Association be declared illegal;
2. The officers and members of respondent association

who have instigated, declared, encouraged and/or
participated in the illegal strike be held and punished
for contempt of this Honorable Court and be declared
to have lost their employee status;
3. Pending hearing on the merits and upon the filing of a

bond in an amount to be fixed by this Honorable Court,
a temporary injunction be issued restraining
respondent association, its officers, members and
representatives acting for and on their behalf from

committing, causing or directing the commission of the
unlawful acts complained of, particularly obstructing
and preventing petitioner, its customers, officers and
non-striking employees from entering and going out of
its various offices, in its refinery, installations, depots
and terminals and the use or threat of violence and
intimidation;
4. After trial, said injunction be made permanent; and

5. The damages that petitioner has suffered and will
suffer up to the trial of this action be ascertained and
judgment be rendered against respondent association,
its officers, members and representatives jointly and
severally for the amount thereof.
Petitioner prays for such other and further relief as this
Honorable Court may deem just and equitable in the
premises. (Annex D, Petition)
Such urgent petition was frontally met by the Association with a

motion to dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of the industrial court.
The motion to dismiss was opposed by the Company and on May 17,
1965 the trial court denied the same. Not satisfied with the order of
May 17, 1965, the Association moved for its reconsideration before
respondent court en banc.
Because of the settlement between the parties on May 30, 1965 of
some of their disputes, the Association filed with respondent court
under date of June 3, 1965 a manifestation (to which was attached a
copy of the return-to-work agreement signed by the parties on May
30, 1965), to the effect that the issues in Case No. 1484-MC(1) had
become moot and academic. Under date of June 15, 1965 the
Company filed a counter-manifestation disputing the representations
of the Association on the effect of the return-to-work agreement. On
the basis of the manifestation and counter-manifestation, respondent
court en banc issued a resolution on August 24, 1965 allowing the
withdrawal of the Associations motion for reconsideration against
the order of May 17, 1965, on the theory that there was justification
for such withdrawal.
Relative to the resolution of August 24, 1965 the Company filed a

motion for clarification which the Association opposed on September
22, 1965, for it contended that such motion was in reality a motion for
reconsideration and as such filed out of time. But respondent court
brushed aside the Associations opposition and proceeded to clarify
the resolution of August 24, 1965 to mean that the Company was not
barred from continuing with Case No. 1484-MC(1).
At the hearing on September 1, 1965 of Case No. 1484-MC(1) the

Association insisted that the incident had become moot and academic
and must be considered dismissed and, at the same time, it offered to
present evidence, if still necessary, in order to support its contention.
Respondent court thereupon decided to secure evidence from the
parties to enlighten it on the interpretation of the provisions of the
return-to-work agreement relied upon by the Association as
rendering the issues raised in Case No. 1484-MC(1) already moot and
academic. Evidence having been received, the trial court ruled in its
order of February 15, 1966 that under the return-to-work agreement
the Company had reserved its rights to prosecute Case No. 1484MC(1) and, accordingly, directed that the case be set for hearing
covering the alleged illegality of the strike. Within the prescribed
period the Association filed a motion for reconsideration of the
February 15, 1966 order to which motion the Company filed its
opposition and, in due course, respondent court en banc issued its
resolution dated March 28, 1966 affirming the order. Appeal from the
interlocutory order was elevated by the Association to this Court in
G.R. No. L-25955, but the corresponding petition for review was
summarily DISMISSED for being premature under this Courts
resolution of May 13, 1966.
After a protracted preliminary investigation, the Associations charge

for unfair labor practices against the Company and its officials
docketed in a separate proceeding was given due course through the
filing by the prosecution division of respondent court of the
corresponding complaint dated September 10, 1965, in Case No.
4344-ULP against Caltex (Philippines), Inc., W. E. Menefee and B.F.
Edwards. As noted by respondent court in its decision under review,
Case No. 4344-ULP was filed by the Association because, according to

the latter, the Company and some of its officials, including B.F.
Edwards, inquired into the organization of the Association and he
manifested his antagonism to it and its President; that another
Company official, W.E. Menefee, issued a statement of policy
designed to discourage employees and supervisors from joining labor
organizations; that the Company refused to bargain although the
Association commands majority representation; that due to the steps
taken by the Company to destroy the Association or discourage its
members from continuing their union membership, the Association
was forced to file a strike notice; that on April 22, 1965 it declared a
strike; and that during the strike the Company and its officers
continued their efforts to weaken the Association as well as its picket
lines. The Company in its answer filed with respondent court denied
the charges of unfair labor practice.
Considering the interrelation of the issues involved in the two cases

and by agreement of the parties, the two cases were heard jointly.
This explains why only one decision was rendered by respondent
court covering both Case No. 1484-MC(1), relating to the illegality of
the strike as contended by the Company, and Case No. 4344-ULP,
referring to the unfair labor practice case filed by the Association
against the Company, W. E. Menefee and B. F. Edwards.
The Association assigned the following errors allegedly committed by

respondent court:
I
RESPONDENT
COURT
ERRED
IN
JURISDICTION OVER CASE NO. 1484-MC(1).
ASSUMING
II
ASSUMING
THAT
RESPONDENT
COURT
HAS
JURISDICTION OVER CASE NO. 1484-MC(1), IT ERRED IN
NOT HOLDING THAT THE SAME ALREADY BECAME MOOT
WITH THE SIGNING OF THE RETURN TO WORK
AGREEMENT ON MAY 30, 1965.
III
ASSUMING LIKEWISE THAT RESPONDENT COURT HAS
JURISDICTION OVER CASE NO, 1484-MC(1) IT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT CAFIMSAS STRIKE WAS STAGED FOR NO
OTHER REASON THAN TO COERCE THE COMPANY INTO
RECOGNIZING THE CAFIMSA AND THAT SUCH STRIKE
WAS UNJUSTIFIED, UNLAWFUL AND UNWARRANTED.
IV
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURTS CONCLUSION THAT CAFIMSAS STRIKE WAS
DECLARED IN OPEN DEFIANCE OF THE MARCH 29, 1965
ORDER IN CERTIFICATION CASE NO. 1484-MC.
V
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURTS
FINDING,
DESPITE
THE
SUBSTANTIAL
CONTRARY EVIDENCE ON RECORD THAT THE STRIKERS
RESORTED TO MEANS BEYOND THE PALE OF THE LAW IN
THE PROSECUTION OF THE STRIKE AND IN
DISREGARDING THE CONSIDERATION THAT THE
STRIKERS MERELY EMPLOYED LAWFUL ACTS OF SELFPRESERVATION AND SELF-DEFENSE.
VI
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
DISMISSAL BY THE TRIAL COURT OF J.J. MAPA,
CAFIMSAS PRESIDENT, AND OTHERS, OR IN OTHERWISE
PENALIZING THE STRIKERS.
VII
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE FACTS FOUND BY THE
TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE ACCEPTED, IN DISREGARD OF
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE COMPANY
DAMAGING TO ITS CAUSE, OR ALTHOUGH THE TRIAL
COURT
DISREGARDED
THE
SUBSTANTIAL
INCRIMINATORY EVIDENCE AGAINST THE COMPANY,
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE
PRINCIPLE OF IN PARI DELICTO.
VIII
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD THAT
THE COMPANY IS BARRED UNDER SECTION 9(e) OF THE
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 875 FROM SEEKING THE RELIEF
PRAYED FOR IN CASE NO. 1484-MC(1).
IX
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY ABSOLVING
THE COMPANY FROM THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
CHARGE AND IN DISREGARDING THE SUBSTANTIAL
INCRIMINATORY
EVIDENCE
RELATIVE
THERETO
AGAINST THE COMPANY.
X
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT
FOR THE CAFIMSA IN CASE NO. 4344-ULP AND IN NOT
ORDERING THE COMPANY TO PAY BACK WAGES AND
ATTORNEYS FEES.
XI
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN PREMATURELY
IMPLEMENTING THE TRIAL COURTS DISMISSAL OF J.J.
MAPA AND DOMINADOR MANGALINO. (Brief for the
Petitioner, pp. 1-4).
To our mind the issues raised in this appeal may be narrowed down
to the following:
1. Whether or not the Court of Industrial Relations has
jurisdiction over Case No. 1484-MC(1);
2. Whether or not the strike staged by the Association on April

22, 1965 is illegal and, incident thereto, whether respondent
court correctly terminated the employee status of Jose Mapa,
Dominador Mangalino and Herminigildo Mandanas and
reprimanded and admonished the other officers of the
Association; and
3. Whether or not respondent court correctly absolved the

respondents in Case No. 4344-ULP from the unfair labor
practice charge.
Respondents courts jurisdiction over Case No. 1484-MC(1) has to be

tested by the allegations of the Urgent Petition dated April 26, 1965
filed by the Company in relation to the applicable provisions of law. A
reading of said pleading shows that the same is for injunctive relief
under Section 9(d) of Republic Act No. 875 (Magna Charta of Labor);
for contempt, obviously pursuant to Sec. 6 of Commonwealth Act No.
103 in conjunction with Sec. 3(b) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court; and
for forfeiture of the employee status of the strikers by virtue of their
participation in what the Company considered as an illegal strike.
It is well known that the scheme in Republic Act No. 875 for achieving
industrial peace rests essentially on a free and private agreement
between the employer and his employees as to the terms and
conditions under which the employer is to give work and the
employees are to furnish labor, unhampered as far as possible by
judicial or administrative intervention. On this premise the
lawmaking body has virtually prohibited the issuance of injunctive
relief involving or growing out of labor disputes.
The prohibition to issue labor injunctions is designed to give labor a
comparable bargaining power with capital and must be liberally
construed to that end (U.S. vs. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,
79 F. Supp. 485, Certiorari denied, 69 S. Ct. 137, 335 U.S. 867, cause
remanded on other grounds, 174 F. 2nd 160, 85 U.S. App. D.C.,
certiorari denied 70 S. Ct. 140, 338 U.S. 872, 94 L. Ed. 535). It is said
that the prohibition creates substantive and not purely procedural
law. (Oregon Shipbuilding Corporation vs. National Labor Relations
Board, 49 F. Supp. 386). Within the purview of our ruling, speaking
through Justice Labrador, in Social Security Employees Association
(PAFLU), et al. vs. The Hon. Edilberto Soriano, et al. (G.R. No. L20100, July 16, 1964, 11 SCRA 518, 520), there can be no injunction
issued against any strike except in only one instance, that is, when a
labor dispute arises in an industry indispensable to the national
interest and such dispute is certified by the President of the
Philippines to the Court of Industrial Relations in compliance with
Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 875. As a corollary to this, an injunction in
an uncertified case must be based on the strict requirements of Sec.
9(d) of Republic Act No. 875; the purpose of such an injunction is not
to enjoin the strike itself, but only unlawful activities. To the extent,
then, that the Company sought injunctive relief under Sec. 9(d) of
Republic Act No. 875, respondent court had jurisdiction over the
Companys Urgent Petition dated April 26, 1965.
As to the contempt aspect of Case No. 1484-MC(1), the jurisdiction
of respondent court over it cannot be seriously questioned it
appearing that Judge Tabigne in good faith thought that his advice
to the Association during the hearing on March 29, 1965 not to strike
amounted to a valid order. This is not to say, however that respondent
court did not err in finding that the advice given by Judge Tabigne
during the hearing on March 29, 1965 really constituted an order
which can be the basis of a contempt proceeding. For, in our opinion,
what Judge Tabigne stated during said hearing should be construed
what actually it was an advice. To say that it was an order would be
to concede that respondent court could validly enjoin a strike,
especially one which is not certified in accordance with Sec. 10 of
Republic Act No. 875. To adopt the view of respondent court would
not only set at naught the policy of the law as embodied in the said
statute against issuance of injunctions, but also remove from the
hands of labor unions and aggrieved employees an effective lawful
weapon to either secure favorable action on their economic demands
or to stop unfair labor practices on the part of their employer.
With respect to the alleged illegality of the strike, as claimed by the

Company, and the consequent forfeiture of the employee status of the
strikers, we believe these are matters which are neither pertinent to
nor connected with a certification case as opined by Judge Paredes, to
which we agree. Respondent court, therefore, initially erred in
entertaining this issue in Case No. 1484-MC(1). No prejudice,
however, has resulted since, as correctly pointed out by respondent
court, the illegality for the strike was squarely raised by the Company
as a defense in Case No. 4344-ULP and, in any event, we observe that
the Association was given all the opportunity to put forward its
evidence.
We now come to the important issue as to whether the strike staged

by the Association on April 22, 1965 is illegal. From an examination of
the records, we believe that the lower court erred in its findings in this
regard.
To begin with, we view the return-to-work agreement of May 30, 1965

as in the nature of a partial compromise between the parties and,
more important, a labor contract; consequently, in the latter aspect
the same must yield to the common good (Art. 1700, Civil Code of
the Philippines) and (I)n case of doubt shall be construed in favor of
the safety and decent living for the laborer (Art. 1702, ibid). To our
mind when the Company unqualifiedly bound itself in the return-towork agreement that all employees will be taken back with the same
employee status prior to April 22, 1965, the Company thereby made
manifest its intention and conformity not to proceed with Case No.
1484-MC(c) relating the illegality of the strike incident. For while it is
true that there is a reservation in the return-to-work agreement as
follows:
6. The parties agree that all Court cases now pending shall
continue, including CIR Case No. 1484-MC.
we think the same is to be construed bearing in mind the conduct and
intention of the parties. The failure to mention Case No. 1484-MC (1)
while specifically mentioning Case No. 1484-MC, in our opinion, bars
the Company from proceeding with the former especially in the light
of the additional specific stipulation that the strikers would be taken
back with the same employee status prior to the strike on April 22,
1965. The records disclose further that, according to Atty. Domingo E.
de Lara when he testified on October 9, 1965, and this is not seriously
disputed by private respondents, the purpose of Paragraph 10 of the
return-to-work agreement was, to quote in part from this witness, to
secure the tenure of employees after the return-to-work agreement
considering that as I understand there were demotions and
suspensions of one or two employees during the strike and, moreover,
there was this incident Case No. 1484-MC(1) (see Brief for the
Petitioner, pp. 41-42). To borrow the language of Justice J.B.L. Reyes
in Citizens Labor Union Pandacan Chapter vs. Standard Vacuum Oil
Company (G.R. No. L-7478, May 6, 1955), in so far as the illegality of
the strike is concerned in this proceeding and in the light of the
records.
The matter had become moot. The parties had both abandoned
their original positions and come to a virtual compromise and
agreed to resume unconditionally their former relations. To
proceed with the declaration of illegality would not only breach
this understanding, freely arrived at, but to unnecessarily revive
animosities to the prejudice of industrial peace. (Italics
supplied)
Conceding arguendo that the illegality incident had not become moot
and academic, we find ourselves unable to agree with respondent
court to the effect that the strike staged by the Association on April
22, 1965 was unjustified, unreasonable and unwarranted that it was
declared in open defiance of an older in Case No. 1484-MC not to
strike; and that the Association resorted to means beyond the pale of
the law in the prosecution of the strike. As adverted to above, the
Association filed its notice to strike on March 8, 1965, giving reasons
therefor any one of which is a valid ground for a strike.
In addition, from the voluminous evidence presented by the

Association, it is clear that the strike of the Association was declared
not lust for the purpose of gaining recognition as concluded by
respondent court, but also for bargaining in bad faith on the part of
the Company and by reason of unfair labor practices committed by its
officials. But even if the strike were really declared for the purpose of
recognition, the concerted activities of the officers and members of
the Association in this regard cannot be said to be unlawful nor the
purpose thereof be regarded as trivial. Significantly, in the voluntary
return-to-work agreement entered into between the Company and the
Association, thereby ending the strike, the Company agreed to
recognize for membership in the Association the position titles
mentioned in Annex B of said agreement.[3] This goes to show that
striking for recognition is productive of good result in so far as a
union is concerned.
Besides, one of the important rights recognized by the Magna Charta

of Labor is the right to self-organization and we do not hesitate to say
that is the cornerstone of this monumental piece of labor legislation.
Indeed, because of occasional delays incident to a certification
proceeding usually attributable to dilatory tactics employed by the
employer, to a certain extent a union may be justified in resorting to a
strike. We should not be understood here as advocating a strike in
order to secure recognition of a union by the employer. On the whole
we are satisfied from the records that it is incorrect to say that the
strike of the Association was mainly for the purpose of securing
recognition as a bargaining agent.
As will be discussed hereinbelow, the charge of unfair labor practice

against the Company is well-taken. It is, therefore, clear error on the
part of the Association is unjust, unreasonable and unwarranted.
We said earlier that the advice of Judge Tabigne to maintain the
status quo cannot be considered as a lawful order within the
contemplation of the Magna Charta of Labor, particularly Section 10
thereof; to so regard it as an order would be to grant respondent court
authority to forbid a strike in an uncertified case which it is not
empowered to do. The fact that the strike was not staged until April
22, 1965 is eloquent proof enough of the desire of the Association and
its officers and members to respect the advice of Judge Tabigne.
However, as shown in this case during the pendency of the
certification proceedings unfair labor practices were committed by
the Company; hence, the Association was justified in staging a strike
and certainly this is not in violation of the advice of Judge Tabigne on
March 29, 1965.
Respondent court picked out a number of incidents. taking place

during the strike, to support its conclusion that the strikers resulted
to means beyond the pale of the law in the prosecution of a strike.
Thus, it made mention on the blocking by a banca manned by two
striking supervisors by the name of Dominador Mangalino and one
Bonecillo of the Caltex M/V Estrella when it was about to depart; the
blocking at the refinery of the Company in Bauan, Batangas of the
LSCO WARA, the Hills Bros Pinatubo, and the Mobil Visayas so that
they could not dock; the blocking by the strikers of incoming vehicles,
non-striking supervisors, and rank-and-file workers to prevent them

from entering the refinery gate in Bauan, Batangas, at the Poro
Terminal, at the Companys Padre Faura office in Manila, and at the
Pandacan Terminal; that at the Legaspi and Mambulao Bulk Depots
the striking supervisors refused to surrender to their superiors the
keys to the depots and storage tanks; and that also at the Legaspi
Depot the truck ignition keys were mixed up or thrown at the seats of
the trucks in violation of the Company regulations in order to create
confusion and thus prevent the trucks from being used.[4] To refute
these and similar findings of respondent court the Association,
drawing chief y and abundantly from the Companys own evidence,[5]
called attention to the exculpatory declarations of the Companys own
witnesses[6] either establishing or tending to establish that the
picketing by the strikers was generally peaceful and orderly. We find
that such, indeed, was the real situation during the strike and it would
be the height of injustice to rule otherwise in the face of the records
before us.
In ignoring strong evidence coming from the witnesses of the

Company damaging to its case as well as that adduced by the
Association also damaging to the Companys case, we believe that
respondent court clearly and gravely abused its discretion thereby
justifying us to review or alter its factual findings (see Philippine
Educational Institution vs. MLQSEA Faculty Association, 26 SCRA
272. 278).[7] There is thus here, to employ the language of Justice
J.B.L. Reyes in Lakas ng Pagkakaisa sa Peter Paul vs. Court of
Industrial Relations, 96 Phil., 63, an infringement of cardinal
primary rights of petitioner, and justified the interposition of the
corrective powers of this Court (Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial
Relations and National Labor Union, 69 Phil., 635):
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to

present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the
rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan vs. U.S.,
298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 Law Ed. 1288.) In the language
of this Court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, the right to
adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of
the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously
futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is
presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration.

(Ibid., p. 67)[8]
We are convinced from the records that on the whole the means
employed by the strikers during the strike, taking into account the
activities of the Company and the non-striking employees on the
same occasion, cannot be labeled as unlawful; in other words, the
Company itself through the provocative, if not unlawful, acts of the
non-striking employees[9] is not entirely blameless for the isolated
incidents relied upon by respondent court as tainting the picketing of
the strikers with illegality. As we said through Justice Fernando in
Shell Oil Workers Union vs. Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd.,
L-28607, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 276:
6. Respondent court was likewise impelled to consider the

strike illegal because of the violence that attended it. What is
clearly within the law is the concerted activity of cessation of
work in order that a unions economic demands may be granted
or that an employer cease and desist from the unfair labor
practice. That the law recognizes as a right. There is though a
disapproval of the utilization of force to attain such an objective.
For implicit in the very concept of a legal order is the
maintenance of peaceful ways. A strike otherwise valid, if
violent, in character, may be placed beyond the pale. Care is to
be taken, however, especially where an unfair labor practice is
involved, to avoid stamping it with illegality just because it is
tainted by such acts. To avoid rendering illusory the recognition
of the right to strike, responsibility in such a case should be
individual and not collective. A different conclusion would be
called for, of course, if the existence of force while the strike
lasts is pervasive and widespread, consistently and deliberately
resorted to as a matter of policy. It could be reasonably
concluded then that even if justified as to end, it becomes illegal
because of the means employed. (Ibid., p. 292; Italics
supplied).
In the same case we further observed:

Barely four months ago. in Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd.
Employees Association vs. Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd.,
there is the recognition by this Court, speaking through Justice

Castro, of picketing as such being inherently explosive. It is thus
clear that not every form of violence suffices to affix the seal of
illegality on a strike or to cause the loss of employment of the
guilty party. (Ibid., pp. 293-294; italics supplied)
In the cited case of Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees

Association-NATO, FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees
Association-NATU and Insular Life Building Employees AssociationNATU vs. The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., FGU Insurance
Group, et al., L-25291, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 244, we held
through Justice Castro, and this is here applicable to the contention
of the Association, as follows:
Besides, under the circumstances the picketers were not legally

bound to yield their grounds and withdraw from the picket
lines. Being where the law expects them to be in the legitimate
exercise of their rights, they had every reason to defend
themselves and their rights from any assault or unlawful
transgression. (Ibid., p. 271)
In this cited case, by the way, we reversed and set aside the decision
of the Court of Industrial Relations and ordered the Company to
reinstate the dismissed workers with backwages.
Let us now examine the charge of unfair labor practice which

respondent court dismissed for lack of merit and substantial
evidence.
Under Sec. 14(c) of Republic Act No. 875, the parties themselves are
required to participate fully and promptly in such meetings and
conferences as the (Conciliation) Service may undertake. In this
case, the parties agreed to meet on April 21, 1965 and yet,
notwithstanding this definite agreement, the Company sent no
representatives. The Companys claim to bargaining in good faith
cannot be given credence in the face of the fact that W.E. Menefee,
the Companys Managing Director, conveniently left Manila for Davao
on April 17 or 18, 1965, as admitted by W.E. Wilmarth.[10]
Nowhere is there serious claim on the part of the Company that it

entertains real doubt as to the majority representation of the
Association. Consider further that admittedly the certification
election proceeding for the Cebu Supervisors Union in the Company
had been pending for six (6) years already. From all appearances,
therefore, and bearing in mind the deliberate failure of the Company
to attend the conciliation meetings on April 19 and 21, 1965, it is clear
that the Company employed dilatory tactics doubtless to discredit
CAFIMSA before the eyes of its own members and prospective
members as an effective bargaining agent, postpone eventual
recognition of the Association, and frustrate its efforts towards
securing favorable action on its economic demands.
It is likewise not disputed that on March 4, 1965, the Company issued

its statement of policy (Exh. B). At that time the Association was
seeking recognition as bargaining agent and has presented economic
demands for the improvement of the terms and conditions of
employment of supervisors. The statement of policy conveyed in
unequivocal terms to all employees the following message:
We sincerely believe that good employee relations can be

maintained and essential employee needs fulfilled through
sound management administration without the necessity of
employee organization and representations. We respect an
employees right to present his grievances, regardless of
whether or not he is represented by a labor organization.
(Italics supplied)
An employee reading the foregoing would at once gain the impression

that there was no need to join the Association. For he is free to
present his grievances regardless of whether or not he is represented
by a labor organization.
The guilty conduct of the Company before, during and after the strike
of April 22, 1965 cannot escape the Courts attention. It will suffice to
mention typical instances by way of illustration. Long prior to the
strike, the Company had interfered with the Cebu Supervisors Union
by enticing Mapa into leaving the Union under the guise of a
promotion in Manila; shortly before the strike, B. R. Edwards,
Manager-Operations, had inquired into the formation and
organization of the petitioner Association in this case. During the

strike, in addition to the culpable acts of the Company already
narrated above, due significance must be given to the inclusion
initially of J. J. Mapa and A. Buenaventura, the Associations
President and Vice-President, respectively, in 1965, in two coercion
cases filed at that time and their subsequent elimination from the
charges at the initiative of the Company after the settlement of the
strike;[11] the cutting off of telephone facilities extended to Association
members in the refinery; and the use of a member of the Association
to spy for the company.[12] The discriminatory acts practiced by the
Company against active unionists after the strike furnish further
evidence that the Company committed unfair labor practices as
charged.[13] Victims of discrimination are J. J. Mapa, A. E.
Buenaventura, E. F. Grey, Eulogio Manaay,[14] Pete Beltran, Jose
Dizon, Cipriano Cruz, F. S. Miranda and many others. The
discrimination consisted in the Companys preferring non-members
of the Association in promotions to higher positions and humiliating
active unionists by either promoting junior supervisors over them or
by reduction of their authority compared to that assigned to them
before the strike, or otherwise downgrading their positions.[15]
Then, effective July 1, 1969, the Company terminated the

employment of J. J. Mapa and Dominador Mangalino, President and
Vice-President, respectively, of the Association at that time, And this
the Company did not hesitate to do notwithstanding the Associations
seasonable appeal from respondent courts decision. We perceive in
this particular action of the Company its anti-union posture and
attitude. In this connection, we find merit in the claim of petitioner
that the dismissal of Mapa and Mangalino was premature considering
that respondent court did not expressly provide that such dismissal
might be effected immediately despite the pendency of the appeal
timely taken by the Association. The situation would have been
different had respondent court ordered the dismissal of Mapa and
Mangalino immediately. As the decision is silent on this matter the
dismissal of said officers of the Association ought to have been done
only upon the finality of the judgment. Because appeal was timely
taken, the Companys action is patently premature and is furthermore
evidence of its desire to punish said active unionists.
Verily, substantial, credible and convincing evidence appear on

record establishing beyond doubt the charge of unfair labor practices
in violation of Sec. 4 (a), Nos. (1), (3), 1(4), (5) and (6), of Republic
Act No. 875. And pursuant to the mandate of Art. 24 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines that courts must be vigilant for the protection of
one at a disadvantage and here the Association appears to be at a
disadvantage in its relations with the Company as the records show
adequate affirmative relief, including backwages, must be awarded to
the strikers. It is high-time and imperative that in order to attain the
laudable objectives of Republic Act 875 calculated to safeguard the
rights of employees, the provisions thereof should be liberally
construed in favor of employees and strictly against the employer,
unless otherwise intended by or patent from the language of the
statute itself.
The Court takes judicial notice of the considerable efforts exerted by

both parties in the prosecution of their respective cases and the
incidents thereof both before the lower court and this Court since
1965 to date. Under the circumstances and in conformity with Art.
2208, No. 11, of the Civil Code of the Philippines, it is but just, fair
and equitable that the Association be permitted to recover attorneys
fees as claimed in its tenth assignment of error.
WHEREFORE, respondent courts resolution en banc dated May 16,

1969, together with the decision dated February 26, 1969, is reversed
and judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Case No. 1484-MC(1), the Court declares the strike of the

Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors Association as
legal in all respects and, consequently, the forfeiture of the
employee status of J. J. Mapa, Dominador Mangalino and
Herminigildo Mandanas is set aside. The Company is hereby
ordered to reinstate J. J. Mapa and Dominador Mangalino to
their former positions without loss of seniority and
privileges, with backwages from the time of their dismissal
on July 1, 1969. Since Herminigildo Mandanas appears to
have voluntarily left the Company, no reinstatement is
ordered as to him.
2. In Case No. 4344-ULP, the Court finds the Company, B. F.

Edwards and W. E. Menefee guilty of unfair labor practices
and they are therefore ordered to cease and desist from the
same. In this connection, the Company is furthermore
directed to pay backwages to the striking employees from
April 22, 1965 to May 30, 1965 and to pay attorneys fees
which are hereby fixed at P20,000.00.
Costs against private respondents.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
[1] Based apparently on the apprehension of the Association that such a

proceeding might turn out to be protracted like the certification proceeding
for the Cebu Supervisors Union in the Company initiated in 1962 but still
pending as of May 29, 1968 and no collective bargaining agreement had been
signed as of the latter date, as admitted by R. E. Wilmarth, the Companys
labor relations manager (see Brief for the Petitioner, p. 68).
[2] See Brief for Respondents, pp. 211-212; Brief for the Petitioner, pp. 5-7.
[3] The stipulation reads thus:
CAFIMSA members holding the following Supervisory Payroll Position
Title are Recognized by the Company.
Payroll Position Title
Assistant to Mgr. National Acct. Sales
Jr. Sales Engineer
Retail Development Asst.
Staff Asst. O Marketing
Sales Supervisor
Supervisory Assistant
Jr. Supervisory Assistant
Credit Assistant
Lab. Supvr. Pandacan
Jr. Sales Engineer B
Operations Assistant B
Field Engineer
Sr. Opers. Supvr. MIA A/S
Purchasing Assistant
Jr. Construction Engineer
St. Sales Supervisor
Depot Supervisor A
Terminal Accountant B
Merchandiser
Dist. Sales Prom. Supvr.

Instr. Merchandising
Asst. Dist. Accountant B
Sr. Opers. Supervisor
Jr. Sales Engineer A
Asst. Bulk Ter. Supt.
Sr. Opers. Supvr.
Credit Supervisor A
Asst. Stores Supvr. A
Ref. Supervisory Draftsman
Refinery Shift Supvr. B.
Asst. Supvr. A Operations (Refinery)
Refinery Shift Supvr. B
Asst. Lab. Supvr. A (Refinery)
St. Process Engineer B (Refinery)
Asst. Supvr. A Maintenance (Refinery)
Asst. Supvr. B Maintenance (Refinery)
Supervisory Accountant (Refinery)
Communications Supervisor (Refinery)
Finally, also deemed included are all other employees excluded from the
rank and file unions but not classified as managerial, or otherwise
excludable by law or applicable judicial precedents. (Annex B of Annex B,
Petition).
See Decision, Appendix A, Brief for the Petitioner, pp. 169-176.
See Brief for the Petitioner, pp. 77-95.
Namely. Jose M. Alejo, the Companys chief security officer Ernesto Roy,
staff assistant aid: Conrado Medrano and Esperidion Villanueva, two jobless
persons of Bauan, Batangas: E. Baquiran and Modesto Ocoy, security guards
at the Pandacan Terminal: A. Orbin; Romulo Reyes and Loreto Herrera,
security guards assigned at the Caltex main office; Godofredo Mesina,
deputy manager for operations Juanito Garcia, a fisherman; F. Dolezal,
refinery manager; Lucas L. Cruz, captain of the M/V Estrella; and J.J. Mapa,
the Associations President (who was presented by the Company as its own
witness on August 14, 1967) (Ibid.).
Citing Manila Electric Co. vs. National Labor Union, 70 Phil. 617, 620;
Mindanao Bus Co. vs. Mindanao Bus Co. Employees Association, 71 Phil.
168, 177; Bohol Land Transportation vs. BLT Employees Labor Union, 71
Phil. 291, 296; Rex Taxicab vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 70 Phil. 621,
631; Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Rural Transit Employees Ass., 85 Phil. 242,
245; Kaisahan vs. Tantongco. L-18338. Oct. 31, 1962: Rizal Cement Workers
Union vs. C.I.R., L-18442, Nov. 30, 1962; Industrial Com. Agricultural
Workers Organization vs. Bautista, L-15639, April 30, 1963; Lu Do vs. Phil.
Land-Air-Sea Labor Corp. vs. C.I.R., L-20838, July 30, 1965; Manila Pencil
Co. vs. C.I.R., L-16903; Aug. 31, 1965; East Asiatic Co. vs. C.I.R., L-17037,
April 30, 1966; Barnachea vs. Tabigne, L-22791, May 16, 1967; Laguna
College vs. C.I.R. L-28927. Sept. 25, 1968; see also National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority vs. NWSA Consolidated Union, 27 SCRA 227, 237.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] This ruling was echoed on Sanches vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 27
SCRA 490, where this Court, through Justice Fernando, indicated, and this
is applicable to the instant appeal: There was thus a manifest failure to
observe the requirement that the evidence be substantial. For thereby the
actuation of respondent Court was marred by arbitrariness. That was to
deprive petitioners of due process which requires reasonableness and fair
play. Ibid., p. 501).
[9] E.G., Judge Lorenzo Relova of the Batangas Court of First Instance found
the captain of the Mobil Visayas guilty of reckless imprudence (see Decision
dated February 25, 1969, Annex Q, Petition); Jose Alejo, chief security
officer of the company, was found guilty of grave coercion (see Annex P, p.
6, Petition); and Dominador Mangalino suffered injuries at the hands of
strike-breakers. (Ibid., p. 12).
[10] See Brief for Respondents, pp. 302-303.
[11] See Annex P, p. 12, Petition.
[12] Said disloyal CAFIMSA member was promoted by the Company to the
position of manager immediately after the strike (see Brief for the
Petitioner, p. 110).
[13] In line with our ruling in Caltex Filipino Managers & Supervisors
Association vs. Caltex (Philippines), Inc. (L-28472, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA
492, 503).
[14] Manaay, a supervisor, had to do even janitorial job like cleaning the toilet
and the room where classes were held (Petitioners Reply Brief, p. 15-A).
[15] See Petitioners Reply Brief, pp. 11-A to 67-A.
Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors Association vs. Court of Industrial Relations, [47 SCRA 112
(1972)]
This is an Appeal by the Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors Association from the resolution en banc
dated May 16, 1969 of the Court of Industrial Relations affirming the decision dated February 26, 1969 of
Associate Judge Emiliano G. Tabigne, Associate Judge Ansberto P. Paredes. Judge Tabignes decision covers
two cases, namely, Case No. 1484-MC(1) in which he declared the strike staged on April 22, 1965 by the
Association as illegal with the consequent forfeiture of the employee status of three employees and Case
No. 4344-ULP filed against Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Ben F. Edwards and W.E. Menefee which Judge
Tabigne dismissed for lack of merit and substantial evidence.
Issue: Whether or not the strike staged by the Association on April 22, 1965 is illegal and, incident thereto,
whether respondent court correctly terminated the employee status of Jose Mapa, Dominador Mangalino
and Herminigildo Mandanas and reprimanded and admonished the other officers of the Association
Held:
The Court declares the strike of the Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors Association as legal in all
respects and, consequently, the forfeiture of the employee status of J. J. Mapa, Dominador Mangalino and
Herminigildo Mandanas is set aside.
From the voluminous evidence presented by the Association, it is clear that the strike of the Association
was declared not lust for the purpose of gaining recognition as concluded by respondent court, but also for
bargaining in bad faith on the part of the Company and by reason of unfair labor practices committed by
its officials. But even if the strike were really declared for the purpose of recognition, the concerted
activities of the officers and members of the Association in this regard cannot be said to be unlawful nor
the purpose thereof be regarded as trivial.
Besides, one of the important rights recognized by the Magna Charta of Labor is the right to selforganization and we do not hesitate to say that is the cornerstone of this monumental piece of labor
legislation.
Visayan Refining Company et. al vs. Camus et. al G.R. No. L-15870
FACTS: Upon the direction of the Governor-General, the Attorney-General filed a complaint with the CFI
(Rizal) in the name of the Government of the Philippines for the condemnation of a certain tract of land in
Paranaque for military and aviation purposes. The petitioners herein are among the defendants named.
Likewise, it was prayed that the court will give the Government the possession of the land to be expropriated
after the necessary deposit (provisional) of P600, 000.00 as the total value of the property. Through the order
of the public respondent, Judge Camus, the prayer was granted.
During the pendency of the proceedings, the petitioners raised a demurrer questioning the validity of the
proceedings on the ground that there is no law authorizing the exercise of the power of eminent domain.
Likewise, they moved for the revocation of the order on the same ground stated and with additional
allegation that the deposit had been made without authority of law since the money was taken from the
unexpended balance of the funds appropriated by previous statutes for the use of the Militia Commission and
the authority for the exercise of the power of eminent domain could not be found in those statutes. The
demurrer and motion were overruled and denied respectively by Camus. This prompted the petitioners to file
this instant petition to stop the proceedings in the CFI.
ISSUE: Can the Philippine Government initiate expropriation proceedings in the absence of a statute
authorizing the exercise of the power of eminent domain?
RULING: Yes, it can. The Philippine Government has the general authority to exercise the power of eminent
domain as expressly conferred by Section 63 of the Philippine Bill (Act of Congress of July 1, 1902). It says
that the Philippine Government is authorized to acquire, receive, hold, maintain, and convey title to real
and personal property, and may acquire real estate for public uses by the exercise of the right to eminent
domain. The same is subject to the limitation of due process of law. In consonance with this, Section 64
of the Administrative Code of the Philippine Islands (Act No. 2711) expressly confers on the Government
General the power to determine when it is necessary or advantageous to exercise the right of eminent domain
in behalf of the Government of the Philippine Island; and to direct the Attorney-General, where such at is
deemed advisable, to cause the condemnation proceedings to be begun in the court having proper
jurisdiction. There is no question as to the Governor Generals authority to exercise this power.
However, this authority is not absolute. It is subject to two limitations, namely, that the taking shall be for
public purpose and there must be just compensation.
Apparently, the reason behind the taking of the subject land was for military and aviation purposes. This
considered a public purpose given the importance of the military and aviation in the operation of the State.
As to the second requirement, it must be remembered that at that time there was no law requiring that
compensation shall actually be paid prior to the judgment of condemnation. The deposit was made, despite
the absence of said law, to afford absolute assurance that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably
taken from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid. This is in conformity with the just compensation
requirement.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 103125. May 17, 1993.]
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOV. LUIS R.
VILLAFUERTE and HON. BENJAMIN V. PANGA as Presiding
Judge of RTC Branch 33 at Pili, Camarines Sur, petitioners, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION), ERNESTO SAN
JOAQUIN and EFREN SAN JOAQUIN, respondents.
The Provincial Attorney for petitioners.
Reynaldo L. Herrera for Ernesto San Joaquin.
SYLLABUS
1.POLITICAL LAW; INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE; EMINENT DOMAIN;
PUBLIC PURPOSE; CONCEPT. Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a
broader interpretation of "public purpose" or "public use" for which the power of eminent
domain may be exercised. The old concept was that the condemned property must
actually be used by the general public (e.g. roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.) before the
taking thereof could satisfy the constitutional requirement of "public use". Under the new
concept, "public use" means public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to
contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community, like a resort
complex for tourists or housing project (Heirs of Juancho Ardano v. Reyes, 125 SCRA
220 [1983]; Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461 [1987]).
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DEEMED SATISFIED WHEN THE PURPOSE DIRECTLY AND
SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTS PUBLIC HEALTH; SAFETY, THE ENVIRONMENT
AND IN SUM THE GENERAL WELFARE. The expropriation of the property
authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public purpose. The establishment of a
pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of
the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center would make available to the
community invaluable information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage
industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be
enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of the
Constitution. As held in Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461, "Housing is a basic
human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and
significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum the general
welfare."
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; DEEMED SUPERIOR TO THE POWER TO DISTRIBUTE LANDS

UNDER THE LAND REFORM PROGRAM. In Heirs of Juancho Ardana v. Reyes,
125 SCRA 220, petitioners raised the issue of whether the Philippine Tourism Authority
can expropriate lands covered by the "Operation Land Transfer" for use of a tourist resort
complex. There was a finding that of the 282 hectares sought to be expropriated, only an
area of 8,970 square meters or less than one hectare was affected by the land reform
program and covered by emancipation patents issued by the Ministry of Agrarian
Reform. While the Court said that there was "no need under the facts of this petition to
rule on whether the public purpose is superior or inferior to another purpose or engage in
a balancing of competing public interest," it upheld the expropriation after noting that
petitioners had failed to overcome the showing that the taking of 8,970 square meters
formed part of the resort complex. A fair and reasonable reading of the decision is that
this Court viewed the power of expropriation as superior to the power to distribute lands
under the land reform program.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; LIMITATIONS ON THE EXERCISE THEREOF BY LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNITS MUST BE CLEARLY EXPRESSED, EITHER IN THE LAW
CONFERRING THE POWER OR IN OTHER LEGISLATION. It is true that local
government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only
when expressly authorized by the legislature (City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 US 439,
74 L.ed. 950, 50 S Ct. 360). It is also true that in delegating the power to expropriate, the
legislature may retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof
by the local governments (Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 US 668 67 L. ed. 1167, 43
S Ct. 684). While such delegated power may be a limited authority, it is complete within
its limits. Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of the delegated power must be
clearly expressed, either in the law conferring the power or in other legislations.
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; STATUTES CONFERRING THE POWER THEREOF TO POLITICAL
SUBDIVISION CANNOT BE BROADENED OR CONSTRICTED BY
IMPLICATION. Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local
government units must first secure the approval of the Department of Land Reform for
the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can institute
the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of
agricultural lands by local government units to the control of the Department of Agrarian
Reform. The closest provision of law that the Court of Appeals could cite to justify the
intervention of the Department of Agrarian Reform in expropriation matters is Section 65
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. The opening, adverbial phrase of the
provision sends signals that it applies to lands previously placed under the agrarian
reform program as it speaks of "the lapse of five (5) years from its award." The rules on
conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of Executive Order No.
129-A, Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the authority of the Department of
Agrarian Reform to determine the suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for the
purpose to which it would be devoted by the expropriating authority. While those rules
vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the exclusive authority to approve or
disapprove conversions of agricultural lands for residential, commercial or industrial
uses, such authority is limited to the applications for reclassification submitted by the
land owners or tenant beneficiaries. Statutes confering the power of eminent domain to
political subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by implication (Schulman v.
People, 10 N.Y. 2d. 249, 176 N.E. 2d. 817, 219 NYS 2d. 241).
6.ID.; ID.; ID.; DETERMINATION OF PUBLIC USE LODGED WITH THE
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH. To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local
government units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction
of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc., without first applying for conversion of the use
of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would
naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of
Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public
use. Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall
determine whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the
same being an expression of legislative policy. The courts defer to such legislative
determination and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real or
substantial relation to the public use (United States Ex Rel Tennessee Valley Authority v.
Welch, 327 US 546, 90 L. ed. 843, 66 S Ct 715; State ex rel Twin City Bldg. and Invest.
Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 174 NW 885, 8 ALR 585). There is also an ancient rule
that restrictive statutes, no matter how broad their terms are, do not embrace the
sovereign unless the sovereign is specially mentioned as subject thereto (Alliance of
Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1 [1983]). The
Republic of the Philippine, as sovereign, or its political subdivisions, as holders of
delegated sovereign powers, cannot be bound by provisions of law couched in general
terms.
7.ID.; ID.; ID.; DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION, GOVERNED BY
THE RULES OF COURT. The fears of private respondents that they will be paid on
the basis of the valuation declared in the tax declarations of their property, are unfounded.
This Court has declared as unconstitutional the Presidential Decrees fixing the just
compensation in expropriation cases to be the value given to the condemned property
either by the owners or the assessor, whichever was lower ([Export Processing Zone
Authority v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 [1987]). As held in Municipality of Talisay Ramirez,
183 SCRA 528 [1990]7 the rules for determining just compensation are those laid down
in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which allow private respondents to submit evidence on
what they consider shall be the just compensation for their property.
DECISION
QUIASON, J :
p
In this appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No.
20551 entitled "Ernesto N. San Joaquin, et al., v. Hon. Benjamin V. Panga, et al.," this
Court is asked to decide whether the expropriation of agricultural lands by local
government units is subject to the prior approval of the Secretary of the Agrarian Reform,
as the implementor of the agrarian reform program.
On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur
passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to
purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to
establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing
project for provincial government employees.
cdasia
The "WHEREAS" clause of the Resolution states:

"WHEREAS, the province of Camarines Sur has adopted a five-year
Comprehensive Development plan, some of the vital components of which
includes the establishment of model and pilot farm for non-food and nontraditional agricultural crops, soil testing and tissue culture laboratory centers,
15 small scale technology soap making, small scale products of plaster of paris,
marine biological and sea farming research center, and other progressive
feasibility concepts objective of which is to provide the necessary scientific and
technology know-how to farmers and fishermen in Camarines Sur and to
establish a housing project for provincial government employees;
"WHEREAS, the province would need additional land to be acquired either by

purchase or expropriation to implement the above program component;
"WHEREAS, there are contiguous/adjacent properties to be (sic) present
Provincial Capitol Site ideally suitable to establish the same pilot development
center;
"WHEREFORE, . . . ."
Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, Hon.
Luis R. Villafuerte, filed two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San
Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin, docketed as Special Civil Action Nos. P-17-89 and P19-89 of the Regional Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur, presided by the Hon. Benjamin V.
Panga.
Forthwith, the Province of Camarines Sur filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession. The San Joaquins failed to appear at the hearing of the motion.
The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the
price offered for their property. In an order dated December 6, 1989, the trial court denied
the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of
the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount of P5,714.00, the
amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that private
respondents may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper. The trial
court issued a writ of possession in an order dated January 18, 1990.
The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the Province of
Camarines Sur to take possession of their property and a motion to admit an amended
motion to dismiss. Both motions were denied in the order dated February 26, 1990.
cdll
In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution
No. 129, Series of 1988 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b)
that the complaints for expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order dated December
6, 1989 (i) denying the motion to dismiss and (ii) allowing the Province of Camarines Sur
to take possession of the property subject of the expropriation and the order dated
February 26, 1990, denying the motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set
aside. They also asked that an order be issued to restrain the trial court from enforcing the
writ of possession, and thereafter to issue a writ of injunction.
In its answer to the petition, the Province of Camarines Sur claimed that it has the
authority to initiate the expropriation proceedings under Sections 4 and 7 of Local
Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and that the expropriations are for a public purpose.
Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General
stated that under Section 9 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no
need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed
the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the
Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use
as a housing project.
The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of
Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' lands and the order denying the
admission of the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend the
expropriation proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted
the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification
of the property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land.
Hence this petition.
It must be noted that in the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked for: (i) the dismissal
of the complaints for expropriation on the ground of the inadequacy of the compensation
offered for the property and (ii) the nullification of Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988 of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur.
The Court of Appeals did not rule on the validity of the questioned resolution; neither did
it dismiss the complaints. However, when the Court of Appeals ordered the suspension of
the proceedings until the Province of Camarines Sur shall have obtained the authority of
the Department of Agrarian Reform to change the classification of the lands sought to be
expropriated from agricultural to non-agricultural use, it assumed that the resolution is
valid and that the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.
cdll
Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of "public
purpose" or "public use" for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised. The
old concept was that the condemned property must actually be used by the general public
(e.g. roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.) before the taking thereof could satisfy the
constitutional requirement of "public use". Under the new concept, "public use" means
public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare
and the prosperity of the whole community, like a resort complex for tourists or housing
project (Heirs of Juancho Ardano v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 [1983]; Sumulong v.
Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461 [1987]).
The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public
purpose. The establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct
benefit and advantage of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational,
the center would make available to the community invaluable information and
technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of
the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also
satisfies the public purpose requirement of the Constitution. As held in Sumulong v.
Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461, "Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a
matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the
environment and in sum the general welfare."
It is the submission of the Province of Camarines Sur that its exercise of the power of
eminent domain cannot be restricted by the provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657), particularly Section 65 thereof, which requires the
approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform before a parcel of land can be
reclassified from an agricultural to a non-agricultural land.
The Court of Appeals, following the recommendation of the Solicitor General, held that
the Province of Camarines Sur must comply with the provision of Section 65 of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and must first secure the approval of the
Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of the San Joaquins.
In Heirs of Juancho Ardana v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, petitioners raised the issue of
whether the Philippine Tourism Authority can expropriate lands covered by the
"Operation Land Transfer" for use of a tourist resort complex. There was a finding that of
the 282 hectares sought to be expropriated, only an area of 8,970 square meters or less
than one hectare was affected by the land reform program and covered by emancipation
patents issued by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. While the Court said that there was
"no need under the facts of this petition to rule on whether the public purpose is superior
or inferior to another purpose or engage in a balancing of competing public interest," it
upheld the expropriation after noting that petitioners had failed to overcome the showing
that the taking of 8,970 square meters formed part of the resort complex. A fair and
reasonable reading of the decision is that this Court viewed the power of expropriation as
superior to the power to distribute lands under the land reform program.
The Solicitor General denigrated the power to expropriate by the Province of Camarines
Sur by stressing the fact that local government units exercise such power only by
delegation. (Comment, pp. 14-15; Rollo, pp. 128-129).
cdrep
It is true that local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can
exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature (City of Cincinnati v. Vester,
281 US 439, 74 L.ed. 950, 50 S Ct. 360). It is also true that in delegating the power to
expropriate, the legislature may retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the
exercise thereof by the local governments (Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 US 668 67
L. ed. 1167, 43 S Ct. 684). While such delegated power may be a limited authority, it is
complete within its limits. Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of the delegated
power must be clearly expressed, either in the law conferring the power or in other
legislations.
Resolution No. 219, Series of 1988, was promulgated pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg.
337, the Local Government Code, which provides:
"A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a
resolution of its sanggunian exercise the right of eminent domain and institute
condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose."
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government units must
first secure the approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands
from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can institute the necessary
expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by
local government units to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The closest
provision of law that the Court of Appeals could cite to justify the intervention of the
Department of Agrarian Reform in expropriation matters is Section 65 of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which reads:
"SECTION 65.Conversion of Lands. After the lapse of five (5) years from its
award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for
agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will
have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial
purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with
due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize the
reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided, That the
beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation."
The opening, adverbial phrase of the provision sends signals that it applies to lands
previously placed under the agrarian reform program as it speaks of "the lapse of five (5)
years from its award."
The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of
Executive Order No. 129 - A, Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the authority of the
Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the suitability of a parcel of agricultural
land for the purpose to which it would be devoted by the expropriating authority. While
those rules vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the exclusive authority to approve
or disapprove conversions of agricultural lands for residential, commercial or industrial
uses, such authority is limited to the applications for reclassification submitted by the
land owners or tenant beneficiaries.
Statutes confering the power of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot be
broadened or constricted by implication (Schulman v. People, 10 N.Y. 2d. 249, 176 N.E.
2d. 817, 219 NYS 2d. 241).
To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no
longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges,
schools, hospitals, etc., without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with
the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve
a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to
scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.
Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine
whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being
an expression of legislative policy. The courts defer to such legislative determination and
will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real or substantial relation to the
public use (United States Ex Rel Tennessee Valley Authority v. Welch, 327 US 546, 90 L.
ed. 843, 66 S Ct 715; State ex rel Twin City Bldg. and Invest. Co. v. Houghton, 144
Minn. 1, 174 NW 885, 8 ALR 585).
There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes, no matter how broad their terms are,
do not embrace the sovereign unless the sovereign is specially mentioned as subject
thereto (Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment, 124
SCRA 1 [1983]). The Republic of the Philippine, as sovereign, or its political
subdivisions, as holders of delegated sovereign powers, cannot be bound by provisions of
law couched in general terms.
prcd
The fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the basis of the valuation
declared in the tax declarations of their property, are unfounded. This Court has declared
as unconstitutional the Presidential Decrees fixing the just compensation in expropriation
cases to be the value given to the condemned property either by the owners or the
assessor, whichever was lower ([Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, 149 SCRA
305 [1987]). As held in Municipality of Talisay Ramirez, 183 SCRA 528 [1990]7 the rules
for determining just compensation are those laid down in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court,
which allow private respondents to submit evidence on what they consider shall be the
just compensation for their property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of
Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the Province
of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' property; (b) orders the trial
court to suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of
Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or
reclassify private respondents' property from agricultural to non-agricultural use.
cdasia
The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it sets aside the order of
the trial court, denying the amended motion to dismiss of the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ ., concur.
Province of Camarines Sur vs CA

Facts:
On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines
Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to
purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to
establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing
project for provincial government employees.
Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, Hon.
Luis R.Villafuerte, filed two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San
Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin
Trial court authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property
upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount of P5,714.00, the amount
provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that private respondents may
suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper. The trial court issued a
writ of possession.
In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that the complaints for
expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order denying the motion to dismiss and
allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property subject of the
expropriation be set aside.
Province of Camarines Sur claimed that it has the authority to initiate the expropriation
proceedings under the Local Government Code
CA set aside the order of the trial court. It also ordered the trial court to suspend the
expropriation proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted
the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification
of the property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property may be expropriated by the local governments
exercise of power of eminent domain
Held:
Yes
To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no
longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges,
schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with
the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve
a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform
to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.
It should be noted that CA did not rule on the validity of the questioned resolution;
neither did it dismiss the complaints. However, when the Court of Appeals ordered the
suspension of the proceedings until the Province of Camarines Sur shall have obtained
the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to change the classification of the
lands sought to be expropriated from agricultural to non-agricultural use, it assumed that
the resolution is valid and that the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.

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Cases Batch 4: Adong to Abra

Section 5, Article III