DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS

This principle operated as an implicit limitation

on legislative powers as on the two other
powers.In essence, separation of powers means
the legislation belongs to Congress, execution to
the executive, settlement of legal controversies
to the judiciary. Each is prevented from invading
the domain of the others. But the separation is
not total. The system allows for checks and
balances the net effect of which being that, in
general, no one department is able to act without
the cooperation of at least one of the other
departments.
Purpose: To prevent concentration of powers in
one department and thereby to avoid tyranny.
The purpose was not to avoid friction, but, by
means of the inevitable friction incident to the
distribution of governmental powers among the
three departments, to save the people from
autocracy.
1. To secure action
2. To forestall overaction
3. To prevent despotism
4.To obtain efficiency
Principle of Blending of Powers: Instances
when powers are not confined exclusively within
one department but are assigned to or shared by
several departments.
Principle of Checks and Balances: This
allows
one
department
to
resist
encroachments upon its prerogative or to rectify
mistakes or excesses committed by the other
departments.
The first
and safest criterion to determine
whether a given power has been validly
exercised by a particular department is
whether
or
not
the
power
has
been
constitutionally
conferred
upon
the
department claiming its exercisesince the
conferment
is
usually
done
expressly.
However, even in the absence of express
conferment, the exercise of the power may
be justified under the doctrine of necessary
implication. The grant of express power carried
with it all other powers that may be reasonably
inferred from it.
Justiciable question- implies a given right,
legally demandable and enforceable, an act or
omission violative of such right, and a remedy
granted and sanctioned by law for said breach of
right. (Casibang vs. Aquino, 92 SCRA 642)
THE INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE
1. Police Power
2. Power of Eminent Domain
3. Power of Taxation
Similarities:
1. Inherent in the State, exercised even
without need of express constitutional grant.
2. Necessary and indispensable; State cannot be
effective without them.
3. Methods by which State interferes with private
property.
4. Presupposes equivalent compensation.
5. Exercised primarily by the legislature.
Distinctions:
Police Power
Regulates both
liberty
andproperty
may be exercised
only by
government;
cannot be
delegated to
administrative

Eminent
Domain
Affects
property rights
may even be
exercised
byprivate
entities
the property
is wholesome
& devoted to

Taxation
Power
affects
property rights
may be
exercised only
by government;
cannot be
delegated to
administrative
body

body
property taken
is usually noxious
(unpleasant &
harmful) or
intended for
noxious purpose
and may thus be
destroyed
compensation is
the intangible,
altruistic feeling
that the
individual has
contributed to
the public good

public use or
purpose
compensatio
n is the full
and fair
equivalent of
the
property taken

the property is
wholesomeand
devoted to
public
use/purpose
it is the
protection
and/orpublic
improvements
instituted by
government for
the taxes paid

Limitations: Generally,
the Bill
of Rights,
although in some cases the exercise of the power
prevails
over
specific
constitutional
guarantees. The courts may annul the
improvident exercise of police power.These
powers must not be exercised arbitrarily, to the
prejudice of Bill of Rights.
In Ericta vs. City Government of Quezon
City, 122 SCRA 759,the City Government of
QC was not exercising police power when
they
required
private cemetery owners to
reserve 6% of the burial lots for paupers burial
ground. The SC held that in police power, the
property to be taken is to be destroyed. The 6%
are private property of the cemetery owners. This
is a taking of private property. Sec. 9, Art. III:
Private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation.
Clearly, this is an invalid exercise of police power.
The City was made to pay the owners just
compensation.
In
Philippine
Press
Institute
vs.
COMELEC,
244
SCRA
272,
Sec.
2
ofCOMELEC
Resolution
No.
2772,
which
mandates newspapers of general circulation in
every province or city to provide free print space
of not less than page as COMELEC space, was
held to be an invalid exercise of police power
there being no showing of the existence of a
national emergency or imperious public necessity
for the taking of print space, nor that the
resolution was the only reasonable and calibrated
response to such necessity. This was held to be
an exercise of the power of eminent domain,
albeit invalid, because the COMELEC would not
pay for the space to be given to it by the
newspapers.
Police power and power of taxationcannot be
delegated to administrative bodies.
Police power and power of eminent domain both
involved taking. They differ in purpose.
Police powerto destroy; because the property
is harmful, obnoxious, poses a risk to the public.
Power of eminent domainonly private
property is the subject of taking; the purpose is
to convert the private property to public use.
POLICE POWER
-It is the power of promoting public welfare by
restraining & regulating the use of liberty and
property.
-It is the power vested by the Constitution in the
legislature to make, ordain, & establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes and ordinances, either w/ penalties or
without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as
they shall judge to be for the good & welfare of
the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the
same.

-The power is plenary & its scope is vast &

pervasive, reaching & justifying measures for
public health, public safety, public morals, & the
general welfare.
-It
is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety & general welfare of the
people. (Binay vs. Domingo)
-It has been described as the most essential,
insistent & the least limitable of powers,
extending as it does to all the great public
needs. It is the power vested in the legislature
to make, ordain, & establish all manner of
wholesome & reasonable laws, statutes &
ordinances, either w/ penalties
or w/o, not
repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge
to be for the good & welfare of the
commonwealth,& for the subjects of the
same. (Carlos Superdrug Corp. vs. DSWD,
G.R. No. 166494, June 29, 2007)
-Cabrera vs.
Lapid, G.R. No. 129098,
December 6, 2006, a careful reading of the
questioned
Resolution
reveals
that
the
Ombudsman dismissed petitioners criminal
complaint because respondents had validly
resorted to the police power of the State when
they effected the demolition of the illegal
fishpond in question following the declaration
thereof as a nuisance per se. in the words of the
Ombudsman, those who participated in the
blasting of the subject fishpond were only
impelled by their desire to serve the best interest
of the general public; for the good and the
highest good.
Requisites (Limitations):
1. Lawful subjectthe interests of the public
in general as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the exercise of this
power.
2. Lawful meansthe means employed are
reasonably for the accomplishment of the
purpose, and not unduly oppressive on
individuals.
Affected with public interestan industry
is subject to control for the public good; it has
been considered as the equivalent of subject to
the exercise of police power.
Construction: construed strictly and any doubt
must be resolved against the grant.
Scope/Characteristics:
It is the most pervasive, least limitable, and the
most demanding of the three powers. The
justification is found in:
salus populi est
suprema lex(the welfare of thepeople is the
supreme law) and sic utere tuo ut alienum
non laedas(use your propertyso as not to impair
others).
1. It cannot be bargained away through the
medium of a treaty or a contract.
2. The taxing power may be used as an
implement of police power
3. Eminent domain may be used as an
implement to attain the police powerobjective
(Association of Landowners vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform,175 SCRA 343).
4. In Ortigas & Co. vs. CA, G.R. No.
126102, December 4, 2000, nonimpairment
of contracts or vested rights clauses will have
to yield to thesuperior and legitimate exercise
by the State of the police power.
5. In PRC vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. 144681,
June 21, 2004,the exercise ofthe constitutional
right of every citizen to select a profession or

course ofstudy may be regulated pursuant to the

police power of the State to safeguardhealth,
morals, peace, education, order, safety, and the
general welfare of thepeople. This regulation
assumes particular pertinence in the field of
medicine, to protect the public from the
potentially dead effects of incompetence and
ignorance.
In Chavez vs. Romulo, 431 SCRA 534,the
right to bear arms is merely statutory
privilege. The license to carry firearm is neither a
property nor a property right. Neither does it
create a vested right. A permit to carry outside
ones residence may be revoked at any time.
Even if it were a property right, it cannot be
considered as absolute
as to be beyond the reach of the police power.
Who may exercise police power?
The power is inherently vested in Congress.
However, they may validly delegate this power to
the following:
1. the President of the Republic of the Phils.
2. administrative bodiespublic and quasi-public
corporations
3. the lawmaking bodies of local government
units
Local government units exercise the power under
the general welfare clause.
CANORECO vs. Torres, G.R. no. 127249,
February 27, 1998, while police power may be
delegated to the President by law, RA 6939 and
PD 260, as amended, do not authorize the
President or any other administrative body, to
take over the internal management of a
cooperative. Accordingly, Memorandum Order
No. 409, issued by the
President, constituting an ad hoc committee to
temporarily take over and manage the affairs of
CANORECO is invalid.
In MMDA vs. Bel-Air Village Association,
G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000, there is no
provision in RA 7924 that empowers the MMDA or
its
council
to enact ordinance, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. Thus,
MMDA may not order the opening of Neptune St.
in the Bel-Air Subdivision to public traffic, as it
does not possess delegated police power.
Section 11, Article Xthe Congress may, by
law, create special metropolitan political
subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set
forth in Section 10 hereof. The component
cities and municipalities shall retain their
basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their
own local executives and legislative assemblies.
The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority
that will thereby be created shall be limited to
basic services
requiring coordination.
MMDA is not a special metropolitan
political subdivision.
However,
in MMDA vs. Garin, G.R. No.
130230, April 15, 2005, although thelaw (RA
7924) does not grant the MMDA the power to
confiscate & suspend orrevoke drivers licenses
w/o need of any legislative enactment, the same
law veststhe MMDA the duty to enforce existing
traffic rules & regulations. Thus, where there isa
traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the
legislature or those agencies to whom
legislative power has been delegated, the MMDA
is not precluded& in fact is dutybound

toconfiscate
& suspend or revoke drivers
licenses in the exercise of
itsmandate
of
transport & traffic management, as well as
the administration
&implementation of all
traffic
enforcement operations,
traffic
engineering
services
&traffic
education
programs.
Additional Limitations (When exercised by
delegate):
a. express grant by law
b. within
territorial
limits
(for
local
government units, except when exercised to
protect water supply)
c. must not be contrary to law
For municipal ordinance to be valid:
1. it must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute;
2. it must not be unfair or oppressive;
3. it must not be partial or discriminatory;
4. it must not prohibit, but may regulate, trade;
5. it must not be unreasonable; and
6. it must be general in application and
consistent with public policy.
In City of Manila vs. Judge Laguio, G.R. No.
118127, April 12, 2005, the SCdeclared as an
invalid exercise of the police power the City of
Manila Ordinance No.7783, which prohibited the
establishment or operation of businesses
providing
certainforms
of
amusement,
entertainment, services and facilities in the
Ermita-Malate area,for being contrary to the
Constitution, infringing the guarantees of due
process &equal protection of the laws.
In Centeno vs. Villalon-Pornillos, 236
SCRA 197 (1994), solicitation forreligious
purposes may be subject to proper regulation by
the State in the exercise ofpolice power.
In Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs.
CA, 329 SCRA 314 (2000),theissuance of
business licenses & permits by a municipality
or city is essentiallyregulatory in nature. The
authority,
which
devolved
upon
local
government units,
to issue or grant such
licenses or permits, is essentially in the exercise
of the police power of the State within the
contemplation of the general welfare clause of
the LGC.
The
implementation
of
the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) is
an exercise of police power and the power of
eminent domain. To the extent that the CARL
prescribes retention limits to the landowners,
there is an exercise of police power for the
regulation of private property in accordance with
the Constitution. But where, to carryout such
regulation, the owners are deprived of lands
they own in excess of the maximum area
allowed, there is also taking under the power of
eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not
a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is
required is the surrender of the title to and
physical possession of the said excess and all
beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of
the farmer beneficiary. The Bill of rights provides
that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty
and property without due process of law. The
CARL was not intended to take away property
without due process of law. The exercise of power
of eminent domain requires that due process be
observed in the taking of private property.
[Roxas and Co., vs. CA, 321 SCRA 106
(1999)]

Republic vs. Manila Electric Company,

G.R. No. 141314, November 15, 2002, the
regulation of rates to be charged by public
utilities is founded upon the police power of the
State and statutes prescribing rules for the
control and regulations of public utilities are a
valid exercise thereof. When a private property
is used for a public purpose and is affected
with public interest, it ceases to be juris
privati only & becomes subject to regulation.
The regulation is to promote the common
good. Submission to regulation may be
withdrawn by the owner by discontinuing use;
but as long as the use of the property is
continued, the same is subject to public
regulation.
In regulating rates charged by public
utilities, the State protects the public against
arbitrary and excessive rates while maintaining
the efficiency and quality of services rendered.
However, the power to regulate rates does not
give the State the right to prescribe rates which
are so low as to deprive the public utility of a
reasonable return on investment.
Philippine
Press
Institute
(PPI)
vs.
COMELEC, 244 SCRA 272,
Section 2
ofCOMELEC
Resolution
No.
2772,
which
mandates newspapers of general circulation in
every province or city to provide free print space
of not less than page as COMELEC space, was
held to be invalid exercise of police power there
being no showing of the existence of national
emergency or imperious public necessity for the
taking of print space, nor that the resolution was
the only reasonable and calibrated response to
suchnecessity.
Public purpose and use has broader concept
now. It now includes VICARIOUS BENEFITS that
society
may
derive
from
a
particular
measure.e.g. CONCERN FOR THE POORSC
recognized this as one for public purpose and
use.
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN also known as
the power of expropriation. The power of eminent
domain is the power of the State to forcibly take
private property for public use upon payment of
just compensation. It is the right/power of a
sovereign state to appropriate private property to
particular uses to promote public welfare.
It is governments right to appropriate, in the
nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private
property for public use or purpose. (Moday vs.
CA, 268 SCRA 586)
The ultimate right of the sovereign power to
appropriate, not only the public, but even the
private property of all citizens within the
territorial sovereignty, for public purpose.
Power
of Destruction
Due
to
Eminent Domain Necessity
involves
public involves
private
rights
rights
such as self-preservation &
the property is self-defense
converted
to there is no need for the
public use
conversion to public use
there must be no
need
for
just
payment
of compensation
justcompensation
may
be
validly
undertaken
by undertaken even by
the State
private individuals
Object of Expropriation:
1. anything that comes under the dominion of
man
2. real, personal, tangible and intangible

3. property right
4. churches and other religious properties
5. property already devoted to public use
Except: money- because compensation is also
money
Who may exercise?
Generally, the legislature, but also upon valid
delegation to:
1. the President;
2. lawmaking bodies of LGUs;
3. administrative bodiespublic and quasi-public
corporations
4. Private enterprises performing public services.
In the case of Republic vs. CA, G.R. No.
146587, July 2, 2002, the power of eminent
domain must, by enabling law, be delegated to
local governments by the national legislature,
and thus, can only be as broad as the real
authority would want it to be. The grant of the
power to local government units under RA
7160 cannot be understood as equal to the
pervasive and all encompassing power vested
in thelegislative branch of government.
JIL School Foundation vs. Municipality of
Pasig, G. R. No. 152230, August 9, 2005
Sec. 19, of the LGC requires the LGU to tender a
prior written definite and valid offer to acquire
the property before the filing of the complaint for
eminent domain.
Filstream Intl Inc. vs. CA, 284 SCRA 716
the exercise of the power of eminent
domain is clearly superior to the final and
executor judgment rendered by the court in an
ejectment case.
RP vs. PLDT, 26 SCRA 620services were
considered
embraced
in
the concept of
property subject to taking under the power of
eminent domain. Republic, in the exercise of the
sovereign power of eminent domain, may
require
the telephone company to permit
interconnection of the government telephone
system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of
government service may require, subject to the
payment of just compensation to be determined
by the court.
Where Expropriation Suit Is Filed:
In the Regional Trial Courtbecause
incapable of pecuniary estimation

it

is

Requisites POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN:

1. Necessitywhen exercised by:
a. Congressit
is
a
political
question;
(Municipality of Meycauayan,Bulacan vs.
IAC, 157 SCRA 640)
b. Delegatethe determination of whether there
is a genuine necessity for the exercise is a
justiceable question (Republic vs. La Orden
de Po.Benedictinos, 1 SCRA 649).
The RTC has the power to inquire to the legality
of the exercise of the right of eminent domain
and to determine whether there is a genuine
necessity for it (Bardillon vs. Brgy. Masili of
Calamba, Laguna, G.R. No. 146886, April
30, 2003).
Lagcao vs. Judge Labra, G.R. No. 155746,
October 13, 2004there was no showing at all
why petitioners property was singled out for
expropriation by the city ordinance or what
necessity impelled the particular choice or
selection. The ordinance stated no reason for
the choice of petitioners property as the site
of a socialized
housing project.

2. Private propertyall private property

capable of ownership may be expropriated
except money and choses in action; may
include services.(Republic vs. PLDT, 26 SCRA
620)
In City of Manila vs. Chinese Community,
40 Phil. 349, a cemetery open tothe public was
already in public use and no part of the ground
could be taken for otherpublic uses under a
general authority. The City of Manila was
without authority toexpropriate the property.
(The Congress itself should expropriate or
there must bespecial grant.)
3. Taking there is taking when:
a. The owner is actually deprived or dispossessed
of his property;
b. There is practical destruction or material
impairment of the value of theproperty;
c. The owner is deprived of the ordinary use of
his property;
d. The owner is deprived of jurisdiction,
supervision and control of his property.
Requisites for a valid taking: (Republic vs.
Castellvi)(EMADO)
a. The expropriator must enter a private
property;
b. Entry must be for more than a momentary
period;
c. Entry must be under warrant or color of
authority;
d. Property must be devoted to public use or
otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected;
e. Utilization of the property must be in such a
way as to oust the owner anddeprive him of
beneficial enjoyment of the property.
The taking of private property may include the
impairment of the use of theproperty for which
it was intended. In US vs. Causby, 328 US
256,the flight of planesfrom a nearby military
airport over plaintiffs property below the
navigable
airspaceresulting in the ruin of
plaintiffs
chicken
farm
was
considered
compensable taking. Soalso were low landing &
take-off flights which made nearby residential
area unlivable(Griggs vs. Allegheny County).
This is taking in the constitutional sense.
Avenida, Rizal
used to be the commercial
center of Manila. However, whenthe Light
Railway Transit (LRT) was built, the commercial
value of Avenida was greatly diminished. The
shops and stores had to close. The owners of
these establishmentssuffered losses because of
the operation of the LRT along Avenida, Rizal.
Are they entitled to be paid just compensation?
No. SC held that the kind of injury or loss that
one must suffer that will justifythe payment of
just compensation must be a special kind of
injury or loss as in thecase of Causby. If the
injury or loss that one suffered is one which he
suffered togetherwith the rest of the community,
his only compensation in such a case is the
altruisticfeeling that somehow he is able to
contribute to the common good.
CANORECO vs. CA, G.R. No. 109338,
November 20, 2000, The owner of theproperty
cut the electric lines alleging that it impaired him
of the use of his property. TheSC held that the

property owner was not justified in cutting the

electric lines. Hisproperty becomes the servient
estate subject to the encumbrance, and the
acquisitionof an easement of right of way filed by
an electric power company for the construction
of transmission lines falls within the purview of
the power of eminent domain. However, since
there was an impairment of the use of the
property, he is entitled to the payment of just
compensation.
The establishment of an easement is a form
of compensable taking. In NAPOCOR vs. Sps.
Gutierrez, G.R. No. 60077, January 18,
1991, the owner of the land was awarded full
compensation against the NAPOCORs argument
that the owners were not totally deprived of the
use of the land and could still plant the same
crops as long as they did not come into contact
with the wires. The Court said: the right of way
easement perpetually deprives defendants of
their proprietary rights as manifested by the
imposition by the plaintiff upon defendants that
below said transmission lines no plant higher
than 3 meters is allowed. Furthermore, because
of the high-tension current conveyed through the
transmission lines, danger to life and limbs that
may be caused beneath said wires cannot
altogether be discounted, and to cap it all,
plaintiff only pays the fee to defendant once,
while the latter shall continually pay the taxes
due on said affected portion of their property.
In People vs. Fajardo, 104 Phil. 44, a
municipal ordinance prohibiting a building which
would impair the view of the plaza from the
highway was considered taking. The property
owner was held to be entitled to payment of just
compensation.
In Velarma vs.
CA, 252 SCRA 400, the
owner of the property can recoverpossession of
the property from squatters, even if he agreed to
transfer the property to the Government, until
the transfer is consummated or the expropriation
case is filed.
Taking under
Taking under Police
Eminent Domain Power
Only private
All properties are subject
properties may be to taking
taken
The purpose of taking is
The private
to destroy the property
property is taken
because it is harmful or
in order to convert obnoxious to the public.
it to public use
TELEBAP, Inc. vs. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 1998,
the constitutionality of Sec. 92 of BP 881
(requiring radio and television station owners &
operators to give to the COMELEC radio &
television time free of charge) was challenged on
the ground that it violated the due process
clause and the eminent domain provision of the
Constitution by taking airtime from radio and
television broadcasting stations without payment
of justcompensation. The SC held that
all
broadcasting, whether by radio or by television
stations, is licensed by the government. Airwaves
frequencies have to be allocated as there are
more individuals who want to broadcast than
there frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a
privilege subject, among other things, to
amendment by Congress inaccordance with the
constitutional provision that any such franchise
or right granted x xx shall be subject to
amendment, alteration or repeal by the

Congress when the common good so requires

(Art. XII, Sec.11).
In the granting of the privilege to
operate broadcast stations and thereafter
supervising radio and television stations, the
State spends considerable public funds in
licensing & supervising such stations. It would be
strange if it cannot even require the licensees to
render public service by giving free airtime. x x x
As radio and televisionbroadcast stations do
not own the airwaves, no private property is
taken by the requirement that they provide
airtime to the COMELEC.
PPI vs. COMELEC

TELEBAP vs.
COMELEC
there was taking of
there was no taking of
property
private property
newspaper space is
airwaves are scarce
the private property of
resources, the use is
the newspaper owners
regulated by the State
print media do not
franchise (privilege) is
enjoy privilege
issued by the State
(Art. XII, Sec. 11)
Shifting argument alleged in TELEBAP: both PPI
and TELEBAP are media of communication &
information. Equal protection clause was raised
as an issue. The SC ruled that equal protection
clause does not guarantee absolute equality.
There may be classification. Persons or things
ostensibly similarly situated may, nonetheless,
be treated differently if there is a basis for valid
classification.
4. Public
usepublic
interest;
public
benefit;
public
welfare;
public
convenience (Reyes vs. NHA, G.R. No.
147511, January 20, 2003).
The general conceptmeeting public
need or public exigency; may include indirect
public benefit or advantage.
In Estate of Salud Jimenez vs. PEZA, 349
SCRA 240, public use is whatever may be
beneficially employed for the general welfare.
It has been broadened to include not only uses
directly available to the public but also those
which redound to their indirect benefit; that only
a few would actually benefit from the
expropriation of the property does not
necessarily diminish the essence & character of
public use. (Manosca vs. CA, 252 SCRA 412)
In Filstream Intl Inc. vs. CA, 284 SCRA 716,
the fact that the property is less than hectare
and that only a few could actually benefit from
the expropriation does not diminish its public use
character, inasmuch as public use now
includes the broader notion of indirect public
benefit or advantage, including, in particular,
urban land reform and housing.
By express legislative authority granted by
Congress in Sec. 19, RA 7160, LGUs may
expropriate private property for public use, or
purpose, or welfare, for the benefit of the poor
and the landless. Thus, in Moday vs. CA, 268
SCRA 568, the SC held that the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur was without
authority
to
disapprove Bunawan Municipal
Resolution No. 43-89 because, clearly, the
Municipality of Bunawan has authority to exercise
the power of eminent domain and its
Sanggguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate
the assailed resolution.

However, in the case of Municipacility of

Paraaque vs. V.M. Realty Corporation,
292 SCRA 676, the SC declared that there was
lack of compliance with Sec. 19 of RA 7160,
where the Municipal Mayor filed a complaint for
eminent domain over two (2) parcels of land
on the strength of the resolution passed by
the Sangguniang Bayan, because what is
required by law is an ordinance and not mere
resolution.
In
Francia,
Jr.
vs.
Municipality
of
Meycauayan, G.R. No. 170432, March 24,
2008, the Supreme Court held that the
determination of a public purpose for the
expropriated property is not a condition
precedent before a court may issue a writ of
possession. Once the requisite in Sec. 19 of the
Local Government Code are satisfied,
the issuance of the writ becomes a ministerial
matter for the court.
5. Just Compensationthe full and fair market
value of the property taken; it is the fair market
value of the property. It is settled that the
market value of the property is that sum of
money which a person, desirous but not
compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but not
compelled to sell, would agree on a price to be
given and received therefor.
Medium: money except: payment other
than
money
(Association
of
Small
Landowners vs. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, 175 SCRA 343), payment is allowed to
be made partly in bonds, because under the
CARP it deals with the revolutionary kind of
expropriation.
The determination of just compensation
in eminent domain cases is a judicial function
and factual findings of the CA are conclusive on
the parties and reviewable only when the case
falls
within
the
recognized
exceptions.
(NAPOCOR vs. San Pedro,Sept. 26, 2006)
Land Bank vs. CA (and DAR vs. CA), 249
SCRA 149Sec. 16(e), RA 6657the deposit of
compensation must be in cash or in Land
Bank bonds not in any other form, and certainly
not in a trust account.
Reckoning point of market value of the
property:
FMV at the date of:
a) filing of the complaint; or
b) the taking whichever is earlier.
Rules in Just Compensation-Rule 67, Sec. 6:
1. Determine the actual or basic value of the
property.
2. If entire property not expropriated:
Value
of
property-consequential
benefits+consequential
damages / (basic or actual)
(CB) +
(CD)
If consequential benefits exceed consequential
damages, CB and CD should be disregarded
because the BASIC VALUE of the property should
be paid in every case.
Basic/market valuethe price that may be
agreed upon by the parties willing but not
compelled to enter into a contract of sale.
Factors to be considered:
1. Cost of acquisition
2. Actual or potential uses
3. Current value of like properties

4. in particular case: size of lands, shape,

location & tax declaration
Consequential
damagesinjuries
directly
caused on the residue of the privateproperty
taken by reason of expropriation
Example: the property left is in odd shape or with
area virtually unusable
Consequential Benefitsthe remainder is, as a
result of the expropriation, placed in a better
location, such as fronting a street where it used
to be an interior lot.
Association of Small Landowners vs. DAR,
175 SCRA 343 (1989) the power of eminent
domain could be used as an implement of
police power. The expressed objective of the
law was the promotion of the welfare of the
farmers, which came clearly under the police
power of the state. To achieve this purpose, the
law provided for the expropriation
of
agricultural
lands
(subject
to
minimum
retention limits for the
landowners) to be distributed among the landless
peasantry.
DARAB
determines
just
compensation
(exception to the general rule that courts decide
the value)
DAR may make initial valuation; owner goes to
court if not satisfied.
Expropriation may be initiated by court action
or by legislation. In both instances, just
compensation is determined by the courts.
In
Republic
vs.
Salem
Investment
Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 137569, June
23, 2000, the Supreme Court held that it is only
upon payment of just compensation thattitle
over the property passes to the gov't.
Therefore, until the action for expropriation
has been completed & terminated, ownership
over the property being expropriated remains
with the registered owner. Consequently, the
latter can exercise all rights pertaining to an
owner, including the right to dispose of his
property, subject to the power of the State
ultimately to acquire it through expropriation.
The Dela Ramas make much of the fact that
ownership of the land was transferred to the
gov't because the equitable & the beneficial
title were already acquired by it in 1983, leaving
them with only the naked title. However, xxx the
recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the
property expropriated shall pass from the owner
to the expropriator only upon full payment of just
compensation.
Legal interest for expropriation cases6%
-from the time of taking until just compensation
is actually paid
-interest must be claimed, otherwise, it is
deemed waived
Title
to
the
property
shall
not
be
transferred until after actual payment of just
compensation is made to the owner.
Genuine Necessity
National legislationquestion of necessity is
POLITICAL; judiciary has no power to inquire.
Delegateliberally in favor of the private
property owner; judiciary can inquire into
whether the authority conferred upon such
delegate correctly and properly exercised/
whether expropriation contemplated by the
delegate necessary or wise.

May eminent domain be barred by res

judicata or law of the case?The principle
of res judicata, which finds application in
generally all cases and proceedings, cannot
bar the right of the State or its agents to
expropriate private property. The very nature
of eminent domain, as an inherent power of
the State, dictates that the right to exercise the
power be absolute and unfettered even by a prior
judgment or
res
judicata.
The scope of
eminent
domain
is
plenary and,
like
policepower, can reach every form of property
which the State might need for public use. All
separate interests of individuals in property are
held of the government under this tacit
agreement
or
implied
reservation.
Notwithstanding the grant to individuals, the
eminentdomain, the highest & most exact idea of
property, remains in the gov't, or inthe aggregate
body of the people in their sovereign capacity;
&they have the right toresume the possession of
the property whenever the public interest
requires it.
Thus,the State or its authorized
agents cannot be forever barred from exercising
said right byreason alone of previous noncompliance with any legal requirement.
While the principle of res judicata does
not denigrate the right of the State toexercise
eminent domain, it does not apply to specific
issues decided in a previouscase. For example, a
final judgment dismissing an expropriation suit
on the ground thatthere was no prior offer
precludes another suit raising the same issue;
it cannot,however, bar the State or its agent,
from thereafter complying with this requirement,
asprescribed by law, and subsequently exercising
its power of eminent domain over thesame
property.
[Municipality of Paraaque vs.
V.M. Realty Corp., 292 SCRA 678(1998)]
When may
the
property
owner
be
entitled
to
the
return
of
the
expropriated property in eminent domain
cases?
In Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs.
Villaroya, the unpaid landowners were allowed
the alternative remedy of recovery of the
property. The Court ruled that under ordinary
circumstances, immediate return to the owners
of the unpaid property is theobvious remedy.
However, in cases where land is taken for public
use, public interest must beconsidered. (Estate
of Salud Jimenez vs. PEZA, 349 SCRA 240)
Right of landowner in case of non-payment
of just compensationas a rule, it does not
entitle the landowners to recover possession of
the expropriated lots, but onlyto demand
payment of the fair market value of the property.
(Republic vs. CA, G.R.No. 146587, July 2,
2002; Reyes vs. NHA, G.R. No. 147511,
January 20, 2003).
However, in RP vs. Vicente Lim, G.R. No.
161656, June 29, 2005, the SC saidthat the
facts of the case do not justify the application of
the rule. In this case, theRepublic was ordered to
pay just compensation twice; the first was in
the expropriationproceedings, and the second,
in the action for recovery of possession. Fiftyseven (57)years have passed since then. The
Court construed the Republics failure to pay
justcompensation as a deliberate refusal on its
part. Under such circumstances, recovery

ofpossession is in order. It was then held that

where
the
government
failed
to
pay
justcompensation within 5 years from the
finality
of
the
judgment
in
the
expropriationproceedings, the owners concerned
shall have the right to recover possession of their
property.
Plaintiffs right to dismiss the complaint in
Eminent Domain
In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as
the plaintiffs matter-of-right to dismiss the
complaint, precisely because the landowner
may have already suffereddamages at the start
of the taking. The plaintiffs right to dismiss the
complaint hasalways been subject to court
approval and to certain conditions. (NAPOCOR
& Pobrevs. CA, G.R. No. 106804, August 12,
2004)
Right to repurchase or re-acquire the
property
The property owners right to repurchase the
property depends upon the character of the
title acquired by the expropriator, e.g., if the land
is expropriated for aparticular purpose with a
condition that when the purpose is ended or
abandoned, the property shall revert to the
former owner, then the former owner can reacquire the property. In this case, the terms of
the judgment in the expropriation case were
veryclear and unequivocal, granting title to the
lot in fee simple to the Republic. No condition on
the
right
to
repurchase
was
imposed.
(Mactan-Cebu
International
Airport
Authority vs. CA, G.R. No. 139495,
Novermber 27, 2000)
Republic vs. CA, G.R. No. 146587, July 2,
2002, in arguing for the return of their property
on the basis of non-payment, respondents
ignored the fact that the right of the
expropriatory authority is far from that of an
unpaid seller in ordinary sales to which the
remedy is rescission may perhaps apply.
Expropriation is an in rem proceeding, and after
condemnation, the paramount title is in the
public under a new & independent title.
POWER OF TAXATION
-The power to demand from the members
ofsociety their proportionate share/contribution
in the maintenance of the government.
-It is the power by which the State raises
revenue to defray the necessary expenses of
the Government.
Scope: covers persons, property or occupation
to be taxed within the taxing jurisdiction. It is so
pervasive; it reaches even the citizens abroad
and their income outside the Philippines; all the
income earned in the Philippines by a citizen or
alien.
Basis: power emanating from necessity
(lifeblood doctrine)
Importance of Taxation:
1. No constitutional government can exist
without it;
2. It is one great power upon which the whole
national fabric is based;
3. It is necessary for the existence and prosperity
of the nation; and
4. It is the lifeblood of the nation.

Who may exercise? Generally, the legislature,

but also upon valid delegation:
1. Lawmaking bodies of LGUs (Sec. 5, Art. X);
2. President (limited extent-delegated tariff
powers), under Sec. 28 (2), Art. VI of the
Constitution or as an incident of emergency
powers that Congress may grant to him under
Sec. 23 (2), art. VI.
Purpose: unavoidable obligation of the
government to protect the people and extend
them benefits in the form of public projects and
services.
Public purposeproceeds must be devoted to
public use. It includes INDIRECT public
advantage/benefits. The mere fact that the tax
will be directly enjoyed by private individual
does not make it INVALID so long as the same
link to public welfare is established.
Requisites:
1. It must be for public purpose;
2. It shall be uniform;
3. Person or property taxed shall be within the
jurisdiction of the taxing authority;
4. In assessment & collection, notice and hearing
shall be provided.
Limitations on the Power of Taxation
Inherent limitations:
1. Public purpose;
2. Non-delegability of power;
3. Territoriality or Situs of taxation;
4. Exemption of government from taxation;
5. International comitygenerally accepted
principles of international law
Constitutional limitations:
1. Due process of lawtax should not be
confiscatory.
Due process does not require previous
notice and hearing before a law prescribing
fixed/specific taxes on certain articles may be
enacted.
If the tax to be collected is to be based on the
value of the taxable propertyad valorem tax
the taxpayer is entitled to be notified of the
assessment proceeding and to be heard on the
correct valuation.
2. Equal protection of lawtaxes should be
uniform and equitable.
3. Uniformitypersons/things belonging to the
same class shall be taxed at the same rate
Equitabilitytaxes should be apportioned among
the people according to their capacity to pay
Progressivity
4. Non-impairment of contracts
5. Non-imprisonment for non-payment of poll tax
6. Revenue and tariff bills must originate in the
HOR
7. Non-infringement of religious freedom
8. Delegation of legislative authority to the
President to fix tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues
9. Tax exemption of properties actually, directly
and exclusively used for religious, charitable and
educational purposes
10.Majority vote of all the members of Congress
required in case of legislative grant of tax
exemptions
11.Non-impairment of the SCs jurisdiction in tax
cases
12.Tax exemption of revenues and assets of,
including grants, endowments, donations, or
contributions to, educational institutions.
Double taxationadditional taxes are laid:
1. On the same subject;

2. By the same taxing authority;

3. During the same taxing period; and
4. For the same purpose.
Double taxation is allowed by law. However, it
will not be allowed if the same will result in
violation of the equal protection clause. What is
prohibited is direct double taxation.
In Punzalan vs. Municipal Board of Manila,
95 Phil. 46, there is no double taxation if one
tax is imposed by the LGU and the other by the
National Government.
Taxesthe enforced proportional contributions
from persons and property levied by the State by
virtue of its sovereignty for the support of the
government and for all public needs.
TAX
LICENSE
1. AS TO BASIS
Power of taxationto
Police powerto
raise revenue
regulate
2. AS TO
LIMITATION
Rate or amount to be
collected is unlimited
provided it is not
confiscatory
3. AS TO OBJECT
Imposed on
persons/property
4. AS TO EFFECT
OF NON-PAYMENT
Business or activity
does not become
illegal

Amount is limited to
cost of: a)issuing the
license; and
b)necessary
inspection of police
surveillance
Paid for privilege of
doing something but
privilege is revocable
Business becomes
illegal

Tax
Debt
due to the
due to the
government in its
government in its
sovereign capacity
corporate capacity
Taxes cannot be subject to off-setting or
compensation for the simple reason that the
government and the taxpayers are not creditors
and debtors of each other. (Philex Mining
Corp. vs. CIR, 294 SCRA 687)
Tax exemptions:
-discretion of the legislature
1. Sec. 28 (4), Art. VI
2. Sec. 28 (3), Art. VI
3. Sec. 4 (3), Art. XIV
4. Sec. 4 (4), Art. XIV
5. Where tax exemption is granted gratuitously,
it may be revoked at will; but not if granted for
a valuable considerationdeemed to partake
of the nature of contract and obligation thereof
protection against impairment.
In Lladoc vs. CIR, 14 SCRA 292, a parish priest
accepted a donation to be used for
the
construction of a church. The money was
spent for the purpose. The CIR imposed tax.
The objection was based on
constitutional
exemption of church properties from taxes. The
SC rejected. Exemption referred only to property
taxes
imposed
on
lands,
buildings
&
improvements used for religious purposes. The
tax in this case is not an ad valorem tax on the
church itself but an excise tax imposed on the
priest (not on the properties) for his exercise of
the privilege to accept the donation.
Territoriality in Taxationthe power to tax
operates only within the territorial jurisdiction
of the taxing authority. It cannot be exercised
beyond the boundaries except under certain
circumstances.

Taxable Situs of Real Propertiesthe place

where they are situated
Mobilia Sequntur Personamthe intangible
personal property such as credits, bank deposits,
bonds, corporate stocks which do not admit of
actual location and do not have inherent value
but mere evidence of debts or property are
usually taxable in the state ofresidence of the
owner.
Uniformity in Taxationall taxable articles, or
kinds of property of the same class,shall be taxed
at the same rate. There is uniformity when a tax
operates in taxation withthe same force& effect
on its subject wherever found.
Equality of Taxationtaxes shall be strictly
proportional to the relative value of thetaxable
property
.

Article IIIBILL OF RIGHTS

Significance.
Government is
powerful.
When limited, it becomes tyrannical. It is
aguarantee that there are certain areas of
persons
life,
liberty
or
property
whichgovernment power may not touch.
All the powers of the government (police
power, power of eminent domain and power of
taxation) are limited by the Bill of Rights.
Classification of Rights:
1. Political Rightsgranted by law to
members of a community in relation to their
direct or indirect participation in the
establishment
or
administration
of
government.
2. Civil Rightsrights which municipal law
will enforce at the instance of private
individuals for the purpose of securing them
the enjoyment of their means of happiness.
3. Social and Economic Rightsthese are
the
rights
which
generally
require
implementing legislation. (Article XIII)
Doctrine
of
Preferred
Freedom
(Hierarchy of Rights)some rights are
preferred
PBM Employees Org. vs. PBM Co., Inc., 51
SCRA 189
While the Bill of Rights also protects property
rights, the primacy of human rights over
property is recognized. Because these
freedoms are delicate & vulnerable, as well
as supremely precious in our society and
the
threat
ofsanctions may deter their
exercise almost as potently as the actual
application ofsanctions,
they
need
breathing space to survive, permitting
governmentregulation only with narrow
specificity.
Property and property rights can be lost thru
prescription;
but
human
rights
areimprescriptible.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of
free expression and of assemblyoccupy a
preferred position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of ourcivil and
political institutions; and such priority gives
these liberties the sanctity and thesanction not
permitting dubious intrusions.

The superiority of these freedoms over

property rights is underscored by the factthat
a mere reasonable or rational relation
between the means employed by thelaw and
its object or purposethat the law is neither
arbitrary nor discriminatorynor oppressive
would suffice to validate a law which
restricts or impairsproperty rights.
On the other hand, a constitutional or valid
infringement of human rights requires amore
stringent criterion, namely existence of a
grave
and
immediate
danger
of
asubstantive evil which the State has the right
to prevent.
Sec. 1, Art. III
No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process
of law nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws.
LIMITATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY -Inherent in
sovereignty, & therefore not even required to
be conferred by the Constitution, are the
police, eminent domain, & taxation powers.
The Bill of Rights, notably the due process,
equal protection & non-impairment clauses, is
a means of limiting the exercise of these
powers by imposing on the State the
obligation to protectindividual rights. The Bill
of Rights is addressed to the State, notably the
government, telling it what it cannot do to the
individual.
A. DUE PROCESS OF LAW or LAW OF THE
LAND
That which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment
only after trial.
Applies to all persons, without regard to any
difference in race, color or nationality
Artificial personscovered but only insofar as
their property is concerned.
Extends to aliens
Includes the means of livelihood
Responsiveness to the supremacy of reason,
obedience to the dictates of justice.(ErmitaMalate
Hotel
&
Motel
Operators
Association vs. City of Manila, 20 SCRA
849
Lifeincludes the right of an individual to his
body
in
its
completeness,
free
from
dismemberment, & extends to the use of
God-given
faculties
which
make
life
enjoyable.
Libertyincludes the right to exist and the
right to be free from arbitrary personal
restraint or servitude. x x x It includes the
right of the citizen to be free to use his
faculties in all lawful ways. (Rubi vs.
Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil 660)
Propertyis anything that come under the
right of ownership and be the subject of
contract. It represents more than the things a
person owns; it includes the right to secure,
use and dispose of them.
Public office is not a property which one
may
acquire
a
vested
right,
it
is
nevertheless a protected right. (Bince vs.
COMELEC, 218 SCRA 782)

Scope/Aspects of Due Process:

1. Procedural Due Process the method or
manner by which the law is enforced.It serve
as a restriction on actions of judicial and quasijudicial agencies of the government.
Requisites: (non-criminal cases)
a. An impartial court or tribunal clothed
with judicial power to hear &
determine matter before it;
b. Jurisdiction properly
acquired
over
person of defendant & overproperty which is
the subject matter of the proceeding;
c. Opportunity to be heard; &
d. Judgment rendered upon lawful hearing
and based on evidenceadduced.
Impartial Court or TribunalJudges must
not only be impartial but must also appear to
be impartial as an added assurance to the
parties that his decision will be just.
In Anzaldo vs. ClaveJacobo Clave, acting
as Chairman of CSC, rendered a decision
against petitioner. When petitioner appealed to
the Office of the President, the same Jacobo
Clave, but this time acting as Presidential
Executive Assistant, upheld his own earlier
decision. The SC held that this violates
fundamental fairness required by due process.
A public officer who decided the case should
not be the same person todecide it on appeal
because he cannot be an impartial judge.
People vs. Mendenilla (2001), judges have
as much interest as counsel in the orderly and
expeditious presentation of evidence, and
have the duty to ask questions that would
elicit the facts on the issues involved,
clarify ambiguous remarks by witnesses and
address the points overlooked by counsel.
Questions which merely clear up dubious
points and elicit relevant evidence arewithin
the prerogative of a judge to ask.
Sec. 14 (1), Art. IIINo person shall be
held to answer for a criminal offensewithout
due process of law. ---This is procedural due
process in criminal cases
Requisites of Criminal Due Process:
a. Accused has been heard in a court of
competent jurisdiction;
b. Accused is proceeded against under the
orderly processes of law;
c. Accused is given notice and opportunity to
be heard;
d. Judgment rendered within authority of
constitutional law
If the prosecution produces the conviction
based on untrue evidence, then it is guiltyof
depriving the accused of due process. Thus
false testimony can
be questioned by the
accused regardless of the time that lapsed.
(Mejia vs. Pamaran, No. L-56741, April
15, 1988)
2. Substantive Due Process it requires
that
the
law
itself,
not
merely
theprocedures by which the law would be
enforced, is fair, reasonable and just.This
serves as a restriction on the governments
law and rule-making powers; a prohibition of
arbitrary laws.

The heart to substantive due process is the

reasonableness, or the absenceof exercise
of
arbitrary power. These are necessarily
relative
concepts whichdepend on the
circumstances of every case.
As a general rule, when the State acts to
interfere with life, liberty, or property,the
presumption is that the action is valid. In rare
cases, as in prior restraint,there is a
presumption of invalidity.
Requisites:
a. Interest of the public;
b. Means employed are reasonably necessary
for accomplishment of purpose and not unduly
oppressive.
The legislature may not, under the guise of
protecting the public interest, arbitrarily
interfere with private business or impose
unusual and unnecessaryrestrictions upon
lawful occupations.
Void-for-vagueness
Rulea
criminal
statute
that fails to give a person
ofordinary intelligence fair notice that his
contemplated conduct is forbidden by
thestatute, or is so indefinite that it
encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and
convictionsis
void for
vagueness. The
constitutional vice in a vague or indefinite
statute is the
injustice to the accused in placing him on trial
for an offense, the nature of which he isgiven
no fair warning.
A law is vague as not to satisfy the due
process
need
for
notice
when
it
lackscomprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess
asto its
meaning & differ
as to its
application or is so indefinite that it
encouragesarbitrary & erratic arrests &
convictions.
It is injustice to the accused in placing him on
trial for an offense, the nature ofwhich he is
given no fair warning.
It is repugnant to the Constitution in 2
aspects:
1. It violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it,
fair notice of the conduct to avoid; &
2. It leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion
in carrying out its provisions & become an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
The act must be utterly vague on its face, that
is to say, it cannot be clarified by either
saving clause or by construction. (People vs.
Dela Piedra, 350 SCRA 163, January 24,
2001)
Overbreadth Doctrinedecrees that a
governmental purpose may not be achieved
by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly
and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms.
Facial Challengea facial challenge is
allowed to be made to a vague statute & to
one which is overbroad because of possible
chilling effect upon protectedspeech.

On its face invalidation of statutes results in

striking them down entirely on theground that
they might be applied to parties not before the
Court whose activities areconstitutionally
protected. It constitutes a departure from
the case and controversyrequirement of the
Constitution and permits decisions to be
made without concretefactual settings and in
sterile abstract contexts.
Tanada
vs.
Tuvera, 146
SCRA 446
(1986),Motion for reconsideration.
[T]he clause "unless it is otherwise provided"
refers to the date of effectivity and not tothe
requirement of publication itself, w/c cannot in
any event be omitted. This clausedoes not
mean that the legislature may make the
law effective immediately uponapproval, or
on any other date, w/o its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case,
but the legislature may in its discretionprovide
that the usual 15-day period shall be
shortened or extended.
It is not correct to say that under
the
disputed
clause
publication
may
bedispensed w/ altogether. The reason is that
such omission would offend due processinsofar
as it would deny the public knowledge of the
laws that are supposed to governit.
Conclusive presumption of knowledge of
the
law.--The
conclusive
presumption
thatevery
person
knows
the
law
presupposes
that
the
law has
been
published if thepresumption is to have any
legal justification at all.
The term laws should refer to all
laws
and
not
only
to
those
of
generalapplication, for strictly speaking all
laws relate to the people in general albeit
there aresome that do not apply to them
directly.
An example is a law granting
citizenship to aparticular individual, like a
relative of Pres. Marcos who was decreed
instant naturalization.
RULE:All statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shallbe published
as a condition for their effectivity, w/c shall
begin 15 days after publicationunless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
Coverage:Covered by this rule are PDs and
EOs promulgated by the Pres. inthe exercise of
legislative powers. Administrative rules and
regulations must also bepublished if
their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing
law pursuant to a validdelegation.
Interpretative regulations & those
merely internal in nature, i.e., regulating only
the personnel of the administrative agency &
not the public, need not be published. Neither
is publication required of the so-called
letters
of
instructions
issued
by
administrative
superiors
concerning
the
rules or guidelines to be followed by
theirsubordinates in the performance of their
duties.
Publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all since its purpose isto inform
the public of the contents of the laws. The
mere mention of the numberof the PD, the

title of such decree, its whereabouts, the

supposed date ofeffectivity, & in a mere
supplement of the OG cannot satisfy the
publicationrequirement.
This is not even
substantial compliance.
Publication of laws is part of substantive
due process. It is imperative to the validity
oflaws, PDs, EOs, Administrative rules and
regulations except interpretative legislations.
(Taada
vs.
Tuvera,
No.
L-63915,
December 29, 1986)
Notes: In the original case Tanada vs.
Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985), the SC ruled
that as a matter of substantive due process,
any law must be published before the people
can beexpected to observe them.
But,
according to a split decision, publication need
not be madein the Official Gazette.
It is
enough that it be published in a newspaper of
general circulation.
After the EDSA revolution, upon
the
reconstitution
of
the
SC,
the
originaljudgment was reconsidered, & the
SC now ruled that publication must be made
in theOfficial Gazette, pursuant to CA 638 and
the Civil
Code, unless a law "provides
otherwise" that is, a different mode of
publication.
What must be published are(1) all
laws of general application, and even those
not ofgeneral application like (2) private laws
affecting only particular
individuals, e.g.,
legislativegrant of citizenship, (3) laws of
local
application,
and
(4)
rules
and
regulations of a
substantive character. This means not only
the title but the entire law. When? Forthwith,
that is, immediately. Where? Only in the
Official Gazette
Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion (2000), an
extraditee is not entitled to notice &hearing
during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process. PD 1069 affords
anextraditee
sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence
against him once the petition isfiled in court.
During the evaluation stage, right to know is
withheld to accommodate themore compelling
interest of the Stateto prevent escape of
potential extradite whichmay be precipitated
by premature information on the basis of the
request for extradition.Roxas vs. Vasquez
(2001), lack of notice to, participation of
complainants at theREINVESTIGATION does
not render the resolution of the Ombudsman
null and void.(But in preliminary investigation,
their participation is needed.)
Exceptions
to
Notice
and
Hearing
Requirements
Philcomsat vs. Alcuaz (1989)without
conducting
any
hearing,
NTC
orderedPHILCOMSAT to reduce its rates by
15%. PHILCOMSAT challenged the validity of
theorder on the ground that it is an exercise of
a quasi-judicial power without the required
hearing. NTC replied that the order was merely
interlocutory. The SC held that fixing rates is
quasi-judicial in nature. Hence, unlike in the
exercise of quasi-legislative power, it must be

preceded by a hearing. The fact of the order

being merely interlocutory does not alter the
situation because for all practical purposes
it is final as to the period covered.
BUT, in Radio Communications vs. NTC
(1990)the Court upheld the temporary
rates granted by the NTC asserting that the
law allows the NTC to approve temporaryrate
requested by public service agency provided
hearings are held within 30 daysthereafter.
As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the
fundamental requirements of proceduraldue
process,
are essential
only
when an
administrative
body
exercises
its
QUASIJUDICIALfunction.
In the exercise of its EXECUTIVE or
LEGISLATIVE functions, such as issuing rules
&regulations, an administrative body need
not comply with the requirements of notice
&hearing.
Suntay vs. People (1957)the passport of a
person sought for the commission of acrime
may be cancelled without notice and hearing.
Equitable Banking Corp. vs. Calderon,
G.R. No. 156168, December 14, 2004, the
Scruled that no malice or bad faith attended
the Banks dishonor of Calderons credit
card,inasmuch as the dishonor was justified
under its Credit Card Agreement which
providedthat the cardholder agreed not to
exceed his approved credit limit, otherwise the
cardprivilege
would
be
automatically
suspended without notice to the cardholder.
Appeal and due processAppeal is not a
natural right nor is it a part of due process;
generally, it may beallowed or denied by the
legislature in its discretion. But where the
Constitution gives aperson the right to appeal,
denial of the right to appeal constitutes a
violation of dueprocess. Where there is
statutory grant of the right to appeal, denial of
that remedy alsoconstitutes a denial of due
process.
Preliminary
Investigation
and
due
processPreliminary investigation is not a
constitutional
right,
but
is
merely
a
rightconferred by statute
(Serapio vs.
Sandiganbayan,
G.R.
No.
148468,
January 28, 2003).
It may be waived
expressly or by failure to invoke it
(Benedicto vs. CA, G.R.No. 125359,
September 4, 2001). The right may be
forfeited by inaction, and cannot beinvoked for
the first time on appeal (People vs. Lagao,
G.R. No. 118457, April 8,1997).
Go vs. CA, 206 SCRA 138, when there is
statutory grant of the right topreliminary
investigation, denial of the same is an
infringement of the due processclause. The
right
to
preliminary
investigation
is
substantive, not merely formal or technical.
To deny it to the petitioner would deprive him
of the full measure of his right todue process.
(Yusop vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
138859-60, February 22, 2001)
Prejudicial PublicityTo warrant a finding of
prejudicial publicity there must be allegation

and proof that the judges have been unduly

influenced, not simply that they might be, by
the barrage of publicity. Petitioners cannot just
rely on the subliminal effects of publicity
because these are basically unbeknown and
beyond knowing. (Webb vs. De Leon, 1995)
Does the due process clause encompass
the right to be assisted by counsel during
an administrative inquiry?
No. The right to counsel, which cannot be
waived unless the waiver is in writing & in the
presence of counsel, is a right afforded a
suspect or an accused during custodial
investigation. It is not an absolute right and
may,
thus,
be invoked or rejected in a
criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in
an administrative inquiry.
While
investigations
conducted
by
an
administrative body may at times be akin to a
criminal proceeding, the fact remains that
under existing laws, a party in an
administrative inquiry may or may not be
assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature
of charges and of the respondents capacity to
represent himself, and no duty rests onsuch
body to furnish the person being investigated
with counsel. In an administrative proceeding,
a respondent has the option of engaging the
services of counsel or not. Thus, the right to
counsel is not imperative in administrative
investigations
because such inquiries are
conducted merely to determine whether there
are facts that merit disciplinary measures
against erring public officers and employees,
with the purpose of maintain the dignity of
government service.
The right to counsel is not indispensable to
due
process
unless
required
by
the
Constitution or law. (Lumiqued vs. Exevea,
282 SCRA 125)
Is an extraditee entitled to notice and
hearing before the issuance of a warrant
of arrest once the petition for extradition
is filed in court?
Both on statutory and constitutional grounds,
the answer is no. In Government of USA
vs. Hon. Puruganan, G.R. No. 148571,
September 24, 2002:
1. On the basis of Extradition Law
Sec. 6 of PD 1069Extradition Law, uses the
word immediate to qualify the arrest of the
accused. This qualification would be rendered
nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of
the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending
notices to the opposing parties, receiving facts
and arguments from them, and giving them
time to prepare and present such facts and
arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing
can no longer be considered immediate.
The law could not haveintended the word
as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as
a means ofimpairing a sense of urgency and
swiftness in the determination of whether
awarrant or arrest should be issued.
By using the phrase if it appears, the law
further conveys that accuracy is notas
important as speed at such an early stage. The

trial court is not expected tomake an

exhaustive determination to ferret out the
true and actual situation,immediately upon
the filing of the petition. From the knowledge
and the materialthen available to it, the court
is expected merely to get a good first
impressionaprima facie findingsufficient to
make a speedy initial determination as
regardsthe arrest and detention of the
accused.
2. On the basis of the Constitution
Even Sec. 2 of Article III does not require a
notice and hearing before theissuance of a
warrant of arrest.
To determine probable cause for the issuance
of arrest warrants, the Constitutionitself
requires only examination--under oath or
affirmationof complainants &the witnesses
they may produce. There is no requirement to
notify & hear theaccused before the issuance
of warrant of arrest.
B. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
The equal protection of the law is embraced in
the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of
justice and fair play. It hasnonetheless been
embodied in a separate clause in Section 1 of
Article III to provide fora more specific
guaranty
against
any form of
undue
favoritism or hostility from thegovernment.
Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on
the basis of the due
processclause. But if the particular act
assailed
partakes
of
an
unwarranted
partiality orprejudice, the sharper weapon to
cut it down is the equal protection clause.
It simply requires that all persons or things,
similarly situated should be treatedalike, both
as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. Similar subjects, in otherwords,
should not be treated differently, so as to give
undue favor to some and unjustlydiscriminate
against others.
It does not require the universal application
of the laws on all persons or thingswithout
distinction. This might in fact sometimes result
in unequal protection, as where,for example, a
law prohibiting mature books to all persons,
regardless of age, wouldbenefit the morals of
the youth but violate the liberty of adults.
What the clause requiresis equality among
equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Byclassification is meant the
grouping of persons or things similar to each
other in certainparticulars and different from
all others in these same particulars.
(Philippine JudgesAssociation vs. Prado,
227 SCRA 703)
Who are protectedall persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to rights conferred &
responsibilities
imposed. Natural and juridical persons are
entitled to this guarantee; but with respect
to
artificial
persons,
they
enjoy
the
protection only insofar as their property is
concerned.
Scope:
Political, Economic and Social Equality

Art. XIII, Secs. 1&2 (social justice)

political & economic
Section
1The
Congress
shall
give
highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect & enhance the right of
all the people to human dignity, reducesocial,
economic, & political inequalities, and remove
cultural inequities by equitably diffusing
wealth & political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the
acquisition, ownership, use, &disposition of
property and its increments.
Section 2The promotion of social justice
shall include the commitment tocreate
economic opportunities based on freedom of
initiative and self-reliance.
Art. XIII, Sec. 3 (protection to labor)
Article XII, Section 10 (nationalization of
business)
FILIPINO
FIRST
POLICY
TheCongress shall, upon recommendation of
the economic & planning agency, when
thenational interest dictates,
reserve to
citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum (60%) of
whose capital is owned by such citizens, or
such higher percentage as Congress may
prescribe, certain areas of investments.
The Congress shall enact measures that will
encourage the formation and operation
ofenterprises whose capital is wholly owned by
Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, & concessions
covering the national economy& patrimony,
the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos.The State shall regulate and exercise
authority over foreign investments withinits
national jurisdiction and in accordance with its
national goals and priorities.
Art. XII, Sec. 2(2) (reservation of marine
resources)economic
The State shall protect the nations marine
wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial
sea, and exclusive economic zone, and
reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively
toFilipino citizens.
Art. III, Sec. 11 (free access to the courts)
political & economic
Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial
bodies and adequate legal assistance shall
not be denied to any person by reason of
poverty.
Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5) (legal aid to the
poor)xxx Promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law,
the IBP, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, & shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts
and
quasi-judicial
bodies
shall
remain
effective
unless
disapproved
by
theSupreme Court.

Art.
IX-C,
Sec.
10
(protection
of
candidates)political
Bona fide candidates for any public office shall
be free from any form of harassment and
discrimination.
Art. II, Sec. 26 (public service)The
State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service, and prohibit
political dynasties as may be defined by law.
Art. II, Sec. 14 (equality of women and
men)The State recognizes the role of
women in nation-building, and shall ensure
the fundamental equality before the law
ofwomen and men.
There are areas of economic activity which
can be limited to Filipinos. TheConstitution
itself acknowledges this in various places exploitation of marine wealth(Article XII,
Section 2, paragraph 2), certain areas of
investment (Article XII, Section 10),to name a
few.
In Ichong v. Hernandez, 201 Phil.
1155 (1937), the SC upheld the validity of
the law which nationalized the retail trade.
For the protection of the law can be
observed by the national interest.
But there are areas where aliens cannot be
kept away for the simple reason that they
cannot be deprived of a common means of
livelihood, especially when they are admitted
to the country as immigrants.
Valid Classification:
Persons
or
things
ostensibly
similarly
situated
may, nonetheless, be treated
differently if there is a basis for valid
classification.
The requisites are:
1. Classification must be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences;
2. The distinction must be germane to the
purpose of the lawthe distinctions whichare
the bases for the classification should have a
reasonable relation to the purpose of the law;
3. Not limited to existing conditions only; and
4. It must apply to all members of the same
class.
Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado,
227
SCRA
703,
The
withdrawal
of
frankingprivileges formerly granted to the
judiciary but remained with the executive
andlegislative departments, was declared
unconstitutional, because the three branches
ofgovernment are similarly situated.
Villegas vs. Hui Chiong, the ordinance
imposing a work permit fee of P50.00 upon
allaliens desirous of obtaining employment
in
the
City
of
Manila
was
declaredunconstitutional,
because the fee
imposed was unreasonable & excessive, &
itfailed
to
consider
valid
substantial
differences in situation among individual
aliens whowere required to pay it.

Sexual Discrimination
Phil. Association of Service Exporters vs.
Drilon,
163
SCRA
386,
female
domesticworking abroad were in a class by
themselves because of the special risks to
whichtheir class was exposed.
Administration of Justice
Chavez vs. PCGG, G.R. No. 130716,
December 9, 1988, Special grant of
exemption infavor of the Marcoses as
contained in the agreement entered into by
PCGG withMarcos Family to compromise the
ill-gotten wealth cases (exempt from all
taxes) filedby the former against the latter
is a CLASS LEGISLATION, vilative of the
equalprotection clause.
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
128096, January 20, 1999, petitioners
andintervenors right to equal protection was
not violated by the enactment of RA
8249because the law was not directed only to
Kuratong
Baleleng
cases.
Every
classificationmade by law is
presumed
reasonable, and the party who challenges the
law mustpresent proof of arbitrariness.
Public Policy
Ceniza vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 763, The
law excluding residents of Mandaue Cityfrom
voting for provincial candidates was justified
as a matter of legislative discretionand that
equal protection would be violated only if
group within the city were allowed tovote
while others were not.
Olivares vs. Sandiganbayan, 248 SCRA
700, when the mayor issued permit in favor of
unidentified vendors while imposing numerous
requirements
upon
Baclaran
Credit
Cooperatives, he violated the equal protection
clause when failed to show that the two were
not similarly situated.
Tiu vs. CA, G.R. No. 127410, January 20,
1999, the executive order granting tax &
duty
incentives
only
to
business
&
residents within the secured area of
Subic Special Economic Zone and denying
them to those who live within the zone but
outside such fenced in territory is VALID.
The Constitution does not require absolute
equality among residents. It is enough that all
persons under like circumstances or conditions
are given the same privileges & required to
follow the same obligations.
Classification based on valid and reasonable
standards
does
not
violate
the equal
protection clause.
International
School Alliance of
Educators vs.
Quisumbing,
G.R. No.
128845,June 1, 2000, there were no
reasonable distinctions between the services
rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires
as to justify the disparity in salaries paid
to those teachers.
Relative Constitutionality:

Central Bank Employees Association vs.

BSP, G.R. No. 148208,
December 15,
2004, the constitutionality of a statute
cannot, in every instance, be determined by a
mere comparison of its provisions of the
Constitution since the statute may be
constitutionally valid as applied to one set of
facts and invalid in application to another.
A statute valid at one time may become
void at another time because of altered
circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its
practical operation becomes arbitrary or
confiscatory,
its
validity,
even though
affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to
inquiry and investigation in the light of
changed conditions.
In
Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392
(1980), the SC upheld the validity of sec. 4 of
Batas Blg. 52 disqualifying retired elective
local officials who have received retirement
benefits and would have been 65 years old at
the start of the term. It does not violate equal
protection, for it gives younger blood the
opportunity to run the local government.
In Igot v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980),
however, the disqualification of candidates
convicted or simply charged with national
security offenses was struck down as
unconstitutional,
for
violating
the
presumption
of
innocence
and thus
ultimately the equal political protection.
Sec. 2, Article III
Searches and Seizures
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.
Scope: The protection is available to all
persons, including aliens, whether accused of
crime or not. Artificial persons are also entitled
to the guarantee, although they may be
required to open their books of accounts for
examination by the State in the exercise of
police and taxing powers.
The right is personal; it may be invoked
only by the person entitled to it (Stonehill
vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383). As such, the
right may be waived either expressly or
impliedly, but the waiver must be made by
the person whose right is invaded, not by one
who is not duly authorized to effect such
waiver. (People vs. Damaso, 212 SCRA
457)
SEARCH
WARRANTmay be
particularly describe the things to
when the description therein is as
the circumstances will ordinarily
when the description expresses a

said to
be seized
specific as
allow; or
conclusion

of fact, not of law, by which the warrant officer

may be guided in making the search and
seizure; or when the things described are
limited to those which bear direct relation to
the offense for which the warrant is being
issued.
WARRANT OFARRESTsaid to particularly
describe the person to be seized if it
contains the name of the person to be
arrested.
Requisites of a valid warrant:
1. It must be based upon probable cause
such facts and circumstances antecedent
to the issuance of the warrant that in
themselves are sufficient to induce a cautious
man to rely on them & act in pursuance
thereof.
It consists of a reasonable ground of
suspicion
supported
by
circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man in believing accused to be
committing the offense or to be guilty of the
offense.
For a search warrantsuch facts and
circumstances
which
would
lead
a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed
and that the objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place sought tobe
searched. (Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133
SCRA 800)
For a warrant of arrestsuch facts
and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested (Webb vs. De Leon,
G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995)
In Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 385
(1967), 42 search warrants were issued for
alleged violation of Central Bank Laws, the
Tariff and Customs Code, the NIRC, and the
Revised Penal Code. The SC voided the
warrants on the ground that it was
impossible for the judge to have found
probable cause in view of the number of laws
alleged to have been violated by the
petitioner. How could he even know what
particular provision of each law had been
violated? If he did not know this, how could it
be determined if the person against whom the
warrant was issued was probably guilty
thereof?
In truth, this was a fishing
expedition, which violated the sanctity of
domicile and privacy of communications. To
establish the requirement of probable cause,
therule is: One crime, one warrant.
2. The probable cause must be determined
personally by the judge. The judge shall:
a. Personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documentssubmitted by the public
prosecutor regarding
the
existence of
probablecause and on the basis thereof, issue
a warrant of arrest; or
b. If the basis thereof he finds no probable
cause, he may disregard theprosecutors
report and require the submission of
supporting affidavitsof witnesses to aid him in

arriving at a conclusion as to the existence

ofprobable cause.
Under the 1987 Constitution, only a judge
can issue a warrant; the offensive & much
abused phrase "& other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law" in the 1973
Constitution has been removed.

Likewise, in Corro v. Lising, 137 SCRA 541

(1985), the testimony based on investigation
reports that certain items in the Philippine
Times were subversive were held to be not
personal knowledge, and thus the search
warrant issued was not valid.

Search warrant
The judge must
personall examined in
the form of
searching Q&As,
inwriting & under
oath, the
complainant& any
witnesses he may
produce onfacts
personally known to
them.

Warrant of arrest
It is not necessary
that the judgeshould
personally examined
thecomplainant & his
witnesses; thejudge
would simply personally
review the initial
determination of
theprosecutor to see if it
is supported substantial
evidence.

4. It must particularly describe the place to be

searched and the persons or things to be
seized.

The determination
of
probable
causedepends to a
large extent upon
thefinding or opinion
of the judge who
conducted
the
required
examinationthe
applicant
and
the
witnesses.

Judge determines the

probability,
notthe
certainty, of the and, in
so doing, guilt of the
accused,and
in so
doing, he need not
conduct a de novo
hearing.

3. The determination must be made after

examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may
produce.The examination conducted by the
judge takes the form of searching questions.
The requirement that the judge must
personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses means that the actual examination
cannot be delegated to someone else, like the
clerk of court.
So said the Court in Bache and Co.
(Phil) v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 (1971). In this
case, when the BIR agent and his witnesses
arrived in court in the middle of a hearing, the
judge suspended the hearing and directed the
branch clerk to examine & take the testimony
of the witnesses in his chambers. After he was
through with the hearing,
he went back to his chambers and finding that
the examination was finished, asked the BIR
agent and his witnesses if they affirmed what
they what they testified to, after which he
issued the search warrant in question.
The determination of the
reasonableness of the judicial warrant must be
based on the affidavit of one who has personal
knowledge of the facts to which he testifies.
The testimony cannot be based on mere
belief. Neither can it be based on a report.
Otherwise, the warrant is void.
Thus, in Burgos v. Chief of Staff,
(1984), reiterating
the
1937
case
of
Rodriguez v. Villamiel, the testimony based on
a military report that the newspaper
We
Forum was used for subversive were held to be
not a personal knowledge &
so was
inadmissible.

Search warrant
The description of
the property to be
seized need not be
technically accurate
nor necessarily
precise, and its nature
will necessarily vary
according to whether
the identity of the
property or its
character is amatter
of concern; the
description is
required to be specific
only insofar as the
circumstances will
allow.

Warrant of arrest
General warrants
are proscribed &
unconstitutional.
However,a John Doe
Warrant (a warrant for
the apprehensionof a
person whose true name
is unknown) satisfies the
constitutional
requirement of
particularity if there is
some descriptio
personae which will
enable the officer to
identify the accused.

Failure to state with particularity the place to

be searched and items to be seized makes the
warrant used for fishing evidence (a general
warrant) which is void.
In Burgos v. Chief of Staff, the description
which read "subversive documents,leaflets,
papers to promote the objective of the
Movement for a Free Philippines, the
Light a Fire Movement, and the April 6
Movement" were held not to be particular
descriptions, thus making the warrant a
general warrant.
In Corro v. Lising, the search and seizure of
"printed copies and dummies of Philippine
Times, subversive documents, articles, printed
matters, handbills,
leaflets, banners, and
typewriters, tape recorders, etc." was again
invalidated for the description was not at all
particular or specific, thus making the
warrants general warrants.
When it comes to printed matters, the
offensive material need not be set out in full.
It is enough if it specifies the issues and the
title of the articles. The instruction toseize
"subversive materials" is not valid because
the determination of whether a material is
subversive or not is not for the police
officer to decide; no unfettereddiscretion
must be granted to him. The matter
is
different if goods were searched and seized
because of their intrinsic quality (as when
they are stolen or smuggled), than if the goods
were searched for the ideas they contain (as
when a "subversive newspaper is sought). In
the latter case, a more detailed description of
the physical features of the item is required to
avoid delegating the appreciation of ideas, and
thus threaten free expression.
Properties subject to Seizure:
1. Property subject of the offense;

2. Property stolen or embezzled and other

proceeds or fruits of the offense; and
3. Property used or intended to be used as the
means of committing an offense.

question that when a child has been

reportedkidnapped in a community, the police
can stop all cars and check if the detained
child isin any one of them.

Permissible Area of Search:

In People vs. Hindoy, G.R. No. 132662,
May 10, 2002,
the warrantless search
andseizure as an incident to a lawful arrest
may extend beyond the person of the one
arrested
to
include
the
premises
or
surroundings under his immediate control.

(b) When search is an incident to a valid

arrest.

Admissibility of Illegally Seized Evidence:

Articles illegally seized are not admissible
as
evidence.
The
rule
has
beenconstitutionally affirmed in Section 3(2),
Article III,
which provides that such
evidenceshall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. Such evidence is
the fruit of the poisonous tree. However, it
is submitted that it may nonetheless be used
in the judicial or administrative action that
may be filed against the officer responsible for
its illegal seizure.
It has also been held that where the accused
did not raise the issue of theadmissibility of
the evidence against him on the ground that it
had been illegally seized, such omission
constitutes a waiver of the protection granted
by Section 3, and the illegally seized evidence
could then be admitted against him.(People
vs. Exala, 221 SCRA 494)
WARRANTLESS ARREST
1. When a person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
2. When an offense has just been committed
and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
3. When the person to be arrested is an
escapee or a detention prisoner. (5, R113,
Rules of Crim Procedure)
The Rule requires that the accused perform
some overt act that would indicate that he has
committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.
The officer arresting a person who has just
committed, is committing, or is about to
commit an offense must have personal
knowledge of the fact. The offense must also
be
committed in his presence or within his view.
(People vs. Tudtud & Bolong, G.R. No.
144037, September 26, 2003)
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
(a) When search is made of moving vehicles
The reason is the person may escape
easily if a warrant has to be applied for the
mean time. In the Tariff and Customs Code,
customs agents are specificallyauthorized to
search and seize vehicles even without a
warrant.
Checkpoints are valid in some
instances
depending
on
the
purpose
(e.g.apprehend a suspected criminal) and the
circumstances (e.g. probable cause that
thecriminal is inside the car). There is no

Rule 126, Sec. 12. Search incident to

lawful arrest-- A person lawfully arrested
may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search
warrant.
A person arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything that proves
the commission of the offense. It follows that
the search can only be made
within the area of control of the arrested
person, and within the time of the arrest.
In Nolasco v. Cruz Pano, 139 SCRA
152 (1985), Milagros Roque and Cynthia
Nolasco were arrested at the intersection of
Mayon and Margal Streets in QC at 11:30
a.m., having been wanted as high officers
of the CPP. At 12:00 noon, Roque's
apartment located 2 blocks away, was
searched and some documents seized. The SC
at first held that the search was valid even if
the warrant issued was void for failing to
describe with particularity the things to be
seized, because it was an incident of a valid
arrest.
But after the EDSA revolution, the
reconstituted
SC granted the motion for
reconsideration and held that just because
there was a valid arrest did not mean that the
search was likewise valid. To be valid, the
search must be "incidental" to the arrest, i.e.,
not separated by time or place from the arrest.
If the basis for allowing incidental searches is
looked into, one can see that this situation is
not one involving a valid incidental search.
The law allows the arresting officer to
search a person validly arrested (by frisking
him for instance) because (1) a weapon held
by the arrested person may be
turned against his captor and (2) he may
destroy the proof of the crime, if the arrested
officer has to first apply for a search warrant
from a judge.
If, in the Nolasco case, the search
was conducted 30 minutes after the arrest,
there is no longer any danger that the
captured may turn against the captor; and if
the
documents in the apartment were 2 blocks
away, the search would no longer be
justified since there is no way for Roque to go
back to the apartment and destroy the
documents, having been arrested already.
In People vs. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432,
while a contemporaneous search of a person
arrested may be effected
to
discover
dangerous weapons or proofs or
implements used in the commission of the
crime and which search may extend to the
area within his immediate control where he
might gain possession of a weapon or

evidence he can destroy, a valid arrest must

precede the search. The process cannot be
reversed.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest,
as the precedent arrest determines the validity
of the incidental search, the legality of the
arrest is questioned in a large majorityof these
cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used
as a pretext for conducting asearch. In this
instance, the law requires that there be first a
lawful arrest before asearch can be madethe
process cannot be reversed.
In the case of People vs. Go, 354 SCRA 338
(2001), the police saw the gun tucked in
appellants waist when he stood up. The gun
was plainly visible. No search was conducted
as none was necessary. Accused-appellant
could not show any license for the firearm,
whether at the time of his arrest or thereafter.
Thus, he was in effect committing a crime in
the presence of the police
officers.
No
warrant of arrest wasnecessary in such a
situation, it being one of the recognized
exceptions under the Rules.
As a consequence of appellants
valid
warrantless arrest,
he may be lawfully
searched
for
dangerous
weapons
or
anything which may used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search
warrant, as provided in Rule 126, Section 12.
This is a valid search incidental to a lawful
arrest. The subsequent discovery in his car of
drug paraphernalia and the crystalline
substance, which, was later identified as
shabu, though in a distant place from where
the illegal
possession of
firearms was
committed, cannot be said to have been made
during an illegal. As such, the seizeditems do
not fall within the exclusionary clause. Hence,
not being fruits of the poisonous tree, the
objects found at the scene of the crime, such
as the firearm, the shabu and thedrug
paraphernalia, can be used as evidenced
against appellant. Besides, it has been held
that drugs discovered as a result of a
consented search is admissible in evidence.
In
People vs. Molina, 352 SCRA 174
(2001), to constitute a valid in flagrante
delito arrest, two (2) requisites must concur: 1)
the person to be arrested must execute
an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and 2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within
the view of the arresting officer.
In People vs. Estrella, G.R. Nos. 13853940, January 21, 2003, the arresting officer
may take from the arrested individual any
money or property found upon the
latters person that which:
1. Was used in the commission of the crime;
2. Was the fruit of the crime;
3. May provide the person arrested with the
means of committing violence or escaping;
4. May be used in evidence in the trial of the
case.

The
search,
however,
must
be
contemporaneous to the arrest and made
within a permissible area of search.
Requisite: the apprehending officer
must
have been spurred by probable cause in
effecting the arrest which could be considered
as one in cadence with the instances
ofpermissible arrest enumerated in Section
5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
In the case of People vs. Montilla, G.R.
No. 123872, January 30, 1998, the officer
could reasonably assumesince the informant
was by their side and had so informed them
and pointed out the culpritthat the drugs
were in the appellants luggage, and it
would have been irresponsible,
if
not
downright absurd, for them to adopt a waitand-see attitude at the risk of eventually
losing their quarry.
(c) When things seized are within plain view
of a searching party
People vs. Hedishi Suzuki, G.R. No.
120670, October 23, 2003, whenever the
rightagainst
unreasonable
search
and
seizure is challenged, an individual may
choosebetween invoking the constitutional
protection or waiving his right by giving
consent tothe search and seizure.
A
reasonable search is not to be determined by
any fixedformula but is to be resolved
according to the facts of the case.
Plain View Doctrinefinds application only
when the incriminating nature of the objectis
in the plain view of the police officer.
The law enforcement officer must lawfully
make an intrusion or properly be in aposition
from which he can particularly view the area.
In the course of such lawful
intrusion, he came inadvertently across a
piece
of
evidence
incriminating
the
accused.The object must be open to eye and
hand and its discovery inadvertent.It is clear
that an object is in plain view if the object
itself is plainly exposed tosight. The difficulty
arises when the object is inside a closed
container. Where the objectseized was inside a
closed package, the object itself is not in plain
view and thereforecannot be seized without a
warrant. However, if the package proclaims its
contents,whether
by
its
distinctive
configuration, its transparency, or if its
contents are obvious toan observer, then the
contents are in plain view and may be seized.
In other words, ifthe package is such that an
experienced observer could infer from its
appearance that itcontains the prohibited
article, then the article is deemed in plain
view. It must beimmediately apparent to the
police that the items that they observe may be
evidence ofa crime, contraband or otherwise
subject to seizure. (People vs. Doria, 301
SCRA668)
Requisites:
1. Valid intrusion based on a valid warrantless
arrest in which the police are legally present in
the pursuit of their official duties;

2. The evidence was inadvertently discovered

by the police who have the right to be where
they are;
3. The evidence must be immediately
apparent; and
4. Plain view justified mere seizure of evidence
without further search.
(d) Stop-and-Frisk
It is defined as the vernacular designation of
the right of a police officer to stop acitizen on
the street, interrogate him, and pat him for
weapons where a police officer observes an
unusual conduct which leads him reasonably
to conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous, where in the
course of investigatingthis behavior he
identified himself as a policeman and make
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the
initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel
his reasonable fear for his own or others
safety, he is entitled for the protection of
himself or others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of
such persons in an attempt to discover
weapons which might be used to assault him.

The interest of effective crime prevention and

detection allows a police officer to approach a
person, in appropriate circumstances and
manner,
for
purposes
of investigating
possible criminal behavior even though there
is insufficient probable cause to make an
actual arrest.
Requisites for Stop-and-Frisk
1. The police officer should properly introduce
himself and make the initial inquiries,
approach and restrain a person who manifests
unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to
check the latters outer clothing for possibly
concealed weapons.
2. The apprehending officer must have a
genuine reason to warrant the belief that the
person to be held has weapons or contraband
concealed about him.
It should, therefore, be emphasized that a
search and seizure should precede thearrest
for the principle of stop-and-frisk to apply.
(e) When there is a valid express waiver
made voluntarily and intelligently.
Waiver cannot be implied from the fact
that the person consented or did not object to
the search, for it many happen that he did so
only out of respect for the
authorities. The waiver must be expressly
made. It must be given by the person
whoseright is violated.
In People vs. Bongcarawan, G.R. No.
143944, July 11, 2002, the shabu in
thebaggage of the accused was found by
(private)
security
officers
of
the
interislandpassenger vessel who then reported
the matter to the Philippine Coast Guard.
Thesearch and seizure of the suitcase and

contraband items
were carried
out
withoutgovernment intervention. Accordingly,
the exclusionary rule may not be invoked.
(f) Searches of vessel and aircraft for violation
of fishery, immigration and customs law
(g) Searches of automobiles at borders or
constructive
borders
for
violation
of
immigration and smuggling laws
(h) Inspection of buildings and other premises
for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and
building regulations
(i)
Conduct of areal target zoning and
saturation drive in the exercise of military
powers of the President
(j) Visual search at checkpoints
Constitutionality of checkpoints and
"areal target zonings"; doctrine of
exigent circumstances
The
constitutional
right
against
unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right and can be invoked only by
those whose rights have been infringed, or
threatened to be infringed. Not all searches
and seizures are prohibited. Those which are
reasonable arenot forbidden. Those which are
warranted by the exigencies of public order
and areconducted in a way least intrusive to
motorists
are allowed. For, admittedly,
routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certain
extent, on motorists right to free passage
withoutinterruption, but it cannot be denied
that, as a rule, it involves only a brief
detention of travellers during which the
vehicles occupants are required to answer a
brief questionor two. For as long as the vehicle
is neither searched nor its occupants subjected
to a body search and the inspection of the
vehicle is limited to a visual search, said
routinechecks cannot be regarded as violative
of an individuals right against unreasonable
search. In fact, these routine checks, when
conducted in a fixed area, are even less
intrusive.
The checkpoint herein conducted was in
pursuance of the gun ban enforced by the
COMELEC. The COMELEC would be hard put to
implement the ban if its deputized agents
were limited to a visual search of pedestrians.
It would also defeat the purpose for which
such ban was instituted. Those who intend to
bring a gun during said period would know that
they only need a car to be able to easily
perpetrate their malicious designs.
There is no need for checkpoints to be
announced.
Not
only
it
would
be
impractical, it would also forewarn those who
intend to violate the ban. Even so, badges of
legitimacy of checkpoints may still be
inferred from their fixed location and the
regularized manner in which they are
operated. (People vs. Usana, 323 SCRA
754)
Knock and Announce Principle
General Rule: Police officers are obliged to
give
notice,
show
their
authority
anddemand that they be allowed entry. They
may only break open any outer or inner dooror
window of a house to execute the search

warrant if, after such notice and demand, such

officers are refused entry to the place of
directed search.
Exceptions: Unannounced intrusion into the
premises is permissible when:
1. A party whose premises or is entitled to the
possession thereof refuses, upon demand, to
open it;
2. When such person already knew of the
identity of the officers and of their authority
and persons;
3. When the officers are justified in the honest
belief that there is an imminent peril to life or
limb;
4. When those in the premises, aware of
the presence of someone outside, are then
engaged in an activity which justifies the
officers to believe that an escape or the
destruction of evidence is being attempted.
(People vs. Huang Zhen Hua and Lee,G.R.
No. 139301, September 29, 2004)
In People vs. Marti, 193 SCRA 57, the
constitutional
protection
against
unreasonable searches and seizures refers
to
the
immunity
of
ones
person
frominterference by government and it
cannot be extended to acts committed by
private individuals so as to bring it within the
ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion.
Do
the
ordinary
right
against
unreasonable searches and seizures
apply to searches conducted at the
airport pursuant to routine airport
security procedures?
In the case of People vs. Leila Johnson,
G.R. No. 138881, December 18, 2000,
persons may lose the protection of the search
and seizure clause by exposure of their
persons or property to the public in a
manner reflecting a lack of subjective
expectation of privacy, which expectation
society
is
prepared
to
recognize
as
reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in
airport security procedures. With increased
concern
over
airplane
hijacking
and
terrorism has come increased security at
the nations airports. Passengers attempting
to board an aircraft routinely pass through
metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as
well as checked luggage, are routinely
subjected to x-ray scans. Should these
procedures
suggest
the
presence
of
suspiciousobjects,
physical
searches are
conducted to determine what the objects are.
There is little question that such searches are
reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness,
the gravity of the safety interests involved,
and
the
reduced
privacy
expectations
associated with airline travel.
Indeed,
travelers are often notified through airport
public address systems, signs, and notices in
their airline tickets that they are subject to
search and, if any prohibited materials or
substances are found, such would be subject
to seizure.
These announcements place passengers on
notice that ordinary constitutional protection
against warrantless searches and seizures
do not apply to routine airport

procedures.
People vs. Susan Canton, G.R. No.
148825, December 27, 2002,
a search
made pursuant to a routine airport security
procedure is allowed under RA 6235, which
provides that every airline ticket shall contain
a condition that hand-carried luggage, etc.,
shall be subject to search, and this
condition
shall
form
part
of
the
contractbetween the passenger and the air
carrier.
To limit the action of the airport
security personnel to simply refusing the
passenger entry into the aircraft and sending
her home(as suggested by the appellant), and
thereby depriving the security personnel of
ability and facility to act accordingly,
including to further search without warrant, in
light
of
suchcircumstances,
would
be
sanctioned impotence and ineffectiveness in
law enforcement,to the detriment of the
society. The strip search in the ladies room
was justified underthe circumstances.
Procedure
for
Seizure
of
Pornographic
Materials:
To justify a warrantless search as an incident to
a lawful arrest, the arrest must be on account
of a crime having been committed;.(Pita vs.
CA, 178 SCRA 362)
1. There must be a criminal charge against
the person for purveying the porno materials;
2. Application for search warrant must be
obtained from the judge;
3. Materials must be brought to court in the
prosecution of the accused for the crime
charged;
4.
Determination
whether
the
items
confiscated are pornographic materials;
5. Judgment rendered by the court
Sec. 3, Article III
(1) The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable
exceptupon lawful order of the court, or
when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of
this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
The guarantee includes within the mantle of its
protection tangible, as well asintangible
objects. (See RA 4200 below)
Exceptions to inviolability:
1. Lawful order of the court;
2. When public safety or orders requires
otherwise, as may be provided by law.
Is there a constitutional right to
privacy?
Yes. The essence of privacy is the right to
be left alone. It is expressly recognized
inSection 3(1) of Article III. Other facts of the
right
to
privacy
are
protected
in
variousprovisions of the Bill of Rights, i.e.,
Sections 1 (right to due process clause), 2
(rightagainst unreasonable searches and
seizures), 6 (right to liberty of abode and
ofchanging the same, as well as the right to
travel), 8 (freedom of association) and 17(right
against self-incrimination). (Ople vs. Torres,
G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1988)

Zones
of
privacy
recognized
and
protected in our laws:
1. The Civil Code provides that every person
shall respect the dignity, personality,privacy
and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons and punishes asactionable torts
several acts by a person of meddling and
prying into the privacy of another. It also holds
a public officer or employee or any private
individual liable for damages for any violation
of the rights and liberties of another person,
and recognizes the privacy of letters and other
private communications.
2. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the
violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation
of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to
dwelling.
3. Anti-Wiretapping Law (RA 4200) invasion
of privacy.
4. Secrecy of Bank Deposits (RA 1405)
5. Intellectual Property Law (RA 8293)
6.
Rules
of
Court
on
privileged
communication likewise recognize the privacy
of certain information [Sec. 24, Rule 130(c),
Revised Rules on Evidence]

heated discussion at the police station

between accused police officer Navarro and
the deceased, Lingan, which was taken
without the knowledge of the two. The SC held
that Jalbuenas testimony is confirmed by the
voice recording he had made. It may be asked
whether the tape is admissible in view of RA
4200, which prohibits wire tapping. The answer
is in the ffirmative. The law prohibits the
overhearing, intercepting or recording of
private
communications.
Since
theexchange between petitioner Navarro and
Lingan was not private, its tape recording is
not prohibited.

Exempted acts:
A. Use of such record or any copies
thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned
below: [Secs. 1, par. 2]
B. Any peace officer, who is authorized
by the written order of the Court (RTC within
whose territorial jurisdiction the acts for which
authority is applied for are to be executed), to
execute any of the acts declared to be
RA 4200 Anti-Wire Tapping Act
unlawful in cases involving thecrimes of: [Sec.
It
prohibits
any
person
not
being
3, par. 1]
authorized by all parties to any private
1. treason
communication or spoken word, to tap any
2. espionage
wire or cable, or by using any other device or
3. provoking war and disloyalty in case of
arrangement to secretly overhear, intercept or
record the same, or to communicate the
4. piracy
content thereof to any person.
5. mutiny in the high seas
The use of said record may be permitted in the
6. rebellion
following instances:
7. conspiracy and proposal to commit
1. In civil or criminal proceedings involving
rebellion
certain specified offenses principally affecting
8. inciting rebellion
national security; and
9. sedition
2. When authorized by the court which may
10. conspiracy to commit sedition
be issued under the following conditions:
11. inciting to sedition
a. The constitutional requirements for the
12 kidnapping as defined by the RPC
issuance of a warrant should be complied with;
13.violations of CA 616, punishing espionage
and
and other offenses against national security
b. The authority shall be effective only for sixty
The WRITTEN ORDER shall only be
(60) days.
issued or granted upon written application with
Any evidence obtained in violation of this law
the examination under oath or affirmation of
is not admissible in any proceeding.
the applicant and the witnesses hemay
produce and must show:
RA 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it
a) That there are reasonable
illegal for any person, not authorizedby all
grounds to believe that any of the crimes
parties to any private communication, to
enumerated herein has been committed or is
secretly record such communications by
being committed provided, that in cases
means of a tape recorder. The law does
involving the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy
not
make
any
distinction.
A
and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to
telephoneextension is not among the devices
rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit
covered by this law. (Gaanan vs. IAC, 145
sedition, such authority shall be granted
SCRA 112)
onlyupon prior proof that a rebellion or acts of
sedition, as the case may be, have actually
Navarro vs. CA, G.R. No. 121087, August
been or are being committed;
26, 1999, two local media men in LucenaCity
b) That there are reasonable grounds
went to the police station to report alleged
to believe that evidence may be obtained
indecent show in one nightestablishment in
essential to the conviction of any person for, or
the City. At the station, there was a heated
to the solution of, or to the prevention of,any
argument between policeofficer Navarro and
of such crimes;
Lingan, one of the two media men, which led
c) That there are no other means
to fisticuffs. Lingan felland his head hit the
readily available for obtaining such evidence.
pavement which caused his death. During the
trial, Jalbuena, the other media man, testified.
Contents:
Presented in evidence to confirm his testimony
1. The identity of the person or persons whose
was a voicerecording he had made of the
communications, conversations, discussions,

or spoken words are to be overheard,

intercepted, or recorded and, in the case of
telegraphic or telephonic communications, the
telegraph line and the telephone number
involved and its location;
2. The identity of the peace officer authorized
to
overhear,
intercept,
or
record
the
communications, conversations, discussions, or
spoken words;
3.
The offense or offenses sought to be
committed or prevented; and
4. The period of the authorization.
Effectivity:
The authorization shall
be
effective for the period specified in the order
which shall not exceed 60 days from the date
of issuance of the order, unless extendedor
renewed by the court upon being satisfied that
such extension or renewal is in the public
interest.
ADMISSIBILITY
Any communication or spoken word,
or
the
existence
contents,
substance,
purport, effect or meaning of the same or any
part
thereof,
or
any
information
thereincontained, obtained or secured by any
person in violation of this Act shall not be
admissible in evidence in any judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative hearing or
investigation.
Exclusionary Rule
Art. III, Sec. 3. xxx
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation
of this (privacy of communication and
correspondence) or the preceding section
(unreasonable searches and seizures) shall be
inadmissible for any purpose
in any
proceeding.
One of the remedies of one who was
victimized by an illegal search is to ask for the
suppression of the things seized and the
evidence illegally taken.
The exclusionary rule prohibits the use
of any evidence obtained in violation of
Sections 2 and 3 (1), Art. III for "any purpose"
and in "any proceeding."
The evidence
isabsolutely useless. This has not always been
the case.
In Moncado v. People's Court
(1948), the SC, following the U.S. case of Wolf
V. Colorado, rules that evidence illegally
obtained is
not
necessarily excluded
if
isotherwise admissible under the rules of
evidence.
In such case, the evidence
admitted, without prejudice to any criminal,
civil or administrative liability of the officer
who illegally seized it. In other words, the
admissibility of the evidence is not effected by
the illegality of the means by which it was
acquired.
It was in Stonehill v. Diokno, supra,
following the U.S. case of Maop v. Ohio1969,
when the exclusionary rule was first adopted in
the Philippines, the SC noting thatthe total
suppression of the thing seized is the only
effective means of ensuring the constitutional
right which it seeks to preserve. The Court
noted, the insufficiency of the other remedies
(e.g. action for damages, criminal punishment,
resistance), especially in the
Philippines

where violations were committed by those in

power and were thus equipped with the
pardoning power to water down the gravity of
the other penalties imposed to violators of
those constitutional rights.
The victim may or may not get back
the thing seized, depending on whether it is
contraband or not. It the thing is contraband,
it
would not be returned, and only
itssuppression can be asked for. But if the
thing is legal, the party can ask for its return,
even if no criminal prosecution has yet been
filed, as in the Stonehill case.
Civil Action for Damages
A civil case for damages can also be filed
pursuant to Article 32 of the Civil Code.
In Aberca v. Ver, the SC held that
even if the privilege of the writ is suspended,
the court can nevertheless entertain an action
not only against the task force but evenagainst
the top ranking officials who ordered the
seizure, to recover damages for the illegal
searches and seizures made in a despotic
manner. By so doing, one canindirectly
inquire into the validity of the suspension of
the privilege.
Ramirez vs. CA, 248 SCRA 590, RA 4200
clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for
any person, not authorized by all parties to
any
private
communication,
to
secretlyrecord such communications by means
of a tape recorder. The law does not make a
distinction.
Zulueta vs. CA, 253 SCRA 699, the right
may be invoked against the wife who went to
the clinic of her husband and there took
documents
consisting
of
privatecommunications between her husband
and his alleged paramour.
Should in camera inspection of bank
accounts be allowed? Before an in camera
inspection may be allowed, there must be a
pending case before a court of competent
jurisdiction.
Further, the account must be
clearly identified, the inspection limited to
the subject matter of the pending case
before the court of competent jurisdiction.
The bank personnel and the account holder
must be notified to be present during the
inspection, and such inspection may cover
only the account identified in the pending
case.
In Union Bank vs. CA, Section 2 of the
Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits, as amended,
declares bank deposit to be absolutely
confidential except:
1. In an examination made in the course of
special or general examination of a bank that
is specifically authorized by the Monetary
Board after being satisfied that there is
reasonable ground to believe that a bank fraud
or serious irregularityhas been or is being
committed and that it is necessary to look into
deposit to establish such fraud or irregularity;
2. In an examination made by an independent
auditor hired by the bank to conduct its
regular audit provided that the examination is
for audit purposes only and the results thereof
shall be for the exclusive use of the bank;

3. Upon written permission of the depositor;

4. In case of impeachment;
5. Upon order of a competent court in cases of
bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials;
or
6. In cases where the money deposited or
invested is the subject
matter
of the
litigation.
In the case of Marquez vs. Desierto, G.R.
No. 135882, June 27, 2001, there isyet no
pending litigation before any court of
competent authority. What is existing is an
investigation
by
the
Office
of
the
Ombudsman. In short, what the Office of
the Ombudsman would wish to do is to fish
for additional evidence to formally charge
Amado
Lagdameo,
et
al.,
with
the
Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending
case in court which would warrant the opening
of the bank account for inspection.
Human Security Act of 2007
Section 3, HAS of 2007, provides that the
authorities may, upon a written order of the
Court of Appeals, listen to, intercept and
record, with the use of any mode, form,
kind or type of electronic or other surveillance
equipment or intercepting and tracking
devices, or with the use of any suitable
ways and means for that purpose, any
communication,
message,
conversation,
discussion, or spoken or written words
between
members
of
terrorist
group.
Provided, That surveillance, interception
andrecording of communications between
lawyers and clients, doctor and patients,
journalists and their sources and confidential
business
correspondence
shall
not
beauthorized.
Sec. 4, Article III
No law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech, of expression, or the
press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.
The rule on privileged communications has its
genesis not in the nations penal code but in
the Bill of Rights of the Constitution
guaranteeing freedom of speech and ofthe
press. As early as 1918, in US vs.
Caete, 38 Phil 253, the SC ruled that
publications
which
are
privileged
for
reasons of public policy are protected by
the
constitutional
guaranty
of
freedom
of
speech. This constitutional right cannot be
abolished by the mere failure of the legislature
to give it express recognition in thestatute
punishing libel. (Borjal vs. CA, 301 SCRA 1)
The freedom to speak includes the right to be
silent. This freedom includes also includes the
right to an audience, in the sense that the
State cannot prohibit the people from hearing
what a person has to say, whatever be the
quality of his thoughts. This right, however, is
not demandable against those unwilling to
listen, who may not be herded by the
government into a captive audience.
Types of Privileged Communications:

1. Absolutely privileged communications

those which are not actionable even if the
author acted in bad faith. An example is found
in Article VI, Section 11 which exempts a
member of Congress from liability for any
speech or debate inthe Congress or in any
Committee thereof.
2. Qualifiedly privileged communications
those contained defamatory imputations
are not actionable unless found to have been
made without good intention or justifiable
motive. To this genre belong private
communications and fair and true report
without any comments or remarks.
Freedom of ExpressionElements:
1. Freedom from censorship or prior restraint;
and
2. Freedom from subsequent punishment.
Free speech and free press may be identified
with the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully any matter of public interest without
censorship and punishment. There is to be no
previous restraint on the communication of
views or subsequent liability whether in libel
suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for
damages, or contempt proceedings unless
there be a clear and present danger of
substantive evil thatCongress has a right to
prevent. (Chavez vs. Gonzalez, G.R. No.
168338, February 15, 2008)
Sec. 18, Article III
(1) No person shall be detained solely by
reason of his political beliefs and
aspirations.
Freedom
from
subsequent
punishment
Restrictions on Free Speech:
1.
Content-based
Restrictionsare
imposed because of the content of the
speech itself; distort public debate, have
improper motivation, and are usually imposed
because of fear how people will react to a
particular speech.
Subject to the Clear-and-Present danger Rule
Test
In Sanidad vs. COMELEC, a rule prohibiting
columnists, commentators, and announcers
from campaigning either for or against an
issue in a plebiscite must have compelling
reason to support it, or it will not pass muster
under strictscrutiny.
These
restrictions
are
censorial
and
therefore they bear a heavypresumption of
constitutional validity. In addition, they will be
tested for possibleoverbreadth and vagueness.
2. Content-neutral Restrictionsare those
which are not concerned with thecontent of
the speech.
The clear-and-present danger rule is
inappropriate as a test fordetermining the
constitutional validity of laws.
Tests for a valid Governmental
Interference:
1. Clear and Present Danger Rulewhen
words are used in such circumstance and of
such nature as to create a clear and present
danger that will bring about substantive evil
that the state has the right to prevent.

2.
Dangerous
Tendency
Rulewords
uttered create a dangerous tendency of an evil
which State has the right to prevent.
3. Balancing of Interest Testwhen
particular conduct is regulated in interest of
public order, and the regulation results in
an indirect, conditional, partial abridgment
of speech, the duty of the courts is to
determine which of the 2 conflicting interests
demand
greater
protection
under
the
particular circumstances presented.
In the case of Adiong vs. COMELEC, 207
SCRA 713, the SC held that the posting of
decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles,
pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the
consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence,
the preference of the citizens becomes crucial
in this kind of propaganda, not the financial
resources of the candidate. The owner can
even prepare his own decals or stickers for
posting on his personal property. To strike
down this right and enjoin it is impermissible
encroachment of his liberties. The prohibition
on posting of decals and stickers on mobile
places whether public or private except in
authorized areas
designated
by the
COMELECbecomes censorship which cannot be
justified by the Constitution.
Doctrine
of
Fair
CommentFair
commentaries on matters of public interest are
privileged and constitute a valid defense in
an action for libel or slander.It means that
while in
general
everydiscreditable
imputation publicly made is deemed false,
because every man is presumed innocent
until his guilt is judicially proved, and every
false
imputation is deemed malicious,
nevertheless,
when
the
discreditable
imputation is directed against a public person
in his public capacity, it is not necessarily
actionable. In order that such discreditable
imputation to a public official may be
actionable, it must either be a false allegation
of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition. If the comment is an expression
of opinion, based on established facts, it is
immaterial that the opinion happens to be
mistaken,as long as it might reasonably
inferred from the facts. (Borjal vs.CA,301
SCRA1)
Right to Assemble and Petition
Government
The right to assemble is not subject to prior
restraint and may not be conditioned upon the
prior issuance of a permit or authorization
from the government authorities.
However, the right must be exercised in such
a way as will not prejudice the publicwelfare.
If assembly is to be held at a public place,
permit for the use of such place, and not for
the assembly itself may be validly required.
Power of local officials is merely for
regulation and not for prohibition. (Primicias
vs. Fugoso, L-1800, January 27, 1948)
Permit for public assembly is not
necessary if meeting is to be held in:
a. A private place;
b. The campus of a government-owned or
operated educational institution; or

c. A freedom park.
The provisions of BP 880 (Public Assembly
Act of 1985) are not absolute ban on public
assemblies but a restriction that simply
regulates the time, place and manner of the
assemblies. The Court referred to it as
content-neutral regulation.

Test for Lawful Assembly:

1. Purpose Testthe purpose for which the
assembly is held regardless of the auspices
under which it is organized; and
2. Auspices Test.
In the case of Bayan vs. Ermita, G.R.
No. 169838, April 25, 2006,
Calibrated
Pre-emptive Response (CPR) serves no valid
purpose if it means the something else.
Accordingly, what is to be followed is and
should be that mandated by the law itself,
namely,
maximum
tolerance,
which
specifically means the highest degree of
restraint
that the military, police and other peace
keeping authorities shall observe during a
public assembly or in dispersal of the same.
Sec. 5, Article III
No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession
and
worship,
without
discrimination
or
preference,
shall
forever be allowed. No religious test
shall be required for the exercise of civil
or political rights.
Religionany specific system of belief,
worship, conduct, etc., often involving a code
of ethics and a philosophy
It is a profession of faith to an active power
that binds and elevates man to his Creator.
(Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil 201)
Freedom of Religion
1. Non-Establishment Clause
Scope:
a. State cannot set-up church;
b. Cannot pass laws which aid one religion,
all religions or prefer one over another;
c. Nor influence a person to go to or remain
away from church against his will; nor
d. Force him to profess a belief or disbelief in
any religion.
2. Freedom of Religious Belief and Worship
Dual aspect of Freedom of Religious Belief and
Worship:
a. Freedom to believeabsolute as long as
the belief is confined within the realm of
thought; and
b. Freedom to act on ones beliefsubject to
regulation where the belief is translated into
external acts that affect the public welfare.
Ecclesiastical
Affairit
involves
the
relationship between the church and its
members and relates to matters of faith,
religious doctrines, worship and governance

of thecongregation to which the state cannot

meddle.
Benevolent
Neutralityrecognizes
that
government must pursue its secular goals and
interest but at the same time strive to uphold
religious liberty to the greatest extentpossible
within flexible constitutional limits. Thus,
although the morality contemplated by laws is
secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality basedon religion,
provided it does not offend compelling state
interests.
Three (3)-Step process of the compelling
State Interest Test:

1. Has the statute or government action

created a burden on the free exercise of
religion?
2. Is there a sufficiently compelling state
interest to justify this infringement of
religious liberty?
3. Has the state in achieving its legitimate
purposes used the least intrusive means
possible so that the free exercise is not
infringed any more than necessary to achieve
the legitimate goal of the state? (Estrada vs.
Escritor, A.M. No. P-021651,June 22,
2006)
Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent,
219 SCRA 256, to compel students to take
part in a flag ceremony when it is against their
religious beliefs will violate their religious
freedom. Petitioners have the right to refuse to
salute to the Philippine flag on account of their
religious freedom.
Iglesia ni Cristo vs. CA, 259 SCRA 529, the
INCs postulate that its religious freedom is per
se beyond review of the MTRCB should be
rejected. Its public broadcast on TV of
its religious programs brings it out of the
bosom of internal belief. Television is a
medium that reaches even the eyes and ears
of children. The exercise of religiousfreedom
can be regulated by the State when it will
bring about the clear and present danger of a
substantive evil which the State is dutybound to prevent, i.e., seriousdetriment to
the more overriding interest of public
health, public morals, or public welfare. A
laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion
can be seductive to the liberal mind but
history counsels the Court against its blind
adoption as religion is and continues to be a
volatile area of concern in our society today.
For sure, we shallcontinue to subject any act
pinching the space for the free exercise of
religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall
not leave its rational exercise to the
irrationality of a man. For when religion divides
and its exercise destroys, the State should not
stand still.
Taruc vs. Bishop Dela Cruz, G.R. No.
144801,
March
10,
2005,
expulsion/excommunication of members of a
religious institution/organization is a matter
best left to the discretion of the officials,
and
the
laws
and
canons,
of
said
institution/organization. It is not for the courts
to exercise control over church authorities in
the performance of their discretionary and
official functions. Rather, it is for the

members
of
the
religious
institution/organization to conform to just
church regulations.
Religious Tests
The constitutional prohibition against religious
tests is aimed against clandestine attempts
on the part of the government to prevent a
person from exercising his civil or political
rights because of his religious beliefs.
Sec. 6, Article III
The liberty of abode and of changing the
same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court. Neither shall the right
to travel be impaired except in the
interest of national security, public
safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law.
Liberty of Abode and Travel
The purpose of the guaranty is to further
emphasize
the
individuals
liberty
as
safeguarded in general terms by the due
process clause. Liberty under that
clause
includes the right to choose ones residence,
to leave it whenever he pleases, and to travel
where he wills.
Limitation on Liberty of Abode: upon
Lawful order of the court
Restrictions on Right to Travel:
1. Interest of national security;
2. Public safety;
3. Public health; or
4. Any person on bail.

In Caunca vs. Salazar, 82 Phil 851, a maid

has the right to transfer to another residence
even if she had not yet paid the amount
advanced for her transportation from the
province by an employment agency which was
then effectively detaining her.
Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil 778, the
Mayor of Manila was not sustained by the SC
when he deported some 170 women of illrepute to Davao, for the admittedly
commendable purpose of ridding the city for
serious moral and health problems. These
women are nevertheless not chattels but
Philippine
citizens
protected
by the
sameconstitutional guarantees as are other
citizensto change their domicile from Manila
to another locality.
Rubi vs. Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil 660,
the respondents were justified in requiring the
members of certain non-Christian tribes to
reside in a reservation, for their better
education, advancement and protection. The
measure was held to be a legitimate exercise
of police power.
Lorenzo vs. Director of Health, 50 Phil
595, health officers may restrict access to
contaminated areas and also quarantine those
already exposed to the disease soughtto be
contained.
Zemel vs. Rusk, 381 US 1, the Secretary of
State may regulate or even prohibit thetravel
of citizens to hostile countries to prevent
possible international misunderstandingand
conflict.
Section 26 of HAS of 2007cases where
evidence of
guilt
is
not strong,
and
theperson charged with the crime of terrorism
as therein defined is entitled to bail and if

granted the same, the court, upon application

by the prosecutor, shall limit the right to travel
of the accused to within the municipality or
city where he resides or where the case is
pending, in the interest of national security
and public safety.
Sec. 7, Article III
The right of the people to information on
matters of public concerned shall be
recognized. Access to official records,
and to documents, and papers pertaining
to official acts, transactions, or decisions,
as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development,
shall be afforded the citizens, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by
law.
Right of the People to Information on Matters of
Public Concern:

The citizen has a right to know what is

going on in
the
country
and in his
government so he can express his views
thereon knowledgeably and intelligently. One
cannot question the extravagance of the
government, for example, if is denied
examination of official vouchers. A citizen may
not expose anomaly if those responsiblefor it
may validly prevent him from investigating
their activities. In the interest of truth and
fairness, the citizen should not be made to
guess only at what is being done bypublic
functionaries and to base his views and
conclusions on mere rumors, half-truths,
conjectures and even canards.
Recognized restrictions:
1. National
security
matters
and
intelligence informationthis jurisdiction
recognizes the common law holding that
there is a governmental privilege against
public disclosure with respect to state
secrets regarding military, diplomatic and
other national security matters;
2. Trade or industrial secrets(pursuant to
the Intellectual Property Code, RA 8293 and
other related laws and banking transactions
pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act,
RA 1405);
3. Criminal matters, such as those relating to
the apprehension, the prosecution and the
detention of criminals, which courts may not
inquire into prior to such
arrest, detention and prosecution; and
4. Other confidential information. The
Ethical Standards Act further prohibits public
officials and employees from using or divulging
confidential or classified information to the
public. [Section 7 (c), RA 6713] Other
acknowledgedlimitations to information access
include diplomatic correspondence, closed
door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions
of either House of congress, as well as the
internal deliberations of the SC. (Chavez vs.
PCGG, 299 SCRA 744)
Rights guaranteed:
1. Right to information on matters of public
concern; and
2. Corollary right of access to official records
and documents

BA-RA 7941 vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos.

177271 and 177314, May 4, 2007, the
right to information is a public right where
the real parties in interest are the public, or
the
citizens to be precise. The peoples right to
know is limited to matters of public
concernand is further subject to such limitation
as may be provided by law. Similarly, the
policy
of full disclosure is confined to transactions
involving public interest and is subject
toreasonable conditions prescribed by law.
Valmonte vs. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRa 256
the information sought must be mattersof
public concern, access to which may be
limited by law. The information sought
bypetitioners is the truth of reports that
certain Members of the Batasan Pambansa
belonging to the opposition were able to
secure clean loans from the GSIS immediately
before the February 7, 1986 election through
the intercession of the former First Lady
Imelda Marcos. x x x The public nature of the
loanable funds of the GSIS and the public
office held by the alleged borrowers make the
information sought clearly a matter of public
interest and concern.
Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission, the
SC affirmed the right of the petitioner to
secure from the Civil Service Commission
information regarding the civil service
eligibility of certain persons employed in
the health department of the Cebu City
government.
Sec. 8, Article III
The right of the people, including those
employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or
societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not be abridged.
Right to Form associationsshall not be
impaired without due process of law;
guarantees the right not to join an
association.
(Sta.
Clara
Homeowners
Association
vs. Gaston, G.R. No. 141961, January 23,
2002)
This right is especially meaningful in a
free society because a man is by nature
gregarious. His disposition to mix with others
of the same persuasions, interests or
objectives is guaranteed by this provision.
It also expressly guarantees to those
employed in the public and private sectors the
right to form unions. This right is available also
to those in the government sectors. It is a
settled in jurisprudence that, in general,
workers in the public sectors do not enjoy the
right to strike. The general rule in the past and
up to present is that the terms
and
conditions
of
employment
in
the
Government,
including
any
politicalsubdivision or instrumentality thereof
are governed by law. x x x. Since the terms
and conditions of government employment are
fixed by law, government workers cannot use
the same weapons employed by the workers in

the private sector to secure concessions from

their employers. The principle behind labor
unionism in private industry is that industrial
peace cannot be secured through compulsion
by law. Relations between private employers
and their employees rest on an essentially
voluntary basis. x x x In government
employment, however, it is the legislature
and, where properly given delegated power,
the administrative heads of government
which fix the terms and conditions of
employment. And this is effected through
statutes or administrative circulars, rules and
regulations, not through collective bargaining
agreements.
(Alliance
of
Concerned
Government Workers vs. Ministry of
Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1)
In the case of Jacinto vs. CA, 281 SCRA
657, the SC held that petitioners were not
penalized for the exercise of their right to
assemble peacefully and to petition the
government for a redress of grievances.
Rather, the Civil Service Commission found
them guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service for having absented
themselves without proper authority,
from
their school during regular school days, in
order to participate in the mass protest, their
absence
ineluctably
resulting
in
the
nonholding of classes and in the deprivation
of students
of education, for which they were responsible.
Had petitioners availed themselves of their
free timerecess, after classes, weekends or
holidaysto dramatize their grievances and to
dialogue with the proper authorities within the
bounds of law, no onenot the DECS, the CSC
or even
the SCcould have held them liable for the
valid exercise
of
their
constitutionally
guaranteed rights. As it was, the temporary
stoppage of classes resulting from their
activity necessarily disrupted public services,
the very evil sought to be forestalled by the
prohibition against strikes by
government
workers. Their act by their
nature was
enjoined by the Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations, for which they must, therefore, be
made answerable.
GSIS vs. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa
sa GSIS, G. R. No. 170132, December 6,
2006, it was against the backdrop of the
provisions of the Constitution that the Court
resolved that employees in the public service
may not engage in strikes or in concerted and
unauthorized stoppage of work; that the right
of government employees to organize is
limited to the formation of unions or
associations, without including the right to
strike. It may be, as the appellate court urged,
that the freedom of expression and assembly
and the right to petition the government for a
redress of grievances stand on a level higher
than economic and other liberties.
Sec. 9, Article III
Private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation.
(See discussions Under Eminent Domain)

Sec. 10, Article III

No law impairing the obligation of
contract shall be passed.
The freedom to contract is not absolute; all
contracts and all rights are subject tothe
police power of the State and not only may
regulations which affect them beestablished
by the State, but all such regulations must be
subject to change from time totime, as the
general well-being of the community may
require, or the circumstances maychange, or
as experience may demonstrate the necessity.
The purpose of the impairment clause is
to
safeguard
the
integrity
of
validcontractual
agreements
against
unwarranted interference by the State. As a
rule, theyshould be respected by the
legislature and not tampered with by
subsequent laws thatwill change the intention
of the parties or modify their rights and
obligations. The will of the obligor and the
obligee must be observed; the obligation of
their contract must not be impaired.
However, the protection of the impairment
clause is not absolute. There are instances
when contracts valid at the time of their
conclusion may become invalid, or some of
their provisions may be rendered inoperative
or illegal, by virtue of supervening legislation.
Limitations:
1. Police powerprevails over contracts;
2. Eminent domainmay impair obligation of
contracts; and
3. Taxationcannot impair obligation of
contracts.
Impairmentanything that diminishes the
efficacy of a contract .
There is impairment when there is
change in the terms of a legal contract
between parties, either in the time or mode of
performance, or imposes new conditions, or
dispenses with expressed, or authorizes for its
satisfaction something different from that
provided in its terms. (Clemons vs. Nolting,
No. 17959, January 24, 1922)
Hon.
Heherson
Alvarez
vs.
PICOP
Resources,
Inc.,
G.R.
No.
162243,
November 29,
2006,
in
unequivocal
terms, the SC have consistently held that
such licenses concerning the harvesting of
timber in the countrys forests cannot be
considered contracts that would bind the
Government regardless of changes in policy
and the demands of public
interest and
welfare. Since timber licenses are not
contracts, the non-impairment clause cannot
be invoked.

Custodial Investigation
Any questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way.
It shall include the practice of issuing invitation
to a person who is investigatedin connection with
an offense he is suspected to have committed,
without prejudice to
the liability of the inviting officer for any
violation of the law. (RA 7438)

Sec. 11, Article III

Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial
bodies and adequate legal assistance shall
not be denied to any person by reason of
poverty.
Inspired by t social justice policy and covered by
the equal protection clause, thisrule has been
implemented by several provisions of the Rules
of Court in favor of thepauperlitigant. The IBP
provides deserving indigents with free legal
aid, includingrepresentation in court, and
similar services available from the DOJ to
litigants whocannot afford retained counsel, like
the accused in a criminal case who can ask for
theassistance of counsel de officio. There are
also private legal assistance organizationsnow
functioning for the benefit of penurious clients
who otherwise might be unable toresort to the
courts of justice because only of their
misfortune of being poor. Thisprovision makes
them the equal of the rich before the law.
Sec. 12, Article III
(1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shallhave the
right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have acompetent and
independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If theperson cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided
with
one. These rights cannot be waived except
in writing and in the presenceof counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means
whichvitiate the free will shall be used
against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar
forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall
be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil
sanctions for violations of thissection as
well as compensation to and rehabilitation
of victims of torture or similar practices,
and their families.
Rights of an Accused under Custodial
Investigation
Exist only in custodial interrogation
Available when the investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crimebut has
begun to focus on a particular suspect, the
suspect has been taken into police
custody, the police carry out a process of
interrogation that tend to elicit
incriminatingstatements.

People vs. Lugod, G.R. No. 136253,

February 21, 2001, the accused shouldhave
been entitled to Miranda rights, because even
assuming that he was not yet under
interrogation at the time he was brought to the
police station, his confession was elicitedby a
police officer who promised to help him if he told
the truth. Furthermore, when heallegedly pointed
out the body of the victim, the atmosphere was
highly intimidating andnot conducive to a
spontaneous response as the whole police force
and nearly 100townspeople escorted him there.
Not having the benefit of counsel and not having
beeninformed of his rights, the confession is
inadmissible.
Miranda rights
(Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 US 436)
x x x The prosecution may not use statements,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory,stemming
from custodial interrogation of the defendant
unless it demonstrates the use ofprocedural
safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incriminations. By custodial
interrogation, it means questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has
beentaken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way. As
forthe procedural safeguards to be employed,
unless other fully effective means are devised to
informed accused-persons of their right of silence
and to assure a continuous opportunity
toexercise it, the following measures are
required. Prior to any questioning, the person
must bewarned that he has the right to remain
silent, that any statement he does make may be
used asevidence against him, and that he has a
right to the presence of an attorney, either
retained orappointed. The defendant may waive
effectuations of these rights, provided the waiver
is madevoluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If,
however, he indicates in any manner and at any
stageof the process that he wishes to consult
with an attorney before speaking there can be
noquestioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone
and indicates in any manner that he does
notwish to be interrogated, the police may not
question him. The mere fact that he may
haveanswered some questions or volunteered
some statements on his own does not deprive
him ofthe right to refrain from answering any
further inquiries until he has consulted with an
attorneyand thereafter consents to be
questioned.
Applies only from the moment the investigating
officer begins to ask questions for thepurpose of
eliciting admissions, confessions or any
information from the accused.
People vs. Baloloy, G.R. No. 140740, April
12, 2002, it was held that this guaranteedoes

not apply to spontaneous statement, not

elicited through questioning by the
authorities but given in an ordinary manner
whereby the suspect orally admitted
havingcommitted the offense. Neither can it
apply to admissions or confessions made by a
suspect before he was placed under custodial
investigation. In this case, the narrationbefore
the Barangay Captain prior to custodial
investigation was admissible in
evidence, but not the admissionquestioning by
the judge was done after the suspect had been
arrested and such
questioning already constituted custodial
investigation.
Rights guaranteed:
1. Right to remain silent;
2. Right to have a competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice
at all stages of the investigation;
Independent and competent counselwilling
to safeguard the constitutional rights of
the accused
3. Right to be informed of such rights;
Rationale:
a. to make him aware of it;
b. to overcome the inherent pressure o the
interrogating atmosphere; and
c. to show the individual that his interrogators
are prepared to recognize his
privilege should he choose to invoke it.
4. Right to be provided with counsel, if the
person cannot afford one;
These rights cannot be waives except in writing
and in the presence of counsel; it is not
required in a police-line up as the latter is not
part of a custodial inquest.
5. No torture, force, etc. which vitiate free will
shall be used;
6. Secret detention places are prohibited; and
7. Confession/admissions obtained in violation
of rights are inadmissible inevidence.
Ways of identifying the suspects During Custodial
Investigation:
1. Show-ups (out-of-court identification)
where the suspect alone is brought faceto face
with the witness for identification;
People vs. Escordial, G.R. Nos. 138934-35,
January 16, 2002, the accused,having become
the focus of attention by the police after he had
been pointed toby a certain Ramie as the
possible perpetrator of the crime, it was held that
whenthe out-of-court identification was
conducted by the police, the accused
wasalready under custodial investigation.
2. Mug shotswhere photographs are shown
to the witness to identify thesuspect; and
3. Police Line upswhere a witness
identifies the suspect from a group ofpersons
lined up for the purpose. It is not considered a
part of any custodialinquest because it is
conducted before that stage of investigation is
reached(People vs. Bravo, G.R. No. 135562,
November 22, 1999). The process hasnot yet
shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory
stage, and it is usually thewitness or the
complainant who is interrogated and who gives a
statement in thecourse of the line-up (People
vs. Amestuzo, July 12, 2001).
Factors in Resolving the Admissibility of and
Relying on Out-of-Court Identification ofSuspects:
TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES TEST

1. The witness opportunity to view the criminal

at the time of the crime;
2. The witness degree of attention at that time;
3. The accuracy of any prior description given by
the witness;
4. The level of certainty demonstrated by the
witness at the identification;
5. The length of time between the crime and the
identification; and
6. The suggestiveness of the identification
procedure.
Two (2) kinds of Involuntary or Coerced
Confessions:
1. Those which are the product of 3rd degree
methods such as torture, force,violence,
threat, intimidation, which are dealt with in
paragraph 2 of Section 12;and
2. Those which are given without the benefit of
Miranda warnings.
Extrajudicial Confessionsare presumed
voluntary, and, in the absence ofconclusive
evidence showing the declarants consent in
executing the same has been
vitiated, such confession will be sustained.
To be admissible, it must be:
1. Voluntary;
2. Made with the assistance of competent and
independent counsel;
3. Express; and
4. In writing.
Investigations not considered custodial
interrogation
1. Those conducted by an audit examiner
2. Those conducted by the Court Administrator
3. Those conducted by the employer
For the reason that these people are not law
enforcement officers
However, in the case of People vs. Salonga,
G.R. No. 131131, June 21, 2001, after
anaudit, the accused was summoned to
appear before the Assistant Accountant of
MetroBank and, in the course of the interview,
accused admitted having issued thesubject
cashiers checks without any legitimate
transaction, the written confession washeld
admissible in evidence inasmuch as the
interview did not constitute
custodialinvestigation.
Ladiana vs. People, G.R. No. 144293,
December 24, 2002, the counteraffidavitsubmitted by the respondent during
preliminary investigation is admissible because
preliminary investigation is not part of custodial
investigation. The interrogation by thepolice, if
any would already have been ended at the time
of the filing of the criminal casein court or in the
public prosecutors office.
Spontaneous statementsthose elicited
through questioning by law
enforcementofficers, but given in an ordinary
manner where the appellant verbally admits to
havingcommitted the offense, are admissible.
(People vs. Guillermo, G.R. No.
147786,January 20, 2004)
WAIVER

Itmust be in writing and made in the presence

of the counsel. The burden of proving that

there was a valid waiver rests on the
prosecution. The presumption of

official duty has been regularly performed

cannot prevail over the presumption
ofinnocence.
What may be waived?
1. Right to remain silent
2. Right to counsel
Exclusionary Rule
Confession or admission obtained in violation of
Sections 12 and 17 of Article III shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
Fruit of the poisonous treeonce the primary
source is shown to have been lawfullyobtained,
any secondary or derivative evidence derived
from it is inadmissible.
Evidence illegally obtained by the State
should not be used to gain otherevidence
because the originally obtained evidence taints
all evidence subsequently
obtained.
Sec. 13, Article III
All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable bysufficient
sureties, or be released or recognizance as
may be provided by law.
The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ ofhabeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required.
Right to Bail
Bailthe security given for the release of a
person in custody of the law, furnished byhim or
a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance
before any court as may berequired.
The right to bail may be invoked by any
person once detention commences evenif no
formal charges have yet to be filed;
It can availed of by a person who is in custody
of law or otherwise deprived of hisliberty;
Suspension of the writ of the privilege of
habeas corpus does not suspend theright to bail;
Even when the accused has previously jumped
bail, still he cannot be denied bailbefore
conviction if it is a matter of right. The remedy is
to increase the amount ofbail;
Right to bail has not been recognized and is
not available to the military.
Standards for fixing amount of bail:
1. Financial ability of the accused;
2. Nature and circumstances of the offense;
3. Penalty for the offense charged;
4. Character and reputation of the accused;
5. Age and health of the accused;
6. Weight of evidence against the accused;
7. Probability of appearance at trial;
8. Forfeiture of other bonds by him;
9. He was a fugitive from justice when arrested;
and
10.Pendency of other cases where he is also
under bail.
Bail as a matter of right
All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as
a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as prescribed by law:
1. Before or after conviction by the MTC; and
2. Before conviction by the RTC of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusionperpetua or
life imprisonment.
3. The evidence of guilt is not strong.
Bail when discretionary

1. Upon conviction by the RTC of an offense

not punishable by death, reclusionperpetua or
life imprisonment, the court, on application, may
admit the accusedto bail.
2. The court, in its discretion, may allow the
accused to continue on provisionalliberty after
the same bail bond during the period to appeal
subject to the consentof the bondsman.
3. If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment
exceeding 6 years but not morethan 20
years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his
bail previously grantedshall be cancelled, upon
showing by the following or other similar
circumstances:
a. That the accused is a recidivist, quasirecidivist, or habitual delinquent, orhas
committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteracion;
b. That the accused is found to have
previously escaped from legalconfinement,
evaded sentence, or has violated the conditions
of his bailwithout valid justification;
c. That the accused committed the offense while
on probation, parole, orunder conditional
pardon;
d. That the circumstances of the accused or his
case indicates the probabilityof flight if released
on bail; or
e. That there is undue risk that during the
pendency of the appeal, theaccused may
commit another crime.
Whether bail is a matter of right or
discretionreasonable notice of hearing
isrequired to be given to the prosecutor, or
at least he must be asked for his
recommendation, because in fixing the amount
of bail, the judge is required to take intoaccount
a number of factors.
When bail shall be denied
No person, regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution, shall be admitted to bail if:
a. Charged with capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment; and
b. Evidence of guilt is strong.
When the accused is charged with an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetuaor higher, a
hearing on the motion for bail must be
conducted by the judge todetermine whether
ornot the evidence of guilt is strong.
Without a hearing, the judge could not
possibly asses the weight of the evidenceagainst
the accused before granting the latters
application for bail.
(See the cases of Government of USA vs. Hon.
Purganan and
Government of Hongkong vs. Judge Olalia)
Sec. 14, Article III
(1) No person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of
law.
(2)In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be presumed innocent until
thecontrary is proved, and shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel, to
be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against
him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face,
and to have compulsory process to secure
the attendance of witnessesand the
production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial

may proceed notwithstanding the absence

of the accused provided that hehas been
duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.
Rights of the Accused:
1. Criminal due process:
a. Opportunity to be heard in court of competent
jurisdiction;
b. The accused must proceed against under
orderly processes of law;
c. He must be given notice and opportunity to be
heard; and
d. The judgment rendered was within the
authority of a constitutional law.
2. Presumption of innocence
Every circumstance favoring the innocence of the
accused must be takeninto account. The proof
against him must not be permitted to
swayjudgment and the presumption that official
duty was regularly performedcannot, by itself,
prevail over the constitutional presumption of
innocence.
3. Right to be heard by himself and counsel
4. Right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him
Objectives:
a. To furnish the accused with such a description
of the charge against him as will enable him to
make the defense;
b. To avail himself of his conviction or
acquittal for protection against afurther
prosecution for the same cause;
c. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that
it may decide whether theyare sufficient in law to
support a conviction, if one should be had.
Description, not designation, of the offense is
controlling.
Void-for-Vagueness Rulethe accused is
denied the right to be informed of thecharge
against him, and to due process as well,
where the statute itself iscouched in such
indefinite language that it is not possible for
men of ordinaryintelligence to determine
therefrom what acts or omissions are punished
and,hence, shall be avoided.
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
148560, November 19, 2001,
everylegislative measure is presumed
constitutional. Petitioner failed to discharge the
burden to overcome the presumption of
constitutionality.
5. Right to speedy, impartial and public trial
Impartialthe judge must not be bias and not
motivated by malice or bad faith
6. Right to meet witness face to face
Witnesses not submitted for cross-examination
are not admissible as evidence.However, right to
cross-examination may be waived.
7. Right to compulsory process to secure
attendance of witnesses and productionof
evidence
8. Trial in Absentia
After arraignment;
Due notice; and
Absence is unjustified.
Plea of guilt to a capital offense
1. There must be searching inquiry into the
voluntariness of the plea and the full
comprehension of the consequences thereof;

2. Presentation of evidence to prove the guilt of

the accused and the precise degree of his
culpability;
3. The accused must be asked if he desire to
present evidence on his behalf and allow him to
do so if he so desires.
Sec. 15, Article III
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
shall not be suspended except in cases of
invasion or rebellion when the public safety
requires.(Relate this to Section 18, Article
VII)

Writ of habeas corpus

A writ issued by the court directed to a person
detaining another, commanding him to
produce the body of the prisoner at designated
time and place, with the day andcause of his
capture and detention, to do, to submit to, and
to receive whatever court orjudge awarding
writ shall consider in his behalf.
It lies only where the restraint of a persons
liberty has been judicially adjudged tobe illegal
or unlawful.
A petition for habeas corpus will be given
due course only if it shows thatpetitioner is
being detained or restrained of his liberty
unlawfully. A restrictive custody
and monitoring of movements or whereabouts
of police officers under investigation bytheir
superiors is not a form of illegal detention or
restraint of liberty.(SP02 Manalo vs. PNP
Chief Calderon, G.R. No. 178920, October
15, 2007)
Sec. 16, Article III
All persons shall have the right to a
speedy disposition of their cases before
all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.
Enriquez vs. Office of the Ombudsman,
G.R. No. 174902-06, February 15,
2008,this right, like the right to a speedy trial,
is deemed violated when the proceedings are
attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays.
The concept of speedy disposition of cases
is relative or flexible. A simplemathematical
computation of the time involved is
insufficient. The facts andcircumstances
peculiar to each case must be examined. In
ascertaining whether theright to a speedy
disposition of cases has been violated, the
following factors must be
considered:
1. The length of delay;
2. The reasons for the delay;
3. The assertion or failure to assert such right
by the accused; and
4. The prejudice caused by the delay.
(Tilendo vs. Ombudsman
andSandiganbayan, G.R. No. 165975,
September 13, 2007)
Sec. 17, Article III
No person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself.
Right against self-incrimination
Availability:

Not only in criminal prosecutions but also in

all other government proceedings,including
civil actions and administrative or legislative
investigations
May be claimed not only by accused but
by any witness to whom an incriminating
question is addressed.
Scope:
It applies only against testimonial
compulsion and production of
documents,papers and chattels in court
except when books of account are to be
examined in
exercise of power of taxation and police power.
Two (2) types of Immunity Statutes:
1. Transactional Immunity Statutetestimony
of any person or whose possessionof
documents or other evidence necessary or
convenient to determine the truth inany
investigation conducted is immune from
criminal prosecution for an offenseto which
such compelled testimony relates; and
2. Use Immunity Statuteprohibits the use of
a witness compelled testimony andits fruits in
any manner in connection with the criminal
prosecution of the witness.
Sec. 18, Article III
(1) No person shall be detained solely by
reason of his political beliefs and
aspirations.
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form
shall exist except as a punishment for a
crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted.
Right against Involuntary Servitude
It is a condition where one is compelled by
force, coercion, or imprisonment, and against
his will, to labor for another, whether he is paid
or not.
General Rule: No involuntary servitude shall
exist.
Exceptions:
1. As punishment for a crime whereof one has
been duly convicted;
2. Service in defense of the State;
3. Naval enlistment;
4. Posse commitatus;
5. Return to work order in industries affected
with public interest; and
6. Patria potestas.
Sec. 19, Article III
(1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed,
nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death
penalty be imposed, unless,
forcompelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, the Congress hereafter
provides for it. Any death penalty
already imposed shall be reduced
toreclusion perpetua.
(2) The employment of physical,
psychological, or degrading punishment
againstany prisoner or detainee or the
use of substandard or inadequate penal
facilities under subhuman conditions
shall be dealt with by law.

Prohibited Punishments
Mere severity does not constitute cruel or
unusual punishment. To violate constitutional
guarantee, penalty must be flagrant and
plainly oppressive,
disproportionate to nature of offense as to
shock senses of community.
Sec. 20, Article III
No person shall be imprisoned for debt or
non-payment of a poll tax.
Coverage:
1. Debtany civil obligation arising from
contract
2. Poll taxa specific sum levied upon any
person belonging to a certain class
without regard to property or occupation.
A tax is not a debt since it is an obligation
arising from law hence, its non-payment
may be validly punished with imprisonment.
Sec. 21, Article III
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy
of punishment for the same offense. If an
act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under
eithershall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
Right against Double Jeopardy
Requisites:
1. A valid complaint or information;
2. Filed before competent court;
3. To which defendant has pleaded; and
4. Defendant was previously acquitted or
convicted or the case dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express
consent.
Two (2) types:
1. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense;
2. If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under
either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.To substantiate a
claim of double jeopardy, the following must
be proven:
1. A first jeopardy must have attached prior to
the second;
2. The second jeopardy must be for the same
offense, or the second offenseincludes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged
in the firstinformation, or is an attempt to
commit the same or is a frustration thereof.
Legal Jeopardy Attaches Only:
1. Upon a valid indictment;
2. Before a competent court;
3. After arraignment;
4. When a valid plea has been entered and
5. The case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the
accused.
General Rule: Dismissal of action, when
made at the instance of the accused, does
notput the accused in first jeopardy.
Exceptions:
1. When ground for dismissal is insufficiency of
evidence; 2. When the proceedings have been

unreasonably prolonged as to violate the right

of the accused of a speedy trial.
Crimes covered:
1. Same offense; or attempt to commit or
frustration thereof or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included
in the offense charged inoriginal complaint or
information; and
2. When an act is punishable by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittalunder either
shall bar another prosecution for the same act.
Doctrine of Supervening Event
prosecution for another offense if
subsequentdevelopment changes the
character of the first indictment under which
he may havealready been charged or
convicted.
Conviction of accused shall not bar another
prosecution for an offense whichnecessarily
includes the offense originally charged when:
1. Graver offense developed due to
supervening facts arising from the same actor
omission;
2. Facts constituting graver offense arose or
discovered only after filing offormer
complaint or information; and
3. Plea of guilty to lesser offense was made
without the consent of prosecutor oroffended
party.
Cabo vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
169509, June 16, 2006, for double jeopardy
toattach, the case against the accused
must have been dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a
validinformation sufficient in form and
substance and the accused pleaded to the
saidcharge.
People vs. Perlita J. Tria-Tirona, et al.,
G.R. No. 130106, July 15, 2006, after trial
onthe merits, an acquittal is immediately final
and cannot be appealed on the ground
ofdouble jeopardy. The only exception where
double jeopardy cannot be invoked is
wherethere is finding of mistrial resulting in a
denial of due process.
Sec. 22, Article III
No ex-post facto law or bill of attainder
shall be enacted.
Right against Ex-Post Facto Law and Bill
of Attainder
Ex-Post Facto Law
The equivalent of the impairment clause in
criminal matters is the prohibition against the
passage of the ex post facto law. This is
because the ex post facto law, like
the law impairing the obligation of the
contracts, operates retroactively to
affectantecedent acts. A law can never be
considered ex post facto as long as it
operatesprospectively since its structures
would cover only offenses committed after
and notbefore its enactment. Basically, an ex
post facto law is one that would make a

previousact criminal although it was not so at

the time it was committed.
Kinds:
1. Law criminalizing act done before its
passage;
Example: A law passed in 1990 raising the
age of seduction from 18 to 25years, effective
1980
2. Law aggravating penalty for crime
committed before passage;
Example: A law passed in 2000 designating
the crime of homicide through reckless
imprudence as murder, effective 1990
3. Law that changes punishment, and inflicts
greater or more severe punishmentthan the
law annexed to the crime when committed;
Example: A law passed in 2000 increasing the
penalty for libel from prision correccional to
prision mayor, effective 1990
4. Law altering legal rules of evidence and
receives less or different testimony thanlaw
required at the time of commission, in order to
convict accused;
Example: A law passed in 2000 requiring for
conviction merely preponderance of evidence
instead of proof beyond reasonable doubt,
effective 1990
5. Law assuming to regulate civil rights and
remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty
of deprivation of right for something which
when done was lawful; and
Example: A law passed in 2000 depriving
professionals of the right to practice for failure
or refusal to vote, effective 1990.
6. Law depriving accused of some lawful
protection to which he had been entitled, such
a protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or of a proclamation of
amnesty.
Example: A law passed in 2000
lengthening the period for prescription
ofblackmail from 5 to 10 years, effective 1990.
Characteristics:
1. It refers to criminal matters;
2. It is retroactive in application; and
3. It works to the prejudice of the accused.
In the case of US vs. Gomez Colonel, 12
Phil 279, an information for adulteryfiled by
the prosecutor was dismissed by the SC on the
ground that at the time of the
alleged commission of the offense, prosecution
could be commenced only on complaintof the
offended spouse. It was held that the
amendatory law permitting the prosecutor
toinitiate the charge was ex post facto.
Bill of Attainder
It is a legislative act that inflicts punishment
without trial
It is a legislative declaration of guilt
Essential:
1. Specification of certain individuals or a
group of individuals;
2. The imposition of a punishment, penal or
otherwise;
3. Lack of judicial trial.
It substitute legislative fiat for a
judicial determination of guilt. Thus, it is
onlywhen a statute applies either to named
individuals or to easily ascertainable

membersof a group in such a way as to inflict

punishment on them without judicial trial that
it
becomes a bill of attainder.
Article IV
CITIZENSHIP
Citizenship- is membership in a political
community which is personal and moreor less
permanent in character.
Nationality- is membership in any class or
form of political community. Thus,nationals
may be citizens [if member of a
democratic community] or subjects [if
members of a monarchial community]. It
does not necessarily include the right
orprivilege of exercising political and civil
rights.
Usual modes of acquiring citizenship:
a. By Birth
i. Jus sanguinis-by blood
ii. Jus soli-by birth
b. By Naturalization
c. By Marriage
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to
the principle of JUS SANGUINIS.Thereunder,
a child follows the nationality or citizenship of
the parents regardless of theplace of his
birth, as opposed to the doctrine of JUS
SOLI which determines thenationality or
citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
(Valles vs. COMELEC, 337
SCRA 543)
Modes (by birth) applied in the
Philippines
A. Before the adoption of the 1935 Constitution
i. Jus Sanguinis. All inhabitants of the islands
who were Spanish subjects onApril 11, 1899,
and residing in the islands who did not
declare theirintention of preserving Spanish
nationality between said date and October11,
1900, were declared citizens of the Philippines
[Sec. 4, Philippine Billof 1902; Sec. 2, Jones
Law of 1916], and their children born after
April 11,1899. (en masse Filipinization)
ii. Jus Soli. Those declared as Filipino citizens
by the courts are recognizedas such today, not
because of the application of the jus soli
principle, butprincipally because of the
doctrine of res judicata.
B. After the adoption of the 1935 Constitution:
Only the Jus Sanguinis doctrine.
Section 1, Article IV The following are
citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at
the time of the adoption of thisConstitution;
(February 2, 1987)
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens
of the Philippines; (jus sanguinis)
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of
Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippinecitizenship upon reaching the age of
majority;
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance
with law.
Section 2, Article IV Natural-born
citizens are those who are citizens of

thePhilippines from birth without having to

perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance
withparagraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16,
1934 in Australia, to spousesTelesforo
Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet,
Camarines Norte, and Theresa
Marquez, an Australian. Is she a Filipino
citizen and, therefore, qualified to run for
Governor of her province?
Historically, she was born a year before the
1935 Constitution took into effectand at that
time, what served as the Constitution of the
Philippines were the organic
acts by which the US governed the country.
These were the Philippine Bill of July 1,1902
and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29,
1916, also known as the JonesLaw.
These laws defined who were deemed to be
citizens of the Philippine Islands.Xxx Under
both organic acts, all inhabitants of the
Philippines who were Spanishsubjects on
April 11, 1899 and resided therein including
their children are deemed to bePhilippine
citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo,
was born on January 5, 1879in Daet,
Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a
certified true copy of an entry inthe registry
of Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of
1902 and the Jones Law,Telesforo Ybasco was
deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of
the same laws,which were the law in force at
the time of her birth, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is
likewise acitizen of the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Constitution
has established the principle of jussanguinis as
basis for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship xxx. This principle
conferscitizenship by virtue of blood
relationship. It was subsequently retained
under the 1973and 1987 Constitutions.
Thus, herein private respondent, Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen,having been
born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being
born in Australia is not
tantamount to her losing her Philippine
citizenship. If Australia follows the principle
ofjus soli, then at most, private respondent
can also claim Australian citizenship
resultingto her possession of dual citizenship.
(Valles vs. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543,
August9, 2000)
Maria Jeanette Tecson vs. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004 (on
thecontroversy surrounding the citizenship of
FPJ) The Court took note of the fact that
Lorenzo Pou (grandfather of FPJ), who died in
1954 at the age of 84 years of age,would have
been born sometime in 1870, when the
Philippines was under the Spanishrule, and
that San Carlos, pangasinan, his place of
residence upon his death in 1954, inthe
absence of any other evidence, could have
well been his place of residence beforedeath,
such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited

from the en masse Filipinizationthat the

Philippine Bill of 1902 effected. That Filipino
citizenship of Lorenzo Pou, ifacquired, would
thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe
(father of FPJ). The 1935Constitution,
during which regime FPJ has seen first
light, confers citizenship toall persons
whose fathers are Filipino citizens
regardless of whether suchchildren are
legitimate or illegitimate.
Marriage by Filipino to an alien: Citizens
of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain
their citizenship, unless by their act or
omission they are deemed, under the law, to
have renounced it [Sec.4, Art. IV].
Re: Application for Admission to the
Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching, Bar
Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999 Vicente
Ching, a legitimate child, having been born on
April 11, 1964 of Filipino mother and an alien
father, was already 35 years old when
hecomplied with the requirements of CA 625
on June 15, 1999, or over 14 years after hehad
reached the age of majority. By any
reasonable yardstick, Chings election
wasclearly beyond the allowable period within
which to exercise the privilege. All his
acts(passing the CPA and Bar Exams) cannot
vest in him citizenship as the law gives himthe
requirement for election of Filipino citizenship
which he did not comply with. (He wasnot
allowed to take the Lawyers Oath)
The proper period for electing Philippine
citizenship was, in turn, based on
thepronouncements of the Department of
State of the US government to the effect that
theelection should be made within a
reasonable time after attaining the age of
majority.The phrase reasonable time has
been interpreted to mean that the election
should bemade within three (3) years from
reaching the age of majority except when
there isjustifiable reason to delay.
The span of 14 years that lapsed from the
time he reached 21 until he finallyexpressed
his intention to elect Philippine citizenship
is clearly way beyond the
contemplation of the requirement of electing
upon reaching the age of majority.(If his
parents were not married, he will follow the
citizenship of his mother and he need not elect
Philippine citizenship. )
Caram provision. Those born in the
Philippines of foreign parents who, before
theadoption of the 1935 Constitution, had
been elected to public office in the Islands
areconsidered citizens of the Philippines. In
Chiongbian vs. de Leon, the SC held that
theright acquired by virtue of this provision is
transmissible.
Re: 1973 Constitution: Those whose mothers
are citizens of the Philippines. Provision
isprospective in application; to benefit only
those born on or after January 17, 1973
(dateof effectivity of 1973 Constitution).
If born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino
mothers, the person must elect

Philippinecitizenship upon reaching the age of

majority. [Within reasonable time=3 years
except
when there is justifiable reason to delay]
Procedure for election of Philippine
citizenship:
1. Election is expressed in a statement to
be signed and sworn to by the
partyconcerned before any official authorized
to administer oaths.
2. Statement to be filed with the nearest
Civil Registry accompanied with theOath
of Allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines
[Sec. 1, CA 625].
Those whose fathers or mothers are
citizens of the Philippines
Prospectiveapplication, consistent with the
1973 Constitution.
The right to elect Philippine citizenship is an
inchoate right; during his minority, thechild is
an alien [Villahermosa vs. Commissioner
of Immigration 80 Phil. 541].
The constitutional and statutory
requirements of electing Filipino citizenship
apply onlyto legitimate children. In Republic
vs. Chule Lim, G.R. No. 153883, January
13, 2004,it was held that the respondent,
who was concededly an illegitimate child
consideringthat her Chinese father and
Filipino mother were never married, is not
required tocomply with said constitutional and
statutory requirements. Being an illegitimate
child of
a Filipino mother, respondent became a
Filipino upon birth. Record shows
thatrespondent elected Filipino citizenship
when she reached the age of majority. She
registered as a voter in Misamis Oriental when
she was 18 years old. The exercise ofthe right
of suffrage and the participation in election
exercises constitute a positive act
of electing Philippine citizenship.
Naturalized citizens are those who have
become Filipino citizens
throughnaturalization, generally under CA
No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, which repealed the former
Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), andby RA
530.
To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove
that he possesses all the qualifications
andnone of the disqualifications provided by
law to become a Filipino citizen. The
decisiongranting Philippine citizenship
becomes executor only after 2 years from
its
promulgation when the court is satisfied that
during the intervening period, the applicant:
1. Has not left the Philippines;
2. Has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or
profession;
3. Has not been convicted of any offense
or violation of government promulgated
rules; or
4. Has not committed any act prejudicial to
the interest of the nation or contraryto any
government announced policies. [Sec. 1, RA

530] (Bengzon III vs.HRET, G.R. No.

142840, may 7, 2001)
Qualifications that must be possessed by
an applicant:
1. He must be not less than 21 years of age on
the day of the hearing of petition;
2. He must have resided in the Philippines for
a continuous period of not less than 10 years;
may be reduced to 5 years if:
a. he honorably held office in Government;
b. He established a new industry or
introduced a useful invention in the
Philippines;
c. He is married to a Filipino woman;
d. Has been engaged as a teacher in the
Philippines (in a public or private school not
established for the exclusive instruction of
persons of aparticular nationality or race) or
in any of the branches of education orindustry
for a period of not less than 2 year; or
e. He was born in the Philippines
3. He must be of GMC and believes in the
principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution, and must have conducted himself
in a proper and irreproachable
manner during the entire period of his
residence in the Philippines in his relationwith
the constituted government as well as with the
community in which he is
living;
4. He must own real estate in the
Philippines worth not less than
P5,000.00,Philippine currency, or must have
some known lucrative trade, profession or
lawful occupation;
5. He must be able to write and speak English
or Spanish and any of the principallanguages;
and
6. He must have enrolled his minor children of
school age, in any of the publicschools or
private schools recognized by the Bureau of
private Schools of the
Philippines where Philippine history,
government and civic are taught
orprescribed as part of the school
curriculum, during the entire period of
theresidence in the Philippines required of him
prior to the hearing of his petition
fornaturalization as Filipino citizen. (Bengzon
III vs. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, may7,
2001)
Disqualifications:
1. Those opposed to organized government or
affiliated with any association or group of
persons who uphold and teach doctrines
opposing all organized
governments;
2. Those defending or teaching the necessity
or propriety of violence, personalassault or
assassination for the success of predominance
of their ideas;
3. Polygamists or believers of polygamy;
4. Those convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude;
5. Those suffering from mental alienation or
incurable contagious disease;
6. Those who, during the period of their
residence in the Philippines have not

mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have

not evinced a sincere desire to
learn and embrace the customs, traditions and
ideals of Filipinos;
7. Those citizens or subjects of nations with
whom the Philippines is at war, duringthe
period of such war;
8. Those citizens or subjects of a foreign
country whose laws do not grant Filipinosthe
right to become naturalized citizens or
subjects thereof.
Procedure:
1. Filing of declaration of intention- 1 year prior
to the filing of the Petition with the OSG
Persons exempt from filing declaration of
intention :
a. Those born in the Philippines and received
their primary and secondary education in
public or private schools recognized by the
Government andnot limited to any race or
nationality;b. Those resided in the Philippines
for 30 years or more before the filing ofthe
petition, and enrolled their children in
elementary and HS recognized
by the government and not limited to any race
or nationality;
c. Those widows and minor children of
aliens who have declared theirintention to
become citizens of the Philippines and die
before they areactually naturalized.
2. Filing of the Petition, accompanied by the
affidavit of 2 credible persons, citizensof the
Philippines, who personally know the
petitioner, as character witness;
3. Publication of the Petition in the O.G. or in a
newspaper of general circulationonce a week
for 3 consecutive weeks. Failure to comply is
fatal. (Po Yo Bi vs.
Republic, 205 SCRA 400)
4. Actual residence in the Philippines during
the entire proceedings.
5. Hearing of the Petition.
6. Promulgation of the decision.
7. Hearing after 2 years. During the 2-year
probation period, applicant has:
a. Not left the Philippines;
b. Dedicated himself continuously to a lawful
calling or profession;
c. Not been convicted of any offense or
violation of rules; and
d. Not committed an act prejudicial to the
interest of the nation or contrary to any
government-announced policies.
8. Oath taking and issuance of Certificate of
naturalization.
Modes of Naturalization:
1. DIRECT - through:
d. Judicial or administrative proceedings- e.g.
RA 9139 The
AdministrativeNaturalization Law of 2000
grants Philippine citizenship to aliens
bornand residing in the Philippines
e. Special act of legislature- this is
discretionary on Congress; usuallyconferred
on an alien who has made an outstanding
contribution to thecountry
f. Collective change of nationality, as a result
of cessation or subjugation

g. Some cases, by adoption of orphan

minors as nationals of the State where they
are born
2. DERIVATIVE -Citizenship conferred on:
a. Wife of naturalized husband;
b. Minor children of naturalized person;
c. Alien woman upon marriage to a national.
Edison So vs. RP, G.R. No. 170603,
January 29, 2007Naturalization signifies
theact of formally adopting a foreigner into the
political body of a nation by clothing him orher
with privileges of a citizen. Under current and
existing laws, there are 3 ways bywhich an
alien may become a citizen by naturalization:
a. Administrative naturalization pursuant to RA
9139;
b. Judicial naturalization pursuant to CA No.
473, as amendedcovers all aliens regardless
of class; and
c. Legislative naturalization in the form of a
law enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine
citizenship to an alien.
It is the burden of the applicant to prove not
only his own good moral characterbut also the
good moral character of his/her witnesses,
who must be credible persons.
A naturalization proceeding is nota judicial
adversary proceeding, and the
decisionrendered therein does not constitute
res judicata. A certificate of naturalization may
becancelled if it is subsequently discovered
that the applicant obtained it by misleadingthe
court upon any material fact.
RA 9139not all aliens may avail of this
remedy. Only native born aliens who havebeen
residing here in the Philippines all their lives,
who never saw any other countryand all along
thought that they were Filipinos; who have
demonstrated love and loyaltyto the
Philippines, and affinity to the customs and
traditions of the Filipinos.
Naturalization
Repatriation
-mode for both
acquisition and
reacquisition of
citizenship
-governed by CA 473 (for
acquisition) and
CA 63 (for reacquisition)
-consists a lengthy
process

4. Minor children born outside the Philippines

before parents naturalization shall
beconsidered Filipino citizens only during
minority, unless they begin to
residepermanently in the Philippines;
5. Child born outside the Philippines after
parents naturalization shall beconsidered
Filipino citizen, provided that he registers
as such before any
Philippine consulate within one year after
attaining majority age, and takes hisoath of
allegiance.
Denaturalization
Grounds:
1. Naturalization certificate was obtained
fraudulently or illegally;
2. Within 5 years, he returns to his native
country or to some foreign country and
establishes residence there;
Prima Facie evidence of intent to take up
residence:
a. Native country- 1-year stay
b. Foreign country- 2-year stay
3. Petition was made on an invalid declaration
of intent;
4. Minor children failed to graduate through
the fault of the parents either by neglecting to
support them or by transferring them to
another school;
5. Allowed himself to be used as a dummy;
In Republic vs. Guy, 115 SCRA 244,
although misconduct was committed after the
2yearprobationaryperiod,
convictionofperjuryandrapewasheldtobevalid
groundfordenaturalization.
Effects of Denaturalization:
1. If the ground affects the intrinsic validity of
the proceedings, denaturalization shall divest
the wife and children of their derivative
naturalization;
2. If the ground was personal to the
denaturalized person, his wife and children
shall retain their Philippine citizenship.

-mode for reacquisition

Policy against Dual Allegiance :Dual
for those who lost
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
their citizenship
interest and shall be dealt with by law [Sec.
-governed by various
5, Art. IV].
statutes
-consists of taking of an The phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160,
Section 40(d) LGC must beunderstood as
oath of allegiance
to the RP and registering referring to dual allegiance. Consequently,
persons with mere dual
said oath in the
LCR of the place where citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual
the person
concerned resides or last allegiance, whomust be subject to strict
process with respect to the termination of
resided
their status, forcandidates with dual
citizenship, it should suffice if, upon filing of
their Certificates ofCandidacy (COC), they
Effects of Naturalization:
elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their
1. Vests citizenship on wife if she herself may
status as personswith dual citizenship
be lawfully naturalized; (She need notgo
considering that their condition is the
through the naturalization process; if she
unavoidable consequence of
doesnt suffer from any disqualification, no
conflicting laws of different states.
need to prove the qualifications)
By electing Philippine citizenship, such
2. Minor children born inconsidered citizens
candidates at the same time,
of the Philippines;
forswearallegiance to the other country of
3. Minor children born outside the Philippines
which they are also citizens and thereby
who were residing in the Philippinesat the time
terminatetheir status as dual citizens. It may
of naturalization shall be considered Filipino
be that, from the point of view of the foreign
citizens.

state and of its laws, such an individual has

not effectively renounced his foreign
citizenship.
That is of no moment.
The filing of a COC suffices to renounce
foreign citizenship, effectively removingany
disqualification as dual citizen. This is so
because in the COC, one declares that he is a
Filipino citizen and that he will support and
defend the Constitution and will maintaintrue
faith and allegiance to the same. Such
declaration under oath operates as
aneffective renunciation of foreign citizenship.
In this case, the Court adopted the liberal
interpretation of the rule. Manzano is not really
prohibited to run due to dual citizenship.Dual
allegiance is the one prohibited. Dual
citizenship referred to under Section 40 (d)of
the Local Government Code refers to dual
allegiance under Section 5 of Article IV ofthe
1987 Constitution.[Mercado vs. Manzano,
307 SCRA 630, May 26, 1999]
Section 5, Article IVDual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest
andshall be dealt with by law.
This section is not a self-executing law. It
needs an implementing law.
Section 40 (d), LGCDisqualifications.
The following persons are disqualified
fromrunning from any elective local election:x
xx
(d) Those with dual citizenship.x x x.
The provision prohibits dual citizenship but
the Supreme Court ruled that it refers to
prohibition on dual allegiance.
Doctrine of INDELIBLE ALLEGIANCE: an
individual may be compelled to retain
hisoriginal nationality even if he has already
renounced or forfeited it under the laws of the
second State whose nationality he has
acquired.
Dual Citizenship

Dual Allegiance

arises as a result
of the concurrent
application of the
different laws of 2
or
more states, a
person is
simultaneously
considered as a
national of said
states
involuntary

arises as a result
of the concurrent
application of the
different laws of 2
or
more states, a
person is
simultaneously
considered as a
national of said
states
involuntary

Calilung vs. Datumanong, G.R. No.

160869, May 11, 2007, what RA 9225 does
isallow dual citizenship to natural-born citizens
who have lost their Philippine citizenshipby
reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country. On its face, it does
notrecognize dual allegiance. By swearing to
the supreme authority of the Republic,
theperson implicitly renounces its foreign
citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, RA
9225stayed clear out of the problem of dual

allegiance and shifted the burden of

confrontingthe issue of whether or not there is
dual allegiance to the concerned foreign
country.
What happens to the other citizenship was not
made a concern of RA 9225.
Instances when a citizen of the
Philippines may possess dual citizenship:
1. Those born of Filipino fathers and/or
mothers in foreign countries which followthe
principle of jus soli;
2. Those born in the Philippines of Filipino
mothers and alien fathers if by the lawsof their
fathers country such children are citizens of
that country;
3. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of
the latters country the former areconsidered
citizens, unless by their act or omission they
are deemed to have
renounced Philippine citizenship. [Mercado
vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630, May26,
1999]

Res judicata in cases involving

citizenship:
General Rule: It does not apply to questions of
citizenship.
Exception: In Burca vs. Republic, 51 SCRA
248, an exception to the general rule
wasrecognized provided the following must be
present:
1. A persons citizenship be raised as a
material issue in a controversy wheresaid
person is a party;
2. The Solicitor general or his authorized
representative took active part in theresolution
thereof; and
3. The finding on citizenship is affirmed by SC.
Although the GR was set forth in the case of
Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case did not foreclose the
weight of prior rulings on citizenship. It
elucidated that reliance may
somehow be placed on these antecedent
official findings, though not really binding,
tomake the effort easier or simpler. (Valles
vs. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543, August 9,
2000).
Loss and Reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship
A. Loss of citizenship:
1. By naturalization in a foreign
country(Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, 174
SCRA245) However, this was modified by RA
9225An Act Making the Citizenshipof
Philippine Citizens Who Acquire
Foreign Citizenship Permanent
September 15, 2003 which declares the policy
of the State that all Philippinecitizens who
become citizens of another country shall be
deemed to have losttheir Philippine citizenship
under the conditions of this Act.
They may reacquire Philippine citizenship by
taking the oath of allegiance
Those Filipino citizens who, after the
effectivity of RA 9225, become citizens of a
foreign country, may reacquire Philippine
citizenship upontaking the oath of allegiance

 Unmarried child, whether legitimate,

illegitimate or adopted, below 18years of
age, of those who reacquire their Philippine
citizenship upon theeffectivity of RA 9225 shall
be deemed citizens of the Philippines.
Those who reacquire or retain Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil
and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilitiesand responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and the
following
conditions:
o Meet the requirements of RA 9189, The
Overseas Absentee VotingAct of 2003, and
other existing laws
o For those seeking elective public office and
appointive office, meetthe qualifications,
make personal and sworn renunciation,
subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance
to the RP
o For those intending to practice their
profession, apply with the proper authority
for a license or permit to engage in such
practice
2. By express renunciation of citizenship
Conscious, voluntary and intelligent
renunciation
Labo vs. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1, Labo lost
Filipino citizenship becausehe expressly
renounced allegiance to the Philippines when
he applied forAustralian citizenship.
Express renunciation means a renunciation
made known distinctly andexplicitly, and not
left to inference or implication.
Mere registration of alien in BID and mere
possession of foreign passportdo not
constitute effective renunciation. (Valles vs.
COMELEC)
In Willie Yu vs. Defensor-Santiago,
169 SCRA 364, obtaining aPortuguese
passport and signing commercial documents
as a Portuguesewere construed as
renunciation of Philippine citizenship.
3. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance
to support the Constitution or laws of aforeign
country upon attaining the age of 21;
provided, however, that a Filipino
may not divest himself of Philippine citizenship
in this manner while RP is at warwith any
country. an application of the principle of
Indelible Allegiance.by
virtue of RA 9225
4. By rendering service to or accepting
commission in the armed forces of
aforeign country EXCEPT:
If RP has a defensive and/or offensive
pact of alliance with the saidforeign
country; and
The said foreign country maintains armed
forces in Philippine territory withthe consent of
RP
5. By cancellation of the certificate of
naturalization
6. By having been declared by
competent authority a deserter of
thePhilippine armed forces in time of
war UNLESS subsequently, a plenarypardon
or amnesty has been granted.
B. Reacquisition of citizenship:

1. Under RA 9225, by taking an oath of

allegiance
2. By naturalization
3. By repatriation
4. By direct act of Congress
Effect of repatriation:
It allows the person to recover or return to, his
original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship. Thus, the respondent, a former
natural-born Filipino citizen who
lost his Philippine citizenship when he enlisted
in the US Marine Corps, was deemed tohave
recovered his natural-born status when he
reacquired Filipino citizenship
throughrepatriation. (Bengzon III vs. HRET,
G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001)Joevanie
Arellano Tabasa vs. CA, G.R. No.
125793, August 29, 2006, the
onlypersons entitled to repatriation under RA
8171 are the following: a) Filipino women
wholost their Philippine citizenship by
marriage to aliens; and b) Natural-born
Filipinos
including their minor children who lost their
Philippine citizenship on account of politicalor
economic necessity.

Article V
SUFFRAGE
Section 1
Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens
of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least
eighteen (18) years of age, and who
shallhave resided in the Philippines for at
least one year and in the place wherein
they propose to vote for at least six
months immediately preceding the
election. No
literacy, property, or other substantive
requirement shall be imposed on the
exercise of suffrage.
Section 2
The Congress shall provide a system for
securing the secrecy and sanctity of the
ballots as well as a system for absentee
voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a
procedure for the disabled and illiterates
to vote without the assistance of other
persons. Until then, they shall be allowed
to
vote under existing laws and such rules
as the Commission on Elections may
promulgate to protect the secrecy of the
ballot.
Right of Suffrage
Right to vote in election of officers chosen by
people and in the determination of questions
submitted to people.
ELECTIONis the embodiment of the popular
will, the expression of the sovereignpower of
the people.

It is the means by which the people choose

their officials for a definite and fixedperiod
and to whom they entrust for the time
being the exercise of the powers of
government.
Kinds:
1. REGULAR ELECTIONrefers to an election
participated in by those who possess the
right of suffrage and not disqualified by law
and who are registeredvoters. It is the election
of officers either nationwide or in certain
subdivisionsthereof, after expiration of full
term of the former members.
a. National Election
i. for President and VPevery 6 years
ii. for Senatorsevery 3 years
Paras vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 123169,
November 4, 1996, the SK Election isnot a
regular election because the latter is
participated in by youth with ages rangingfrom
15-18, as per RA 9164, some of whom are not
qualified voters to elect local ornational
elective officials.
b. Local Elections
i. For Members of HOR
ii. Party-List Representatives
iii. Provincial Officials Every 3 years from
the

2
iv. City Officials
Monday of May 1992
v. Municipal Officials
nd
c. Barangay Elections every 3 years after
July 2002 to be held on the last
Monday of October, synchronized with the SK
elections
d. ARRM Elections
i. For Regional Governor
ii. Regional Vice Governor
Every 3 years
from March 1993
iii. Regional Assemblymen
e. Sanggguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections -every 3 years after July 2002 to
be held on the last Monday of October,
synchronized with the Barangay
elections

------(ended in page 124)