HGHGKJ

Table of Contents
ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................................iii
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES................................................................................................iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT................................................................................................................v
1. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................1
1.1.
Overview about real estate environment in Vietnam........................................................1
1.2.
Corporate Governance structure of stock-holding firms in Vietnam...............................2
1.3.
Problems in Vietnamese corporate governance................................................................3
1.4.
Factors affecting firms performance...............................................................................4
1.1.1.
Objective factors.......................................................................................................4
1.1.2.
Subjective factors.....................................................................................................5
2. LITERATURE REVIEW.............................................................................................................7
2.1.
Corporate Governance overview......................................................................................7
2.1.1.
Definition of corporate governance..........................................................................7
2.1.2.
Studies approaches to corporate governance............................................................8
2.2.
Researches on Corporate Governance worldwide..........................................................11
2.2.1.
In USA and UK.......................................................................................................11
2.2.2.
In Japan...................................................................................................................12
2.2.3.
In Vietnam..............................................................................................................15
3. METHODOLOGY.....................................................................................................................18
3.1.
Data collection method...................................................................................................18
3.2.
Population selection........................................................................................................18
3.2.1.
Dependent variables...............................................................................................19
3.2.2.
Independent variables.............................................................................................20
3.3.
Descriptive statistics.......................................................................................................22
3.4.
Correlation analysis........................................................................................................24
4. REGRESSON MODEL ANALYSIS..........................................................................................25

4.1.
Assumptions...................................................................................................................25
4.2.
General model................................................................................................................26
4.2.1.
Equation 1: Test all independent variables with dependent variable ROA............26
4.2.2.
Test all independent variables with dependent variable ROE................................29
4.2.3.
Summary.................................................................................................................32
4.3.
Test several alternative models.......................................................................................32

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4.3.1.
Test 7 independent variables with dependent variable ROA Equation 3............32
4.3.2.
Test 9 independent variables with dependent variable ROA Equation 4............34
4.3.3.
Test 9 independent variables with dependent variable ROE Equation 5.............35
4.3.4.
Test 7 independent variables with dependent variable ROE (Equation 6).............36
4.4.
Error detection in the model...........................................................................................38
4.4.1.
Autocorrelation.......................................................................................................38
4.4.2.
Heteroskedasticity..................................................................................................39
4.6.
Findings and Discussion.................................................................................................41
5. CONCLUSION..........................................................................................................................45
5.1.
Conclusion......................................................................................................................45
5.2.
Limitations......................................................................................................................45
5.3.
Recommendation............................................................................................................46
APPENDIX 1: LIST OF REAL ESTATE FIRMS LISTED IN VN...............................................48

APPENDIX 2: DATABASE USED FOR RUNNING EVIEWS...................................................50
APPENDIX 2: CONTINUING......................................................................................................53
APPENDIX 3: CORRELATION BETWEEN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES............................59
APPENDIX 3: CONTINNNUING................................................................................................60
REFERENCE.................................................................................................................................63
Page ii
ABSTRACT
Corporate governance has become one of the most popular phenomena that draw the worldwide
attention recently. As corporate governance is one of factors that have significant influences on
the performance of almost every business, it deserves to a great deal of concern from
management of the firms. However, the adoption of good corporate governance in real estate
sector in Vietnam contributes to the success of firms is still statistically questionable. There is
limited research to quantifying the actual impact of corporate governance in firms performance.
The objective of this paper is to provide a deep look into the relationship between corporate
governance and performance of real estate sector from 2013 to 2014, especially in successful
companies in Vietnam by presenting both theoretical framework and empirical study. The part of
theoretical framework provides readers with profound knowledge about corporate governance in
general. In the empirical study section, a list of public real estate enterprises in Vietnam have
been fully chosen as a population to run econometric models which examine the effect of several
variables of corporate governance on the firms profitability. The overall result of study shows
that board size, executive size and coincident people between BOM and BOD has not clearly
significant effect on both ROA and ROE of these firms.
Key words: Real estate firms performance, ROA, ROE, corporate governance, board size,
executive size, coincident.
Page iii
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1: Two types of corporate governance system worldwide......................................................9
Table 2 : Descriptive Statistics.......................................................................................................20
Table 3: Testing result of all 15 independent variables with dependent variable ROA - Equation 1
........................................................................................................................................................24
Table 4: Testing result of 15 independent variables with dependent variable ROE - Equation 2. .27
Table 5: Test independent variables with dependent variable ROA Equation 3..........................30
Table 6: Test 9 independent variables with dependent variable ROA Equation 4.......................32
Table 7: Test 9 independent variables with dependent variable ROE Equation 5.......................33
Table 8: Test 7 independent variables with dependent variable ROE (Equation 6).......................34
Table 9: Autocorrelation BG Serial Correlation LM Test...........................................................36
Table 10: Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey..........................................................38
Table 11: Summarizing the results of regression models...............................................................39
Table 12: Summary to coefficient of controlling variables............................................................40
Page iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Page v
[CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PUBLIC REAL ESTATE

FIRMS IN VIETNAM] Kieu Van Anh MFBA6
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Overview about real estate environment in Vietnam
Vietnam is progressing to the next stage of urbanization. Basic infrastructures, affordable homes
and shopping malls are being developed in major Vietnamese cities like Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh
City. The continual flow of foreign investments, coupled with an export-driven economy, is
propelling Vietnam towards the goal of becoming an industrialized nation by 2020. With Vietnam
governments determination to develop the economy further, there is a window of opportunities
for foreign firms in the building and construction industry to participate in Vietnams real estate
development. It is therefore, crucial for companies and organisations which have an interest in
Vietnam to acquire adequate knowledge of the culture, financial and legal framework of Vietnam
in order to develop long term partnerships with the related business firms there.
As a result of joining WTO in 2007, property market surged in Vietnam, supported by high
economic growth and significant increase in foreign investment.
End of 2008 until now: property market halted due to the global economic crisis and domestic
economic uncertainties. The market saw large falls in prices in all sectors. With support from the
government, the real estate market is expected to recover in the short to medium term.
In 2015, the financial pressure on real estate enterprises is greatly reduced. Circular 36/2014 / TTNHNN is reducing the level of lending risk for loans invested in real estate from 250% to 150%.
This movement is expected to help unfreeze credit flows to the real estate sector and companies
in the industry to help resume sales operations and investment projects in this sector.
Besides, lower deposit interest rates will ease the pressure on borrowing costs for businesses that
remains debts in the previous year. In addition, stock market is forecasted to be dynamic again,
increasing the likelihood of success for further public offers, which is in turn provide more funds
to pay down debt and improving financial situation.
Opportunities in Vietnamese real estate industry
According to Cushman & Wakefield Group, the research report for the third
quarter 2014 shows the disbursement of FDI increased by 4.5% compared to it in
the same period last year. This means that the expatriates working in Vietnam will
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continue to grow. This is a chance for the apartment building service provider to
meet growing demand of customers.
Also the increase in the number of international visitors to Vietnam by 0.5% for
the first 9 months in 2014 compared with the volume in the same period in 2013
opens an opportunity for accommodation service and promotes hospitality
segment to attract tourists to stay and increase sales in the peak season.
Several FTAs will be completed in the near future.
Challenges in Vietnamese real estate industry
Despite of the gloomy economy surrounding, the rent per month is observed as a
steady increase in addition with other consumers product.
Another challenging point to real estate market is that the abundant and massive
supply of apartments and houses causing pressure on the price of the market.
1.2. Corporate Governance structure of stock-holding firms in Vietnam

Codes for corporate governance are essential sources for corporate governance for many
economies. Until March 2007, the Ministry of Finance issued Code of Corporate governance
for listed firms, which was developed under Enterprise Law 2005 and Securities Law 2006.
According to Le Toan (2008), "this code is, in fact, a piece of subordinate legislation (with
mandatory rules) and is therefore different from a voluntary code of corporate governance in
advanced economies such as the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, the German
Corporate Governance Code, and the Chinese Code of Corporate Governance for listed
companies."
The main principles of corporate governance applicable to a listed company under the Code
include: Rights of shareholders, General meetings of shareholders, Board of Management,
Control Board, Conflict of interest and related party transactions and Information Disclosure
and Transparency.
The structure of stock-holding company in Vietnam is summarized as follows:
Figure 1: Corporate governance structure of a stock-holding company in Vietnam
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1.3. Problems in Vietnamese corporate governance

According to Mr. Dinh Van An, Director of the Institute for Economic Central Management,
though the Enterprise Law is assessed to be suitable with the principles of market economy
and standards of international law, but many defects about protection shareholders' rights and
implementation corporate governance model still exist.
Currently, under the provisions of the Enterprise Law, for the corporation, shareholders have
the rights to receive important information, but not all information, records and documents of
the company is accessible. Shareholders are not guaranteed the right to review accounting
records, minutes of meetings of shareholders. Besides, despite the rights of the minority
shareholders is guaranteed when nominating, and convening the shareholders' meeting, the
law has not defined the principles for determining the number of people that they are allowed
to elect, as well as how to form and content requirements of the request to convene a meeting,
etc.
About implementing the model of corporate governance, Corporate Law does not specifically
refer to the issue of authorization holders. For the corporation, a common problem is that
persons who directly exercise the rights of shareholders are shareholder representatives.
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Although they can be directly and closely supervised by shareholders, to some extent, it can
lead to the abuse for the purposes of self-interest.
Dr. Le Dang Doanh, who is senior advisor for the Ministry of Planning and Investment, said
that the shortcomings of corporate governance in Vietnam are the laws on accounting,
auditing, and transparency of information. This is the reason why violation is slowly detected;
the penalties for these faults have insufficient effect. This allows some non-executive director
at the abuse of power and position to earn illicit profits.
1.4. Factors affecting firms performance

Aspects influencing firms' performance could be divided into two separated fields: objective
and subjective factors, which are discussed more detailed as follows.
1.1.1. Objective factors
There are three factors that are considered as external factors affecting firms'
performance: international and regional environmental factors, national economic factor,
and industrial environmental factor.
1.4.1.1.
International and regional environmental factors
Stable international and regional economical environment plays a vital role in the
success of firm. Political trend and open market impact firms' input and output
market. The economic environment and political stability in the region is a secured
basis for businesses to conduct business activities, contributing to improve business
efficiency.
1.4.1.2.
National economic factor
National political environment has always been a prerequisite for the development
and expansion of investment activities of enterprises, organizations and individuals
locally and abroad. Those investment activities have an impact to the business
performance of enterprises. Besides, national laws and regulations are also very
important as businesses must comply strictly with the provisions to perform their
obligations to the state, to society and to employees. In another word, laws are
constraining or encouraging factors for the survival and development of enterprises,
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thereby directly affecting the results and effectiveness of the business operations of
the business. Some other dimensions belonging to national environment includes
unemployment, education level, lifestyle, customs, habits, social psychology,
economic policy, the growth rate of the national economy, inflation, the average
income per capita, etc. Let take unemployment as an example as it could has both
positive and negative influence on firms' performance. Without unemployment,
workers have more opportunities to choose jobs; labor cost of the employer's business
will be certainly higher, thus reducing the efficiency of production, and vice versa. If
unemployment is high, the cost of the employer's business will be reduced, leading to
an increase in production efficiency of the business. But high unemployment will
cause the reduction in consumption, thus reducing business efficiency.
1.4.1.3.
Industrial environmental factor
Industrial environmental factors consist of market competition, threats of new

entrance, substitute products, powers of buyers, and power of suppliers. The level of
competition between firms in the same industry directly influence products' supply
and demand of each business, affecting the price, speed of consumption, thus
impacting the performance of each business.
1.1.2. Subjective factors
Three most important internal aspects are corporate governance, labor, and financial
situation of business. Other factors could be named as features of the product, raw
materials, facilities, engineering and technologies, and business working environment.
1.4.1.4.
Corporate governance
Corporate governance apparatus is particularly important for the survival and

development of enterprises, which simultaneously perform many other tasks as
below:
The first task is to develop business strategy. If corporate governance

mechanism has ability to build an appropriate business strategy in line with
the business environment, consistent with the ability of the enterprise, it will
be the basis of a good orientation to conduct business activities effectively.
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Develop business plans on the basis of the business strategy.
Implement the plan, and the business activity proposed.
To examine, evaluate and adjust the above process.
Due to the critical functions and duties of corporate governance, we can confirm that
its quality has a huge impact on producing effective enterprise. If the machine is held
with management structure in line with the tasks of production and business
enterprises, be flexible, with clear separation of duty, a qualified and responsible
management team, it can be sure that the business would operate with high efficiency.
1.4.1.5.
Financial situation of business
Enterprises being financially healthy would have the ability to ensure that the
business activities are stable, have capability in technological innovation and
application of that technology advanced in order to reduce costs, improve
productivity and product quality. Financial viability of businesses directly affected its
reputation, the ability to be active in the production, which influences the target of
minimizing costs by actively exploit and optimize the use of inputs. So, the financial
situation of enterprises has very strong impact on the efficiency of the business
enterprise.
1.4.1.6.
Inventory
Inventory is one of the most essential input factors, takes part in every activities, and
operating procedure of a real estate company. Quality and the day inventory on hand
directly impact process of construction, productivity, the consumption rate, so it
directly affects the efficiency of the business.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Corporate Governance overview
The literature review explores the following theme of the research questions: the impact of
corporate governance on real estate public firms in Vietnam from 2013 to 2014. After a brief
definition of corporate governance, a model was performed to find out the impact of corporate
governance, including board size of management, size of executive board and the coincident
people between BOM and BOD and disclosure, on firm profitability.
2.1.1. Definition of corporate governance

There are many definitions of corporate governance. OECD (2004) states that Corporate
governance is a system by which companies are directed and controlled. La Porta et al
(2000) considercorporate governance as a set of mechanisms in which outside investors
protect themselves against problems arising from conflicts of interest from the managers
and controlling shareholders. According to Pei Sai Fan (2004), Corporate governance is
basically about putting in place the structure, processes and mechanisms by which
business and affairs of the company are directed and managed in order to enhance the
long term shareholder value through accountability of managers.
At basic level, corporate governance problems arise when shareholders wish to control
their companies in a different way to the managers. These problems are further
complicated by conflicts among different shareholders due to the diversity in ownership.
To solve these conflicts, proper corporate governance frameworks are put in place. Five
mechanisms in corporate governance are used to manage the conflicts:
(i)
(ii)
hostile takeover,
partial concentration ownership and control in large shareholders or a group of
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
shareholders,
delegation of partial control to large creditors (e.g. financial intermediaries),
control of CEO by board of directors,
Alignment managers interests with shareholder through remuneration policy.
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Among these mechanisms, the role of board of directors in controlling CEOs is widely
used. Most corporate charters require that shareholders elect a board of directors, which
monitors the CEO on their behalf.
2.1.2. Studies approaches to corporate governance
2.1.2.1.
Agency theory
Agency theory seems to be the most frequent used to develop the concept of
corporate governance, resulting in the practice of this approach to a variety of
researches. According to agency theory, shareholders (principals) would be the
owners of the companies, but do not run the operating activities on day-to-day basis.
Instead, they delegate decision making authority to the directors, called agents.
Because of the separation of duty between control and ownership, and the difference
of concern between two parties, there remains a situation that the agents act on their
own interest, which influences that of principals. This problem has been aggravated
in Anglo-Saxon economies by the development of modern firms with large number of
atomized shareholders whose delegation of multiple tasks as well as decision making
to managers has set room for managers engagement in moral hazard and adverse
selection. As a result, the agency cost exists unavoidably.
The main task behind agency theory is to produce a method that make sure the
efficient alignment of interest of principals and agents, leading to the reduction of
agent cost. Indeed, in accordance with Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and
Jensen (1983), solutions to agency problems involve establishing a nexus of
optimal contracts (explicit as well as implicit) between the owners and management
of the company. These contracts, also known as the internal rules of the game,
identify the rights of agents in the organization, performance criteria against which
they will be evaluated and the resulting payoff functions they will tend to face.
2.1.2.2.
Transaction cost economics theory
Cost and difficulties along with market transactions sometimes favor hierarchies and
sometimes act as an economic governance structure. Firms have two main sources of
funds, which are from debt-holders and shareholders. In which, debt is often the cost
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effective way as involving non-specific assets and equity is the most economical for
investments that involves specific assets. Williamson (1985, 1996) characterized
specific assets or asset specificity by costly to redeploy when the contract breaks
down as there would be a loss of useful value. Williamson presumes that projects can
only be financed with debt initially. If governance structure works out of rules, failure
to make payment leading to bankruptcy, which makes the recovered rate to debt
holders proportionate to the extent that the assets are redeploy able. Because of the
fact that debt holders can anticipate values that they would be able to recover when
liquidation, the assets become less redeployable. Transaction Cost Economics
predicts debt financing are adjusted, making debt financing becomes more costly as
the degree of asset specificity increases (Williamson 1988).
2.1.2.3.
Stakeholder theory
Originally created by R. Edward Freeman (1984), stakeholder theory gives a broader

overview about corporate governance than agency theory; hence it creates better look
for company performance from corporate governance. This theory is used in lots of
researches before across the world, and also discussed as the centerpiece among
governance theories in this research. In practice, there is a variety of stakeholders that
related to the corporation beside the shareholders, including employees, customers,
suppliers, banks, environmentalists, governments, etc. This concept is usually applied
to large corporation, where the impact of companies on society is so persuasive that
they should discharge responsibility to many more sectors of the society rather than
on their shareholders only (Solomon, 2004).
Freeman (1984) indicates that corporation must simultaneously satisfy the owners,
the employees, and their unions, suppliers and customers in order to be successful.
Besides, managers in different functional disciplines ought to be more responsive to
the external environment by carrying forward the notion of internal stakeholders as
the conduits to external groups. In such an organization, the executives should act as
corporate spokesperson, political and social participant and manager of the human
resources of the firm.
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Giving the same description like Freeman, Buchholz (1989) also showed the
importance of unity in interest between parties. He brought about some new findings
to solve this difficult problem such as increasing rights to shareholders to participate
in important management decisions, change in the composition of boards by
including more outside directors to alleviate concern boards that are too subservient
to management or employee representation at some level in corporate governance.
Besides, Donaldson and Preston (1995) analyzed stakeholder theory via its
descriptive accurateness, instrumental influence and normative legitimacy. Because
of being a powerful tool to examine empirical claims, guesstimate appropriately
stockholder concept, and to test the links between corporate management and its
performance, this approach is both descriptive and instrumental. First, this theory is
used to describe, and sometimes to explain, specific corporate characteristics and
behaviors. It is immoral if focus exclusively in the interest of shareholders, it should
be enlarged the concern by non-shareowners community. Second, applying in
instrumental way, stakeholder theory aims to recognize the bonds between
management and accomplishment in corporate objectives. By using different tools to
decrease information asymmetry, and enforcement devices including law, and
emphasis of fairness, stakeholder theory succeeds in suiting variety of stakeholder
concentrations.
In the world, corporate governance system is mainly divided into two systems, insider
type governance and open type governance. The characteristics of both types of
governance are shown as the table below:
Table 1: Two types of corporate governance system worldwide
Insider type corporate governance Open
type
corporate
system
governance system
Characteristics Based on a long term relation and Based on law, contracts and
mutual reliance
self-responsibility
Not taking opportunity principle Numerous bearers of corporate

mutually.
The
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bearer
governance.
of
corporate Various kinds of monitors.

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governance is limited.
Assuming the existence of the
Monitoring is taken on by a main market, with free entry and
Strengths
Limitations
bank.
free withdrawal.
Insufficient disclosure.
Sufficient disclosure.
Price mechanism works.

Stable management and stable Incentive mechanism works
employment.
for managers.
Retrenchment of monitoring cost.
Easy
Internalize adjustment cost.

Uncertain management system
restructuring.
Burgeoning monitoring cost.
to
The system becomes invalid when Generate

the management is unstable.
promote
free
business
riders
of
monitoring
Promote rent-seeking activities

Source: EPA (1998), Mitsubishi Research Institute, Inc
2.2. Researches on Corporate Governance worldwide

2.2.1. In USA and UK
Researches carried out by many authors in the world indicate that corporate governance
has strong relationship with firms performance. In USA, one of the first famous findings
belonged to McConnell and Servaes (1990), who conducted the quantitative analyses by
gathering data from 1.173 firms in 1976 and 1.093 US firms listed on NYSE or AMEX.
At first, these researchers base solely on agency theory, leading to hypothesis that value of
firm would depend on Proportion of shared owned by insiders. It is reasonable when they
pointed out that there is a motivation for the manager to adopt investment and financing
plans that profit him, but lessen the payoff to external stockholders. Thus, the greater the
percentage of the shares owned by insiders, the bigger the value of the firm.
When taking OLS, they decided to conduct the test four times. In the initial regression, Q
is regressed against insider ownership and insider ownership squared. In the next three
regressions, various measures of block-holder ownership were introduced into the model
as additional control variables. Second examination showed the relationship between
percentage of shares owned by the largest single block-holder and Q. The measure in third
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test for block-holder ownership was the percentage of shares owned by all block-holders,
and the last had the measure which was an indicator variable that is assigned the value of
one if the firm has a block-holder and zero, otherwise. In no case, for either year, does the
measure of block-holder owner. The results significantly contributed to the world
civilization when there is a positive relation between Q and fraction of shared owned by
institutional investors, financial leverage, R&D intensity and advertising intensity.
Besides, curvilinear relationship between Q and percentage of shares owned by corporate
insiders comprised of officers and members of Board of Directors (BOD) were
discovered, which set the foundation to lots of researches afterward. In 1996, Nickell got
Panel data from EXSTAT 670 UK firms from 1972 to 1986. Adding new concept to firm
performance market competition, Nickell observed the link between productivity
growth and market share, competition dummy and value-added. An important conclusion
was made, containing the reduction that market power takes on level of Productivity and
the increase in growth if competition rises.
In 1997, Nickell continued his work with colleagues Nicolitsas and Dryden to regress
productivity with eight independent variables. Interestingly, the implication of dependent
variable in this case is far different from that in a year before as it derived from change in
log of real sales. Since basing on stakeholder theory, eight variables bringing both inside
and outside factors contains lagged productivity growth, change in log of employment,
change in log of capital stock, change in index of industry overtime hours, monopoly
power, size by log of employment, financial pressure and industry and time dummies. It
was logical when the outcome is productivity increasing significantly with ownership
control, market competition, and financial pressure. This paper focused entirely on
manufacturing sector via collecting data from 580 manufacturing firm in UK from 1985
to 1994, showing its valuable implication.
2.2.2. In Japan
Japan experienced the significant change in firm behavior in 1990s as the considerable
shift in corporate governance. In the past, investments of Japanese firms depended mainly
on external debt, especially on borrowing channel from banks. Until the mid 1980s, equity
and corporate bond finance rose dramatically, while short and long term bank borrowing
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reduced in size. Kitamura (2001) expected that the lack of governance and leadership,
together with the balance sheet problem of banking and non-banking firm contributing to
long recession. Due to the similarities in situation between Japan and Vietnam, this paper
is decided to use as a corner stone throughout this thesis. In his paper, Kitamura not only
focused on how corporate governance affects performance of firms, but also market
competition. Using panel data from Basic Survey ofhpanese Business Structure and
Activities, hegathered information from 26,000 firms over 33 industrial categories from
1992 to 1995. Specifically, manufacturing industries accounted for 50%, wholesale and
retail industry made up 40%, the remainder belonged t other industries. Seven types of
information were pulled together including types and Year establishment number of
employees and organization, assets, liabilities, capital, stock, and investment, intraindustry trade and international trade, research and development, holding and use of
patents and licenses, and parent company, subsidiaries and affiliations.
Taking reference from Nickell (1996) suggesting idea that competition improves
corporate governance, Kitamura added this factor into his paper. In fact, Nickell shows
facts that rivalry, as quantified by increased amount of competitors or by lower levels of
rents, is coupled with a considerably higher rate of total factor productivity growth. In line
with the standard economic theory, perfect competition results in proficient allocation of
resource. In fact, Nickell ascertained that firms with higher market share tend to have
higher productivity growth. Consequently, it is vague to conclude that market competition
strengthens corporate performance on practical grounds.
However, after elaborating paper of Allen and Gale in 2000, Kitamura found out the
contradicting phenomenon as they ended up with the conclusion that although there is a
lack of outside discipline and monitoring, most firms seen to operate fairly efficiently.
Thus, they argue that a wider viewpoint than the standard agency view of governance is
essential. Particularly, firms must have entrepreneurial management teams that have
ability to make good decisions about prospect directions rather than only cost minimize. It
means that managers have more work to do to specify direction that firms should move in,
more willingly than being standing-ins. To test the accuracy of effect that corporate
governance associated with competition takes on firms' performance, the process that used
to conduct the investigation is describe more detailed as below. Kitamura developed the
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model based on eight variables. In which, from the view point of corporate governance,
own capital ratio and return on equity (ROE) are classified as governance variables from
shareholders, while liquidity ratio, debt/equity ratio, and symbol ratio are those from debtholders. There were five control variables symbolizing for corporate governance including
Own capital, Debt-Equity ratio, Liquidity ratio, Leverage ratio, and Square of leverage
ratio. Besides, Labor and Capital stand for stakeholder factors, whereas sales share
represented for market competition. Especially, he chose ROA to be a symbol of firm
performance. ROA gives investors information about the profits generated from the
invested amount (or the amount of assets). ROA differs significantly between joint stock
companies and depends on the business and industry that firms get in. Assets of a
company are derived from loans and equities. Both of these funds are used to finance the
company's operations. The effect of the ability to transfer from capital to profit is
described via ROA. Because the company has the capability to earn more money on less
investment amount, so the higher the ROA, the better. All of the data were taken from
annual report of each firm.
The result is summarized as follows:
ROAt = 0.043 + 0.261 * St + 0.003 * lnLt 0.004 * lnKt 0.03 * (D/A)t 0.02 *
(D/A)2t + 0.051 * OwnCapRatiot 0.03 * LiquidityRatiot
t-stat (resp) (13.03), (5.47), (13.68), (-25.1), (-7.55), (-11.7), (19.18), (-17.52)
In which: ROA: Return on Total Assets, S t: (Sales share) Share of firm's output in total
output, Lt: (Labor) numbers of full-time employees, Kt: (Capital) Real Capital stock,
(D/A)t: Debt to Assets ratio, OwnCapRatio t: (Owned Capital Ratio) Shareholder equity to
Assets ratio, LiquidityRatiot: Liquid Assets to Liquid Debt ratio.
It is obvious to see that sales share, labor, own capital ratio positively relate to ROA,
meanwhile, capital factor, leverage ratio, square of leverage ratio and liquidity ratio have
inverse relationship with dependent variable. At the beginning, Kitamura proposed debtequity ratio as one of the explanatory variables, however, after thorough procedure of
testing, this ratio did not show any strong link to explained variable ROA as the
coefficient term equaled 0 and t-stat was 1.53.
The second Japanese research that should be considered is from Hirotsugu Sakai and
HittoshiAsaoka. Taking data from 468 Japanese firms, they conducted three tests at the
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sametime. Dependent variable was spent for value added, represented firm performance
and used throughout the 3 experiment. According to SNA, value added is defined as
(i)personnel cost (employees compensation, welfare expense and allowance for employee
retirement benefits), (ii) rental cost, (iii) financial cost, tax and public charge (excluding
the following taxes), (iv) corporate tax, residence tax, and enterprise tax, (v) current net
profit, (vi) depreciation allowance.
In the first test, they examined the relationship of firm performance with market
competition. Lagged market share, Leverage ratio, Capital stock and Labor were
employed to be predictor variables. The second test showed the bond linking ownership
structure and block holders. One of the most interesting things in this paper is that
Hirotsugu Sakai and Hitoshi Asaoka applied the same basic control variables listed above
for these 3 tests, with some additional variables in the subsequent examination to satisfy
the suitability in feature of each test. As a result, the second experiment existed additional
regressor namely ratio of block holders' shareholders of firm. The last test was the
association of ownership structure with financial institution, non financial institution,
foreigners and individual. The added stimulus variable was dummy variables that separate
ratio of block holders' shareholders of firm in the previous test into 3 main variables
containing foreign investors, individual investors and financial institution investors.
The result is impressive with some important relationships that were proved. Market
competition increased the firm performance but not so strong, meanwhile, leverage ratio
and block holderspositively affected ROA. Foreigner shareholder was the only variable
having impact on firm effectiveness and efficiency out of the other three.
2.2.3. In Vietnam
There are few quantitative researches that investigate about the connection between firm
performance and corporate governance in Vietnam as a reason of limited source of
information. Most of the studies in this issue in Vietnam focus on banking sector such as
the following two papers.
One of the first and foremost studies about this subject is conducted by PhD. Dao Binh
and Hoang Giang (2012). In which, they revealed the fact about banking sector, along
with the base of agency theory and stewardship theory. Besides, to support for the
Literature Review
Page 15

consistence of model, they implement the external - internal and triangle framework of
bank corporate governance. A sample combined of the information within theperiod of
2008 and 2010 was gathered, after a check of extreme value, they obtained a sample of 30
data with a combination of cross-sectional and time-series data. Most of the data are
collected from annual reports and financial statement of 30 banks.
Chosen among variety of proxies for bank performance, ROE became the closest
measurement of return to shareholders' investment. In term of independent variables,
banks are standardized by SBV regulation, so there is one important variable standing for
risk management called CAR. Almost one third of Vietnamese commercial banks have
foreign strategic partners or foreign investors, foreign ownership is decided as
representative for shareholder characteristics. Their general model is made up one
dependent variable ROE Return on Equity and three independent variables BS
Board Size, CAR Capital Adequacy Ratio and FOWN foreign ownership. After
testing several alternative models, they brought out one significant result: Bank
performance is considerably affected by board size and CAR. Meanwhile, foreign
ownership is not the factor that has influence on ROE. Besides, they made up another six
tests with board composition variable; however, it is obvious from the models that the
composition of the Board of Directors has very little influence on the bank performance in
Vietnamese banking sector.
Another research that deserves to be mentioned is performed by Tran Tu and Pham Khanh
(2012). In thispaper, they pointed out the relationship between bank performance and
corporategovernance via using new base idea corporate governance index (CGI). A
sample consisted of 36 commercial banks, with data was collected from 2010 to 2011, so
the totalobservations were 72. Financial data includes ROE -- return on equity, ROA on
assets, ratios of cost over income - COIs, equity over assets ratio, the size of total assets
which are obtained from audited financial reports or annual reports of banks. The
dependent variable is bank performance, which is measured by operational performance:
ROE, ROA or Cost over Income ratio. Independent variables include CGI, Total assets
and Leverage ratio. Corporate governance index (CGI) is selected to be proxy for
corporate governance. In constructing a corporate governance index, there are two main
approaches. First, CGI is built through a project joint between academic institutions.
Literature Review
Page 16

Second, corporate governance index is built in researches in studying the relationship
between corporate governance and firm performance.
Based on method for CGI of all business (T.N.Thang, 2010), OECD principles and Basel
principles for enhancing corporate governance (2006), modifications from the first test in
March 2012, a scorecard is designed to estimate CGI. The main components of CGI for
Vietnamese banks composed of Shareholder and Shareholder's annual meeting, Board of
Director, Board of Supervisors, Disclosure, transparency and auditing and Violation.
After examining several models, they found out that CGI has positive impact on
performance of Vietnamese commercial banks in 2010-2011. However, its impact is not
considerable. However, in young market like Vietnam, performance of commercial banks
is also influenced by many other variables such as number of branches (Nguyen Manh
Hung, 2010), quality of assets (Nguyen Duc Thank, 2012) and risk management (Vincent
Aebiet all 2012). Therefore, in their research, the explanation of control variables in
models is not high.
Literature Review
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3. METHODOLOGY
3.1. Data collection method
In this section, I will explain the sampling method used to conduct the model. The population
of interest is real estate firms listed in Vietnam at the date of 30 May 2015. As the number of
real estate companies listed in Vietnam is limited to 59 firms, in which 44 firms on HOSE and
15 firms on HNX, this study is plan to consider the whole population of 59 stock codes for the
population size.
Further, this study is to collectdata for 59 firms for the period from 2013 to 2014.
Because the objective of this thesis is to learn lessons about corporate governance from
successful corporations, it is reasonable to take the additional condition of positive ROA and
ROE values.
ROA and ROE in 2013, 2014 are set to be dependent variables. Other figures are designated as
independent variables that were collected from firms annual financial reports. All of them are
inputs to Excel worksheet to process, and then imported to Eviews to perform the test and
further analysis.
3.2. Population selection

Based on prior research of Kitamura (2001) about Corporate Finance and Market
Competition: Evidence from the Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities in
the late 1990s in Japan; this study have the basic idea to select some main variables that is
believed to be suitable to Vietnam. They are ROA and ROE as dependent variables, along with
Net income, Total Assets, Equity, Debt, Current Assets, Current Liabilities, Inventory, Capital,
Debt to Asset ratio, Equity to Asset ratio, Debt to Equity ratio, Quick ratio, Liquidity ratio, as
independent variables. Besides, this study developsother independent variables including
Board size (BOM), Executive size (BOD) and Coincident people between BOM and BOD to
find out the impact of corporate governance factors on the performance of the company.
Methodology
Page 18

3.2.1. Dependent variables
To finalize the model, this fieldwork is trying both ROA and ROE as dependent variables.
After conducting the test, which one better that create the most relevant model could be
selected as prediction variable.
3.2.1.1.
Return on Assets ROA
ROA provide investors with the information about the performance of the company,
particularly the profits generated from the invested amount of assets. Assets of a
company are derived from loans and equities. Both of these funds are used to finance
the companys operations. The effect of the ability to transfer from capital to profit is
described via ROA. The higher the ROA is, the better it is. Because the higher ROA
means that company has the capability to earn more money on less invested amount.
That is the reason why ROA is the best indicator for firms performance evaluation.
ROA is calculated as in this equation:
In this thesis, ROA is calculated from Net income and Total assets which are
collected from annual audited reports of each chosen firms.
3.2.1.2.
Return on Equity ROE
ROE is the most important ratio with shareholders, measuring the profitability per
dollar of shareholder equity. This index is an accurate measurement to assess how
much profit could be generated by accumulated capital spending. High ROE means
that the company could demonstrate the effective usage of shareholder capital,
proving the harmonious balance between equity and debt to exploit its competitive
advantage in the process of raising capital and expanding scale of economy.
Therefore, the higher the ROE is, the more attractive the stock to investors is.
ROE is calculated in this equation:
Methodology
Page 19

In this thesis, ROE is calculated from Net income and Total equity which are
collected from annual audited reports of each chosen firms.
3.2.2. Independent variables
3.2.2.1.
Net income NI
Net income is the amount of profit after tax collected in the income statement. For
most shareholders, net income is the most important benchmark to evaluate the
performance of an investment.
3.2.2.2.
Current assets CA
Current asset isan account on balance sheet that illustrates the value of all assets
which are reasonably expected to be converted into cash within one normal course of
business or one year. Current assets include cash, accounts receivable, inventory,
marketable securities, prepaid expenses and other liquid assets that can be readily
converted to cash.
3.2.2.3.
Current liabilities CL
A current liability is also an account on balance sheet that is due within one cycle of
business. However, it creates an obligationthat will require the use of a current asset.
3.2.2.4.
Inventory INVENTORY
The proper management of inventory is critical for any size business, particularly real
estate companies. The way a company values its inventory can be the difference
between a profit and loss. In fact, inventory valuation affects a company's profit
margin, working capital, assets and shareholder's equity.
3.2.2.5.
Capital CAPITAL
Capital in this thesis is also equity in the balance sheets as of the date 30 December.
3.2.2.6.
Leverage ratio DEBTASSETS
Most firms in real estate industry take huge debts to finance its operation. When used
prudently, financial leverage can enhance investment returns when investing in non-
Methodology
Page 20

residential real estate. However, when leverage is deployed excessively or structured
inappropriately, the investment results can be catastrophic.
3.2.2.7.
Quick ratio QUICKRATIO
Quick ratio is calculated as the ratio of current assets minus inventory in comparison
to current liabilities. It shows the ability to carry out its obligation for maximum one
year or once business cycle.
3 independent variables that represent for firms corporate governance
3.2.2.8.
Board size BSIZE
Board size is the number of people elected by the annual shareholders meeting to be
in the Board of Directors. This data is extracted from the annual audited financial
statements of each firm. A larger board could also favor better decision making as a
result of diversified competency and experience. It is supposed that the larger the
board size is, the better the firms performances are.
3.2.2.9.
Executive board EXESIZE
Executive board is the number of people that are elected or appointed to be in charge
with the activities of organization. This information is taken out from the annual
audited financial statements of each firm. It is reasonable when company is managed
by bigger size of executive board would perform better than small size. This research
expects that EXESIZE and dependent variables are positively related.
3.2.2.10.
Coincident people between BOM and BOD COINCIDENT
This factor implies how many people have responsibility in both boards. The larger
the number of coincident people is, the smaller separation of duty in corporate
governance in firms is. This means that one person would be in charge of various
functions, resulting in the reduction in efficiency and effectiveness of management
team. Because of this reason, it is anticipated that the coefficient of this variable
would have a negative sign, which reflects the inverse relationship between number
of coincident persons and dependent variables. In case it acquires positive sign, it
could be interpreted as another case.
Methodology
Page 21

3.3. Descriptive statistics

All of the data is collected from annual reports of each firm, which is gathered from their
official website. Due to the aim of this thesis which is to learn lesson from successful
companies, firms are selected on purpose. Condition to choose data is that ROA and ROE
must be higher than zero, showing the financial health of company. The mean and standard
deviation of each variable is summarized as follows:
Table 2 : Descriptive Statistics
NI
TA
EQUITY
DEBT
CA
CL
INVENTORY
ROA
ROE
CAPITAL
DEBTASSETS
EQUITYASSET
DEBTEQUITY
QUICKRATIO
LIQUIDRATIO
BSIZE
EXESIZE
COINCIDENT
Mean
197098.8
5102483.
1809518.
3087112.
2765524.
1544120.
1482174.
0.029080
0.074669
1809518.
0.539945
0.439546
1.574134
1.215077
2.507949
5.829787
3.872340
2.106383
Median
29463.50
1653434.
610350.0
946934.5
1089090.
531801.0
459966.0
0.017922
0.043536
610350.0
0.546076
0.432037
1.269346
0.776762
1.986253
5.000000
3.000000
2.000000
Maximum
6779512.
90485307
20396041
63200674
39844678
26675265
18913717
0.140316
0.556955
20396041
0.847689
0.796901
5.565519
12.83162
14.06737
11.00000
9.000000
6.000000
Minimum
107.0000
118710.0
63537.00
24802.00
24940.00
11504.00
0.000000
0.000113
0.000402
63537.00
0.192194
0.152311
0.254860
0.102944
0.494470
5.000000
1.000000
0.000000
Std. Dev.
788662.3
12807655
3334443.
8995758.
5676981.
3850535.
2895603.
0.030791
0.094599
3334443.
0.153410
0.150910
1.125264
1.639485
1.973657
1.372842
1.667101
0.955663
Firstly, as regards to characteristics of dependent variables, it is clear that there is a significant

spread among all observations and their mean.ROE ranges from 0.04% to 55.69% with mean
value equals to 7.47%. While ROA ranges from 0.01% to 14.03%, with mean value equals to
2.9%. Mean value of ROE is much higher than that of ROA in addition that ROEs standard
deviation is also higher than ROAs (9.5% and 3.08%). IDV - VinhPhuc Infrastructure
Development Joint Stock Company in 2014 gained the highest return of equity of 55.69%,
while in 2013 PPI - Pacific Property And Infrastructure Developement Joint Stock Company
obtained the lowest percentage of ROEas 0.04%.When it comes to ROA, the best return on
assets is the percentage of 14.03% in 2013 of REE - Refrigeration Electrical Engineering
Methodology
Page 22

Corporation and the least return on assets is also in 2013 with the percentage of 0.01% of
UDC - Urban Development and Construction Corporation.
As for the features of independent variable BSIZE (board size), the table indicates that the
average of board size among all real estate firms in Vietnam from 2013 to 2014 is 5.8 with a
wide range from 5 to 11 members. Most of firms have their board size of 5 persons over the
period of 2013 and 2014. Meanwhile most of them kept smaller size of executive board
EXESIZE, only 3 persons and varying from 1 to 9 members.
The COINCIDENT in almost
firms studied in this thesis is 2 persons. The particular circumstances areSCR - SaiGonThuong
Tin Real Estate Joint Stock Company without coincident and HQC Hoang Quan Consulting
Trading Service Real Estate Corporation with the largest coincident of 6 people.
Further, leverage ratio (DEBTASSETS) and total debts to owner equities ratio
(DEBTEQUITY) and equity to total assets ratio (EQUITYASSET) reflect comprehensively
characteristics of real estate sector. Real estate firms often operate with high level of debts,
most of capital comes from debts. That is the reason why all three variables remain high on
average.
The last independent variable need to be classified is INVENTORY which is used to measure
the outstanding inventory from 2013 to 2014. The data shows that the average inventory in the
studying period remained very high of 1,482 billion VND. The only one firm having without
inventory in both 2013 and 2014 is DRH - Dream House Investment Corporation. The
exceptional case of VIC - VinGroup Joint Stock Companykept its inventory at the very high
and rising level with the amount from 16,598 billion VND in 2013 to 18,913 billion VND in
2014.
3.4. Correlation analysis

Before the regression model is run, the matrix correlation between our variables (dependent
and independent) is performed in the Appendix 4. The matrix shows that variables in the
model are not highly correlated.
Methodology
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4. REGRESSON MODEL ANALYSIS

4.1. Assumptions
Econometric methodology is applied in this thesis to examine the link between corporate
governance controlling mechanism and performance of Vietnamese real estate listed firms.
More specifically, ordinary least square OLS method is utilized for testing.
As the requirement in application of OLS, several assumptions as follows should be concerned
and accepted:
1. Linear regression model: the regression model is linear in the parameters
(With i = 1,..n)
2. X values are fixed in repeated sampling
Values taken by the regressor X are considered fixed in repeated samples, or in other
words, X is assumed to be nonstochastic.
3. Zero mean value of disturbance i. Given the value of X, the mean or expected value of
the random disturbance term iis zero. E(i|Xi) = 0
4. Homoskedasticity or equal variance of i. Given the value of X, the variance of i is the
same for all observations. Var (i|Xi) = 2
5. No autocorrelation between the disturbances. Given any two X values, Xi and Xj (i#j),
correlation between any twoiand j is zero. Cov(i,j|Xi,,Xj) = 0
6. Zero covariance between iand Xi, or Cov(i,Xi) = 0
7. The number of observations n must be greater than the number of parameters to be
estimated (explanatory variables).
8. Variability in X values. The Xa values in a given sample must not all be the same.
Technically, Var(X) must be a finite positive number.
9. The regression model is correctly specified. There is no specification bias or error in the
model used in empirical analysis.
10. There are no perfect multicollinearity. There are no perfect relationships among the
explanatory variables.
Besides, aiming to conduct the examination using Eviews software and simplify the tests, it is
understandable that all the data are assumed to be normally distributed. It is reasonable to test
the model under one level of significant, being 5% , as it is a prevalent benchmark in
econometric study.
Data Analysis
Page 24

4.2. General model

After analyzing quantitative model of corporate governance and real estate firms performance
by using statistic description of variables and correlation analysis among all variables, the
general econometric models are formed as the following combination of dependent and
independent variables.
4.2.1. Equation 1: Test all independent variables with dependent variable ROA
Firstly, this part generates a regression model as equation 1 including one dependent
variable ROA return on assets which represent for the performance of real estate
corporations listed in Vietnam. Also, the model has 15 independent variables including
Net income NI, Total Assets TA, Debts DEBT, Current Assets CA, Current
Liabilities CL, Inventory INVENTORY, Capital CAPITAL, the ratio of debt to total
assets DEBTASSETS, the ratio of equity to total assets EQUITYASSET, the ratio of
Debt to total Equity DEBTEQUITY, the quick ratio QUICKRATIO, the liquidity ratio
LIQUIDRATIO, the board size BSIZE, the executive board EXESIZE, the
coincident people between BOM and BOD COINCIDENT.
The aim of the general model is to test the effect of corporate governance on the
performance of real estate firms listed in Vietnam from 2013 to 2014.
Table 3: Testing result of all 15 independent variables with dependent variable ROA Equation 1
Dependent Variable: ROA
Method: Least Squares
Date: 05/30/15 Time: 17:06
Sample: 1 94
Included observations: 94
Data Analysis
Variable
Coefficient
C
NI
TA
DEBT
CA
CL
-0.040483
6.84E-08
5.32E-08
-6.14E-08
-9.76E-09
1.53E-09
Std. Error
t-Statistic
0.087809 -0.461029
1.15E-08 5.956582
1.63E-08 3.261717
1.89E-08 -3.255265
4.83E-09 -2.022411
6.08E-09 0.251561
Prob.
0.6461
0.0000
0.0016
0.0017
0.0466
0.8020
Page 25

INVENTORY
CAPITAL
DEBTASSETS
EQUITYASSET
DEBTEQUITY
QUICKRATIO
LIQUIDRATIO
BSIZE
EXESIZE
COINCIDENT
6.19E-09
-4.59E-08
0.096292
0.073903
-0.001808
0.005927
-0.000416
-0.002922
0.000113
0.000682
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)
0.491713
0.393966
0.023970
0.044817
226.0973
5.030450
0.000001
4.58E-09
1.56E-08
0.083128
0.090877
0.005689
0.003336
0.002981
0.002383
0.001754
0.002951
1.352689
-2.938545
1.158361
0.813219
-0.317854
1.776673
-0.139654
-1.226364
0.064356
0.231074
Mean dependent var

S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat
0.1801
0.0043
0.2503
0.4186
0.7514
0.0795
0.8893
0.2238
0.9489
0.8179
0.029080
0.030791
-4.470155
-4.037254
-4.295295
1.824805
Where: the name of variables are presented in Sample selection part

Individual partial coefficient test: p-value solution
Hypothesis:
H0: i = 0 (the variable i has no influence on dependent variable)

Hi: i 0 (the variable i has influence on dependent variable)
Significant level: = 5%
Decision rule:
H0 is rejected if p-value of the coefficient is less than 5%
H0 is not rejected if p-value of the coefficient is greater than 5%
Based on the result on Equation 1, there are five variables which have probability less
than 5%. These are Net Income, Total Assets, Debt, Current Assets and Capital. The null
hypothesis for these variables is rejected. This means thatthese variables have a statistical
significance on the firm performance when it comes to ROA.
The remaining variables includeCurrent liabilities, Inventory, Debt to Assets, Equity to
Assets, Debt to Equity, Quick ratio, Liquidity ratio, Board size, Executive size, and
Coincident.Because the null hypotheses for the remaining variables are not rejected,
leading to further testing of adding or removing these variables from the model.
Data Analysis
Page 26

As can be seen from equation 1:
R-squared of this model equals to 0.491713 means that 49.17% of ROA
movement that can be explained by movements of independent variables.
Adjusted R-squared of this model is 0.393966 means that these 15 independent
variables give an explanation of 39.39% movements of ROA.
Corporate governance independent variables in Equation 1 have tiny
significance on the firms ROA.
Board size show a negative relationship with return on assets;
That the coefficient of BSIZE equals to -0.002922 is interpreted
that ROA is expected to decrease to 0.29% on average if the board
of management increases by one person, holding other variables
constant.
Whereas, executive board and coincident present a positive

relationship with ROA.
That the coefficient of EXESIZE equals to 0.000113 is interpreted
that ROA is expected to increase to 0.011% on average if the
executive board increases by one person, holding other variables
constant.
That the coefficient of COINCIDENT equals to 0.000682 is
interpreted that ROA is expected to increase to 0.068% on average
if the coincident increases by one person, holding other variables
constant.
4.2.2. Test all independent variables with dependent variable ROE

Secondly, this part generates a regression model as equation 2 including one dependent
variable ROE return on equity which represent for the performance of real estate
corporations listed in Vietnam. Also, the model has 15 independent variables including
Net income NI, Total Assets TA, Debts DEBT, Current Assets CA, Current
Liabilities CL, Inventory INVENTORY, Capital CAPITAL, the ratio of debt to total
assets DEBTASSETS, the ratio of equity to total assets EQUITYASSET, the ratio of
Debt to total Equity DEBTEQUITY, the quick ratio QUICKRATIO, the liquidity ratio
Data Analysis
Page 27

LIQUIDRATIO, the board size BSIZE, the executive board EXESIZE, the
coincident people between BOM and BOD COINCIDENT.
The aim of the general model is to test the effect of corporate governance on the
performance of real estate firms listed in Vietnam from 2013 to 2014.
Table 4: Testing result of 15 independent variables with dependent variable ROE Equation 2
Dependent Variable: ROE
Date: 05/30/15 Time: 17:06
Sample: 1 94
Variable
Coefficient
Std. Error
t-Statistic
Prob.
C
NI
TA
DEBT
CA
CL
INVENTORY
CAPITAL
DEBTASSETS
EQUITYASSET
DEBTEQUITY
QUICKRATIO
LIQUIDRATIO
BSIZE
EXESIZE
COINCIDENT
-0.254863
1.54E-07
9.45E-08
-1.13E-07
-1.95E-08
1.71E-08
1.06E-08
-8.51E-08
0.331122
0.252105
0.014444
0.025513
0.003310
-0.003830
-0.000932
0.002662
0.221513
2.89E-08
4.12E-08
4.76E-08
1.22E-08
1.53E-08
1.15E-08
3.94E-08
0.209704
0.229253
0.014350
0.008416
0.007519
0.006010
0.004424
0.007444
-1.150557
5.310868
2.294145
-2.369190
-1.603567
1.112639
0.916417
-2.158117
1.578998
1.099680
1.006516
3.031461
0.440239
-0.637297
-0.210688
0.357518
0.2534
0.0000
0.0245
0.0203
0.1129
0.2693
0.3623
0.0340
0.1184
0.2749
0.3173
0.0033
0.6610
0.5258
0.8337
0.7217
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)
0.657302
0.591399
0.060469
0.285209
139.1177
9.973725
0.000000
Mean dependent var

S.D. dependent var
Schwarz criterion
Durbin-Watson stat
0.074669
0.094599
-2.619525
-2.186623
-2.444664
1.907136
Individual partial coefficient test: p-value solution

Hypothesis:
Data Analysis
H0: i = 0 (the variable i has no influence on dependent variable)

Page 28

Hi: i 0 (the variable i has influence on dependent variable)
Significant level: = 5%
Decision rule: H0 is rejected if p-value of the coefficient is less than 5%
Based on the result on Equation 2, there are five variables which have probability less
than 5%. These are Net Income, Total Assets, Debt, Quick ratio and Capital. The null
hypothesis for these variables is rejected. This means that these variables have a statistical
significance on the firm performance when it comes to ROE.
The remaining variables include Current assets, Current liabilities, Inventory, Debt to
Assets, Equity to Assets, Debts to Equity, Liquidity ratio, Board size, Executive size, and
Coincident. Because the null hypotheses for the remaining variables are not rejected,
leading to further testing of adding or removing these variables from the model.
In this second trial, Adjusted R-squared of this model equals to 0.591399, much
higher than that of ROAs regression model with all 15 independent variables in
Equation 1 (Adjusted R-squared of Equation 1 is 0.393966).
Adjusted R-squared of ROEs model with 15 independent variables means that
59.14% of ROE movement that can be explained by movements of these
independent variables.
Similarly to the Equation 1, corporate governance independent variables in
Equation 2 also have tiny significance on the firms ROE.
Board size and executive board show a negative relationship with
return on equity;
That the coefficient of BSIZE equals to -0.003830 is interpreted
that ROE is expected to decrease to 0.38% on average if the board
of management increases by one person, holding other variables
constant.
That the coefficient of EXESIZE equals to -0.000932 is interpreted
that ROE is expected to decrease to 0.09% on average if the
executive board increases by one person, holding other variables
constant.
Data Analysis
Page 29

Whereas, only 1 controlling variable thatcoincident presents a

positive relationship with ROE.
That the coefficient of COINCIDENT equals to 0.002662 is
interpreted that ROE is expected to increase to 0.26% on average if
the coincident increase by one person, holding other variables
constant.
4.2.3. Summary
The table below summarizes the variables which are statistical significance to a real estate
company listed in Vietnam based on the criteria of ROA and ROE.
No
1
2
3
4
5
4.3.
ROA
Net Income
Total Assets
Debts
Current Assets
Capital
ROE
Net Income
Total Assets
Debts
Quick ratio
Capital
Test several alternative models
To find out the completed model, this study runs the regression model again with the statistic
significant variables as well as keeping several controlling variables to corporate governance
and removing the remaining variables.
4.3.1. Test 7 independent variables with dependent variable ROA Equation 3
Table 5: Test independent variables with dependent variable ROA Equation 3
Date: 05/30/15 Time: 17:15
Sample: 1 94
Data Analysis
Variable
Coefficient
C
NI
TA
DEBT
CAPITAL
0.030848
6.03E-08
5.40E-08
-6.48E-08
-4.86E-08
Std. Error
t-Statistic
0.018581 1.660134
9.53E-09 6.325457
1.49E-08 3.614412
1.72E-08 -3.767037
1.41E-08 -3.459066
Prob.
0.1005
0.0000
0.0005
0.0003
0.0008
Page 30

DEBTASSETS
QUICKRATIO
BSIZE
0.010229
0.005229
-0.002289
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)
0.440292
0.394734
0.023955
0.049351
221.5679
9.664504
0.000000
0.021029 0.486395
0.001547 3.380287
0.002266 -1.010140
Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Schwarz criterion
Durbin-Watson stat
0.6279
0.0011
0.3153
0.029080
0.030791
-4.543998
-4.327547
-4.456568
1.835938

In this third trial, Adjusted R-squared of this model equals to 0.394734, higher
than that of ROAs regression models (Adjusted R-squared of Equation 1 is
0.393966), but lower than that of ROEs regression model with all 15 independent
variables in Equation 2 is 0.591399.
Adjusted R-squared of Equation 3 means that only 39.47% of ROA movement that
can be explained by movements of these independent variables.
Similarly to the Equation 1, corporate governance independent variable in
Equation 3 also has tiny significance on the firms ROA.Board sizevariable shows
a negative relationship with return on assets;
That the coefficient of BSIZE equals to -0.002289 is interpreted that ROA is
expected to decrease to 0.22% on average if the board of management increases by
one person, holding other variables constant.
4.3.2. Test 9 independent variables with dependent variable ROA Equation 4
Table 6: Test 9 independent variables with dependent variable ROA Equation 4
Date: 05/30/15 Time: 17:14
Sample: 1 94
Variable
NI
TA
Data Analysis
Coefficient
Std. Error
t-Statistic
Prob.
6.97E-08
4.63E-08
8.77E-09
1.28E-08
7.943492
3.623303
0.0000
0.0005
Page 31

DEBT
CA
LOG(CL)
INVENTORY
CAPITAL
QUICKRATIO
BSIZE
-5.19E-08
-1.26E-08
0.003835
7.64E-09
-4.03E-08
0.006494
-0.003872
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
Durbin-Watson stat
0.494728
0.447173
0.022894
0.044551
226.3769
1.866743
1.47E-08
4.18E-09
0.000991
3.72E-09
1.25E-08
0.001477
0.002121
-3.519866
-3.020630
3.870784
2.051225
-3.228639
4.398332
-1.825718
Mean dependent var

S.D. dependent var
Schwarz criterion
0.0007
0.0033
0.0002
0.0433
0.0018
0.0000
0.0714
0.029080
0.030791
-4.625040
-4.381533
-4.526681

In this forth trial, Adjusted R-squared of this model equals to 0.447173, higher
than that of ROAs regression models (Adjusted R-squared of Equation 1 is
0.393966). (Adjusted R-squared of Equation 3 is 0.394734). However, adjusted Rsquared of models on ROA and independents results in a lower number in
comparison to results of models on ROE and holding remained independent
variables. Adjusted R-squared of Equation 4 is much lower than that of ROEs
regression model with all 15 independent variables in Equation 2 is 0.591399.
Adjusted R-squared of Equation 4 means that only 44.71% of ROA movement that
Similarly to the Equation 1 and Equation 3, corporate governance independent
variable in Equation 4 also has tiny significance on the firms ROA. Board size
variable shows a negative relationship with return on assets;
That the coefficient of BSIZE equals to -0.003872 is interpreted that ROA is
4.3.3. Test 9 independent variables with dependent variable ROE Equation 5

Table 7: Test 9 independent variables with dependent variable ROE Equation 5
Data Analysis
Page 32

Date: 05/30/15 Time: 17:14
Sample: 1 94
Variable
Coefficient
Std. Error
t-Statistic
Prob.
NI
TA
DEBT
CA
LOG(CL)
INVENTORY
CAPITAL
QUICKRATIO
BSIZE
1.39E-07
3.02E-08
-2.88E-08
-2.40E-08
0.009286
1.57E-08
-3.24E-08
0.033096
-0.013323
2.38E-08
3.48E-08
4.01E-08
1.14E-08
0.002694
1.01E-08
3.39E-08
0.004014
0.005766
5.821433
0.869025
-0.719114
-2.110453
3.447246
1.546208
-0.954896
8.244259
-2.310752
0.0000
0.3873
0.4740
0.0378
0.0009
0.1258
0.3423
0.0000
0.0233
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
Durbin-Watson stat
0.604299
0.567057
0.062244
0.329321
132.3586
1.606480
Mean dependent var

S.D. dependent var
Schwarz criterion
0.074669
0.094599
-2.624651
-2.381144
-2.526292

In this model, Adjusted R-squared of this model equals to 0.567057, higher than
that of ROAs regression models (Adjusted R-squared of Equation 1 is 0.393966),
(Adjusted R-squared of Equation 3 is 0.394734), (Adjusted R-squared of Equation
4 is 0.447173), ; higher than that of ROEs regression model with all 15
independent variables in Equation 2 is 0.591399.
Adjusted R-squared of Equation 5 means that only 56.70% of ROE movement that
Similarly to the Equation 2, corporate governance independent variable in
Equation 5 also has tiny significance on the firms ROE. Board size variable
shows a negative relationship with return on equity;
That the coefficient of BSIZE equals to -0.013323 is interpreted that ROE is
4.3.4. Test 7 independent variables with dependent variable ROE (Equation 6)
Table 8: Test 7 independent variables with dependent variable ROE (Equation 6)
Data Analysis
Page 33

Date: 05/30/15 Time: 17:15
Sample: 1 94
Variable
Coefficient
Std. Error
t-Statistic
Prob.
C
NI
TA
DEBT
CAPITAL
DEBTASSETS
QUICKRATIO
BSIZE
-0.033840
1.55E-07
9.85E-08
-1.18E-07
-9.28E-08
0.187170
0.027972
-0.004726
0.046518
2.39E-08
3.74E-08
4.30E-08
3.52E-08
0.052647
0.003872
0.005673
-0.727461
6.485191
2.632054
-2.740999
-2.637929
3.555197
7.223416
-0.833054
0.4689
0.0000
0.0101
0.0074
0.0099
0.0006
0.0000
0.4071
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)
0.628345
0.598094
0.059972
0.309308
135.3052
20.77110
0.000000
Mean dependent var

S.D. dependent var
Schwarz criterion
Durbin-Watson stat
0.074669
0.094599
-2.708621
-2.492171
-2.621191
1.818987

In this trial, Adjusted R-squared of this model equals to 0.598094, higher than
that of ROAs regression models (Adjusted R-squared of Equation 1 is 0.393966),
(Adjusted R-squared of Equation 3 is 0.394734), (Adjusted R-squared of Equation
4 is 0.447173), ; higher than that of ROEs regression models (Adjusted R-squared
of Equation 2 is 0.591399), (Adjusted R-squared of Equation 5 is 0.567057).
Adjusted R-squared of Equation 6 means that only 59.81% of ROE movement that
Similarly to the Equation 2 and Equation 5, corporate governance independent
variable in Equation 6 also has tiny significance on the firms ROE. Board size
variable shows a negative relationship with return on equity;
That the coefficient of BSIZE equals to -0.004726is interpreted that ROE is
Data Analysis
Page 34

4.4.
Error detection in the model

4.4.1. Autocorrelation
Autocorrelation exists when residuals in the model at present are related to the residuals at
previous or next. The Breusch Godfrey test is employed to test for autocorrelation.
Table 9: Autocorrelation BG Serial Correlation LM Test
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:
F-statistic
Obs*R-squared
1.075935
2.374693
Prob. F(2,83)
Prob. Chi-Square(2)
0.3457
0.3050
Test Equation:
Dependent Variable: RESID
Date: 05/30/15 Time: 17:25
Sample: 1 94
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero.
Variable
Coefficient
Std. Error
t-Statistic
Prob.
NI
TA
DEBT
CA
LOG(CL)
INVENTORY
CAPITAL
QUICKRATIO
BSIZE
RESID(-1)
RESID(-2)
-1.48E-09
-1.92E-09
2.25E-09
1.70E-10
0.000221
-2.07E-10
1.73E-09
-0.000375
-0.000425
0.063564
-0.158958
8.83E-09
1.29E-08
1.48E-08
4.18E-09
0.001008
3.73E-09
1.25E-08
0.001499
0.002160
0.111996
0.116605
-0.167642
-0.149428
0.151590
0.040652
0.219252
-0.055529
0.138181
-0.250063
-0.196860
0.567560
-1.363213
0.8673
0.8816
0.8799
0.9677
0.8270
0.9559
0.8904
0.8032
0.8444
0.5719
0.1765
R-squared
0.025263
Adjusted R-squared -0.092176
S.E. of regression
0.022874
Sum squared resid
0.043426
Log likelihood
227.5799
Durbin-Watson stat 1.983956
Data Analysis
Mean dependent var

S.D. dependent var
Schwarz criterion
-6.34E-05
0.021887
-4.608083
-4.310463
-4.487866
Page 35

Where: NI: Net Income, TA: Total Assets, DEBT: total debts, CA: Current Assets,
LOG(CL):
Current
Liabilities,
INVENTORY:
Inventory,
CAPITAL:
Capital,
QUICKRATIO: Quick ratio, BSIZE: board size of BOM.

Hypothesis:
H0: no autocorrelation
H1: autocorrelation exists

Critical value: level of significance: = 5%, n = 32, df = 2 ->
Test statistic: BG = n * R2 = 32 * 0.025263 = 0.808416
Conclusion, since BG = 0.808416<
, do not reject H0 at = 5%
Do not reject the hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation exists in this model.
Therefore, there is insufficient statistical evidence to infer at 5% level of significance that
the autocorrelation exists in the model.
4.4.2. Heteroskedasticity
This error is due to the change of variance residual along with the change of independent
variables. This causes some other consequences.
Heteroskedasticity arises because of some reasons:
Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates are no longer best linear unbiased estimators
(BLUE). That is, among all the unbiased estimators, OLS does not provide the estimate
with the smallest variance.
Other sources of heteroscedasticity are the presence of outliers and the skewness in the
distribution of one or more regressors (Damodar 2009, p.391).
This thesis proposes to test whether the variances of iare variable, in other words, check
the models heteroskedasticity. The heteroskedasticity can cause several consequences to
OLS estimators; for instance, i is no longer BLUE, and t-statistics and F-statistics
become unreliable. Therefore, detecting and correcting this error are really necessary.
Table 10: Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey
F-statistic
Data Analysis
1.356627
Prob. F(9,84)
0.2211
Page 36

Obs*R-squared
Scaled explained SS
11.92922
11.58892
Prob. Chi-Square(9)
Prob. Chi-Square(9)
0.2173
0.2375
Test Equation:
Dependent Variable: RESID^2
Date: 05/30/15 Time: 17:26
Sample: 1 94
Variable
Coefficient
Std. Error
t-Statistic
Prob.
C
NI
TA
DEBT
CA
LOG(CL)
INVENTORY
CAPITAL
QUICKRATIO
BSIZE
0.002397
3.87E-10
1.65E-10
-1.40E-10
-1.27E-10
-8.89E-05
3.99E-11
-1.55E-10
-2.61E-05
-0.000109
0.001277
2.92E-10
4.08E-10
4.68E-10
1.47E-10
9.89E-05
1.24E-10
4.00E-10
5.67E-05
6.83E-05
1.877794
1.322787
0.403648
-0.299364
-0.859775
-0.898987
0.322338
-0.386778
-0.460559
-1.600425
0.0639
0.1895
0.6875
0.7654
0.3924
0.3712
0.7480
0.6999
0.6463
0.1133
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)
0.126907
0.033361
0.000722
4.38E-05
551.8343
1.356627
0.221055
Mean dependent var

S.D. dependent var
Schwarz criterion
Durbin-Watson stat
0.000474
0.000735
-11.52839
-11.25783
-11.41910
2.071128
Where: NI: Net Income, TA: Total Assets, DEBT: total debts, CA: Current Assets,
LOG(CL):
Current
Liabilities,
INVENTORY:
Inventory,
CAPITAL:
Capital,
QUICKRATIO: Quick ratio, BSIZE: board size of BOM.

Hypothesis:
H0: no heteroskedasticity(Var(i) = 2)
H1: heteroskedasticity exists (Var(i) = i2)
Critical value: level of significance: = 5%, n = 32, df = 12 ->

Test statistic: W = n * R2 = 32 * 0.126907 = 4.041024
Data Analysis
Page 37

Conclusion, since W = 4.041024<
, do not reject H0 at = 5%
Do not reject the hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation exists in this model.
Therefore, there is insufficient statistical evidence to infer at 5% level of significance that
the heteroskedasticity exists in the model.
4.6.
Findings and Discussion
The table below summarizes the results of regression models based on the benchmark of Rsquared:
Table 11: Summarizing the results of regression models
Dependent
Equation 1
Equation 2
Equation 3
Equation 4
Equation 5
Equation 6
variable
ROA
ROE
ROA
ROA
ROE
ROE
R - squared
Adjusted R - No of variables
squared
0.393966
0.591399
0.394734
0.447173
0.567057
0.598094
0.491713
0.657302
0.440292
0.494728
0.604299
0.628345
15
15
7
9
9
7
ROA
ROE
ROA
ROA
ROE
ROE
max
min
The first thing is found out is that models on ROE are better resultto ROAs.
The model 6 is the best regression model because it has the highest adjusted R-squared in
addition to the least number of variables.
Based on the criteria of highest adjusted R-squared model and least quantity of variables in the
model, the equation is recalled for evaluation as Equation 6:
ROE = 0.002397 + 3.87E-10NI + 1.65E-10TA - 1.40E-10DEBT-1.27E-10CA -8.89E-05
LOG(CL)+
3.99E-11INVENTORY
1.55E-10CAPITAL
2.61E-05QUICKRATIO
-0.000109BSIZE
To summarize, the test points out these most important ideas:
Performance of public real estate firms in Vietnam is not clearly affected by
corporate governance whichrepresented by 3 variables such as the number of
Data Analysis
Page 38

people in the board of management, the number of people in the board of
directors, the number of coincident persons between BOM and BOD.
The influencing factors to public real estate firms performance are Net Income,
Total Assets, Debt, Current Assets, Quick ratio and Capital.
In which: Net Income, Total Assets, and Quick ratio have positive relationship
with firms' performance. Debt, Current Assets, and Capital negatively influence
firms' performance.
Discussion in detail:
Summary to coefficient of controlling variables
Table 12: Summary to coefficient of controlling variables
Coefficient of BSIZE
Equation 1
Equation 2
Equation 3
Equation 4
Equation 5
Equation 6
-0.002922
-0.003830
-0.002289
-0.003872
-0.013323
-0.004726
Coefficient of EXESIZE
0.000113
-0.000932
//
//
//
//
Coefficient
of
COINCIDENT
0.000682
0.002662
//
//
//
//
The number of people in board of management unexpectedly takes negative affect to

firms performance regardless of ROA or ROE. There are a number reasons explaining
why large board size will lead to better performance of banks. However, the results in
models above are in contrary to normal convention. The smaller BOM, the better
performance. It can be explained that larger board size is to gather the probability of
power concentration into the hand of small group of directors who have the advantages in
skills and expertises.
There are also several researches that imply a contradictory result. For instance,
Praptiningsih (2009) found an insignificant impact of board size on bank performance in
several countries in Asia. In addition a negative relationship between corporate
governance was found in the research of Bellthir (2008). The lack of ultimate conclusion
on the impact of board size on performance of real estate firms may be explained by the
fact that there is no "one size fit all"in corporate governance field. In other words,
Data Analysis
Page 39

performance benchmark for the sector of real estate is not tremendously affected by the
size of the board, depending on other feature of each firm.
Number of coincident persons between BOD and BOM unexpectedly take positive
advantage to firms' performance. We often anticipate that when separation of duty exists,
firm would operate effectively and efficiently in objective way. However, the situation
seems to be contradicting in Vietnam. Only when people invest their money into
company, and run their firms at the same time could they are responsible for their
investment. Especially, the more coincidence happens, the less agentproblem occurs.
There is no need for fear of interest difference between two parties management and
executive board.
In general, in this research the influences of these corporate governance proxies on performance
of Vietnamese public real estate firms are only observed in a short period of two years along with
the occurrence of the gloomyglobal economy. Therefore, there may a change in the result when
the time series is expanded to more than 10 years.
Data Analysis
Page 40

5. CONCLUSION
5.1.
Conclusion
The finding obtained from the analysis of dependent and independent variables shows that the
performance of public Vietnamese real estate firms generated from 2013 to 2014 was statistical
explained by other factors rather than corporate governance and there was a significant spread in
ability of producing ROE among firms.
In terms of independent variables, majority of firms had medium size of board with 5 members
on average. Also, the medium size of directors of most firms was 3 on average. While the
coincident between two boards is 2 persons, relatively high compared to the total number of
BOD.
5.2.
Limitations
The research is more valuable if I could surmount a couple of difficulties listed below:
Firstly, due to time limitation and complexity of corporate governance issue, it is hard for me to
cover all dimensions of real estate corporate governance system. This research is only able to
consider some certain aspects of the selected proxies. For example, regarding to the board of
management and board of directors, only the size of these proxies is taken into account and
tested, while there are some other aspect of these proxies can affect the company performance
such as the quality of the BOM and BOD.Thus other aspects such as transparency in information,
assurance in equitable shareholders' rights and problems when governing corporations are
anticipated to be assessed and discussed in further research.
Further, due to a fairly short period of time between 2013 and 2014, in this research, BSIZE and
EXESIZE show a negative relationship with firm performance.
In terms of Foreign Ownership ratio, the study did not present and test it because the period of
two years is not adequate to see clearly the impact of the presence of foreign ownership in
shareholding structure. Also, the other areas distributed by foreign ownership should be taken
into consideration rather than only focusing on capital distribution.
Recommendation
Page 41

Secondly, this study only concentrates on financially healthy real estate firms, not on inefficient
operating firms, evidencing by taking data from positive value of ROA, positive value of ROE
firms only. Currently, the aim of this thesis is learning the lesson from successful firms, so the
bad performance firms are not the subject to be tested. Sample size is simply represented for
financially healthy part, not the real estate sector as a whole.
Thirdly, due to time restriction, sample size in regression model is not large enough. As a result,
researcher would find it less accuracy to use only the sign of each independent variable's
coefficient to generalize the relationship with dependent variable.
Lastly, resulting from data restriction, data for market share is inaccessible.
These are some main obstacles that exist in my thesis, making it become less accurate and
helpful. Therefore, in further study, researcher strongly suggests to have a better model, analysis
methodology as well as data source in this particular knowledge.
5.3.
Recommendation
In my model, there are six significant factors that contributing to the real estate firms'
performance: Net income, Total Assets, Debt, Capital, Current Asset and Quick ratio. To improve
the efficiency and effectiveness of company, the responsibility of managers is significant. Of the
potential ones, the following will be recommended in my research.
The first thing a firm should focus on is its efficiency in employing its debts to finance for its
activities. The high leverage ratio and having negative relationship with firms' performance
means that firms focus too much on utilizing debt to supply their operations, which can lead to
low return on asset (ROA) and low return on equity (ROE).
Along with this, a ratio firms need to take into account if they want to enhance their governance's
performance is the number of coincident persons between BOM and BOD. Its low negative
coefficient indicates that firms in Vietnam would be better if they are set up and directly run by
shareholders, who contribute their funds and operate their business with entire their efforts.
Recommendation
Page 42

Furthermore, the model suggests that Capital has negative relationship, while total assets have a
contradictory link with ROA and ROE. Firms that have tremendous total asset and small capital
will have the capability of earning more money on less investment amount. However, firms'
capital should be strong enough to become a cushion in (high productivity, urgent and difficult
case.
Recommendation
Page 43

APPENDIX 1: LIST OF REAL ESTATE FIRMS LISTED IN VN

Stock
code
VIC
HAG
REE
KBC
ITA
IJC
PDR
8
9
10
11
12
13
SJS
DIG
HDG
BCI
NBB
DLG
14
15
DXG
SCR
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
HQC
QCG
ASM
OGC
NTL
TDH
TIX
API
SC5
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
HDC
SZL
IDI
D2D
VPH
NVT
LHG
IDV
Name
VinGroup Joint Stock Company
HAGL Joint Stock Company
Refrigeration Electrical Engineering Corporation
KinhBac City Developement Share Holding Corporation
Tan Tao Investment Industry Corporation
Becamex Infrastructure Development Joint Stock Company
PhatDat Real Estate Development Corporation
Song Da Urban & Industrial Zone Investment and
Development Joint Stock Company
Development Investment Construction Joint Stock Company
Ha Do Joint Stock Company
BinhChanh Construction Investment Shareholding Company
NBB Investment Joint Stock Company
Duc Long Gia Lai Group Joint Stock Company
DatXanh Real Estate Service And Construcstions
Corporation
SaiGonThuong Tin Real Estate Joint Stock Company
Hoang Quan Consulting Trading Service Real Estate
Corporation
Quoc CuongGia Lai Joint Stock Company
SAO MAI GROUP CORPORATION
Ocean Group.,JSC
TuLiem Urban Development Joint Stock Company
Thu Duc Housing Development Corporation
Tan Binh Import - Export Joint Stock Corporation
Asia - Pacific Investment Joint Stock Company
Construction Joint Stock Company No 5
Ba Ria Vung Tau House Development Joint Stock
Company
Sonadezi Long Thanh Joint Stock Company
International Development & Investment Corporation
Industrial Urban Development Joint Stock Company No. 2
Van Phat Hung Corporation.
Ninh Van Bay Travel Real Estate Joint Stock Company
Long Hau Corporation
VinhPhuc Infrastructure Development Joint Stock Company
Index
membership
HOSTC
HOSTC
HOSTC
HOSTC
HOSTC
HOSTC
HOSTC
HOSTC
HOSTC
HOSTC
HOSTC
HOSTC
HOSTC
HOSTC
HNX
HOSTC
HOSTC
HOSTC
HOSTC
HOSTC
HOSTC
HOSTC
HNX
HOSTC
HOSTC
HOSTC
HOSTC
HOSTC
HOSTC
HOSTC
HOSTC
HNX
65
No
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

SDU
TIG
KAC
36
PPI
37
NDN
38
CLG
39
40
41
42
UIC
UDC
RCL
TKC
43
44
VRC
DRH
45
NHA
46
47
CCL
D11
Song Da Urban Investment Construction And Development

Joint Stock Company
Thang Long Investment Group Joint Stock Company
Khang An Investment Real Estate Joint Stock Company
Pacific Property And Infrastructure Developement Joint
Stock Company
Danang Housing Investment and Development Joint Stock
Company
Cotec Investment And Land-House Development Joint
Stock Company
IDICO Urban and House Development Joint Stock
Company
Urban Development and Construction Corporation
ChoLon Real Estate Joint Stock Company
Tanky Construction Real Estate Trading Corporation
Vung Tau Real Estate and Construction Joint Stock
Company
Dream House Investment Corporation
Ha Noi South Housing And Urban Development
Corporation
Cuu Long Petro Urban Development And Investment
Corporation
Real Estate 11 Joint Stock Company
HNX
HNX
HOSTC
HOSTC
HNX
HOSTC
HOSTC
HOSTC
HNX
HNX
HOSTC
HOSTC
HNX
HOSTC
HNX
65
33
34
35

APPENDIX 2: DATABASE USED FOR RUNNING EVIEWS

CA
34,875,608
39,844,678
10,112,493
9,740,545
2,966,586
2,561,941
10,649,033
9,989,721
6,735,871
5,854,561
4,994,309
3,023,628
5,705,424
5,362,887
4,868,895
4,856,366
3,560,284
3,139,079
1,715,675
1,847,445
2,463,589
2,638,893
2,758,260
2,629,853
1,901,481
1,218,447
1,678,871
934,032
4,014,917
4,139,898
2,731,120
2,116,099
5,293,144
4,686,058
1,953,211
1,069,348
CL
24,603,801
26,675,265
9,257,202
4,959,271
1,551,093
1,420,507
3,302,950
6,520,855
2,488,273
2,152,231
2,374,834
1,206,182
1,126,777
676,216
3,321,427
3,259,456
1,065,415
1,516,659
1,236,666
1,476,428
524,592
746,333
709,784
1,018,767
648,153
461,046
965,363
531,226
1,554,052
1,755,701
1,384,005
1,539,155
783,193
1,894,082
778,826
566,208
65
NO YEAR NAME
NI
TA
EQUITY
DEBT
1
2014
VIC
3,158,583 90,485,307 20,396,041 63,200,674
2
2013
VIC
6,779,512 75,772,648 14,471,837 57,156,106
3
2014
HAG 1,474,256 36,368,864 14,237,728 20,978,624
4
2013
HAG
846,073 29,813,179 12,852,649 16,293,243
5
2014
REE 1,061,972 8,403,186 5,910,154 2,064,936
6
2013
REE
975,819 6,954,450 5,196,623 1,753,251
7
2014
KBC
325,617 13,048,822 5,376,098 6,792,341
8
2013
KBC
72,499 12,532,339 4,050,480 7,617,564
9
2014
ITA
144,363 11,996,725 7,937,954 4,009,197
10
2013
ITA
87,230 10,760,315 7,133,591 3,606,513
11
2014
IJC
230,445 6,730,499 3,066,255 3,664,244
12
2013
IJC
161,533 4,807,856 3,007,699 1,800,157
13
2014
PDR
41,642 6,052,986 1,468,294 4,584,692
14
2013
PDR
2,342 5,657,966 1,427,534 4,230,432
15
2014
SJS
156,395 5,419,827 1,752,006 3,653,906
16
2013
SJS
70,127 5,607,236 1,595,831 3,978,413
17
2014
DIG
43,921 5,034,820 2,410,858 2,576,685
18
2013
DIG
53,333 4,634,308 2,372,406 2,216,475
19
2014
HDG
148,275 2,293,764
857,650 1,242,449
20
2013
HDG
122,776 2,327,799
750,176 1,479,149
21
2014
BCI
97,241 3,237,056 1,770,888 1,466,169
22
2013
BCI
95,671 3,439,644 1,753,488 1,600,176
23
2014
NBB
35,514 3,138,727 1,576,950 1,551,746
24
2013
NBB
25,256 3,084,056 1,309,792 1,764,824
25
2014
DLG
52,796 4,111,652 1,558,654 2,444,547
26
2013
DLG
2,131 2,420,313
808,481 1,508,807
27
2014
DXG
167,834 2,160,453 1,002,760 1,088,225
28
2013
DXG
82,764 1,268,215
633,133
604,600
29
2014
SCR
26,540 5,404,229 2,284,128 3,087,476
30
2013
SCR
7,960 5,586,857 2,260,530 3,317,192
31
2014
HQC
30,118 4,056,044 1,786,020 2,270,025
32
2013
HQC
23,013 3,140,079
955,902 2,184,178
33
2014
QCG
32,858 6,885,285 3,795,224 2,951,448
34
2013
QCG
14,784 6,360,750 2,309,529 3,856,908
35
2014
ASM
89,151 2,481,244 1,267,206 1,203,535
36
2013
ASM
25,479 1,673,512
702,896
969,098

404,392 11,944,409
NI
TA
55,381 11,424,464
36,675 1,367,020
91,875 1,323,357
51,055 2,439,213
21,677 2,259,697
67,731 1,021,635
60,971
964,026
1,030
574,238
45,947
505,360
33,354 2,190,244
53,722 2,099,450
22,689 1,207,709
26,090 1,271,924
43,403 1,234,439
39,433 1,143,268
90,419 1,950,652
41,099 1,845,614
57,299 1,114,028
44,749 1,112,361
2,944 1,712,821
6,276 1,791,406
5,612 1,434,704
20,614 1,390,408
25,170 1,475,559
24,191 1,648,494
50,454
442,091
27,324
339,495
2,698
983,909
1,588
799,571
29,520
512,154
7,911
279,931
1,343
426,612
1,818
383,353
22,917
885,198
107
777,368
51,018
479,857
19,171
509,250
13,203 1,600,716
3,491,886
EQUITY
3,205,935
850,384
850,387
1,405,343
1,361,151
584,624
563,709
278,888
277,858
333,598
332,898
592,807
561,725
460,518
470,577
627,893
577,507
360,005
333,106
487,559
484,615
845,395
839,784
638,868
643,367
90,589
63,537
334,723
332,025
300,571
170,581
248,314
246,971
336,907
266,325
228,941
142,783
254,280
7,445,022
DEBT
7,373,886
505,273
455,331
924,771
810,716
436,811
400,117
295,330
227,492
1,856,646
1,766,552
597,923
694,014
773,920
672,691
1,322,759
1,268,107
723,914
747,389
1,225,262
1,245,027
435,044
391,324
836,691
1,005,127
351,502
275,958
649,185
467,546
141,665
53,801
178,298
136,382
548,291
511,043
248,666
366,467
1,202,868
5,412,662
CA
6,096,048
1,293,695
1,233,750
1,188,570
993,984
543,177
489,550
195,685
161,025
1,767,245
1,513,999
1,050,590
1,108,831
495,651
401,909
1,159,976
1,063,980
765,528
860,317
1,658,119
1,709,620
457,851
344,383
803,573
823,654
299,963
161,831
520,565
277,700
295,577
89,807
359,106
311,664
861,923
751,322
278,761
412,199
645,530
4,773,307
CL
3,502,436
474,624
424,032
532,376
485,674
187,400
98,083
246,188
179,349
1,446,151
1,374,319
433,839
511,510
79,998
77,562
1,216,237
1,200,869
291,298
418,604
866,497
1,155,225
125,989
265,235
447,181
500,981
32,333
11,504
644,444
441,479
52,702
37,300
70,211
83,982
476,747
448,114
155,327
188,898
818,666
65
37
2014
OQC
NO YEAR NAME
38
2013
OQC
39
2014
NTL
40
2013
NTL
41
2014
TDH
42
2013
TDH
43
2014
TIX
44
2013
TIX
45
2014
API
46
2013
API
47
2014
SC5
48
2013
SC5
49
2014
HDC
50
2013
HDC
51
2014
SZL
52
2013
SZL
53
2014
IDI
54
2013
IDI
55
2014
D2D
56
2013
D2D
57
2014
VPH
58
2013
VPH
59
2014
NVT
60
2013
NVT
61
2014
LHG
62
2013
LHG
63
2014
IDV
64
2013
IDV
65
2014
SDU
66
2013
SDU
67
2014
TIG
68
2013
TIG
69
2014
KAC
70
2013
KAC
71
2014
PPI
72
2013
PPI
73
2014
NDN
74
2013
NDN
75
2014
CLG

NI
29,407
27,004
26,080
1,546
204
21,484
19,589
3,229
2,365
772
663
11,249
2,204
5,504
402
2,193
2,124
1,366
1,208
TA
1,131,132
397,461
423,897
1,658,374
1,807,913
292,678
314,557
318,408
349,288
342,998
330,457
300,362
292,215
122,118
118,710
551,210
531,735
161,321
171,527
EQUITY
237,121
181,772
171,963
365,378
367,968
178,081
168,583
128,495
127,860
177,962
173,424
202,771
178,190
97,316
91,812
277,427
275,453
81,584
87,124
DEBT
842,701
215,689
251,933
1,258,182
1,338,307
114,597
145,974
189,913
221,428
162,787
152,684
97,591
114,025
24,802
26,898
273,784
256,282
79,737
84,402
CA
685,719
255,652
271,649
1,144,136
1,154,681
229,159
239,927
231,298
281,057
280,775
255,726
77,439
56,332
24,940
26,534
480,515
450,065
156,374
165,740
CL
571,609
215,561
236,806
842,259
936,494
70,642
106,853
182,738
219,408
128,967
108,855
97,490
113,924
24,802
26,898
138,277
134,824
78,757
83,413
65
NO YEAR NAME
76
2013
CLG
77
2014
UIC
78
2013
UIC
79
2014
UDC
80
2013
UDC
81
2014
RCL
82
2013
RCL
83
2014
TKC
84
2013
TKC
85
2014
VRC
86
2013
VRC
87
2014
DRH
88
2013
DRH
89
2014
NHA
90
2013
NHA
91
2014
CCL
92
2013
CCL
93
2014
D11
94
2013
D11

APPENDIX 2: CONTINUING
YEAR
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
NAME INVENTORY
VIC
16,598,351
VIC
18,913,717
HAG
2,084,906
HAG
1,838,006
REE
1,238,029
REE
869,187
KBC
7,616,350
KBC
7,473,006
ITA
4,303,915
ITA
3,361,871
IJC
3,944,541
IJC
2,606,302
PDR
5,413,250
PDR
5,164,363
SJS
4,364,150
SJS
4,377,080
DIG
2,114,386
DIG
1,970,922
HDG
889,048
HDG
1,121,823
BCI
2,119,942
BCI
2,147,175
NBB
2,416,420
NBB
2,304,756
DLG
381,765
DLG
333,644
DXG
499,214
DXG
432,787
SCR
1,011,910
SCR
860,950
HQC
788,927
HQC
611,294
QCG
4,120,109
QCG
4,073,536
ASM
861,193
ASM
502,828
ROA
0.0349
0.0895
0.0405
0.0284
0.1264
0.1403
0.0250
0.0058
0.0120
0.0081
0.0342
0.0336
0.0069
0.0004
0.0289
0.0125
0.0087
0.0115
0.0646
0.0527
0.0300
0.0278
0.0113
0.0082
0.0128
0.0009
0.0777
0.0653
0.0049
0.0014
0.0074
0.0073
0.0048
0.0023
0.0359
0.0152
ROE
0.1549
0.4685
0.1035
0.0658
0.1797
0.1878
0.0606
0.0179
0.0182
0.0122
0.0752
0.0537
0.0284
0.0016
0.0893
0.0439
0.0182
0.0225
0.1729
0.1637
0.0549
0.0546
0.0225
0.0193
0.0339
0.0026
0.1674
0.1307
0.0116
0.0035
0.0169
0.0241
0.0087
0.0064
0.0704
0.0362
CAPITAL
20,396,041
14,471,837
14,237,728
12,852,649
5,910,154
5,196,623
5,376,098
4,050,480
7,937,954
7,133,591
3,066,255
3,007,699
1,468,294
1,427,534
1,752,006
1,595,831
2,410,858
2,372,406
857,650
750,176
1,770,888
1,753,488
1,576,950
1,309,792
1,558,654
808,481
1,002,760
633,133
2,284,128
2,260,530
1,786,020
955,902
3,795,224
2,309,529
1,267,206
702,896
DebtAssets EquityAsset
0.6985
0.2254
0.7543
0.1910
0.5768
0.3915
0.5465
0.4311
0.2457
0.7033
0.2521
0.7472
0.5205
0.4120
0.6078
0.3232
0.3342
0.6617
0.3352
0.6630
0.5444
0.4556
0.3744
0.6256
0.7574
0.2426
0.7477
0.2523
0.6742
0.3233
0.7095
0.2846
0.5118
0.4788
0.4783
0.5119
0.5417
0.3739
0.6354
0.3223
0.4529
0.5471
0.4652
0.5098
0.4944
0.5024
0.5722
0.4247
0.5945
0.3791
0.6234
0.3340
0.5037
0.4641
0.4767
0.4992
0.5713
0.4227
0.5937
0.4046
0.5597
0.4403
0.6956
0.3044
0.4287
0.5512
0.6064
0.3631
0.4851
0.5107
0.5791
0.4200
65
NO
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

2014
YEAR
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
OQC
265,946
NAME INVENTORY
OQC
404,034
NTL
1,055,517
NTL
963,248
TDH
674,551
TDH
448,443
TIX
167,297
TIX
205,040
API
13,811
API
10,182
SC5
1,011,910
SC5
860,950
HDC
871,736
HDC
940,491
SZL
81,607
SZL
85,159
IDI
522,604
IDI
222,401
D2D
396,940
D2D
477,758
VPH
1,493,844
VPH
1,474,407
NVT
41,866
NVT
40,624
LHG
272,148
LHG
320,623
IDV
63,902
IDV
14,216
SDU
330,322
SDU
165,179
TIG
49,120
TIG
6,994
KAC
315,061
KAC
281,722
PPI
381,120
PPI
471,489
NDN
181,303
NDN
326,445
CLG
87,651
0.0339
ROA
0.0048
0.0268
0.0694
0.0209
0.0096
0.0663
0.0632
0.0018
0.0909
0.0152
0.0256
0.0188
0.0205
0.0352
0.0345
0.0464
0.0223
0.0514
0.0402
0.0017
0.0035
0.0039
0.0148
0.0171
0.0147
0.1141
0.0805
0.0027
0.0020
0.0576
0.0283
0.0031
0.0047
0.0259
0.0001
0.1063
0.0376
0.0082
0.1158
ROE
0.0173
0.0431
0.1080
0.0363
0.0159
0.1159
0.1082
0.0037
0.1654
0.1000
0.1614
0.0383
0.0464
0.0942
0.0838
0.1440
0.0712
0.1592
0.1343
0.0060
0.0130
0.0066
0.0245
0.0394
0.0376
0.5570
0.4300
0.0081
0.0048
0.0982
0.0464
0.0054
0.0074
0.0680
0.0004
0.2228
0.1343
0.0519
3,491,886
CAPITAL
3,205,935
850,384
850,387
1,405,343
1,361,151
584,624
563,709
278,888
277,858
333,598
332,898
592,807
561,725
460,518
470,577
627,893
577,507
360,005
333,106
487,559
484,615
845,395
839,784
638,868
643,367
90,589
63,537
334,723
332,025
300,571
170,581
248,314
246,971
336,907
266,325
228,941
142,783
254,280
0.6233
0.2923
0.6454
0.2806
0.3696
0.6221
0.3441
0.6426
0.3791
0.5761
0.3588
0.6024
0.4276
0.5722
0.4150
0.5847
0.5143
0.4857
0.4502
0.5498
0.8477
0.1523
0.8414
0.1586
0.4951
0.4909
0.5456
0.4416
0.6269
0.3731
0.5884
0.4116
0.6781
0.3219
0.6871
0.3129
0.6498
0.3232
0.6719
0.2995
0.7153
0.2847
0.6950
0.2705
0.3032
0.5892
0.2814
0.6040
0.5670
0.4330
0.6097
0.3903
0.7951
0.2049
0.8128
0.1872
0.6598
0.3402
0.5847
0.4153
0.2766
0.5869
0.1922
0.6094
0.4179
0.5821
0.3558
0.6442
0.6194
0.3806
0.6574
0.3426
0.5182
0.4771
0.7196
0.2804
0.7515
0.1589
65
37
NO
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

YEAR
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
NAME INVENTORY
CLG
79,012
UIC
133,344
UIC
127,786
UDC
718,111
UDC
700,531
RCL
124,505
RCL
170,396
TKC
73,514
TKC
150,417
VRC
240,872
VRC
244,520
DRH
DRH
NHA
5,703
NHA
5,610
CCL
420,658
CCL
394,468
D11
6,504
D11
1,072
ROA
0.0260
0.0679
0.0615
0.0009
0.0001
0.0734
0.0623
0.0101
0.0068
0.0023
0.0020
0.0375
0.0075
0.0451
0.0034
0.0040
0.0040
0.0085
0.0070
ROE
0.1240
0.1486
0.1517
0.0042
0.0006
0.1206
0.1162
0.0251
0.0185
0.0043
0.0038
0.0555
0.0124
0.0566
0.0044
0.0079
0.0077
0.0167
0.0139
CAPITAL
237,121
181,772
171,963
365,378
367,968
178,081
168,583
128,495
127,860
177,962
173,424
202,771
178,190
97,316
91,812
277,427
275,453
81,584
87,124
0.7450
0.2096
0.5427
0.4573
0.5943
0.4057
0.7587
0.2203
0.7402
0.2035
0.3915
0.6085
0.4641
0.5359
0.5964
0.4036
0.6339
0.3661
0.4746
0.5188
0.4620
0.5248
0.3249
0.6751
0.3902
0.6098
0.2031
0.7969
0.2266
0.7734
0.4967
0.5033
0.4820
0.5180
0.4943
0.5057
0.4921
0.5079
65
NO
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

YEAR
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
LIQUID
RATIO
BSIZE EXESIZE COINCIDENT
1.417488623
11
7
3
1.493693802
11
6
3
1.092391956
8
5
3
1.964108233
7
5
3
1.912577776
5
3
1
1.803539863
5
3
2
3.224097549
5
5
2
1.531964903
5
4
1
2.707046614
5
3
2
2.720228916
5
3
2
2.103013937
7
5
1
2.506775926
5
3
1
5.063489936
6
2
1
7.930730713
6
3
3
1.465904565
5
5
1
1.489931449
5
5
1
3.341687511
5
4
2
2.06973288
6
6
4
1.387339023
8
4
3
1.251293663
7
4
4
4.696200095
7
3
1
3.535811762
7
3
1
3.886055476
7
7
2
2.581407721
6
6
1
2.933691582
8
6
2
2.642788355
5
6
2
1.739108501
5
3
2
1.758257314
5
4
2
2.583515223
6
5
0
2.357974393
6
5
0
1.973345472
7
9
6
1.374844639
7
5
4
6.758415869
5
3
3
2.474052338
5
3
3
2.507891365
6
9
4
65
NO
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
DEBT
QUICK
NAME EQUITY RATIO
VIC
3.09867
0.7429
VIC
3.94947
0.7847
HAG
1.47345
0.8672
HAG
1.2677
1.5935
REE
0.34939
1.1144
REE
0.33738
1.1917
KBC
1.26343
0.9182
KBC
1.88066
0.3859
ITA
0.50507
0.9774
ITA
0.50557
1.1582
IJC
1.19502
0.4420
IJC
0.59852
0.3460
PDR
3.12246
0.2593
PDR
2.96345
0.2936
SJS
2.08556
0.1520
SJS
2.493
0.1470
DIG
1.06878
1.3571
DIG
0.93427
0.7702
HDG
1.44867
0.6684
HDG
1.97174
0.4915
BCI
0.82793
0.6551
BCI
0.91257
0.6588
NBB
0.98402
0.4816
NBB
1.34741
0.3191
DLG
1.56837
2.3447
DLG
1.86622
1.9191
DXG
1.08523
1.2220
DXG
0.95493
0.9436
SCR
1.35171
1.9324
SCR
1.46744
1.8676
HQC
1.271
1.4033
HQC
2.28494
0.9777
QCG
0.77767
1.4978
QCG
1.67
0.3234
ASM
0.94975
1.4021

2013
NO
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
YEAR
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
ASM
1.37872
1.0006
DEBT
QUICK
NAME EQUITY RATIO
OQC
2.13209
1.0782
OQC
2.30007
1.6252
NTL
0.59417
0.5018
NTL
0.53544
0.6379
TDH
0.65804
0.9655
TDH
0.59561
1.1233
TIX
0.74717
2.0058
TIX
0.70979
2.9007
API
1.05896
0.7388
API
0.81873
0.8411
SC5
5.56552
0.5223
SC5
5.30659
0.4752
HDC
1.00863
0.4123
HDC
1.2355
0.3291
SZL
1.68054
5.1757
SZL
1.4295
4.0838
IDI
2.10666
0.5241
IDI
2.19583
0.7008
D2D
2.01084
1.2653
D2D
2.2437
0.9139
VPH
2.51305
0.1896
VPH
2.56911
0.2036
NVT
0.5146
3.3018
NVT
0.46598
1.1452
LHG
1.30965
1.1884
LHG
1.56229
1.0041
IDV
3.88018
7.3009
IDV
4.34326 12.8316
SDU
1.93947
0.2952
SDU
1.40817
0.2549
TIG
0.47132
4.6764
TIG
0.3154
2.2202
KAC
0.71803
0.6273
KAC
0.55222
0.3565
PPI
1.62743
1.0085
PPI
1.91887
0.6245
NDN
1.08616
0.6274
1.888613372
6
8
4
LIQUID
RATIO
1.133943826
5
4
1
1.7405166
5
2
1
2.725726048
5
5
2
2.909568146
5
5
2
2.232576224
5
6
3
2.046607395
5
6
3
2.898489861
5
2
1
4.991180939
5
4
3
0.794860026
7
2
2
0.897830487
5
1
1
1.222033522
5
4
3
1.101635792
5
4
3
2.421612626
8
2
2
2.167760161
8
2
2
6.195792395
7
3
3
5.181777159
7
3
3
0.953741746
8
4
2
0.886008382
8
4
2
2.627989207
5
2
2
2.055204919
5
3
2
1.913588853
5
2
2
1.479902184
5
2
2
3.634055354
10
2
2
1.298407073
9
2
2
1.796974827
5
3
2
1.644082311
5
2
2
9.277301828
5
2
2
14.06736787
5
3
1
0.807773833
5
3
2
0.629021992
5
3
2
5.608458882
5
4
2
2.40769437
5
3
2
5.114668642
5
4
2
3.711080946
7
2
2
1.807925378
5
6
3
1.676631393
5
6
3
1.794671886
5
4
3
65
36

2013
NO
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
YEAR
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2013
NDN
2.5666
0.4540
DEBT
QUICK
NAME EQUITY RATIO
CLG
4.73049
0.6814
CLG
3.55389
1.0614
UIC
1.18659
0.5674
UIC
1.46504
0.6075
UDC
3.44351
0.5058
UDC
3.63702
0.4849
RCL
0.64351
1.4815
RCL
0.86589
0.6507
TKC
1.47798
0.8634
TKC
1.7318
0.5954
VRC
0.91473
0.3094
VRC
0.88041
0.1029
DRH
0.48129
0.7943
DRH
0.63991
0.4945
NHA
0.25486
0.7756
NHA
0.29297
0.7779
CCL
0.98687
0.4329
CCL
0.9304
0.4124
D11
0.97736
1.9029
D11
0.96876
1.9741
2.182124745
5
4
3
LIQUID
RATIO
0.788514486
5
5
1
1.199629467
5
7
1
1.185984478
5
5
2
1.147137319
5
5
2
1.358413505
5
3
2
1.232982806
5
3
2
3.243948359
5
3
3
2.245393204
5
3
3
1.265735643
5
3
2
1.280978816
5
3
2
2.177107322
5
2
1
2.349235221
5
1
1
0.794327623
7
5
1
0.494469998
7
5
1
1.005564067
5
2
2
0.986467395
5
2
2
3.475017537
5
3
2
3.338166795
5
3
2
1.985525096
5
3
2
1.986980447
5
3
2
65
74

APPENDIX 3: CORRELATION BETWEEN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

TA
0.874806
1.000000
0.924038
0.992038
0.965725
0.975063
EQUITY
0.742279
0.924038
1.000000
0.869319
0.865705
0.849763
DEBT
0.895048
0.992038
0.869319
1.000000
0.968801
0.985300
CA
0.894987
0.965725
0.865705
0.968801
1.000000
0.976775
CL
0.914760
0.975063
0.849763
0.985300
0.976775
1.000000
INVENTORY
0.794033
0.859764
0.753323
0.868426
0.946213
0.886967
INVENTORY
ROA
ROE
CAPITAL
0.794033
0.303762
0.469552
0.742279
0.859764
0.124871
0.294683
0.924038
0.753323
0.136059
0.198620
1.000000
0.868426
0.116198
0.318937
0.869319
0.946213
0.093179
0.296125
0.865705
0.886967
0.128686
0.337345
0.849763
1.000000
0.035262
0.230405
0.753323
DEBTASSETS
0.126924
0.170816
0.023219
0.218651
0.209492
0.233240
0.210660
EQUITYASSET
-0.17149
-0.22657
-0.06941
-0.27409
-0.26331
-0.29184
-0.251348
DEBTEQUITY
0.215001
0.220341
0.064298
0.267999
0.253181
0.285434
0.246165
QUICKRATIO
-0.04237
-0.06655
-0.07046
-0.06429
-0.09809
-0.09493
-0.157014
LIQUIDRATIO
BSIZE
EXESIZE
-0.0989
0.529972
0.213538
-0.09683
0.558728
0.273789
-0.0854
0.466233
0.254749
-0.09631
0.572301
0.272609
-0.06458
0.524678
0.278089
-0.14724
0.549735
0.281831
0.008069
0.445137
0.236898
COINCIDENT
0.127423
0.133893
0.115139
0.137619
0.099002
0.113121
0.061890
65
NI
TA
EQUITY
DEBT
CA
CL
NI
1.000000
0.874806
0.742279
0.895048
0.894987
0.914760

APPENDIX 3: CONTINNNUING
ROE
0.469552
0.294683
0.198620
0.318937
0.296125
0.337345
CAPITAL
0.742279
0.924038
1.000000
0.869319
0.865705
0.849763
DEBTASSETS
0.126924
0.170816
0.023219
0.218651
0.209492
0.233240
EQUITYASSET
-0.171491
-0.226572
-0.06941
-0.274094
-0.263306
-0.291835
DEBTEQUITY
0.215001
0.220341
0.064298
0.267999
0.253181
0.285434
INVENTORY
ROA
ROE
CAPITAL
0.035262
1.000000
0.803921
0.136059
0.230405
0.803921
1.000000
0.198620
0.753323
0.136059
0.198620
1.000000
0.210660
-0.15465
0.253383
0.023219
-0.251348
0.151073
-0.264843
-0.06941
0.246165
-0.053101
0.368769
0.064298
DEBTASSETS
-0.15465
0.253383
0.023219
1.000000
-0.973646
0.887436
EQUITYASSET
0.151073
-0.26484
-0.06941
-0.973646
1.000000
-0.904486
DEBTEQUITY
-0.0531
0.368769
0.064298
0.887436
-0.904486
1.000000
QUICKRATIO
0.309829
0.519889
-0.070457
0.081925
-0.103495
0.161902
LIQUIDRATIO
BSIZE
EXESIZE
0.157878
-0.01013
-0.05301
0.345609
0.127533
0.005913
-0.085404
0.466233
0.254749
0.064793
0.039513
0.148446
-0.048347
-0.086906
-0.152728
0.098324
0.025646
0.091105
COINCIDENT
0.026630
0.054182
0.115139
0.078669
-0.067512
0.036914
65
NI
TA
EQUITY
DEBT
CA
CL
ROA
0.303762
0.124871
0.136059
0.116198
0.093179
0.128686

LIQUIDRATIO
-0.098899
-0.096831
-0.085404
-0.096312
-0.064578
-0.147238
BSIZE
EXESIZE
0.529972 0.213538
0.558728 0.273789
0.466233 0.254749
0.572301 0.272609
0.524678 0.278089
0.549735 0.281831
INVENTORY
-0.157014
0.008069
0.445137
ROA
ROE
CAPITAL
0.309829
0.519889
-0.070457
0.157878
0.345609
-0.085404
DEBTASSETS
0.081925
EQUITYASSET
COINCIDENT
0.127423
0.133893
0.115139
0.137619
0.099002
0.113121
0.061890
-0.01013
0.127533
0.466233
0.236898
0.053005
0.005913
0.254749
0.064793
0.039513
0.148446
0.078669
-0.103495
-0.048347
-0.08691
0.152728
-0.067512
DEBTEQUITY
0.161902
0.098324
0.025646
0.091105
0.036914
QUICKRATIO
1.000000
0.766530
-0.01167
0.079348
-0.029473
LIQUIDRATIO
BSIZE
EXESIZE
0.766530
-0.011669
-0.079348
1.000000
-0.06494
-0.152053
-0.06494
1.000000
0.192428
0.152053
0.192428
1.000000
-0.022076
0.186062
0.386569
COINCIDENT
-0.029473
-0.022076
0.186062
0.386569
1.000000
0.026630
0.054182
0.115139
65
NI
TA
EQUITY
DEBT
CA
CL
QUICKRATIO
-0.042372
-0.066554
-0.070457
-0.064291
-0.098089
-0.094925
65
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Table of Contents

Overview about real estate environment in Vietnam........................................................1

Corporate Governance structure of stock-holding firms in Vietnam...............................2

Problems in Vietnamese corporate governance................................................................3

Factors affecting firms performance...............................................................................4

Corporate Governance overview......................................................................................7

Definition of corporate governance..........................................................................7

Studies approaches to corporate governance............................................................8

Researches on Corporate Governance worldwide..........................................................11

In USA and UK.......................................................................................................11

Data collection method...................................................................................................18

4. REGRESSON MODEL ANALYSIS..........................................................................................25

Equation 1: Test all independent variables with dependent variable ROA............26

Test all independent variables with dependent variable ROE................................29

Test several alternative models.......................................................................................32

Test 7 independent variables with dependent variable ROA Equation 3............32

Test 9 independent variables with dependent variable ROA Equation 4............34

Test 9 independent variables with dependent variable ROE Equation 5.............35

Test 7 independent variables with dependent variable ROE (Equation 6).............36

Error detection in the model...........................................................................................38

Findings and Discussion.................................................................................................41

APPENDIX 1: LIST OF REAL ESTATE FIRMS LISTED IN VN...............................................48

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

[CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PUBLIC REAL ESTATE

[CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PUBLIC REAL ESTATE

1.2. Corporate Governance structure of stock-holding firms in Vietnam

[CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PUBLIC REAL ESTATE

1.3. Problems in Vietnamese corporate governance

[CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PUBLIC REAL ESTATE

1.4. Factors affecting firms performance

International and regional environmental factors

National economic factor

[CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PUBLIC REAL ESTATE

Industrial environmental factor

Industrial environmental factors consist of market competition, threats of new

Corporate governance apparatus is particularly important for the survival and

The first task is to develop business strategy. If corporate governance

[CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PUBLIC REAL ESTATE

Financial situation of business

[CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PUBLIC REAL ESTATE

2.1.1. Definition of corporate governance

[CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PUBLIC REAL ESTATE

Transaction cost economics theory

[CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PUBLIC REAL ESTATE

Originally created by R. Edward Freeman (1984), stakeholder theory gives a broader

[CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PUBLIC REAL ESTATE

Not taking opportunity principle Numerous bearers of corporate

corporate Various kinds of monitors.

[CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PUBLIC REAL ESTATE

Assuming the existence of the

Monitoring is taken on by a main market, with free entry and

Price mechanism works.

Retrenchment of monitoring cost.

Internalize adjustment cost.

The system becomes invalid when Generate

Promote rent-seeking activities

2.2. Researches on Corporate Governance worldwide

[CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PUBLIC REAL ESTATE

[CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PUBLIC REAL ESTATE

[CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PUBLIC REAL ESTATE

[CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PUBLIC REAL ESTATE

[CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PUBLIC REAL ESTATE