HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION vs.

SECRETARY MOCHAEL
DEFENSOR; GR. NO. 163980; AUGUST 3, 2006
FACTS: The instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, with prayer for the issuance of a

temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction,
seeks to prevent respondents from enforcing the implementing
rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207, otherwise
known as the National Government Center (NGC) Housing and
Land Utilization Act of 2003.
ISSUE: Whether an IRR issued by an administrative office may be reviewed
by Courts
HELD: Yes. Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making
powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasilegislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations
which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the
granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of
powers. In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation
issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative
remedies before going to court. This principle, however, applies only where
the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to
its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rulemaking or quasi-legislative power.
The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the
Committee expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly
on the theory that the assailed IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the
ground that it is not germane to the object and purpose of the statute it
seeks to implement. Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality
of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the
performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have
jurisdiction to pass upon the same. Since the regular courts have jurisdiction
to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued by the Committee in the
exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to assail its validity
must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus
and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum. True, this Court has the full discretionary
power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly with it if compelling
reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, so warrant. A
direct invocation of the Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued
in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary
writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,
whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering
said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said
proceedings are without or in excess of said entitys or persons jurisdiction,
or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or

any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
[20][21] Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not
against legislative or quasi-legislative functions.
Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within
the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice
in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against
usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the
exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the
inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where
there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which
such relief can be obtained. Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate
an IRR, petitioners remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action
which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
In any case, petitioners allegation that respondents are performing or
threatening to perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction
may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction
or a temporary restraining order. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for
prohibition is DISMISSED.

Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres

212 SCRA 298
FACTS: On 01 June 1991, DOLE Secretary Ruben Torres as a result of published stories the
abuses suffered by Filipina housemaids particularly in Hong Kong suspended the placement
and recruitment by the private recruitment agencies. The DOLE itself and POEA took control of
the recruitment and deployment of Filipina helpers bound to Hong Kong. On 01 July 1991,
DOLE Secretary ordered the administrator of POEA to use the facilities of the agencies for the
purpose. On 10 July DOLE Secretary issued memorandum Circulars no. 30 series of 1991
seeking accreditation by the Philippine government from recruitment agencies based in Hong
Kong. On 01 August of the same year, POEA Administrator issued MC no.37 series of 1991 on
the processing of domestic helpers after the request for accreditation was responded positively
by recruitment agencies in based in Hong Kong. On 02, September 1991, petitioner, through its
counsel, filed a petition to annul the DO 16 and MC 30 and 37 thus, preventing the Department
of Labor and Employment and the Philippine Overseas and Employment Administration to
implement the issuances.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not respondents committed a grave abuse of discretion and/or in
excess of their rule-making authority in issuing the circulars? (2) Whether or not the issuances
violates the constitution and against the regimes of reasonableness, fairness and equality? (3)
Whether or not the issuances complies the requirement of publication for its validity?
HELD: Resolving the first issue, the court finds that the circulars are valid exercise of the rulemaking power of DOLE Secretary as delegated to the executive Branch of the Government.
Applying article 36 the regulatory power of the Secretary of Labor to restrict and regulate the
recruitment and placement as well as deployment of Filipino abroad. Executive order 797 issued
on May 01, 1982 further provides the DOLEs regulatory functions to regulate the deployment of
foreign Filipino workers. The issuances of those circulars are therefore valid exercise of quasilegislative power of the agency, it cannot be considered as unconstitutional or oppressive or
unreasonable. Resolving the last issue, the issuances are legally invalid, defective and it cannot
be enforced for lack of publication requirement as codified under section 2 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines and section 3 and 4 chapter 2 of the administrative code of 1987. Lack of
publication is an essential requisite for the validity of the law. (Tanada v. Tuvera)
Accordingly, the prohibition was granted. The issuances were all suspended pending the
compliance of publications as required by law.

LBP v CA
FACTS
Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to
transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Aggrieved by
the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment of
compensation for their land pursuant to the provisions of RA 6657, private respondents filed with this
Court a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction. Private
respondents questioned the validity of DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992 6 and DAR
Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, 7 and sought to compel the DAR to expedite the pending
summary administrative proceedings to finally determine the just compensation of their properties, and
the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively "earmarked", "reserved" and
"deposited in trust accounts" for private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same.
Petitioners maintain that the word "deposit" as used in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 referred merely to the act
of depositing and in no way excluded the opening of a trust account as a form of deposit. Thus, in opting
for the opening of a trust account as the acceptable form of deposit through Administrative Circular No. 9,
petitioner DAR did not commit any grave abuse of discretion since it merely exercised its power to
promulgate rules and regulations in implementing the declared policies of RA 6657.

ISSUE
WON the administrative issuances should be nulled.

HELD
Yes. It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere
does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the intention
to include a "trust account" among the valid modes of deposit, that should have been made express, or at
least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a "trust account"
is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction
of the term "deposit".

The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an administrative agency
may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, a grave abuse of power
or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a
legislative enactment. 18 In this regard, it must be stressed that the function of promulgating rules and
regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into
effect. The power of administrative agencies is thus confined to implementing the law or putting it into
effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulations cannot extend
the law and amend a legislative enactment, 19 for settled is the rule that administrative regulations must be
in harmony with the provisions of the law. And in case there is a discrepancy between the basic law and
an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails. 20

CIR v CA
FACTS
Executive Order No. 41 was promulgated declaring a one-time tax amnesty
on unpaid income taxes. Availing itself of the amnesty, respondent R.O.H.
Auto Products Philippines, Inc., its Tax Amnesty Return No. 34-F-00146-41
and Supplemental Tax Amnesty Return No. 34-F-00146-64-B, and paid the
corresponding amnesty taxes due.
Prior to this availment, petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in a
communication received by private respondent on 13 August 1986, assessed
the latter deficiency income and business taxes for its fiscal years ended 30
September 1981 and 30 September 1982 in an aggregate amount of
P1,410,157.71. The taxpayer wrote back to state that since it had been able
to avail itself of the tax amnesty, the deficiency tax notice should forthwith
be cancelled and withdrawn. The request was denied by the Commissioner,
in his letter of 22 November 1988, on the ground that Revenue Memorandum
Order No. 4-87, dated 09 February 1987, implementing Executive Order No.
41, had construed the amnesty coverage to include only assessments issued
by the Bureau of Internal Revenue after the promulgation of the executive
order on 22 August 1986 and not to assessments theretofore made.

ISSUE
WON the CIR has erred in denying the private respondents tax amnesty
claim.

HELD
Yes. If, as the Commissioner argues, Executive Order No. 41 had not been
intended to include 1981-1985 tax liabilities already assessed
(administratively) prior to 22 August 1986, the law could have simply so
provided in its exclusionary clauses. It did not. The conclusion is unavoidable,
and it is that the executive order has been designed to be in the nature of a
general grant of tax amnesty subject only to the cases specifically excepted
by it.
All issuances must not override, but must remain consistent and in harmony
with, the law they seek to apply and implement. Administrative rules and
regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the
law.

Ople v Torres
FACTS
Administrative Order No. 308, entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System," was issued by President Fidel Ramos On December 12, 1996.
Senator Blas F. Ople filed a petition seeking to invalidate A.O. No. 308 on several grounds. One of
them is that: The establishment of a National Computerized Identification Reference System
requires a legislative act. The issuance of A.O. No.308 by the President is an unconstitutional
usurpation of the legislative powers of congress. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere
administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges
that A.O. No.308 establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects
the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates
their right to privacy.

On this point, respondents counter-argue that: A.O. No. 308 was issued within the executive
and administrative powers of the president without encroaching on the legislative powers of
congress.
ISSUE
Whether the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is an unconstitutional usurpation of the power of Congress
to legislate.
HELD
Legislative power is the authority to make laws, and to alter and repeal them. The Constitution
has vested this power in the Congress. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad,
general, and comprehensive. Any power deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is
necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere.
The executive power, on the other hand, is vested in the President. It is generally defined as the
power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical
operation and enforcing their due observance. As head of theExecutive Department, the
President is the Chief Executive. He represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all
laws are enforced by the officials andemployees of his department. He has control over the
executive department, bureausand offices. Corollary to the power of control, the President also
has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and
publicorder. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under hiscontrol
to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and
enforcingorders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix
auniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of hisagents. To this
end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.
From these precepts, the Court holds that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is notappropriate
to be covered by an administrative order.
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to
specificaspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with
thelaw and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out
thelegislative policy. The Court rejects the argument that A.O. No. 308 implements thelegislative
policy of the Administrative Code of 1987. The Code is a general law andincorporates in a unified
document the major structural, functional and proceduralprinciples of governance and embodies
changes in administrative structure andprocedures designed to serve the people.

It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the
Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National
Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a
delicate adjustment of various contending state policies - the primacy of

national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by

government, the choice of policies, etc. Assaid administrative order redefines
the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenryvis-a-vis the State as well
as the line that separates the administrative power of thePresident to make
rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evidentthat it
deals with a subject that should be covered by law.

Manila Jockey Club v CA

FACTS
On June 18, 1948, Congress approved Republic Act No. 309, entitled An Act to Regulate HorseRacing in the Philippines. This Act consolidated all existing laws and amended inconsistent
provisions relative to horse racing. It provided for the distribution of gross receipts from the sale
of betting tickets, but is silent on the allocation of so-called breakages. Thus the practice,
according to the petitioners, was to use the breakages for the anti-bookies drive and other sales
promotions activities of the horse racing clubs.
On March 20, 1974, Presidential Decree No. 420 was issued creating the Philippine Racing
Commission (PHILRACOM), giving it exclusive jurisdiction and control over every aspect of
the conduct of horse racing, including the framing and scheduling of races. By virtue of this
power, the PHILRACOM authorized the holding of races on Wednesdays starting on December
22, 1976.
Petitioners made a joint query regarding the ownership of breakages accumulated during
Wednesday races. In response to the query, PHILRACOM rendered its opinion in a letter dated
September 20, 1978. It declared that the breakages belonged to the racing clubs concerned.
On December 16, 1986 President Corazon Aquino amended certain provisions Sec. 4 of R.A.
6631 and Sec. 6 of R.A. 6632 through Executive Orders No. 88 and 89.
On April 23, 1987, PHILRACOM itself addressed a query to the Office of the President asking
which agency is entitled to dispose of the proceeds of the breakages derived from the Tuesday
and Wednesday races.
In a letter dated May 21, 1987, the Office of the President, through then Deputy Executive
Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., replied that the disposition of the breakages rightfully belongs
to PHILRACOM, not only those derived from the Saturday, Sunday and holiday races, but also
from the Tuesday and Wednesday races in accordance with the distribution scheme prescribed in
said Executive Orders.
Controversy arose when herein respondent PHILRACOM, sent a series of demand letters to
petitioners MJCI and PRCI, requesting its share in the breakages of mid-week-races and proof
of remittances to other legal beneficiaries as provided under the franchise laws.
ISSUE
Who are the rightful beneficiaries of the breakages derived from mid-week races?
This issue also carries an ancillary question: assuming PHILRACOM is entitled to the
mid-week breakages under the law, should the petitioners remit the money from the
time the mid-week races started, or only upon the promulgation of E.O. Nos. 88 and
89?
HELD
A reasonable reading of the horse racing laws favors the determination that the
entities enumerated in the distribution scheme provided under R.A. Nos. 6631 and
6632, as amended by Executive Orders 88 and 89, are the rightful beneficiaries of
breakages from mid-week races. Petitioners should therefore remit the proceeds of
breakages to those benefactors designated by the aforesaid laws.
The holding of horse races on Wednesdays is in addition to the existing schedule of
races authorized by law. Since this new schedule became part of R.A. 6631 and
6632 the set of procedures in the franchise laws applicable to the conduct of horse
racing business must likewise be applicable to Wednesday or other mid-week races.

A fortiori, the granting of the mid-week races does not require another legislative
act to reiterate the manner of allocating the proceeds of betting tickets. Neither
does the allocation of breakages under the same provision need to be isolated to
construe another distribution scheme. No law can be viewed in a condition of
isolation or as the beginning of a new legal system.
Proceeding to the subsidiary issue, the period for the remittance of breakages to the
beneficiaries should have commenced from the time PHILRACOM authorized the
holding of mid-week races because R.A. Nos. 6631 and 6632 were already in effect
then. The petitioners contend that they cannot be held retroactively liable to
respondent PHILRACOM for breakages prior to the effectivity of E.O. Nos. 88 and 89.
They assert that the real intent behind E.O. Nos. 88 and 89 was to favor the
respondent PHILRACOM anew with the benefits which formerly had accrued in favor
of Philippine Amateur Athletic Federation (PAAF). They opine that since laws operate
prospectively unless the legislator intends to give them retroactive effect, the
accrual of these breakages should start on December 16, 1986, the date of
effectivity of E.O. Nos. 88 and 89. Now, even if one of the benefactors of breakages,
the PAAF, as provided by R.A. 6631 and 6632 had ceased operation, it is still not
proper for the petitioners to presume that they were entitled to PAAFs share. When
the petitioners mistakenly appropriated the breakages for themselves, they became
the implied trustees for those legally entitled to the proceeds.
While herein petitioners might have relied on a prior opinion issued by an
administrative body, the well-entrenched principle is that the State could not be
estopped by a mistake committed by its officials or agents. Although there was an
initial interpretation of the law by PHILRACOM, a court of law could not be precluded
from setting that interpretation aside if later on it is shown to be inappropriate.
Mauricio Cruz vs. Stanton Youngberg
GR No. L-34674 October 26, 1931
FACTS: Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which prohibits the importation
of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands. It was enacted for the purpose of
preventing the introduction of cattle diseases into the Philippine Islands from foreign countries.
The Act provides: SECTION 1. After March thirty-first, nineteen hundred and twenty-five
existing contracts for the importation of cattle into this country to the contrary notwithstanding, it
shall be strictly prohibited to import, bring or introduce into the Philippine Islands any cattle from
foreign countries: Provided, however, That at any time after said date, the Governor-General,
with the concurrence of the presiding officers of both Houses, may raise such prohibition entirely
or in part if the conditions of the country make this advisable or if decease among foreign cattle
has ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and livestock of the lands.
ISSUE: Whether or not the power given by Act No. 3155 to the Governor-General to suspend or
not, at his discretion, the prohibition provided in the act constitutes an unlawful delegation of the
legislative powers.
HELD: No. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion
as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done;
to the latter no valid objection can be made. The Governor-General is authorized to lift the
prohibition, with the consent of the presiding officers of the legislature, if he should determine
after a fact-finding investigation that there was no longer any threat of contagion from cattle. The
lifting of the ban would have been effected through a contingent regulation based on the
prescribed contingency, to wit, the finding that foreign cattle would no longer contaminate the
local livestock.

Walter E. Olsen & Co. v. Aldanese

G.R. No. L-18740. March 29, 1922
FACTS:
The petitioners assail the validity of the Act No. 2613 of the Philippine Legislature entitled "an
act to improve the methods of production and the quality of tobacco in the Philippine and to
develop the export trade therein. The Collector of Internal Revenue is authorized to certify to
the Insular Collector of Customs that the standard tobacco exported is the growth and product of
the Philippine Islands. Paragraph 5 of the petition alleges that under clause B of section 6 of the
Act, the Collector of Internal Revenue promulgated Administrative Order No. 35, known as
"Tobacco Inspection Regulations," in which it is said:
To be classed as standard, cigars must be manufactured under sanitary conditions from good,
clean, selected tobacco, properly cured and seasoned, of a crop which has been harvested at
least six months, exclusively the product of the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, or Nueva Vizcaya.
The cigars must be well made, with suitable spiral wrapper and with long filler, etc.
The petitioner applied to the Collector of Internal Revenue for a certificate of origin covering a
consignment of 10,000 machine-made cigars to San Francisco, and as the petitioner himself
stated on making such application that the cigars sought to be exported have been manufactured
from short-filler tobacco which was not the product of the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, and
Nueva Vizcaya. The Collector of Internal Revenue did not deem it necessary to make an actual
examination and inspection of said cigars in view of the fact that the cigars were not made with
long-filler nor were they made from tobacco exclusively the product of any of the three
mentioned provinces.
ISSUE:
Whether or not A.O No. 35 and Act No. 2613, as well as the refusal of the Collector of Internal
Revenue to issue a certificate of origin, are constitutional.
HELD:
Yes. Under the provisions of Act No. 2613, the Collector of Internal Revenue of the Philippine
Islands promulgated Administrative Order No. 35, known as "Tobacco Inspections Regulations."
Such rules and regulations, having been promulgated by that officer, the court has a right to
assume that he was acting under such rules and regulations when he refused to issue the
certificate of origin. It appears from the record that the cigars in question were not long-filler
cigars, and that they were not manufactured from tobacco grown in one of the three provinces.
By the express terms and provisions of such rules and regulations promulgated by the Collector
of Internal Revenue, it was his duty to refuse petitioner's request, and decline the certificate or
origin, because the cigars tendered were not of the specified kind, and the court have a right to
assume that he performed his official duty as the understood it. After such refusal and upon such
grounds, it would indeed, have been a vain and useless thing for the Collector of Internal
Revenue to his examined or inspected the cigars. Having refused to issue the certificate of origin
for the reason above assigned, it is very apparent that a request thereafter made examine or
inspect the cigars would also have been refused.

SALVADOR A. ARANETA, ETC., ET AL. vs. THE HON. MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, ET AL.
G.R. Nos. L-8895 and L-9191, April 30, 1957

Facts: The League of Municipal Mayors of municipalities near the San Miguel Bay, between the
provinces of Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte, manifested in a resolution that they condemn
the operation of trawls in the said area and resolving to petition the President of the Philippines to
regulate fishing in San Miguel Bay. In another resolution, the same League of Mayors prayed that
the President ban the operation of trawls in the San Miguel Bay area. In response to the pleas, the
President issued EO 22 prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay but the EO was amended
by EO 66 apparently in answer to a resolution of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur
recommending the allowance of trawl-fishing during the typhoon season only. Subsequently, EO
80 was issued reviving EO 22. Thereafter, a group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for
injunction praying that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Director of
Fisheries be enjoined from enforcing said executive order and to declare the same null and void.
The Court held that until the trawler is outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot be banned
from San Miguel Bay by executive proclamation and held that the EOs 22 and 66 are invalid.

Issues: Whether or not the President has authority to issue EOs 22, 66 and 80. Whether or not
the said Executive Orders were valid as it was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly
delegated to the President.
Held: Yes. Under sections 75 and 83 of the Fisheries law, the restriction and banning of trawl
fishing from all Philippine waters come within the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources. However, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources exercises its
functions subject to the general supervision and control of the President of the Philippines, the
President can exercise the same power and authority through executive orders, regulations,
decrees and proclamations upon recommendation of the Secretary concerned. Hence, EOs 22,66
and 80 restricting and banning of trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay are valid and issued by
authority of law. For the protection of fry or fish eggs and small immature fishes, Congress
intended with the promulgation of the Fisheries Act, to prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing
devise like trawl nets that could endanger and deplete our supply of seafood, and to that end
authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by regulations and such
restrictions as he deemed necessary in order to preserve the aquatic resources of the land. When
the President, in response to the clamor of the people and authorities of Camarines Sur issued
EO 80 absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within the San
Miguel Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of said
coastal province and dispose of issues of general concern which were in consonance and strict
conformity with the law.

Public Schools District Supervisors

Association v.s. De Jesus
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 9155, otherwise known as the Governance of Basic Education Act 2001,
became a law on August 11, 2001, in accordance with Section 27(1), Article VI of the
Constitution. Under Section 14 of the law, the DepEd Secretary is mandated to promulgate the
implementing rules and regulations within ninety (90) days after the approval of the Act,
provided that the principle of shared governance shall be fully implemented within two (2)
years after such approval.
On March 13, 2003, the PSDSA, the national organization of about 1,800 public school district
supervisors of the DepEd, in behalf of its officers and members, filed the instant petition for
prohibition and mandamus, alleging that:
I. THE ACT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION IN REMOVING PETITIONERS
ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OVER ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS AND ITS
PRINCIPALS (SCHOOL HEADS) WITHIN HIS/HER DISTRICT AND CONVERTING
HIS/HER ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION TO THAT OF PERFORMING STAFF FUNCTION
FOR THE DIVISION OFFICE PER SECTION 5.1 RULE V OF THE IMPLEMENTING
RULES AND REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT 9155 (DEPED ORDER NO. 1, SERIES
OF 2003) IS A GROSS VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT 9155 THE GOVERNANCE OF
BASIC EDUCATION ACT OF 2001.
II. THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATION OF REPUBLIC ACT 9155 AS
PROMULGATED UNDER DEPED ORDER NO. 1, SERIES OF 2003 EXPANDED THE LAW
AND INCLUDED PROVISIONS WHICH ARE DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED TO THE
LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE SUBJECT LAW.
Issues:
1) Whether or not District Supervisor shall exercise administrative supervision over the
Elementary School Principals (ESPs) and Secondary School Principals (SSPs).
2) Whether or not Rule IV, Section 4.3; Rule V, Sections 5.1 and the second paragraph of Section
5.2; and Rule VI, Section 6.2, paragraph 11 of Department of Education Order No. 1, Series of
2003 are constitutional.
Rulings:
1) A plain reading of the law will show that the schools district supervisors have no
administrative supervision over the school heads; their responsibility is limited to those
enumerated in Section 7(D) of R.A. No. 9155, to wit:
(1) Providing professional and instructional advice and support to the school heads and
teachers/facilitators of schools and learning centers in the district or cluster thereof;
(2) Curricula supervision; and
(3) Performing such other functions as may be assigned by proper authorities.
It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or
consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not,
by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that
the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been
not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
2) The court reviewed the IRR and found that Section 4.3 of Rule IV, and Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of
Rule V are valid. The provisions merely reiterate and implement the related provisions of R.A.

No. 9155. Under the law, a division superintendent has the authority and responsibility to hire,
place, and evaluate all division supervisors and district supervisors as well as all employees in
the division, both teaching and non-teaching personnel, including school heads. A school head is
a person responsible for the administrative and instructional supervision of the schools or cluster
of schools. The division superintendent, on the other hand, supervises the operation of all public
and private elementary, secondary, and integrated schools and learning centers.

ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS vs. PHILIPPINE COCONUT

AUTHORITY
GR No. 110526 February 10, 1998
FACTS: On November 5, 1992, seven desiccated coconut processing companies belonging to
the APCD brought suit in the Regional Trial Court to enjoin the PCA from issuing permits to
certain applicants for the establishment of new desiccated coconut processing plants. Petitioner
alleged that the issuance of licenses to the applicants would violate PCA's Administrative Order
No. 02, series of 1991, as the applicants were seeking permits to operate in areas considered
"congested" under the administrative order. On November 6, 1992, the trial court issued a
temporary restraining order and, on November 25, 1992, a writ of preliminary injunction,
enjoining the PCA from processing and issuing licenses. Subsequently and while the case was
pending in the Regional Trial Court, the Governing Board of the PCA issued on March 24, 1993
Resolution No. 018-93, providing for the withdrawal of the Philippine Coconut Authority from all
regulation of the coconut product processing industry. While it continues the registration of
coconut product processors, the registration would be limited to the "monitoring" of their
volumes of production and administration of quality standards. The PCA then proceeded to
issue "certificates of registration" to those wishing to operate desiccated coconut processing
plants, prompting petitioner to appeal to the Office of the President of the Philippines on April
26, 1993 not to approve the resolution in question. Despite follow-up letters sent on May 25 and
June 2, 1993, petitioner received no reply from the Office of the President. The "certificates of
registration" issued in the meantime by the PCA has enabled a number of new coconut mills to
operate.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not PCAs Board Resolution No. 018-93 is null and void for being an
undue exercise of legislative power by an administrative body.
2. Whether or not the PCA is authorized to renounce the power to regulate implicit in
the law creating it for that is what the resolution in question actually is.
HELD: 1. Yes. The resolution in question was issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rulemaking or legislative power. To be sure, the PCA is under the direct supervision of the President
of the Philippines but there is nothing in P.D. No. 232, P.D. No. 961, P.D. No. 1468 and P.D. No.
1644 defining the powers and functions of the PCA which requires rules and regulations issued
by it to be approved by the President before they become effective.
2. No. On December 6, 1982, a phase-out of some of the existing plants was ordered by
the government after finding that "a mere freeze in the present capacity of existing plants will
not afford a viable solution to the problem considering that the total available limited market is
not adequate to support all the existing processing plants, making it imperative to reduce the
number of existing processing plants." Accordingly, it was ordered: Sec. 1. The Philippine
Coconut Authority is hereby ordered to take such action as may be necessary to reduce the
number of existing desiccated coconut processing plants to a level which will insure the survival
of the remaining plants. The Authority is hereby directed to determine which of the existing
processing plants should be phased out and to enter into appropriate contracts with such plants
for the above purpose. In plain disregard of this legislative purpose, the PCA adopted on March
24, 1993 the questioned resolution which allows not only the indiscriminate opening of new
coconut processing plants but the virtual dismantling of the regulatory infrastructure whereby,
forsaking controls theretofore placed in its keeping, the PCA limits its function to the innocuous
one of "monitoring" compliance by coconut millers with quality standards and volumes of
production. In effect, the PCA would simply be compiling statistical data on these matters, but in
case of violations of standards there would be nothing much it would do. Instead of determining
the qualifications of market players and preventing the entry into the field of those who are unfit,
the PCA now relies entirely on competition with all its wastefulness and inefficiency to do
the weeding out, in its naive belief in survival of the fittest. The result can very well be a repeat
of 1982 when free enterprise degenerated into a "free-for-all," resulting in cut-throat competition,
underselling, the production of inferior products and the like, which badly affected the foreign
trade performance of the coconut industry.

Echegaray v Secretary

Facts:
The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10
year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty
for the said crime.
He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for the first time the issue of the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape.
In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death penalty
from electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT
DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659.
The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection against him
under the grounds that it constituted cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, being violative of
due process, a violation of the Philippines' obligations under international covenants, an undue
delegation of legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the
power to legislate, and an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to
respondent Director.
ISSUE
WON RA 8177 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power?
HELD
No. R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its
limits, map out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It indicates
the circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be carried out. R.A. No. 8177
specifically requires that "the death sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director
of the Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the
person under the sentence during the lethal injection as well as during the proceedings prior to
the execution." Further, "the Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall take steps to ensure that
the lethal injection to be administered is sufficient to cause the instantaneous death of the
convict." The legislature also mandated that "all personnel involved in the administration of
lethal injection shall be trained prior to the performance of such task." The Court cannot see that
any useful purpose would be served by requiring greater detail. The question raised is not the
definition of what constitutes a criminal offense, but the mode of carrying out the penalty already
imposed by the Courts. In this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is sufficiently definite and the exercise of
discretion by the administrative officials concerned is, canalized within banks that keep it from
overflowing.
However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 suffer serious flaws
that could not be overlooked. To begin with, something basic appears missing in Section 19 of
the implementing rules which provides a manual for the execution procedure. It was supposed to
be confidential.
The Court finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the implementing rules a vacuum. The
Secretary of Justice has practically abdicated the power to promulgate the manual on the
execution procedure to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, by not providing for a mode of
review and approval. Being a mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of
Corrections could not promulgate a manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the
administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule-making authority under R.A. No.
8177. Such apparent abdication of departmental responsibility renders the said paragraph
invalid.

Lupangco vs CA 160 SCRA 848

FACTS
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as part
ofits "Additional Instructions to Examinees to all those applying for admission
to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. The resolution embodied
the following pertinent provisions:"No examinee shall attend any review
class, briefing, conference or the likeconducted by, or shall receive any handout, review material, or any tip from any school,college or university, or any
review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer,instructor official or
employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutionsduring the three
days immediately preceding every examination day including
theexamination day.Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject
to the sanctions.Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure
examinations in accountancyfiled in their own behalf and in behalf of all
others similarly situated like them, with theRTC a complaint for injunction
with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminaryinjunction against
respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned
resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional.
Issue
WON the Resolution is unconstitutional
Held
The Resolution is null and void. The enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not aguarantee
that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or atleast
minimized. Making the examinees suffer by depriving them of legitimate means
ofreview or preparation on those last three precious days-when they should be
refreshingthemselves with all that they have learned in the review classes and
preparing theirmental and psychological make-up for the examination day itselfwould be likeuprooting the tree to get ride of a rotten branch. What is needed to be
done by therespondent is to find out the source of such leakages and stop it right
there. If corruptofficials or personnel should be terminated from their loss, then so
be it. Fixers orswindlers should be flushed out. Strict guidelines to be observed by
examiners shouldbe set up and if violations are committed, then licenses should be
suspended or revoked.These are all within the powers of the respondent
commission as provided for inPresidential Decree No. 223. But by all means the
right and freedom of the examinees toavail of all legitimate means to prepare for
the examinations should not be curtailed.

Taxicab Operators vs. Board of Transportation

G.R. No. L-59234. September 30, 1982.
Facts:
Petitioners who are taxicab operators assail the constitutionality of Memorandum Circular No.
77-42 issued by the Board of Transportation (BOT) providing for the phasing out and
replacement of old and dilapidated taxicabs; as well as Implementing Circular No. 52 issued
pursuant thereto by the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) instructing personnel of the BLT
within the National Capital Region to implement the said BOT Circular, and formulating a
schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public
conveyances.
Petitioners allege that the questioned Circulars did not afford them procedural and substantive
due process, equal protection of the law, and protection against arbitrary and unreasonable
classification and standard. Among others, they question the issuance of the Circulars without
first calling them to a conference or requiring them to submit position papers or other documents
enforceability thereof only in Metro Manila; and their being applicable only to taxicabs and not
to other transportation services.
Issues:
Whether or not the constitutional guarantee of due process was denied to the taxicab operators
and/or other persons affected by the assailed Circular No. 52.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that there was no denial of due process since calling the taxicab
operators or persons who may be affected by the questioned Circulars to a conference or
requiring them to submit position papers or other documents is only one of the options open to
the BOT which is given wide discretionary authority under P.D. No. 101; and fixing a six- year
ceiling for a car to be operated as taxicab is a reasonable standard adopted to apply to all vehicles
affected uniformly, fairly, and justly.
The Court also ruled that neither has the equal protection clause been violated by initially
enforcing the Circulars only in Metro Manila since it is of common knowledge that taxicabs in
this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more
constant use, thus making for a substantial distinction; nor by non-application of the Circulars to
other transportation services because the said Circulars satisfy the criteria required under the
equal protection clause, which is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under
identical or similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege
conferred and the liabilities imposed.
It is clear from the provision of Section 2 of P.D. 101 aforequoted, that the leeway accorded the
Board gives it a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the
formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a
conference or require the submission of position papers or other documents from operators or
persons who maybe affected, this being only one of the options open to the Board, which is given
wide discretionary authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim, therefore, that they were
deprived of procedural due process. Neither can they state with certainty that public respondents
had not availed of other sources of inquiry prior to issuing the challenged Circulars. Operators of
public conveyances are not the only primary sources of the data and information that may be
desired by the BOT.

De Jesus v COA
FACTS
Petitioners are employees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA).
Prior to July 1, 1989, they were receiving honoraria as designated members
of the LWUA Board Secretariat and the Pre-Qualification, Bids and Awards
Committee.
On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758 (Rep. Act 6758), entitled An Act
Prescribing A Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the
Government and For Other Purposes, took effect. Section 12 of said law
provides for the consolidation of allowances and additional compensation
into standardized salary rates. Certain additional compensations, however,
were exempted from consolidation.
To implement Rep. Act 6758, the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) issued Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10),
discontinuing without qualification effective November 1, 1989, all
allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of basic salary.
Petitioners contend that DBM-CCC No. 10 is inconsistent with the provisions of Rep. Act 6758
(the law it is supposed to implement) and, therefore, void. And it is without force and effect
because it was not published in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE
WON the Circular is void.
HELD
YES. On the need for publication of subject DBM-CCC No. 10, we rule in the affirmative.
Following the doctrine enunciated in Tanada, publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines is required since DBM-CCC No. 10 is in the
nature of an administrative circular the purpose of which is to enforce or implement an existing
law. Stated differently, to be effective and enforceable, DBM-CCC No. 10 must go through the
requisite publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines.
In the present case under scrutiny, it is decisively clear that DBM-CCC No. 10, which completely
disallows payment of allowances and other additional compensation to government officials and
employees, starting November 1, 1989, is not a mere interpretative or internal regulation. It is
something more than that. And why not, when it tends to deprive government workers of their
allowances and additional compensation sorely needed to keep body and soul together. At the
very least, before the said circular under attack may be permitted to substantially reduce their
income, the government officials and employees concerned should be apprised and alerted by
the publication of subject circular in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines - to the end that they be given amplest opportunity to voice out whatever
opposition they may have, and to ventilate their stance on the matter. This approach is more in
keeping with democratic precepts and rudiments of fairness and transparency.

People vs. Maceren

79 SCRA 450

FACTS: This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in
fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law. On March 7, 1969 Jose
Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario
were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with
having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1.It was alleged in the complaint that the
five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio
San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz. Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court quashed the
complaint. The prosecution appealed. The Court of First Instance of Laguna affirmed the order
of dismissal. The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric
current is not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in Section 11 of the
Fisheries Law and that it is not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted
by substances. The lower court further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro
fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful. It is noteworthy that
the Fisheries Law does not expressly punish .electro fishing. Notwithstanding the silence of the
law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the
Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84, prohibiting
electro fishing in all Philippine waters. On June 28, 1967 the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Fisheries Commission, issued Fisheries
Administrative Order No. 84-1, amending section 2 of Administrative Order No. 84, by restricting
the ban against electro fishing to fresh water fisheries.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing the Fisheries Administrative
Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1.
HELD: The Court ruled in the affirmative. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative
Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries
Commission, Republic Act No. 3512. The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly
prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to
penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing,
are devoid of any legal basis. That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous
substance, or explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in deep-sea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking
of marine molusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the
kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other violations. Nowhere in that law is electro fishing
specifically punished. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a
particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the
sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. The rule-making power must be
confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has
been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute
cannot be sanctioned. Thus, the lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the
power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of
regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself.

CIR vs. CA, CTA and FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP.

G.R. No. 119761; August 29, 1996
Facts: Fortune Tobacco Corporation ("Fortune Tobacco"), engaged in the
manufacture of different brands of cigarettes, registered "Champion,"
"Hope," and "More" cigarettes. BIR classified them as foreign brands since
they were listed in the World Tobacco Directory as belonging to foreign
companies. However, Fortun changed the names of 'Hope' to 'Hope Luxury'
and 'More' to 'Premium More,' thereby removing the said brands from the
foreign brand category.
A 45% Ad Valorem taxes were imposed on these brands. Then Republic Act
("RA") No. 7654 was enacted 55% for locally manufactured foreign brand
while 45% for locally manufactured brands. 2 days before the effectivity of
RA 7654, Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 ("RMC 37-93"), was
issued by the BIR saying since there is no showing who the real owner/s are
of Champion, Hope and More, it follows that the same shall be considered
locally manufactured foreign brand for purposes of determining the ad
valorem tax - 55%. BIR sent via telefax a copy of RMC 37-93 to Fortune
Tobacco addressed to no one in particular. Then Fortune Tobacco received, by
ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of RMC 37-93. CIR assessed Fortune
Tobacco for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00.Issue:

Issue: WON it was necessary for BIR to follow the legal requirements when it
issued its RMC

Held. YES. CIR may not disregard legal requirements in the exercise of its
quasi-legislative powers which publication, filing, and prior hearing.
When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its
applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no real
consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. BUT
when, upon the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely
providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the
implementation of the law but substantially increases the burden of those
governed, the agency must accord, at least to those directly affected, a
chance to be heard, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of
law.
RMC 37-93 cannot be viewed simply as construing Section 142(c)(1) of the
NIRC, as amended, but has, in fact and most importantly, been made in order
to place "Hope Luxury," "Premium More" and "Champion" within the
classification of locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brands and
to thereby have them covered by RA 7654 which subjects mentioned brands
to 55% the BIR not simply interpreted the law; verily, it legislated under its
quasi-legislative authority. The due observance of the requirements of notice,
of hearing, and of publication should not have been then ignored.

PCFI vs. Sec. of Education Culture and Sports

153 SCRA 622
FACTS: On 21 February 1987, the Task Force on Private Education under the Department of
Education Culture and Sports had recommended to the DECS several measures or courses of
actions congruent to the governments policy regulating private colleges in the country. On the
said proposal it stipulates that Private schools may increase school fees from 15-20% without a
prior approval from DECS provided that the school shall not exceed the total amount of school
fees of One Thousand Pesos. Petitioner herein, questioned AO 37 and sought for
reconsideration on the basis that the increase was too high or exorbitant. On 10 April 1987, on
the basis that education is a matter of right and considering the public clamor, DECS secretary
issued a modified administrative order authorizing back all Private Higher Educational
Institutions (PHEI) to implement an increase of 10-15% rate in the payment of school fees.
Discontented with the reconsideration prayed for, complainant-petitioner seeks for presidential
intervention to suspend the implementation of the modified AO 37 however; no response was
made by the President of the Philippines. On 20 May 1987, petitioner herein, elevates the
matter to the Supreme Court seeking to prevent the implementation of the said order. Thus, the
filing of petition for prohibition on the ground of public interest, seeking to resolve the following
questions before the Supreme Court;
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Administrative Order 37 issued by DECS Secretary has legal
basis? (2)Whether or not Administrative Order 37 issued by DECS Secretary curtailed the due
process clause enshrined in the constitution?
HELD: On the first issue, the court resolves that under section 57 Batas Pambansa Bilang. 232
or the Education Act of 1982 empowers the Department of Education Culture and Sports to
regulate the educational systems in the country such as the power to promulgate, administer,
supervise educational systems. Furthermore, under Sec. 70 of the same act, contemplates on
the Rule-Making power of the Minister of Education Culture and Sports. Ultimately the court
holds that the power to prescribe school fees is implied with the regulatory power exercised by
the Secretary of Education. To resolve the second issue, the court is in affirmative that in the
exercise of the rule-making (quasi-legislative) power of the secretary of education (formerly
Minister of Education) prior notice and hearing are not essential for the validity of the issuance.
Accordingly, the petition for prohibition was DISMISSED for lack of merit. However, the court
reiterates that the rule-making power of the Secretary of Education to prescribe school fees for
private school shall not be exercise unreasonably, further stressed that any issuances will be
subjected by the Supreme Court power of review.

Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. vs. Department of Finance Secretary
238 SCRA 63
Facts: Petitioner Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. is a domestic corporation
whose members, individually or collectively, are engaged in the buying and selling of copra in
Misamis Oriental. On the other hand, respondents represent departments of the executive
branch of government charged with the generation of funds and the assessment, levy and
collection of taxes and other imposts. It alleges that prior to the issuance of Revenue
Memorandum Circular (RMC) 47-91 on June 11, 1991, which implemented Value Added Tax
(VAT) Ruling 190-90, copra was classified as agricultural food product under Section 103(b) of
the National Internal Revenue Code and, therefore, exempt from VAT at all stages of production
or distribution. The petitioner contends that the Bureau of Food and Drug of the Department of
Health and not the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) is the competent government agency to
determine the proper classification of food products. It cites the opinion of Dr. Quintin Kintanar of
the Bureau of Food and Drug to the effect that copra should be considered "food" because it is
produced from coconut which is food and 80% of coconut products are edible. The respondents,
on the contrary, argue that the opinion of the BIR, as the government agency charged with the
implementation and interpretation of the tax laws, is entitled to great respect. Likewise,
petitioner claims that RMC No. 47-91 is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution because while coconut farmers and copra producers are exempt,
traders and dealers are not, although both sell copra in its original state. Petitioners add that oil
millers do not enjoy tax credit out of the VAT payment of traders and dealers. Thus, the present
petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to nullify Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 4791 and enjoin the collection by respondent revenue officials of the Value Added Tax (VAT) on the
sale of copra by members of petitioner organization.
Issues:
1. Is copra an agricultural food product for purposes of the provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC), thus exempting the petitioner from payment of the Value Added Tax
(VAT)?
2. Whether or not the opinion of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue should be accorded
respect in interpreting the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code.
3. Is RMC No. 47-91 violative of the equal protection clause?
4. Are oil millers exempt from payment of the Value Added Tax (VAT)?
Held:
1. In the case at bar, we find no reason for holding that respondent Commissioner erred in not
considering copra as an "agricultural food product" within the meaning of Section 103(b) of the
NIRC. As the Solicitor General contends, "copra per se is not food, that is, it is not intended for
human consumption. Simply stated, nobody eats copra for food." That previous Commissioners
considered it so is not reason for holding that the present interpretation is wrong. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue is not bound by the ruling of his predecessors. To the
contrary, the overruling of decisions is inherent in the interpretation of laws. Under Section
103(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code, the sale of agricultural non-food products in their
original state is exempt from VAT only if the sale is made by the primary producer or owner of
the land from which the same are produced. The sale made by any other person or entity, like a
trader or dealer, is not exempt from the tax. On the other hand, under Section 103(b) the sale of
agricultural food products in their original state is exempt from VAT at all stages of production or
distribution regardless of who the seller is. The reclassification had the effect of denying to the
petitioner the exemption it previously enjoyed when copra was classified as an agricultural food
product under Section 103(b) of the National Internal Revenue Code.
2. The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. In interpreting Section 103(a) and (b) of the
National Internal Revenue Code, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue gave it a strict
construction consistent with the rule that tax exemptions must be strictly construed against the
taxpayer and liberally in favor of the state.
Moreover, as the government agency charged with the enforcement of the law, the opinion of
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in the absence of any showing that it is plainly wrong, is
entitled to great weight. Indeed, the ruling was made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
in the exercise of his power under Section 245 of the NIRC to "make rulings or opinions in
connection with the implementation of the provisions of internal revenue laws, including rulings
on the classification of articles for sales tax and similar purposes."

3. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. There is a material or substantial difference
between coconut farmers and copra producers, on the one hand, and copra traders and
dealers, on the other. The former produce and sell copra, the latter merely sell copra. The
Constitution does not forbid the differential treatment of persons so long as there is a
reasonable basis for classifying them differently.
4. It is not true that oil millers are exempt from VAT. Pursuant to Section 102 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, they are subject to 10% VAT on the sale of services. Under Section 104
of the Tax Code, they are allowed to credit the input tax on the sale of copra by traders and
dealers, but there is no tax credit if the sale is made directly by the copra producer as the sale is
VAT exempt. In the same manner, copra traders and dealers are allowed to credit the input tax
on the sale of copra by other traders and dealers, but there is no tax credit if the sale is made by
the producer.