Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Author(s): W. G. Runciman
Source: Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Jul., 1982), pp. 351-377
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/178506
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351
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W. G. RUNCIMAN
AND SEMISTATES
353
354
W. G. RUNCIMAN
355
Maroboduuswas feasible among them in a way that it could not be for any of
the basileis of Ithaca, including Odysseus himself.'2 Third, a legal system is
in existence such that, according to Tacitus, there are fixed rules for the
settlementof feuds; it is permissibleto lay capitalchargesbefore the assembly
(at which the priests, ratherthanthe reges, have ius coercendi); andprincipes
chosen by the assembly are sent out with supportingretinuesto administerthe
law (jura) in the villages. Despite the similarities, therefore, there are no
governmentalroles in the Ithacancase which go beyond patriarchaldomination in the Weberian sense.13 But in the German case there are. It may,
admittedly, be relevant to point out both that Ithaca is an island and that the
plot of the Odyssey dependson Odysseusbeing absentfor twenty yearsduring
the minority of his only son, whereas Germanyby the first centuryA.D. was
ripe for secondary state formationin response to Roman pressure. But whatever the particularcauses behind it, a critical process has been at work in the
one case which has not been at work in the other. In the first, something will
have to happento bringaboutstatehood;in the second, somethingwill have to
happen to prevent it.
It might perhaps be objected that the distinction between semistates and
protostates is teleological-that the difference is merely between those
societies which do and those which don't become states. But if the diagnosis
is correctly made, it can in principle be predictedin advance which will do
which. It is a matterat once of the roles which have been evolved and of the
power available to attach to them. Sahlins contrasts the societies in which
prestigious huntersor big-men must "personally constructtheir power over
others" with chieftainships "properly so-called" in which men "come to
power,"'4 and it is this difference which is critical. When Herodotusis giving
his accountof the origins of the Macedonianroyal house, he talks of Perdiccas
as having acquired (ktesamenos) the "tyranny" or, in a later passage, the
"sovereignty" (VIII.137, 139), which is to say thatthe power was thereto be
come to, or taken. But in Homeric Ithaca, the power from which Laerteshas
abdicated, which Odysseus has not come back to take up, and which Telemachus is too young to assume, is of the kind which has to be built up and
maintainedby the personal prowess of the incumbentof the "kingly" role.
of his contemporarieswho are also his friends(Odyssey III.363), and when Antinousasks how he
achievedit (IV.642-44), the only alternativehe puts is thatof householdservantsof Telemachus's
own.
12 Maroboduus
appearsin Germania42 as a rex of noble genus, but his assumptionof a royal
title apparentlyrenderedhim fatally unpopular(Annals II.xliv: Maroboduumregis nomen invisumapud popularis). E. A. Thompson, The Early Germans (Oxford, 1965), 68, speaks of him
as a "permanentautocrat"who had "won despotic power," but in the event, his power, despotic
as it may have been, was temporaryonly.
13 Max
Weber, Wirtschaftund Gesellschaft, 4th ed. (Tiibingen, 1956), II, 588: "Bei der
patriarchalen Herrschaft ist es die personliche Unterwerfungunter den Herrn...."
14 Sahlins, Stone
Age Economics, 139.
356
W. G. RUNCIMAN
Indeed, the description of Laertes living away from the town on his farm
"unable," as M. I. Finley puts it, "to rule iphi, by might"15is more reminiscent of an ousted Anuak headmanwho has retiredto the village of his maternal kin where he has kept a separate set of gardens16than of a deposed or
abdicatedex-king in the full monarchicalsense. In more general terms, the
difference between a world in which semistates only are possible and one in
which protostate power is available to be come to or taken is implicit in
Thucydides's celebratedopening chapter.He had, to be sure, less knowledge
of the actual societies of Mycenaean Greece than we do. But he was fully
aware of the significance of the change from a world of nomadic tribes,
shifting allegiances, chronic piracy, and impermanentcultivation to one of
investible surpluses(periousia chrematon), effective navies, inheritedrulerships, and the permanentsubjectionof smaller towns by larger ones-or, in
other words, a world with the foundations on which roles constitutive of
statehoodcould be built.
A different objection might be that if protostates are defined by the
emergence of governmentalroles, then there can be no real difference between a protostate and a state. But the critical transitiondoes not happen
overnight; it is not a "phoenix-like birth"17by which a city-state, or any
other, is broughtinto being. It is truethat there can be instancesof secondary
state formation where the imitation or imposition of the institutions of a
central governmentis a single event ratherthan a gradualprocess. It is also
true that at one point in the course of a gradualprocess a lawgiver may codify
legal and governmentalpracticesinto whatthereafterremainstheirestablished
form. But it is still necessaryto allow for a stage correspondingto what Henri
J. M. Claessen calls the "transitional,"as opposed to the "inchoate," type of
early state.18If, after a generationor two, the structureof governmentalroles
is sufficiently stable for one group or faction of incumbentsto be replacedby
another(even if by violence) without bringingabout regressionto semistatehood or anarchy,then and only then can the society in questionbe designated
without qualificationas a state.
EMERGENCE OF GOVERNMENTAL
ROLES
357
358
W. G. RUNCIMAN
24
359
360
W. G. RUNCIMAN
32
361
are only as many ways for states to originate as there are means for the
incumbents of specialized, permanent,nonkin governmentalroles to secure
the obedience of their subjects and/or fellow-citizens. The question raises
wider issues of sociological theory than can be accommodated within the
limits of this article. But it is central to my argumentabout the cumulative
accretion of power, and I accordingly propose to assume without further
discussion that there are three and only three forms of power, and therefore
varieties of sanction, on which the roles constitutive of statehood can be
based. These correspondto the familiardistinctionbetween the economic, the
social (in the sense of social status) and the political. That is to say, the
powers of any and all rulersderive from some combinationof (1) possession
of or control over the sources and distributionof wealth and therewith the
ability to offer or withhold the means of subsistence, (2) attributionby subjects and/or fellow-citizens of superiorhonour or prestige, whether deriving
from sacred or secular personal or institutionalcharisma, and therewiththe
ability to attractand retaina following, and (3) commandof the technical and
organizationalmeans of physical coercion and therewiththe ability to impose
obedience by force.
Now there are, in the literatureon archaic Greece, rival accounts of the
emergence of states which deliberatelyassign priorityto one or the otheron a
priorigrounds. A distinctivelyMarxianaccountcan be found, for example, in
the work of George Thomson,33for whom the story is one of neolithic selfsufficiency followed by the introductionof metal and thereforethe extraction
of surplus value placed in the hands of chiefs who, by waging wars of
conquest with superiorweapons and tilling their demesne lands with captured
slaves, arrive at the stage of a landed aristocracy engaged in commodity
exchange and productionfor profitratherthan use. A distinctivelyDurkheimian account can be found in the work of Louis Gernet,34for whom it is a
story of Homeric priest- (or magician-) kings, aristocraticgene, and peasant
communitiesheld togetherby communalfestivities whose conscience collective evolves the legal and political institutionsof the polis in response to a
largely religious anomie. A distinctively Weberianaccount can be found in
the work of Weber himself,35 for whom it is a story of the evolution of
militaryorganizationand technique, the subordinationof the demiurgoito the
military needs of a warriorclass, and the consolidation of that class through
the process of synoecism as rulers of the emergentpoleis. No doubt all three
33 George Thomson, Studies in Ancient Greek Society: The Prehistoric Aegean (London,
1949), esp. 353-58.
34 Louis Gernet, Anthropologie de la Grece antique (Paris, 1968), esp. I, 2 ("Frairies antiques") and IV, 1 ("Les Nobles dans la Grece antique"). See also S. C. Humphreys, "The
Work of Louis Gernet," History and Theory, 10:2 (1971), 172-96.
35 Max Weber, "Agrarverhaltnissein Altertum," in his Gesammelte
Aufsitze zur Sozial-und
Wirtschaftsgeschichte(Tiibingen, 1924), esp. 93-128.
362
W. G. RUNCIMAN
are valid in part. No doubt, too, they may apply with particularrelevance to
particularsocieties at particularstages in their history. But the cumulative
accretion of power can be nontrivially cited as critical to the transition to
statehoodbecause, among other things, the three varieties of sanctions reinforce one another.Whatis more, no protostatewill survive into statehoodif it
rests on one form of power alone. It is the combination of economic productivity, ideological legitimacy, and militaryorganizationwhich is decisive.
Once two negative preconditionsare fulfilled-the absence of fragmentation
on the one hand or conquest on the other-any trigger which augments the
economic or ideological or military power available to potential rulers will
also augment the other two.
The point is perhapsparticularlyworth making with regardto social-cumideological sanctions. There is nothingnovel in the assertionthat increases in
disposable economic surplus and in the means of destruction,as opposed to
production,reinforceone another:in the dictum which Dio (XLII.49) attributes to Julius Caesar, it is the money obtained by soldiers and the soldiers
obtainedby money which between them create, preserve, and add to dynasteias. But legitimacy is no less importantthan money and/or soldiers to the
ability of a protostateto achieve the permanencewhich makes it a state. The
deliberatequest for supernaturalor dynasticprestigeby those who have taken
or come to economic and political power can be documentedacross an enormous range of places and times. Although not all incumbentsof monarchical
roles claim divine descent (as the Spartankings did and Herodotusappearsto
accept at face value), a claim to more than ordinarydescent is commonplace;
and a long list could be put togetherof rulers each of whom, as Marc Bloch
put it in speakingof Pepin in 751, "eprouva le besoin de colorer son usurpation d'une sorte de prestige religieux. "36 Penelope's suitors in an Ithaca
already at the semistate stage had the means to murder Telemachus and
Laertesand then fight it out for the kingship among themselves, yet they not
only refrained from doing so but sought and acknowledged the legitimacy
which would accrue to the successful aspirant to the hand of Odysseus's
widow. This may be one of the points on which the Odyssey as a work of
fiction is a poor guide to the sociological realities of contemporaryGreece.
But the respect accorded to good birth-the agathon genos of Odyssey
XXI.335 or agathon haima of IV.611-is sufficiently well attested both in
Homer and elsewhere37that it cannot be discounted as a source of power
independentof but contributoryto the power attachingto ownershipor control
of land and the capacity to defend or add to it by force of arms. The pedigrees
36 Marc
Bloch, Les Rois Thaumaturges(Strasbourg, 1924), 68.
37 It
may be objected that the surviving literarysources, with the sole exception of Hesiod,
reflect an aristocraticbias. But complaints like those of Theognis (54-58) about the rise of
base-bornparvenusare nonetheless evidence of a time when greaterpower did accrue to birth.
363
may have been short, as they were bound to be, and there is no way of
calculating the relative importanceof superiordescent in securing the obedience of nonkin followers or dependents. But there is a ready parallel in the
type of Anglo-Saxon king depicted by Bede, whose command over his followers rests partlyon birthand partlyon personalprowess.38Statehoodis still
embryonic. But for that very reason, the economic and military resources
available to the incumbentof a protostaterole may be no more importantthan
his ability either to attach or to carry over to it a legitimacy deriving from
genealogical or charismaticprestige.
The threefold characterof the accretion of power sufficient for statehood
can be illustratedin some detail from two instructivecase studies in the recent
anthropologicalliteraturewhere the process can be much more directly observcd than anywhere in archaic Greece-Cohen's study of the Pabir of
northeasternNigeria39and Maurice Bloch's study of the Merinakingdom of
Madagascar.40The Pabir, as Cohen describes them, evolved in the direction
of statehoodunderpressurefrom a powerful neighbour.Previouslythey were
a semistatein which land was owned by village founders, lineage groupswere
stratifiedonly to a limited degree, and the highest-rankingrole was no more
powerful than that of an Homeric basileus: "The village chief who later
became king was not appreciablydifferentfrom others."41 The initial move to
protostatehoodwas triggeredby the awarenessof a need for defence against
Boro raiders, and thus the constructionof walled and moated settlements.
But as soon as this was done, not only was land use intensified(and segmentation thereby made less attractive), but the supernaturalpowers and priestly
role of the settlementheadmanbecame much more elaborate.The royal burial
groundbecame a national shrine, and queenship, which in the previous stage
had been a focus of local segmentation,came to symbolize the subordination
of subgroups to the central government. The roles of the heads of leading
lineages were transformedfrom thatof council elders to thatof titled nobles of
the realm, who then evolved into an endogamous class of governmental
officials. Not only did the king by that time fulfill all three of what Aristotle
(Politics, 1285b) defined as the traditionalfunctions of a basileus-military
leadership, performanceof collective rituals, and adjudicationof disputesbut, although there was no system of taxation as such, he received regular
tributesufficient to enable him to organize raidingand/ortradingexpeditions
38 Ecclesiastical History III.14 on King Oswine of Northumbria;cf. both Thompson, Early
Germans, 58, and Wallace-Hadrill,Early GermanicKingship, 85-86.
39 Ronald
Cohen, "State Foundations:A Controlled Comparison," in Cohen and Service,
Origins, esp. 147-50.
40 Maurice Bloch, "The Disconnection between Power and Rank as a Process: An Outline of
the Development of Kingdoms in CentralMadagascar," Archives Europeennesde Sociologie,
18:1 (1977), esp. 110-20.
41
Cohen, "State Foundations," 157.
364
W. G. RUNCIMAN
SEMISTATES
TO PROTOSTATES:
DARK
AGE
TO ARCHAIC
GREECE
But how was the critical transitioneffected in the case of Greece? It was not
only widespread, but rapid. It had still not occurredin the ratherbackward
Boeotia of Hesiod as depicted in the Worksand Days. "Polis" as used there
42 Bloch,
"Disconnection,"
113.
ORIGINS OF STATES:
365
366
W. G. RUNCIMAN
Cf. Jack Goody, Technology, Traditionand the State in Africa (London, 1971), 29.
Cf. P. C. Salzman, "The Proto-State in Iranian Baluchistan," in Cohen and Service,
Origins, 135: "Each baluchi sardar, therefore, led a population of nomadic tribesmen who
controlledtheirown capitalresourcesthe majorpartof which, the herds, was mobile. The sardar
had virtuallyno economic patronageto dispense and had little way of coercing mobile followers
with independentresources. Even if a sardar had managedsomehow to form a militaryarmloyal
to him alone the othertribesmencould have massed in opposition, or else could have loaded their
camels and disappeared."
48 See Marvin Harris, CulturalMaterialism (New York, 1979), 101-2.
47
367
emmental roles. It may well be true that archaic Greek colonization, like
archaicGreek warfare,did somethingto help and nothingto hinderthe evolution towards statehood. But it was not, any more than warfare(or population
growth, or trade, or religion) "the" cause of it. The critical process, in
colonial and parentcommunities alike, was the accumulationof power available to the incumbents of the governmentalroles which were coming into
being.
Uncertainas the details of the chronology remain, there is clear evidence
that over roughly speaking the course of the eighth century B.C. there was
indeed a mutuallyreinforcingaccumulationof power of all three kinds. Economically, it has plausiblybeen hypothesizedthatthere was a significantshift
from stock rearing to arable farming which could be expected not only to
supporta largerpopulationbut also to endow the more fortunatehouseholds
with a significantdisposable surplus.The model granariesalreadyto be found
in Athenian and other graves of the second half of the ninth century, or the
remains of a circular granaryexcavated at Old Smyrna, cannot be used to
make any quantitativeinference about land use, any more than can the references to ploughingand harvestingin Hesiod or Homer, and thereis not (or not
yet) the kind of archaeologicalevidence which might prove conclusive.49But
as nomadismand pastoralismdeclined, which they evidently did, there was a
progressive shift to agriculture;and if populationwas simultaneouslyincreasing, intensification of land use is the natural concomitant as well. Furthermore,there is tangible evidence for a periousia chremat6nin the sudden
upsurge in metallic dedications. The table assembled by Anthony Snodgrass
to show the increasefrom the eleventh and tenthcenturiesthroughto the later
eighth and seventh must, with even the most sceptical allowance for possible
sources of distortion,be admittedas evidence for the "majorrise of wealth in
metals, both in toto and per capita" for which he argues.50
368
W. G. RUNCIMAN
earlier assumptions. But by 700 B.C., at any rate, there are over seventy
known places of worship of which nearlyhalf have temples.51Moreover, the
late eighth century was also a period of sudden and substantialincrease in
dedicationsat tombs and sanctuaries.Explanationis complicatedby the coincidence of their distributionwith the circulationof the Homeric poems. But
this does not underminethe inference from the rise of hero-cultsto the quest
for legitimacy in the occupation of a given locality-a quest which subsequentlyreachedits extremein the literalimportationof the hero Melanippus
from Thebes into Sicyon by its tyrantCleisthenes in orderto transferto him
the honours previously paid to Adrastus (Herodotus V.67). Unfortunately,
there is no literaryevidence bearing directly on the transitionfrom personal
allegiance to civic patriotism:Tyrtaeus, who is generally accepted as having
written towards the end of the seventh century, clearly celebrated the new
civic virtues, but by then the transitionto a hoplite state was complete. It
would not, however, be warrantedto argue that the transitionwas simply a
function of increased population density in adjoining communities and the
rivalries therebygeneratedbetween them. It was a function also of religious
sentiments and practices already existing in Dark Age Greece which were
available to be fostered and in due course manipulatedby rulersmoving from
the personal or kin-based leadership of retainers and followers to the centralizedcommandof subjectsor fellow citizens themselvesawareof a patriotic
attachmentto their common institutions.
Finally, the improvementsin armourand tactics known to have taken place
towardsthe end of the eighth century furtheraugmentedthe power available
to the rulersof the emerging protostates.The "hoplite revolution," if such it
was, fell laterthanthe periodwithin which the transitionfrom the heroic style
of Homeric warfarebetween uncoordinatedleaders and their followings had
alreadytaken place. But the phalanxmay well have been devised before 675
B.C.,52 and the archaeologicalevidence leaves no doubtthatby the last quarter
of the eighth centurythe hoplite shield, the "Corinthian"helmet, and the new
type of body-armourhad all made theirappearance.It is also possible to see in
the fragmentaryevidence for the "Lelantine" war fought between Chalcis
and Eretriasome time before the turnof the centurythe signs of an incipient
evolution both in tactics and in internationalrelations. Thucydides (I.15),
althoughhe refersto this conflict in a context suggestive of a boundarydispute
between neighbours,at the same time remarkson its significance in bringing
allies in on both sides. Hesiod (Works and Days, lines 651-59), who went
over to Euboea to compete in the funeralgames for Amphidamas,a basileus
(as he is designated in the Contest of Homer and Hesiod) of Chalcis, makes
the occasion sound very Homeric. But the later reference by Archilochus
51
52
ORIGINS OF STATES:
369
53.
Ronald Cohen, "State Origins:A Reappraisal," in Claessen and Skalnik, The Early State,
370
W. G. RUNCIMAN
Any analysis of the origins of states in archaic Greece must, however, take
some accountof the distinctionwhich the Greeksthemselves regardedas fundamentalbetweenthe mutuallyexclusive categoriesof "ethnos"'and "polis."57
It is not, althoughsometimestakento be, a distinctionbetween states without,
and states with, an urbancentre, as the single knock-downexample of Sparta
is enough to show. Nor is it a differencebetween centralizedand segmentary
states:Macedonwas both centralizedand an ethnos.58Thereis undoubtedlya
contrast to be drawn in their respective forms and degrees of permanent,
specialized, nonkin governmentalauthority.As J. A. O. Larsenpoints out, it
is significant that Greek usage classified all federal states as ethne,59and as
54 Ed. Will, Korinthiaka(Paris, 1955), 298.
37I
372
W. G. RUNCIMAN
373
hood: he could not have performedhis role if there were not already a governmentalauthorityin Thebes which was, or at least wished to proclaimitself
as, capable of enforcing his proposal.The profusionof legislation, the variety
of oligarchic constitutions, the shifting patterns of interstate alliances and
federations, and the range of permutationson the continuumfrom ethnos to
polis cannot themselves explain the transition from semistatehood which
made them possible. Local basileis had first to have agreed on a transferor
pooling of their augmentedpower and thus transformedthe roles of one or
more among them from that of individual landlords-cum-employers,
and generals-cum-policemento that of rulersholding
arbitrators-cum-priests,
offices in which they could wield economic, ideological, and military sanctions on behalf of their ethnos or polis as a whole.
OFFENSIVE
VS. DEFENSIVE
PROTOSTATEHOOD:
Oscar Broneer, "Athens in the Late Bronze Age," Antiquity, 30:117 (1956), 14.
Coldstream, GeometricGreece, 57, fig. 13. No doubt it is possible to be over-scepticalof
the inferences about roles which can be drawn from archaeological finds. The contents of
Childeric's tomb, for example, surely licence the conclusion that "this was no leader of a small
69
374
W. G. RUNCIMAN
rops a first synoecisis by which Attica was divided into twelve town districts
(StraboIX. 1), before which its inhabitantslived merely nomades and sporaden.70 But even if anything remotely so specific ever took place, it did not
amountto statehood.No doubtAthens dominatedthe Attic peninsulathroughout the disturbancesin which the legendary Codrus, son of Melanthus, was
supposedto have died fightingthe Dorians(PausaniasI. 19), and it is plausible
to suppose that the adjacentvillages and settlementsshould look to an Athenian basileus as their Heerfuhrer. But Thucydides's description of them
(11.15) as poleis with their own council-houses (prytaneia) and magistrates
(archontes) is palpably anachronistic.There is nothing to warranta supposition that they were "little states"71 rather than agriculturalcommunities
dominatedby their own local aristocraciesin the mannerof Hesiod's Boeotia,
whetheror not in continuationof Mycenaeansettlement. All that can be said
is that if these local aristocracies were to accept formal subordinationto
Athens, this would both imply and indeed necessitate a transitionfrom semito protostatehood,and thatif Athens were thereafterto hold together, it would
become a state both large and powerful by the standardsof eighth-century
Greece.
This, of course, is just what happened.It is not necessary to believe either
in Theseus or in a literal synoecism to accept the tradition of a political
unificationwhich, whateverlocal battlesmay have been fought in Attica, was
not brought about by Athenian conquest (and which, if it had been, would
surely have left tracesin the literatureto thateffect). Geographically,the East
Attic nobility had an unmistakableinterest in a defensive alliance with the
rulers of the Acropolis, and it is they whose economic, social, and military
role would most be changed by a unification.72Moreover, the Acropolis was
importantas a ritualcentre as well as a stronghold,and the suspicion that the
transition was not as abrupt as Thucydides and Plutarch (borrowing from
Aristotle) believed is further strengthenedby the oddity of a simultaneous
creationof the role of "the" eponymousarchonshiptogetherwith two others:
it may be more plausible to suppose that the archonshipwas createdfirst and
the polemarchy second, with life-tenure of a by then ritual kingship being
war-band, but an established federate king...." (Wallace-Hadrill, Early Germanic Kingship,
18; cf. H. Ament, "The Germanic Tribes in Europe," in The Northern World, David M.
Wilson, ed. (London, 1980), 64: "Even if the signet-ringhad not been found, one would have to
speakof a 'king's' ratherthan a 'noble's' tomb. ") But there is no such traceof a GreekChilderic
in Dark Age Athens or anywhere else.
70 See F. Jacoby, Atthis (Oxford, 1949), 126.
71 As
they are describedby C. Hignett, History of the AthenianConstitution(Oxford, 1952),
30.
72
Cf. G. Alfoldy, "Der attische Synoikismos und die Entstehungder athenischenAdels",
Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire, 47:1 (1969), 14, who is preparedto speak of an
"Umwandlungderpolitischen, wirtschaftlichen,sozialen undzweifellos auch militarischenRolle
des attischen Adels, die durch eine Art von Zentralisierungdieses Adels erfolgte. "
375
74
75
376
W. G. RUNCIMAN
ORIGINS
OF STATES:
THE
CASE
OF ARCHAIC
GREECE
377