BOETHIUS OF DACIA: 'ON THE HIGHEST GOOD'

Author(s): ANTHONY J. CELANO

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Traditio, Vol. 43 (1987), pp. 199-214
Published by: Fordham University
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BOETHIUS

OF DACIA: ON THE HIGHEST

By ANTHONY

GOOD'

J. CELANO

of Dacia evokes today an image of a radical thinker, who

cause
of philosophical
the
freedom, even at the expense of his
championed
His
have
earned
beliefs.
him, together with his contempo
religious
writings
The name Boethius

rary, Siger of Brabant, the title of leader of the 'Latin Averroists'

dox Aristotelians.'1
Boethius'
treatise on the highest good has

or 'Hetero

contributed
as
a
to
the
of
Boethius
modern
radical
thinker.
M.
Grabmann,
opinion
greatly
who rediscovered the De summo bono, considered the work to be a clear expres
sion of the anti-Christian tendencies inherent in 'Latin Averroism';
and P.
saw
to
most
the
short
treatise
be
the
Mandonnet
radical expression of a pro
gram of the natural life, the purest rationalism, and a total denial of the
Christian order.2 More

recently, this view has been modified by F. Van Steen

his
who argue that Boethius of Dacia
and
is indeed a Chris
students,
berghen
tian thinker, and in no way excludes 'supernatural beatitude' from his notion
of the highest good. They point out that, as a teacher of Aristotelian philoso
phy, Boethius' main concern is the summum bonum which can be attained on

earth. As a result, the De

Faculty at Paris.3

summo bono is a characteristic product of the Arts

The opposing views on the opusculum of Boethius lead us to consider first the
nature and origin of the work itself. We must ask ourselves whether the De
1 The

term

'Latin Averroism,'
whose main proponent
is P. Mandonnet,
et
Siger de Brabant
si?cle (Louvain
latin au XIIIe
1911), has a long history. More recently, F. Van
of the Arts masters
at Paris as 'Aver
objecting
strongly to the designation
Steenberghen,
in Siger de Brabant
ses
the alternative
'heterodox
roists,' proposed
Aristotelians,'
d'apr?s
l'averro?sme

uvres in?dites (Louvain

1931-1942)
also R. Hissette,
'?tienne Tempier
47 (1980) 231-70.
Neither
m?di?vale

and Ma?tre
Siger de Brabant
(Louvain-Paris
1977). See
et ses condemnations,'
Recherches
de th?ologie ancienne
et
term does justice to the varied teachings
of the masters

so designated,
to 'Averroist.'
but 'Aristotelian'
is preferable
For Boethius'
see B. Bazan,
of thirteenth-century
'La r?conciliation
philosophy

history
raison:

own place
in the
la foi et de la

de

?tait-elle
radicaux?'
19 (1980) 235-54;
for
pour les aristot?liens
possible
Dialogue
see P. Wilpert,
von
of the autonomy
Boethius'
of philosophy,
'Boethius
understanding
?
Die Autonomie
des Philosophen,'
Dacien
Miscellanea
3 (1964) 135-52.
Mediaevalia
2 M.
'Die Opuscula
De summo bono sive De vita philosophi
und De sompniis des
Grabmann,
v. Dacien,'
II (Munich
Boethius
Mittelalterliches
Geistesleben
idem, Neukaufge
1936) 220-24;
v. Dacien
und Siger v. Brabant
fundene Werke des Boethius
(Sb. Akad.... M?nchen
1924). 247;
'Note compl?mentaire

P. Mandonnet,

22 (1933) 250.
th?ologiques
3 F. Van

sur Bo?ce

de Dacie,'

au XII
La philosophie
Steenberghen,
sur les 219 articles condamn?s ? Paris

sette, Enqu?te

si?cle

Revue

des sciences philosophiques

et

(Louvain-Paris
1966) 404; R. His
le 7Mars
1277 (Louvain-Paris
1977) 17.

200

TRADITIO

summo bono is truly a radical departure from the teachings of Boethius' con
temporaries in the Parisian Arts Faculty, or merely the product of a more
daring use of Aristotelian terminology. We should note, first of all, that some

summo bono are not very characteristic of the literary activ

contemporaries in the Arts Faculty at Paris around 1270.4 In
ity of Boethius'
the De summo bono Boethius uses terms, such as beatitudo in futura vita and
beatitudo humana, which are rarely found in the writings of his colleagues in the
features of the De

Parisian Arts Faculty.5 His concepts of future beatitude and earthly beatitude
Summa Theologiae
correspond directly to notions found in Thomas Aquinas'
can
I?11, qq. 2-5. The Summa
hardly be called representative of the work of

the Arts masters, but its influence on the doctrine of the De summo bono is
of the presence of both theological and philosophical
undeniable.6 Because
summo
De
in
the
bono, we cannot say that the work is unquestionably
concepts
magisterial activity in the Arts Faculty.7 Rather than
on the place of origin of the treatise, we should look to the text

the result of Boethius'

conjecturing
itself in order to determine the place of the De

summo bono in thirteenth-cen

tury thought.
Boethius himself tells us that his treatise iswritten about the first principle,
which is the philosophical term for deus gloriosus. This is a very unusual way
for a master of the thirteenth-century Parisian Arts Faculty to consider the

final end forman. Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, for example, refuse
to consider God when discussing the highest human good in their commentar
ies on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. They prefer to concentrate upon
the operations of man, whose virtuous activities constitute happiness; or in

4 The most recent editor of the De summo bono

date
gives 1270 as the approximate
(DSB)
or
the
work:
the
of
of
he offers no explanation
of composition;
purpose
origin
place
concerning
Boetii Daci
N. G. Green-Pedersen,
opera, opuscula: De aeternitate mundi, De summo bono, De
danicorum medii aevi 6.2; Copenhagen
somniis (Corpus philosophorum
1976) xlvi-xlviii.
5 Thomas
in the Sentendo
libri Ethicorum
Opera omnia
[Sent] (ed. R.-A. Gauthier,
Aquinas,
attacks
those who
confuse
P. M.
47.1-2
iussu edita Leonis XIII
1969] 51.74-76),
[Rome
'Ex quo patet quod
with the Christian
ideal of beatitude:
of happiness
concept
ad intelligentiam
in ilia continuatione
de qua Philosophus
loquitur non consistit
in his
the Great,
ut
Albert
homo
omnia,
quidam
per quam
posuerunt.'
intelligat
separatam
Lectura
'Dicendum,
generalis beatitudo
quod felicitas non est quaedam
[Led.], does likewise:
omnes potentias,
sed operatio
sicut quidam
secundum
totius animae
et ordinatio
dicunt,

Aristotle's
felicitas

secundum

determinatam

rationem'

(Super Ethica

et determinatam
scilicet
scilicet prudentiam,
virtutem,
potentiam,
commentum et quaestiones Alberti Magni
Opera omnia [M?nster 1968]

14.1.1. 75.71-76.74).
6
xlvi.
the De summo bono to Thomas
DSB
attribute
Indeed, three manuscripts
Aquinas:
7 G.
De summo bono and his De generatione
of Boethius'
the parallel passages
Saj? compares
that the former work
influenced the latter. Boethii Daci
et corruptione, and concludes
opera,
Quaestiones
Copenhagen
generatione

de generatione
1972) xi-xv.
provide

et corruptione
(Corpus philosophorum
is similar,
style of both works

The

little help

in determing

the place

of origin

danicorum
and

medii

the passages
of the DSB.

aevi 5.1;
in the De

BOETHIUS

OF

201

DACIA

terminology they restrict themselves to the finis quo while relegating

the finis cuius to another branch of inquiry.8 A concentration upon the earthly

Thomas'
end

to the

for man,

of his

exclusion

supernatural

end,

is not,

however,

a feature

summo bono; the theological considerations of imperfect and perfect

beatitude, and their interdependence, are found in this work.9
We must then take Boethius at his word, and consider this treatise to con
of the De

cern the highest good, which can be understood in the following different ways:
the highest good simply; the highest good forman in the afterlife; the highest
good forman in this life. All these elements are considered in the De summo

to a certain confusion concerning its purpose. We can

it
offer here no conclusive statements on the origin of this work, because
and theological argu
contains such tightly woven strands of philosophical
bono and contribute

Even the last lines of the treatise seem somehow self-contradictory;

after praising the rational life of the philosopher, Boethius concludes the work
first principle, however,
with what can easily be considered a prayer: The
concerning which this discourse was made, isGod, glorious and sublime, who is

ments.

forever and ever, Amen.'10 Boethius seems to indicate here that the
activity of the philosopher, whose study of the causes of being
leads him to an awareness of the first cause, resembles the immediate intellec
tual knowledge of God, which the perfectly blessed enjoy. Thus the philoso

blessed

intellectual

pher's imperfect knowledge of God leads to the absolute perfection of the

intellect. Boethius makes this conclusion explicit when he discusses the rela
tion between perfect and imperfect beatitude, as we shall see below.

summo bono, then, cannot be considered a purely philosophical work

It is a much more
of the usual products of the Arts masters.
complex discourse, containing both a consideration of the Christian belief in
perfect beatitude and philosophical arguments on the role of the first principle
The De

in the manner

8 Sent.

the finis cuius and the finis quo are explained

most
29.26-34;
fully in Summa
I?11 1.8: 'Finis dupliciter
idest ipsa res in
dicitur, scilicet cuius, et quo;
Theologiae
(S. Th.)
. . .' Albert's
usus
et
sive
illius
rei.
boni
invenitur
of the subject
ratio
qua
adeptio
description
moral
matter
is similar to that of Boethius:
of Aristotelian
'Dicendum,
philosophy
quod
et sic est unum tantum, quod est deus; et sic non
vel simpliciter,
dupliciter:
. . .'
summum
summum
et sic quaeritur
Vel
alicui...
bonum
hominis
(Lect.
the end is Aristotle,
The origin of the twofold distinction within
De anima 2.4

summum

dicitur

quaeritur

hic.

33.74-81).

The direct source for the thirteenth-century

commentators
cf. 415b2-3).
is Aver
(415b20-21;
on the De anima: Commentarium
in
roes' commentary
Aristotelis
De anima
libros (ed.
magnum
F. S. Crawford, Corpus
Averrois
in Aristotelem
commentariorum
6.1 [Cambridge, Mass.
1953]
The first use of the distinction
183-84).
aurea:
inWilliam
of Auxerre's
Summa

Thomas
9 DSB

d'Aquin
(Ottawa
372.75-78.

10 'Primum
est benedictus

1956)

within the end, with respect to Christian beatitude,

is
see R. Guindon, B?atitude
et th?ologie morale
chez saint

54.

de quo sermo factus est, est deus

princ?pium,
in saecula
saeculorum.
Amen.'
377.242-44.
DSB

autem

gloriosus

et sublimis,

qui

202

TRADITIO

in the human good. In the language of the time, Boethius' opusculum deter
the way in which the finis cuius affects the finis quo. Let us now turn
our attention to the specific doctrines of the De summo bono, in order to see

mines

how Boethius

understands

this relationship.
on the highest good with a statement that
his
discussion
opens
summarizes his interpretation of the first six chapters of Aristotle's Nicoma
Boethius

chean Ethics:
'Since in every species of being there is some highest possible
good and man is a certain species of being, it is necessary that some highest
good be possible to man.'11 These opening lines are derived from Aristotle's

description of the good found at the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, and
include Aristotle's assertion that man must have his own specific good. Boe
thius does not attribute these positions directly to Aristotle, most likely be
cause

were

they

so well-known

at

the

time.

stating that man as a species of being must have a highest good,

Boethius declares his specific topic to be the summum sibi, which is here the
refrains from an extensive con
highest good attainable by man. Boethius
After

of the summum bonum absolute, because he wishes to investigate

only that good which can be known by reason (per rationem investigemus).12
Must we then, like Grabmaiin, Mandonnet,
and even Van Steenberghen,
sideration

the words per rationem investigemus to exclude any religious con

from the treatise ?13 Despite his claim to investigate the good by
reason, Boethius considers both perfect and imperfect beatitude, and the way
inwhich the highest earthly good forman contributes to his ultimate goal as a

understand
siderations

are hardly the concerns of a man who expresses anti-Chris

tian tendencies or totally denies the Christian order. When Boethius says that
he will investigate only the summum bonum hominis, he does not thereby
Christian.14 These

exclude God from the discussion.

For man

to obtain his ultimate end, he must

to Boethius, no greater good which man can

know God; there is, according

attain 'than a cognition of the totality of beings which emanate from the first
principle and therefore a cognition of the first principle itself as far as such
cognition is possible.'15 The De summo bono turns out to be not merely an
notion of happiness in the usual manner of his
predecessors in the Arts Faculty, who concentrated on the human activities; it
is also a consideration of the ultimate end, or object, of these activities. It is to
explanation

Boethius'

11 DSB

of the Aristotelian

credit that he recognized that God played an important role inAris

369.1-3.

See J. Schneider,

(Munich-Paderborn-Vienna
12DSB
369.4-7.
13 See
.2.
above,
14 See
below, pp. 213-214.
15DSB
371.47-51.

1967).

Das

Gute und die Liebe

nach der Lehre Albert

des Grossen

BOETHIUS

OF

203

DACIA

totelian ethics (Eth. Nie. 10.8, 1178b22-32). Moreover, he sees no fundamental

opposition between the philosopher's desire to know the first being and the
In this way, Boethius' work is similar to the Summa
believer's love of God.
Theologiae.

In his search to discover the activities in which the highest human good
follows very closely Aristotle's doctrine on human happi
consists, Boethius
ness. Like Aristotle, Boethius quickly rejects the actions which are produced
by the vegetative and sensitive powers of the soul as possible explanations of
the human good. Sensation and growth are common to lower forms of life,
and, as such, are inadequate descriptions of the human good. Boethius con
cludes that the highest human capability resides in the intellect, and that the
best life consists in using the intellect in order to contemplate and to act

morally.16

In his brief summary of the Aristotelian notion of happiness, Boethius real

a consists in the exercise of both rational faculties
izes that Aristotle's e a

In asserting that the human good encompasses both speculation

actions, Boethius follows very closely the interpretation of Aristot
le's Ethics found in Thomas Aquinas' Sententia libri Ethicorum. Like Thomas,
Boethius argues that for each rational power of the soul there is a highest
possible good. The speculative power of the intellect attains its summum
of the soul.
and moral

bonum in the cognition of truth and the delight therein; for the practical intel
lect, the operation of good and the delight therein constitute the highest
good.17 Boethius concludes that the highest human good is both knowing truth
and performing morally good actions, and the pleasure that both these activi
stresses the necessity of per
ties bring.18 Throughout the treatise, Boethius
in
the
human
actions
attaining
good. Indeed, a great
forming morally good
16 DSB

virtus hominis ratio et intellectus est;

Note
that Boethius
says: Optima
tarn in speculando
quam in operando'
(italics mine).
regimen vitae humanae
from Etnica Nicomachea
2.1
between
ratio and intellectus is derived
The distinction
[E. N.]
between
intellectual
and moral virtues.
where Aristotle
distinguishes
(1138b34-1139al5),
17 DSB
see Sent. 58.84-90,
where Thomas
and 371.32-34;
370.20-24,
argues that felicitas
est enim

369.7-14.

summum

life: '. .. sed felix habet

virtu
in both the active
and contemplative
consists
perfectam
... ergo iste semper vel maxime
poterit operari in vita activa quae sunt secundum virtu
in vita contemplativa.'
tem et speculari
18 DSB
in
is almost universally
and Thomas
The position of Boethius
371.62-65.
rejected
the thirteenth century in favor of that of Albert, who sees in the E. N. two distinct types of

tem

happiness,
hominis,
33.7-10).

duos ordines duo sunt summa bona

'Et sic secundum
contemplative:
unum
scilicet
civilis ad contemplativam'
ad
tarnen
ordinatur
alterum,
(Led.
quorum
on the E. N.
of MS Vat.
lat. 2172 (V), following
commentator
The anonymous
civil

and

in the late thir

of Aristotle's
notion of happiness
gives the common
interpretation
et ista consistit
in speculacione
veritatis
est felicitas: contemplativa,
century:
'Duplex
... Alia est felicitas
in usu
et ista consistit
encium.
et maxime
practica,
respectu primorum

Albert,
teenth

et operibus
prudencie
ro?stes" sur l'?thique
269-93.
(1947-48)

(fol. 6va). See also R.-A.

? Nicomaque,'
Archives d'histoire

virtuosis'

Gauthier,
doctrinale

Trois

commentaires

"aver

et litt?raire du moyen-?ge

16

204

TRADITIO

attempts to demonstrate how a man who

the
truth will best know which actions he should perform.19
speculates upon
insistence upon the role of pleasure in the human good
Finally, Boethius'
assertion that the operations of intellectual and
recalls vividly Aristotle's
portion

moral

of the rest of the work

virtue

are most

pleasurable.20

Although Boethius claims the highest good must consist in both intellectual
and moral virtues, he, as a thinker in the Aristotelian tradition, cannot deny
the superiority of speculation. He argues that ultimately all other actions are
directed to the one supreme action, which is the contemplation of truth.21

denying the moral superiority of the philosopher,22 Boethius considers

the primary function of a philosopher to be the contemplation of truth, and
praises the human intellect because of its kinship with the divine. Boethius

Without

further compares the intellect with the best imaginable entity in the totality of
being, and concludes that both are worthy of the designation 'divine.' It is this

divine portion of the human soul that separates man from the beasts.23
Boethius'
claim that the supreme human act is the contemplation of truth
leads him to a consideration of the object of intellectual activity. He makes it

clear that the human desire for knowledge can never be satiated until man
knows ens increatum. Citing Averro?s, Boethius argues that all men naturally
desire knowledge of the divine.24 This section marks an important transition in
the subject matter of the De summo bono; from now on, Boethius speaks of the
summum bonum in different terms from those we have previously encountered.
longer does he restrict himself solely to a consideration of the human activi
ties which comprise the human good; he will now treat the object of the phi

No

losopher's knowledge. Although Boethius limits his arguments on the object of

intellection to philosophical ones, he leaves no doubt as to the identity of the
object of human speculation. The object, or the finis cuius, of human happi
ness is the first cause, the uncreated being, the first principle.25 These last
three terms are used in the De summo bono to refer to deus gloriosus et sublimis,
as Boethius himself clearly admits.26 As a result, we must consider the purpose
19DSB

374.149-375.64.

21 DSB

375.165-70;

20 E.

22 DSB
23 DSB
24 DSB
25DSB

. 1.8
(1099a7-23).
E.

375.163-64:
370.20-24;

. 10.7
(1177al2-18).
est facilius virtuosus
'. . . ideo philosophus
10.7 (1177b26-1178a8).
E. N.

quam

alius.'

375.170-73.

. in the late
on the E.
in commentaries
Such terms are common
passim.
consistit
century: e.g. : 'Cum in bono separato,
quod est prima causa, aliqualiter
humana
of James of Douai
felicitas . . .' (V, fol. 7rb). The commentary
(?) names God as the
'. . .qui finis sit oper?ci?
hominis bene tarnen est propter
extrinsic end for man
(finis cuius):
alium finem extrinsecum,
scilicet finem ultimum simpliciter, qui est deus' (MS Paris, B.N.
lat.
375-77,

thirteenth

'Les Questiones
14698 [J], fol. 133va). See R.-A. Gauthier,
Revue du moyen ?ge latin 20 (1964) 233-60.
d'Auvergne,'
26 DSB
377.210-13.

supra

librum Ethicorum

de Pierre

BOETHIUS

OF

205

DACIA

treatise truly to be a consideration of the highest good, God

how
God affects the summum bonum hominis. In a most impor
and
himself,
?
?
tant way
God is the highest
i.e., as the object of human speculation
human good, concerning which the opusculum was written.
of Boethius'

see now that Boethius

We

does not restrict himself to a discussion

of the

end in terms of human activity alone. The idea that God is the sum
mum bonum hominis opens the way for some philosophical considerations on
the nature of the object of human intellection. Because the final end of human
human

knowledge consists in contemplation of the divine, Boethius does not believe

that an examination of the uncreated being lies entirely outside the scope of
his work. As a result, Boethius considers the problem of summum bonum homi
nis from two points of view: (1) the most common way for a master of the

thirteenth-century Parisian Arts Faculty, the activities of human reason, or

the finis quo;27 (2) the manner inwhich Thomas Aquinas discusses God in the
Summa Theologiae as the object of human intellection, or the finis cuius.28
Until the time of the De summo bono this second way of considering the human
end had been dismissed as irrelevant to the study of the human good by reason
alone. Because Aristotle had considered the question of the idea of the good as

predecessors in the
appropriate to another branch of philosophy, Boethius'
Arts Faculty who composed commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics did like
wise.29 Boethius, however, is not writing a commentary on the text of the
Nicomachean Ethics, but an exposition of a problem arising from his reading of

concern is the way in which the highest good affects the

consideration of the relation between God and
the human good marks a decisive point in the history of moral philosophy in
the thirteenth century. The commentators on the Nicomachean Ethics of the

Aristotle.

His main

summum bonum hominis. His

late thirteenth century, most likely influenced by his De summo bono and
Thomas' Summa Theologiae, will now regard God, as the finis cuius, to be an
integral part of their work on moral philosophy.30
27 See
above,
28 S. Th.
I?II,

.8.
qq. 2-5 are concerned mainly
See specifically
S. Th. I?11

with

beatitude.

See

the perceptive
1964) 120-21.

also

(Mainz
29 E.

comments

ofW.

Kluxen,

1.8:

the way

in which

is necessary
to
God
et
scilicet
cuius
dicitur,
dupliciter
de
quo; idest ipsa res in qua ratio boni invenitur et usus sive adeptio rei. ... Si ergo loquamur
rerum.
ultimo fine hominis quantum
ad ipsam rem quae est finis hominis et omnium aliarum
ad consecutionem
Si autem loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum
finis. . . . Nam homo et
. . .'
aliae rationales
creaturae
finem cognoscendo
ultimum
et amando
Deum.
consequuntur

human

'Finis

Philosophische

Ethik

bei Thomas

Aquin

. 1.6
DSB
Cf. the opinions of Albert and Thomas,
who
376, passim.
(1096b30-35);
consider the concern of ethics to be human activities
alone (Led. 31.31-81;
Sent. 14.14-21).
30 Boethius'
to the study of ethics in the thirteenth century is his realiza
main contribution
see J. Dudley,
tion that the divine plays an important
role in Aristotle's
Gott und
Ethics;
e

bei Aristoteles

(Frankfurt

a. M.

1981).

Boethius'

influence

can

be

seen

in Peter

of

206

TRADITIO

In his investigation of the highest good, Boethius, despite his claim to inves
tigate his topic through reason alone, considers a very important tenet of faith:

expects beatitude after his death. Boethius' mere use of the word
beatitudo to describe human perfection, instead of the more usual felicitas,
betrays his sensitivity to the theological question of the relationship between
that man

life on earth and his hope for a future reward.31 Boethius first claims the
highest good to be beatitudo humana, which he defines as the cognition of truth,
the operation of good, and the delight in each.32 What Boethius has given here

man's

is his understanding ofAristotle's definition for human happiness, which, as we

have said, is almost always referred to in the writings of his contemporaries in
the Arts Faculty as felicitas33
We must

first ask ourselves whether Boethius has confused the philosophical

of
the human good as happiness with the theological understanding
description
as
ofman's end
heavenly beatitude. The way inwhich he continues to discuss
beatitude seems to indicate some confusion about his own philosophical ideal

of human perfection on earth. He says that for the sake of beatitude society
should be ordered by military and legislative means so that the citizens are
given the best possible chance to achieve their goals. He then claims that this
is the greatest good which man can receive from God and which God
can give to man in this life.34
At first glance Boethius' assertion that God grants beatitude may lead us to
conclude that Boethius has altered the method of investigating the human
good by reason. If God grants human beatitude, then all Boethius' talk con
cerning intellectual and moral virtue ismerely a prelude to his specific inten
beatitude

on the E. N.:
'Cum dicitur quod finis omnium est prima causa, non est
questions
Auvergne's
suam.
de consideracione
civilis scientie, dicendum
substanciam
quod hoc verum est secundum
tarnen prohibet
in quantum
civilis doctrine
Nichil
ipsam esse de consideracione
operaciones

a civili sciencie ordinantur

ad ipsum'
Universit?tsbibliothek
1386,
(MS Leipzig,
article
'Peter
of
A
fol.
See
my
supra librum Ethicorum:
Questiones
Auvergne's
[L]
118ra_b).
Critical Text and Study,' Mediaeval
Studies
'Les Questio
1-110; also R.-A. Gauthier,
(1986)
nes . . .' (above, n. 25).
31 The difference between
in
felicitas and beatitudo is clearly stated by Robert Kilwardby
as well as ancient philoso
to Catholics
his De sortu scientiarum:
'The spiritual good according
considerate

call happiness;
which philosophers
while
the Catholics
phers is beatitude,
prefer beatitude.
in the mortal
to the truth of the Catholic
Beatitude
faith cannot be fully attained
according
life...'
ortu
ed.
A.
C.
124
The word
scientiarum,
(De
Judy
[Toronto
1976]
[my trans.]).

refers to
felicitas, when unmodified
by terms such as in futura vita or divina, almost always
in this
For a discussion
of the problem of beatitude
the philosophical
concept of happiness.
to my article mentioned
above
era, see the introduction
(n. 30).
32 DSB
371.65-67.
33 See

above,

n. 32.

Ethica Nicomachea
34 DSB
372.72-73:
deus

homini

dare

Robert

Grosseteste

in Aristoteles

Latinus

'Hoc

potest

enim

est maius

in hac vita.'

always
26.1-3.4
bonum

translates
(Leiden
quod

1974).
homo a deo

a as felicitas.
recip?re

potest

See

his

et quod

BOETHIUS

OF

207

DACIA

tion, i.e., to describe the way in which God grants to man the human good.
Thus, we are forced to view the De summo bono as a work that contradicts
itself: on the one hand, Boethius claims to investigate the human good by
reason alone; on the other, he asserts unequivocally
that God causes human

If God is said to be the cause of human perfection, then Boethius

happiness.
would be forced to admit that man, being unable to affect the first cause, must
reason, which Boethius
passively await divine intervention. Even
prizes

In order to
greatly, could never ensure that God 'grant' human happiness.
understand the significance of Boethius' assertion that God gives man beati
tude we must first determine the exact meaning of beatitudo humana.

The key to understanding Boethius' doctrine of beatitude lies in the writings

of his predecessors, who see in the Nicomachean Ethics a notion of beatitude
which is distinct from that of happiness.
In chapters 9 and 10 of Book
I,
Aristotle

discusses

of his discussion

the effects of fortune upon the human good.

a a
he introduces the term 'beatitude' (

In the course

). Modern
asserted
in
the
that
Ethics
Nicomachean
long
happiness (e a
a a
a) and beatitude or blessedness (
) mean more or less the same
uses
that
Aristotle
them
and
thing,
interchangeably.35 It is not my intention
scholars have

doctrine of beatitude; we may simply note

that Aristotle implies a distinction between the essential element of happiness,
which is the exercise of virtue, and a supremely blissful life,which ismarked
here to examine

in detail Aristotle's

by an abundance of material benefits.36

The medieval
interpretation of the Aristotelian concept of earthly beatitude
its
in
Eustratius'
has
commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, which was
origin
translated

In his discussion
by Bobert Grosseteste in 1246-1247.37
notion of the human good, Eustratius excludes external or
from the essence of happiness.38 Eustratius argues that only

into Latin

of the Aristotelian

corporeal goods
those virtues which
ture of Aristotelian

result from mental activities constitute the essential na

political, or earthly, happiness. As a result, misfortunes

35 Foremost

? Nicomaque
and Y. Jolif, L'?thique
among them are R.-A. Gauthier
(Louvain
note ad 1101a7. Also J. A. Stewart, Notes on theNicoma
and commentary,
1970) translation
the usual position
chean Ethics of Aristotle
(Oxford 1892), whose note on 1101a6 summarizes
a a
of modern
between e a
and
is not carefully observed
scholars:
'The distinction
by Aristotle.'
36
See my

article

'Aristotle

amines E. N.
1.9-10.
37 D. A.
'The Date
Callus,
and

Dionysius
200-209.
38 Eustratii

chum (ed. H.

of Grosseteste's

the Nicomachean

Metropolitani
P. F. Mercken;

[Leiden 1973] 147).

on Beatitude,'

Ethics,'

Ancient

Philosophy

Translation

Recherches

and

5 (1985)
Commentaries

de th?ologie ancienne

205-14,

ex

on the Pseudo

etm?di?vale

in primum Aristotelis moralium

Enarraiio
on the 'Nicomachean
The Greek Commentaries
Ethics'

Nicaeae

which

14 (1947)
ad Nicoma
of Aristotle

208

TRADITIO

and calamities, such as those that Aristotle describes, 'do not alter the sub
stance of happiness, but somewhat restrict and impede beatitude, bringing sad
ness and impeding many an operation.'39
In recognizing the distinction be

and 'happiness,' Eustratius understands the use of

in
the Nicomachean Ethics to signify a refinement of
(beatus)
e
a
a (felicitas), for he notes that 'he is blessed
concept of

tween the terms 'beatitude'

the word

a a

the Aristotelian

in his civil affairs (beatus in politicis) who has an abundance

of every sort of

good.'40

sees a separate philosophical notion of beatitude

in
Although Eustratius
Aristotle's Ethics, he adds his own decidedly Christian interpretation to Aris
totle's claim that men who live according to complete virtue and who have

sufficient external goods will be 'blessed, as men.'41 Eustratius

interprets this
line to mean that men are blessed according to human life,which is subject to
beatitude on earth is de
many changes during earthly existence. Because

pendent on good fortune, and is thus fragile and mutable, Eustratius views the
words 'blessed as men' as an expression of Aristotle's belief in another type of
beatitude. According to Eustratius, Aristotle claims men can be blessed only
as men, because
'there is another species of beatitude of an intellectual and
divine nature, having its existence without movement,
and sustaining no
change

whatsoever.'42

had a profound impact on the thirteenth

commentary of Eustratius
on
commentators
the
of
Nicomachean
Ethics. His understanding
century
as
a
beatitude
distinct
related
the
Aristotel
to,
from,
concept
earthly
though
The

ian notion of happiness was widely accepted in the writings of the Arts Masters
at Paris. His realization of the conflicting claims of the philosopher's beatitude
and the Christian's final end influenced both the philosophical and the theo

logical discussion of Aristotle's moral philosophy in the second half of the

thirteenth century, although his understanding of the words 'blessed as men,'
as an implication of the Aristotelian
doctrine of future beatitude, was not
us
our
turn
Let
attention now to those thinkers who,
universally accepted.
having been influenced by the commentary of Eustratius, had the greatest
impact on the doctrine of Boethius' De summo bono: Albert the Great and
Thomas

Aquinas.

39 Ibid.

converso autem accidentia

et opposite
ei quod est bene substantiam
160:
quidem
autem quodammodo
et impediunt
tristitias
beatitudinem,
felicitatis non alterant,
angustant
inferentia et multam
operationem
(italics added).
impediunt'
40 Ibid.
et
si ipsi accidant
163: 'Interim autem
infortunia qualia
igitur non erit beatus,
omnem
enim ille est in politicis qui secundum
Priamo.
Beatus
abundat.'
speciem bonorum
here that Eustratius'
There can be no question
is purely
concept of beatitude
41 a a
. 1.10
ut
'a
E.
(beatos,
homines):
(1101a20).
42
.
Enarratio
[above,
38] 166.

philosophical.

BOETHIUS

OF

209

DACIA

Albert the Great raises the question of the possibility of worldly beatitude
when discussing Aristotle's response to Solon's dilemma. According to Albert
in the Lectura, Solon did not want to say that a man must be dead to be happy,
but rather he must be beyond life's changing fortunes to be judged happy. For
only when a man is dead and beyond any possibility of performing actions

contrary to those of a happy man can he be safely said to have been a happy
man. Albert calls this problem more pertinent to logic than to ethics.43 Albert
later refines his position in his paraphrase of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics as
follows: certainly when we speak of a happy man, we speak of a living man,

even if it is only after his death that he can first safely be called happy. Albert
concentrates upon the way inwhich we can safely call someone happy; but he
goes on to distinguish between the essential nature of happiness and the mate
rial benefits which one may accumulate throughout one's lifetime. Albert says
that the perfect good may be considered as happiness secundum esse, which
consists in the operation of virtue, or as happiness secundum posse, which
includes

virtuous

actions

as well

as

all

possible

external

goods.44

Solon's

argu

ment, Albert concludes, pertains only to the second way of considering happi
ness: we wait until after a man's death in order to judge correctly concerning
that happiness which encompasses all external goods, but even to say a man
cannot be called happy when he is performing the essential activities of happi

ness

is absurd.

Albert argues, in the Lectura, that if one considers happiness secundum esse,
one must say that it lacks nothing of itself, consists in the exercise of reason,
and need not endure until the final moment of life. If, on the other hand, one
considers happiness according to every mode which can possibly occur to it

(felicitas secundum posse), then one must conclude that human happiness is
made more perfect by the contentment of a happy death.45 This second man
ner of considering happiness corresponds directly to Eustratius' notion of bea
tus in politicis.
In fact, Albert uses the term beatus felicitate civili to denote
that happiness whereby a man has everything which he may desire on earth.
Still, Albert admits that even one who is blessed on earth is not the same as a
felix simpliciter, whose every possible desire is fulfilled after death.46
43 Led.

sur la Morale
'Le cours in?dit d'Albert
See A. Pelzer,
le Grand
? Nico
et r?dig? par S. Thomas
Revue
de
24
d'Aquin,'
n?oscolastique
philosophie
479-520.
(1922) 333-61,
44
=
libri X
Ethicorum
cf. Led.
22.37-45,
(
Para.):
Opera omnia (Paris
1891) 1.7.14.127b;
where felicitas secundum essentiam is compared with felicitas in maxime
posse, which denotes
of external goods.
happiness
together with an abundance
45 Led.
69.68-72.

maque

60.78-86.

recueilli

46 Led.

in vita,

52.46-50:
sed beatus

dummodo
distinguish

voluntas
heavenly

quod felix simpliciter habet quae vult simpliciter, sed hoc non
civili habet omnia quae vult, secundum
statum, non simpliciter,
uses the words
sit ordinata.'
Albert
felix simpliciter here in order to
beatitude
from his notion of earthly beatitude
(beatus felicitate civili).

'Dicendum,
felicitate

210

TRADITIO

Like Eustratius, Albert realizes that Aristotle's concept of beatitude is not

the same as that of the Christian faith, and he understands Aristotle's words to
be an explicit rejection of the possibility of perfect beatitude

non

Et
tur.

Tales

oportet
autem

ut mos
dicimus

ut tune vere
exspectetur,
[ed. Vives:
non
ut homines
quibus
competit

in this life:

viri]

beati

dican

supercoelestium

beatitudo et divina; quia ad illam homo non potest ex his quae hominis sunt.47
Albert argues that even Aristotle, the pagan philosopher, realized the imper
fect nature of man; by excluding man from perfect beatitude, Aristotle distin
guished human beings from the gods and the spirits.48 In his comments on the

Ethics

of Aristotle, Albert

is content to restrict himself to a mere mention

of

perfect beatitude. He considers this idea to lie outside the realm of moral
philosophy, because otherworldly beatitude cannot be investigated by philo
sophical reasoning. The happiness which is characterized by divine contempla

tion is something to be believed in, not to be investigated by reason.49

The work of Albert the Great, together with the commentary of Eustratius,
set the direction formuch of the discussion on the notion of happiness in the

second half of the thirteenth century.50 Nowhere is their influence more ap

parent than in Thomas Aquinas'
teachings on Aristotelian happiness and be
atitude.51 Thomas views the dilemma of Solon to be primarily a question

the possibility of happiness on earth. Thomas

refutes the opinion of
on
reserve
to
wished
the quality of a human life until
Solon, who
judgment
after a man's death, by appealing to the nature of happiness. Thomas argues
about

that ifwe follow the turns of fortune, and must continually revise our opinion
throughout the course of a person's lifetime, we must then concede that happi
ness is indeed weakly based. Such constant re-evaluation belies the true nature

defined by the Philosopher as the enduring operation of virtue.52

lies in his failure to see the correct
Solon's mistake, according to Thomas,
external
in
of
human
goods
happiness. Like Albert, Thomas finds the
place
solution to Solon's dilemma in the distinction between felicitas secundum opti
of happiness,

mum quod esse potest and felicitas secundum esse. Happiness

considered accord
essence
can
be attained during one's lifetime, and nothing prevents us
ing to its
from calling a virtuous man happy before his death. On the other hand, if
is thought of as the maximum

happiness
47
Para.
48 Led.

69.39-44.

49 Led.

17.50-55,

50 R.-A.

51 See

130-31.
52 Sent.

enjoyment

of all possible

things, or

1.7.15.127b.

Gauthier,
the

57-58,

introduction

55.139-48.

75-78.

'Trois commentaires
by R.-A.

.. .'
.
18) 244-69.
(above,
to L'?thique
? Nicomaque

Gauthier

(above,

n. 35),

esp.

BOETHIUS

OF DACIA

211

the status congregatione omnium bonorum, then we would do well to wait and
judge a man happy only after he is beyond the effect of fortune.53
Thomas' distinction between happiness secundum esse and happiness secun

dum optimum possibile is taken directly from the work ofAlbert the Great, and
the latter concept corresponds directly to Eustratius' notion of beatus in politi
cis or Aristotle's beatus ut homo. It is clear to Thomas that the notion of the
in the civil life, refers to the
possible happiness, or blessedness
an
abundance of external goods along with the exercise of vir
enjoyment of
tuous actions. When Thomas
speaks of a man, for example, who loses the
his
this
loss of an external good does not take away
of
fellow
citizens,
respect

maximum

his happiness, but rather 'tarnishes (his) beatitude'

(coinquinat beatitudi
man
an
a
if
of exterior goods, his
the
other
abundance
On
hand,
enjoys
nem).5*
lifewill be more blessed (beatior), because such goods embellish or contribute to
the operations of virtue.55 For Thomas the words beatus and felix are not
synonyms; beatus, in Thomas'
commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, means
exactly what itmeans forEustratius and Albert: a man who is blessed with an
abundance ofmaterial benefits, and who performs virtuous actions.
Thomas' own understanding of the notion of worldly beatitude ismade clear

of his commentary, where he refers to Aristotle's

says: 'we will call those blessed who, among
the living in this life, have now and will have in the future all the things
mentioned above.'56 All those things mentioned above are none other than the
external goods which make a man beatus in politicis. The reference to the
in the oft-cited passage
phrase 'blessed, as men.'

Thomas

possession of these goods in the future tense assures us that Thomas considers
the question in terms of the dilemma of Solon: can we call a man happy during
his lifetime ? Thomas argues that because the products of good fortune are not
the essential characteristic of human happiness, Aristotle must have a distinct
like Eustratius and Albert
concept of a purely earthly beatitude.57 Thomas,
53 Sent.
omnium

of the highest good as the status

The designation
De cons. phil. 3, pr. 2 (CCL 94.38), and
from Boethius,
on the E. N.
commentaries

59.198-60.215.
bonorum

thirteenth-century
54 Sent. 47.159-62:

is taken

congregatione
in
is common

ad hoc subdit quod denudari

'Et quantum
exteriorum
bono
quibusdam
rum coinquinat
in quantum
scilicet reddit hominem
beatitudinem,
aliqualiter
contemptibilis
in oculis aliorum.'
55 Sent. 58.116-59.120:
. .
conf?rent ad hoc quod vita hominis
sit beatior
'Si bona,
quia.
sunt instrumenta
bonis vei ad decorem vei in quantum
felicitas indiget exterioribus
operatio
virtutem.'
nis secundum
56 Sent. 60.215-22:
'Et si ita est ut dictum

est (beatos
illos de numero viventium
dicemus)
in futuro ea quae dicta sunt; quia
et existent
existunt
in praesenti
ista
quibus
non usquequaque
ad conditiones
subdit quod
videntur
supra de felicitate positas,
attingere
sicut homines,
subiecta non possunt perfec
tales dicimus beatos
qui in hac vita mutabilitati
habere.'
tam beatitudinem
57 See
I argue that Thomas'
'Aristotle on Beatitude'
inter
my article
(above, n. 36) where
is essentially
correct.
of the text of Aristotle
pretation
in hac

vita

212

TRADITIO

before him, sees the clearest expression of the concept of earthly beatitude in
the words beatos, ut homines, which signify the mutability and imperfect nature
of human

beatitude.

Thomas'

of Aristotle's concept of beatitude leads him to compare

beatitude with that of the Christian faith. He argues that
realized that the highest state that men can achieve on earth

discussion

the philosopher's
because Aristotle

is blessedness, which can be lost in various ways, he left open the question of
other-worldly beatitude. Because beatitude after death can never be lost, Tho
mas concludes that itmust be more perfect than that described by Aristotle in
his Ethics.58

Although Thomas is reluctant to discuss the theological concept of Christian

beatitude when commenting on the words of the Philosopher, he does not
hesitate to compare the various claims of the philosophers and the theologians
in his Summa Theologiae. There Thomas
consistently substitutes the words

beatitudo imperfecta for felicitas when discussing the philosophical ideal of hap
In the theological work, Thomas
is most interested in showing the
on
life
earth
between
the
and the hope of future reward.
relationship
good

piness.

into two kinds: perfect and imperfect. Imperfect

to
the
notion of happiness that is found in the Nicoma
corresponds
chean Ethics, and consists primarily in contemplation and secondarily in the
operation of the practical intellect. Perfect beatitude consists solely in the

Thomas

divides beatitude

beatitude

vision of God, and can be attained only after death.59 No longer is Thomas
interested merely in the philosophical distinction between happiness according
to its essence and happiness according to all possible benefits, as he was in his

commentary on the text of Aristotle; here, he is examining both the philo

sophical and the theological ideas of the human good.
In the Summa, Thomas understands the words beati, ut homines to be Aris
totle's denial of the possibility of the achievement of absolute perfection on
earth. As a result, Aristotle posited only imperfect beatitude, which is the

highest good attainable on earth.60 Because

imperfect beatitude can be lost
through the effects of ill fortune and because even true happiness (felicitas
secundum esse) can be lost by turning away from virtuous actions, Thomas
58 H.

P. F. Mercken

in the Sent.:

see H.

P.

of Aristotle's
Ethics
into Christian
speaks of a transformation
theology
of the Ethics
of Aristotle
F. Mercken,
'Transformation
in the Moral

nel suo settimo centenario, Atti del

of Thomas
Tommaso
Aquinas,'
d'Aquino
'Trois
Mercken,
congresso internazionale
1974) 5.151-56.
(Rome-Naples
following Gauthier,
. . .'
.
a transformation
commentaires
of Aristotle's
(above
18), may be correct in ascribing
in the Summa
doctrine
but not in the Sent., where Thomas
remains true to the
Theologiae,
The following discussion
intention of Aristotle.
of Aquinas'
is a sum
concept of beatitude

Philosophy

mary

of my

'The Concept

ofWorldly

History ofPhilosophy (1987).

of the
59 S. Th.
60 S. Th.

I?II

I?II

3.5; I?II 4.5.

3.2, ad 4.

Beatitude

in the Writings

of Thomas

Aquinas,'

Journal

BOETHIUS

concludes

that Aristotle's

to

pared

The
Summa

eternal

OF

213

DACIA

ideal is somehow

imperfect, especially when

com

blessedness.61

in Thomas'
relationship between
imperfect and perfect beatitude
is complex and need not concern us here. It is sufficient to note that
are called blessed

in this life participate in future beatitude. We

cannot speak of perfect beatitude for the living, because one cannot attain the
obiectum beatitudinis secundum seipsum, namely God, during one's lifetime.
Thomas admits only that earthly beatitude is somehow similar to true beati
those who

tude.62

of Eustratius, Albert, and Thomas on the firstbook of the

Nicomachean Ethics form the intellectual background to Boethius' treatise on
the highest good, but it is the Summa Theologiae that is the direct source for
Boethius' notion of beatitude. When Boethius argues that human beatitude
depends on God's beneficence and that man receives beatitude from God, he is
The commentaries

not transforming the rational ethics of Aristotle

into a doctrine of faith.
an
Rather, he is offering
interpretation ofAristotle similar to that of his prede
cessors: Boethius'

notion of the highest human good that can be investigated

reason
turns out to be Eustratius'
beatus in politicis, Albert's felici
entirely by
tas secundum posse, and Thomas'
beatitudo imperfecta. Boethius'
insistence

upon the necessity of an orderly society and a long life, and upon God's role in
the production of the highest human good, assures the reader that he is speak
?
which consists in the operation of
ing here not of the essence of happiness
?
but of happiness together with a significant measure of mate
virtue alone
rial prosperity, i.e., the Aristotelian concept of beatitude.63 Thus Boethius can
claim that God grants beatitude in that he provides external goods which lie
that the essence of happi
beyond an individual's control, while maintaining
ness is due primarily to the human activities of the intellect.
Boethius, like Thomas, takes the opportunity to mention briefly the relation
between the philosopher's concept of beatitude and the theologian's ideal of
account of the way inwhich imperfect beatitude participates
in perfect beatitude closely resembles Thomas' position in the Summa:

blessedness.

61 S.

His

I?11

Th.

potest haberi,
vei per oblivionem
... Si autem
turbare,
auferre.

remaneat

per
possunt quidem beatitudinem
integra, exteriores transmutationes
non tarnen possunt earn totaliter
virtutum;
operationes
impediunt multas
esse contra rationem
beatitudo
huius vitae amitti potest, quod videtur
esse in hac vita beatos non simpliciter,
ideo Philosophus
dicit in I Eth. aliquos

inquantum
... Et
quia

beatitudinis,

sed sicut homines,

62 S. Th. I?II
63 DSB
humana,

si loquamur
de beatitudine
in hac
'Dicendum
quod
imperfecta, qualis
sic potest amitti. Et hoc patet in felicitate contemplativa,
quae amittitur
. . . Patet
. . .vei per
enim idem in felicitate activa;
aliquas
occupationes.

5.4:

vita

quorum natura
5.3, ad 1.2-3.

371.65-372.75.
and

beatitudo

Note

mutatione

that Boethius

in hac vita to mean

subiecta
uses
the same

est.'

the terms

eiiis hominis

thing as Thomas'

beatitudo,

beatitudo

beatitudo

imperfecta.

214

TRADITIO

Qui enim perfectior est in beatitudine, quam in hac vita homini possibile esse
per rationem scimus, ipse propinquior est beatitudini quam in vita futura per
fidem

expectamus.64

the inclusion of a decidedly theological notion, perfect beatitude, in a

work devoted to the highest good known through reason does not entirely
demolish Boethius' claim. It is a faith transcending reason that leads Boethius
Even

to proclaim the existence of heavenly beatitude, as it did forBoethius' prede

cessors. But Boethius
implies that it is, at least, not contrary to reason to
assume that, even given the imperfect nature of earthly beatitude, one may

expect a type of perfect beatitude. Although one cannot know for certain the
fate of the soul after death, faith teaches that itwill enjoy eternal perfection.65
The appearance
inBoethius' discussion of elements such as future beatitude,
the divine causality of earthly beatitude, and even the source of sin,66 should
make us re-evaluate the traditional characterization of this work as a denial of
order, or even as a characteristic product of the Parisian Arts
A
pure rationalist, who is expressing anti-Christian beliefs, would
Faculty.67
have ignored totally the question of the relationship between perfect and im
perfect beatitude; and a characteristic product of the Arts Faculty would have
the Christian

avoided discussion of God as the object of human actions (finis cuius) and the
divine cause of beatitudo imperfecta. It is more correct to state that the title,
De summo bono, characterizes perfectly the aim of Boethius'
treatise: to ex

plain the highest good forman, both as an activity and as the object of that
activity. By considering Aristotle's Ethics in light of both the finis cuius and
the finis quo, Boethius sets the course of the discussion on the human good for
to come. The commentators on the Nicomachean Ethics of the last
of
the thirteenth century do not hesitate to consider God as the pos
quarter
sible object and source of human happiness,
in works that are devoted to
rational inquiry.68 The concerns of Boethius of Dacia's De summo bono become
decades

the central questions

of late thirteenth-century moral philosophy.69

Stonehill College
North Easton, Massachusetts
64 DSB

65

372.75-78.

Although

of Auvergne's

not expressly
stated, Boethius'
position differs little from that
on the Ethics:
'Dicendum
felicitatem
dicimus
questiones
quod

found

in Peter

una
duplicem:
que utrum [est L]
de felicitate autem

in vita, alia est post mortem;

[unam L] que est ultima perfectio hominis
vel aggregati non est multum
curandum;
ponamus
ipsius animae
separate
de alia autem non, et ideo similiter faciamus'
mencionem,
que est in vita facit Philosophus
. ..'
'Les Questiones
is
(L, fol. 122va; edited by R.-A. Gauthier,
[above, n. 25] 244, n. 24). There
no trace of the infamous
'double truth' doctrine on the fate of the soul in the DSB.
66 Sin is defined as the
'declinatio hominis ab ordine naturali':
DSB
374.145-46.
67 See
above, p. 206.
68 See
Studies (above n. 30); also R.-A. Gauthier,
'Trois commentai
my article inMediaeval
.
res .. .' (above,
18) 270-93.
69 This article is a revised version
of a paper read at the Centre forMedieval
Studies and the
Pontifical
Institute of Mediaeval
Studies, Toronto, November
5, 1985.