Preliminary Analysis of Myanmar’s 2010 Electoral Laws

Prepared for the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum by

Richard Horsey1
31 March 2010

I. Introduction

This briefing paper is intended to give a concise overview of the main provisions of the
electoral laws and bylaws issued by the Myanmar authorities in March 2010, and to
discuss some of the implications of the most important provisions. These laws establish
the detailed framework for the first elections in Myanmar for 20 years, which will take
place later this year on a date yet to be announced. These elections, while they will not
be free and fair, nevertheless represent the most important political shift in a
generation. A new political space will be created – however constrained it may be –
along with a set of new State institutions. The ageing military leadership will also hand
over the reins of power to a new generation. It is therefore vital to have a clear
understanding of this legislation and its likely consequences; however, much of the
debate so far has been based on a hasty and often erroneous reading of the laws.

These major changes will not automatically put Myanmar on a path of greater openness
and reform, but they will offer important new opportunities to domestic and
international actors to push the country in a more positive direction. Now is not the
moment to push this new generation of leaders into further isolation, but rather to
convince them that it is possible for them to break with the failed policies of their
predecessors and introduce much-needed social, economic and political reforms, and that
the international community stands ready to support such moves.

An accurate reading of the electoral laws is indispensible in guiding the most effective
policy responses. For example, if it were true that all persons with a criminal record
were ineligible to stand for election or join political parties, then most opposition
politicians would be excluded from the political process – whether they are currently in
prison or not. (Such a claim has often been made,2 but it is not correct; see section III
below.)If this claim were true, the only way for such people to be included in the process
would be an amendment to the Political Party Registration Law, something that a
number of countries have called for. In fact, it is only people who are currently
imprisoned that are excluded. Therefore, a more inclusive political process could be
achieved even under the current laws if political prisoners were released from prison.
Misreading the law can thus give rise to very different policy priorities, and
unfortunately such misreadings have been common.

This paper is structured as follows: Section II provides an analysis of some of the more
significant provisions in the new laws; Section III addresses some of the most widely-

                                                        
1 Richard Horsey is an independent political analyst and a former ILO liaison officer in Myanmar; he is

fluent in the Burmese language.

2 See, for example, Security Council Report’s update on Myanmar, 23 March 2010, p. 1. (Note that the

organization has subsequently amended the online version of the report after the errors were brought to its
attention.)
held misconceptions about these laws; and Section IV gives a more detailed annotated
summary of the main provisions of the laws and bylaws.

In total, five laws and four bylaws have been promulgated, along with various other
notifications and announcements. All of these have been in the Burmese language, and
to date no official English translations have been made available. A number of different
unofficial translations are in circulation which have been made by exiled media
organizations, Western embassies, and Myanmar analysts. However, the quality of
these translations varies markedly, and all contain significant errors and omissions. The
present analysis is based on the author’s reading of the original Burmese-language
texts.

II. Analysis of the most significant provisions

With the promulgation of the electoral laws and bylaws, the answers to most of the
outstanding questions about how the elections will be conducted are now clear, with the
exception of the election date itself (which will almost certainly be in the 4th quarter of
2010),and which parties will register and contest the elections and at which levels. The
deadline for existing parties to notify the Election Commission that they wish to
continue to operate is 7 May.For new parties there is no specific registration deadline,
but the Election Commission will set a date by which candidates will have to file their
papers in order to contest a legislative seat. (The NLD decided on 29 March that it will
not take part in the elections. It will therefore cease to be a legally-registered political
party, with the possibility that all party assets will revert to the State.)

The 2008 Constitution establishes a bicameral legislature at the national level – the
Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Union legislature) made up of the Pyithu Hluttaw (People’s
Assembly, the lower house) and the Amyotha Hluttaw (National Assembly, the upper
house).3 There are also 14 regional legislatures. Although the Constitution will only
come into force after the elections, the legislation that has been issued is in conformity
with the provisions of the new Constitution. On election day voters will cast three
separate ballots – one for each legislature.4

It should be recalled that one-quarter of the seats in all these legislatures are reserved
for members of the armed forces appointed by the Commander-in-Chief (presently Than
Shwe). The elections will be for the other three-quarters of the seats. It should also be
recalled that these elections are not to choose a government. They are legislative
elections. The Union legislature will then serve as a Presidential electoral college to
choose a President and two Vice-Presidents from candidates nominated by the elected
members and the military appointees. It will then be for the President to select his
government, from among the legislative representatives or not as he sees fit.5

                                                        
3
For an analysis of the provisions of the 2008 Constitution see Richard Horsey, “A preliminary analysis of
Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution”, CPPF Briefing Paper, 14 January 2009; and “Myanmar: Towards the
elections”, International Crisis Group, 20 August 2009.
4
Voters from certain ethnic groups in certain regions/states may also be entitled to elect a separate ethnic
representative to the region/state legislature, in accordance with §161(b),(c) of the 2008 Constitution. (See
§44 of the 2010 Region or State Hluttaw Election Law.)
5
The male gender in this sentence has been chosen with good reason: partly due to the military’s
longstanding domination of politics, participation of women in government in Myanmar is among the lowest
in the world. That may begin to change, but it is highly likely that the presidential candidate nominated by
the military appointees will be chosen as President, and it is almost inconceivable that this would be a
woman.

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Just as the 2008 Constitution drew heavily on previous constitutions, most of the
provisions of the 2010 election laws are identical to the laws governing the 1990
elections. It is the small number of departures from earlier precedent that are most
interesting and potentially most significant, as they can give some indication of the
government’s intentions with regard to the elections.

Of the new provisions, many repeat provisions from the 2008 Constitution (which is
necessary given thatthe Constitution is not yet in force). Some of these provisions may
be objectionable, but they should not be surprising, since it was clear that the laws could
hardly contradict the Constitution. The remaining provisions – those that were not
included in the 1988-1990 legislation, and which do not merely repeat provisions of the
2008 Constitution – are few in number, but highly significant.

Of all the new laws, it is the Political Party Registration Law that can be seen as the
most restrictive, and as departing the most from earlier precedent. It is substantially
more restrictive than the 1988 party registration law, which was skeletal. In particular,
its restriction on prisoners (defined as “persons currently serving a prison sentence as a
result of a conviction in a court of law”) joining or remaining members of political parties
is draconian, all the more so in light of the fact that many opposition figures are
imprisoned. If there is no general amnesty for political prisoners before the elections (or
before the 7 May notification deadline for existing political parties), this provision will
undoubtedly be seen as severely undermining the credibility of the polls.

Some of the most significant issues raised by the legislation are as follows:

Some existing political parties face significant dilemmas.Existing parties have limited
time to decide how to react to the new legislation. In order to continue as legal parties,
they must apply to the Election Commission by 7 May 2010. (Note that as existing
parties, they do not need to re-register, merely to apply to the Commission to continue
their registration, by filling out Form E-1 attached to the relevant Bylaws.) The NLD
decided on 29 March that it would not do so.

It is not possible for parties to boycott the elections if they wish to remain legally
registered. Any party that does not field candidates in at least three constituencies (in
any legislature - not one candidate in each legislature as has been wrongly claimed in
some articles and translations) will be deregistered.

If an existing party decides to continue its activities, in filling out Form E-1 it will have
to:
 Provide full details on its head and deputy-head6 [E-1, para. (g)]
 Agree to adhere to the provisions of the 2010 Political Party Registration Law
[E-1, para. (h)]
 Meet the party membership requirements (1000 people for parties that will
contest at the national level) within 90 days of Electoral Commission
approval of the application [E-1, para. (i)]
 Declare that the party is not in violation of the provisions of §7 of the Political
Party Registration Law, nor an organization involved in illegal drug activities
[E-1, para. (j)]

                                                        
6 In the case of the NLD, this would be Chairman Aung Shwe and Vice-Chairman Tin Oo, not General-

Secretary Aung San Suu Kyi.

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Note that no specific declaration to safeguard the Constitution is required, beyond the
general acceptance to adhere to the provisions of the law. Also, no immediate expulsion
of members currently in prison would appear to be required. Since parties are given 90
days to meet membership requirements and submit lists of members to the Electoral
Commission, it would seem that parties would therefore have 90 days after Commission
approval of an E-1 application in order to resolve those matters.7The Shan Nationalities
League for Democracy (SNLD)would face serious difficulties, however, since its key
leaders are in prison (Chairman KhunTun Oo and Secretary Sai Nyunt Lwin, in
addition to several party members).8

Ethnic parties and the Border Guard Force proposal. In April 2009, the Myanmar
authorities informed ethnic ceasefire groups that they had to transform their armed
units into “Border Guard Forces” under the partial control of the Myanmar army. The
proposal met with significant resistance from many ceasefire groups, who saw it as a
major concession that would significantly reduce their autonomy, in return for which
they were being offered no significant quid pro quo by the government. A revised
deadline of 28 February 2010 set by the government for all ceasefire groups to accept the
proposal has already passed, and the impasse remains.

Section 12(a)(iii) of the 2010 Political Parties Registration Law provides that parties
may be deregistered for having “direct or indirect contacts with armed insurgent groups,
terrorists or unlawful associations ”. This could be problematic for ethnic parties (new or
existing). In particular, it is conceivable that any ceasefire groups that refuse to
transform into Border Guard Forces as demanded by the authorities could be declared
illegal organizations. Any political party having direct or indirect links with those
organizations (such as the Kachin State Progressive Party does with the Kachin
Independence Organization ceasefire group) could then be deregistered. Note that this
clause repeats a provision of the 2008 Constitution (§407b). There was no such provision
in the 1988 Law.9

The cost of registration.Myanmar is a very poor country, and therefore clearly thevarious
fees for registering political parties and candidates, and for obtaining permission to
print party materials, do represent a significant potential barrier to political
participation. Some commentators have claimed that the fees and maximum
expenditure levels are very high compared with 1990, and that this will favour wealthy
elite candidates.10 At the same time, it should be pointed out that the fee levels do not
differ greatly from those stipulated in 1990 in real terms.11

                                                        
7 It is possible that the Commission could take a more restrictive view as to the application of §§5(f), 10 and

12(a)(vi) of the Political Parties Registration Law to existing parties; in practice, however, it seems likely
that the Commission could only act after being notified by a party of its list of members.
8 Other parties with members in prison such as Arakan League for Democracy are no longer officially

registered, so would have to re-form from scratch in any case.

9 However, a similar provision in the 1989 Pyithu Hluttaw Election Law (§10h) applied to those standing for

election.
10 See, for example, Htet Aung, “Party registration regulations favor wealthy”, The Irrawaddy, 18 March

2010.
11 The K500,000 registration fee for candidates is presently equivalent to about US$500; the deposit amount

set by the 1989 Pyithu Hluttaw Election Rules (§20c) was K10,000 (at that time equivalent to about
US$330). Similarly, the maximum expenditure per candidate is now K10 million (equivalent to about
US$10,000), whereas the 1989 Pyithu Hluttaw Election Rules (§79) limited expenditure to K75,000 (at that
time equivalent to about US$2,500). Once decreases in purchasing power over the last 20 years are also
taken into account, the real-term differences are minimal.

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Citizenship requirements.The citizenship requirements are more inclusive than they
were in 1990. Citizens, associate citizens, naturalized citizens and holders of temporary
(non-citizen) registration certificates all have the right to form and join political parties
and to vote. Extending such rights to temporary certificate holders enfranchises the
Rohingya Muslims, which must be seen as a positive step, but unfortunately without
granting them citizenship (unlike in 1990, when the Rohingya were able to vote, in spite
of the fact that under the 1989 law only citizens, associate citizens and naturalized
citizens had the right to do so).12 These provisions also enfranchise many people of
Chinese and Indian descent who have been denied citizenship, as well as ethnic people
in remote and ceasefire areas that have never been under State control.

Voting.As noted above, three simultaneous votes will take place on election day: for the
two chambers of the bicameral national legislature; and for Region/State legislatures.
The constituencies for each of these three polls will be different (and there is a fourth
kind of constituency for ethnic candidates in the Region/State legislatures under
§161(b),(c) of the Constitution). All contests will be on a first-past-the-post basis, as was
the case in 1990 (although at that time, elections were for a single, unicameral
legislature – and the election results were never implemented, of course).

Will the vote be fair? It is of great significance that no obvious attempt has been made by
the authorities to facilitate manipulation of the election results. Thus, all the features of
the 1990 polls that prevented such manipulation from happening are in place again.
This must be seen as positive. It is in stark contrast to the 2008 Referendum, which
would have provided a much more restrictive precedent that the authorities could have
followed. For example, votes are to be counted at the close of voting in each polling
station, in the presence of the candidates or their nominated agents and members of the
public (for the referendum, ballots were counted at a centralized location). This is the
key feature that was seen as ensuring a fair count in 1990.

This strongly suggests that while the authorities may try to manipulate the
campaigning process and influence which parties register – and they have already taken
steps to ensure that the playing field is not level – they are not planning to manipulate
the count itself. (Although this is obviously not to suggest that irregularities will not
arise.) The electoral legislation thus sets the scene for an election with some similar
characteristics to the 1990 election – that is, it will once again not be free (the political
space is tightly controlled, many political actors are imprisoned, there are tight controls
on political parties, and continued restrictions on freedom of expression and assembly),
but the count itself may well be reasonably fair as it was felt to be in 1990.

Many observers have suggested that the military’s strategy in 1990 was to encourage as
many political parties as possible to register, thus creating a “cacophony” that would
confuse the electorate and split the opposition vote.13 Of course, if that was the strategy
in 1990, then it spectacularly failed to take account of the massive popular appeal of the
NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi. This time around, the more restrictive party registration
provisions will significantly limit the number of parties that register. Indeed, part of the
                                                        
12 The category of “temporary registration certificate” holder was created by the 1982 Citizenship Law, the
implementing rules for which were issued only in 1989. Temporary certificates started to be issued only
after the 1990 elections. Prior to that, most Rohingya held a different form of identification (a green
National Registration Card), which was in practice sufficient to meet the citizenship requirements of the
1989 election law.
13 A total of 235 parties registered in advance of the 1990 elections, of which only 130 actually participated.

Only 93 parties were able to meet the requirement of contesting at least three constituencies, and of those
only 27 parties won seats.

  5
reason why the authorities may have decided to tighten some of the restrictions on party
registration is to limit the number of spurious registrations, and thereby reduce the
workload for the Electoral Commission – although, of course, it is very clear that other
restrictions are there to create difficulties for existing opposition parties, particularly
the NLD.

One consequence of the tightened registration requirements is that it will be difficult for
very small parties to register and contest the elections, although there is nothing to
prevent independent candidates from doing so. In fact, independent candidatesavoid
some of the costs and many of the restrictions.

III. Popular misconceptions

Much of what has been written in the media, and even commentary by political activists
and some foreign governments, has been based on a hasty and often erroneous reading
of the provisions. Some of the most-repeated misconceptions are as follows:

Misconception 1: Aung San Suu Kyi cannot run for political office because her late
husband was British. In fact, there is no constitutional or legal restriction on individuals
with foreign spouses contesting legislative seats. She would therefore not be prevented
from running for office on this basis – even if she were still married. She cannot be a
presidential candidate, but this is due to the fact that her sons have British nationality,
and there is a constitutional restriction on presidential candidates having spouses,
children or children-in-law who are foreign citizens.14

Of course, the fact that she is under house arrest may prevent her from being a
leader/member of a political party, or standing for a legislative seat. This is not certain,
however, from the Constitution and legislation (see next).

Misconception 2: Individuals with a criminal record cannot stand for election, be

members of political parties, or vote. In fact, the prohibition on these activities applies
only to “persons currently serving a prison term as a result of a conviction in a court of
law”.15 There are therefore no restrictions on former political prisoners, and it is not
clear whether Aung San Suu Kyi would be regarded as currently serving a “prison
term,” since her sentence has been suspended. This is something that the Election
Commission would have to rule on. Note also that these prohibitions repeat identical
language from the electoral laws governing the last election in 1990. The implication is
that if Aung San Suu Kyi were released she could certainly remain part of the NLD, and
could vote (and stand as a parliamentary representative as well, see above) – although
now that the party has decided that it will not take part in the elections, it looks set to
be deregistered.

It is therefore vital that political pressure continues to be brought to bear for her release
and the release of all other political prisoners prior to the election, and preferably before
the 7 May notification deadline for existing parties. This is something that is more likely
to be acted on than calls for the amendment or repeal of legislation that has just been
issued.

Misconception 3: The laws disenfranchise members of religious orders. It is correct that

Buddhist monks and nuns, and the clergy of other religions, cannot stand for election,
                                                        
14 See §§59(f) and 120-121, 152-153 of the 2008 Constitution.
15 2008 Constitution, §392b; 2010 Political Party Registration Law, §§2(l), 4(e), 10(e).

  6
join political parties, or vote. However, it is important to note that the clergy have never
in modern times been enfranchised. It has been a longstanding view of the Buddhist
clergy that politics and religion should not be mixed, and that monks should not be
tainted by politics. This has been the position since long before independence, and it was
strongly supported by Aung San, the independence hero and Aung San Suu Kyi’s father.
It was included in the 1947 independence constitution, and all constitutions since.16

IV. Key provisions

This section provides a condensed overview of the most important provisions in each of
the new laws, and notes which of these are based on earlier precedents, and which are
new. The following legislation has been promulgated (as noted above, all these texts
have been issued in Burmese only):

1. Union Election Commission Law (SPDC Law No. 1/2010)

2. Political Parties Registration Law (SPDC Law No. 2/2010)
3. Pyithu Hluttaw (lower house) Election Law (SPDC Law No. 3/2010)
4. Amyotha Hluttaw (upper house) Election Law (SPDC Law No. 4/2010)
5. Region Hluttaw or State Hluttaw Election Law (SPDC Law No. 5/2010)
6. Bylaws under laws no. 2 – 5.

1. Union Election Commission Law

 Essentially repeats the provisions in §§398–403 of the 2008 Constitution (that is,
the Law can be seen as setting out interim arrangements consistent with the
Constitution, since the Constitution is not yet in force).
 Provides that Electoral Commission members are appointed by the regime
(which has already been done).
 Empowers Electoral Commission to designate constituencies, compile voter lists.
 Empowers Electoral Commission to postpone/cancel elections in constituencies
for reasons of natural disaster or lack of security.
 Provides for the Electoral Commission to form Election Tribunals to hear
electoral disputes, and objections.
 Section 8(k) gives the Electoral Commission powers to regulate the activities of
political parties; no such provision was included in the 1988 Law, and this is seen
as intrusive by many in opposition, including the NLD.
 Repeals the 1988 Multi-party Democracy General Elections Commission Law
(SLORC Law No. 1/88).

2. Political Parties Registration Law (and Bylaws)

 New parties need at least 15 people as “organizers,” who must sign a declaration
(§4) that they meet the stipulated requirements relating inter alia to citizenship,
age (at least 25), not being a member of a religious order, not being a civil
servant, not being a prisoner (§4e), not being a foreigner or naturalized citizen of
a foreign country, etc.
 “Prisoner” is defined in the same terms as in the 1989 Pyithu Hluttaw Election
Law and the 2008 Constitution, as “a person serving a prison sentence resulting
from a conviction in a court of law.”

                                                        
16 For further discussion, see International Crisis Group, op. cit., p. 8 f.

  7
  The citizenship requirement is rather inclusive: citizens, associate citizens,
naturalized citizens, and holders of temporary (non-citizen) registration
certificates can all form or join political parties.
 Parties must declare that they will “safeguard the constitution” (§6c), which will
be seen as a problematic provision by those who have been critical of the
Constitution and the manner of its drafting.
 Party organizers and members must be free of foreign interference (§6f). This
sub-section broadens the original characterization of foreign interference in the
1988 law (§3d) to include “influence” (the Burmese expression used has a very
broad meaning) and “direct or indirect” support from foreign countries or
organizations. (§407c of the 2008 Constitution does not include the term
“influence.”)
 Within 90 days of registration, parties contesting at the national level must have
signed up 1000 members, and regional parties 500 members. Members must
meet the same citizenship requirements, be of age (18), and meet the other
requirements as for organizers (§10). This includes the requirement that party
members not be presently serving a prison term resulting from a conviction in a
court of law (§10e); this is more restrictive than the 2008 Constitution, which
contains no such provision (see §407).
 The Electoral Commission must be provided with lists of party members per
township (on a detailed prescribed form, including all particulars of each
member). (Bylaws §13 and forms H and H-1 and their attachments)
 Parties are responsible for expelling members who do not meet the stipulated
criteria. Failure to do so (or to meet other listed requirements) shall result in
party deregistration (§12a).
 There is a party registration fee of K300,000 (about US$300) (Bylaws §7b).
 Parties must contest at least three Hluttaw seats (in any of the three legislative
assemblies). [§12(a)(i); see also Bylaws §16]. The same provision was introduced
in advance of the 1990 elections.17
 Parties face deregistration if they have direct or indirect contacts with armed
insurgent groups, terrorists or unlawful associations [§12(a)(iii)]. This repeats a
provision of the 2008 Constitution (§407b). There was no such provision in the
1988 Law, although a similar provision in the 1989 Pyithu Hluttaw Election Law
(§10h) applied to those standing for election.
 Parties are permitted to operate commercial enterprises as a source of party
funds [§15(a)(iii)]. This is a new provision.
 The Electoral Commission is given wide powers to regulate the activities of
political parties (§24b). No such powers were given explicitly to the Electoral
Commission in the previous 1988 Law, but it did evolve such powers by the time
of the 1990 elections.
 There are limits to the amount that a party may spend as a whole, and per
Hluttaw candidate, within each Hluttaw term (§16). The maximum expenditure
per candidate is K10 million (about US$10,000) (Bylaws §21).
 If a party disbands or is deregistered, party property reverts to the State (§19).
This is a new provision without previous precedent.
 Decisions of the Election Commission are final and conclusive (§20), as they were
previously (1988 Law, §8).

                                                        
17Election Commission Announcement No. 337 of 5 December 1989, requiring each registered political
party to contest at least three Pyithu Hluttaw seats

  8
  Existing parties are required apply to the Electoral Commission within 60 days
of enactment of this law (that is, by 7 May 2010), if they wish to continue to be
registered as parties (§25, and Bylaws §8, Form E-1).
 Repeals the 1988 Political Parties Registration Law (SLORC Law No. 4/88).

3. Pyithu Hluttaw Election Law (and Bylaws)

 Almost all provisions of this law are carried over verbatim from the 1989 Law.
Exceptions are: number of constituencies, right of temporary registration card
holders to vote, and standards of conduct for electoral officials.
 Pyithu Hluttaw (lower house) Constituencies are approximately townships, to a
number of exactly 330 (§4) (there are presently 325 townships, and under the
provisions of the law, the five most populous of these will be split into two
constituencies).
 Eligible voters are citizens, associate citizens, naturalized citizens and holders of
temporary (non-citizen) registration certificates who have reached age 18 and
who are on the electoral roll, and who are not members of a religious order,
currently serving a prison term, of unsound mind, undischarged insolvents, or
foreigners or naturalized citizens of a foreign country (§§6-7).
 To stand for election, candidates must be 25 or over and have lived the previous
10 years continuously in Myanmar, and be citizens born of parents who were
both citizens, and not violate the other constitutional restrictions on candidates
(§§8,10).
 Candidates are required to pay a registration fee of K500,000 (about US$500)
(Bylaws §18c).
 Criteria for inclusion on the electoral roll are fairly inclusive, including of “those
outside the country with government permission” (§14) (this includes registered
migrant workers, and possibly also those who are unofficial migrants but who
maintain their Myanmar passports by making periodic payments to Myanmar
embassies overseas); the electoral roll is published in advance to allow errors and
omissions to be corrected, with the possibility of appeal to township level
Electoral Commission (§§16-18).
 Independent candidates are possible (§9); appointment of election agents possible
as in 1990 (self, or a nominated person meeting the requirements to stand for
election) (§§29-30).
 Date of election to be determined by Electoral Commission (§34c), as was the case
in 1990 (1989 Law, §28c).
 Voting is by secret ballot (§35). Advance voting procedures are as in 1990 (§§45-
46). Those outside the country vote by advance voting (§47).
 Counting to take place at each polling station in the presence of electoral agents
and members of the public, as in 1990 (§48).
 Electoral Commission officials are granted functional immunity (§87); an
identical provision was included previously (1989 Law, §80); requirements for the
conduct of such officials are set out (also new) (§§82-83).
 The results of the 1990 elections are declared void by this law (§91b).
 Repeals the 1989 Pyithu Hluttaw Election Law (SLORC Law No. 14/89).

4. Amyotha Hluttaw Election Law (and Bylaws)

 Amyotha Hluttaw (upper house) consists of 12 elected representatives (plus 4

military appointees) from each Region or State (§3), as provided in the 2008
Constitution.

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  Amyotha Hluttaw constituencies are based on the combination or subdivision of
townships according to a stipulated procedure (§4).18
 Candidates for election must meet the same requirements as for election to the
Pyithu Hluttaw, except that in this case they must be aged at least 30 [§8(a)(i)].
 All other provisions are in line withthe Pyithu Hluttaw Law.

5. Region/State Hluttaw Election Law (and Bylaws)

 Region/State legislatures are based on two constituencies per township (formed

with approximately equal population without splitting wards/village tracts), plus
one constituency corresponding to the whole State/Region for election of ethnic
candidates under §161(b),(c)of the Constitution (§§3-4).
 Eligibility requirements on candidates for election are the same as for the Pyithu
Hluttaw, including age (§8,10).
 Voters who are eligible to elect ethnic candidates under §161(b),(c) of the
Constitution may vote once for their chosen township constituency candidate,
and once for their chosen ethnic candidate (§44).
 All other provisions are in line withthe Pyithu Hluttaw Law.

                                                        
18There are five States and one Region – Chin, Kayin, Kayah, Mon, East Shan and Tanintharyi – that have
less than 12 townships, and in these cases certain of the most populous townships will be divided into two
Amyotha Hluttaw constituencies; all other States and Regions have more than 12 townships, and in these
cases certain of the least populous townships will be combined to form single Amyotha Hluttaw
constituencies.

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