Professional Documents
Culture Documents
27
EUROPEAN STUDIES
An Interdisciplinary Series in European Culture, History
and Politics
Executive Editor
EUROPEAN STUDIES
An Interdisciplinary Series in European Culture, History
and Politics
27
Edited by
Georg Wiessala, John Wilson and Pradeep Taneja
Le papier sur lequel le prsent ouvrage est imprim remplit les prescriptions
de "ISO 9706:1994, Information et documentation - Papier pour documents Prescriptions pour la permanence".
The paper on which this book is printed meets the requirements of
ISO 9706: 1994, Information and documentation - Paper for documents Requirements for permanence.
ISBN: 978-90-420-2741-1
E-Book ISBN: 978-90-420-2742-8
Editions Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam - New York, NY 2009
Printed in The Netherlands
CONTENTS
9
17
47
NATEE VICHITSORATSATRA
The EU and China in the Context of Inter-Regionalism
65
GEORG WIESSALA
Duality - Dialogue - Discourse:
Some Perspectives on Human Rights in EU-China Relations
83
DAVID ASKEW
Sport and Politics: The 2008 Beijing Olympic Games
103
123
RAJENDRA K. JAIN
The European Union and China:
Indian Perceptions and Perspectives
139
EUROPEAN STUDIES
CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS
Russias Closer Ties with China: The Geo-politics of Energy
and the Implications for The European Union
151
167
187
209
CARLO FILIPPINI
Trade and Investment in the Relations between
the European Union and the Peoples Republic of China
225
VALERIA GATTAI
EU-China Foreign Direct Investment: A Double-Sided Perspective 241
PRADEEP TANEJA
Chinas Search for Energy Security and EU-China Relations
259
ZOU KEYUAN
Recent Chinese Practice in the Maintenance
of Maritime Security and the European Experience
275
291
10
EUROPEAN STUDIES
of Governance in Berlin, at the Europa College in Bruges and at a number of other universities in Europe, the US, Canada and Asia. A former
academic and diplomat, Dr Cameron was an adviser in the European
Commission for more than a decade and served at the EUs delegation in
Washington DC. Dr Cameron was Director of Studies at the European
Policy Centre from 2002-2005. He is the author of several of books and
articles on European and international affairs. His most recent books
include S Foreign Policy after the Cold War (2005) and An Introduction to European Foreign Policy (2007). He is a well-known commentator on international affairs and moderator of conferences and workshops. He has extensive experience of working with the corporate world
in Europe and elsewhere. (fc@eu-russiacentre.org)
JENNY CLEGG is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Central
Lancashire and course leader for the B.A. Hons Degree programme in
Asia Pacific Studies in the School of Languages and International Studies. She is involved in teaching modules on Asia Pacific development
and international relations as well as on China and Globalisation at undergraduate and postgraduate levels. Her current research interests
mainly focus on Chinas development and its implications for the world
order. Her new book Chinas Global Strategy: towards a multipolar
world was published by Pluto Press in January 2009. In recent years, she
has also carried out research on management and ownership reforms in
Chinas rural enterprises, and has published her results in the form of
book chapters and journal articles. Her other main publications include
Fu Manchu and the Yellow Peril: the making of a racist myth (Trentham Press). She has a Ph.D. from the University of Manchester.
(JClegg4@uclan.ac.u)
CARLO FILIPPINI was awarded a Professorship in Economics at Bocconi
University in Milan in 1981. He is currently the director of ISESAO, a
Research Centre devoted to East Asian economic and social studies. He
graduated in Economics and Management at Bocconi University in 1969
and spent two years at the University of Cambridge, UK as a research
student. He has visited East Asian countries many times and given short
courses, seminars or contributed with papers to conferences in Universities and research centres of the region, in particular Japan, Thailand, and
Vietnam. His research interests presently focus on regional integration
and trade relations between East Asian economies and the rest of the
world. In 19932002 he was the Director of the Master in Economics
AUTHORS
11
programme at Bocconi University and in 2002-2004 the European Coordinator of the European Studies Programme Vietnam. In 2004 he was
awarded the Japanese Order of the Rising Sun, 3rd class.
(carlo.filippini@unibocconi.it)
VALERIA GATTAI was awarded a PhD in Economics from Bocconi
University in 2007 with a thesis on the boundaries of multinational enterprises. Her research interests move within the fields of International
Economics (Foreign Direct Investment, Multinational Firms, Internationalisation) and Asian Studies (Chinese Economy). She is author of a
number of publications on FDI, and she has been invited to many international conferences on the topic. Valeria Gattai is currently a post-doctoral researcher at Bologna University and a lecturer in Micro- and Macroeconomics at Bocconi University. (valeria.gattai@uni-bocconi.it)
HUAIXIAN XIE is a Phd candidate at Loughborough University. Her
thesis on EU-China trade relations will be submitted in late 2009.
(H.Xie@lboro.ac.uk)
RAJENDRA K. JAIN is Professor of European Studies and Chairperson,
Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal
Nehru University, New Delhi. He has been Visiting Professor at
Freiburg, Leipzig, and Tbingen Universities and at the Maison des
Sciences de l'Homme, Paris. He is the author/editor of 30 books and has
published 80 articles/chapters in books. He has most recently published
India and the European Union: Building a Strategic Partnership (2007)
(editor). (rkjain13@googlemail.com)
PAUL LIM has been a Senior Academic Adviser at the European Institute
for Asian Studies (EIAS) from October 2007 onwards. He was one of
the EIAS co-founders in 1989. He was the Research Coordinator and
Senior Research Fellow at the EIAS before his departure in 2002 to the
Universiti Sains Malaysia in Penang, Malaysia, where he set up and ran a
new Master in International Studies (European Studies). His latest publications in 2008 have been European Studies: Any sense in Malaysia and
Living in Two/Three Cultures. His other forthcoming publication will
be European Perspectives of Taiwan which he will co-edit with Assistant Prof. Jens Damm from the Institute of East Asian Studies at Freie
Universitt, Berlin. His chapter in his own co-edited book has the provisional title of The European Unions Relations with the Republic of
12
EUROPEAN STUDIES
AUTHORS
13
14
EUROPEAN STUDIES
AUTHORS
15
INTRODUCTION
Pradeep Taneja, Georg Wiessala and John Wilson
China is a continent, not just a country. It is a series of identities, some shared, some
differentiated, and some contradictory: modern, Confucian, authoritarian, democratic, free,
and restrained. Above all, China is a plural noun. (Rana Mitter 2008: 11)
There is, indeed, something plural about the relations between the
European Union (EU) and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). Perhaps the best way to encapsulate this phenomenon is by reference to the
concepts of contradiction and duality, challenge and opportunity - of
being, at the same time, fundamentally the same, and yet essentially
different.
On the one hand, views on China, more often than not, fall prey to
headline-grabbing, media hype, as witnessed in the discussions about the
European Parliaments 2008 Sakharov Prize award to Hu Jia, a Chinese
human rights activist. Other, more recent, issues have concerned, for
example, the humanitarian and political fallout from the 2008 Sichuan
earthquake, the cancellation of the 2008 EU-China summit and the
problem of unsafe Chinese consumer products. At times, the glare of
publicity has been focused on matters as diverse as anti-dumping taxes
on Chinese candles, cyber-wars and virtual ghost-networks allegedly
attacking the West, Dalai Lama visits and German students throwing
shoes at the Chinese PM in Cambridge1 the list of incidents and issues
could easily be extended.
At the same time though, there is much more than just detail: the
EU-China relationship although at times on rocky roads is the most
1
18
European Studies
Phrase borrowed from: Times Higher Education magazine, 22 January 2009: 26/7.
See, for instance: China tells Europe to Mind its Manners in Far Eastern Economic
Review, March 2009 and: A Time for Muscle-Flexing in the Economist, 21 March 2009: 29.
3
INTRODUCTION
19
ety, the forces of the New Left and the New-Right are vying for intellectual supremacy, influence and political predominance, over issues,
welfare the environment, the rule of law and the scope and optimum
pace of reform (Leonard 2008).
In stark contrast to this, the proponents of an alternative view frequently point to the China-threat: in this perspective, the PRC has mutated into angry China: an accidental empire4 and an aggressive pariahstate threatening both Taiwan and world peace; a country whose defence
expenditure rose by 17.6 per cent in 2008,5 which props up rogue-regimes in Sudan, North Korea and Burma6 and insists, unreasonably, on
its developing-nation-status; a violator of human and personal integrity
rights on a massive scale, which silences human rights advocates, plays
on colonial guilt, hides behind the Olympic spirit and Asian values to
suppress dissent and democracy.7 In this view China is a state which
eradicates autochthonous cultures in Tibet and elsewhere, stifles religious
freedoms and seeks to censure the internet (Ching 2008).
While many aspects of both these points of view can, at times, be
ideologically-motivated, and may be, at times, insufficiently backed-up by
data, they remain, more often than not, influential and persistent bones
of contention, as well as background issues.
A substantial proportion of the theory and political practice of current
EU-China relations is linked to the various interpretations of these disparate views. Concomitantly with this, there is a resurgence of interest in
the academic study of matters relating to Europes China strategy;
throughout 2008/09, both new Confucius Institutes and Chairs of EU-China
Relations have been cropping up on an ongoing basis, while the subject
has been debated at Academic Symposia around the globe.8 And, increasingly, European (and western) debates about how to engage, socialise,
contain and tie-in China are echoed in a Chinese mirror-discourse on
20
European Studies
how best to manage the decline of the West and shape the world in an
Asian mould (Mahbubani 2007; Leonard 2008).
These perceptions are, of course, ultimately connected to wider discourses about new Great Games: what kind of superpower is China
becoming? Can the PRC perceive the EU as more than a mere counterbalance in its relations with the United States of America?9 What is
Chinas and the European Unions rightful place in global affairs? Which
lessons can be learned from the global economic downturn, and can
China lead on putting them into practice?10 How important are culture
and rights in the debates about politics and human rights? Who will this
century and the next one belong to? What is the most appropriate
way for the European Union to shape its relations with the PRC?
The attempts to resolve these questions, in turn, unfold against a
background of swift, unprecedented, change in China, characterised by
voracious demands for energy, the Chinese wish for market-economystatus, an increasing population imbalance, persistent wealth disparities
between coastal and inland provinces, the emergence of a new largely
conservative middle-class, the Chinese anti-secession legislation of
2005, an unprecedented expansion of higher education and progressive
environmental degradation to name but a few developments recently
commented on (e.g.: OCallaghan 2004; Gungwu and Wong 2007;
Crossick and Reuter 2007; Shambaugh et al 2008; Leonard 2008; Ching
2008).
The Chapters in this Book
On the one hand, Europe should not listen to Europeans who assume Europe
has all the answers for China as though it was somehow cloning Dolly the sheep,
because it does not; on the other hand, China should not listen to those Chinese
conservatives who believe that China is so different that it can only learn from
within. China is and does need to go through a process of enlightenment-style
thinking to underpin its future political, economic and social trajectory and to
rationalize the current contradictions of Marxist-Leninist thought with a freewheeling economy (Gary Hallsworth in Crossick and Reuter. 2007: 221)
9
See: Europes World, autumn 2008, (http://www.europesworld.org), the Economist,
21 March 2009: 15 and FEER, 1 May 2009 (http://www.feer.com).
10
Francis Smith Lessons from the East in Asian Affairs, March 2009: 6; World
Affairs 2001 (Special Issue).
INTRODUCTION
21
22
European Studies
Vichitsorasatra nevertheless cautions that ASEM should not be considered a failure since its role has always been to stimulate and sustain
growth in bilateral interactions.
The chapter by Georg Wiessala offers seven diverse perspectives on
what may well be the thorniest issue in contemporary EU-China relations: the human rights question. The chapter examines the fundamental
ambiguities in Sino-European relations and points to the legacies of past
civilisational encounters. It proceeds to discuss how EU-China relations
can be conceptualised from the point of view of international relations
theory and intellectual discourse in China and Europe. It subsequently
analyses the role of ideas, identity-politics and perceptions in EUChina human rights discussions, and it examines how EU China foreign
policy can be understood to be constructed around some key elements
and frameworks. The chapter closes by emphasising the roles of intellectual exchange and knowledge-based co-operation and by offering a brief
assessment of the likely future course of EU-China debates over human
rights.
Finally, in the first section of this book, David Askews chapter is not
so much a tale of EU-China relations, more a critical examination of the
relationship between politics, sports and human rights. In China, where
sport has long been mobilized to construct narratives of national identity,
the nationalistic pride generated by sporting success has become increasingly important to the Party-state. Askew also reminds us that until the
mid-1970s, the European Commission saw economic development as a
precondition for the realization of human rights, rather than the current
position, which is to see the guarantee of human rights as a precondition
for development. This attempt by the EU to recreate itself as a normative power means that its relationship with China has been a troubled
one because Beijings official position today shares much in common
with the pre-mid-1970s European Commission.
The second section of this book, The Geopolitical Setting of EU-China
Interaction, deals with a number of important, global, facets of the contemporary EU-China relationship. It introduces into the frame of this
book the concepts of multi-polarity, complex inter-dependence, bi-multipolarity, and an in-depth analysis of a number of international partners
other than the European Union, whose relations with the Peoples Republic of China, nevertheless, constitute an important frame of reference
for Sino-EU contacts, such as India, Russia and the US.
INTRODUCTION
23
24
European Studies
Last but not least, for this second section of the book, Paul Lim
assesses in some detail the place of Taiwan in the EUs thinking, and in
EU-China relations. He focuses especially on the One China Policy,
adhered to by the EU in order to maintain good relations with the PRC.
After surveying an extensive amount of archival materials and data on
trade and investment between Taiwan and the EU, Lim demonstrates
that the Union has made every attempt to obviate the One China Policy,
without offending China. Indeed, Lim claims that, working through its
links with the EU, Taiwan has found a place on the international stage,
anticipating further progress in the near-future through further negotiations.
The third, and final, segment of this book aims to home in on a
number of key topics which have been selected for their potential to give
shape to contemporary EU-China relations, and to determine its immediate future. The section is entitled Issues, Policies and Perceptions in EU-China
Dialogue, a choice of title which is meant to hint at the potential of the
subject-areas chosen, not only to be the practical drivers of EU-China
dialogue, but also to function as important indicators of how the two
partners will view one another in the further course of the 21st Century.
This final part of the book does not lose sight of the role of ideas and
perceptions in EU-China relations. However, it enlarges the scope of the
investigation, in order to embrace some of the ways in which present and
future EU-China co-operation is rooted in a range of developments
pertaining to economics, law, security, energy, crime, media freedom and
maritime matters, to name only a few.
The section begins with an essay by Peter Anderson, revolving
around the situation of Chinese journalism, its freedom of manoeuvre
and the limitations imposed upon it in contemporary China. It places a
particular emphasis on the pressures generated by the impact of the
Internet, and on attempts by the Chinese leadership to police it, in the
year of the Beijing Olympics. In 2009, the year which marks the 20th
Anniversary of the Tiananmen Square crackdown, Anderson investigates
the Chinese Governments perspective on media control and gate-keeping, with reference to national security, stability, political liberty and
education of Chinese students abroad. He offers a range of speculative
political scenarios on the future course and possible extension of journalistic freedoms in the PRC. In some areas, this chapter can be read in
INTRODUCTION
25
conjunction with the chapters about human rights, the Olympic Games
and the context of EU-China relations.
The following two chapters add to the analysis of the state of China
by means of economic evaluation. In the first chapter, Carlo Filippini,
following a thorough examination of the development of economic
relations between the EU and China, focuses mainly on Merchandise
Trade and the Trade in Services. Fillipini relates his analysis, on the one
hand, to the EUs trade deficit with China, and, on the other hand, to
issues of democratic reform in the PRC. He investigates both EU concerns over competition, corruption, regulation and product safety in
China, and analyses Chinese views on the question of Market-EconomyStatus (MES), protectionism and the EU nexus between economic matters and human rights developments. Moreover, Filippini calls for a more
open ranking in the EUs aims for its economic China policy, for the
clarification of competencies, and for a fuller understanding of issues of
language and culture when dealing with China. This latter view relates to
an overall theme of this volume, and it is echoed throughout a number
of other contributions.
The second chapter focusing on economics, by Valeria Gattai, builds
on the previous economic analysis, through her detailed analysis of the
impact of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) patterns in EU-China interaction. In her chapter, Gattai suggests a double-sided conceptualisation,
examining the EU and China in their respective, mutual, roles as host
and home economies. Gattais chapter is informed, on the one hand, by
a comprehensive analysis of the outward internationalisation of Chinese
enterprises since Dengs 1978 Open-Door approach, and with the goglobal policies implemented by successive Chinese leaderships. On the
other hand, her key concern lies with the physical, normative and psychological hurdles European firms often face when seeking to invest in
the PRC. Gattai, furthermore, seeks to point to other factors, such as
skills, intangible resources and capabilities. In pointing to the challenge,
for example, of cultural distance Gattais chapter relates to the arguments also put forward by other authors in this volume, among them by
Fraser Cameron, Carlo Fillipini and Nicholas Rees.
The final two chapters in this last section of the book are concerned
with different aspects of security in China-EU relations, particularly in
the areas of energy and maritime security. These chapters have been
included, not only because there appears to be a significant dearth of
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European Studies
INTRODUCTION
27
EU-CHINA RELATIONS:
HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES
Nicholas Rees
Abstract
This chapter offers and in-depth examination of the origins and the
development of EU-China relations, in the context of the EU-China
Strategic Partnership. The chapter looks at how contemporary, bilateral, Member State relations have formed the background to the
emergence of EU policies with regard to the PRC. It places a particular focus on offering a contribution which can help in our understanding of how the actors in the EU and in China view each other.
The chapter examines how perceptions which shape the contemporary EU-China relationship have been influenced by the legacies of
past encounters.
Introduction
The rise of China and its growing role in international affairs provides
both challenges and opportunities for the European Union and its Member States. The challenges for the EU lie in understanding and working
with China. Economic relations, reflecting trade and European investments in China, tend to dominate the contemporary relationship, although other issues are increasingly on the agenda. The economic relationship also makes it more difficult for the EU to develop a coherent
policy towards China, as those EU Member States with significant economic interests in China are unlikely to agree to a more comprehensive
EU policy towards China that may damage their economic relations. The
challenge for China is to maintain its strong economic and trading relationship with the EU and its Member States while ensuring that any
potentially divisive issues such as human rights, Tibet and Taiwan do not
32
Nicholas Rees
EU-CHINA RELATIONS
33
and during the 1920s, Sino-German trade grew with a number of German armament companies establishing links in China. This was reinforced and intensified following the rise to power of the Nazi Party in
1933, with Germany concluding a treaty with China in 1934 On the
Exchange of Chinese Raw Materials and Agricultural Products for German Industrial and Other Products. The relationship, however, faltered
following the outbreak of second Sino-Japanese war in 1937 and the
increasing pro-Japanese line followed by Germany. In 1941, following
the attack on Pearl Harbour, China joined forces with the allies and
declared war on Germany.
The ensuing legacy of the earlier period and the division of Germany
after World War II meant that Chinas relations with Germany have
always been relatively good with less baggage from the past impacting
on the relationship. Germany (then the German Federal Republic) established diplomatic relations with China in 1972 with the aim of underpinning its commercial relations and supporting German companies doing
business in China. This involved an increasing range of bilateral visits,
including annual visits by the German Chancellor to China, as well as the
development of further systematic cooperation. As with the other EU
states, relations between Germany and China dipped after Tiananmen
Square, but were quickly placed back on track reflecting the importance
of the commercial relationship (Stumbaum 2007: 60). Germany, along
with France, has been a strong advocate of removing the EU arms embargo on China. It has also been cautious about criticising Chinas record
on human rights, supporting the EUs approach of constructive engagement.
The relationship between China and Germany hit rocky waters following a private meeting between the German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the Dalai Lama in September 2007. This was in marked contrast
to the visit by the Chancellor to China the previous August, where she
was warmly welcomed. The meeting with the Dalai Lama annoyed the
Chinese, temporarily leading to a drop to almost freezing point in relations and the cancellation of a number of meetings.1 It also led to criticism from within Germany by a powerful German industrial lobby led
by Jrgen Thumann. The Social Democrats (SPD) and Christian Democrats (CDU), including the German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Stein1
Pressure Growing on Merkel to Fix Squabble with China, Spiegelonline,
27/11/07 http://www.spiegel.de (accessed 28/01/09)
34
Nicholas Rees
meier (SPD) were also critical of the Chancellors actions. This incident
serves to highlight the dilemma for states such as Germany, who find it
difficult to balance economic interests with issues such as Tibet and
human rights.
Sino-British Relations
Britain is the fourth largest exporter of goods to China in Europe and
second in terms of imports from China (Stumbaum 2007: 66). The importance of China to Britain today reflects not only recent developments
but also a considerable history of relations dating back as early as 1637
when Captain John Wendell arrived in Macau and attempted to establish
trading relations with China. These early attempts failed in the face of
opposition from both the Portuguese and the Ming Dynasty (13881644). During the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), British trade developed
with China, although the relationship was often considered highly unequal. The Treaty of Nanjing, signed in August 1842, brought to an end
the first Opium War (1939-42), and led to the acquisition of Hong Kong
as a crown colony.
This was a highly significant development and one that has had a
considerable impact on the development of British relations with China.
Foreign involvement in China later led to the Boxer rebellion, once again
prompting foreign military intervention and suppression of the rising by
a coalition of states, which included Britain. On the Chinese side this left
a lasting impact, with many considering it as imperial aggression and
national shame that has continued to impact on the development of
Chinese foreign policy. Following successful military cooperation during
World War II, where British and Chinese troops fought together against
Japan, the emergence of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) in 1949,
presented a fresh set of challenges for British foreign policy.
The British government recognised the PRC as the legitimate government of China, which led to the reestablishment of diplomatic relations
during the 1950s, first with the appointment of a charg daffaires in Beijing
(1950), and later the appointment of a Chinese charg daffaires in London (1954). It was, however, only in 1972 that full diplomatic relations
were established. As early as 1950 trade matters were of growing importance to British companies leading them to form the Group of 48 (companies), which is now the China-Britain Business Council and the SinoBritish Trade Council (1954).
EU-CHINA RELATIONS
35
It could be argued that it was not until 1984, with the Sino-British
Joint Declaration, which led to the return of Hong Kong to Chinese
sovereignty in 1997 that the injustices of the past were addressed and
that relations with China were placed on a better footing. The importance that Britain attaches to its relations with China is reflected in the
fact that the UK government established in November 2003 a China
Task Force, which is chaired by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The
task force covers seven areas of possible cooperation and includes
among its members a mix of business leaders, academics, and politicians.2
Relations between Britain and China intensified after May 2004, when
Prime Minister Blair and Premier Wen Jiabao signed a statement on the
establishment of a comprehensive strategic partnership and agreed to
hold annual summits.3 This has been exemplified in the intensity of
diplomatic visits, with the visit of Premier Wen Jiabao to Britain in September 2006 and both the British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary
each making two visits to China in 2008. It is also evident in the range of
institutional channels for communication, which include the summit
meetings and task forces, as well as the UK-China Economic and Financial Dialogue, sector specific dialogues, and the UK-China Human
Rights Dialogue.
These are mirrored on the Chinese side by bodies such as the UK
Task Force. Most recently, in 2009, the UK Government published a
new strategy document on The UK and China: A Framework for Engagement in which it identifies why China matters, the key challenges and
the UK response. It is suggested that China matters to the UK in a number of areas, including in terms of British prosperity, globalisation, climate change, development, international security and the international
system. The document identified three key elements of British foreign
policy towards China: getting the best for the UK from Chinas growth,
fostering Chinas emergence as a responsible global player, and promoting sustainable development, modernisation and internal reform in
China.
In respect to each of these areas, the paper outlines more detailed
targets and deliverables. In seeking to achieve these targets the UK has
2
36
Nicholas Rees
EU-CHINA RELATIONS
37
focus of many of these activities and visits has been on developing economic relations and trade. Notable examples of major contracts awarded
to French companies include the sale of Airbus planes to China and
cooperation in areas such as energy and information technology. The
relationship, however, has also had its problems. In early 2008 there
were significant public protests in Paris during the Olympic torch relay
about human rights in China and the issue of Tibet. This led to protests
in China, including a campaign by the Chinese to boycott the French
hypermarket Carrefour, as well as warnings from the Chinese government that Sino-French relations could be damaged by such incidents. In
response to this situation, both the French and Chinese governments
sought to calm the situation. An indication of how seriously the French
government took the situation was that President Sarkozy wrote a letter
of sympathy to the Chinese athlete who had carried the Olympic torch in
Paris, which was delivered in person by the President of the French
Senate. However, Sarkozys own meeting with the Dalai Lama in December 2008 had detrimental effects on Sino-French relations, with the
Chinese cancelling the EU-China summit that France was meant to have
hosted as part of its EU Presidency.
The EU and China: Developing a Multi-Faceted Relationship
The EU and China are now engaged in cooperation on a number of
levels, including on international and bilateral issues, reflecting the growing complexity and density of the relations. This reflects the EUs objective of trying to move away from a relationship largely based on economic and commercial interests, towards a more strategic partnership
based on a comprehensive set of relations between the EU and China.
The partnership has also been increasingly institutionalised and formalised, ensuring a continuous dialogue and stream of visitors between
China and the European Union (Men 2008). It has been variously described as a long-term relationship, a comprehensive partnership, a
maturing partnership, a strategic and enduring relationship and closer
partners (Dai 2007). Since the late 1990s, there has been a profusion of
new strategy papers and communications published by the European
Commission, reflecting the increasing levels of EU-China engagement
and activity (see Chapter by Cameron). The titles of these papers are
important as they indicate how the relationship has been evolving, at
least from the European Commissions viewpoint.
38
Nicholas Rees
The overall theme has been one of engagement, linked to development of a strategic partnership that is maturing based on shared interests
and challenges. On the Chinese side, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
response to the 2003 Commission paper published its own strategy paper, Chinas EU Policy Paper, in October 2003. The paper identified
the EU as a major force in the world and one that will play an increasingly important role in both regional and international affairs (MFA
2003, 1). It suggests that the two sides share some common interests,
including support for a strong multi-lateral (or multi-polar) international
system. The paper identifies the objectives of Chinas EU strategy as
being: closer political ties with the EU, continuing economic cooperation
and integration with the EU, and more people to people exchanges to
increase learning from each other. It notes, however, given the differences in historical background, cultural heritage, political system and
economic development level, it is natural that the two sides have different views or even disagree on some issues.
The EU and China are increasingly engaged in a multi-faceted relationship across areas that include trade and aid, human rights, security
and international cooperation. It is, however, trade that dominates the
relationship, with other issues arising on a periodic basis and providing
the basis for dialogue and progress.4 In trade terms, the European Union
is Chinas largest market and China is the EUs fourth largest market. In
2007, the EU imported 231 billion worth of goods from China, while it
only exported 72 billion in goods to it.5 In this trading relationship, the
EU is the primary supplier of technology and goods to China in comparison to the USA. Arising out of nature of this relationship, the EU has
suffered a significant trade deficit with China amounting to 159 billion
in 2007. In 2007, European companies invested 1.8 billion in China,
considerably less than in 2006 (6.2 billion), with Germany being the
largest investor followed by the Netherlands, the UK and France. This
investment is not simply in manufacturing but also includes R&D, highlighting the importance of China to large European companies. However, China is also investing in Europe by directly manufacturing prod4
The EU is also a significant provider of development assistance in China, which is
administered through the Commission Delegation in Beijing.
5
EU-China Trade in Facts and Figures, 23 September 2008 http://europa.eu
/rpid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference= MEMO/08/580&format=H (accessed
28/01/2009)
EU-CHINA RELATIONS
39
[editors note]: see also the chapter by Georg Wiessala in this volume.
40
Nicholas Rees
7
The lifting of the arms embargo has also been opposed by the European Parliament.
EU-CHINA RELATIONS
41
42
Nicholas Rees
individuals who are well informed and knowledgeable about the EU and
China respectively (Algieri 2008: 67-69). However, public knowledge and
understanding of China is relatively limited, reflecting the geographical
and cultural distances that exist between Europe and China (Crossick
and Reuer 2007).
The effectiveness of the EU as an actor is also questionable and the
Chinese authorities are well aware of this. At the EU level, the Member
States do engage in cooperation by sharing information and coordinating
action and in most instances the EU as a group has more influence than
a single member state (Keukeleire and MacNaughton 2008). Individual
states do, of course, pursue their own economic interests and commercial relations with China. This is inevitable given the importance of the
Chinese market, which has a huge potential for European companies and
which cannot be ignored. This is always likely to make it difficult to
develop a more comprehensive EU view and policy towards China and
makes it easy for the Chinese authorities to exert pressure on particular
Member States when they feel it is to their advantage and when they
want to reward/sanction behaviour.
Nevertheless, as indicated later in this chapter and elsewhere in this
book (see Chapter by Cameron), the EU Member States have coordinated their actions and agreed common approaches towards China on
very specific issues. For example, the issue of intellectual property theft
is a major concern for many European companies and a coordinated EU
approach is more likely to achieve results in China. It is also the type of
issue which the EU through the Commission can pursue in the WTO
and through bilateral links with China. As a result, in January 2009 the
EU and China signed an agreement on intellectual property rights, highlighting the success of a unified EU approach to China.
The Chinese view (or views) of Europe needs to be placed and understood in the broader context of Chinas growing role in international
affairs. In the international system China is striving to establish its position as a major international player or great power. It aims to do this
through a policy of cooperative engagement and the use of soft power
within the international economic system (Narramore 2008: 90; also Gill
and Huang 2006).9 On its immediate borders it has to contend with
9
This initially began under Deng Xiaoping, with the Five Principles of Peaceful
Co-existence, and was then replaced by the new Security Concept, which emphasised
cooperation as an alternative to the Cold War environment.
EU-CHINA RELATIONS
43
Russia, India and other East Asian states, while its relationship with the
United States still remains problematic especially in relation to Taiwan.
Against this backdrop, the European Union is seen as relatively benign
and a potential partner in international relations (Crossick and Reuter
2007: 4). In this context, Chinese political leaders and intellectuals have
diverse views and understandings of Europe (Leonard 2008). They are,
however, engaged in trying to more fully understand Europe and, at the
same time, build an understanding in Europe and elsewhere of China
(Gill and Huang 2008).
There are clearly possibilities for cooperation with the EU and Chinese leaders often find the EUs approach to international relations more
acceptable than that of the United States or Russia. Equally, however,
there is recognition that the EU and United States do work in close
cooperation in organisations such as NATO and on issues such as international terrorism. China has also drawn some lessons from the EU
experience with regional cooperation and has committed itself to closer
regional cooperation in Asia through organisations such as the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation and ASEAN, including ASEAN + 1 (China),
ASEAN + 3 (China, Japan and South Korea), the ASEAN Regional
Forum and ASEM (see Shambaugh 2005b). Chinese political leaders
have a good understanding of how the European Union works and the
role of its Member States than perhaps it is given credit by many Europeans (Sandschneider 2002: 44).
Conclusion
In looking to the future, the challenge for the EU and China is to try to
develop a more long term strategic partnership that enables them to
work more closely together in the international system. There are undoubtedly some similarities between China and the European Union
with both committed to some form of multilateralism, the rule of law,
supportive of regional cooperation and the pursuit of economic and
political objectives by peaceful means. But there are also significant
challenges. First, as is evident from this analysis, the EU is far from a
composite international actor with a clear focus on what it wants to
achieve in its relations with China. China and the EU are very different
types of actors, coming from differing political and ideological traditions
that may make cooperation more difficult to achieve (Scott 2008). Second, the EUs own Member States are committed to pursuing their own
44
Nicholas Rees
References
Algieri, Franco. 2008. Its the system that matters: institutionalization and
making of EU policy toward China in Shambaugh, David, Eberhard Sandschneider and Zhou Hong, (eds.) 2008. China-Europe Relations: perceptions,
policies and prospects. London: Routledge: 63-83.
Anderson, Peter and Georg Wiessala. 2007. The European Union and Asia: Reflection and Reorientation. Amsterdam and New York, NY: Rodopi.
Balm, Richard. 2008. A European Strategy towards China? The Limits of
Integration in European Foreign Policy Making in Balme, Richard and
Brian Bridges (eds.), Europe-Asia Relations: Building Multilateralisms.
Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan: 125-44.
Balme, Richard and Brian Bridges, (eds.). 2008. Europe-Asia Relations: Building
Multilateralisms. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
Barysch, Katinka with Charles Grant and Mark Leonard. 2005. Embracing the
Dragon: The EUs Partnership with China. London: Centre for European Reform.
Casarini, Nicola and Costanza Musu, (eds.). 2007. European Foreign Policy in an
Evolving International System. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
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45
Crossick, Stanley and Etienne Reuter, (eds.). 2007. China-EU: A Common Future.
New Jersey: World Scientific.
Dai, Xiudian. 2007. EU-China Relations in the New World Order: An Uncertain Partnership in the Making. Paper presented at the 57th PSA Annual
Conference, 11-13 April.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). 2009. The UK and China: A Framework for Engagement. London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
Gill, Bates and Yanzhong Huang. 2006. Sources and Limits of Chinese Soft
Power in Survival 48(2): 17-36.
Godement, Franois. 2008. The EU and China: A Necessary Partnership in
Grevi, Giovanni and lvaro de Vasconcelos (eds.) Partnerships for Effective
Multilateralism: EU Relations with Brazil, China, India and Russia. Paris: EU
Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper No. 109, May: 59-76
Grant, Charles with Katinka Barysch. 2008. Can Europe and China Shape a New
World Order? London: Centre for European Reform.
Grevi, Giovanni and lvaro de Vasconcelos (eds.). 2008. Partnerships for Effective
Multilateralism: EU Relations with Brazil, China, India and Russia. Paris: EU
Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper No. 109, May.
Heron, Tony. 2007. European Trade Diplomacy and the Politics of Global
Development: Reflections on the EU-China Bra Wars Dispute in Government and Opposition 42(2): 190-214.
Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan. 2008. The Foreign Policy of the European
Union. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
Leonard, Mark. 2008. What does China Think? London: Fourth Estate.
Men, Jing. 2008. EU-China Relations: From Engagement to Marriage? Brugge: College of Europe, EU Diplomacy Papers, No. 7.
Mller, Kay. 2002. Diplomatic Relations and Mutual Strategic Perceptions:
China and the European Union in The China Quarterly 169: 10-32.
Narramore, Terry. 2008. China and Europe: Engagement, Multipolarity and
Strategy in The Pacific Review 21, no. 1: 87-108.
Rees, Nicholas. 2008. European and Asian Security and the Role of Regional
Organisation in the Post- 9/11 Environment in Murray, Philomena, (ed.).
Europe and Asia: Regions in Flux. Palgrave Macmillan: 149-169.
Scott, David. 2007. China and the EU: A Strategic Axis for the Twenty-First
Century? in International Relations 21(1): 23-45.
Sandschneider, Eberhard. 2002. Chinas Diplomatic Relations with the States
of Europe in The China Quarterly 169: 33-44.
Shambaugh, David; Eberhard Sandschneider and Zhou Hong (eds.). 2008.
China-Europe Relations: perceptions, policies and prospects. London: Routledge.
Shambaugh, David. 2005a. The New Strategic Triangle: US and European
Reactions to Chinas Rise in The Washington Quarterly 28(3): 7-25.
Shambaugh, David. 2005b. Chinas New Diplomacy in Asia in Foreign Service
Journal May.
46
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Fraser Cameron
Abstract
The EU and China have both undergone dramatic changes in the past
20 years. With 480 million citizens, a single currency and the largest
GDP in the world the EU has become an important actor on the
international stage. China, with over 1.3 billion citizens, has undergone dramatic reforms and enjoyed unprecedented economic growth
that has also led to a greatly increased world role. Both the EU and
China are now keen to develop and further deepen their relationship.
As Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner stated in February 2005:
There is no greater challenge for Europe than to understand the
dramatic rise of China and to forge closer ties with it. But what do
Brussels and Beijing mean when they talk of a strategic partnership?
To what extent do they share the same conceptual ideas and principles? The EU proclaims it stands for a values-based foreign policy
with the emphasis on effective multilateralism. China asserts that its
peaceful rise is aimed at developing a harmonious world. But often
the two sides seem to talk past each other. In recent years there has
been a flurry of EU policy papers on China. In contrast, China published just one paper in 2003 which was highly appreciative of the
EU. This chapter reviews the EU approach to China, assesses the
thinking behind the various communications and examines the main
challenges the EU is facing in forging a new strategic partnership
with China.
Introduction
Relations between the European Union (EU) and the Peoples Republic
of China (PRC) have developed remarkably fast over the past decade.
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The two very different actors now engage in a large number of dialogues
covering issues ranging from trade and development to climate change
and global governance. Both sides are negotiating a new partnership and
cooperation agreement (PCA). The EU side has been prolific in terms of
policy papers about China with the European Commission issuing several Communications which have provoked debate in the European
Parliament and decisions in the Council. Several research institutes,
academics and NGOs in Europe have also produced policy papers and
reports on China. In contrast, China has published only one major document about the EU, in 2003, but there is a growing interest about the
EU in China reflected in the fact that more and more academic institutions and think tanks are studying the EU (Grant 2008).
Although relations between the EU and China have developed rapidly in recent years, there are several contentious areas concerning issues
such as human rights, the arms embargo, the trade imbalance, market
economy status (MES), currency levels and intellectual property rights
(IPR). Increased contact has, no doubt, led to greater understanding
between both sides but there remain considerable misperceptions on
both sides. This could be witnessed during the disputes over Tibet in the
spring of 2008 and in the subsequent divisions within the EU about
whether to attend the Olympic Games.1 Differences over the then EU
President Sarkozys announcement in early November that he would
meet with the Dalai Lama led to the cancellation of the EU-China summit in December 2008. This move was a blow to those who argued that
EU-China relations were on a continuous upward trajectory, although
China stressed that the matter should be seen more as a bilateral dispute
with France, rather than with the EU itself.
This chapter reviews the development of EU-China relations since
the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1984. It focuses on the various China Communications of the European Commission and seeks to
assess the impact and influence of the other EU institutions on the development of the relationship. It does not cover bilateral relations of EU
Member States with China, reviewed elsewhere in this volume. The
chapter highlights how EU policy has changed during the past two decades evolving from a focus on assisting Chinas development and re1
In the end, most EU leaders did attend the Olympics, which were widely regarded as a major success, and which marked Chinas coming-out-party.
49
form process to a focus on dealing with the challenges posed by the rise
of China.
The Legal Framework of EU-China Relations
The 1985 EC-China Trade and Economic Co-operation Agreement
continues to be the main legal framework for EU-China relations. It was
complemented, in 1994 and 2002, by means of exchanges of letters
establishing a broad EU-China political dialogue. Both sides signed a
Textiles Agreement in 1979 while the following year the EU agreed to
include China in the general system of preferences (GSP). The development of the relationship was not without its problems during the early
period, with Chinas rapid economic rise leading to calls for EU protectionism. Similarly, the issue of human rights in China has also risen up
the agenda and is highly contentious among the EU Member States,
epitomised by the controversy surrounding attempts to lift the arms
embargo. The relationship has also been beset by competition between
EU Member States, which, spurred on by economic interests, have often
sought to develop their own bilateral relations with China. By the 1990s,
the EU-China relationship had significantly altered and expanded with a
broader set of dialogues being developed, including through the establishment of the first Joint Working Group on Economic and Trade
Matters (1993), the establishment of regular meetings between the EU
troika2 and Chinese ministers and annual EU-China summits since 1998.
Negotiations on a more comprehensive Partnership and Co-operation
Agreement (PCA) started in January 2007 and are still on-going, having
reached the half-way stage in January 2009. In 2008, a new High Level
Economic and Trade Dialogue (ETD) format was launched, following a
similar Sino-US model. The EU and China have also concluded a number of sectoral (sector-specific) agreements, notably the following:
The Science and Technology Agreement (1998, renewed in 2004)
The Maritime Transport Agreement (2002)
The Agreement on Cooperation in the EU Galileo Satellite Navigation
Programme (October 2003)
2
The troika is the unwieldy EU representation for political dialogue with third
countries. It comprises the current and future EU Presidencies, plus Commission and
Council.
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A Long Term Policy for China EU Relations, 24.6.1995 COM (1995) 295.
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53
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On the Taiwan question, see also the chapter by Paul Lim, in this volume.
57
both sides. Regarding the rather sensitive issue of the arms embargo the
paper avowed that further work will be necessary by both sides.9
A review of these Commission communications reveals a major
change in EU concerns. For most of the 1990s, China was tarred with
the Tiananmen-Square brush. The EU was willing to assist China in
joining international bodies such as the WTO but closer cooperation
would depend on Beijing paying more attention to domestic reforms,
especially in human rights. In the first decade of the twentieth century,
the balance of power began to shift in Chinas favour, and EU concerns
now surrounded economic and trade issues, especially protecting EU
jobs from alleged unfair Chinese competition.
The Commission does not produce policy papers in a vacuum. It
consults regularly with Member States about their interests and concerns.
The resulting communications are thus a balancing act between what is
politically feasible, taking into account the views of the Member States,
the Commission services, other EU institutions, and China.
Alternative Agendas: Views of the European Parliament and Council
The European Parliament (EP) has traditionally taken a much more
critical approach to China than the European Commission or, indeed,
most of the Member States. While approving the various Commission
Communications outlined above, Parliament often added Resolutions
critical of Chinas human rights record. One example of this was an EP
Resolution of February 2001 when Parliament called on China to guarantee the constitutional right to freedom of religion and belief, together
with the exercise of the associated rights of freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, freedom of association and freedom of assembly.10
Another contentious issue was the arms embargo. In December 2003,
Parliament adopted a Resolution opposing any arms sales to China until
there was a significant improvement in human rights.11
Moreover, in April 2005, the European Parliament adopted a Resolution stating that strategic partnerships with third countries must be based
on the sharing and promotion of common values. It regretted that
relations with China had made progress only in the trade and economic
fields, without any substantial achievement as regards human rights and
9
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P6_TA(2005)0132.
P6_TA(2005)0381.
14
P6_TA(2006)0346.
13
59
Another pertinent document to be considered in this study was contained in the East Asia Policy Guidelines, agreed by the Council in
December 2007.17 The Guidelines emphasised the importance of integrating China into the global system, with the aim of tackling issues
ranging from climate change and nuclear proliferation, to trade and
regional security, especially in the case of Africa.
An Overview of Chinese Views
The Chinese authorities have been much less prolific about producing
policy papers on the EU. The only Chinese paper so far, specifically
focusing on the EU, appeared in 2003. It was compiled by the Chinese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and reflected a glowing picture of the
EU, which was seen as a major force in the world. In the papers view,
and in spite of their twists and turns, China-EU relations were seen to be
better than any time in history. The paper saw no fundamental conflict
of interest between China and the EU and neither side posed a threat to
the other. However, given their differences in historical background,
cultural heritage, political system and economic development level, it was
seen as natural that the two sides would have different views or even
disagreed over some issues. Nevertheless, according to this paper, the
15
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common ground between China and the EU outweighed any disagreements by far.
The Chinese EU policy paper did not omit the sensitive issues in the
relationship. It encouraged EU officials and others to visit Tibet and
welcomed the support of the EU and its members to Tibet's economic,
cultural, educational and social development and their cooperation with
the autonomous region subject to full respect of China's laws and regulations. The Chinese side requested the EU side not to have any contact
with the Tibetan government in exile or provide facilities to the separatist activities of the Dalai clique.
On human rights, the strategy noted that there was both consensus
and disagreements between China and the EU. The Chinese side appreciated the non-confrontational approach but reminded the EU that there
were social, economic and cultural rights to be protected. The paper
emphasized that the proper handling of the Taiwan question was essential for a steady growth of China-EU relations. China appreciated the EU
commitment to the one-China principle and hoped that the EU would
continue to respect China's major concerns over the Taiwan question,
guard against Taiwan authorities' attempt to create two Chinas or one
China, one Taiwan and prudently handle Taiwan-related issues. EU
exchanges with Taiwan must be strictly unofficial and non-governmental.
In terms of economics, the Chinese document demanded that the EU
should grant China full market economy status at an early date, reduce
and abolish anti-dumping and other discriminatory policies and practices
against China. The EU should also lift its ban on arms sales to China at
an early date so as to remove barriers to greater bilateral cooperation on
defence industry and technologies.
Chinas 2003 EU policy paper represented the apex, so far, of the
PRCs assessment of the EU. Over subsequent years, China became
more frustrated with the EU over a range of issues, including the failure
to lift the arms embargo, to receive market economy status, a plethora of
anti-dumping cases, the perceived European support for the Dalai
Clique, and European threats to boycott the 2008 Olympics. Chinese
resentment over some of these matters led to the cancellation of the EUChina summit in December 2008. It remains to be seen to what extent
these negative reactions on the Chinese side were tactical and temporary,
rather than genuine and permanent. At the same time, the EUs failure to
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18
The paper is available on the website of the Chinese MFA and of DG RELEX.
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63
References
Crossick, Stanley and Reuter, Etienne. 2007. China-EU: A Common Future.
Singapore: World Scientific Press.
Gill, Bates 2007. Rising Star: Chinas New Security Diplomacy. Washington DC:
Brookings Institution Press.
Grant, Charles. 2008. Can Europe and China Shape a New World Order? London:
Centre for European Reform.
Holslag, Jonathan. 2007. China and Europe: the Myth of Post-Modern World in
Brussels: BICCS Background Paper, Volume 2/2007
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Abstract
This chapter focuses on the analysis of cooperation between the
EC/EU1 and China using an eclectic approach which proposes that
the fluctuation between bilateral and multilateral interregional cooperation process is influenced by actors strategic choices in pursuing a
material, institutional or ideational focus in their interaction. The
chapter conducts a broad analysis of the material, institutional and
ideational elements of the EC-China inter-regional partnership. It
contends that, in its relationship with China, the EU appeared to
consistently opt for a bilateral strategy, with a priority on material
interests. Using the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) as the main multilateral forum for engagement between Europe and Asia, there is little
evidence to suggest that the EU pursued a multilateral strategy with
China. The first part analyses the ECs motivations for inter-regionalism. The second part observes the material, institutional and
ideational influences in the EC-China bilateral and multilateral partnerships. The final part argues that active bilateralism has taken precedence in the ECs dealings with China, while passive multilateralism remains an option for future engagement between the two.
1
In this chapter, the terms EC and EEC refer to the European Communities
and the European Economic Communities/Community and the First Pillar of the
EU, where the focus is on economic, social, and environmental aspects of SinoEuropean relations. Where the analysis extends to the CFSP or Police and Judicial
Cooperation, the chapter employs the terms the EU Member States or EU.
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http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/index_en.htm
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69
seen to hold a friendlier attitude towards the Chinese than the Americans.
This positive attitude the Europeans appeared to offer might have
been critical in improving subsequent commercial and political relationships. The French and the British sincerely believed that China could
have a role in maintaining peace and stability in Indochina. Following the
Geneva conference, trade quickly increased between China and the West
European countries with (West) Germany, Britain and France being the
largest traders with China (Shambaugh 1996: 5). At this stage, the USA
had already terminated all commercial ties with China after Maos accession to power. The USA also tried to influence its Western allies to restrict the export of strategically sensitive products to communist countries through the Paris Co-ordinating Committee (COCOM) (Dent 1999:
129).
The 1960s Sino-Soviet split provided the next crucial period in the
Europeans early relationship with the Peoples Republic of China (PRC).
When China and the Soviet Union parted ways, China found itself increasingly dependent on West European commerce. In 1964, French
President Charles de Gaulle gave diplomatic recognition to the PRC.
Kapur describes a three-pronged policy whereby in the early 1960s the
Chinese under the leadership of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping used
public relations, economic initiatives and diplomacy to improve the countrys relationship with the West Europeans, particularly the members of
the then EEC (1986: 8-15).
The years between 1971 and 1985 proved a critical time, both for
Chinese domestic reform and in terms of Chinas interaction with the
international community. To begin with, this was a period when China
finally became fully accepted by the international community and the
Western blockade against China ended. This was also a period when
Deng Xiaopings market reforms started to take place, thus enabling
China to enter the international trading arena with renewed vigour. Finally, this was the period when the international trading community
realized the possible impact the Chinese trading capacity could have on
their own economies, and this was marked by increased signs of protectionism against Chinese products.
By the time the Cultural Revolution ended in 1969, the opportunity
arose for moderates in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to have a
larger role in the domestic policy making process. It is assumed that Mao
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October 1997, the European Commission referred to a conceptual breakthrough in its bilateral accession negotiations with China, and a provisional deadline of December 1998 was set for Chinas WTO accession
(Dent 1999: 147). During this critical period, the first two EC-China
Summits were held in 1998 and 1999, bringing along an expansion of the
political as well as the economic dialogue. The actual signing took place
in May 2000, allowing China to accede to the WTO. It should be noted,
however, that the US had already concluded its own bilateral agreement
with China in 1999.
While the maturing of relations and dialogue between China and the
EC continued between 1995 and 2000, the EC trade deficit continued to
grow. EC imports increased from Ecu 26.4 billion in 1995 to Ecu 69.6
billion in 2000, while EC exports to China only added up to Ecu 14.6
billion in 1995 and Ecu 25.4 billion in 2000. This meant that the EC
Member States trade deficit with China had quadrupled from Ecu 11.6
billion in 1995 to a staggering Ecu 44.6 billion in just five years (Allen
2002).
In 2003, China had become the ECs second largest trading partner
after the US, but by this stage the EC had already amassed its biggest
bilateral trade deficit of Ecu 64 billion against the Chinese. This was,
according to the Commission, continuing to widen (CEC 2005).
The Commissions 2003 Communication praised China for making
considerable efforts to keep up its WTO accession commitments, but it
also highlighted substantial concerns including the lack of transparency
of economic governance, restrictive regimes in certain sectors and introduction of new NTBs. The EC clearly stated that a year and a half after
Chinas WTO accession, it continues to encounter problems with market
access, services, the enforcement of intellectual property rights and compliance with international standards (CEC 2003: 15-16).
If a single feature were to mark the difference between the EC-China
partnership against others such as the EC-Japan and EC- Republic of
Korea partnerships, it would be the manner in which the EC-China
partnership has witnessed continuous cooperation right from the beginning of the ECs history. Issues of exogenous against endogenous effects
and patterns of interaction and communication continue to play extremely important roles in the EC-China cooperation process, but in this
particular case, progress appears to have resulted from familiarity and
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continuous dialogue rather than from conflict as was the case with the
ECs partnerships with Japan and the ROK.
The first principal feature of the EC-China partnership is based on
exogenous effects, and focused mainly on the lack of US involvement in
the partnership. The USs refusal to engage with China after World War
II provided the Europeans with a unique opportunity to engage with the
Chinese. This was not the case with Japan and the ROK where the US
had considerable sway over its East Asian allies. West Europeans were
quick to engage with the Chinese during this period of US hostility
against the Chinese, which provided them with the opportunity to engage
in a healthy trade relationship with China. Eventually, it appears that the
EC-China trade partnership has become based on this long and steady
cooperative relationship which began in the 1950s. When the US finally
re-established direct trade with China, it had an important impact in
reducing the ECs trade share with China, but the cooperation remained
and the examples in this chapter have shown how EC-China differences
were resolved quickly, perhaps due to the familiarity and long-standing
engagement between the two sides.
The second key feature of the interaction is the manner in which
endogenous effects appear to have been handled in a far more cautious
manner by the Europeans. Endogenous effects, particularly Chinas
opening of its economy since 1978, has resulted in a widening trade gap
between the EC and China. The ECs trade deficit with China has continued to grow. On the European side, the Commissions collective
action in dealing with the Chinese on trade matters has proven to be
effective, with most of the European countries preferring to hand over
competency to the Commission. This positive trend has broadly continued, apart from perhaps a minor incident involving textiles exports to the
EC in 2005 (commonly referred to as the bra wars) which was later
resolved amicably.
The third main feature of the EC-China relationship relates directly to
the first and second features and demonstrates how a long history of
interaction and communication has resulted in an optimistic and cooperative attitude between the partners. Numerous Communications by the
Commission also mark an exceptionally cooperative and patient undertone.
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promise of further cooperation between the two regions. Had the dynamics of the international political economy not changed the following
year, it is perhaps possible that cooperation between the European and
Asian members of ASEM would have continued fruitfully according to
the guidelines set by the Bangkok Declaration. The period leading up to
the Bangkok Declaration can undeniably be described as the most promising period in the evolution of EU-Asia cooperation.
This stage provides some important insights into inter-regionalism
but it also raises some additional questions. It appears that the ECs
strategy was to begin institutionalizing the process and to sidetrack the
role of states as much as possible through the process. The strategy of
mirroring of the ECs own institutions and the use of institutions to
create stability was used actively to draw in the East Asians (Smith and
Vichitsorasatra 2008).
The onset of the Asian Financial Crisis from July 1997 saw a shift in
the cooperation scenario and the beginning of the third phase of collaboration. The balance of trade between the EC and Asia, already in Asias
favour, tripled as Asian currencies devalued. Since the establishment of
ASEM, trade between the EC and Asia had already increased substantially, although the EC did not view this as particularly helpful due to the
increased trade deficit.
The third phase of the evolution of cooperation in the ASEM process
highlights several important facts about the entire relationship. It shows
that ASEM clearly has the potential to succeed as an alternative method
to bilateralism and global multilateralism in conducting a multilateral
relationship between the two regions. Despite the informality of the
process and its non-binding nature, there is clear evidence that trade
between the two regions has significantly increased since the establishment of ASEM.
Moreover, the third stage of cooperation in the ASEM process indicates that if both sides of the ASEM equation do not feel that they are
equally benefiting from the cooperation process, either the EC or individual East Asian member states could refuse to extend their full cooperation. This clearly amounts to the accentuation of hierarchy, or at least an
attempt to accentuate hierarchy, whereby the EC tries to take control of
the process particularly when smaller states are involved. Once again, the
informality of the ASEM process acts as a double-edged sword and
offers the defecting side an easy excuse to leave the cooperation process.
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ensured that accepted principles of conduct are agreed on and that both
sides become familiarized with each others ideas and values. These ideas
and values have been introduced by both the European and Asian
ASEM members into ASEM, and the ASEM process has been conducted around these ideas and values. Last but not least, an extremely
intense nature of dialogue and institutionalization, possibly leading to the
dreaded forum fatigue, might actually be one of ASEMs most useful
features. The lack of understanding of ASEMs purpose and value may
be the primary factor keeping this multilateral forum from advancing
further.
A concise evaluation of the significance of this multilateral mode of
cooperation results in the preliminary finding that, while being only
marginally important, the evolution of cooperation between the EC and
China would have been different without ASEM. The relationship would
have been one with a smaller degree of trust, less dialogue and a lower
level of caring for, and familiarity with, one other. Although passive,
the presence of the multilateral mode of cooperation in the EC-China
engagement is justified if only because of the manner in which ASEM
has gradually introduced ideational values into the relationship. These
have been important in shaping the behaviour of the partners as well as
in ensuring that dialogue continues, even in the face of recurring instances of conflict.
References
Aggarwal, Vinod K. and Edward. Fogarty (eds). 2003. EU Trade Strategies: Between Regionalism and Globalism. Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan.
Allen, T., 2002. EU Trade with China and Russia. Eurostat Statistics in Focus.
Eurostat: European Communities.
Commission of the European Communities. 1995. A Long Term Policy for
China-Europe Relations: Communication of the Commission, Com(279)
final (Brussels: European Community).
Commission of the European Communities. 1994. Towards a New Asia Strategy: Communication from the Commission to the Council, Com(94) 314
(Brussels: European Community).
Commission of the European Communities. 2003a. A new partnership with
Southeast Asia: Communication from the Commission, COM399/4
(Brussels: European Community)
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tional Relations in the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 317342.
Rland, J. 2001. ASEAN and the European Union: A Bumpy Inter-regional
Relationship. Bonn: Zentrum fr Europische Integrationsforschung
(ZEI), discussion paper C95.
Santander, S. 2005. The European Partnership with Mercosur: a Relationship
Based on Strategic and Neoliberal Principles in Journal of European Integration, 27(3): 285-306.
Shambaugh, D.L. 1996. China and Europe, 1949-1995. London: Contemporary
China Institute (School of Oriental and African Studies) University of London.
Smith, M.H. and N. Vichitsorasatra. 2007. The European Union as a Foreign
Policy Actor in Asia: Defining and Theorising EU-Asia Relations in P.
Anderson and Georg Wiessala (eds) The European Union and Asia. European
Studies: A Journal of European Culture, History and Politics 25(1): 103-124. Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi.
Soderbaum, F., P. Stalgren and L. Langenhove. 2005. The EU as a Global
Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism: A Comparative Analysis in
Journal of European Integration, 27(3): 365-380.
Tharakan, M. 2002. European Union and Preferential Arrangements in The
World Economy 25(10): 1387-1398.
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Georg Wiessala
Africa, and Southeast Asia, no one has a weaker sense of rights than do we
Chinese.1
The relations between the European Union (EU) and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) are a game of two halves, in more ways than one.
In one sense, there is more than meets the eye when it comes to EUChina interaction an important phenomenon this chapter will explore.
But beyond that, perhaps more importantly, duality seems to be the
watch-word of China-EU contacts. Some would go further and say that
ambiguity is the leitmotiv of the relationship, as well as the handmaiden of
consensus, in the China-Europe inter-continental conversation. When it
comes to what one may call the intellectual geography, and the position
of human rights, in the EU-China exchange, a number of paradoxes and
dualities become apparent.
On the most general level, there is the duality of history. The key
paradoxes here concern, for instance, the fact that it was often Chinese
inventions of many centuries ago, which, when borrowed by Europe,
allowed the latter to steam ahead of China from the late 19th Century
onwards. On the flipside of this paradox, Yahuda (2008: 20/1) rightly
points to the thought that it was the very assimilation of the European,
Westphalian, system by China which did much to determine Chinese
concerns for issues such as territorial integrity, national security and
claims to succession, for instance in regard to Taiwan and Tibet. A second intriguing paradox is the way in which European attitudes towards
China have always vacillated between admiration and disgust, Sinophilia
and Sinophobia, since before Montaigne, Leibnitz or Voltaire.2 The arguments advanced by Sen (2006) about European curatorial, magisterial
and exoticist approaches towards India transpose quite easily to the
Europe-China context.
This chapter suggests that these perceptions continue to count today,
for instance, in debates over Chinese agency in world history, Asian
Values, globalization, contributions to civilisation and the right path
towards democracy and fair and equitable development. In this context,
it is fair to say that what has been termed human rights diplomacy
(renquan waijiao) mirrors another, wider, duality in EU-Asia relations:
1
Liang Qichao (1873-1929). Xinmin shuo, Chung-hua shu-ch (ed. Taiwan: Zhonghua
shuju, 1959). Ch. 8, 31-32; 38-39 - PZ; quoted from: WM T. De Bary and R. Lufrano.
2000: 295.
2
BBC Radio 3: English Takeaway, 2009.
85
debates about rights contain the potential to become, firstly, an enabling, accelerating, aspect of relations. Secondly, they can also turn into
an inhibitory mechanism, slowing down progress. Human rights issues,
in the shape of EU policy-conditionalities are, thirdly, often drivers of
international foreign-policy decisions pertaining to the EU and China
as the activities of the PRC in Africa3 show (Holslag 2006: 11/12; Zhang
Tiejun 2007: 153/4; Leonard 2008: 96/7). This chapter seeks to demonstrate that this enabling-inhibitory-dynamic is alive in contemporary EUChina dialogue.
In China-EU exchanges, a dynamic tension exists between, on the
one hand, the lure and myth of the (Chinese) market (Yahuda 2008: 21)
and Chinas impact on Europes economic recovery, and, on the other
hand, human rights and the rule of law; this tension forms a key dualist
theme in this chapter. It is not just since US Foreign Secretary Hillary
Clintons explicit de-coupling of trade from human rights in US-China
relations4 that some point to liberties being sacrificed on the altar of
Sino-European trade.
But the most pertinent duality of all, framing human rights in EUChina relations, lies in the starkly contrasting views of China in circulation at present (Peerenboom 2008: 2-22; World Affairs 2007): on the one
hand, the PRC is seen, in a phrase coined by Kishore Mahbubani, as
manifestation of the New Asian Hemisphere (Mahbubani 2008), a selfconfident, peacefully-rising superpower, replacing the prevailing Washington Consensus on world affairs with ideas like Beijing Consensus, Harmonious
Society, Walled World and Lawfare; a successful rational-authoritarian oneparty state, with an emerging, largely conservative, middle-class; a government putting economic and cultural rights before civil and political
ones; a state jockeying for position in a new Asian Great Game; above
all, a potential example for other developing nations in Asia and Africa
to follow suit (Youngs 2001; Leonard 2008: 96-107). Its many critics, on
the other hand, perceive the PRC as a brutal human rights pariah, censoring the press and the internet, closing human rights law firms,5 destroying Tibetan culture, propping up rogue-states such as Sudan,
North Korea, Uzbekistan and Burma, and abusing the prestige afforded
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Georg Wiessala
See the chapters by David Askew and Peter Anderson in this volume.
Zhang Zhidong (1837-1009) Rectifying Political Rights; source as fn 1: 247.
8
See: The Sunday Times, 8 April 2004: 4.
9
China still commemorates the protests, on May 4 1919, against the Versailles
Treaty, bequeathing German concessions in China to Japan.
7
87
intellectuals over the right way, to measure time, decode the heavens
and grasp the place of human beings in society.
These episodes have left important legacies, as has the development
of diverse traditions in East and West. The Enlightenment left Europe
with a taste for individualism and a curiosity of enquiry (de Prado 2007;
Ringmar 2007). Confucian scholars, by contrast, emphasised societal
harmony, duties and subordination of the individual to group requirements. Both intellectual traditions continue to be instrumentalised in
human rights and Asian Values debates of our era, in spite of their
wider potential (Bell 2008; Garton Ash 2009). However, in our time,
Confucius has gone to market.10 The Masters teachings experience
experiencing a renaissance as a tool in contemporary Chinese international diplomacy.11
These legacies of China-Europe relations have important contemporary repercussions: they live on in the enquiries of the 21st Century, as to
what kind of contributions East and West will have made to global civilisation. They also inform debates over just how instrumental economic
and cultural, civil and political, rights were in these contributions. In
terms of China-EU, the lessons of the past if they have indeed been
learned influence the present and the future. They constitute a knowledge resource base and a store of memories, determining how conceptions of rights are shaped, how research agendas develop and how
political labels such as knowledge-based-dialogue or value-guided policies emerge. In EU-China relations, issues such as global leadership,
involvement in international organisations, rights rgimes and security
challenges have deep roots in the connections of former centuries. Contemporary arguments about de-Westernisation, the Asian Hemisphere,
Clashes of Civilisations and Peaceful Rise owe a recognisable debt to
the vagaries and stereotypes of China-Europe civilisational encounters of
past ages; and a consciousness regarding human rights and their relative
ranking in society is an integral part of this picture.
10
11
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Georg Wiessala
Embeddings
The most immediate consequence of Chinas rise is that the much predicted
universalization of Western liberal democracy has stalled (Leonard 2008: 117)
89
These theoretical conceptualisations of EU-China interaction are underpinned by a range of powerful discursive traditions influencing human
rights discussions in EU-China relations. The Asian Values debates of
the 1990s (e.g. Bauer and Bell, 1999; Youngs 2001) might seem dated
now (World Affairs, 1998), but it is by no means dead, and China has its
12
13
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Georg Wiessala
unique place in it. For many, the Asian Financial Crisis (1997/98) rendered thinking about Asian Values obsolete. After all, the Asian Sonderweg, or special path to development, did not prevent the collapse; it did
not then, nor does it now, in the global downturn of our times. For those
of a universalist normative persuasion, the Asian Values label was always little more than an ideological tool, justifying authoritarianism in
Asia, on the spurious grounds that states are rather like families, and
duties count for more than rights. It is not necessary to dwell on this for
too long here, as China, in any case, escaped much of that particular
crisis owing to its governments fiscal policies. However, this did not
prevent the PRCs leaders from promoting many of the paternalistic
ideas attributed to this particular discursive channel, especially when
faced with criticism from the EU or US over the Chinese human rights
record. Even now, the spirit of the Asian Values debate is never far
away instead, it has metamorphosed into wider arguments over who
has been the real engine of world history,14 and who contributes most to
international organisations and inter-civilisational dialogue.
Next to cultural politics and Asian Values, the normative spaces
occupied by the human rights issue in EU-China dialogue are inspired by
discursive traditions analysing democratic institutional practice, security
and regionalism (Katzenstein 2005), ASEAN-EU relations, and Asian
human rights mechanisms (e.g. Muntarbhorn 2001; Close and Askew
2004). Alternative enquiries focus on Asian constitutionalism (e.g. ANU
2003), limitations of rights, civil society (e.g. Ratnam 2003; Singh 2007)
and Chinese legal thought.
In the latter area, a cluster of writers espoused a religious-philosophical dimension, seeking to recruit Buddhism or Confucianism15, in order
to buttress human rights, humanism, communitarian ideas and noninterference (World Affairs, 1998: 25/6; Bauer and Bell 1999; Wiessala
2006: 44-47). Thus, personalities from times past and present, from the
Indian Emperor Aoka, to the Dalai Lama, have become something akin
to human rights heroes (World Affairs, 1998: 26-28; Sen 2001: 236). In
addition, some have suggested that a special path for China is justified
by her size, age and other conditions (Christie and Roy 2001; Barr 2002).
But contemporary, discourse inside the Chinese power-house of
ideas is as wide-spread, as it is generally underrated by many Western
14
15
91
observers. This holds true for debates between the New Left and the
New Right in China, on economic reform, political power, equality,
markets, neo-liberalism and the role of the state. Leonard (2008: 29, 9499) demonstrates cogently how Chinese intellectuals of a liberal-internationalist, nationalist-neo-comm or pragmatist ilk are appropriating
western globalization discourses, adapting them to a Chinese context.
This is apparent in current Chinese discourse on soft power (ruan
quanli), through an enhanced dissemination of Chinese culture and ideas
world-wide, through agents such as Confucius Institutes, CCTV 9 and
China Radio International.16 But it applies equally to human rights debates
(Jacobsen and Bruun 2000). Indeed, rights and values have always
been key leitmotivs of post-enlightenment China-Europe exchange; in this
context, Chinese intellectuals thematised freedom and personal liberty
(Angle 2002; Yun 2002), examined the fragmented character of Chinese
society and explored notions of human nature, good and evil, duties
and rights (He 1996: 110).
The subordination of rights under prerequisites, such as economic
circumstances, development and national conditions (guoqing) is a recurring theme (Yun, 2002: 7; Angle 2002: 256). Scholars like Chih-Yu Shih
(1999: 97-99), related human rights with current Chinese rule-of-lawthought. Others investigated the potential of a hybrid-constitutional,
party-rule (dangzhu lixian) in China (Zou 2007). Observers like Wang
(2003: 16-73) scrutinised the relationship between rights, reciprocity
and power within Confucianism and Chinese history. And other contemporaries (Chan 2000: 218/9; Christie and Roy 2001: 220) argued that
Confucian morale transcends a relationship-based ethic and does not
need to be seen to reject human rights ideas (see also: de Bary 1998).
The last decade resulted in many unique discursive contributions,
some of them of a more constructivist, cultural-linguistic, bend. David
Kellys Asian Lexical Matrix, demonstrating the associations between
freedom, human rights and such concepts, and the accessibility of
appropriate words/ signs for them in Asian languages has lost none of
its power more than ten years after its first publication (Kelly 1998).
More recently, scholarship on discursive constructions and communicative strategies in EU-China relations was contributed by San Golden
16
English-language Shortwave Frequencies in May 2009 included: 5960, 7205,
7285 and 9440 kHz. See: http://english.cri.cn/. Radio Taiwan International is on 6155
kHz.
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Georg Wiessala
(2006), perhaps as a reminder of just how powerful, yet under-represented, the analytical tools of integration-discourse-analysis can be in the
study of EU-Asia interaction (Diez 2001).
In the present, scholars like Peerenboom (2008) are attempting to
separate ideological ballast from pertinent critique in EU-China relations.
Peerenbooms work helps to isolate the key questions: what is the relationship between development and the rule of law, between the latter
and democratisation, between wealth, civil society and human rights? Is
an amount of discretion compatible with rule of law, and can trade be
married to human rights? Many China-watchers have queried whether
civil society is a political, economic or alternate concept (Singh 2007:
115), and whether democracy and growth have to be in direct competition to one another. Is China, as Christie and Roy have claimed (2001:
232), really too vast, too poor and too populous to sustain political and
economic rights? Is it disingenuous to state, as some do (Cameron and
Yongnian 2007: 13), that human rights are too sensitive a subject to be
brought to the (Chinese) leadership level? Is economic advancement ipso
iure changing political assertiveness among the Chinese public, and fostering convergence on human rights and democratic reform (Haina Lu
2003; Andreosso 2004)? Will political pluralism as if on auto-pilot
contribute to a resolution of Chinas problems? There are no simple
answers to these questions, but it seems that the PRC is currently something akin to a global laboratory of political transition. There is evidence
that economics, democratisation and human rights are, indeed, strongly
inter-linked (Wei-Wei Zhang 2003: 11; Andreosso OCallaghan 2004).
On human rights, many comment on the EUs policy-preference for the
civil-political side of the spectrum. Is this justifiable or, as some have
suggested (Angle 2002: 256/7; Peerenboom 2008), merely a tactical
dialogue-debate, deliberately conflating liberal democracy with the rule of
law, and seeking to skirt awkward questions about global inequalities?
Identities
Many of these questions are indeed behind the ups and downs of EU
dialogue with China over human rights. In addition to this, what makes
this particular aspect of EU-Asia relations so special is a peculiar, threefold, phenomenon:
Firstly, EU-China human rights interaction can be said to be characterised by a large number of, what may be termed, signature-issues. This
93
term is meant to imply that (a) these topics have become emblematic for
a focus on the civil and political category of human rights; (b) that they
stand out through their recurrence and recognisability in the official
EU-China dialogue; and (c) that they are, by their very, contentious,
nature, able to raise the diplomatic temperature in China-EU relations
(Ching 2008; Jing Men 2009: 3).
Amongst these issues are: human rights in commercial agreements
(Bartels 2005: 33),17 freedoms of speech and media control in the PRC
and in Hong Kong, the suppression of opposition and political dissent
since the Tiananmen Square massacres;18 conditions of detention, the death
penalty, the Sinification of Tibet; the position of the Dalai Lama and
religious choice for Christians, Muslims and Falun Gong practitioners in
China; the Chinese strike-hard-at-crime campaigns, the Chinese judicial
system and the pace of (legal) reform (Ching 2008; Peerenboom 2008).
Last, but not least, this, incomplete, list must also include Chinese ratification of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), the situation in Myanmar (Burma)19 and issues of associationpolitics and national identity across the Taiwan Straits (Fuh-Sheng Hsieh
2004).20
Secondly, a number of questions, such as the arms embargo, and EU
Member States sponsorship (until 1998) of a Resolution censuring the
PRC over human rights at the UN Human Rights Commission, have
become wedge-issues in EU-China dialogue, dividing Member States
and Council alike (Close and Askew 2004: 106; Balducci 2009: 9-11).
Some see in those developments the fruits of a deliberate Chinese strategy of divide et impera.21 To counterbalance this, there are also hinge-issues, bringing the EU and the PRC closer together over common interests. Terrorism, climate-change and policy towards Burma (Myanmar)
constitute pertinent examples. These issues have become corner-stones
17
Trade with China falls under the 1985 EEC-China Co-operation Agreement,
which does not include a human-rights-clause (see: [1985] OJ L250/2).
18
The 20th Anniversary of the killings in 2009 coincided with the publication of
ex-premier Zhao Ziyangs secret memoirs Prisoner of the State. In May 2009, the BBC
World Service broadcast a series of commemorative programmes, entitled The Lost Voices
of Tiananmen Square (http://www.bbc.co.uk/podcasts/series/docarchive).
19
Events in Burma in May 2009 influenced the 11th EU-China Summit in May
2009 (http://www.euobserver.com of 18 May 2009).
20
See also the chapter on Taiwan by Paul Lim in this volume.
21
For example, the International Campaign for Tibet (ICT): http://www.
savetibet.org/
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Georg Wiessala
95
EU foreign policy towards the PRC on human rights exists next to similar initiatives of at least five EU Member States in China (Holslag 2006:
2). Moreover, since 2003, the EUs approach has been billed as part of a
wider, strategic, dialogue (zonghe zhanlue huoban guanxi) (KAS 2006;
Shambaugh 2008: 135). Looking at its detail, Algieri (2008: 79) mentions
the EUs policy-making and institutionalization patterns as the two main
wellsprings of its China policy. The strategic partnership entails a network of sector-specific, regional and multi-lateral co-operation, although
the use of the term is still subject to critical scrutiny (Holslag 2006; Jing
Men 2009: 4).25
While the multitude of EU-China sector-specific dialogues cannot be
elaborated here26, it is worth noting that relations stand out noticeably,
even in the limited context of EU-Asia relations, in two ways: firstly,
through their complexity and ability to shape wider EU-Asia relations;
secondly, by the way they suffer from incoherence, imbalance and
24
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Georg Wiessala
97
98
Georg Wiessala
And, near the end of the present decade, Rana Mitter (2008: 91) elaborated on the same topic:
The wider Chinese world opens up intriguing divisions between what is
free and democratic. China itself is neither fully free nor democratic.
Taiwan, since the 1990s, has been both free and democratic. Singapore, a
largely Chinese society, is democratic, in that it has regular elections which
33
34
http://esia.asef.org
A Survey of China, 25/03/06: 13.
99
are nominally open to opposition candidates (but at high cost to themselves), but is not free (the media and political activism are both heavily
regulated). Most intriguing though, is Hong Kong, which is little more
democratic than it was under the British.
References
Algieri, Franco. 2008. Its the System that Matters in Shambaugh, David;
Sandschneider, Eberhard and Zhou Hong. 2008. China-Europe Relations.
Perceptions, Policies and Projects, London: Routledge: 65-83
Andreosso-OCallaghan, Bernadette; Rees, Nicholas and Yanlai Wang. 2004.
Economic Change and Political Development in China: Findings from a a
Public Opinion Survey in Journal of Contemporary China, 13(39): 203-222
Angle, S. C. 2002. Human Rights and Chinese Thought, Cambridge: CUP.
Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF). 2001. Fourth Informal ASEM Seminar on Human Rights (Bali, Indonesia, 12-13 July 2001), Singapore: ASEF
Australian National University (ANU). 2003. Constitutions & Human Rights in a
Global Age, Canberra: ANU.
Baker, Philip. 2002. Human Rights, Europe and the PRC in The China Quarterly, 169: 45-63.
100
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Gungwu, Wang (2003), Ideas Wont Keep-The Struggle for Chinas Future Singapore:
Eastern Universities Press
Haina, Lu. 2003. EU-China Rights Dialogue: An Acceptable Option? in EurAsia
Bulletin June-July 2003, EIAS, Brussels: EIAS: 5/6.
He, Baogang. 1996. The Democratisation of China. Routledge: London.
Holland, Martin et al. 2007. The EU through the Eyes of Asia, Singapore: ASEF.
Holslag, Jonathan. 2006. The EU & China: The Great Disillusion in BICCS Asia
Paper 1(3), Brussels: Brussels Institute for Contemporary China Studies (BICCS)
Hutton, Will. 2007. The Writing on the Wall. China and the West in the 21st Century, London: Abacus.
Jacobsen, M and Bruun, O. 2001. Human Rights and Asian Values, Richmond/ Surrey:
Curzon
Jing, Men EU-China Relations need more Mutual Understanding in EU-China
Observer 1/2009, Brugge: College of Europe: 3-7
KAS (Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung). 2006. The EU & China, Singapore: KAS
Katzenstein, Peter J. 2005. A World of Regions Asia and Europe in the American Imperium, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press
Kelly, David. 1998. Freedom, A Eurasian Mosaic in Kelly, D. and Reid, A. (eds)
Asian Freedoms Cambridge: CUP: 1-17
Leonard, Mark. 2008. What Does China Think? London: Harper Collins
Li, Jinshan. 2007. Governance in Crossick, Stanley and Reuter, Etienne (eds) ChinaEU A Common Future, London: World Scientific: 215-227.
Mahbubani, Kishore. 2008. The New Asian Hemisphere, New York: Public Affairs
Mitter, Rana. 2008. Modern China A Very Short Introduction. Oxford, OUP: 91.
Moran, James. 2009. The EU and China: Growing Expectations, Growing Challenges in EU-China Observer 2/2009, Brugge: College of Europe: 2-5
Muntarbhorn, Vitit (2001), Strengthening ASEAN Cooperation [] in Petchsiri, A.
2001. Strengthening ASEAN Integration, Bangkok: CES: 65-73.
Peerenboom, Randall. 2008. China Modernizes Threat to the West or Model for the Rest,
Oxford: OUP.
Ratnam, K.J. 2003 Rights, Freedoms and Civil Society, Pulau Pinang: Universiti Sains
Malaysia
Ringmar, Erik. 2007. Why Europe Was First: Social Change and Economic Growth in
Europe and East Asia, 1500-2050, London: Anthem Press.
Sen, Amartya. 2006. The Argumentative Indian, London: Penguin.
Shambaugh, David; Sandschneider, Eberhard and Zhou Hong. 2008. China-Europe
Relations. Perceptions, Policies and Projects, London: Routledge
Singh, G. 2007. Emerging Civil Society in China: The Post-Reform Period in World
Affairs 11(4): 108-117.
Tonra, Ben and Christiansen, Thomas. 2004. Rethinking EU Foreign Policy. Manchester: MUP.
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Welfens, P.J.J.; Knipping, F.; Chirathivat, S.; Ryan, C. (eds) 2006. Integration in Asia
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David Askew
Introduction
Hong et al (2005) note that Beijing views international and, in particular,
Olympic sporting successes as a significant, symbolic, demonstration of
its determination to forge a place in the international community for
China as a superpower. Beijing hoped and believed that the Beijing
Olympic Games would function to announce the arrival of an emerging
global power, and sought to recreate the global narrative of China as the
story of a forward-looking, modern nation that can boast a long and
glorious past. When China bid for the Games, the confident and revealing slogan it used was New Beijing, Great Olympics (in English) and
New Beijing, New Olympics (Xin Beijing Xin Aoyun) in Chinese. According to the official Party version of Chinese history, Chinas modern
history consists of a century of shame and humiliation that lasted from
the Opium Wars through to 1949. This century was followed by a long
period of international isolation and what can only be called the genocidal madness of the PRC the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957, the
Great Leap Forward of 1958-1960 and subsequent mass starvation, the
Cultural Revolution of 1966 to 1969, and the Tiananmen Square (June
the Fourth) Massacre of 1989, together with the invasion and occupation
of Tibet in 1950 and continuing human rights abuses throughout China.
China has moved away from this history, and so the term New Beijing
is a highly pregnant one.
At the same time, however, the ghosts of the past are not easily laid
to rest. In a fascinating and insightful paper, Lovell (2008: 765) argues
that, an unstable consciousness of ancient glory and modern humiliation
still haunts the contemporary Chinas self-image, and provides the context against which we must read the mixed messages of the Beijing
Olympics a metonym for the curious phenomenon of modern Chinese
nationalism. To understand the Beijing Olympic Games, we have to
discuss this unstable consciousness, and also introduce modern Chinese
perceptions of Self and Other which were created through the encounter with an imperialistic West and then Japan. We will start, however,
with an examination of the three decades that led up to the Games.
The China that Deng Built
December 2008 was the thirtieth anniversary of the CCP meeting at
which Deng Xiaoping announced a reversal of communist dogma and
the introduction of a pragmatic and outward-looking policy of gaige
105
kaifang (reform and opening). As Chang (2008: Part 1) notes, the great
legacy of Deng was that he undid that of Mao Zedong. The reform and
opening policies introduced in December 1978, and pursued now for
three decades, sought to promote economic growth by learning from the
experience of the East Asian economic miracle. Thus, 1978 ushered in
a new era in which a Western and, in particular, an American way of life
was embraced, and the commercialization of life and consumerism were
pursued. Rejecting communist dogma in favour of pragmatism, Beijing
in effect decided to westernize the Chinese economy. The result has been
a Chinese economic miracle that has attracted as much, if not more,
attention than the original models provided first by Japan and then by
South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong. One unforeseen
consequence has been the commercialization not only of the economy
but also of culture. Indeed, Chinese culture has become increasingly
westernized as the country has been exposed to the values of hedonistic
materialism, capitalism, and consumerism. The forces of globalization
threaten to bury both Chinese traditions and Chinese communism, and
so inevitably challenge Chinese cultural identity.
Three decades after Deng decided on a pragmatic acceptance of
markets, China has emerged as a powerful global actor. China or
Zhongguo, the Central Kingdom, once was central in fact as well as name.
Following a long hiatus of half a millennium, China is today quickly
recovering lost ground. The economy has averaged growth of 9.8 percent
per year for the past three decades (Chang 2008). In 1978, Chinas share
of the global economy was only 1.8 percent; today it is 6 percent (The
Economist 2008b). Millions of impoverished Chinese individuals 200
million, according to The Economist have been lifted out of poverty.
Since Deng launched his market-oriented policies, China has also come
of age as a political power. A major Chinese goal has long been national
reunification and Hong Kong was handed back to China in 1997,
while Macau was returned in 1999. Another major goal has been to fully
rejoin the international community after decades of self-imposed isolation under Mao. China did in fact join the World Trade Organization in
2001, and, after failure in 1993, made a successful bid for the Olympic
Games in 2001.
The year 2008 marked another anniversary: 1978 saw the spontaneous outbreak of the first major democracy movement in China since
1949 the Democracy Wall Movement. Wei Jingsheng, perhaps Chinas
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David Askew
1
Wei was released in September 1993, as part of the Chinese governments efforts
to woo the IOC and global opinion in advance of the vote on the venue for the 2000
Olympic Games. Once Sydney was awarded the Games, Wei found himself back in
prison. In 1997, he was released and deported to the USA.
107
2
See: Tiantsin Young Men, 26 October 1907 and 23 May 1908, frequently cited in
the literature.
108
David Askew
109
trumpeted Chinas sporting successes, claiming When a country is powerful, its sports will flourish () Chinese athletes will make contributions to realize our nations great revival (cited in Lovell 2008: 773).
Even famous dissidents such as Wei Jingsheng draw on the discourse.
Wei wrote his first articles on democracy precisely to show that the
Chinese were not a bunch of spineless weaklings, and that when individual citizens learned to straighten their spines China would stand tall in
the world (Fitzgerald 1999: 47).
As reflected in the popular slogan from the 1930s, jiuguo qiangzhong
(save the nation and strengthen the [Chinese] race), it was believed that a
strong and healthy state required a strong and healthy people (Xu 2008:
62). Sports and physical exercise were thus crucial in re-forging the national image. The various attempts to cure the sick man focused on
Western ideas of physical education and Western sports. Moreover,
China believed that it needed to demonstrate to the world that it had
been cured, and therefore ached for opportunities to excel in international competitions. Because it was believed that the physical vitality of
the new China could be demonstrated through victory on international
playing fields, the Olympics and other international competitions promised to provide a means to achieve the recognition China so desperately
sought. It is no coincidence that the visit to Beijing by President Nixon
was prepared through Ping-Pong Diplomacy. And it is because of this
happy coincidence of physical activities, national health and vitality,
legitimacy, and subsequent international status, that the Chinese have
shown [such] unbridled enthusiasm for using sports for political purposes, most especially for strengthening the ruling partys legitimacy and
as a means of garnering international prestige (Xu 2008: 49).
Victory in international sporting events served as a symbolic representation of a revitalized national strength and national status and fed a
meta-narrative of national vigour. The hated sick man label was banished for good by sporting victories from the 1980s and most emphatically by the Beijing Olympic Games. Without understanding Chinas
modern history, and especially the crisis following the end of communism, it is difficult to understand the way in which, for instance, the
Chinas womens volleyball team triggered such nationalistic pride in the
1980s when the Chinese womens volleyball team defeated Japan, in
1981, in the final of the World Cup, and went on to dominate the sport
for much of the decade. This team and its sporting prowess demon-
110
David Askew
However, China is not yet able to readily accept losses. Training the
body was thus seen as a means of national salvation (the personal was
the political). Maos famous swim across the Yangtze River in 1966 was
a reflection not only of his belief that a strong body meant a strong nation, but also of the notion that legitimate leadership rested on physical
prowess the swim proved he was fit to rule (Browell 1995: 57 uses the
pun too). In terms of the Olympic Games, the sleek, healthy, and athletic
body of Olympic sportsmen and sportswomen can be viewed as an
official attempt to project to the world an image of a healthy, modern,
and Western China.
However, Chinas Westernization is a selective Westernization in
which technology, for instance, is vigorously adopted, but democracy is
kept firmly at arms length. In terms of sports, Olympic sports in China
are without exception foreign imports, and are defined in China as modern
sports and contrasted to indigenous traditional or pre-modern sports that
are not privileged by the Party-State (one indigenous practice is qigong, a
quiet, meditational breathing exercise that is increasing popular in China
today, and, as seen in practitioners of Falun Gong, is used to articulate a
quiet resistance to communist rule).
Thus Western sports were adopted and vigorously promoted in China
as a tool for promoting the image of a healthy body politic and as a
means of both stimulating and satisfying nationalistic emotions. It is,
however, important to stress both the political and the ambiguous nature
of Western sports in China: traditional (pre-modern) Chinese culture
placed an enormous weight on literacy. This was encapsulated in the
popular phrase of zhongwen qingwu (esteem literacy, despise martiality).
Sports are, of course, frequently seen to be military in nature, and so, in
China, the acceptance of modern sports required a rejection of traditional
beliefs. With women in particular, sport also symbolizes a political rejection of traditional ideas of femininity (footbinding) and therefore sym-
111
bolizes a radical emancipatory revolution of ideas and practice. Moreover, as Brownell (2008: 62) notes, Chinese people embraced modern
sports, as they did the form of the nation, because of their desire to take
their place on the global stage of modernity. Sporting prowess is thus a
means of reinforcing notions of national identity, of highlighting communist legitimacy, and of recreating the image of a powerful China.
However, at the same time, the Chinese government wishes to reject
what it sees as Western cultural pollution.
The Beijing Olympic Games
An examination of the literature on the Beijing Olympics reveals that a
major theme is that of narrative, and in particular Beijings official narrative of the Games and various contesting counter-narratives.5 The official narrative is a product of state and society; of the CCPs propaganda
machinery and of a strong nationalistic desire on the part of majority
Han Chinese for China to gain due recognition in the eyes of the world.
It is embodied in a number of core themes. For instance, in bidding for
the games, the PRC claimed that Beijing would provide a Green Olympics, a Peoples Olympics, and a High-Tech Olympics. The official slogan of the 2008 Games was One-World-One-Dream.
The CCP hoped to use the Games to promote a story that focuses on
three decades of economic growth and the subsequent success in overcoming poverty, on present prosperity, and on future aspirations to fully
rejoin the global community. Beijing has attempted to persuade the
world that China is a powerful but peaceful, a prosperous and normal
state, and in doing so hopes to enhance the stature of both China and the
CCP at home and overseas. The Beijing Games would allow Beijing to
symbolically declare an end to the century of national humiliation that
began with the Opium War, the subsequent collapse of the Sino-centric
world, and the brutal exploitation of China by imperialist powers. Beijing
will wish to emphasize political stability in addition to economic growth,
and will want to claim the status of a major global power, specifically in
terms of sporting prowess, but also generally in terms of both soft and
hard power.
5
For the Beijing Olympic Games, see in particular Brownell (2008), Close, Askew
and Xu (2007), Jarvie, Hwang, and Brennan (2008), Price and Dayan eds (2008),
Worden ed. (2008), and especially Xu (2008).
112
David Askew
113
Together with close ties to unsavoury, rogue regimes, domestic oppression poses a major stumbling block in Beijings attempts to construct
an image of a benign and peaceful power and threatens its Olympic
narrative.
During the Games, the official narrative in which Beijing attempted
to use the Games to construct a new national identity and to articulate its
aspirations for a new world order in which China will play an increasingly central role, and the counter-narrative which criticized Chinas
human rights record, were both unveiled on the global stage. The Opening Ceremony, for instance, was widely seen as a huge success. It has
been claimed that the Ceremony reflected Needhams China. Brook
(2008) notes, indeed, were it not for Needham, I doubt that the Olympic
organisers would have chosen the history of Chinese science as their
theme for the opening extravaganza in Beijing this summer.6
The Opening Ceremony did, on the one hand, reflect the official
narrative, in which a secure, confident and westernizing China demonstrated that it was both willing and able to (re)join the community of
nations and seemed to confirm one understanding of China that of a
modern, sophisticated, and powerful nation with a glorious past. On the
other hand, however, the violence and bloodshed immediately preceding
the Games lent support to the counter-narrative, and seemed to confirm
a very different understanding of the Chinese Party-State as a savage and
brutal power, indifferent to human rights and contemptuous of its colonized peoples.
Lovell (2008: 759) argues that Beijing hoped the 2008 Olympics
would prove to be a harmonious fusion of nationalism and internation6
For Joseph Needham, see Winchesters (2008) recent biography, Bomb, Book and
Compass. Brooks paper is a review of Winchester.
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David Askew
115
116
David Askew
sal Declaration of Human Rights, the thirtieth anniversary of the appearance of the Democracy Wall in Beijing, and the tenth of Chinas signing of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. We are approaching the twentieth anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen massacre of pro-democracy student protesters. The Chinese people, who have endured human
rights disasters and uncountable struggles across these same years, now
include many who see clearly that freedom, equality, and human rights are
universal values of humankind and that democracy and constitutional government are the fundamental framework for protecting these values.
117
118
David Askew
References
Brook, Timothy. 2008. Sapient Sinophile in Literary Review. Online at:
www.literaryreview.co.uk/brook_09_08.html.
Brownell, Susan. 1995. Training the Body for China: Sports in the Moral Order of the
Peoples Republic. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Brownell, Susan. 2008. Beijings Games: What the Olympics Mean to China. Lanham,
Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
Chang, Gordon G. 2008. China After 30 Years of Reform, I in Forbes, 16
December 2008. Online at: www.forbes.com/opinions/2008/12/16/chinaeconomic-reform-oped-cx_gc_1216chang.html.
Close, Paul, David Askew, and Xu Xin. 2007. The Beijing Olympiad: The Political
Economy of a Sporting Mega-event. London: Routledge.
The Economist 2008a. Chinese Nationalism: Flame On in The Economist, 26
April 2008.
119
The Economist. 2008b. Chinas Reforms: The Second Long March in The
Economist, 13 December 2008.
Economy, Elizabeth C. and Adam Segal. 2008. Chinas Olympic Nightmare:
What the Games Mean for Beijings Future in Foreign Affairs, July/August.
Fitzgerald, John. 1999. China and the Quest for Dignity in The National Interest,
Spring: 47-59.
Ha Jin. 2008. The Censor in the Mirror in The American Scholar. Online at
www.theamericanscholar.org/au/08/censor-jin.html.
Hobbes, Thomas. 1998. Hobbes: On the Citizen, Cambridge University Press.
Hong, Fan. 1997. Footbinding, Feminism, and Freedom: The Liberation of Women's
Bodies in Modern China. London and Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass.
Hong, Fan. 2004. Innocence Lost: Child Athletes in China in Sport in Society.
7(3): 338-354.
Hong, Fan, Ping Wu, and Huna Xiong. 2005. Beijing Ambitions: An Analysis
of the Chinese Elite Sports System and its Olympic Strategy for the 2008
Olympic Games in The International Journal of the History of Sport 22 (4): 510529.
Jarvie, Grant, Dong-Jhy Hwang and Mel Brennan. 2008. Sport, Revolution and the
Beijing Olympics. Oxford: Berg.
Kristof, Nicholas D., and Sheryl WuDunn. 1994/1995. China Wakes: The Struggle for the Soul of a Rising Power. New York: Vintage Books.
Link, Perry. (trans.). 2009. Chinas Charter 08 in The New York Review of Books
56 (1), 15 January 2009.
Lovell, Julia. 2008. Prologue: Beijing 2008 The Mixed Messages of Contemporary Chinese Nationalism in The International Journal of the History of Sport
25 (7): 758-778.
Mangan, J.A. 2008. Preface: Geopolitical Games Beijing 2008 in The International Journal of the History of Sport 25 (7): 751-757.
Morris, Andrew D. 2004. Marrow of the Nation: A History of Sport and Physical
Culture in Republican China. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press.
Nathan, Andrew J. 2008. Medals and Rights: What the Olympics Reveal, and
Conceal, about China in The New Republic, 9 July 2008: 41-47.
Price, Monroe E., and Daniel Dayan (eds). 2008. Owning the Olympics: Narratives
of the New China, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
Seymour, James D. (ed.). 1980. The Fifth Modernization: Chinas Human Rights
Movement, 1978-1979. New York: Human Rights Publishing Group.
Sheridan, Greg. 2008. Chinese Engagement is a Two-way Street in The Australian (27 March 2008).
Washington Post. 2006. China and Darfur: The Genocide Olympics? in Washington Post (14 December 2006).
Wiessala, Georg. 2006. Re-orienting the Fundamentals: Human Rights and New Connections in EU-Asia Relations. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Winchester, Simon. 2008. Bomb, Book and Compass: Joseph Needham and the Great
Secrets of China. London: Viking.
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Worden, Minky (ed.). 2008. Chinas Great Leap: The Beijing Games and Olympian
Human Rights Challenges, New York: Seven Stories Press.
Xu, Guoqi. 2008. Olympic Dreams: China and Sports, 1895-2008, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, and London: Harvard University Press.
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Position Paper: New Security Concept, 31 July 2002: China Report 39 (1): 128-131.
127
opment goals, but as Van Ness argues, it represented much more than
this, forming a response, as it were, to US interventionism and to the
then US President George W. Bushs unilateralist, preventive war doctrine (Van Ness 2005: 264).Whilst the US stands for a largely
ideologically-driven international security environment which is shaped
by military power and military alliance, the NSC opposes this revival of
Cold War mentality, instead positing a cooperative view of security, one
which is not just something for countries with similar views but in which
all countries to work together to foster a shared sense of security, to
achieve common security for the world as a whole. Differences between
countries, it is argued, should not become the reason for estrangement,
hostility and conflict, posing barriers to the development of normal
State-to-State relations, but should serve as driving forces behind closer
exchanges and cooperation of countries and greater common development and progress.2 The NSC offers an alternative system for managing
relations between diverse countries, a qualitatively new type of international relations of non-alliance and non-confrontation, inclusive of the
US, and based not on power politics but on equality and trust. It reflects
Chinas interests in peaceful development, in creating a stable international environment which allows it to focus on its own development, not
least by opening opportunities for others. What provides the strategic
substance of Chinas partnerships is not simply the shifting from a world
pattern based on US dominance, but a world multi-polar developmentalism with its goals of conflict resolution through dialogue, winwin economic cooperation and institutionalised multilateralism.
Historical Overview
The origins of Chinas distinctive view of Europes multi-polar role can
be traced to Mao Zedongs Theory of the Three Worlds, which was initially
delivered as a speech by Deng Xiaoping to the UN in 1974, aimed at
supporting Third World demands for a New International Economic
Order (NIEO).3 At this time, US leadership of the Western capitalist
2
Pei Yuanying The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the Theory and
Practice of Chinas Diplomacy in the New Era China Institute of International Studies.
On-line at: http://www.ciis.org.cn; Jiang Zemins speech at the Russian Duma in
Beijing Review (12-18 May 1997).
3
See: Chairman Maos Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism. 1977. Peking: Foreign Languages Press.
128
Jenny Clegg
bloc was coming under increasing challenge. The Vietnam War was
being fought at huge expense and the collapse of the dollar saw the
breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of economic coordination.
From the perspective of the Theory of the Three Worlds, the world
situation was not one of straightforward imperialist-socialist confrontation, but instead was being shaped by power relations between the three
worlds of the superpowers of the US and USSR, the second order powers, namely Europe and Japan, and the Third World.
These together
created a complex web involving both cooperation and conflicts of interests. The theory focused in particular on superpower rivalry and dominance which was seen primarily as dividing and subordinating the Third
World, and called for an international united front against hegemonism
and superpower aggression. In this it sought to unite Third World states,
regardless of their revolutionary or progressive stance, as the main force
against imperialism, whilst also winning over second order powers.
Whilst recognising the extensive cooperation amongst the advanced
capitalist countries to shape the rules of the global economy to reflect
their interests, the analysis nevertheless lent particular weight to the
differences emerging within the Western alliance. This was considered to
reveal a certain potential for Western Europe as well as Japan to develop
as a counter hegemonic force.
With the end of colonialism, both Europe and Japan were no longer
the main forces of imperialist domination and oppression. They were
now seen to emerge as intermediate global players. Although they looked
to the US to maintain and promote the capitalist world system, drawing
benefits from their relationship with the superpower, they in turn had to
adapt their own development to the priority needs of the leading power.
With the US seeking to extend its global domination, this tended to
reduce their own independent influence in world affairs, limiting their
sovereignty. However, in the eyes of Chinese strategists, these secondary powers were becoming less willing to accept US leadership unconditionally, seeking instead a more equal partnership as they themselves
started to outpace US growth after their successful post war reconstruction. The establishment of the Common Market in Western Europe,
Frances partial withdrawal from NATO and De Gaulles independent
stance, the reluctance of European powers to support US aggression in
Indochina, the collapse of the dollar-based monetary system, and sharpening trade and currency conflicts between Europe and Japan on the one
129
hand and the US on the other, the refusal by European allies to allow US
planes to use US air bases on their soil in the Middle East war, were all
seen by the mid-1970s as marking a serious weakening in the Western
alliance, a harbinger, together with the Sino-Soviet split, of the break up
of Cold War bipolarity (Ding Yuanhong 1983: 85-102).
With the Third World pressing for a new more equal international
economic order, the propoents of the Three Worlds Theory argued for
the recognition of a degree of common ground, between the secondary
powers and developing countries, as regards their discontent with US
dominance. Although tied to US power, these states might, in their
search for equal partnership with the US, remain neutral or even be
prepared to make concessions to Third World countries. Indeed, both
Japan and Western Europe were to respond after a fashion to the calls
for an NIEO with their own development agendas, the Fukuda doctrine
(1977) and the Brandt Report (1980). Taking a strategic perspective on
the international trends of cooperation and conflict, the Three Worlds
theory was of fundamental significance, in that it opened up opportunities for the emergence of counter-hegemonic alternatives to superpowerdominance. It paved the way for a qualitative shift in Chinas diplomacy
in the early 1980s from a revolutionary to a non-ideological approach, as
the country strove for equal status as a world power and a level playing
field in the global economy through North-South dialogue based on
South-South cooperation.
In 1982, Chinas strategic direction underwent a qualitative shift, with
the adoption of an independent foreign policy of peace and development. Following significant improvements in its relations with both
superpowers, China no longer considered itself under pressure of imminent attack and could afford to take a more non-aligned stance.4 Its view
that world revolution was the only alternative to imperialist wars and
interventions had dictated a foreign policy based on friends and foes.
Now China was to give priority to securing a peaceful international
environment, whilst refocusing its objectives towards domestic construction. Chinese observers saw the improvements in their countrys situation as indicative of a qualitative, world-wide, shift, accompanied by
declining capabilities, in both the US and USSR, to sustain Cold War
divisions and dominate the world. Western Europes stance, in particular,
4
1982 saw the Joint Sino-American Communique, pledging to scale back arms sales to
Taiwan; consultations also started on the normalisation of Sino-Soviet relations.
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Jenny Clegg
which favoured East-West dtente during the nuclear arms race between
the US and USSR in the 1980s assumed great significance in Chinas
eyes. Weak in military power, Western Europe still tied its defence
against the USSR to the US, agreeing to the rearmament of NATO in
1979, with both Britain and Germany accepting the siting of US cruise
missiles in their countries from 1983.
Nevertheless, Western Europes strategic situation was very different.
Whereas the US regarded Soviet rivalry to its hegemony as the strategic
priority and determined to maintain rough balance in nuclear arms, such
that the two superpowers in effect held each other in check through
mutually assured destruction, this placed the Western Europeans facing
the prospect of a limited nuclear war on European soil. So despite their
dependence on the US alliance, Western Europe sought to expand its
political and economic exchange with the USSR in order to shift relations from Cold War freeze towards dialogue (Guo Fengmin 1982: 98123). For China, the Reagan-Gorbachev agreement on nuclear arms
control marked a monumental shift in the world situation: war was no
longer inevitable (Chan 1999: 121); the door had thus been opened for a
multi-polar world. By the end of the 1980s, although the US and USSR
were still overwhelmingly strong militarily, their political influence was
dwindling. The EEC and Japan, both surpassing the US in economic
terms, were starting to pursue at least a quasi-independent approach in
world affairs across a range of issues. With this, the trends towards the
greater independence of smaller and medium-sized nations were making
hegemonism and power politics run up against a wall (Quian Quichen
1989). In these new circumstances of emerging multi-polarity, shaped
not least by Europes greater assertiveness, China, whilst still intending
to keep a low profile, gradually stepped up its commitment to multilateralism and a negotiated world order, starting to seek membership of
international organisations and participate in multilateral treaties.
Although, with the end of the Cold War, the US clearly emerged as
the sole superpower, Chinese analysts saw the world order configured
not simply by unipolarity but characterised as a five-pointed star pattern:
one superpower (the US) and four major powers (Europe, Japan, Russia
and China) (Chan 1999: 110-112). This was seen to allow China to take
a more proactive role. The US, indeed, had put on a dramatic display of
overwhelming military superiority in the 1st Gulf War, but its economy
was plagued by deficits, whilst Europe and Japan were continuing to
131
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133
China (Yu Xintuan 2004), its concerns with labour rights, gender equality
and prison conditions are regarded as more in accord with Chinas own
aims to improve its governance (Yan Wei 2006).
When, following the attack on Iraq, the tone of the EU towards
China became more muted, indicating a greater willingness to accommodate Chinas gradualist approach towards political reform, China took the
opportunity to expand its engagement (Lanxin Xiang 2004: 113). Analysts were nevertheless cautious not to overstate the discord across the
Atlantic, given the shared values and ideologies at the base of the USEuropean alliance (Wu Baiyu 2004). Once transatlantic commonalities
began to reassert themselves, however, it was also noted that considerable potential still existed for new rifts to emerge. Differences over the
US missile defence system, the Kyoto Protocol to curb global warming,
as well as the war on Iraq, meant that the rifts, rooted in their rivalry to
re-divide the worlds strategic resources, would not be easily repaired
(Wu Liming 2004).
Recent Developments: Towards Strategic Co-operation?
After 2003, EU-China relations appeared to reach a new watershed, with
agreements on Chinas participation in the Galileo satellite tracking system, and on ITER - the International Thermonuclear Experimental
Reactor - signifying new heights in technological cooperation. However,
as the second Bush Administration returned to the multilateral fold, not
least to ease the transatlantic rift, it at the same time exerted intense
pressure on the EU not to comply with the Chinese governments explicit request to lift the arms embargo, imposed after the 1989
Tiananmen Incident.
As Europes trade deficit with China widened, the EU has also expressed economic concerns, deciding against granting China market
economy status. This is despite the fact that Chinas economy is already
far more open than for example India or Russia, whose bids for this
status the EU supports. The EU has also taken to joining US calls for
renminbi revaluation. On the other hand, as Chinese commentators have
pointed out, much of the deficit in trade is accounted for by Sino-European joint ventures in China.7
7
Over 60 per cent of the trade deficit was created through Sino-EU joint ventures
(Ding Ying. 2008)
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To explain these limitations on the Sino-EU partnership, and especially the European reluctance to strain relations with the US, some
Western commentators argue that the EUs multilateralism and Chinas
multi-polarisation are at odds with the former emphasising a rules-based
order and the latter seeking to adjust the world power balance (e.g.:
Geeraerts 2008, 34). Indeed, Chinas main aim has to be to deflect the
US python strategy, preventing any link-up between NATO and the US
allies in Asia. Direct relations with the EU are seen to offer a buffer
between China and the US (Ni Yanshu 2005). But what China seeks in
relation to the US is a peaceful sharing of space so that it can make its
own distinct contribution in shaping the future world.8 In advocating a
multi-polar world, then, China is pursuing no more than the EU - an
equal partnership with the US. The challenge, as China sees it, is to figure out a way to make the US an ordinary member of the [world
order], rather than a lawmaker (Zhang Yansheng 2007).
In fact, although the US effect continues to exert an influence on the
Sino-European relationship, the EU has not entirely lined itself up with
the US. Europe continues high-level cooperation with China, including
in sensitive technologies, indicating a certain preparedness to assist directly in Chinas economic development (You Ji 2008). At the same time,
although it has become more strident on the issue of RMB revaluation,
the EU tends to emphasise that the Chinese government should decide
when and how to change its policy (Ming Wan 2008). In 2007, the SinoEU relations took the further step of agreeing to cooperate on preventing big exchange rate fluctuations (Barber 2007). But how far will the
EU be willing cooperate in Chinas calls for the democratisation of the
international order and the creation of a more stable international financial and economic system favourable to world development? Both China
and the EU, lacking the military means to pursue their interests globally,
share the need for a rules-based negotiated world order. They do, however, differ with respect to the type of rules needed for this - those shaping a liberal or a developmental international political economy. Chinas
multi-polar vision seeks an international order in which developing countries have their say to ensure that the system operates in their interests. A
particular problem here for Europe is that the multi-polarising world
trend brings into question its own over-representation in international
8
See Bush, the new international order and Chinas choice in Peoples Daily (22
November 22).
135
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independent military role in Peoples Daily (19 December 2004).
Zhang Yansheng cited in McGregor, R., and Callan, E. 2007. Bejings uncomfortable deal with America in Financial Times (11 April 2007).
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Romano Prodi complained that India was too focused on the United
States in its foreign and economic policy, which came at the expense of
the EU (cited in Shedde 2001). Europeans often have urged India to
shed its so-called narrow prism of Pakistan once and for all and develop a wider world-view like that of China in order to create a more
meaningful partnership.
Europeans argue that China has made greater efforts at understanding EU institutions than India. Some of them conclude that the Chinese
perhaps understand Europe better than even the Europeans themselves.
The EU, many Indians feel, does not make things easy, given the complexity of its institutions, proliferating regulations and rotating presidency. A major reason for this is that the Indian elites perceptions of the
EU continue to be essentially conditioned by the Anglo-Saxon media,
which impedes a more nuanced understanding of the processes and
dynamics of European integration, as well as the intricacies and roles of
EU institutions. China, Europeans argue, has been a much greater supporter of European integration, whereas India has tended to stay away
from the debate. Even though India was one of the first countries to
establish diplomatic relations with the European Economic Community,
India has tended to take a comparatively more measured approach towards European integration. To many Indians, Europe is like the doudy
old lady, known for over four centuries. There is no excitement, no
passion between India and Europe (Raja Mohan 2002: 62). India, the
Europeans often complain, like Europe, but love the United States,
even though it is tough love.
China, many Europeans feel, has over the years developed a far more
sophisticated approach towards Europe. Even though EU officials concede that the core of the relationship with both China and India is economic, but China, they insist, functions more like a demandeur, continuously seeking to widen constantly interaction and dialogue. People in
Brussels often argue that India was neither proactive nor entrepreneurial
enough like China to avail of existing opportunities. This may partly
stem from the fact that on most things which are of vital concern to
India, the EU as a collective is neither able nor willing to make a difference, with the result that most deliverables are perceived to essentially lie
in bilateral relationships.
EU officials are fond of saying that India does not devote adequate
human resources commensurate with the need to meaningfully engage
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the Union. In this context, they are fond of stating that China has a
separate embassy accredited to Belgium and a separate 60-member one
to the EU. India, on the other hand, has a combined one of about onethird its size for Belgium, Luxembourg and the European Union.
Whereas Beijing has about half a dozen officials for closely following the
work of the European Parliament, India has none. There are about two
dozen Chinese officials dealing with political affairs, whereas India has
just a few. At summits and other dialogues, the Chinese are said to follow a structured approach with usually several rows of participants followed by note-takers, whereas EU officials say they confront a random
democracy on the other side. Despite about 45-odd issues, on which
there is dialogue and consultations with India under the Strategic Partnership, Brussels feels that it does encounter the problem of capacity and
resources in the Ministry of External Affairs.
Whereas the Union respects China as a great power, some in India
feel that Brussels tends to regard India as a regional South Asian power
and does not adequately appreciate its rise in the Asia-Pacific. Europeans
tend to consider India as still an emerging country whose status is being
slowly enhanced, but the process of its global empowerment is just beginning, whereas China is clearly ahead in terms of GDP, defence capabilities and diplomatic clout (Racine 2007: 53-54). To most Indians, a
Sino-centric Europe has been more willing to accommodate China rather
than India; there is a tendency to draw a comparison with China, that
India should emulate China in its dealings with EU and try to introduce
a competitive spirit (you have only yourselves to blame for the lower
level of interaction and engagement).
Beijing views the European Union as a pole in an emerging multipolar world and as a potential counterbalance to the United States. To that
end, it has been keen that Europeans develop a more united voice. Indians, however, feel that it is going to be a long, long way before Europe
is going to act as a pole, largely because of the inherent constraints of the
Common Foreign and Security Policy in a heterogeneous EU of 27
member states. Indian analysts as well as upper and decision-making
classes do not see the EU as a counterweight to the United States, but as
a building process and a construct that could be able to deliver longterm gains for the Indian subcontinent, while maintaining intact the
diverse range of Indian bilateral relations with specific European countries (Ruel, Chowhdury and Vasudevan 2004: 105-106). The EU displays
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a lack of geopolitical coherence and has not yet shown signs of acting as
a credible power (Lisbonne-de Vergeron 2006: 5).
While Europeans aspire for a multipolar world, they seem to endorse
Chinese views of a unipolar Asia, and not a multipolar Asia which also
takes into account the growing profile of India and Japan in the region.
In fact, both Japan and India will not satisfy themselves with a mere
balancing of China, but they will also vigorously contest Beijings attempts at establishing its dominance in various parts of Asia. (Raja
Mohan 2009: 51). The romantic notion that Asia is a naturally Sinocentric continent, Indian observers argue, should be discarded (Sahni
2008: 37).
Perhaps in no other strategic partnership has Brussels invested so
much political, diplomatic and financial resources as the one with China.
As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China has all the
advantages of great power exceptionalism (Ikenberry 2008: 32) which
India does not. Because of its membership of the UN Security Council,
it was natural that EU-China interaction was much more significant in
the resolution of key problems, because in 2007 China had become the
largest trading partner of Iran, North Korea, and Sudan, and the secondlargest of Burma and Zimbabwe.
China is perceived by most Europeans as a direct and immediate
threat to European jobs, since it is with China that the Union has the
largest bilateral trade deficit. The EUs trade deficit with China was
rising by 15 million an hour and reached 170 billion in 2007. The Pew
Global Attitudes Survey of June 2007 noted that Chinas expanding
economic and military power was triggering considerable anxiety in
Western Europe, where the number of those with a favourable image of
China declined in several West European countries between 2005 and
2007 (Pew Global Attitude Survey June 2007: 35). In a survey of June
2008, majorities in Western Europe believed that either China has already replaced the United States as the worlds leading superpower or
that it will at some point replace the US (Pew Global Attitudes Project
2008: 5). On the other hand, the Unions trade with India was nearly six
times less than with China 55 billion in 2007, compared to 300
billion with China. India is perceived by Europeans as a latent and potential threat taking away service-sector jobs, though pressures will increase as both China and India move up the value chain.
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In recent years, many Europeans fear a threat to their economic interests by the rise of China and India. Indian officials, however, stress that
the tendency to equate India with China in the sense that they constitute
a threat to European employment structures is unfair because the EUs
trade with China is 12 per cent of its total, as compared to two per cent
with India (Saran 2005: 4). Some Europeans concede that there is no
empirical basis for this, but there is an unsubstantiated fear of a rapidly
growing Indian economy having the potential of posing a danger at some
time in the future. There is also an attitudinal difference on how China
and India deal with the European Union. Europeans do not exactly
relish the more vocal approach of a rising India and its confident and
articulate elite keen on gaining a position at the high table. China tends
to be generally much more subtle, making rather indirect and allusive
statements, rather than brazenly direct pronouncements that India tends
to make in the manner of Western foreign offices. In diplomatic discourse and conduct, India has tended to carry many chips on its shoulder, almost always moralistic, needlessly arrogant, argumentative, mistaking such attitude as being an assertion of national pride (Singh 2006:
276-277).
Europe is not yet central to Indian priorities which appear to be UScentric. India accords greater importance to the United States than the
EU because as the principal foreign policy interlocutor, it is perceived as
having the biggest impact on our national security environment. There is
a societal bias towards the United States in terms of the importance
given to Washington, cultural and intellectual ties with the US, and the
million-strong Indian Diaspora. The US has the capacity to act in ways
which are more benefiting to India than long European declaratory statements. As an aspiring power, India is more sympathetic to the American
effort to rework the rules of the global game, whereas Europe is a
staunch defender of the present order. Europe appears increasingly as a
conservative force: protectionist, in relation to markets but also much
else, hoping to keep what it has (Khilnani 2006: 490-491).
A key difference between the EU and American documents on Indias strategic partnership with them is that while gradual incrementalism
through dialogue and discussion is the hallmark of the Union, there is a
more practical, direct American approach, which focuses on vital issues
to India such as geopolitical balance, energy and technology (Racine
2007). India also finds it comparatively easier to deal with the United
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States on a one-to-one basis which is characterized by an effective leadership, whereas decision-making in the EU is inherently time-consuming
in an increasingly heterogeneous EU-27 driven forward by committees
and compromises. The US is making greater efforts to understand Indias foreign policy priorities and strategic preferences, whereas the Europeans come with their own foreign policy preferences, expecting us to
conform to them or explain why we are not.
Indian Perceptions of EU-China Relations
Elites and decision-makers in India maintain that EU policy-makers have
a fixation on China. For long, remarked a veteran Brussels-based Indian
observer, the EU had single-mindedly focused on China since India was
overshadowed by China, both politically and economically (Subhan 2002:
51; Pant 2008). As Asia started to come together and to see how Chinas
peaceful rise could be kept peaceful for Asia, the EU seemed to have
abandoned its traditional focus on India to have concentrated on Southeast and Northeast Asia (Shashank 2007: 23). There has also been resentment in many quarters that until the turn of the millennium the EU
maintained its Cold War policies of equidistance between India and
Pakistan. Most stakeholders in India feel that a Sino-centric Europe has
been more willing to accommodate China rather than India, which, as
Commissioner Mandelson said, is getting there, but not quite arrived
(cited in Rao 2007). India is perceived to be in the Commonwealth
Games league, whereas China is in the Olympic Games league.
Many stakeholders in India feel that there is a degree of discrimination in the European Unions interest in and treatment of democratic
India and in favour of undemocratic China, with which the Union has
few common political values. Thus, many in India feel that the EU has
been less sympathetic to and supportive of a democratic secular India,
one of the few countries to practice democracy in the developing countries against overwhelming odds (Ram 2002: 5). Indias democratic
polity and shared values do not necessarily earn it any brownie points in
Europe. Many Indian stakeholders wondered how EU espousal of human rights and promotion of democracy reconciled with political expediency to embrace military rulers responsible for ousting democraticallyelected rulers in Pakistan.
The rise of India and China offers two developmental models to the
world, especially to developing countries: in China, development has
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missioners and the High Representative for CFSP Javier Solana, whereas
there were nine Commissioner visits to China alone in the first half of
2004. However, in recent years with India and EU talking across the
board, the number of visits of Commissioners and officials has increased, but it still does not equal those to China.
Similarities in Chinese and Indian Approaches towards the EU
There are basic differences in both perceptions and interests of China
and India with the EU in many fields, including trade, development,
globalization, and WTO negotiations, the International Criminal Court,
climate change, etc. where the EU has taken a stand contradictory to
them. China and India argue that the structures of global governance
(including the G8) must be more democratic, representative and legitimate. The two new big kids on the block are wary of the creeping regulatory imperialism of the North. What they want is a different set of
rules to safeguard the interests of their populations which constitute
more than one-third of humanity.
Both China and India have similar attitudes towards the role of the
United Nations and multilateralism. During the UN debate on the eve of
the Iraq war (2002-2003), the Europeans were at the forefront of questioning the American attempt to oust Saddam Hussein based on a perceived threat of weapons of mass destruction. China and India were
vehemently opposed to European aspirations to transform the United
Nations into a supranational organization which can gain and implement
a mandate to interfere in domestic affairs. Both Asian giants resent European efforts to talk down to them from the high pedestal of post-modernism. They remain acutely sensitive about their sovereignty and internal autonomy against intrusive human rights issues and remain wary
about humanitarian intervention and the circumstances in which force
may be used. Both feel that hard power is as necessary as post-modernist
Europes fascination for and advocacy of the merits of soft power.
Above all, both China and India are unanimous that the Commission
often tends to assume a patronizing attitude Engage and we shall
teach you.
As the two most populous economies, China and India continue to
have consultations and policy coordination in multilateral trade negotiations. Since the Cancun Ministerial meeting (2003), the advanced industrialized countries are being challenged in multilateral trade negotiations
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alternative, to become more collaborative and to foster their own development. There are, perhaps, three lessons which India can learn from the
ways in which China engages with the European Union.
Firstly, India should more intensively engage the Council and the
European Parliament. In the past, India concentrated almost entirely on
the European Commission in its dealings with Brussels, primarily because it was the main interlocutor in dealing with trade irritants and
seemed reluctant to engage more intensely with other EU institutions.
For decades, New Delhi regarded the European Parliament as a mere
talking shop and confined itself to fire-fighting or damage control
(mostly on Kashmir). With growing appreciation of the greater profile
and role of the European Parliament in the Unions institutional architecture, the Indian attitude towards it seems to have changed significantly.
This has been reflected in a number of recent high-profile visits, and the
establishment of a separate India Delegation (as in the case of China).
Secondly, India should emulate China in developing a more robust
framework of educational exchanges and encourage Indian elites to
study in Europe. There is a need to strengthen media relationships, academic and intellectual linkages, as well as foster greater intellectual and
elite interaction. The number of Indian students studying in Europe has
been rather limited, partly because of the limited number of courses in
English and because Europe does not provide a structure of post-doctoral fellowships and employment prospects that is available in the
United States. There is a continuing need to re-profile and reorient our
mindsets about the growing prominence of the EU as a collective entity.
While India will not be able to match China in the setting up of Confucius Institutes across the world, the Indian Council of Cultural Relations
has established twenty India Cultural Centres around the world, of which
only two are in Western Europe (Germany and the United Kingdom;
with a third one coming up in Paris shortly). India also maintains nineteen Chairs of Indian Studies and five Chairs of Indian studies on a
semester basis, mostly for teaching of Indian languages. Of these, there
are six for Hindi in Europe (Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Belgium and Spain), one for Sanskrit (France), and one for Tamil (Poland).
India has set up a Chair of Indian Economics at Sciences Po, Paris.
Obviously, more needs to be done in this context.
Thirdly, and finally, a catalytic role can be played by the think-tank
community in Europe, which for too long have been obsessed with
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China. The number of think-tanks in Europe that are continuously engaged and committed to research and dissemination of information and
debate on India are far and few. There is an urgent need to develop a
sustained specialist and policy level dialogue between Indian and European think-tanks.
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Grant, Charles and Tomas Valasek. 2007. Preparing for the Multipolar World:
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Ikenberry, G. John. 2008. The Rise of China and the Future of the West in
Foreign Affairs 87(1): 23-37.
Jain, Rajendra K.. 2007. India and the European Union: Building a Strategic Partnership. New Delhi: Radiant Publishers.
Khilnani, Sunil. 2006. India and the World in Manmohan Malhoutra (ed.)
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Lisbonne-de Vergeron, Karine. 2006. Contemporary Indian Views of Europe. London: Chatham House.
Mandelson, Peter. Letter to Jos Manuel Barroso, President of the European
Commission. Cited in Stephen Castle. 2007. EU-China trade tensions start
to heat up in International Herald Tribune (6 November 2007).
Pant, Harsh V. India and the EU: A Directionless Courtship (7 October 2008).
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Patten, Chris, cited in Rashmee Z. Ahmed. 2002. EU asks India to ditch narrow view of Pakistan; in The Times of India (10 October 2002).
Patten, Christopher. 2005. Not Quite the Diplomat: Home Truths about World Affairs. London: Allen Lane.
Pew Global Attitudes Project, Some Positive Signs for U.S. Image, Global
Economic Gloom China and India Notable Exceptions, 24-Nation Pew
Gl obal Atti tudes Survey, 12 June 2008. Onl i ne at:
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Not Immigration: 47-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey, 4 October
2007. Online at: http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=258
Racine, Jean-Luc. 2007. The India-Europe Relationship in the US Shadow in
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Raja Mohan, C. 2009. India and the Emerging Non-Proliferation Order: The
Second Nuclear Age in Harsh V. Pant (ed.) Indian Foreign Policy in a Unipolar
World. London and New Delhi: Routledge: 43-72.
Raja Mohan, C. 2002. India, Europe and the United States in Rajendra K. Jain
(ed.) India and the European Union in the 21st Century. New Delhi: Radiant
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Raja Mohan, C. 2007. Japan and India in a Rising Asia public lecture at
Fukuoka, Japan, 30 July 2007. Online at: http://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/
kouenkai/070730-Raja_Mohan_Speech.pdf
Ram, A.N. 2002. India and the European Union in the New Millennium in
Rajendra K. Jain (ed.) India and the European Union in the 21st Century. New
Delhi: Radiant Publishers: 1-24.
Rao, H.S, 2007. Kamal Nath makes a point with 'fat cows' (14 December
2007). On line at: http://www.rediff.com/money/2007/dec/14nath.htm
Ruet, Joel, Pramit Pal Chowdhury and Hari Vasudevan. 2004. Indias Europe:
Cultural Footprints and Conflict Resolution Processes in I.P. Khosla (ed.)
India and the New Europe. New Delhi: Konark: 101-108.
Sahni, Varun. 2008. China-India Partnership: Defining an Agenda in China
Report: 44(1): 33-39.
Saran, Shyam. 2005. The EU-India Partnership Summit 2005. New Delhi: Konrad
Adenaeur Foundation.
Saran, Shyam. Speech by Special Envoy of the Prime Minister, on Climate
C hange at Mu mbai , ( 2 1 Apri l 2 0 0 8 ). On l i ne at:
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Shashank. 2007. India and the European Union in Rajendra K. Jain (ed.) India
and the European Union: Building a Strategic Partnership. New Delhi: Radiant
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Shedde, Meenakshi. 2001. Indians seem to favour US because of Hollywood
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Singh, Jaswant. 2006. A Call to Honour: In Service of Emergent India. New Delhi:
Rupa and Co., 2006.
Subhan, Malcolm. 2002. India and the European Union: A View from Brussels
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Delhi: Radiant Publishers: 25-57.
Subhan, Malcolm. 2005. Beneath unrest lies symbiotic harmony in The Financial Express (9 July 2005).
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Similarly, the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia in May 1999, US criticism of Chinas human rights record and its
policy on Taiwan, and the signing of an American-Japanese security
treaty, inflamed China. By the time of the Russian 1998 economic crash,
there was a general feeling in Moscow that Russias flirtation with the
Washington model (liberal democracy and the market) had produced
nothing but pain and heartache. This led to a new direction in Russian
foreign policy and resulted in Kozyrev being replaced by Yevgeny
Primakov in 1997-98. This was important because Primakov wanted to
forge links or build bridges between Russia and Asia (e.g. Central Asia
and China) and his appointment marked a more positive Russian stance
toward Asia (Iwashita 2007: 165-194). Primakov and other actors, such
as the communists (KPRF) and neo-fascists (LDPR) were admirers of
Chinas reforms and experience. These groups, as well as the industrial
lobby (MIC, heavy industry) wanted China as Russias ally (Lukin 2001:
2-4), partly to help reverse Russias economic decline but also to counter
US unliteralism. At an early 1992 summit meeting between President
Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin it was agreed that neither country would intervene in the domestic affairs of the other, that both would stand up
against hegemonism, that neither country would strike the other first
with nuclear weapons, and that it was in Russia and Chinas best interests to expand economic, scientific, cultural and military exchanges (Lee
Nam-ju 2001: 56-57; Su 2007: 93-112).
Since then, both Moscow and Beijing have stressed the primacy of
the UN in global decision-making and the precedence of national sovereignty over western conceptions of humanitarian intervention and limited sovereignty. Both countries aspire to a multipolar world, in which
a few great powers (the US, Russia, the EU, China, India and Japan)
make the big decisions. Both Russia and China are opposed to the
unipolar order associated with a hegemonic America. As a result, in UN
General General Assembly voting, Russia and China have converged
from 1974-2005 but diverged from the US (Ferdinand 2007: 860-862).
An example is the way Russia and China blocked US attempts to reform
the UNHRC in 2005 (Yong Deng 2007: 881). To reverse US domination
Moscow and Beijing have adopted similar positions on the war against
terror, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
and international conflict management, most recently in the context of
the Iraq war. They have also made repeated calls for multipolarity.
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Thus, according to the Russian foreign minister, Igor Ivanov, it is especially important that Russia and China cooperate in key areas such as
raising the authority and the role of the UN, defending the primacy of
international law in world affairs, maintaining strategic stability, first and
foremost, preserving the ABM treaty, creating a new, just, world economic order where everyone enjoys equal rights. (cited in Lukin 2001: 17).
This stance coincides with what Swaine and Tellis refer to as Chinas
calculative security policy which contains three elements: a practical and
non-ideological approach and the maintenance of friendly international
relations; restraining the use of armed force while modernizing the military, and active participation in the international community (Swaine, and
Tellis 2000: 113-114.) But for things to proceed more smoothly, RussoChinese border disputes needed to be resolved first.
Border Disputes and Demarcation
The backdrop to Russias concerns over its border was the collapse of
the USSR, Chechnya and its overall feeling of vulnerability as Russia
shares a 4,300km common border with China (Bobo Lo 2004: 296-297).
Over time the border was gradually militarized, costing the Soviets 60
billion roubles in the 1960s and 70s alone (Wilson 2004: 49). Between
the years 1969-78, there were fifteen rounds of negotiations, all to no
avail. The deadlock was finally broken by Gorbachev in 1987 and by
October that year an agreement had already been reached on the Eastern
boundaries. This was followed in November 1989 by further discussions
regarding Soviet and Chinese border troop reductions (Wilson 2004: 43).
By 1991, only the status of three islands around the Ussuri and Argun
rivers remained unresolved (Wilson 2004: 44). In the period 1992-94,
negotiations over the Western sector of the former Soviet border continued and agreement was finally reached by June 1994, with border demarcation completed by November 1997 (Kireev 2006; Maxwell 2007: 47-72
and Wilson 2004: 44-45). Thus, there are no longer any border issues to
settle, a major step forward. As a result, in the period 2005-7 two million
Russians visited China and 700-750 million Chinese visited Russia, twothirds in the 1,000km border zone (Larin 2008: 2).
The Russian Far East Question
Closely linked to the border question is the vulnerability of the Russian
Far East (hereafter RFE), which has suffered serious population-decline
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(the young, better educated and more industrious have migrated, leaving
the elderly and infirm behind), massive Chinese immigration (of between
300,000 and 2 million), a major influx of Chinese goods and a serious
economic depression, as result of the decline of the Soviet merchant and
naval fleet.
The RFEs plight caused clashes between the Russian Federal government and the governors of various regions (krais)2 - most notably
Khabarovsk and Primore - from 1991 to 1997. These regions and their
rulers felt that the 1991 border demarcation agreement left them and
Russian national security vulnerable (Rangsimaporn 2006: 132-135).
Furthermore, the Russian state was also perceived to be neglecting the
pressing needs of the RFE.
As a consequence, a 2005 Russian public opinion poll revealed that
66% of Russians were against Chinese companies in the RFE/Siberia;
71% feared an increase in the number of Chinese in Russia and 61%
were in favour of restrictions on Chinese imports (cited in Shlapentokh
2007: 6). In general terms, Russians think that the Chinese show open
contempt for the Russians and their customs and that a Chinese influx
will downgrade Russian to an insignificant nation in the world
(Shlapentokh 2007: 13). There is also a widespread Russian conception
that the RFE is a Chinese target and the population fear that the RFE
will soon fall under Chinese control, so defeatism is already present
(Shlapentokh 2007: 12-14).
Although a 2004 survey showed that 35% of Russians in Khabarovsk
and 42% in Vladivostok were against the Chinese (cited in Shlapentokh
2007: 14), attitudes are gradually changing as Russians realize the opportunities available in terms of jobs and Chinese trade with Russias Eastern regions and the Trans-Baikal, which rose from US$515m in 2000 to
US$3.2 billion by 2005 (Larin 2008: 5). Furthermore, some pensioners
from Blagoveshchensk, Russia, have been moving to Heihe, in China, to
take advantage of lower apartment costs, utility fees and inflation (Larin
2008: 3)
But there is still a long way to go on the Russian side of the border
the authorities are unable to cope with the Chinese flow, so smuggling,
tax evasion and migration law violations occur. The Amur-Chinese
bridge project has also made little progress since 1995 and both sides
2
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tinued economic growth, but at the same time Russia could be creating a
major Chinese adversary in the long-term.
Arms and Weapons Sales: Sustaining the Russian MIC
Bobo Lo argues that Russian official trade with China has tripled under
Putin while unofficial commerce, dominated by cross-border shuttle
trade, is at an all-time high (S10 billion according to Putin) (Bobo Lo
2005: 8). By May 2008, Russian Chinese trade had increased to $48
billion (Factbox 2008). This trade and investment involves nuclear energy, space cooperation, as well as in oil and gas projects, as we shall see
later. Military-technical cooperation is also an important feature of
Russo-Chinese relations (see Tsai 2003). China is now Russias biggest
arms customer, accounting for 40 per cent of Russias arms exports.
Arms exports comprise one-fifth of Russo-Chinese trade, and Russia
earns in excess of $1 billion annually from Chinese arms purchases
(Smith 2003: 12). Chinese arms purchases from Russia reached $6.5
billion from 1991to 1999 (Lee Nam-ju 2001: 64).
China has received 200 Su-27SK and Su-27UB trainers; 48 Su30MKK fighter bombers; a Sukhoi-30 jet fighter, 5 Sovremennyi-class
destroyers, 8 modern Kilo-class diesel destroyers; enough S-300PMU-1
ground to air missiles to equip eight divisions, now the core of the Chinese air defence forces and 35 Tor-M1 ground to air missiles (Lee Namju 2001: 64; Smith 2003: 12). In addition, since 1991 more than 2,000
Chinese officers have studied in Russia and currently around 200 Chinese officers are studying in Russian military academies (Smith 2003: 12).
Of serious concern to Russia is the fact that the balance of power between the Russian and Chinese air forces on the Sino-Russian border is
now in favour of China; whilst from a Western perspective the level of
contacts between the Russian and Chinese armed forces has not so far
matched those between the armed forces of NATO states and Russia but
contacts are being extended at MOD and General Staff levels, so this
may be a worry for the future.
On top of military trade and sales, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) has also been used to encourage military co-operation
among SCO members, to boost confidence among members and to
develop a coordinated military policy against potential threats. Thus, in
October 2000 the first round of war games took place between China
and Kyrgyzstan. This was followed in April 2002 by Chinese observers
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one hand, and India, Pakistan, Iran (Atai 2005: 102-103) and Central
Asia (Sun Zhuanghi 2004: 600-612) on the other.
The SCO has also been used to challenge US hegemony in Central
Asia and the biggest coup occurred when the Uzbek government announced that US troops had 180 days to pack and leave in July 2005.
Gleason argues that this change in attitude means that the US has lost an
important outpost in Central Asia, the ability to act as a counterweight to
Russia and China in the region and that in the short to medium term this
will allow Russia to gain a stronger foothold (Gleason 2006: 52). By and
large, though, the SCO lacks the material and diplomatic capabilities to
challenge directly Western interests in Central Asia (Lanteigne 2006-7:
606; on the Wests view of SCO see Zaderei 2008: 48-56).
One issue of concern is the uneven distribution of power within the
SCO. One view expressed in February 2008 argues that it is Russia and
China who largely determine SCO policy, followed by Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan who exert limited influence, and finally by the SCO minnows Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan who have no clout or influence (SCO
2008). However, although Russia wants the SCO to become a militarypolitical bloc, it has no desire to re-create the Warsaw Pact or to start a
new Cold War. For both Russia and China the significance of the SCO is
thus far largely economic energy supplies are the key to both countries
with Russia focusing on oil and gas exports and China on imports (for
more detail see Aris 2008). It is possible, however, that while Russia and
China will eventually compete for power in Central Asia, for the time
being China seems content to keep a low key in the region and is unwilling to challenge Moscows pride (Merry 2003: 26).
China-EU relations and Russias Oilopoly
The European Union (EU) was created in the 1950s, and since then it
has expanded, growing to its current size of twenty-seven member states,
making the EU a major international actor, like the US and China, in
2009. Diplomatic relations between the EU and China started in 1975,
with the EU firmly supporting Chinas transition process and keen on
sustaining Chinas economic and social reforms, partly through trade and
cooperation agreements since 1978 (Heisbourg 2001). According to
Yong Deng (2007: 889), economic ties have reached a new height. China
is now the second largest trading partner of the EU. Eurostat figures
show that Chinese imports to the EU totalled approximately 191 billion
161
162
Christopher Williams
163
a supplier of energy and weapons, but still realizes that Russia often uses
China to gain global influence (Anderson 1997; Garnett 2000 and Bobo
Lo 2008).
Although China has not yet achieved superpower status, its rise is
nevertheless causing some concern in Washington, Moscow, Brussels
and elsewhere. Whether or not the current close Russia-China ties are
maintained will depend on a number of factors - the course of Russian
foreign policy under new President Medvedev; US-Japanese ties; the
impact of the Obama Presidency on the course of US-China and USRussia relations; the role of the UN; the settlement of disputes over the
Korean peninsula (Zhebin and Yong Ung 2008: 29-47); and finally,
whether the unilaterialism of President Bush (Junior) will gradually give
way to triangularism under the new US President Barack Obama.
From a Chinese perspective, its promotion of peaceful development,
harmony and strategic partnerships (such as the SCO), a relatively
problem-free 2008 Olympics and Chinas willingness to accept international aid during the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake, has partly countered
negative perceptions of China and indicated its new openness. But Taiwan and Tibet remain serious Chinese concerns. In terms of the other
main topic addressed here, energy security will continue to be the biggest
potential obstacle to better Russo-Chinese relations for the short to
medium term, and the issue most likely to dominate EU debates with
Russia as well. Thus far, Russia has - and is still - using geo-politics (see
Levgold 2007: 343-392), and energy in particular (Goldman 2008), to
balance various regional powers in areas of key interest, such as Asia, in
order to offset a perceived Chinese threat and to restore Russias great
power status on the world stage; however, this approach might well
produce major problems in the long-term.
164
Christopher Williams
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the earlier parts of the argument and to suggest avenues for further
research in this area.
The Development of EU-China-US Commercial Relations
Over the post-Cold War period, the commercial relations between the
EU, China and the US have developed rapidly, often in ways that have
surprised policy-makers in Brussels and Washington. On the one hand,
the explosive growth of the Chinese economy and its export orientation
have created very mixed reactions in the leading developed economies,
with the EU and the US at the centre of the process. Whilst retailers and
consumers have welcomed access to cheap products, producers have
often had much more mixed feelings, depending on the extent to which
they can take advantage of production or licensing arrangements in
China itself. Both the EU and the US have developed large deficits in
their trade with China, which have led to demands in some quarters for
protection and an emphasis on the vulnerability of both the worlds
leading economies to the challenge from East Asia (Crossick and Reuter
2007: Part III; Freeman 2006; Zaborowski 2006b). At the same time, the
growing availability of Chinese capital for investment in both the EU
and the US has led to further mixed reactions, with the desire for new
investment accompanied by the equal desire not to let prized assets fall
into alien hands. Both the EU and the US have developed strategies for
both containing and taking advantage of the rise of China, involving
not only a series of bilateral dialogues and agreements but also the use of
inter-regional and global multilateral organisations to regulate and civilise the new forces to which they have been exposed (Berkofsky 2006;
Crossick and Reuter 2007: 3-15; Tanca 2006; Zaborowski 2006b).
This said, the EU and the US occupy different positions in any
emerging triangle composed of themselves and Beijing. In some ways,
these different positions are similar to those occupied by the EC and the
US in the previous triangle, centred on the EC, the US and Japan during the 1980s and early 1990s. In that case, the linkages between the US
and the EC, and the US and Japan, were not only strong in commercial
terms but also bolstered by important security and diplomatic connections that gave a strong central core to the relationships and prevented
purely commercial tensions from getting out of hand. But the relationship between the EC and Japan not to mention that between the EU
and Asia-Pacific more generally - was both narrower and weaker, fo-
170
cused on commercial considerations above all else and with a much thinner web of linkages between the two parties (Smith 1998b). In the case
of the EU-US-China triangle some of the same qualities can be discerned. The United States continues to have strong and multidimensional relationships with the EU, which embed the commercial relationship into a much broader set of linkages and networks, and which encompass economic, diplomatic and security concerns (McGuire and
Smith 2008: chapter 2). Although it does not have a highly developed
alliance with China, the US does have a multi-dimensional strategic
relationship, which gives a key significance to security issues such as the
Taiwan question and commits the US to a role much broader than a
simple commercial one (Zaborowski 2006b). By contrast, the EU can be
seen as under-powered, pursuing a strategy in which there are important
variations between the stakes of individual Member States and in which
there is a distinct lack of the multi-dimensional economic, diplomatic
and security themes that are so powerful in US-China relations (Crossick
and Reuter, 2007: 73-80). Although there are clearly elements of a triangle between the EU, the US and China, it is clear that there are important areas of unevenness and (from the EUs perspective) gaps in the
overall structure, whilst the overall development of relations is fluid and
dynamic, especially in light of the rapid development of Chinas position.
This unevenness and dynamism translates into important variations in
strategy between the three participants. For each of them, there are key
considerations: the relationship between grand strategy and the requirements of commercial relations, the relationship between the roles of
partner and competitor, and the distribution of responsibility between
the different stakeholders in the overall constellation of relations. Some
at least of these considerations arise as much out of how the three participants see themselves as players in the global arena as they do out of
material resources and conflicts of interest, and thus relate to norms and
role-conceptions as much as they do to specific institutional arrangements or distributions of power.
What is clear is that the different EU, Chinese and US positions lead
to markedly different responses to the demands of international life and
to the demands of life within the triangle. Thus, the EUs response has
been (as it has in many other areas of external policy) to focus on the
building of a strategic partnership with China, centred on the principles
of multilateralism and encompassing a large number of sectoral and
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other dialogues designed to present and promote the interests of commercial groups in Europe (Jing Men 2007); on occasion, it has appeared
that this partnership might be designed partly as a response to the perceived unilateralism and coercive nature of US policy, particularly under
the George W. Bush Presidencies (Crossick and Reuter 2007: 73-80;
Pollack 2003). By contrast, the US has focused much more on an approach to China couched in terms of grand strategy, emphasising the
linkages between economics, diplomacy and security, and linking China
policy to vital national interests in a way that is simply not available to
the EU (Zaborowski 2006b). It might also be argued that the US has as
a result been sharply aware of the wider vulnerabilities that might be
engendered by too great a reliance on China in commercial terms. For
the Chinese, it seems clear that their approach to both the EU and the
US is shaped by broader considerations of Chinas emergent role in the
world, and by the desire to maintain autonomy and shape a multipolar
distribution of global power; but it is also clear that they feel the need to
engage over a much broader front with the US than they do (at least at
present) with the EU (Zhiyuan Cui 2004).
This discussion demonstrates that the increasing mutual entanglement
of the EU, China and the US is central to the development of the global
arena, but that it reflects variations in salience, scope and sensitivity for
each of the three participants. At a very general level, they are entangled
in a common situation reflecting the relative dynamism of their political
and economic trajectories, but at the level of broad considerations of
economic, diplomacy and security, there are important differences among
them. In terms of their approaches to the global commercial system and
to trade issues, this means that they are likely to take different positions
not only on specific issues and disputes but also on the broad relevance
and utility of material power, institutions and norms.
To put it simply, they are entangled with each other in a situation that
has important elements of complex interdependence (Keohane and Nye
2001): their relations have grown in range and scope, they encompass a
wide variety of governmental and other participants, they exhibit important linkages between issue areas and they demand a process of almost
continuous negotiation. However, their responses to this are likely to be
different not only in style but also in substance; not least, as also suggested by Keohane and Nye, the levels of perceived sensitivity and vulnerability to the consequences of growing interdependence among the three
172
parties are likely to vary, with important consequences for their approaches to negotiations. The next section of the paper suggests a way in
which the impact of complex interdependence can be linked to the
conduct of trade negotiations among the EU, China and the US.
Bi-Multilateralism and EU-China-US Commercial Relations
As noted elsewhere, the relations between the EU and the US contain
important and coexisting elements of bilateralism and multilateralism,
which create distinctive problems for negotiation and the management of
their relationship (Smith 2005). The argument here is that this quality can
also be discerned in the EU-China-US triangle, although as we have
seen this triangle is also subject to fluctuation and variation. To a large
extent, the EU-China-US relationship manifests the following qualities that
are also encompassed by the EU-US relationship (Smith 2005: 167-8):
Multi-level relationships with strong elements of public-private interaction
as well as intergovernmental interaction.
A search for institutionalisation, for example through the New Transatlantic
Agenda (NTA) and the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP), or
the proposed EU-China Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, but
issues about the gaps between institutional potential and institutional
performance.
Strong linkages between what goes on at the level of the triangle and what
goes on at the global level in the context of institutions such as the
WTO and a range of other multilateral bodies.
Intensifying integration especially in areas of the political economy, but
unevenness of that integration across sectors.
A proliferation of relevant networks and dialogues, both transgovernmental
and transnational, but lack of clarity about how those networks and
dialogues relate to each other and interact with each other.
Co-existing languages of policy discourse, ranging from coercion to
coalition-building and collaboration but often in an uneasy coexistence,
reflecting elements of normative consensus but equally strong areas of
normative confusion.
Issues of choice about forums for interaction, about strategies and about
priorities which affect both the EU, and Chinese and US policy-makers.
As a result, a set of adversarial partnerships or relations of competitive
cooperation emerge, which are arguably suboptimal for all concerned
(but which may also serve the purposes of policy-makers on all sides
from time to time).
173
174
175
bership in the late 1980s. There was also a specific institutional context
for the eventual negotiations, since the granting of WTO membership
requires bilateral agreements with all existing member states (or groups,
in the case of the EU). Given the development between the late 1980s
and early 2000s of increasingly intense trade relations between the EU,
China and the US (and of course, of increasing trade deficits for the EU
and the US), it was to be expected that negotiations would be long and
hard. The model of bi-multilateralism would also predict that these
negotiations would be characterised by linkages, by the coexistence of
issues between the three parties and by the emergence of an outcome
that reflected a complex set of trade-offs. It would further predict that
there would be problems of management for all three of the parties,
particularly the EU as the party with the narrowest and most
commercially-focused set of interests and with important internal interests (in the shape of the Member States) to satisfy.
Both the EU and the US were concerned above all with one key
element in the eventual deal that might be struck with China: market
access, which would give them the potential to expand their commercial
interests in China not only through trade in goods but also through trade
in services, intellectual property protection and potential future investment. They thus set priorities for the negotiations that implied a significant market-opening process in China, and also saw as central the
WTOs role in promoting rules and norms on international commercial
transactions, including both trade and investment (Pearson 1999;
Rumbaugh and Blancher 2004). The notion that China should become a
responsible stakeholder in the world economy and particularly in trade
was a key underlying motivation for both the EU and the US; but it must
be remembered that for the US, this was embedded in a wider conception of Chinas role in the broader world order. For the Chinese themselves, it is clear that entry onto the WTO was seen as emblematic of a
broader integration into the world order and recognition of their status
in addition, of course, the liberalisation of trade in areas such as textiles
was a key material motivation. This liberalisation was a key concern for
both the EU and the US, since it threatened to expose areas of vulnerability in their domestic industries, as well as providing new opportunities
for manufacturers, retailers and consumers.
During the negotiations themselves, between 1997 and 2001, there
was thus a wide range of motivations between the three parties, as well
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177
to adjust to the pressures of life in the multilateral system, and it was one
on which the EU and US positions differed, with the EU inclined to
accept that China should enter with the status of less developed country.
The US position was much less accommodating than that of the EU
throughout the negotiations reflecting no doubt the relative priorities
placed on membership for China per se, as well as the influence of Congress, which was extremely sensitive to any give-away on the negotiations.
What developed for the EU was a (self-allocated) role as a kind of
intermediary between China and the US, emphasising the importance of
sensitivity to the varying levels of development in different sectors of the
Chinese economy and also stressing the importance of EU interests in
such areas as trade in services and the integrity of the WTO system as a
whole (Eglin 1997). This implied a delicate balancing act for the Commission in its role as negotiator pushing hard for Chinese accession
and stressing sensitivity to Chinese interests, but also accommodating
itself to the hard line pursued by the US and thus emphasising the need
for Chinese concessions on key areas of market access and WTO rules.
It also implied acute Commission sensitivity (underlined by the watchfulness of key commercial interests in the EU, such as financial services) to
what could be seen as unequal deals by the Chinese that would favour
US companies.
When it came to the dnouement of the negotiations as a whole, there
was a key role for timing. The EU as it transpired was the last of the
major WTO members to conclude a bilateral deal with China, and this
enabled it to push for greater concessions in some areas than the US had
already achieved; at the same time, there was pressure on the EU to
conclude a deal so that key Congressional votes in the US were not
jeopardised (European Report 2000a, 2000b). As a result, the final conclusion of the bilateral agreement with the EU was delayed until May
2000 the US having agreed in late 1999. It could be argued that this
enabled the EU to achieve some slight advantage in the deals carved out
for specific sectors, particularly for financial services. But it was also
clear that Chinese entry (formally achieved on 1 January 2002) was only
the beginning of the story. There remained key questions about the ways
in which Chinese status within the WTO would be defined, and about
the impact of the concessions that had been achieved in specific sectors.
178
Among these, textiles were one of the most sensitive for all three parties
to the EU-China-US triangle.
Among the key agreements made during the entry negotiations had
been one on the elimination of tariffs and quotas. On their side, the
Chinese had agreed to eliminate quotas and other quantitative restrictions on imports no later than 2005, thus opening up in principle a large
new market for both European and American goods (European Report
2001). Not surprisingly, Chinese entry was followed by sustained pressure on Beijing to introduce if not to accelerate these changes. But
the changes have to be seen in the broader context of the reduction of
quotas and quantitative restrictions for all countries as a result of the
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations that was completed in 1993.
One of these was key to both the EU and the US interest: the phasing
out of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement, which had governed imports of
textile products into industrial countries for many years, and which had,
at its core, a set of quota arrangements (Brambilla et al 2007). The agreement was due to expire on 1st January 2005, replaced by the Agreement
on Textiles and Clothing, which meant that the EU as well as other
WTO members had had ten years to adjust but the phasing out of
quotas brought about a veritable flood of imports from China (as well as
a number of other developing countries, especially those in South Asia).
This posed a number of questions for the EU and for the US. Most
particularly, how would they now deal with a need for crisis management in a particularly sensitive area of declining production and vociferous domestic producer interests?
In terms of complex interdependence, it seems clear that this situation moved the politics of trade in the EU and the US from a discourse
centred on sensitivity to one centred on vulnerability, with all of the
resulting calls for protection and the re-imposition of quotas that might
have been predicted. It thus called into question some of the key undertakings that had been made by both the EU and the US when the Chinese entered the WTO. As a result, the effectiveness of international
institutions and rules was at least potentially challenged, and the potential
for imposition of coercive measures against the Chinese, in the form of
anti-dumping or other actions, was raised. Not only this, but the politics
of textiles set a number of different domestic interests for both the EU
and the US against each other: in each case, there were strong regional
variations in the salience of the textiles problem, between producing and
179
non-producing regions; these were accompanied by splits between producers, retailers and consumers that called into question the apparently
technocratic management of trade disputes and opened up the possibilities of broader politicisation.
The crisis, which made its initial and dramatic impact in early 2005,
thus posed major problems of management for the EU and the US within the context of their bilateral relationships with China and of their domestic constituencies; as it developed, it also produced significant problems of adjustment for the Chinese, because of the need to adapt to
successive negotiation phases. Potentially also, it played into the whole
question of the terms on which China had been admitted into the WTO,
since it raised issues about whether the EU and the US had the right to
impose protective measures against the surge of Chinese imports, and
about whether they could use the WTO as an instrument or as a legitimising agent in applying whatever measures they might decide upon.
Thus, although the dispute was about only a part of the trade with China
conducted by the EU and the US, it raised far more general questions
about the ways in which that trade was to be managed both at the time
and in the future.
Between 2004 and 2005, Chinese exports of textiles and clothing to
the EU grew massively both in volume and in value; at the same time,
average unit prices for textile products in the EU had dropped significantly. Not surprisingly, this led to protests from EU manufacturers,
channelled especially through the trade association, Euratex, which identified China as the key culprit and argued that there was a threat both to
EU producers and to other supplying countries from Chinese domination of the import market. The Commission had already identified the
textiles issue as one which might lead to major pressure for protection,
and had deployed a proposed amendment of Council regulations that
would at least in principle allow for the imposition of safeguard measures (European Commission 2004, 2005). But this in itself did not
prepare the EU for the dramatic flood of imports, nor for the conflicting
pressures that arose from the tensions between producers, retailers and
consumers as the crisis developed. In addition to the EU-based instruments, there was also the possibility that measures could be taken under
general WTO provisions to counter market disruption. Finally, there was
also the possibility of coordinated action with other countries or regions
180
especially affected by the import surge the obvious candidate being the
US, which was itself confronting a crisis in this area.
The EUs early response was to place the emphasis on self-control by
the Chinese, rather than to undertake unilateral measures, and to hold
any possibility of action through the WTO very much in the background
(Allen and Smith 2006). But the Commissions hand was forced by pressure from Euratex to deploy safeguard measures, and by increasing
evidence of concern on the part of particular Member States, especially
Italy, Portugal and France. In effect, on this as on a number of other
trade issues, there is a North-South divide in the EU itself, and this
became increasingly obvious during the summer of 2005 as the retail
interests of Northern members such as Sweden and the United Kingdom
ran up against those of the producer countries.
As a result of these complex pressures, Peter Mandelson, the EU
Trade Commissioner, produced a set of guidelines; but at the same time,
in April 2005, the US announced that it was considering the imposition
of safeguard measures that might include revived quota arrangements.
Here, the bilateral and domestic problem faced by the EU became
strongly linked to the responses of the United States, in ways that exerted
further pressure on the Commission. Arguably, this led to a hardening of
the EU position as spring moved into summer during 2005, with the
first mention of possible reference to the WTO. But this in itself was
trumped by the planned imposition of quotas by the US. The Commission found itself between a rock and a hard place, since it was determined not to jeopardise its broader relationship with China, and equally
determined not to damage relations with a whole raft of other textile
producers, in South Asia and elsewhere, that would be disrupted by any
imposition of broad quotas. So there was a desperate search for specific
measures that could be seen as evidence of Commission concern but
which would not create significant harm. In this process, the threat of
formal reference to the WTO played a role, by enabling the start of
formal consultations with the Chinese government and an eventual
agreement between the EU and China in June 2005. It was notable that
at this stage, a contrast was drawn between this agreement based on
consultation and negotiation, and the unilateral actions of the US
(Bodeen 2005; Buckley 2005).
The agreement of June 2005, though, only served to create further
problems, partly because the mechanisms for implementation and moni-
181
toring were ill-defined, thus leaving room for further increases in Chinese exports but also catching large numbers of textile products in a sort
of limbo, trapped in European ports. It appeared that none of the vociferous interests involved in the crisis had actually been satisfied, and this
led to further negotiations during the Summer eventually producing an
agreement in September 2005 that dealt with the release of the trapped
products and also established a system for reviewing the position in the
medium term (with the intention of phasing out any quotas by late 2008)
(Allen and Smith 2006).
Interestingly, the US hard line, with the implementation of quotas on
a number of Chinese products, ran alongside the EUs negotiations; the
EU can partly be seen as using the US stance as a means of reinforcing
its own position in negotiations and consultations, whilst the Chinese
showed at various stages that they felt the EU stance could be used to
exert some leverage on Washington. There was an apparent awareness by
all three participants that although the disputes were not formally linked,
they intersected and that one could play off the other. Notably, although
all of the processes described took place in the shadow of the WTO, and
all parties were well aware of this, there was no formal move to open a
WTO dispute, or to use the established WTO safeguard provisions.
Evaluation and Conclusions
What do the two cases outlined here suggest in terms of the earlier discussion of complex interdependence and bi-multilateralism? A first
assessment is that both of them show signs of the impact of complex
interdependence, at least as seen from Brussels: multiple actors, multiple
channels, the impact of linkages between different sectors and different
negotiations, and the search for negotiated solutions. But they show
these features in different ways and in different measures. Whereas there
is evidence of pressure from a wide range of public and private actors in
the case of WTO entry negotiations, this is to a degree at least muted
and kept in the background, whilst the key negotiations themselves take
place in a largely technocratic context with areas of politicisation reflecting broader national or regional agendas. There is clear evidence of linkages in the WTO entry negotiations, and of the ways in which these
linkages could be exploited by different parties, just as there is evidence
of a search for negotiated solutions in a context of linkages and possible
coalitions.
182
183
more unpredictable, given the ways in which the need for negotiations
occurred, the range and intensity of the interests engaged, and the different courses chosen by the EU and the US in responding to China.
This essay has only scratched the surface of the processes with
which it has been concerned. As relations between the EU, China and
the US intensify, widen and deepen, we can expect the impact both of
complex interdependence in general and of bi-multilateralism in particular to be underlined. The essay has only dealt with this set of problems in
one restricted area, that of commercial policy and more particularly that
of trade; there are important ways in which the study of such issues can
be broadened, first by dealing with the more politicised areas of commercial policy (such as for example the EUs arms embargo and proposals to
lift it) and second by moving away from commercial policy itself into
other areas of international negotiation, such as those dealing with environmental, energy and security issues. This would enable a more comprehensive picture to be drawn of what is inevitably going to be one of the
main axes of negotiation in the global arena for the foreseeable future.
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188
hence there was a deficit. The EEC accounted for 90.26% of total imports from Europe to ROC, while the ROCs exports to the EEC 6
accounted for 98.7% of total exports to Europe. Agricultural products
and processed products constituted a large share of total ROC exports.
In the 1950s, the EEC had a surplus balance of trade with Taiwan.
From 1960 to 1969 (except for 1963 and 1964), trade with Europe
followed the same overall pattern, that is, the value of imports consistently outweighed that of exports. However, the share of the deficit
stemming from European trade showed a gradual decline, from 14% to
8.7%. Until 1973, the period was one of the most successful periods in
the history of ROC foreign trade, especially with regard to exports.
After 1973, the high prices for imported raw materials, shortages in
supply, insufficient demand and stiff competition, resulted in a decline in
foreign trade: trade with Europe exhibited a negative growth of -3.2%
for exports and -26% for imports. Specific to the EEC, Wu stated that in
the 1960s and 1970s imports of EEC goods into the ROC occupied a
minimum of 87% of the total imports from Europe. In the 1960s, ROC
exports to the EEC 6 accounted for 96.2% of total ROC exports to
Europe. In the 1970s, ROC exports to the EEC 9 accounted for 92.8%
of total ROC exports to Europe.
Taiwan was in the early phase of industrialization, when manufacturing exports were low, resulting in the Export Oriented Industrialization
(EOI) strategy. This was promoted by Western economists and politicians at the World Bank, and later adopted by the Asian Tiger economies. In the 1950s and 1960s, if the trade balance was in favour of the
EEC, it was because Taiwan was importing capital goods to manufacture
for export.
In 1975, the EEC established diplomatic relations with the PRC. A
Press Release of 15 September 1975 announced the consent of the appointment of Mr. Li Lien-pi, and stated that he would present his credentials to both the Presidents of the Council and of the Commission. The
Official Journal of 1 September 1975 announced the accreditation with
effect from 16 September 1975.2
These developments had been preceded by the (then) Member States,
except Ireland, establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC: France
transferred its recognition from the ROC to the PRC on 27 January
2
Press Release [1011/75 (Presse 95)]; Official Journal (OJ) of 1 September 1975.
189
190
the Embassy, which closed down on 15 October 1971, on the date Belgium terminated its diplomatic relations with the ROC. As far as economics and trade were concerned, this was considered the contact-point
in all relevant subject-areas, including anti-dumping, until 1990. The
Embassy of the ROC was replaced by the Chinese Cultural Centre (Centre
Culturel Chinois) on 15 October 1971, and then by the Centre Culturel Sun
Yat-sen from 24 February 1972 onwards. This was one of the effects of
the acceptance of the One China Policy and will be analysed further at later
stages in this chapter. Chinese leaders were informed by Sir Christopher
Soames of this autonomous decision concerning the conduct of trade
with Taiwan.
Moreover, a Report, of 1 March 1985, by the European Parliament
(EP), and concerning trade exchanges with Taiwan,7 revealed that Taiwan
felt it was the victim of discrimination in comparison to the other Asian
states which were its main competitors. Parliament wanted a reduction
draconian at times in quotas imposed on textile products between 1978
and 1981, as part of the Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA). The EP document further stated that, for many years, the European Community had
principally exercised its action on imports by taking unilateral measures
without either consulting Taiwan or sharing information. The European
Community had never maintained formal trade relations with Taiwan
until the 1980s at the earliest.
On 25 June 1971, the ROC submitted to the Community an aidememoire, arguing that it ought to benefit from the Communitys Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). This was circulated to all Commissioners in a letter dated 12 July.8 From the minutes of a meeting with
representatives of the Chinese Embassy on 22 July 1975, a Mr. Tran
claimed that the EEC had not given Taiwan preferential treatment, because it did not exist (Mengin 2002: 140). This was confirmed in the
Van Aerssen Report of 1985, already quoted above, which stated in a
footnote that the Commission, having taken pragmatic measures in the
course of unofficial contacts with diverse milieus of Taiwanese production, the discrimination was reduced, albeit marginally. From 1971 onwards, Member States had expressed severe political reservations about
7
191
192
that, in the probable case of Taiwan being excluded from the IACT, the
bilateral agreement with Taiwan must be maintained and the Commission must contact the representatives of Taiwan in Brussels to obtain
their agreement.14 Hence, Taiwan, it can be argued, suffered from the
strict interpretation and application of the One China Policy.
Last, but not least, Wu (1985: 10) has stated that over the period
1970-1979 ROC foreign trade accumulated a US$3,776 million surplus;
a large portion of this surplus (45%, or US$1,728 million) originated
through the ROCs Europe trade. Wu further claims that there was
somewhat of a disequilibrium in this trade. This situation would inevitably result in resistance and restrictions from trading partners, if allowed
to continue over a long period. As an example of this, on 5 February
1974, a first Commission Regulation (No. 300/74) subjected to official
authorization the importation into Italy of tape-recorders from Taiwan.
This was an autonomous decision by a regulation.
However, in February 1973 a first Commission Decision, on an autonomous basis, authorized the French Republic not to extend community treatment to Taiwanese radio receivers, falling within the Common
Customs Tariff (CCT). This authorization to France is recognized as a
deflection of trade preventing the execution of measures of commercial
policy taken as regards Taiwan.15
Trade in the 1980s: the Autonomous Decisions Regime
Throughout the 1980s, while deflections continued because they benefited EEC consumers, the restrictions of the 1970s continued, but were
also applied to new products.16 Taiwan might not yet have developed the
capability to develop and produce higher value-added technology, but
there seemed to be a growing sophistication in the range of its products.
For the first time, a number of Commission Decisions authorized intraCommunity surveillance (in France), in respect of certain piezo-electric
quartz-crystal electronic digital watches originating in the ROC. Similar
cases in Italy concerned Taiwanese imports of slide fasteners.17 The Van
14
Notes to COREPER of 10 November 1971; S/23/72 (COMER 8), of 17 January 1972; note [SEC(72) 1609] to the Commission of 5 May 1972; aide-memoire 01266.
15
OJ L33/7-8 and OJ L50/44-45, 73/14/EEC.
16
See: EEC Tariffs hurt ROC Most, in Economic Daily News, 27 October 1988.
17
Commission Decision 20 December 1984: OJ L 033, 06/02/1985 P. 0013 0014; 88/211/EEC, and of 8 March 1988, OJL 095, 13/04/1988 P. 0020 - 0020.
193
194
Export
9,492,117,496
10,489,794,214
12,185,802,375
13,258,279,443
11,081,900,657
10,930,769,420
13,276,901,224
14,343,546,153
15,581,814,688
16,876,026,667
17,259,721,301
Import
6,708,956,036
7,348,452,344
7,745,000,565
9,402,034,746
10,201,371,42
11,821,274,31
13,835,375,27
14,250,546,82
15,953,912,01
15,357,866,51
13,187,163,14
Balance
2,783,191,40
2,235,233,56
4,440,801,80
3,856,244,67
880,529,245
-890,504,951
-558,474,023
92,999,351
-372,097,373
-2973028741
4,072,558,17
Volume
16,201,073,532
17,838,246,558
19,930,802,940
22,660,314,189
21,283,272,069
22,752,043,791
27,112,276,471
28,594,092,955
31,535,726,749
32,233,893,178
30,446,884,465
Source: Directorate-General of Customs, Ministry of Finance, ROC with balances and volume
deduced. The above figures include re-imports and re-exports.
18
Mengin (2002:141-142, 145-146), has investigated the development of Taipeis
offices in Europe, pointing out that there was little coherence to the system, and that
Belgium led the way on issuing visas.
195
France
17
6
28
8
12
9
8
4
15,422
112,921
Germany
37
20
16
33
91
37
66
63
29
420,273
Netherlands
49
54
68
85
79
28
103,865
125,493
192,741
865,057
UK
89
43
11
58
30
35
90
74
143,361
773,504
EU Total
194
124
124
186
214
111
269
268
380
2,171,755
Source: Data provided by the Directorate-General of Customs, M. of Finance, ROC and computed.
Table 3: Taiwanese investments in the EU (1 unit = US$1,000).
Year Czech R. France Germany Netherlands
1990
0
6
9
5
1991
0
1
3
6
1992
0
2
15
9
1993
0
0
5
10
1994
0
180
1
271
1995
20
882
5
20
1996
0
243
3
217
1997
30
127
3
11,113
1998
1
6
6
8
1999
0
1
21
17,800
Total
51 20,368
76,693
91,030
UK
11
14
4
237,918
16
8
6
13
9
10
332,924
EU Total
33
26
32
253
19
54
10
58
32
51
572
Source: Data provided by the Directorate-General of Customs, M. of Finance, ROC and added up.
196
Even in times of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997/8, the overall levels
of Taiwanese investment were the second highest of the decade. In this
context, Ash (2002: 174-176) observed the disproportionate role played
by the UK as a destination for Taiwanese capital outflows to Europe.
The Czech Republic emerged as the key target of Taiwanese investments
among the new Member States of the EU. Many observers have seen the
political situation in the country as one possible reason for this. Others
have pointed to more attractive conditions offered in connection with
the Czech Republic as a stepping stone or bridge for products and
services to be sold westwards. Table 4 illuminates the question of
whether the key destination countries for Taiwanese investments also
happen to be Taiwans biggest trading partners.
Table 4: Taiwanese export destinations in the EU in terms of Volume of Trade
1991
Fra
Ger
Ita
Ned
Swe
UK
2,310,146,387
6,334,099,147
1,673,494,443
2,749,623,821
801,036,355
2,955,420,123
1993
2,150,684,765
7,118,535,535
1,881,706,176
2,871,832,668
808,680,489
3,096,492,616
1995
2,776,478,529
8,720,900,525
2,389,863,195
4,085,796,157
1,107,794,630
3,728,731,256
1997
5,126,050,004
8,301,539,718
2,488,291,558
5,394,066,421
1,115,681,417
4,753,461,491
3,173,964,125
8,535,495,180
2,405,583,553
5,343,207,235
1,034,362,812
5,049,056,240
The Table reveals that the UK, in spite of constituting a key target of
major Taiwanese investment, is not in fact the principal trading partner of
the ROC. That role goes to Germany, followed by the Netherlands,
France and Italy. The data also show that the products subjected to antidumping and other restrictions were those most exported to the EU or
most in demand in the Union.
Notwithstanding the wide-ranging implications of the Asian Financial
Crisis of the 1990s, it appears that, under the regime of autonomous
decision, there were no more deflections, although anti-dumping duties
continued in relation to new products. Commission Regulation (EC) No
2397/1999 authorized, for the first time, transfers between the import-
197
198
rounded, for example, anti-dumping and anti-subsidy proceedings concerning imports of polyethylene-terephthalate (PET). Is it fair to infer
from this that import restrictions were placed on the most important
ROC exports to the EU? A document concerning Taiwan-EU relations
by the Taipei Representative Office reproduces the following Eurostat information for 2007:
Product Groups
Total
Agricultural products
Energy
Non-agricultural raw materials
Office/telecom equipment
Power/non-electrical equipment
Transport equipment
Chemicals
Textiles and clothing
Iron and Steel
0.3
740
56
140
0.5
50
192 0.7
10,672 40.8
110
8
1,509 114
1,142
4.4
1,201
91
1,819
934
71
665
2.5
597
2.3
262
20
426
1.6
285
22
2,071 157
Source: Eurostat.
199
261
-22
394
-13
-128
Source: Eurostat (billion euro) EU25 until 2002; EU-27 from 2003 onwards
(growth rates for 2003 are based on EU-25 figures); extracted from European Economic
and Trade Office (EETO): EU-Taiwan Trade / Investment Factfile 2008: 4.
As regards the state of both the balance and volume of trade, Table 6
allows some pertinent conclusions: there are considerable discrepancies
between Eurostat trade statistics and Taiwans own customs statistics.
These can be said to be due, among other things, to variations in exchange rates and changes from one year to another, as new Member
States were added to the EU. Those figures speak for themselves: if the
EU in 2007 was able to maintain the same level of exports to Taiwan,
this was mainly thanks to the sustained performance in machinery and
electrical equipment, iron, steel, and chemicals.
On the other hand, the low level of EU exports explained the EUs
sustained deficit, but also accounted for the decline in Taiwans position
among the major trade partners of the EU. The documents, Relations
between Taiwan and the EU and EU-Taiwan Trade and Investment Factfile
2008, issued by the European Economic and Trade Office (EETO)25 both
emphasized ROC-PRC trade and production relations as a key factor in
raising Taiwanese trade flows. Both Ash (2002: 166-167) and Schucher
25
200
(2007: 32) pointed out that Taiwans merchandise trade surplus attained
record levels in 2000, but declined until 2002 by 22%, as a result of international factors, and owing to Taiwans own economic crisis. Is it, therefore, possible to assume that, whatever decline in ROC exports to the EU
there is, will be made up by Taiwans contribution to Chinas exports to
the EU?
In 2007, Taiwan was the EUs thirteenth largest trading partner, because of Romania joining the EU. This was one step up from 2006.
Taiwan was, overall, the EUs fifth most important partner in the whole
of Asia. Conversely, the EU was Taiwans fourth largest trading partner,
accounting for around 10% of Taiwans external trade. Moreover, Taiwan
was in 2007 the EUs twelfth largest import partner and twenty-second
largest export partner.26 Table 7 concerns the services aspect of EU-Taiwan trade. The figures of the European Economic and Trade Office (EETO)
speak of trade in services as a growing part of bilateral trade, which was
equivalent to about 13% of trade in goods. 2003 and 2004 were described as years of rapid growth, followed by a pause and no more
growth after that. Services trade with the ROC still amount to a small
fraction only of EU total external trade in services: only 0.7% in 2006. At
1bn since 2004, this surplus was far from sufficient to compensate for
the more than 10bn deficit on trade in goods.
Table 7: Trade in Services between the EU and Taiwan
EU exports
to Taiwan
EU imports
to Taiwan
Total
Balance for
the EU
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2.0
2.0
2.4
3.2
3.1
31
1.8
3.8
1.8
3.8
201
4.5
2.1
5.3
2.1
5.2
21
52
0.2
0.2
0.3
1.1
1.0
10
Source: Eurostat (billion euro) EU-15 until 2003; EU-27 from 2004 onwards.
26
EU-Taiwan Trade and Investment Factfile 2008, Taiwan's Bureau of Foreign
Trade /CNA, 20 January 2008, pp. 2, 3, 4, 6.
201
Table 8: Taiwanese export destinations in the EU in terms of volume of trade for alternative
years of the 2000s (1 unit = US$1,000)
Jan-Nov 00
Belgium
Finland
Jan-Nov 02
Jan-Nov 04
Jan-Nov 06
Jan-Nov 08
460,876,448
France
Germany
Italy
1,055,380,890
Sweden
1,131,010,212
UK
756,006,531 1,045,975,589
987,399,374 1,169,469,485
Source: Extracted for this table from: Directorate-General of Customs, Ministry of Finance,
ROC; the basic figures included re-imports and re-exports.
France
1,669
47
614
2,008
7,822
465
335
132
13,092
Germany
8,878
5,297
17,066
10,860
22,781
6,262
9,719
7,976
88,839
King- EU Total
Netherlands United
dom
3,245
31,250
45
5,797
29,218
42
56,421
43.028
117
15,137
25,257
621
8,146
17,931
57
256,750
10,789
284
383,044
9,167
413239
399,933
2,671
416
1,128,473
169,311
1,997,897
202
Czech
United
France Germany Netherlands
EU Total
Republic
Kingdom
28,091
96,979
310,965
683,597 1,119,632
33,374
56,522
525,563
245,393
860
19,296
56,364
306,680
189,083
571
14
5,510
299,486
274,818
33,757
613
203,844
102,274
328,882
192,992
827
21,473
53,999
406,381
140,636
622
11,878
434,158
5,417,195 1,505,955 7,369,186
18,802
56,931
6,313,591
651,386 7,040,710
14 342,268 1,156,713 13,884,075 3,642,799 19,025,869
27
28
203
204
33
34
205
206
References
N.B.: a detailed list of archival materials from the Council and European Commission, supplementing the resources cited below, and relating to EU-ChinaTaiwan issues, is available from the author upon request.
Ash, Robert.2002. Economic Relations between Taiwan and Europe. in The
China Quarterly, No. 69, Special Issue: China and Europe since 1978: A European
Perspective, March 2002.
Brodgaard, Kjeld Erik. 2001. China and Denmark: Relations since 1674, in
Kjeld Erik Brodgaard & Mads Kirkkebaek (eds), NIAS Press.
Cabestan, Jean Pierre. 2008. The Taiwan issue in Europe-China relations in
Shambaugh, David; Sandschneider, Eberhard; Zhou Hong (eds.)
ChinaEurope Relations: Perceptions, Policies and Prospects, London: Routledge.
European Parliament Resolutions (Selection):
On CFSP: Resolution A5-0340/2000 (30 November 2000)
On Taiwan B5-0347, 0356, 0372 and 0388/2000 (13 April 2000)
On EU External Services in Southeast Asia: A5-0199/2001 (14 June 2001)
On China Policy: C5-0098/2001-2001/2045 (COS) A5-0076/2002.
EETOs EU-Taiwan Trade and Investment Factfile, EETO: 2008.
Hak Choi. 1983. The Analysis of the German-Taiwanese Trade and the European Economic Community-Taiwanese Trade Theory and Econometric Analysis, Bonn
Hindley, Michael. 1993. Report of the Committee on External Economic Relations on the
Inclusion of China and Taiwan in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 19
March 1993 (Source: A3-0092/93, PE 203.426/fin).
Kaspereit G. 1977. Report on Economic and Trade Relations between the European
Community and the PRC (Source: European Parliament, 5 May 1977, Doc.
76/77, PE 47.759/fin).
Lan, Yuchun. 2004. The European Parliament (EP) and the China-Taiwan
Issue: An Empirical Approach in European Foreign Affairs Review 9, Kluwer
Law International.
Ma Ying-Jeou. 1993. Taipei-Beijing relation and East Asian stability: Implications for Europe in NATO Review (April 1993).
Mengin, Franoise. 2002. A Functional Relationship: Political Extensions to
Europe-Taiwan Economic Ties in The China Quarterly, No. 169, Special Issue:
China and Europe since 1978: A European Perspective (March 2002).
Schucher Gunter. 2007. The EUs policy toward Taiwan in Issues and Studies
43(3).
Taipei Representative Office, Brussels. 2008. Relations between Taiwan and the EU
Van Aerssen, Jochen. 1985. On Trade Exchanges with Taiwan (Source: Doc. 21765/84, PE 94.190/def: 12).
Wilson, Dick. 1973. China and the European Community in The China Quarterly
(56) October-December.
Wu Chung-lih. 1985. Trade Relations between the ROC and European Countries in the Twentieth Century in Industry of Free China, LXIV(6), December
1985.
210
Peter J. Anderson
211
This is a point also made by former CBS journalist, Robert Beers, for example.
212
Peter J. Anderson
213
would come gradually. It is often pointed out by Beijings elite that Communist China is still a relatively new state and hasnt had the hundreds
of years that it took countries like Britain to evolve notions of free
speech and press freedom (Organgrinder 2008).
The opening up and the initial tussle over the degree to which it
would be implemented also allowed Western media to do what often it
likes most, i.e. talk about itself. In making themselves the story for a
while, BBC and other journalists inadvertently left less time and space
for the coverage of stories relating to Chinas continuing repression of its
more adventurous domestic reporters. Again, once the brief Olympics
and post-Olympics media spotlights were gone, the Chinese were able to
continue this policy in the relatively low level glare of the everyday global
news environment an environment in which the repressive aspects of
their policies would have to fight with huge volumes of other negative
news stories all over the world to get onto mainstream television or radio
news bulletins, or into news websites or papers. Even if they make it
onto the agenda of a particular news programme at the moment of writing, pieces about them still have to fight for time and space against
strong stories whose subject matter ranges from cholera in Mugabes
bankrupt Zimbabwe, to atrocities and conflicts in the Middle East, Africa and Asia.
So, if the story of 2008 was to be summarised, in so far as it relates to
the Chinese regulation of the news media, it might most easily be depicted as two steps forward and one step backward. There does seem to
be a recognition in the centre that some of the things which previously
were tightly controlled in terms of reporting, now have to be treated in a
slightly looser manner, if only for pragmatic reasons. They include natural disasters, following on from the earlier loosening up of controls on
reporting corruption, as long as stories concerning them do not imply
criticism of the Beijing leadership. However, the timing of such reports
can still be affected by the governments perception of when the least
damaging moment for their release is.
This was neatly illustrated by the fact that the reporting of the scandal
relating to the contamination of milk with melamine was delayed as long
as possible within China (Branigan 2008b). This was done in order to
minimise the damage caused to the positive image that the leadership
had been projecting to the outside world via the Olympic Games. As
pointed out earlier, it was also claimed that some of the previously loos-
214
Peter J. Anderson
215
civil war and the Japanese invasions and massacres that preceded the
relative calm and political stability,3 resulting from the establishment of
the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. They do not wish to risk
the danger of such rivalries and weakness arising again by means of the
emergence of a new, competing, effective opposition. One way of helping to ensure that this does not occur is through exerting overall control
with regard to what can and cannot be said on Chinese news media and,
where possible, on the world-wide-web. Within the present, the greatest
potential for instability is seen as resulting from the massive disparity of
wealth that still exists between the cities and the countryside.4 Just as the
Communist Party originally turned the peasants into an effective fighting
force that enabled them to take over the government, they now fear the
emergence of new political movements that might be able to rally the
peasants once again, this time against them. Once more, the management of what goes in the countrys news media is seen as important in
the control of views that could provoke or enable the organisation of an
opposition with the potential to attempt a rebellion. The best way of
trying to understand how the government sees the issue of press freedom
in the future is through the device of scenario construction, as the next
section explains.
Understanding News Media Freedom from the Chinese Governments Perspective
The Chinese government is aware, most particularly through the example
of Singapore, that embracing liberal economics does not inevitably entail
the need to embrace liberal politics, with its accompanying press freedoms. As has been pointed out frequently (BBC 2009 for example), what
they seem to be offering their people at the moment is a deal very much
in line with the Asian values concept long expounded by the
Singaporean government (Wiessala 2006: 33): in return for the government delivering economic prosperity it is required that people relinquish
ambitions for Western style democratic pluralism and for freedom of
speech.
Tiananmen Square and the collapse of Communism in the USSR and
Eastern Europe reminded the leadership of the fact that liberal democracy is an idea that potentially could be a potent rallying point for oppo3
The word relative is important, bearing in mind such tumultuous events as the
Cultural Revolution.
4
In the view of an authoritative Party source.
216
Peter J. Anderson
sition to its rule. While the Beijing demonstrators back in 1989 were
brutally suppressed with military force, this is an option that now has
higher costs, given the massive extent to which China has become linked
in to the global economy. Among other things, Chinas leaders will have
observed that Russias last use of military power (in its near abroad)
caused a flight of foreign investment from Moscow. The use of military
force, both at home and abroad, can have serious economic consequences for the user within the globalized capitalist system if investors
judge it to be destabilising of the economy/society of the user, or of the
region within which it used. Being aware of this, it is likely that, since
Tiananmen Square, Chinese policy makers have evaluated a variety of
scenarios relating to situations in which pressures for greater freedom of
speech once again arise (it is quite probable that the scenarios investigated by conservative and more liberal factions differ in range and content). They would be unwise not to have done this, given the following
three developments.
Firstly, in 1989, at least initially, the leadership were caught without
appropriate scenarios in place in the face of a public democratic challenge; it showed signs of being temporarily paralysed as a result. Secondly, the Chinese government has taken risks, by allowing large numbers of Chinese students to study courses in Western universities, many
of which are politically sensitive for Chinese domestic society. Returning students will have been exposed to Western ideas and values and will
have noted criticisms of their own governments record on human rights.
Many will, no doubt, be happy to ignore these on their return home if
the Asian values economic deal continues to be delivered. But equally,
should this prove difficult as a result of a major global recession, or
other factors, they are a potential time-bomb at the heart of all of the
major cities. Each one of them has seen at first hand alternative ways of
doing politics and many, if faced with a Communist promise that is
undelivered in the face of a sustained economic downturn, may, at some
stage, demand democratic pluralism and greater freedom of speech. The
knowledge that Party minders are likely to be among their fellow students may well caution what students say while in the West, but that
knowledge cannot control their thoughts. A government that had not
assessed the risks of allowing Chinas young people to study abroad, and
the costs and benefits of different ways of dealing with them, ultimately
217
218
Peter J. Anderson
might decide to set up, there would be no requirement to produce balanced journalism; news organisations, journalists and bloggers would be
left to decide on their own reporting. This would only become an option
where the value to the government of trying to block access to criticism
of its policies and leaders had disappeared. This would be the case where
gate keeping the web had become impractical for technical reasons, and
where internet usage across China and the accessing of alternative
news media on the web had become so widespread as to make continuing efforts to censor the mainstream media an ineffective means of
controlling the information flow to the mass of the population. Any
continuing attempt to censor news reporting within China would be both
increasingly obsolete (unless, as in Burma, it was decided effectively to
shut the internet down within its borders) and counterproductive, in so
far as it would confirm some of the criticisms of the regime that bloggers
and others make. Such a dramatic liberation of news reporting would put
the predominant position of the CCP under strain, unless measures were
kept in place to prevent the formation of an effective opposition Party.
However, such restraints would become difficult to maintain if the internet was no longer controllable and journalists and bloggers were given
full freedom to report and comment on the views of those who advocate
alternatives to the current Chinese political system. Even the old Party
stalwarts in the media might prove unreliable if given their freedom, as
the reporting of the Peoples Daily and the Central Television Station in the
brief, heady days of 1989 suggested (Herbert 2003: 126). Should alternative ideas start to become popular, they may, eventually, be held by so
many people that it would be difficult to suppress them. In theory, the
Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) could always be brought in, as happened in the case of Tiananmen Square. But the soldiers that were summoned in 1989 had been given only filtered information. If media controls had been abandoned then the PLA would be free to form their own
views. And if opposition ideas spread into the army as a result, the outcome of any attempt to use military force could be civil war and the
collapse of an effective governmental system within China.
Scenario Two: A Smaller Bang. This scenario would be prompted by the
same basic cause and involves an extension of press freedoms to include
the full reporting of criticism of the central government with regard to its
policies and legislative initiatives, with the exception of a narrow band of
219
220
Peter J. Anderson
ing on the internet. From that, they might develop political ideas that
prompt widespread demands for effective opposition parties.
Scenario Four. This case would, in many respects, echo scenario two,
above. The difference in this scenario is that, within all of the Chinese
news media that could still be regulated, it would be required that criticism should be presented in the manner and style which the Daily Mail
newspaper in the UK uses to present the opinions of the Labour Party. It
does so by representing the latters views as being inferior in quality, logic and
practicality to those of the Party that the paper prefers. The risks would be
similar to those in scenario three, above.
Scenario Five. This scenario involves an extension of press freedom that
includes allowing the reporting of criticism of the central government
with regard to a specific and narrow range of sensitive policies and legislative initiatives, but which does not extend that freedom to allow criticism
of the President and which requires that such criticisms be presented
within a balanced context in which the government is given as much
space to put its view as its critics. This might become an option where it
was still possible to prevent access to the majority of negative postings
on the internet, but enough criticism was nevertheless evading official
controls to make it necessary to acknowledge some of its most populist
dimensions and show a willingness to deal with it. To allow balanced
mainstream reporting of such criticism in this context would be to try
and take the initiative away from the bloggers and counteract it by
improving the credibility of the regulated authoritative mainstream
news media. It would give the government a chance to be seen as listening to, and engaging with, its critics in an open and positive debate on
some issues of popular concern. Should the government lose the debate,
in terms of the reactions of the people, then the president, who would
have remained aloof from it and un-criticised within the media, would
have the opportunity to remain politically unscathed. The Party could
attempt to re-establish its legitimacy through him stepping forward as the
peoples champion to re-shape the unpopular policies, thereby correcting
the consequences of bad advice given to him, or other leading figures,
by other isolated and ill-informed members of the government, in a
manner that would be covered by the mainstream media.
221
222
Peter J. Anderson
Conclusions
At the present moment, the collective intelligence of the leadership is
sufficient for it to realise that issues like corruption, which discredit the
Party in the eyes of the people need to be addressed and that the news
media can have a useful role in helping to deal with that. It has realised
too, that natural disasters like the Sichuan earthquake have to be more
fully covered in the internet age, and that the same is true of unnatural
disasters, such as the contamination of milk with melamine during 2008.
The consequence has been a further degree of opening up of media
freedom. However, anything hinting at criticism of the Beijing leadership, or of the authority of Party rule is still as much forbidden as before
and journalists who cross the line can find themselves out of a job, or in
prison. The above scenarios have suggested that the world-wide web has
the potential to grow completely out of the governments control, and
different ways of exploiting it continue to develop at breakneck speed.
The leadership cannot assume that the degree of censorship that pertains
currently will be viable into the future. If it is not simply to be the prisoner of developments it has to evaluate a variety of scenarios for dealing
with such possibilities as the internet escaping from its grasp. It has been
the task of this discussion to show what some of those might look like.
Overall, as far as the above sample scenarios are concerned, several
things are clear. Firstly, the extent to which the Party would be prepared
to risk implementing any of the media policy options covered within
these scenarios would be dependent on how it felt each related to its
fundamental desire to minimise the threats to its continued rule at a
given moment in time. This calculation in turn would be affected significantly by the balance of conservative and liberal forces within the Party
at that time.
Secondly, it would bear in mind also the likelihood of its last resort,
the Peoples Liberation Army, being able to recover the situation through
the effective use of force, should the outcome of the implementation of
policy options contained within particular scenarios turn out to be negative, and should this threaten the Partys continuation in power. Significantly, key army personnel have become serious economic players during
the Deng and post-Deng periods, and it is very much in their interests
that the stability from which they benefit economically should be preserved. However, as has been pointed out, should a freeing up of the
news media lead to the spreading of opposition ideas among significant
223
numbers of the ranks, the overall reliability of the army might become
questionable in some circumstances.
Thirdly, and finally, it should be noted that, as far as the internet is
concerned, the picture is more complex than it has been possible to
represent adequately here. A lot depends on the extent to which Chinese
users decide to access the web to look for alternative political news and
comment should it in future become un-blockable. One of the things
that research has shown so far is that in internet rich, free, societies,
such as the United States for example, very few people go to political
blogs. Those users who access the internet regularly for political news
remain very much in the minority (Pew 2005 and 2006; Anderson and
Ward 2007: 269-70). Should Chinese net-accessing patterns turn out to
mirror or even accentuate these trends towards low political usage, the
Chinese authorities might conclude that the internet provides them with
fewer worries than they feared, and with less of a reason for significantly
changing policies towards mainstream-media controls.
References
Anderson, P.J. and Ward, G. 2007. The Future of Journalism in the Advanced Democracies Aldershot: Ashgate.
Bandurski, D. 2007. Pulling the Strings of Chinas Internet. Far Eastern Economic
Review. Accessed at: www.feer.com/essays/2007/december/ pulling-thestrings-of-Chinas-internet?sea...
BBC Ten OClock News. 2009 (2nd February).
Branigan, T. 2008a. Belgian Reporters Assaulted and Robbed in China. Accessed at: www.guardian.co.uk/media/2008/dec/01journalists-assaultchina-aids-activists/
2008b. China Tells State Media to Report Bad News. Accessed at:
www.guardian.co.uk/media/2008/nov/20/china-media-freedom/print
Branigan, T. and Kiss, J. 2009. China Closes 90 Websites as Internet Crackdown intensifies. Accessed at: www.guardian.co.uk/media/2009/
jem/13/China-internet-censorhsip/print
Bristow, M. 2008. Stories Chinas Media Could Not Write. BBC Online. Accessed at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7171648.stm
Herbert, J. 2003. Practising Global Journalism. Oxford: Focal.
Heren, L., Fitzgerald, C.P. et al. 1973. Chinas Three Thousand Years. London:
Times Newspapers Ltd.
224
Peter J. Anderson
Carlo Filippini
Abstract
Services are the fastest growing component of the import-export
flows of developed countries. At the same time, they are the source
of many disputes because of their nature, being often intangible, and
non-excludable, with high value added. This is the case for service
flows between China and the European Union (EU): they are relevant
but the EU is concerned about the need to level the playing field.
Chinas WTO accession has eased some problems, but not solved
them. The most relevant EU requests concern the intellectual property rights, counterfeit and pirated goods, and technology transfer. In
addition to this, China has not yet implemented all its WTO accession obligations, e.g. in the financial sector. What follows is a detailed
data analysis on service flows. It will comprise of, in particular,
China-EU exchanges compared to world totals. Moreover, data over
time, by EU country, and by sub-sector, will be analysed. Inward FDI
has been liberalized in steps; it is amongst the main export drivers. It
is an important vehicle for the technological upgrading of industrial
sectors. The strict conditions imposed on foreign corporations have
allowed China to acquire nearly up-to-date technologies, acting as a
monopsonist with many suppliers. On FDI, the EU is further stressing a lack of reciprocity. Recently, Chinese outward FDI has been
growing, due to very large Chinese foreign reserves, even though
investment towards the EU remains modest. Last but not least, the
chapter examines relevant data relating to European FDI in China
and Chinese FDI in the EU over time, by EU country of origin,
and by sector.
226
Carlo Filippini
Introduction
Trade relations between Europe and China have a long history. Mercantile delegations, diplomatic embassies, and religious missions already
were exchanged between China and the Roman Empire more than 2000
years ago (cf. Innes Miller 1969). In fact, the Ancient Romans were infatuated with Chinese silk and paid huge amounts of gold to acquire it.
Later on, these relations stayed stagnant because China became more
developed than Europe and thought that no external goods were worth
importing. After a long decline of the Chinese economy, the last decades
have seen its strong and rapid revival; EUChina trade relations are now
quite important: China is the second biggest trade partner of the EU, its
first market for imports and its fourth for exports (as of 2007). This
chapter investigates the evolution of EUChina relations and agreements; furthermore, it presents data to quantify trade structures and
raises some critical points relating to views in the EU and China; finally
the chapter offers a number of tentative conclusions.
Globalization: Chinas and the EUs Choices
The sixty years from the birth of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC)
can be divided almost evenly into two periods: the first is characterized
by quite rigid plans that covered foreign trade flows too. Exports and
imports were not linked to relative prices or to comparative advantage.
After 1978, China changed its economic policy and began a slow, but
straightforward, process of reforms that included deeper integration into
the world economy.
A few features of this transformation are worth noting: the coexistence of liberalization in the economy and continuity (that is a monopoly
of power by the Communist Party) in politics and gradualism in the
process: reforms were initially carried out in limited areas, or sectors, and
later on extended on an ever larger scale if successful. In the end one can
speak of a socialist market economy in a communist state.
The international environment was gradually becoming more open or
globalized, because of the general agreements sponsored by the GATT
and WTO and on account of the many more bilateral Free Trade Area
accords. At the same time, innovation and technical progress, together
with the ICT, drastically cut costs in transport and communications. One
of the results was the birth of production networks or fragmentation.
227
China was very skilful in exploiting its low-cost labour and the (potential) size of its market attracting FDI and asking foreign enterprises to
bring in state-of-art technologies, not the ones dismissed in the country
of origin. By the mid-1980s, China was already a major production centre for many foreign firms. The sanctions following on the heels of the
government crackdown of the Tiananmen protests (1989) simply slowed
the process. Exports have been an important driving factor of Chinese
economic growth, and the countrys 2001 WTO accession was the occasion of further real and promised openings. As one can imagine, liberalization in merchandize trade has been generally greater than in the service sectors. Chinese exports are covering a wide range of products and
seem to defy the traditional theory of comparative advantage. One the
one hand, factor endowments can be modified by economic policies
through expenditures in education, research and technology imports; on
the other hand, quite often only parts of the final high-tech goods that
are exported are produced in China, due to production fragmentation.
The European Union (EU) has adopted a positive attitude towards
China from the beginning and on many occasions has stated its wider
objectives: to support Chinas transition to a pluralist society based upon
the rule of law and respect for human rights, and to encourage its transformation into an open market economy, integrated into the world by
means of the broadening and deepening of both bilateral and multilateral
dialogue.
While in the years up to the beginning of this millennium the EU has
been accommodating towards China because of the latters developing
country status and the high expectations of gains from trade and FDI,
more recently a number of disappointments have emerged: to the EU
China is not only an opportunity but a threat too. At the same time it is
quite difficult to speak of a coherent European policy towards China,
because there are many voices and actors, not always coordinated and
too often conflicting.
Key Steps and Documents in EUChina Economic Relations
After the recognition of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) as the
legitimate government of China (October 25, 1971) by the UN General
Assembly and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the
PRC and most EU member states in the following years, on May 6 1975
the European Union too established diplomatic relations with the PRC.
228
Carlo Filippini
On May 2, 1978 a Trade Agreement was signed and the EU-China Joint
Committee was established, the first meeting of which was held in
Brussels 15 months later. On July 18, 1979, the first agreement, on textile trade, was reached. Ten years after the resumption of diplomatic ties,
on May 21, the 1985 EC-China Trade and Cooperation Agreement
(EEC-China, 1985) was signed in order to promote and intensify trade
and to encourage a steady expansion of economic cooperation between
the two actors. This agreement is still the main legal framework for
economic relations with China; it was extended twice, in order to cover
political issues (in 1994 and 2002). Economics and politics are intertwined in complex ways because of the different moral principles, cultural traditions, and historical legacies of the two entities. Two main
turning points must be mentioned: firstly, the Tiananmen Square protests
in December 1989, after which the EU imposed an arms embargo, and,
secondly, Chinas accession to the WTO twelve years later.
A new, and more general, Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
has been under negotiation for some years, in order to take into account
the new realities and to update the 1985 treaty. Over the past decade or
so the EU has produced a range of key documents on EU-China relations; just to mention a few: the 1995 Communication on A Long-term
Policy for China-Europe Relations, the 1998 one on Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China, the 2003 policy paper on A Maturing
Partnership: Shared Interests and Challenges in EU-China Relations. In
2006, a set of Council Conclusions (EU Council 2006), the Communication Closer Partner, Growing Responsibilities and the related working
document on Competition and Partnership marked a clear (even if ineffectual) break with the previous generally optimistic EU position:
these documents emphasise Chinas increased responsibilities, stemming
from her economic growth and global influence, and stress the need for
a level field in solving trade and investment frictions.
In addition to regular political, trade, and economic dialogue meetings, there are many other, sector-specific (sectoral), dialogues and
agreements covering many aspects. A representative list of these sectorspecific dialogues is represented in table 1, below:
229
A more recent (April 2008), and Chinese-inspired, initiative is the EUChina High Level Economic and Trade Dialogue (HLM), modelled on
the US-China Strategic Economic Dialogue, to support and complement
the existing dialogues. In the recent past, there have been informal talks
and negotiations (since January 2007) about a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, to update and upgrade the 1985 Agreement: the
European and Chinese negotiating positions are, however, quite distant,
and the latters decision to postpone, with only a few days notice, the
11th EU-China Summit, scheduled for December 1, 2008, because of a
meeting between the French President Sarkozy and the Dalai Lama is a
clear evidence of existing frictions. Other cooperation programmes have
been going on for many years, covering various areas, in order to support
Chinas development efforts (EU Comm, 2008).
Merchandise Trade
EU-China merchandise trade has been growing rapidly for years; in the
years 1999-2007, EU-25 imports increased four times in value from
52.41 to 230.31 billion EUR and from 7 to 16.1 % as a share; exports
showed a similar pattern in value from 19.62 to 71.67 billion EUR
and from 2.8 to 5.6 %; this implies a larger and larger deficit (excluding
intra-EU trade). In 2007, China has been the second biggest EU-27 trade
partner after the USA (11.4 %), but the 1st import (16.2 %) and the 4th
export (5.8 %) partner. Conversely, EU-27 has been the biggest trade
partner for China (17.3 %), being in 2nd place for imports (12.7 %), after
Japan, and in 1st place for exports (20.6 %). The EU-27 is exporting to
230
Carlo Filippini
% total EU imports
TOTAL
71,757
100
58
34,398
47.9
80
8,639
12.0
52
6,923
9.6
37
5,148
7.2
193
3,957
5.5
32
902
1.3
26
758
1.1
18
413
0.6
21
101
0.1
36
..
14
Source: Eurostat
%
231,516
64,475
61,952
34,867
6,934
2,417
2,264
673
510
83
76
100
27.8
26.8
15.1
3.0
1.0
1.0
0.3
0.2
..
..
% total EU imports
162
367
230
192
61
38
37
2
16
14
11
231
Table 4: EU-27 Trade with China, by Member State, 2007 (EUR million)
Exports
Share in
Extra-EU
exports
Imports
Share in
Extra-EU
imports
Balance
Extra-EU
71,757
231,516
100%
100%
-159,759
Belgium
3,344
12,526
4.7%
5.4%
-9,182
Bulgaria
70
608
0.1%
0.3%
-538
Czech Rep.
504
4,340
0.7%
1.9%
-3,836
Denmark
1,282
3,892
1.8%
1.7%
-2,61
Germany
29,874
47,877
41.6%
20.7%
-18,003
Estonia
65
299
0.1%
0.1%
-235
Ireland
1,284
2,013
1.8%
0.9%
-730
Greece
111
2,795
0.2%
1.2%
-2,684
Spain
1,980
15,737
2.8%
6.8%
-13,758
France
9,032
18,000
12.6%
7.8%
-8,968
Italy
6,311
21,764
8.8%
9.4%
-15,453
Cyprus
333
0.0%
0.1%
-325
Latvia
17
257
0.0%
0.1%
-240
Lithuania
15
498
0.0%
0.2%
-483
Luxembourg
194
3,413
0.3%
1.5%
-3,219
Hungary
752
5,394
1.0%
2.3%
-4,642
Malta
27
92
0.0%
0.0%
-65
Netherlands
3,724
37,746
5.2%
16.3%
-34,022
Austria
1,666
2,928
2.3%
1.3%
-1,262
Poland
724
5,050
1.0%
2.2%
-4,326
Portugal
181
1,063
0.3%
0.5%
-882
Romania
157
1,667
0.2%
0.7%
-1,51
Slovenia
69
447
0.1%
0.2%
-378
Slovakia
321
1,569
0.4%
0.7%
-1,248
Finland
2,161
3,296
3.0%
1.4%
-1,135
Sweden
2,396
4,703
3.3%
2.0%
-2,307
UK
5,489
33,207
7.6%
14.3%
-27,719
Source: Eurostat
232
Carlo Filippini
Almost half of the EUs trade deficit with the PRC is due to machinery,
mechanical appliances and electrical equipment; other important items
are textiles, base metals and articles in base metals, as well as miscellaneous articles. As far as individual member states are concerned the most
important exports partners are Germany (more than 40 % of the EU-27
total), France, Italy, and UK; for imports Germany, Netherlands, and
UK are in the top positions; the Netherlands, the UK, and Germany
show the highest deficits. The substantial figures for Netherlands are of
course due to the function of Rotterdam as a key entry point (see table 4).
Trade in Services
In 2007, the extra-EU trade in services shows an EU-25 surplus. The
credit side is worth 1,166 billion EUR and the debit side 1,026 billion
EUR, with a net positive balance of 140 billion EUR. As is well-known,
many heterogeneous items are included under the service heading.
China and Hong Kong represent a small share of the total, just over 2%
on both sides of the accounts. In the past few years, China almost doubled its flows, while Hong Kong nearly balanced its exchanges thanks to
rising exports to the EU-25 (see table 5).
Table 5: EU-25 Trade in Services (EUR million)
Extra-EU 2004
2005
2006
2007
China 2004
2005
2006
2007
Hong Kong 2004
2005
2006
2007
Source: Eurostat
Credit
874,341
956,851
1,057,862
1,165,855
9,105
12,419
13,329
17,742
7,124
8,402
6,998
8,225
Debit
799,428
869,054
943,776
1,026,073
7,370
9,392
11,860
13,722
5,211
5,648
6,602
8,122
Net
74,913
87,797
114,086
139,782
1,735
3,027
1,469
4,02
1,913
2,754
396
103
233
The positive service balance sheet of the EU-25 with China alone represents less than one-fortieth of the negative trade balance. The EU is
estimating potential losses in the order of billions or euros, because of
Chinese unfair practices. The credit side is worth 17.74 billion EUR and
the debit one 13.72 billion EUR, giving as a result a net figure of just
over 4 billion EUR; the figures are showing an upwards trend in the past
decade in particular after the WTO accession in 2001 (see table 6). However the EU performance in service trade with China is difficult to fully
evaluate, because the flows are, to some extent, indirect and going
through Hong Kong.
Table 6: EU-25 Trade in services with China, 2007 (EUR million)
CHINA total
Royalties
Financial services
Insurance
Transportation
Travel
Credit
17,742
1,179
453
109
5,501
1,877
Debit
13,722
120
181
281
6,561
2,893
Net
4,02
1,059
272
-172
-1,06
-1,016
Source: Eurostat
[editors note] see also the chapters by D. Askew and G. Wiessala in this volume.
234
Carlo Filippini
criticism in Europe. If one adds environmental issues, and Chinas refusal to be bound by international protocols, it is easy to understand why
relations are, at times, turning sour. China maintains that trade issues
must be discussed independently from other problems, some of which
are seen as domestic (Tibet, e.g.), not international. Of course, the Chine
power elite is reluctant to give up its status and role; it perceives too
much openness as a threat; the collapse of the Soviet Union and its
Communist Party is a clear reminder of what might happen in China too,
if democratic reforms are introduced.
The EUs Trade Deficit with China
The EU has been running a trade deficit with the rest of the world for
years; in 2007, the negative balance amounts to over EUR 186 billion
about 15% of total exports. Over the past decade this percentage almost
doubled. The trade deficit with China is just less than EUR 160 billion.
This amounts to more than twice the value of EU exports to that country, and is equal to EUR 72 billion (2007). It would, of course, be nave
to say that the EUs deficit is caused by China alone; it would be even
more nave to claim that eliminating the deficit would, somehow, solve
all problems. However, the size, growth, and circumstances of the deficit
are disquieting for many in the EU.
A first point to be made pertains to the undervaluation of the Chinese
currency. It is quite difficult to tell the right level of any currency, in
particular, in relation to another one (Frankel 2009). A number of scholars are, however, arguing for a substantial revaluation of the renmimbi
versus the US dollar and the Euro. This opinion is often raised in the
USA, even by the new Obama administration; the Big Mac index, a very
rough and oversimplified PPP version, shows a 40% undervaluation
(The Economist, Jan 22, 2009). In addition, as we shall see later, many
groups and firms are complaining of unfair practices, and of obstacles to
both EU goods and investment. Last but not least, the trade surplus is
one of the sources of Chinese official reserves, the biggest in the world,
used also to finance the sovereign funds.
On the other side of the coin, one has to consider that a large part of
Chinese exports (to the EU and to the world) are due to European or
other foreign direct investment; moreover they incorporate a substantial
share of imports. Koopmans R., Zhi Wang, and Shang-Jin Wei (2008)
estimate that the share of foreign content in Chinas exports is at about
235
While China has substantially lowered its tariffs after WTO accession,
from about 35% to 9% for non-agricultural products (and 15% for agricultural ones), there still are some tariff peaks on goods of particular
importance to European firms. Quite recently, for example, the WTO
Appellate Body has ruled in favour of the EU (plus USA and Canada)
about surcharges over car parts. More relevant are the non-tariff barriers
in the form of product certification (a compulsory system covering more
than 100 items), labelling standards (for instance for pre-packaged food),
236
Carlo Filippini
237
name of the EU firm, but increasingly apply for patents regarding identical or near-identical products. At the same time, filing for trademarks can
take as long as three years in case of opposition.
Last but not least, significant subsidies, or preferential access to
credit, are afforded to companies destined to become national or regional
champions. The taxation system is granting tax preferences, contingent
on the use of local content or export performance. Export subsidies have
effects similar to currency devaluation, while export taxes (also quite
common in China) contribute to currency revaluation. Recent cases of
dangerous products originating from China from toothpaste and powdered milk, to toys have hardened the European stance, undermined
consumers confidence, and frequently turned public opinion against the
made in China label.
Chinese Perceptions and Objections
China too is expressing concerns about those EU policies and decisions
seen to be unfair or restrictive for Chinese firms. It has already been
mentioned that China views the EU nexus between human rights and
trade issues as an example of interference in Chinas internal affairs.
Additional problems are the question of market economy status (MES),
the EUs technical barriers to trade and its agricultural policy, EU peak
tariffs on some products, and, last but not least, the arms embargo
against China.
China maintains that MES is not being granted, in order to put a
further constraint on its growth, and that it is discriminated against,
pointing out that Russia was given this status in 2002, even though at
that time it was not (and still is not) a member of WTO. There is a formal reputation aspect not to be played down, because harmony and not
losing face is paramount in any Confucian culture. However, the wider
consequences of this status are much more important: MES would render it very difficult for the EU to open anti-dumping (AD) cases against
Chinese firms this is the essence of the problem. Upon joining the
WTO, China accepted to be treated as a non-market economy for 15
years but quite soon, in June 2003, it asked the EU to be granted MES.
Over the past few years, the EU has opened many AD cases and used
safeguards against Chinese exports; in relation to trade value China is the
biggest target. In order to avoid a full confrontation, the EU has given it
238
Carlo Filippini
the status of transition economy. That, however, does not carry much
weight.
More fundamentally, the EU argues that China is, in fact, not fulfilling most of the five criteria required for a market economy. These are:
A degree of government influence over the decisions of firms;
Existence and implementation of a transparent and non-discriminatory company law;
Similarly, a set of laws ensuring the respect of property rights;
Existence of a genuine financial sector independent from the state;
Absence of some state-induced distortions in the operation of privatized firms.
Only the last criterion is met, at least according to the EU. The EU has
rather strict technical standards due to its citizens concern about health,
safety, work conditions, and the environment, and many of them appear,
to China, unreasonable and discriminatory (e.g., in the area of chemical
products). The increasing number of dangerous products originating
from China is not inducing the EU to be more accommodating quite
the contrary appears to be true.
The arm embargo was imposed in the aftermath of the Tiananmen
repression in 1989; this problem too has two aspects: a face-saving and a
practical one. China is seeing it as an offence to its status as a world
power, and as an obstacle to its efforts to modernize the armed forces.
After many decades of low profile in military matters China is now upgrading weapons and equipment, in order to be able to play a more
visible role. The transformation, for instance, of its navy, from a brownwater to a blue-water force, is quite telling.
Conclusions and Outlook
In conclusion, it may be said that the EU has been investing enormous
political, diplomatic, and financial resources into expanding its relations
with China for many years. It has done so with a number of aims in
mind: to support change towards a democratic society and an open
market-economy; to lower tensions in an increasingly strategic region;
and to enter a rapidly growing, very large, and potentially profitable,
market. Over the years, the Union suffered some disappointments, but
these were overcome because of Chinas status as a developing country.
239
In 2006 however, the EU realized that most of its hopes were unfulfilled
and changed its political mood, asking China to deliver its part of the
bargain (Berkofsky, 2008 and Scott, 2007). The EU ought now to set its
priorities clearly, speak with one voice, and build up a credible stock of
human capital. European objectives are many and encompass other areas
than just economics: international security and politics, human rights, aid
and cooperation, cultural exchanges count amongst those. What is clearly
lacking is a coherent and open ranking with relative weights for any
trade-off or compromise solution. This may be due to the fact that competences are fragmented and the EUs bodies and Member States have
their own aims and policies. The EU Commission has exclusive competence over trade matters, but is not always in tune with the EU Council;
the Lisbon Treaty, if and when ratified and implemented, may solve
some problems, at least partially. But national interests are often in conflict, and there is no clearing room for finding a synthesis. Throughout
2004 and 2005 for example, conflicting signals over the arms embargo,
and surcharges on Chinese (and Vietnamese) shoes and clothing, served
to prove this point.
It seems that people working with China frequently have little or no
knowledge of its language or culture. Assignments rotate every few years
and there is no incentive or time to acquire information and knowledge.
Also, to many scholars and experts the solution appears quite simple: the
EU ought to separate human rights and trade, give China the MES, and
take a long-term view about IPR and similar problems (Messerlin and
Wang, 2008, among others). However, it is not evident what the EU
would gain from this compliant policy, given the past history of EUChina relations. The present world crisis is an additional obstacle, because economic nationalism and protectionism are making a come-back
(Dreyer and Erixon, 2008 and Erixon and Sally 2009). A compromise
solution will have to be found, because a breakdown is very unlikely and
contrary to everybodys interests: as major political and economic actors
on the world stage, the EU and China are far too big to engage in long
and costly confrontations.
240
Carlo Filippini
References
Berkofsky Axel. 2008. EU-China Relations: Rhetoric versus Reality. ISPI, Milan,
Policy Brief 12/2008.
Dreyer, Iana and Fredrik Erixon. 2008. An EU-China Dialogue: A New Policy
Framework to Contain Deteriorating Trade Relations. ECIPE, Brussels, Policy
Brief 03/3008.
Erixon Fredrik and Razeen Sally. 2009. Fighting the Urge for Protectionism.
Far Eastern Economic Review, January
EEC-China. 1985. Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between the European Economic Community and the Peoples Republic of China. Brussels, OJ L250,
19.09.1985.
EU Comm. 2006. European Commission. Competition and Partnership. Brussels,
24.10.2006, COM(2006)632 final.
EU Comm. 2008. China Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013. Brussels (draft downloaded on Jan 21, 2009).
EUCCC. 2008. European Union Chamber of Commerce in China. Position
Paper 2008-2009. Beijing.
EU Council. 2006. Councils Conclusions on the EU-China Strategic Partnership.
Brussels, 11-12.12.2006, 16291/06.
Frankel, J.A.. 2009. New Estimation of Chinas Exchange Rate Regime. NBER wp
14700.
Holslag, J. 2006. The European Union and China: The Great Disillusion. European Foreign Affairs Review, 555-580.
Innes-Miller, J. 1969. The Spice Trade of the Roman Empire, 29 BC - Ad 641, Oxford, Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press.
Koopman R., Zhi Wang, and Shang-Jin Wei. 2008. How Much of Chinese Exports
is Really Made in China? Assessing Value-Added When Processing Trade is Pervasive.
NBER wp 14109.
Messerlin, P. and Jinghui Wang. 2008. Redesigning the European Unions Trade
Policy strategy towards China. ECIPE-GEM wp 04/2008
Scott, D. 2007. China-EU convergence 1957-2003: towards a strategic partnership. Asia Europe Journal, 217-233.
Shi, Wei. 2008. Intellectual Property in the Global Trading System: EU-China Perspective. Springer, Berlin.
Valeria Gattai
Abstract
This chapter analyzes the EU-China Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
relationship, through a double-sided perspective that considers the
two partners in the mutual roles of host and home economies.
Although many have traditionally identified China as a low-cost manufacturing location, the country has recently turned out to be an important home for multinational activity. Since internationalization of
Chinese companies represents a very recent chapter in the countrys
long history, this chapter first provides a brief historical overview to
highlight the main steps along China open up path and clarify the role
of government intervention in accelerating its global engagement.
Based on recent data, the relative importance of China and the EU in
the respective FDI outflows is then examined, so as to delineate the
relevant trends, discuss the main findings and evaluate future perspectives.
Introduction
Many analysts regard Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as a privileged
entry mode into a foreign market.1 The upward trend in FDI that began
in 2004 accelerated further in 2007, at a pace that varied greatly across
1
According to the IMF/OECD definition, FDI is investment in a foreign company where the investor owns at least 10 percent of the ordinary shares, undertaken
with the objective of establishing a lasting interest in the country, a long-term relationship and a significant influence on the management of the firm (IMF 1993; OECD
1996).
242
Valeria Gattai
industries and regions (UNCTAD 2008). The sector pattern has been
experiencing a steady shift towards services: while Foreign Direct Investment has significantly increased in the last 30 years in all major sectors,
the shares of primary and manufacturing activities have declined sharply.
The geographical pattern has changed as well, with new countries emerging as significant host and home economies. Inflows into developed
countries reached 1248 billion USD in 2007, with the United States (US)
in a leading position as a recipient, followed by the United Kingdom
(UK), France, Canada and the Netherlands. The European Union (EU)
turned out to be the largest host region, attracting two thirds of total
FDI inflows into industrialized economies (UNCTAD 2008).
As far as developing countries are concerned, FDI inflows reached
their highest level ever in 2007 (550 billion USD), with an increase of
21% over the previous year. Moreover, developing countries started to
gain importance as a source of Foreign Direct Investment, mainly because of overseas expansion by Asian Multinational Enterprises (MNEs).
Even though any observers have traditionally considered Asia as a host
for Foreign Direct Investment, it has recently turned out to be an important home for multinational activity. China, in particular, has consolidated its position as a global investor, challenging the dominance of the
Asian new industrialized economies as the main source of FDI outflows
from the East (UNCTAD 2007).
In December 2004, the Lenovo Group, Chinas largest computer manufacturer, successfully acquired the global PC business of IMB, through a
deal worth 1.25 billion USD. At the same time, the China Minmetal Group
was negotiating a 100% acquisition of the Canadian nickel and copper
mining giant Norand. The Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation was
considering injecting up to one billion pound sterling into a joint-venture
partnership with MG Rover, Britains carmaker. In fact, since the early
1980s, China has been able to surprise global observers through a number of record performances, from steady economic growth to FDI attraction, from trade expansion to the emergence of a large and relatively
affluent middle class.
However, the one aspect of Chinas rising power that is most noticed
nowadays, with a mixture of enthusiasm and concern, is the dramatic
growth of its outward FDI, moving from virtually zero in 1978 to the
record stock of 95799 millions USD in 2007 (UNCTAD 2008). With
lower restrictions on outward investment, and an increase in government
243
[editors note]: see also the chapter by Nicholas Rees in this volume.
244
Valeria Gattai
changes and lifestyle improvements have made the country one of the
main Asian players and an important FDI platform. Chinas government
intervention has been a leading ingredient beyond the whole modernization process, and a key force in first attracting, and later promoting Foreign
Direct Investment, as a privileged gateway to capital and technology.
The contribution of the Open Door Policy to inward FDI roughly
falls in two major phases, from 1978 to 1990 and from 1990 to the present.3 The year 1978 proved to be an important threshold-date between
the past, characterized by autarchy, socialism and planned economy, and
the present, made by trade, internationalization and market structure.
Through a gradual approach, the reform launched at first in few Special Economic Zones (SEZs) subsequently extended to coastal regions,
where the SEZs were the theatre of a massive modernization effort,
which subsequently spread from agriculture to manufacturing and from
the army to the political system. In 1979, the Law on Equity Joint-Venture legitimised Inward FDI. It provided the legal base for (partial) foreign ownership of Chinese enterprises. However, one has to wait until
1986 for wholly foreign-owned FDI to be formally accepted. Due to
economic and legislative reforms, Western multinationals started to
target the Chinese market, locating along the coastal regions were conditions to inward investment were more favourable.
Some observers suggest (e.g., Li and Li 1999), that the year 1990 was
a second critical threshold along the Chinese path of opening up. If the
government objective during the 1980s was to modernize and internationalize as many regions as possible, the new goal in the 1990s is to
deepen reforms, adding contents rather than territories. Therefore, incentives to inward FDI were increased and foreign penetration to the Western Chinese provinces was encouraged under the Go West policy. It is
during this phase that outward FDI started to grow and cross-border
acquisitions by Chinese companies captured international attention for
the first time, even if Beijing had been formulating its going out strategy
since the early 1980s, as a critical component of the larger Open Door
Policy (Wu 2005).
The outward internationalization of Chinese enterprises has evolved
in stages, moving from experimental and highly regulated flows during
the 1980s, to rapid spread of overseas affiliates one decade later, and
3
245
246
Valeria Gattai
Latin America
15%
North America
40%
Other European
countries
26%
Africa
5%
Oceania
3%
Other Asian
countries
8%
9500
Malaysia
Indonesia
7500
Singapore
5500
Philippins
China (incl. HK)
3500
South Korea
Taiw an
1500
-500
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
-2500
247
248
Valeria Gattai
249
lengthy negotiations, they write letters and send catalogues that fail to
evoke responses and they make journeys to and from China, all without
definite results. Following closely my earlier findings (Gattai 2008), I
would re-emphasise that cultural distance, linguistic difficulties, lack of
good infrastructure and the absence of a clear and transparent legal
system are among the main complaints of European investors in China.
This made many of them opt for joint ventures, rather than wholly
owned subsidiaries.
Figure 3: EU outward FDI stock to China, by member state, 2007
France
19,2%
Belgium
4,1%
Luxembourg
0,3%
Sw eden
Italy
1,0%
Spain
4,3%
8,6%
Germany
24,7%
UK
37,7%
250
Valeria Gattai
5
6
For a survey, see Markusen 1995, Barba Navaretti and Venables 2004, Saggi 2000.
Similar results hold when we look at the accumulated FDI stock.
251
6 0%
5 0%
4 0%
2 00 5
2 00 6
3 0%
2 00 7
2 0%
1 0%
0%
A s ia
A f ric a
EU
Oth e r
L a tin
No rth O c e an ia
Eu r op e a n A me ric a A me r ic a
c o un tr ie s
252
Valeria Gattai
2005). This is the reason why Nicolas and Thomsen (2008) argue that,
while Chinas Go Global policy is no doubt fuelling outward FDI, it is
mandatory to keep the importance of the state in perspective. Although
some investments are still aiming to secure raw materials, and involve
state-owned enterprises, the drivers for the vast majority of the projects
are now international and domestic competition.
Put another way, Chinese firms are encouraged to go abroad to acquire those skills and technologies that inward flows were not able to
deliver. This is particular evident in the EU, where localization is dictated by purely opportunistic considerations. In fact, Chinese investors
tend to select the sectors for which a given country has a particular
strength; therefore, they invest in machinery in Germany, in automobile
in the UK and in design in Italy, to capture externalities created by host
country intangible asset clusters (UNCTAD 2004).
A number of authors (e.g. Child and Rodrigues 2005; Nolan 2001;
Boisot 2004), argue that the Chinese example is calling for a creative
reconsideration of mainstream theory concerning FDI and international
expansion. While traditional investment patterns, based on Dunnings
OLI paradigm (Dunning 1993), were explained by resource transfer to a
host country (see, for instance, Caves 1996), strategic asset seeking-FDI
is undertaken in order to access intangible resources and gain new capabilities in a host country. This is particularly true for Chinese MNEs
because, as latecomers, they urgently need to engage in Foreign Direct
Investment to address their competitive disadvantages and improve their
global competitiveness. Notice that competitive disadvantages include a
number of critical issues such as regional protectionism, limited access to
capital, lack of developed intellectual property rights, under-provision of
training and education, poor local infrastructure and fragmentation of
regional markets (Child and Rodrigues 2005).
Figure 5 displays the composition of Chinese FDI outflows in 2007,
by economic activity. Based on these data, wholesale and retail sale account for the largest percentage of Chinese overseas operations (25%),
followed by leasing and business services (21%), mining (15%), transport
(15%) and manufacturing (8%). This is not surprising, since China has
still a comparative advantage in terms of production efficiency, by means
of cheap inputs and low labour costs. There is, therefore, a tendency to
perform manufacturing activities domestically, rather than off-shored.
253
o th er
8%
le as in g &
bu s in es s se rvic es
2 1%
a gri cu lt ure ,
fo res try , fis he ry
1%
m in in g
15 %
ma n ufac tu ry
8%
tra ns p ort
1 5%
fi na nc e
6%
wh ol es a le & re ta il
2 6%
In line with the previous discussion, it is possible to offer a rough taxonomy of Chinese internationalization strategies, based on their asset-seeking motivations. While developed countries multinationals are primarily
interested in protecting their intangible resources when expanding abroad,
Chinese MNEs try to access those resources, and they select their entry
modes accordingly. As a result, they operate abroad mainly through
acquisitions of foreign enterprises with certain characteristics. Following
closely the arguments of Schuller and Turner (2005), Chinese acquirers
tend to select overseas companies because of their distribution network,
brand name and technology. Ailing or financially distressed firms, competitive niche producers, former partners or contractors are among the
number one targets: indeed Chinese firms contribute financial strength,
but they lack technical expertise, whereas European firms have financial
difficulties, but they are able to supply know how. Hence, a perfect
matching results when they decide to partner. Although acquisition of an
existing facility is the most common entry mode in Europe, some Chinese multinationals have built new plants from scratch, under a greenfield investment scheme. This often consists of the establishment of
headquarters, subsidiaries, trade representative offices, trading companies
254
Valeria Gattai
Other
28%
Shanghai
8%
Jiangsu
8%
Zhejiang
6%
Fujian
6%
Xiam en
3%
Sichuan
5%
Shenzhen
15%
Guangdong
18%
Shandong
3%
255
Conclusion
This chapter has provided a brief overview of the FDI dimension of the
EU-China relationship. It has done so by means of a double-sided perspective, since both regions are now acting as both investor and investment recipient on the worlds stage. This reflects the new view of the
Peoples Republic of China becoming a major source of multinational
activity rather than a magnet (Deng 2007; Schuller and Turner 2005).
European observers frequently greet this idea with a mixture of enthusiasm and concern. What then, is the relative importance of China for EU
outward investment? What share of Chinese FDI is oriented to Europe?
Based on the empirical evidence reviewed in this chapter, two distinct
results are worth mentioning: firstly, EU-China Foreign Direct Investment is still a limited phenomenon, both in terms of flows and stocks;
secondly, it involves a growing number of firms, therefore it is likely to
raise some questions about the impact of cross-countries operations on
the domestic market. While the influence of Foreign Direct Investment
on Chinas growth has been widely documented in the past (e.g., Guopei
1999), it has been the particular concern of this study, to explore the
other side of the story; that is to say, the effect if any of Chinese
operations in Europe.
For the time being, Chinese investment in EU has had but little impact. This, however, continues to depend on a number of specific reasons, none of which is set in stone. Firstly, Chinese investment represents a small share of total inward FDI into the EU. Most of it arrived
only recently; secondly, many acquisitions have not yet succeeded in
restoring ailing European firms to health; thirdly, investment is seldom
targeted towards labour-intensive sectors in which the impacts of unemployment could be anticipated; and fourthly, European firms have already transferred a large share of production to China.
The author believes that a number of these issues deserve more attention in the future, as they provide precious clues for future discussion.
Schuller and Turner (2005) point out that acquisitions of Western companies by Chinese multinationals and green-field-operations have frequently resulted in unsuccessful stories, casting doubt on the effective
sustainability of what may be termed the dragons surge. Failures in
acquisitions, in turn, often depend on overly optimistic market expectations and synergy estimations, poor merger integration and excessive
pricing in competitive tender offers (Copeland et al. 2000). These prob-
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Valeria Gattai
lems stand for domestic as well as for foreign operations, but it is likely
that the international scenario exacerbates the relationship between the
acquired and the acquiring firms.
While there is a considerable amount of literature that emphasizes the
difficulties encountered by Western multinationals in China7, cultural
distance and different negotiation styles can also affect Chinese crossborder mergers. Another common fear, among European firms, relates
to the bad reputation of Chinas state-owned enterprises. These still
represent a significant share of overseas investors. Indeed, Chinese participating affiliates appear to be afraid of being tainted by poor management practices, low productivity and a lack of transparency from their
parent companies. Adding to this, in some sectors, Chinese investors
represent a competitive threat to European firms, especially as they become more adept at managing brands and at meeting local tastes.
Finally, Chinas hunt for natural resources raises the alarm of national
economic security in some of the countries being targeted (Zhang K.
2005), once environmental degradation and sustainable development
have become urgent issues in the political agenda. A number of analysts
point out (e.g., Zhang Y. 2005), that political and social turmoil, high
public debt and social inequality are among the most serious drawbacks
of Chinas multifaceted story, adding to the astounding economic
growth.
Having described some potential risks of Chinese FDI for European
firms, I would conclude by pointing to some benefits eventually implied
by Chinas Go Global attitude. As Nicolas and Thomsen (2008) suggest, Chinese operations may contribute to industrial resurgence, through
acquisition of some ailing local firms, and they are likely to provide
direct access to Asian markets by exploiting established links with overseas multi-national enterprises. Moreover, it is noticeable that many fears
about the so-called dragons surge relate to a limited awareness of Chinese outward investment, since it is a relatively new phenomenon. There
is still a considerable lack of in-depth research in this area.
While this chapter represents a first attempt at critically examining
EU-China investment relations, I believe that further research is needed,
based on firm-level data, in order to delineate a neater picture, and with
a view to evaluating some future perspectives in detail. The way in which
7
257
Chinese firms adjust to, and learn from, global markets will not only
affect the economic future of the Peoples Republic of China, but may
influence its relations with other regions of the world first among them
the European Union.
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Cai, Kevin G. 1999. Outward Foreign Direct Investment: A Novel Dimension
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Caves, Richard E. 1996. Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis. Cambridge
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Chapel, William B. 1998. Effective Management Communication for China in
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Pradeep Taneja
Abstract
This chapter focuses on Chinas search for energy security, especially
in the oil and gas sector, and on the impact of this search on Chinas
relations with the European Union (EU). It places the Chinese energy
security strategy within the context of the countrys economic reform
program by examining the political dynamics behind developments in
the energy sector. The study outlines some key initiatives China has
taken to ensure regular and cost-effective oil and gas supplies. It
surveys Chinas energy security policy and the institutional structure
which supports it. Chinas search for energy security has led the PRC
to develop closer political and military ties with a number of countries in Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia; Chinese state-owned
oil and gas companies have invested billions of dollars in the development of energy assets there. These efforts have been backed up by
Chinese civilian and military aid flows to some strife-torn countries in
Africa. This is seen by many European politicians and EU officials as
undermining their efforts to improve quality of governance and
respect for human rights in those countries. This chapter examines
the differences between the European Union and China over the
situation in the Darfur region of Sudan, a country in which China has
made significant investments in nearly all aspects of the oil industry.
260
Pradeep Taneja
Introduction
Since the beginning of Chinas economic reform program in 1978, the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has pursued three basic goals: national
unity, economic prosperity and social and political stability. With the
return of Hong Kong and Macau to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 and
1999 respectively, the first goal has been partially met, although it will
not be considered to have been fully achieved until Taiwan is reunited
with the mainland. The second goal has also been partially achieved as
reformist policies have delivered an average annual rate of 9 per cent
economic growth over the past 30 years, catapulting China into the
league of leading economies of the world. On the third goal, a precarious
balance has been maintained, especially since the events of Tiananmen
Square in May-June 1989, in the form of an unwritten social compact
between the government and the Chinese people, ensuring social stability
in return for continuing improvements in living standards.
Indeed, the three goals are interrelated, although maintaining social
and political stability is regarded by the CCP leadership to be paramount.
Chinas leaders regard an annual increase of eight per cent in Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) as essential for keeping employment up and
the possibility of social and political unrest down.1 The ongoing global
financial crisis prompted the Chinese government, in November 2008, to
unveil a massive stimulus package of nearly US$600 billion to ensure
GDP growth stays above 8 per cent. As an additional measure to stimulate the domestic economy, in his report to the National Peoples Congress (NPC) in March 2009, Premier Wen Jiabao projected a fiscal deficit
of 950 billion yuan (US$139 billion) for 2009, the highest deficit in six
decades. At the same time, he also committed to improving the early
warning system for social stability to actively prevent and properly handle all types of mass incidents, using the official code for protests and
riots that might threaten the stability of the regime.2
It is, therefore, clear that maintaining a high GDP growth trajectory is
crucial to preserving social and political stability in China. One of the
critical factors behind Chinas enviable record of economic growth over
1
See, for example, Drew Thompson, Beijings GDP numerology. Online at:
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4747 (consulted 01.06.2009).
2
Premier Wen Jiabao: Chinas economic challenges. Online at: http://www.
businessweek.com/globalbiz/blog/eyeonasia/archives/2009/03/premier_wen_jia.htm
l (consulted 03.06.2009).
261
the past three decades has been its relatively easy access to global energy
and mineral resources. China is now focused on developing a comprehensive energy policy that will underpin its future economic growth.
Given the importance of energy to Chinas future economic growth
and political stability, this chapter focuses on Chinas search for energy
security, especially in the oil and gas sector, and its implications for its
relations with the European Union. It begins by describing Chinas energy policy within the context of its domestic economic reform program
before outlining some of the key global initiatives China has undertaken
to ensure regular and cost-effective supplies of oil and gas to fuel the
continuation of its economic boom. The chapter then looks at areas of
concern insofar as the impact of these initiatives on Chinas relations
with the European Union is concerned. It concludes by highlighting the
potential for cooperation between the two sides in areas where they share
common interests and goals, such as clean coal and alternative sources of
energy to deal with the impact of climate change.
Energy Security: Background
Chinas rapid economic growth over the past three decades has led to a
sharp increase in energy consumption, especially coal, oil and gas. It is
already the worlds second largest oil consumer after the United States,
accounting for over 10 per cent of the worlds total oil consumption. In
2008, China crossed an important energy milestone as its oil imports
equalled domestic production for the first time, making it the third largest importer of oil, relying on imports for fifty per cent of its domestic
demand of 7.6 million barrels per day3. However, unlike other major oil
importing countries, China is not a member of the International Energy
Agency (IEA), set up after the oil shocks of the 1970s to help developed
countries manage oil supplies.4 It largely relies on its own efforts to
secure and manage oil supplies to meet its current and future energy
needs, although it has also begun to work with other countries to promote energy cooperation, as will be discussed later in this chapter.
3
China oil dependence sparks concern, Radio Free Europe, 5 January 2009.
The United States and some other Western countries now believe that it would
be helpful if China joined the IEA. In May 2008, Daniel Sullivan, the then US Assistant Secretary of State, said in Beijing: China should consider a declaration that it
plans to pursue membership in the IEA. This could help ameliorate the anxiety expressed in some quarters over its intentions as it pursues greater energy security (Shai
Oster 2008).
4
262
Pradeep Taneja
Ever since China became a net importer of oil in 1993, the countrys
leadership has intensified its efforts to ensure that its continued economic growth will not be short-circuited by energy shortages. In addition
to inviting foreign oil companies to invest in oil and gas exploration on
Chinese territory beginning in the early 1980s, the Chinese government
has also encouraged its state-owned oil and gas companies to look for
and acquire valuable oil and gas assets in other parts of the world as part
of its go out policy. As Daniel Yergin (2005) points out, China is participating in partnerships, acquiring oil reserves, contracting for future
supplies of liquefied natural gas, selling oil field services, developing
projects around the world, and buying lots of oil.
Before discussing Chinas international efforts to achieve energy
security, however, it would be useful to discuss the domestic political
context in which the countrys reform and energy security policies are
formulated. While international politics has always been at the centre of
the global energy security debate, often little attention is paid to the
internal political dynamics in individual countries in relation to their
energy policies5. Doing so in this case would allow us to visualise the
domestic context in which China seeks to secure energy supplies for its
future economic development. While the Chinese state has retreated
from some sectors of the economy, its policy of grasping the large,
letting go of the small means that it continues to maintain a firm grip on
a number of important industrial sectors, including the oil and gas industry, despite many institutional changes over the past thirty years. The
management and control of the energy sector has been the subject of
intense discussion both in official channels as well as in the growing
number of semi-official publications and internet discussion forums in
China.
Economic Reform and Energy Policy
To understand Chinas energy security initiatives it is necessary to first
examine the political dynamics behind Chinas economic reform program. As has been noted by Peter Nolan (2001), Chinas effort to support the growth of national team of large firms, which are globally
competitive was against the prevailing global trend of liberalization and
privatization. By contrast, the neoclassical economic orthodoxy which
5
See also the chapters by Keyuan Zou and Christopher Williams in this volume.
263
264
Pradeep Taneja
265
the plan until the details of the plan were professionally examined
(Powell 2005). What is unknown here is the role, if any, played by the
senior leaders of the central government and the CCP in this audacious
bid by CNOOC to takeover Americas 9th largest oil company at the
time. Was it a purely corporate decision by the companys chief executive
or was he instructed by the Party and government leaders to pursue this
option? It is very difficult to determine the facts in this matter. In answering a question about the role of the Chinese government in his bid
to takeover Unocal, Fu Chengyu later claimed:
The only thing we needed permission from the Central Government was to
take such a sizeable amount of money out of the country. Thats all. We
received that permission from the appropriate financial authorities, and
thats been the extent of government involvement. (Time Asia 2005)
266
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Crisis in 1997. As argued by Heilmann (2005), the purpose of this commission was also to prevent the breakdown of hierarchies and to reassert
central policy decisiveness in financial affairs.
The CCP leadership has shown time and again that the Leninist
means of control, in particular its nomenclatural system, provides the
basis for upholding a precarious balance between economic decentralisation and political coherence. As Heilmann (2005) has demonstrated,
under the Zhu Rongji government, Party supervision in the financial
industry was exercised mainly through appointment, performance appraisal and discipline inspection of company cadres. It is not uncommon in China today for officials to move between corporate and bureaucratic positions at the behest of the Party leadership. A case in point is
the appointment of Ma Fucai as a deputy head of the Energy Office. Ma
was General Manager of China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC)
when 243 people died in an oil well explosion in Chongqing in December 2003. He later took moral responsibility for the accident and resigned
from the position. His appointment to the Energy Office post signalled
his return to public office after having spent some time in political and
corporate wilderness. The Partys right to appoint, transfer or sack senior
corporate executives of state-owned firms, means that it is able to control their corporate and political behaviour to a large extent. In another
example, Chen Tonghai, the head of Sinopec, the largest oil refining
company in Asia, resigned from his position in June 2007 for what was
then described as personal reasons. But it was later revealed that he was
removed because of corruption and decadent behaviour.8 He was also
expelled from the Party. His replacement was an executive of
PetroChina, a subsidiary of CNPC, another state-owned oil company.
Energy Security: International Initiatives
Ever since it began its economic reform program, the Chinese government has made concerted efforts to ensure its economic growth prospects are not curtailed by a lack of energy resources or interruptions to
energy supplies. It has taken a number of steps in this direction, including supply diversification, the build-up of a strategic oil reserve, more
efficient fuel use, maximizing domestic oil and gas production and sub-
267
stitution. It has also begun working with other countries both producers and consumers of oil and gas to promote energy cooperation.
As a sign of its willingness to cooperate with other countries and to
allay fears about the negative implications of its global energy investments, China has established regular dialogue mechanisms with both the
European Union and the United States on energy-related issues. In June
2004, it hosted a meeting of the twenty-two member Asia Cooperation
Dialogue (ACD) which focused on energy cooperation. This meeting
issued a framework agreement on energy cooperation in Asia. Known as
the Qingdao Initiative, this document was aimed at developing long-term
policies to promote energy security in the wider Asian region (Hu 2004).
Speaking at the Qingdao ministerial meeting, Premier Wen Jiabao said
that the Chinese government stands for accommodating the interests of
others while safeguarding a countrys own interests (Hu 2004).
Not surprisingly, protecting Chinas own energy interests has been at
the forefront of Chinas new energy security strategy. The most important plank of this strategy has been the acquisition of offshore energy
assets in different parts of the world. Chinese oil companies have been
willing to pay premium prices for oil and gas assets in jurisdictions where
many multinational oil companies are reluctant to go because of higher
levels of economic and political risks or because these countries are
listed as rogue states by the United States. Major Chinese oil companies
such as CNPC frequently outbid foreign oil companies, some of them
from other energy-hungry developing nations like India, in acquiring
minority or controlling stakes in overseas oil and gas projects (Rashid
and Saywell 1998).
Oil and gas security considerations have led China to reach out to
countries in Africa, the Middle East, South America as well as its neighbour Russia and the Central Asian states, some of whom have rich oil
and gas reserves. With an eye on their energy resources, China has developed closer political and military ties with a number of these countries.
Chinese state-owned oil and gas companies have invested tens of billions
of dollars in the development of energy assets in these countries. The
first shipments of crude oil from Chinese-owned oil fields located
abroad arrived in China from Kazakhstan and Peru in late 1997, marking
the beginning of this new energy strategy in Beijing (Rashid and Saywell
1998). This strategy entails locking in energy supplies by buying drilling
rights and oil fields or signing loans-for-oil deals with governments
268
Pradeep Taneja
across the world and shipping the crude back home to meet rising domestic demand.
When crude oil price reached a record level of US$147 a barrel in
July 2008 before falling to a low of US$33 a barrel in February 2009,
Chinese oil companies escalated their acquisition of foreign oil fields and
drilling rights with the help of Chinese state-owned banks. As many oilrich countries lack financial resources to develop new oil fields or other
related infrastructure, China has been offering loans on favourable terms
to these governments or government-owned companies in return for oil
on long-term contracts. Between February and May 2009, China committed more than US$50 billion in loans-for-oil agreements with Russia,
Kazakhstan, Venezuela and Brazil (Richardson 2009).
The Chinese strategy of owning oil fields and forging strategic relationships with oil-producing countries seeks to bypass the world market
as much as possible, which many developed countries want to strengthen
and better regulate. In 2006, the former Australian Treasurer, Peter
Costello, told a gathering of G-20 finance ministers in Melbourne, I
believe that true energy security is not possible without effective energy
markets, strong regional cooperation, and sound policy and regulatory
frameworks (Uren 2006). He added that his vision was the creation of
an energy freeway linking energy suppliers and consumers across the
Asia-Pacific region for the benefit of all. This is a view shared by a
number of oil industry experts and scholars in the West who believe that
Chinas strategy is unlikely to succeed. Citing the experience of France in
the 1980s with Iran, Amy Myers Jaffe (quoted in Uren 2006) warns that
Hard lessons have been learnt in the West about the ineffectiveness of
strategic bilateral relationships with key oil exporting countries to safeguard energy supply. Even some Chinese experts warn that the potential
political and economic risks of overseas investments need to be carefully
assessed (He and Qin 2006: 102). Others argue that International Oil
Companies (IOC) such as Shell or Exxon offer better technology and
more experience to resource-owning countries than national oil companies from China. In a speech to an oil industry meeting in Paris in April
2005, Shell CEO Jeroen van der Veer argued that there are advantages
for resource holders in working with IOCs.9 Whereas national oil com9
Jeroen van der Veer, What is the international oil company of the future going to
look like? Online at: http://www-static.shell.com/static/media/downloads/speeches/
jvdv_oilsummb.pdf.
269
10
The Failed States Index is published jointly by the Fund for Peace and the Foreign
Policy magazine. Online at: http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/
270
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271
sent to Southern Sudan (Grant and Barysch 2008: 87). In the end, a lack
of cooperation from the Khartoum regime meant that most of the peacekeeping force had failed to deploy. In the meantime, despite early fears
that some foreign leaders might stay away from the opening ceremony of
the Beijing Olympics, the ceremony and the games passed off smoothly
and were judged to be a great success for the Chinese organizers. The
pressure had been lifted from the shoulders of Chinas leaders.
Chinas search for energy security and its investments in Africa, particularly in Sudan, have added to the already long list of differences
between the European Union and China. Although the Commission has
adopted a softer and more diplomatic approach in dealing with these
differences, the European Parliament (EP) has been much more strident
in its criticism of China criticism which is strongly rejected by the
Chinese. It passed a resolution in April 2008 expressing concern about
Chinas growing influence in Africa at a time when European influence
was declining. The Chinese government called such criticism irresponsible and totally unfounded, telling the European Parliament to stop its
confrontationist and provocative activities.12 A month earlier, the EP
had decided to disinvest in PetroChina/CNPC in protest against Chinese
support for the Sudanese government (Sengupta 2008). This followed
revelations that its members pension funds continued to be invested in
the Chinese company. In 2007, its Sakharov Prize was awarded to Salih
Mahmoud Osman, a leading human rights activist from Darfur, who has
been very critical of Chinas role in Sudan. In December 2008, Osman
accused China of undermining the lives of millions of people of Darfur
for a long time by siding with the Sudanese government and through
aerial bombardments caused by Chinese helicopter gunships.13
In an article published in a Chinese newspaper, the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana (2007),
stressed that the EU and China have a common responsibility and interest in dealing with the challenges of poverty, instability and war in Africa. Pointing to the agreement reached at the Helsinki EU-China summit in 2006 to establish a senior official level dialogue on Africa, Solana
12
Europe comment on Sino-African ties rebuffed. Online at: http://www.
chinadaily.net/china/2008-04/24/content_6642341.htm.
13
China deaf and blind to human rights in Darfur Osman. Online at:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/public/story_page/015-44395-350-12-51-90220081212STO44317-2008-15-12-2008/default_en.htm.
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called for better and more exchanges of information so that our efforts
do not cut across each other as they sometimes have in the past (Solana
2007). Citing a long list of areas in which the EU is actively engaged in
promoting cooperation with African countries, including good governance, fight against AIDS and regional integration, Solana said that there
is positive correlation between EU and Chinese strategies in Africa.
While the tone of this article was clearly upbeat, the underlying message
seemed to be that the EU has spent a long time trying to persuade African governments to comply with certain governance benchmarks and
does do not wish China to undermine European long-term efforts.
Conclusion
Chinas arrival on the world stage as a major player has forced other
major powers to rethink their own strategies in dealing with international
issues of critical importance to their citizens. Its ambitious energy security agenda and its push into Africa have obliged the EU to come up
with creative ways to engage with this rapidly growing power. While the
EU may feel that Chinas so-called win-win approach in Africa might be
undermining EU efforts to improve governance standards on the continent, African governments seem happy to deal with China, albeit not
without driving hard bargains. As Bernt Berger recently pointed out,
China has increasingly regarded Africa as an opportunity, while Europe
has long regarded the continent as a burden.14 The EU will now have to
learn to work with China (and other emerging powers) in seeking the
opportunities in Africa.
As China continues its search for energy security, it will also have to
work with other countries in dealing with the huge challenge of climate
change and environmental degradation. The problems are likely to be
more severe for China and could seriously hamper its efforts to improve
living standards. But a joint and cooperative approach is more likely to
bring about better outcomes for all. It is heartening to see that the EU
and China have already taken the first steps on this long journey. At each
of the past several EU-China summits a plethora of agreements have
been signed to promote bilateral cooperation in areas relevant to energy
conservation, clean energy and scientific and technological collaboration.
14
China outwits the EU in Africa. Online at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/
China/IL13Ad01.html.
273
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World Order? London: Centre for European Reform.
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2009).
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Rashid, Ahmed and Trish Saywell. 1998. Beijing Gusher in Far Eastern Economic Review (26 February 1998): 46-48.
Richardson, Michael. 2009. China Closing Energy Deals While Oil is Cheap in
Japan Times (29 May 2009).
Sengupta, Kim. 2008. EU Boycotts China Oil Firm Over Funding of Darfur
Regime in The Independent (17 March 2008).
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Daily (7 February 2007).
Solnick, Steven L. 1996. The Breakdown of Hierarchies in the Soviet Union
and China: A Neoinstitutional Perspective in World Politics 48(2): 209-238.
Time Asia. 2005. Interview with Fu Chengyu in Time Asia (11 July 2005).
Uren, David. 2006. Securing Energy Supply Lines in The Australian (30 March
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orators. The perpetrators killed all 23 crew members and robbed the
whole ship. As of 8 August 1999, China arrested all suspected pirates. In
January 2000, 13 pirates, including one Indonesian and 12 Chinese,
received the death penalty for crimes of robbery and murder. The remaining 24 pirates were also punished.
While Chinas legal system does not contain the precise terminology
for piracy, China has accepted the term robbery at sea in its legislation.
A regulation issued in 1993, governing the safety of navigation and
fishery activities in the East China Sea, adopted the above term. This is
in line with the new terminology created by the International Maritime
Organization (IMO), i.e., piracy and armed robbery against ships. The
concept embraces piracy on the high seas, as well as acts of piracy in
ports or national waters.4 The regulation requires the coastal regions and
governmental departments concerned to pay close attention to the safety
of navigation. The Department of Public Security is charged with responsibility for combating criminal activities, including robbery at sea
(Wang 1994: 786).
In terms of other legislation concerning maritime security, China
promulgated several important laws and regulations including the 1992
Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the 1998 Law on
the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf, the 1983 Law
on the Maritime Traffic Safety and the 1992 Regulations on the Management of Maritime Navigational Warnings and Navigational Notices. On
the international level, China acceded to the LOS and SUA Conventions
(see above) and participates in meetings in the United Nations and IMO.
China has realized that, it cannot combat piracy in its adjacent waters
all by herself. Therefore, regional cooperation is necessary to reach the
goal of effectiveness. For that purpose, China signed the Joint Declaration on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues with
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in November
2002. This initiated full cooperation between ASEAN and China in the
field of non-traditional security issues and listed various priorities and
forms of cooperation. The priorities include combating trafficking in
illegal drugs, people-smuggling including trafficking in women and children, sea piracy, terrorism, arms-smuggling, money-laundering, interna-
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D1880/984.pdf
279
5
6
http://www.aseansec.org/13185.htm
http://www.recaap.org/about/pdf/ReCAAP%20Agreement.pdf
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Zou Keyuan
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/arms/psi/exercise-2.html
281
http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/prsrl/23764.htm
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blockages to Chinas oil transportation, and about a concomitant deterioration in Sino-US bilateral relations, owing to some dispute over, for
instance, the Taiwan issue. For that reason, China has long been considering the construction of an oil pipeline from Myanmar to China to
reduce its dependence on shipping oil imports through the Strait of
Malacca. Furthermore, a key Chinese diplomat stated that maritime
security is of vital importance for the welfare and economic development
of the region and that regional cooperation is indispensable for maritime
security (Zhao Jianhua, 2004). However, China has some real doubts
over whether principles embodied in international law including the UN
Charter would be or could be strictly observed in real actions against
maritime threats. Extreme care and sensitiveness is thus needed when it
comes to military involvement (Zhao Jianhua, 2004). In a word, China
prefers a regional rather than an international arrangement of maritime
security for the Straits of Malacca.
In addition to this, China has some previous, bitter, experience regarding interdiction at sea, as the following example illustrates: on 7 July
1993, the Chinese freighter Milky Way (yinhe) departed from Tianjin to
the Middle East with the destination of the port of Kuwait. On 23 July,
the United States accused China of sending chemical materials to Iran
(thiodiglycol and thionyl chloride). These were, allegedly, to be used for
the production of chemical weapons. The American side thus demanded
an on-board inspection of the vessel. From 1 August onward, several
American warships followed the Milky Way, monitoring its movement
and taking photos so that the Chinese ship could not sail normally. Due
to these American pressures, the Milky Way was refused anchorage in
port; it remained on the high seas until late August. Finally, on 29 August, China agreed to check the containers on board together with the
Saudi Arabian representative and some American experts. The investigation proved that there were no chemical materials as the United States
had alleged. As a consequence of this incident, the Chinese Foreign
Ministry issued a statement on 4 September 1993, condemning the
American hegemonic attitude and its groundless accusations.9
Chinese legal scholars accused the United States of having violated
international law, including the freedom of the high seas. They demanded the US bear legal liability to compensate for the economic loss
9
http://news.163.com/2004w09/12686/2004w09_1096092272435.html
283
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t169072.htm
See: UN Doc. S/RES/1540 (2004).
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Zou Keyuan
12
http://www.imo.org/Conventions/
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Zou Keyuan
13
http://eur-ex.europa.eu/
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm
15
http://www.emsa.europa.eu/end179d002.html
16
DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, non-paper on Surveillance, 13 October
2008:5.
14
287
288
Zou Keyuan
ing piracy should not produce any negative consequences, that, moreover, such assistance must comply with the Law of the Sea Convention,
and must not constitute a conflict with existing international legislation.
It appears that China is reluctant to send its military forces overseas.
However, it seems that Chinese attitudes changed somewhat after its
vessels were kidnapped by Somali pirates. In this case, the ambassador of
the Somali government to Beijing expressed his welcome of the Chinese
navy to the Somali waters. At a special conference sponsored by the UN
in December 2008, the Chinese representative expressed Chinas willingness to cooperate with other countries to suppress piracy in accordance
with international law and the UN Security Council resolutions.18 With
this in mind, it is not known when and how China would be involved on
a more practical level in the crackdown on Somali piracy. Once China
determines to become involved in military actions against piracy in the
Somali waters, the necessary cooperation and coordination between
China and EU can be well perceived.
Conclusion
After the Cold War, non-traditional security issues became much more
complicated and salient in the context of a wider human security. This
concept includes piracy and maritime terrorism. In recent years, China
has considerably strengthened her capacity in maintaining maritime security in its adjacent seas, as well as, seeking to work towards regional and
world peace and security in cooperation with the international community, including the EU. While there are some opportunities for China and
EU to cooperate in the maintenance of maritime security, China is more
immediately concerned with her surrounding areas and has concluded a
number of pertinent legal and political arrangements with neighbouring
countries. It is certain that such a policy will continue. On the other
hand, as a rising power, China may be more willing to contribute its
efforts globally over time.
18
http://www.nanhai.org.cn/news/news_info.asp?ArticleID=1847
289
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We believe that the diverse contributions in this volume have demonstrated the growth and evolution not only of the multi-faceted area of
EU-China relations, but also of a concomitant agenda of study, enquiry
and research which appears as thorough as it is branched-out and complex The chapters in this volume represent not more than a fleeting
glimpse of the state of affairs of research into EU-China relations as of
mid-2009. They were compiled at a time when the relationship has become, arguably, one of most significant and multi-layered foreign policy
arenas of the European Union (EU).
In our view, the chapters in this collection offer both critical assessment and theoretical debate regarding a number of sides of EU-China
relations which have hitherto been largely under-researched, for example
on matters of energy security, maritime safety, the construction of identities, and sports and politics. In other areas, such as human rights, economics and foreign policy analysis, we hope that the preceding chapters
will have done their part to stimulate the debate and to take the academic
analysis of EU-China contacts into new areas and directions. We believe
that a number of important strands and themes have emerged which not
only represent some of the key conclusions to be drawn from this examination, but which will also, we hope, point interested China watchers in
the direction of some future analytical focal points and, perhaps, towards
an Agenda for 2010 and beyond.
Against this backdrop, Rajendra Jain, in the conclusion to his chapter
for this volume, has offered what is, perhaps, one of the most pertinent
observations, albeit in a more specific context: there is a continuing
292
need to re-profile and re-orient our mindsets about the growing prominence of the EU as a collective entity. The nature and development of
EU actor-ship in foreign policy in general, and in the context of SinoEU interaction in particular - does, indeed, emerge as one of the principal concerns in all of the preceding sections. This appears to hold true
especially, when seen against the background of the search for that elusive, unified, European Union China Policy on the one hand, and of the
frequently conflicting attitudes and interests in the Member States on
the other hand. Speaking una voce with the PRC, it appears, is still difficult for the aspiring global player that is the EU.
With regard to the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), it has almost
become a commonplace to state that this vast country is currently living
through times of unprecedented change, the pace of which seems to be
ever-quickening. In our view, this book has thrown into relief two aspects, in particular, of that change: first, it is possible to conclude from
the findings of several chapters offered here, that the immediate future
of China, and of China-EU relations, will be shaped by the evolving
relationship between Party and regime stability, and national interest, on
the one hand, and questions of openness, democratisation, rule of law,
(media) freedom and internet access on the other hand. Secondly, in
terms of Chinese politics and China-EU relations, the role of Chinese
discursive narratives, identity-constructions and symbolic landscapes in
building political meanings, legitimacy, national prestige, patriotic sentiment and international relations must not be underrated.
This moves into the foreground a third and related aspect: ideational
values, perceptions (and mis-perceptions) as gaps in mutual understanding in the China-EU asymmetrical relationship all continue to
impinge on the conduct of the contemporary diplomacy; in many cases,
bilateral EU-China negotiations are still suffering from underlying, unseen, issues, which threaten to derail progress if wilfully or inadvertently
neglected. We have termed those the iceberg-issues of China-Europe.
These are also the areas where the chequered history of China-Europe
contacts continues to have a significant bearing on the present.
If there is, then, a pressing need for more mutual reaching-out and
interaction, many chapters in this book have pointed to areas in which
bridges can be built and common interests can be pursued.
In a wider context of the network of influence that is international
relations, we think that it is possible to conclude that Chinas relations
CONCLUSIONS
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294
justed. In areas ranging from human rights to Taiwan, from the oneChina-Policy to development, EU-China dialogue is in need of being
developed past the stage of a mere laundry-list of formal, sector-specific, (dis-)agreements, towards a much deeper understanding, in an
attempt to overcome procrastination where it exists. This widening and
deepening of EU-China contacts will be the more successful, the more it
embraces aspects of culture, language, and of what is sometimes euphemistically-termed people-to-people-dialogue. In order for it to have a
more enduring impact, the evolving discourse revolving around EUChina must encompass a more comprehensive critical scrutiny of such
concerns as grass-roots and NGO dialogues, lite-perceptions, thinktank-dialogue, cultural distance, educational exchanges, dialogue of civilisations, human capital, inter-faith dialogue, intellectual linkages and
related areas. Dialogue thus becomes the watchword of EU-China
relations.
Secondly, and in close relation to the first point, in EU-China relations, we think that most if not all of the chapters in this volume
have shown that more equilibrium is required in adjusting the balance
between trade and economic matters and other areas. The interaction,
which is, at present, heavily skewed towards material interests and commercial dialogue, will need to embrace also and much more wholeheartedly many of the broader issues hinted at in this book, such as
ideas and values. It transpires from this volume that a deeper and more
meaningful, holistic, China-EU exchange is needed, encompassing a
rage of issues that are sometimes mistakenly claimed to be binary in
character, such as development and democracy, tradition and modernity, equity and growth and human rights and political stability. Furthermore, we both conclude and predict that one of the main directions
a future EU-China research-agenda will take is a social-constructivistinformed approach, to international relations in general, and to the educational, intellectual and ideational dimensions of Asia-Europe relations
in particular. Thus, a more comprehensive future research programme on
China-EU interaction, could and ought to extend to key themes like
political strategy and declaratory diplomacy, identity and text, linguistics and meaning, seeking to employ, where relevant, some of the tools
of disciplines such as discourse-analysis.
The third kind of balance to be addressed and re-dressed in the
EU-China relations of the future surrounds those new hinge-issues of
CONCLUSIONS
295
the relations, which have been analysed in several of the preceding chapters, and which have such significant potential to shape and distort
the relations of the future. It is both conceivable and desirable, that
future research foci are thus placed on subject-areas like evolving multipolar developmentalism, the environment, global governance, energysecurity, maritime terrorism and a new transcontinental (Asia-Europe)
infrastructure. Human rights too fall into this latter category. The research assembled for this volume allows us to draw the conclusion that
human rights are very definitely in the process of being de-emphasised
in the context of EU-China relations. This is not only careless from the
point of view of political pragmatism; it also ignores the fact that human
rights are a multi-dimensional issue, underlying all areas of the EU-China
dialogue. More constructive perhaps constructivist ways must,
therefore, be found to connect debates about human rights more creatively with other discussions about rights to development, regionalism,
democracy, tolerance and control, dialogue and respect, responses to
globalization and contributions to human civilisation.