A POLITICAL THEORY OF FOREIGN AID*

lL>\NS MoRGENTHAu
Universily of Chicago
Of the seeming and real innovations which
the modern age has introduced into the prac
tice of foreign policy, none has proven more
baffling to both understanding and action than
foreign ai<i. The very assumption that f oreign
aid is an instrument of foreign policy is a
subject of controversy. For, on the one hand,
the opinion is widely held tho.t foreign aid ie
an end in itself, carrying its own justification,
both tran sce ndin g, and independent of, foreign
policy. In this view, foreign aid is th e fulfill
ment of an obligation of the few rich ua tiom
toward the many poor ones. On the other hand,
mn.ny see no ju stificatio n for a policy of foreign
aid at aiL They look at it as a gigantic boon
doggie, a was teful and indefensible opl:'ration
whic h serves neither the interests of the United
States nor those of the recipient nations.
The public debate on foreign aid has con
tributed little t.o understandi ng . In the sprin g
of every year the nation engages in such a
debat, carried on almost exclusively in t-erm
of the amount of money to be spent for pur
pn<e8 of ioreign aid rn ther th1\n of the sub
stantive purpos es which a. policy of foreign aid
is supposed to serve. The Administration tries,
as it were, to sell a certain amount of foreign
aid to Congress, and Congress refuses to buy
that amount . Con g ress generally app ropriateE
about ten per cent less than what the Admin
istration has requested, and the Admin ist.ra
tion spends what is appropriated as it sees fit
within the general categories authorized. Only
when glarin g abuses and inefficiencies are un
covcrd, as for instance in our foreign aid to
Lnos, is tJ1 que stion of the substance of our
foreign air! policy raised in public, and even
then it is put in the negative terms of remedy
i ng the abuses nnd inefficiencies rather than in
the positive terms of the purpost>s our foreign
a.id policy may be supposed to advance and the
kinds of measures best calculated to serve
these aims.
It is in fact pointless even to mise the ques
tion whether the United Stat<.s ought to have
a polic y ef foreign aid-as much so as to ask
whether the United States ough t to have a
foreign political o r military policy. For the
This paper was prepared for the Public Af.
fairs Conference Center, University of Chicago,
and will appear in a volume of essays on foreign
aid to be published by Rand .McNally and Co. in
!962.

United States has interests abroad which can

not be secured by military means and for the
support of which the traditional methods of
diplomacy arc only in part appropri>tte. If
foreign aid is not available t hey will not be
support-ed at all.
The question, what kind of policy of foreign
11id we ought to ho.ve, cn.n then not be evaded.

As it has developed in recent years, the kind

we have is fundamentally weak. It has been
conceived as a self-sufficient technical enter
prise, covering a multitude of disparate objec
tives and activities, responding ha.phazatdly to
all sorts of demands, sound and unsound, un
related or o nly by accident related to the
political purposes of our foreign policy. The
United Sta.tes, in short, has been in the busi
ness of foreign aid for more than two decades,
but it has yet to develop an intelligible theor y
of foreign aid that could provide stan dards of
judgme nt for both the supporters and oppo
nents oi a particular mea sure.
I. SIX TYPES OF FOREIGN Afl)

The first prerequisite for the development of

n

viable foreign aid policy is the recognition of

the diversity of p olicies that go by thnt name.

Six such can he distinguished wh:ch have only
one thing in common: the transfer of money,
goods and services from one nation to another.
They are humanita.rian f oreign aid, subsisten c e
foreign aid, m ilitary foreign aid, bribery,
prestige foreign aid, and foreign aid for eco
nomic development.
Of these distin ct types, only 'lumanitaria.n
foreign aid i s per se nonpolit ical The aid which
government, have t raditi onally extended to
nations which are victims of natural disasters,
such as floods, famine.s and epidemics falls in
that category. So do the services, especially in
the fields of medicine and agriculture, which
private organizations, such as churches and
foundations, have traditionaHy provided in
Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
While humanitarian aid is per se nonpolit ical,
it cnn indeed perform a political function when
it operates within a political wntext. The
forei gn aid that private organizations provide
will be attrihutcd for better or worse to thei r
resp ecti ve governments insofar as hum an itar
ian aid eman ating from a foreign country is
recognized by the recipient country or its in
habitants to Jl('rform a political function, Thus
the agricultural aid which the Rockefeller

301

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THE AMERIC.\t\ l'OLITIC.l. SCJECE REYTEW

Foundation has provided for many years to

certain L!l.tin American countries is likely to
take on under contempo rary conditio ns n
political function which it did not pe rforrr.
pre vi ously. The same has from the begi nning
been true of the work the Ford Foundation has
been doing in India. By the same token,
humanitarian aid ext ende d by a government
mny have p ol it ical cff ee ts.
Subsistence foreign aid is exte nded to govel"!l
ments, such as those of ,J ord an and Niger,
whi ch do not command the resources to main
tain minimal public services. The giving nation
makes up the deficit in the budge t of the

recipient :mtion. Subsistence foreign aid is nkiJI

to the humanitarian type i n that it seeks to
preve nt the brenk1lown of order and the dis
integration of organized society. Rut it also
performs the political func tion o f maintaining
th e statu1 quo, with out, however, tiS u rule,
increasing its viability. Where a politi cal alter
ntttive to a nonviable reg ime ma' exist, sub
sistencc foreign aid diminishes the chances of its
materialh:ing.
Bribes proffered by one government to an
other for pol itil al advantage were until t.he
begi nni nl! of the nineteenth cenLury an inte gral
part of the armory of diplomac.y. No st11tesman
hoaitated to acknowloclge tho gene ral prD.ctiee
of giving and accepting bribes, howe,er anxious
he might be to hide a pnrticulnr transaction.
Thus it \tas proper and common for a govern
ment to pay the foreign minister or ambassador
of another country a pension, that i s, n bribe.
Lord Robert Cecil, the Minjster of Eliznbcth,
received one from Spain. Sir Hen ry Wotton,
British Ambassador to Venice in the seven
tcenth century, accepted one from Snvoy
while applying for one fro m Spttin. The docu
ments which the French rcvolutionary gove r n
ment publishe d in 1793 show that France sub
sidized Austrian statesmen between 1757 and
1769 to the tune of 82,652,479 l ivres , the
Austrian Chancellor Kaunit2l receiving 100,000.
Tho0 PruAAinn A mhnAAllclor in Pnrilt ummPol
u p well the main rule o f this game when he
re1)()rt.ed to his g overnment in I 02: "Experi
ence has taught everybody who is here OJ
d iplomatJc business that one ought never t:>
,::ive anything before the deal is definitel.v
closed, btt it has only proved that the allurE
ment of gain will often work wonders." It is
wo rthy of note tha.t the first nppropriatjon act
adopted by the first Congress of the United
States in 1789 in cluded a modl't contingent
fund for such purposes.
Much of what goes by the name of foreign
aid today sin the nature of bribs. The trans
fer of money :.1 nd senic1s from one g o,cr:i

ment t another performs here the functio n of

a price paid for poli tica l services rendered o r
to be rendered. These bribes differ from t he
traditional ones exemplifiefl above in two re
spects: they are justified pr im1 rly in terms of
foreign a i d for economic development, and
money and services are t ranSfH red through
i

elaborate machinery fashioned for genuine eco

nomic aid. In consequence, these bribes are a
less effective means for the pu rpose of purchas
ing political favors than were tht! traditional
ones.
The compulgion of eubstitutiug for the
traditional busioessliku t ra nsmission of bribes
the pretense D.nd elaborate machinery o f
fo reig n aid for e conomic de ,,elop men t results
from a climate o f opinion which accepts as uni
versally valid the proposition that the highly
de velope d industrial nations have nn obliga
tion to transfer money and services to under
developed nati ons for the purpose of economic
development. Thus, aside from humanituritLn
and mil itary for eign ai d, the only k in d of t ra ns
fer of money and services wltich seems to be
legitimate is one ostensibly made for the pur
pose of economic development. Economic de
velopment has becom e nn ideology by which
the transfer of money 1\nd s ence s from one
government to another in p> ace time is ration
alized and justified .

The present climate of opinion embraces

another assumption ns universally valid: that
economic developmen can actually be pro
moted through such transfers of m oney and
services. Th us e cono mic deve l opmen t as an

ideology requires machinery thoJ makes plaus

ible the postulated eflicnoy of the tmnsfer for
t he stated purpose of economic development.
Jn co ntras t to most pol itical ideologies, which
operate only on tho verb al level a. n d whose
effects remain within lhe realm of id ea s, this
politictd ideology, in order to be plausible , re
quires an ela borate ad minis trative app aratus
servin g a.s an instr ument for a po licy of make
heHeve. The government of nation A, trying
l buy political ad\'antage from the govern
i
ment o f nation B for, say, the pr e o f 20
milli on dollars, must not only pretend, but
a.lso act out in elaborate fashion the pretense,
that what it is actually doing is giving aid for
P.conomic dC\'<'Iopmcnt to the go\ernment of
nation B.
This practii;e of giving bribes o.s t hough they
were contributions to economi c development
ine,itnbly creates, in tho giver and the recip
icnt, expectations which are bound to be dis
appointed . Old-fashioned bribe1y was a rela
t.ivel.v straig h tfo rward transaction; services
were to be rendere d 11 t a price, aod both sides

A I'OU'l'!C,\L

rtHlOltY

knew what to expect. Bribery disguised as

foreign aid for economic dc,elopment makes o f
giver and recipient actors i n a play wltich in
the end they may uo longer be able to dis
tinguish from reality. In consequence, both
may come to expect results i n terms of eco
nomic development which in the nature of
thin;: n111y not he forthcoming. Thus both are
likely to be cJiappointcd, the giver blaming the
rt ci picnt for his iudficiency and the reci pi ent
;:using tho ;inr of stinginess and asking for
mor. The i ll ology, if taken for rcnlity, gets
in the w:1y of the original purpose of the trans
action and ueither side believes that it ha11
rccehed what it is enti tled to.
For the r..:st dceade, military a.id took the
lion shnre ;f the foreign aid programs of the
Gnited tates. A shift in fa vo r of nonmilitary
aid occurred durin g the 1961 scSJ;ion when
Con gress appropriated somewhat over 2 bil
lion dollars for military aid, while the total
voted for a.l the other foreign aid pro grams
mn in excess of 3 billion dollars. To the latter
amount must be added the equivalent of np
proximately l billion dollars in foreigu cur
rencies, the proceeds of the sale of agriculturo.l
<om modi ties abroad, to be used fo r economic
grants l\Od loans to purchasing governments.
Foreign aid for military purposes is a. trndi
t.ional way by which natioru. buLtrca;s the i r
alliance. Rome used to receive tribute from its
alliE's for the military protections it provided.
The se,entwnth and eighteenth contur irs nrc
the claSJlic period of military subsidies, by
which nations, and especi.'\lly Great Britain,
cndca ''ored to increase the militarv strength
of their allies. Glancing through the treaties
of alliance of that period, one is struck by thr:
meticulous precision with which obligations
to furnish troops, equipment, logistic support,
fOO(l, monPy, and the like were defined. Tho
loans which France extended to Russia n.fter
the conclusion of the :.lliance betwrcn t.h<' two
nations in 11)94 fall in the same category. This
traditional mili tary aid can be understood us a
di , iei on of labor between t"o allies who pool
their resour(('S, one supplying money, mnt.erirl,
and trninin;;. the other providing pri murily
m:anpower.
ln contrast to traditional practicr, militnry
aid todny is extended not only to allies but also
to ccrt(tin uncommitted nati ons The mi litary
aid tl11: Uu.it.cd States has been giving to
Yugoslavia is a case in point. The purpose is
hrrc not. so much lllilitary as political. )t seeks
J)Oliticttl :tdmnt:.g<: in exchange for military
aid It obligates by implication, the recipient
toward the giver . The latter expects t.he Conner
to abstain from a political course whit:h might

'

'

OF FOREIGK

303

AID

put in jeopardy the continuation of military

nd. Ml
i itary aid is here really in the nature of a
i

bribe.
What appears as mlitary aid may also be
actually in the nattue o f prestig e aid, to be
discussed below. The provision of jet fighters
and other moder n weapons for certtin under
developed nations can obviously perform no
g enuin e militu.ry f unction. It increases the
prestige of the recipient nation both at home
and aurond. Being in the possession of some of
the more spectacular instruments of modern
wu.rfa.re, a nation can at least enjoy the illusion
of having ltt:><>ome" modem military power.
As bribery appears today in the guise of aid
for economic development, so does aid for eco
nomic development appear in the guise of mili
tary assistance. In the session of 1961, for in
stance, Congress approp ria ted 425 millio n
dollars for economic aid to strategic areas, and
it isli k el y that i n the totnl appr opria tio ns of
over 2 billio n dollars for milit ary nid other
items of economic nid arc hidden. This mode of
operatio n results from the reluctance of Con
gress to vote l:Lrge amounts for conomic nid in
contrast to its readiness to vote virtually any
amount requested for rnilitny purposes. Yet
the purposes of a id for economic development
are likely to suffer when they nre disguised as
mi li tary assistance, ao we oo w the purpose& of
brib{'ry suffer when diSJ;lliseJ M nid for eco
nomic deYelopm<?nt. Th<' milit.:or y context with
in which su ch aid s bound to orate, even
though its direct administration be in the
hands of the civilian authorities, IS likely to
deflect such aid from its genuine purposes.
More particulnrly, it strengthens the ever
present tendency to subordin11te the require
ments of aid for economic development to
militarv considerations.
Prestige aid has in common wit,h modern
bribes the fnct that its true purpose, too, is
concealed by the otensible purpose of eco
nomic development or military a.id. The uu
profitable or idle steel mill, the highway with
out traffic !\nd lencling nowhere, t.hP. >tirline.
operating with foreign porsoru1el and at a loss
but under the Bag of tho recipient count.ry
all ostensibly serve the purposes of economic
development and under different cirumst:tnces
might do so. Actually, however, they perform
no positive economic function. They owe their
existence to the p<mchnnt, prevalent in many
underde,eloped nations , for what might be
culled "conspicuous industrializt1tion," spec
tacular symbols or, and monuments to, indus
trial advancement rnther thnn iovcstments
satisfying any objective economic needs of the
country.
i

304

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

Tlus tendency sheds an illuminating lighL

up<>n the nature of what is generally referred to
as the "revolution of rising expPctations." We
are inclined to assume that the urgent desire to
improve one's lot by means of modern tech
nology and industry is a well-nigh universal
trend in Asia, Africa, and Lat.in America.
Actually, however, this trend is universal only
in the sense that virtun.lly all underdeveloped
nations want. to a.ppear as having achieved in
dustrialization, while only a fmction of the
population, and frequently only small elite
groups within it, seek the social and economic
benefit-s oi industrialization and are willing to
take the measures necessary to achieve them.
For many of the underdeveloped nations the
steel mill, the highway, the airline, the modern
weapons, perform a function that is not pri
marily economic or military, but psychological
and politi\:al. They arc sought as the outward
show of modernity and power. They perform !t
function similar to that which the cathedral
prforme.d for the medieval city and the feudal
casi.lc or the monarch's palace for the absolute
state. Nehru is r<>p<>rt.ed to ha\'e said, when he
showed Chou-En-Lai a new dam: ".It is in these
temples that I worship." And the more under
developed and less viable a nation is, the
greater is likely to be its urge to prove to itself
n,nd to the world through the reult:; of prestige
aid that it, too, has arrived in the mid-twen
tieth <:t'ntury.
The advnnt.age for the giver of prestige aid is
threefold. He may receive a specific political
ad,antage in return for the aid, very much like
the adYantage received for a bribe. Also, the
spectacular character of prestige aid estab
lishes a patent re.lationship between the
generosity of the giver and the increased
prestige of the recipient. The giver's prestige is
enhanced, as it were, by the increase of the
recipient's prestige. Filllllly, prest. ige aid comes
relatively cheap. A limited commitment of re
sources in the form of a spectacular but eco
nomically useless symbol of modernity nHty
bring disproportionate politica.t dividends.

The giver of foreign aid is therefore well ad

vised to distinguish between prestige aid and
aid for economic dev<:'lopment, though both are
justified by the prospective recipient in terms
of genuine economic development. The pros
pective giier, if unaware of the distinction, is
likely to fall into one of two errors. By mis
taking prstige aid for aid for economic de
velopment, he may waste human and material
resources in support of the latter when the
purpose of prestige aid could have been
achie,ed much more simply and cheaply. Or
else he m;t reject out of hand a request for

prestige aid because he cannot justify it. in

terms o f economic development, and mny
thereby forgo available political advantages.
The classic example of t.his error is the Ameri
can rejection of the Afghan request for the
paving of the streets of Kabul as economically
unsound. The Soviet Union, pursuing a politi
cally oriented policy of foreign :tid, did pave the
streets of Kabul.
II. FOREIGN AID FOR ECONOMIC Dt;VELOP
MENT IN PARTICUI,.\R

None of the types of foreign aid discussed

thus far poses theoretical questions of great
magnitude; rather they raise issues for practical
manipulation which can be successfully met by
common sense tested by experience. Foreign
aid for economic development has been the
primary area for theoretical analysis and
speculation, and these have been primarily of
an economic mtture. Economic thought, true
to its prevailing academic tradition, tends to
look at foreign aid as though it were a self
suffieient technical enterprise to b e achieved
with the instruments, and judged by the stand
ards, of pure economics. And since Western
economic development, from the first industrial
revolution onwards, has been due to the forma
tion of capital and the accumulation of tech
nical knowledge, we have tended to a:;ume

that these two factors would br themselves

provide the impetus for the economic develop
ment of the underdeveloped nations of Asi>t,
Africa, and Latin America. This tendency hl\S
been powerfully supported by the spectacular
success of the Marsh11ll Plun, the political
origins and motivations of which were easily
forgotten in its justification as a strictly eco
nomic measure for the provision of capital and
technological know-how. Yet it is not always
recognized that this success was made possible
only by the fact bhat, in contrast to the under
developed nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin
America, the recipients of .Marshall aid were
among t.he leading industrial nations of the
world, whoee economic systems were but
temporarily in disarray.
The populitr mind, on the other hand, and,
through it, much of the practice of foreign aid
have proceeded from certain unexamined as
sumptions, no less rloubtful for being deeply
embedded in the American folklore of politics.
Thus the p<>pular mind has established correla
tions between the infusion of cRpital and
technology into a primitive society and its
economic development, between economic
development and socia.l stability, between
social stability and democratic institutions,
between democratic institutions and a peaceful

A POLITICAl, THEORY OF FOREJG!\ AIO

foreign policy. However attract.ive and reas
suring Lht>se correlations may sound to Ameri
can ears, they are borne out neither by the ex
periences we have had with our policies o f
foreign nid nor b y gcneml historic e.pcrience.
The lirl>t of these assumptions implies thnt
underdevelopment is at least primarily the
result. of leek of capital and tl'chnological
know-how. t:nderdevclopment is regarded as a
kind of accident or at worst as a kind of de
ficiency disease, which can be taken care of
through subcutaneous injections o f the missing
ingrNlic>nt.. Yet. a nation may suffer from de
ficiencies, some natural and insuperable, others
social and remediable, whicb no amount of
capital and technological know-how supplit>d
from the outside ca.n cure. The poverty of
natural resources may be such as to make eco
nomic development impossible. Nations such
ns Jordan and Somalia are i n all likelihood
perlllllnently incapable of economic develop.
mcnt for that reason. L\lany of the oations
which nrc the perennial recipients of subsistence
aid are likoly to fall in the same catcgol"y.
A nation may also suffer from human de
ficiencies which preclude economic develop
ment. As there are individuals whose qualities
of chamcter and level o f intelligence make i t

impossible for them to take advanta.:e of

economic opportunities, so are there nations
similarly handicapped. 'J'o put i t bluntly: as
there are bums and beggars, so are there bum
nnd beggar nations. They may be the recipients
of charity, but short of a miraculous transfor
mation of their collccti ve intelligence and
character, what they rer,eive from the outside is
not likely to be used for economic development.
Other nat.io ns arc presently deficient in the
specific qualities o f character and intelligence
tbn.t go into the making of a modern economic
system, e\cn though their general or inherent
capabilitis qualify them potentially for the
necessary tr:Lnsform:ttion sometime in the fu
ture. They are, to usc a rough analogy, i n a
medieval st.nge of cultural development, still
:-waiting the equivalent of the morn! and in
tellectual revolutions which in the sixteenth
and seventtcnth centuries created the cultural
preconditions for the economic development of
the West. Yet we tnd to take the existence of
these preconditions for granted, forgetting that
without the secularization and rationalization

of Western thought and society the indust-riali

zation of t.hc West would not have been pos
sible.
A civilization, such

as

the Burmese, which

deprecates success in this world because i t

stands in tl:e way of succe&<J i n the other world,

305

puts a cultural obstttcle in the ptlth of industrial

development, which foreign aid by itself cannot
overcome. Saving, that is, the preservation of
capital or goods for investment or future usc,
has become so integral a part of our economic
thought and actiou that it is hard for us to
realize that there :tre hundrds of millions of
people in the undrdcveloped 11reas of the world
who arc oblivious of this mode of 0p<1ration, in
dispensable to economic development. We have
come to consider the productive enterprise !IS a
continuum in the betterment of which the in
dividual owner or manager h>\15 a personal
stnke. Yet i n many underdeveloped areas the
productive enterprise is regarded primarily liS
an object for financial exploitiou, t-o be dis
carded when i t ht1S performed its funation of
bringing the tempotnry owner the largest finura
ci:tl return in the shortest possibl11 time. Foreign
aid poured into such a precapitalist.ic and even
prera t.ional mould i s less likely to transform the
mould than to be forced by it, in 11a.ys hardly
predictable in advance, into channels serving
the iuterests of a precapitalist.ic: or premtionul
society.
The economic int.erests which tend to pre
vent foreign aid from being used for economic
development arc typically identified with the

ruling groups in underdeveloped societies,

which derive their political power in good meas
ure from the economic staltlS quo. The owner
ship and control o f arable lillld , in particular, is
in many of the underdeveloped societies the
foundation of political power. Lnnd reform and
industrialization nre in consequence an attack
upon the political slc1l118 quo. In h
t e measure
thttt they succeed, they are bound to affoot
drastically the distribution of economic n,nd
political power alike. Yet the beneficiaries of
both the economic and political statWJ quo are
the typical recipients of foreign aid given for
the purpose of changing the 6tatus quo. To ask
them to use foreign aid for this purpose is to
require a readiness for st>lf-sacrifice and a sense
of social responsibility which few ruling groups
have shown throughout history. Furdgn uiu
proffered under such circumstances is likely to
fiLii i n its ostensible purpose and, performing
the function of a bribe to the ruling group, to
strengthen the economic and political status
quo. It is more likely to accentuate unsolved
social and political problems thtn to bring
them closer to solution. A team of efficiency
expert-s and public accountn,nts might well
have improved the opemtions of the AI Capone
gang; yet b y doing so, it would have aggravated
the social and political evils whicb the opera
tions of that gang brought forth.
Given this likely resistance of the ruling

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TRE AMERICAN POLri'IC.\L SCIENCE REVIEW

group to economic development, foreign aid

requires dr(l.Stic politicai ch:tugc as a necessary
condition for its suc:cess. Foreign aid must go
hand in h11>nll with politi:al ch!Lnge, <>ither
voluntarily induced from within or brougM
about th:ough pressure from without. ThE
latter alt<'rnative fa.ces the gh-ing nation with a
dilemma. On the one hand, to give foreign aid
for economic development with011t stipuluting
conditions th11t maximize the chnnces for suc
cess will surely mn.ximize the chances for
failure. On the other hand, to give :tid "with
strings" arouses xenophobic suspicions and na
tionalistic resentments, t.: be exploited both by
the defenders of the status quo and the promo
ters of Communist revolution.
Furthermore, once one has decided to bring
a.bout political change in opposition to the
ruling group, one must identify some alterns.
live group as the instrument of political change.
Sometimt'S, the only choice is among al t.erna
tive groups which n.re eqMIIy unattractive.
Sometimes, and not infrequently, the absence
of any avilable alt<>rnative group lcn.ves only
the choice bctwttn creating onr 01 doing noth
ing.
Finally, the promotion of drastic social
change on the part of the giving nation rna y

create the indispensable condHion for economic

development, but it also conjures up the spec
tre of uncontrollable revolution, In many o.l
the underdeveloped nations peace and ordc1
are maintn.ined only through t,he ruthless usc ol
the monopoly of force by the ruling group. De
terminer! J.nd skillful foreign intervention IJUI,y
find little difficulty in weakening o r even re
moving rutogether the power o f the ruling
group. l t is not so easy to finish what has
thereby brcn started. While the interventionist
nation muy be able to control events up to the
point of instiguting drastic reform and revolu
tion, it may well prove unable to control the
course of the revolution itself. ;\lore particu
larly, a democratic nation, such as the United
States, is greatly handicapped in competing
with Communists in the control of a. revolu-
tion. The revolution may start, as it did in
Cubs, under the democratic 11.uspices of un
organized masses dedicated to social reform
and suppc;rted by the United States, and may
in the course or its developmen t be taken ov<'r
by the highly organized and disciplined Com
munist mmority, the only organized and dis
ciplined revolutiontuy group on the scene.
Successtul foreign aid for economic develop
ment may IILL\'C similarly unsettling politiaal
results. E onomic dev('lopmcnt, <specially by
way of industrialization, is bounti to disrupt
the social fabric of the underdevelop<d nation.

By creating an urban industrial proletariat, it

loosens n.nd destroys the socin.l nexus of family,
village and tribe, in which the individual had
found himself secure. And it will not h<' u.ble, at
least not soon, to pro,;de a substitute for this
lost sociaJ world. The ''acuum so ueated will be
filled by social unrest and political agitation.
Furthermore, it is not the downtrodden peoples
Jh>ing in a static world of unrelieved misery who
1\TC the likely protngonists of revolution, but
rnther those groups th:Lt bave begun to rise in
the social and economic scale h:J.ve not enough
to satisfy their aroused expecbtion. Thus,
economic development is bound lo disturb not
only the economic status quo bu, through it,
the political status quo as well. If the change is
dmstic enough, the socinl anrl political effects
of economic development may well bring
about a prerevolutionary or revolutionary
situation. And while the United States may
have startd the revolutionary process, it \\;Jl
again be uncertain under whose allspices it
will be ended.
The United Slates faces a number of formid
able handicaps in trying to control social and
political change in the underdeveloped nations
either as a prerequisite for, or a result of,
foreign aid for economic development. First of

all, as a Wester n capitt\listic nation. the United

States is a conservntive power both domesti
cally and int.ernationally, and must appear
pilrticularly so to the underdevelof!()cl niLtions.
Both in its civilintion >tnd its social and eco
nomic structure, it belongs to that complex of
nations which until recently were able to hold
Africa, Latin America, and the outlying areas
of Asia. in a condition of colonial or semicolonial
dependency. It has milit.ary allia.nces with these
lllltions, and while it hns generally shunned anrl
even opposed outright colonial policies, it has
actively and successfully participated in the
semicoloniaJ exploitation of back11'ard na,tions.
Thus the resentment agsinst the former
colonial powers attaches also, to it and its
policies of foreign aid are frequently suspect, as
serving in disguise the traditionfl ends of
colonialism.
Furthermore, the United Stut<'s, by dint of
its pluralistic political philosophy and social
system, cannot bring to the backward na,tions
of the world a simple message of salvation, sup
ported first b y dedicated and disciplined revolu
tionary minorities and then by totalitarian
control. In the nature of things, the advantage
lies here with the Communist powers. '!'hey are,
as it were, SJll'lialisfs itt exploitir\ a revolu
tionary situation, whirh is bound to cause us
embftrrassment. lor while the Communists are
able to direct 11 revolution into the desired

A POJ,ITICAL THEORY OF FOREIGN AID

channels through their use of a disciplined

minority, we, even if we are convinced that
revolution is inevitable and therefore do not
oppose it, tend to look on it with misgivings
since we cannot control the direction it will
take.
The Communist powers ha.ve still another
advantage over t.he United States in that, at
least on the surface, their problems and
achievements are more meaningful to the
underdeveloped nations than ours. The Soviet
Union has achieved, and Communist China
attempts to achieve, what the more enli.e;htcned
underdeveloped nations seek: a drastic increase
in national output through rapid industrializa
tion. The C'ommunist powers use totalitarian
control as tl:eir instrument and Communist
doctrine as rationa.!ization. Seeking the same
results, the underdeveloped nations cannot
help being attracted by the methods which
brought about these results elsewhere. In con
trast, the slow process, stretching over cen
turies, through which the ll!ttions of the West
achieved a high standard of living through in
dustrialization must appeal much less to them.
That appea.! is further lessened by the economic
processes of the free market and the political
processes of liberal democracy through which
in large mertsure Western industrialization was
achieved. For these processes require a degree
of moral restraint and economic and political
sophistication which are largely absent in the
underdeveloped nations. The simple and crude
methods of totalitarianism must appear to
them much more congenial.
Thus we arrive at the disconcerting conclu
sion t.hat successful foreign aid for economic
development can be counterproductive if the
social and political goal of the giving nation is
the recipient's social and political st:tbility. In
some cases at least, the failure of American aid
for economic development may have been a
i
disguise in that it did not disturb a
blessing n
stable status quo whose continuance was in our
interest. Such aid, intended for economic de
velopment, actually performs the function
either of a bribe or of prestige aid. Here again,
holl'ever, these functions are likely to be im
paired by disappointed expectat.ions of eco
nomic development on the part of the giving
and the recipient nation.
l t is equally a moot question whether suc
cessful foreign aid for economic development is
conducive to the development of democratic
institutions tllld practices. Without stopping
here to examine the complexities of the rela
tionship betll'een democracy and economic
development, it is enough to observe, as recent
history has made clear, that no necessary

307

causal relationship exists between the two.

The lllOSt impressive example is tbe Soviet
Union. Its rapid economic development has
gone hand in hand with totalitarian govern
ment, and a case could well be made for the
proposition that the former would have been
impossible without the latter. It is more likely
than not that where the intellectual and moral
preconditions for economic development are
lacking in the populat.ion at la.rge and are
present only in a small elite, as is true in many
of the underdeveloped nations, the imposition
of the will of that small minority upon the ma
jority of the population is a prerequisite not
only for the start of economic development but
also for sustained economic growth.
As concerns the promotion of a peaceful
foreign policy, economic development is likely
to be counterproductive if a political incentive
for a belligerent foreign policy is present. The
contrary conclusion derives from the popular,
yet totally unfounded assumption that "poor"
nations make war on "rich" nations for eco
nomic advantage and that "rich" Mtions are
by definition peaceful because they have what
they want. In truth, of course, most wars have
been fought not for economic but political
a.dvantage, and, particularly unde modern
technological conditions, only economically ad
mnced nations are capable of waging modern
war. We did not consider the Soviet Union a
military threat as long as it was economically
underdeveloped; it became one when its eco
nomic development had transformed it into a
modern industrial power. Similarly, Commun
ist China today, except to its immediate neigh
bors, s
i only a potential military threat by vir
ture of its economic potential, both likely to
be activated by economic development.
Foreign aid for economic development, then,
has a. very much smaller range of potentially
successful operation than is generally believed.
Its success depends in good measure not so
much upon its soundness in strictly economic
terms as upon intellectual, moral, and political
preconditions, which are not susceptible to
economic manipulation, if they are suscept-ible
(;o manipulation from the outside a1; all. Fur
thermore, the political results of successful
foreign aid for economic development may be
either unpredictable or counterproductive in
terms of the political goals of the giving nation.
[n any event, they are in large measure uncon
trollable. Foreign aid proffered and accepted
for purposes of economic development may
turn out to be something different from what
it was intended to be, unless it is oriented
toward tho political conditions within which it
must operat-e. Most likely, it will turn out to be

BOO

THE AMERICAN POLfTIC.\L SCIENCE REVIEW

a bribe or prestige aid, or else a total waste. To

too much may here be a.s great a risk as to
do too little, and "masterly iMctivity" may
sometimes be the better part of wisdom.
do

Ill. CONCT.t.iSJONS fOR POLICY

The mujor conclusions for poli<:y to be drawn

from this analysis are three: the rNJuirement of
identifying ench concrete situation in the light
of the six different typs of foreign ttid and of
choosing the qun.ntity and quality of for('ign
aid appropriate to t.l1e situat.ion; the requir('
ment of attuning, within the same concrete
situation, differPnt typ<s of fort>ign aid to each
other in view of th" over-all l(oa.Is of fot<-'ign
policy; and U1e requir(ment of dealing with
foreign aid as an integral part of political
policy.
The task of identifying concrete situations
with the type of fortign a.id appropriate t.o them
is a task for <'Otmtry and area experts to per
form. Can country A not sunhe without,
foteign aid? Ts its go,ernm('nt likely to <.>x
th(tnge poiitiea.l advantag<s for econornie
favors'? Would our milittry interests be served
by the strngthening of this nat.ion's military
forcPs? Doc this country provide the non
('r.onomie pnconditions for economic cl('velop
rn<.'nt to be supported by foreign aid? Are our
politicnl inter<.'sts likely to be served by g1vmg
this nation foreign aid for purposes of prestige'
?
Can a case be made for foreign aid in orcl<'f to
alle,-iat<l human suff<>ring'! What kind and
quantity (I[ :oreign aid is neressary nnd suffi
fient. to :J.(hicve the desired result?
To answer these questions cotTcctly dP-mands
first of all a thorough and intimate knowlPdge
and understanding of the tot.al situation in a
particular eonntr.v . But it also requires politic:\I
and <.'eonomic judgment of a v<'f high order,
applid to two distin<:t issms. lt is nccPssary
to anticipat the receptivity of the country
to differfnt kinds of foreign aid and th<'ir <'ff(cts
upon it. When this analysis has been madP, it is
then nec!"ssar
y to SPlPd from u. gr('at numblr of
possil>le IJitusure of foreign :Lid those 1\hi<;h
arr most appropriate t.o the situation and hen<:e
most likelv l;j suerccd.
I n most r2s<s, ltowrver, th< task is not that
simple. Typically, an undtrd!:vdop<d countty
will present a numlwr of sit.uat.ion8 indictting
the need for diffcrPnt typs of foreign aid
simultanl\ouJy. On<' type given without r('g:ml
for its pott'ntial effects upon another type risks
getting in the way of the Iat.ter. One of the most
conspi<uous weaknesses of our past foreign aid
poliei<>s hn:< b<-'t'n th<' disrel(ard o f the effect
different typPs of fordgn aid have upon e:Hh

other. Bribes given to the ruling group, for

instance, are bound to strengthen th political
o.nd economi< status fJHO. :\Iilitary aid is bound
t.o have an impa<:t upon the distribution of
political power within the r<c<iving country;
it c11n nlso hav<l a deletrious effed. upon the
economic system, for instance, by in<reasing
inflationary pr('ssures. Similarly, th< effec:t of
subsistence foreign aid is bound to be the sup
port of the status quo in all it. aspl'l'ls. Insofar
s the giving nation desires these effect. or can
afford to be indifferent. to them they obviously
do not matter in terms of its over-all objectives.
But insofar as the giving nttion has embarked
upon a policy of foreign uid for ee.onomic d<>
velopment which rquires chnligl'S in tlw
politica.l and economic $tatus quo, the other
types of foreign aid policies arc counterproduc
tive in terms of economic development; for
they strength<'n the very factors which stand in
ifS wn-.
This problem is particularly acute in the re
lations hctween prest.igc aid and aid for
conomic devdopmcnt. The giving nation may
seek qui<k political r<sults and use prestige aid
for that purpose; yet it may also bve an in
terest in the economic development of the
recipi<'nt country, the benefits of which are
likely to appear only in th<! more dist:tnt future.
Prestige aid is at best only by accidPnt favor
able to econom1c dev<'lopment; it may be ir
relevant to it, or it may alltually impede it.
What kind of foreign aid is the giving country
to choose? If it chooses a <'ombinntion of both i t
should take care to r.hoose an innocuous kind
of prestige nid and to promote economic de
,elopmmt the benefits of whirh are not too
long in coming. Afghanist.an is the <lassie ex
ample of this dilemmtt. The Soviet l;nion, by
paving the streets of Kabul, chose a kind of
prPstige aid that is irr(lcvant t.o economic dt
nlopnwnt. The Uniter! Statts, by building a
hydrodeetrir. dam in a remote part of the
<:ountry, chos(' economic development, th<- very
existence of which is unknown to most Afghans
and the benefits of whid1 will not ppear for
ye.a,rs to COJUC.
Tt follows, then, from the very political or
ientation of foreign aid that its effect upon the
prestige of the giving nation must always be
in the minds of the formulat.ors and cxcutors
of foreign aid policies. Foreign aid for economic
development, in particular, whkh benefits the
rl'r.ipiont country itnmldiutely nnd patently is
a. mort: potent political wen.pon than iid
promising benefits that arfl obs<;ure and lie fitr
in the future. Furthermore, tlw political effects
of foreign aid are lost if it.'l foreign source is not
obvious to the recipients. For i t is not aid us

A POLITICAL THEORY OF FOREIGK AID

such or it.<; beneficial results that creates polit.i

cal loyalties on the part of the recipient, hut
the positive rhttionship that the mind of the
recipient estnblishes between the t>id and its
beneficial results, on t.he one hand, and the
political phihsophy, the political system, and
the political objectives of the giver, on t.be
other. That is to say, if the recipient continues
to disapprove of t.he politica.l philosophy, sys
tem, and objectives of the giver, despit-e the aid
he has received, the political effects of the aid
arc lost. The st>me is true if he remains un
ronvinced that the aid received is but. a
. natural,
if llU illcviLal.>le, mauifckt.Liou of Lhc voliLi<:al
philosophy, system, and objectives of the
giver. Foreign aid remains politically in
effectual-at least for the short t.errn-ns long
as the recipient says either: "Aid is good, but
tht politit:s of the giver are bad"; or "Aid is
good, hut. the politics of the giver-good, bad,
or indiffren-have nothing to do with it."
hl order to be able to estal)lish psychological
relationship between giver and recipient, the
procedures through which aid is given, and
the subject mattr to which it is applied, must
lend thcmsches to t.he creation of a connection
between the aid and the politics of the giver
which reflect3 credit upon the lat.ter.
The problem of foreign aid is insoluble if it is
considered as a aclf-eufficicnt technical cuter
prise of a primarily economic naturc. It is
soluble only if it is ronsidered an int.egral part
of the political policies of the giving country
which must be devised in view of the political
conditions, and for its effects upon the political
situation, in the receiving country. Jn this
respect, n policy of foreign aid is no different
from diplonmtic or military polit\y or propa-

gandn. They t>re :11! weapons in the political

armorv of the nation.
As rnilitary policy is too important a matter
to be left ultimately to t.he generals, so is
foreign aid too important a m:1ttcr to be left in
the end to the economists. The exptrtise of the
economist must anu.lyze certain facts, devise
certain means, and perform certain functions of
manipulation for foreign aid. Yet the formula
tion and over-all cx(
cution of foreign aid policy
is a political function. It is the province of the
political expert.
l t follows from the politkll nature of foreign
aiJ that it i uot a ;:science but nn art. That art
requires by way of mental predisposition a
political sensitivity to the interrelationship
among the facts, present nnd future, and ends
and means. The requirements by way of mental
activity are two-fold. The first is a ciiscrimina
ting judgment of facts, ends and neans and
their effects upon each other. However, an
analysis of th1 situation in the recipient coun
try and, more particular!', its project-ion into
the future and the conc!us.ions from the analy
sis in terms of policy can only in part be arrived
at through rittional deduction from ascertain
able facts. When all the nvailable fact. have
been ascerta.ined, duly analyzed, and conclu
sions drawn from them, t,la final judgments
nnd decision;; cnn be rlnrivcd onlv from subt-le
and sophisticated hunches. The bst the
formulator and executor of a policy of foreign
aid can do is to maximize the chances that his
hunches turn out to be right. Here as elsewhere
in the formulation and conduct of foreign
policy, the intuition of the statesman, more
than the knowledge of the expert, wiU carry the
clay.