Normative ethics

Normative ethics is the study of ethical action. It is the branch of philosophical ethics that
investigates the set of questions that arise when considering how one ought to act, morally
speaking. Normative ethics is distinct from meta-ethics because it examines standards for the
rightness and wrongness of actions, while meta-ethics studies the meaning of moral language
and the metaphysics of moral facts. Normative ethics is also distinct from descriptive ethics, as
the latter is an empirical investigation of peoples moral beliefs. To put it another way,
descriptive ethics would be concerned with determining what proportion of people believe that
killing is always wrong, while normative ethics is concerned with whether it is correct to hold
such a belief. Hence, normative ethics is sometimes called prescriptive, rather than descriptive.
However, on certain versions of the meta-ethical view called moral realism, moral facts are both
descriptive and prescriptive at the same time.[1]
Most traditional moral theories rest on principles that determine whether an action is right or
wrong. Classical theories in this vein include utilitarianism, Kantianism, and some forms of
contractarianism. These theories mainly offered overarching moral principles to use to resolve
difficult moral decisions.[citation needed]

Contents

1 Normative ethical theories

2 Binding force
o 2.1 Motivating morality
3 References
4 See also

Normative ethical theories

There are disagreements about what precisely gives an action, rule, or disposition its ethical
force. Broadly speaking, there are three competing views on how moral questions should be
answered, along with hybrid positions that combine some elements of each. Virtue ethics
focuses on the character of those who are acting, while both deontological ethics and
consequentialism focus on the status of the action, rule, or disposition itself. The latter two
conceptions of ethics themselves come in various forms.

Virtue ethics, advocated by Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, focuses on the inherent
character of a person rather than on specific actions. There has been a significant revival
of virtue ethics in the past half-century, through the work of such philosophers as G. E.
M. Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Alasdair Macintyre, Mortimer J. Adler, Jacques Maritain,
Yves Simon, and Rosalind Hursthouse.

Deontology argues that decisions should be made considering the factors of one's duties
and others' rights. Some deontological theories include:
o Immanuel Kant's Categorical Imperative, which roots morality in humanity's
rational capacity and asserts certain inviolable moral laws.
o The contractualism of John Rawls, which holds that the moral acts are those that
we would all agree to if we were unbiased.
o Natural rights theories, such that of John Locke or Robert Nozick, which hold
that human beings have absolute, natural rights.

Consequentialism (Teleology) argues that the morality of an action is contingent on the

action's outcome or result. Consequentialist theories, differing in what they consider
valuable (Axiology), include:
o Utilitarianism, which holds that an action is right if it leads to the most happiness
for the greatest number of people. (Historical Note: Prior to the coining of the
term "consequentialism" by Anscombe in 1958 and the adoption of that term in
the literature that followed, "utilitarianism" was the generic term for
consequentialism, referring to all theories that promoted maximizing any form of
utility, not just those that promoted maximizing happiness.)
o State consequentialism or Mohist consequentialism, which holds that an action is
right if it leads to state welfare, through order, material wealth, and population
growth
o Egoism, the belief that the moral person is the self-interested person, holds that an
action is right if it maximizes good for the self.
o Situation Ethics, which holds that the correct action is the one that creates the
most loving result, and that love should always be our goal.
o Intellectualism, which dictates that the best action is the one that best fosters and
promotes knowledge.
o Welfarism, which argues that the best action is the one that most increases
economic well-being or welfare.
o Preference utilitarianism, which holds that the best action is the one that leads to
the most overall preference satisfaction.

Ethics of care or relational ethics, founded by feminist theorists, notably Carol Gilligan,
argues that morality arises out of the experiences of empathy and compassion. It
emphasizes the importance of interdependence and relationships in achieving ethical
goals.

Pragmatic ethics is difficult to classify fully within any of the four preceding
conceptions. This view argues that moral correctness evolves similarly to scientific
knowledge: socially over the course of many lifetimes. Thus, we should prioritize social
reform over concern with consequences, individual virtue or duty (although these may be
worthwhile concerns, provided social reform is also addressed). Charles Sanders Peirce,
William James, and John Dewey, are known as the founders of pragmatism.

Role ethics is based on the concept of family roles.

Binding force
It can be unclear what it means to say that a person "ought to do X because it is moral, whether
they like it or not". Morality is sometimes presumed to have some kind of special binding force
on behaviour, but some philosophers think that, used this way, the word "ought" seems to
wrongly attribute magic powers to morality. For instance, G. E. M. Anscombe worries that
"ought" has become "a word of mere mesmeric force".[2] British ethicist Philippa Foot elaborates
that morality does not seem to have any special binding force, and she clarifies that people only
behave morally when motivated by other factors.
If he is an amoral man he may deny that he has any reason to trouble his head over this or any other moral
demand. Of course, he may be mistaken, and his life as well as others' lives may be most sadly spoiled by his
selfishness. But this is not what is urged by those who think they can close the matter by an emphatic use of
'ought'. My argument is that they are relying on an illusion, as if trying to give the moral 'ought' a magic force.

-Philippa Foot [3]

Foot says "People talk, for instance, about the 'binding force' of morality, but it is not clear what
this means if not that we feel ourselves unable to escape."[3] The idea is that, faced with an
opportunity to steal a book because we can get away with it, moral obligation itself has no power
to stop us unless we feel an obligation. Morality may therefore have no binding force beyond
regular human motivations, and people must be motivated to behave morally. The question then
arises: what role does reason play in motivating moral behaviour?

Motivating morality
See also Causes of good behaviour
The categorical imperative perspective suggests that proper reason always leads to particular
moral behaviour. As mentioned above, Foot instead believes that humans are actually motivated
by desires. Proper reason, on this view, allows humans to discover actions that get them what
they want (i.e., hypothetical imperatives)not necessarily actions that are moral.
Social structure and motivation can make morality binding in a sense, but only because it makes
moral norms feel inescapable, according to Foot.[3] John Stuart Mill adds that external pressures,
to please others for instance, also influence this felt binding force, which he calls human
"conscience". Mill says that humans must first reason about what is moral, then try to bring the
feelings of our conscience in line with our reason.[4] At the same time, Mill says that a good
moral system (in his case, utilitarianism) ultimately appeals to aspects of human nature
which, must themselves be nurtured during upbringing. Mill explains:
This firm foundation is that of the social feelings of mankind; the desire to be in unity with our
fellow creatures, which is already a powerful principle in human nature, and happily one of
those which tend to become stronger, even without express inculcation, from the influences of
advancing civilisation.
Mill thus believes that it is important to appreciate that it is feelings that drive moral behavior,
but also that they may not be present in some people (e.g. psychopaths). Mill goes on to describe
factors that help ensure people develop a conscience and behave morally, and thinkers like
Joseph Daleiden describe how societies can use science to figure out how to make people more
likely to be good.

References
1.
Cavalier, Robert. "Meta-ethics, Normative Ethics, and Applied Ethics". Online Guide to
Ethics and Moral Philosophy. Retrieved 2014-02-26.
Elizabeth Anscombe. (1958). "Modern Moral Philosophy". Philosophy 33, No 24.
Foot, Philippa. (2009). Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives. In S. M. Cahn, &
P. Markie,Ethics: History, Theory, and Contemporary Issues (pp. 556-561). New York: Oxford
University Press.
John Stuart Mill (1863). Utilitarianism. Chapter 3: Of the Ultimate Sanction of the Principle
of Utility.