Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 5442

January 26, 2004

MERCEDES NAVA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. BENJAMIN P. SORONGON, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Mercedes Nava has charged Atty. Benjamin P. Sorongon with dishonest conduct and representing clients with
conflicting interest, in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In a Letter 1 dated June 23, 1999, she alleged that
the respondent had been her counsel for many years and had represented her in various cases. The respondent informed her
of his intention to withdraw as her counsel in two of her cases: Civil Case No. 21417 2 and CA-G.R. SP No. 37002.3 In his
Letter dated November 27, 1996, the respondent explained, thus:
Due to my recent stroke which resulted in the paralysis of my right body, I was advised by my doctor
not to handle civil cases which are complicated in nature and which entailed paper works because it will
aggravate my illness.4
As a postscript, the respondent proposed to be retained as the complainants counsel in Criminal Cases Nos.
441815 and 79688,6 considering that the said cases did not involve too much paper work. Thus, on December 4, 1996, Atty.
Sorongon filed his withdrawal as counsel in Civil Case No. 21417 and in Criminal Cases Nos. 76986-89. The trial court
granted the same.7
The complainant further alleged that albeit the fact that she continuously paid for the services of the respondent,
the latter represented other clients with hostile interests and filed cases against her on their behalf. 8
It appears that the complainant had issued several checks which were dishonored on the ground that her account
with the bank had been closed, and that the respondent assisted one Francisco Atas in collecting the amounts due thereon.
The respondent sent a Demand Letter 9 dated September 18, 1998 to the complainant. Upon her failure to settle the
obligation, the respondent himself assisted Atas in filing a formal complaint against the complainant before the city
prosecutors office for seventeen (17) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. 10
The complainant thereafter sent a Letter to the respondent dated November 23, 1998, 11 expressing her disbelief at
the cases he filed against her and reminding the respondent of his ethical and moral responsibility as her lawyer.
The complainant prayed that an investigation be conducted regarding "this unfortunate actuation and deplorable behavior as
well as the respondents double standard attitude."12
In his Comment, the respondent admitted that the complainant was one of his clients and that it was one of his
friends, Tubin Nava, who asked him to represent her. Initially, he handled only one case for the complainant, but later
acceded to represent her in other cases, with or without attorneys fees. The respondent further made a litany of the progress
and successes on the cases he handled for the complainant, including lack of compensation for services
rendered.1avvphil.net
The respondent also admitted having represented Francisco Atas in the case against the complainant, but he asserted that he
had not violated any of the canons of professional ethics. He insisted that his attorney-client relationship with the
complainant had ceased as early as 1996, and assuming that it had not been terminated, the "supervening event"
incapacitated him from further performing his obligations. He averred that no conflict of interest existed, since his retainer
with the complainant had been limited to only two estafa cases and that his client Atas did not know anything that would

prejudice the complainant. The fact that the complaint was filed only after he handled the cases for Atas against the
complainant shows that the instant case was filed in retaliation, to force the respondent into withdrawing as Atas counsel. 13
In her reply, the complainant pointed out that the respondent admitted being the complainants counsel from the years 1993
to 1995; and that he did not withdraw as her counsel in the other cases before the respondent filed the complaint for estafa in
behalf of Atas. The complainant averred that even assuming that the respondent had withdrawn as her counsel, he should
still not have accepted cases against her as to do so would be to violate Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.14
The respondent maintained his position that he did not violate any rule or canon, and reiterated his defense that
the cases he had handled in behalf of the complainant had nothing to do whatsoever with the case filed by him in behalf of
Atas. He insisted that their attorney-client relationship had long been terminated. The respondent also asserted that as an
officer of the court, it is his solemn duty and obligation to bring to justice anyone committing a crime. 15
The respondent also claimed that the complainant and her counsel Atty. Althea Tugado announced in open court,
during the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 51472-73 and 52266-69 that a disbarment case had been filed against him.
Because of this, the complainant and her counsel are guilty of violating the confidential nature of this case. 16
In her Report and Recommendation dated May 26, 2003, Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan found that the
certifications submitted by the complainant to prove that the respondent was still her counsel on record as of June 1999 in
Criminal Case No. 44181,17 Criminal Case No. 7968818 and Civil Case No. 4270719 belied the respondents assertion that his
attorney-client relationship with the complainant had long been terminated. According to the Commissioner, at the time the
respondent accepted his engagement as Francisco Atas counsel and filed a case against the complainant, he was still acting
as counsel for the latter in a number of cases. It was recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for a period of three (3) years with a warning that a similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.20
Thereafter, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline issued Resolution No. XV2003-354 dated June 21, 2003 finding that the respondent transgressed Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, with modification as to penalty to conform to the evidence, and considering
the respondents clear violation of the prohibition against representing conflicting interests, Atty. Benjamin P.
Sorongon is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year with a Warning that a similar offense
in the future will be dealt with more severely.
When the respondent learned of the said IBP resolution, he promptly moved for the reconsideration 21 of the same,
alleging that no formal investigation had been conducted. He prayed that Resolution No. XV-2003-354 be set aside, and that
a new one ordering the reception of evidence of the parties be entered, and that the case thereafter be dismissed. 22
In a Resolution dated September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors denied the respondents motion for reconsideration,
since pursuant to Section 12 (b) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the Board has no more jurisdiction to consider and
resolve a matter already endorsed to the Supreme Court.
A perusal of the records will show that indeed, no formal investigation was conducted by the IBP in the instant
case before it issued the questioned resolution.
In complaints for disbarment, a formal investigation is a mandatory requirement. 23 The Court may dispense with the normal
referral to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines if the records are complete and the question raised is simple. 24 Similarly, if
no further factual determination is necessary, the Court may decide the case on the basis of the extensive pleadings on
record.25
As we held in Delos Santos v. Robiso:26
Complaints against lawyers for misconduct are normally addressed to the Court. If, at the outset, the Court finds
a complaint to be clearly wanting in merit, it outrightly dismisses the case. If, however, the Court deems it
necessary that further inquiry should be made, such as when the matter could not be resolved by merely

2
evaluating the pleadings submitted, a referral is made to the IBP for a formal investigation of the case during
which the parties are accorded an opportunity to be heard. An ex parte investigation may only be conducted when
respondent fails to appear despite reasonable notice. 27

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

WHEREFORE, the instant administrative case is REMANDED to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
further proceedings. It is DIRECTED to act on this referral with dispatch.

EN BANC
A.C. No. 4808

November 22, 2011

SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

TERESITA T. BAYONLA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. PURITA A. REYES, Respondent.

Footnotes
DECISION
1

Rollo, pp. 3-9.

Entitled Melanie Batisla-ong v. Mercedes Nava for accounting, damages and injunction with prayer for issuance
of preliminary injunction/restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 35.
3
Entitled Mercedes Nava v. Melanie Batisla-ong, et al., pending before the Court of Appeals.
4
Annex "H", Rollo, p. 20.
5
People of the Philippines v. Melanie Batisla-ong, for estafa pending before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
City, Branch 32, where Ms. Nava is the complainant;
6
People of the Philippines v. Melanie Batisla-ong, for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 filed before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Iloilo City, Branch 4, where Ms. Nava is also the complainant;
7
Rollo, pp. 59, 63.
8
Id. at 7.
9
Id. at 110.
10
Id. at 69.
11
Id. at 68.
12
Id. at 8.
13
Id. at 161.
14
Id. at 248-250.
15
Rollo, pp. 261-264.
16
Id. at 262-263.
17
Annex "A" of the Complaint.
18
Annex "B" of the Complaint.
19
Annex "D" of the Complaint.
20
Report and Recommendation, p. 10.
21
Dated August 11, 2003.
22
Motion for Reconsideration, p. 6.
23
Delos Santos v. Robiso, 372 SCRA 276 (2001).
24
Angeles v. Uy, Jr., 330 SCRA 6 (2000).
25
See Manubay v. Garcia, 330 SCRA 236 (2000).
26
Supra, citing Cottam v. Laysa, 326 SCRA 614 (2000) and Baldomar v. Paras, 348 SCRA 212 (2000).
27
Id. at 280.
2

BERSAMIN, J.:
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a
lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving
notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has
secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
- Code of Professional Responsibility.
This canon of professional responsibility is at the center of this administrative complaint for disbarment for gross
dishonesty, deceit, conversion, and breach of trust filed against Atty. Purita A. Reyes by Teresita T. Bayonla, her client. 1
Antecedents
Petra Durban and Paz Durban were sisters who had jointly owned a parcel of land situated in Butuan City in their lifetimes.
They died without leaving a will. Their land was thereafter expropriated in connection with the construction of the Bancasi
Airport. An expropriation compensation amounting to P2,453,429.00 was to be paid to their heirs. Bayonla and her uncle,
Alfredo Tabada (Alfredo), were the compulsory heirs of Paz, being, respectively, Pazs granddaughter and son. 2
On June 22, 1997, Bayonla charged Atty. Reyes with gross dishonesty, deceit, conversion, and breach of trust. Bayonla
alleged that on October 21, 1993, she and Alfredo had engaged the legal services of Atty. Reyes to collect their share in the
expropriation compensation from the Air Transportation Office (ATO), Cagayan De Oro City, 3 agreeing to her attorneys
fees of 10% of whatever amount would be collected; that in November 1993, Atty. Reyes had collected P1 million from the
ATO; that Bayonlas share, after deducting Atty. Reyes attorneys fees, would be P75,000.00, but Atty. Reyes had delivered
to her only P23,000.00, and had failed to deliver the balance of P52,000.00 despite repeated demands; that on June 5, 1995,
Atty. Reyes had collected the amount of P121,119.11 from the ATO; that Bayonlas share, after deducting Atty. Reyes
attorneys fees, would be P109,007.20, but Atty. Reyes had handed her only P56,500.00, and had failed to deliver the
balance of P52,507.20; and that Atty. Reyes should be disbarred for depriving her of her just share.4
In her comment dated February 10, 1998,5 Atty. Reyes admitted that Bayonla and Alfredo had engaged her legal services for
the purpose of collecting their share in the expropriation compensation; that as consideration for her services, Bayonla and
Alfredo had agreed upon a 40% contingent fee for her; that she had given to Bayonla more than what had been due to her;
that Alfredo had received from the ATO the check for the second release corresponding to the share of both Bayonla and
Alfredo; that Alfredo had gotten more than Bayonla out of the second release; that on June 5, 1995 she had received out of
the second release by the ATO only her 40% contingent fee; that Bayonla and Alfredo had agreed to bear the expenses for
the collection of their share; that she had incurred travel and other expenses in collecting such share; and that she should be
absolved from liability arising from the complaint.
On June 29, 1998, the Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report,
and recommendation.6

3
On April 20, 1999, IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro (Commissioner Navarro) rendered a report, 7 whereby she found
and recommended against Atty. Reyes as follows:

On July 30, 2002, the Court directed the IBP Board of Governors to report on whether Atty. Reyes had already accounted for
and remitted the amount of P44,582.66 to Bayonla.11

In so far as this case of disbarment is concerned, the issue hinges only on the complainants position; one of the heirs of Paz
Durban whose legal services of the respondent was not revoked.
The parties were required to submit documents relative to their respective defenses (sic) specially the actual amounts
released by ATO, actual amount due to the complainant as her share, the remittances made by the respondent to the
complainant of her share and receipts to prove the same.
Unfortunately, only the respondent filed an answer without the necessary documents required of them and attached only a
xerox copy of the computation made by Atty. Ismael Laya for the heir of Pedro Durban which had already been previously
attached to the records of this case.

On August 22, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors informed the Court that per the manifestation of Bayonlas counsel Atty.
Reyes had not yet rendered an accounting and had not yet remitted the amount of P44,582.66 to Bayonla.12
Through her manifestation dated September 4, 2002 to the Court, 13 Atty. Reyes posed some queries, as follows: (a) whether
she could be compelled to pay the amount of P44,582.66 to Bayonla even if the latters claims had been based on perjured
statements; (b) whether the payment of the amount would operate to dismiss the estafa case previously filed by Bayonla
against her for allegedly failing to deliver the balance of Bayonlas share; and (c) whether she could deposit the amount of
P44,582.66 with either the IBP Board of Governors or the Court.

In the said computation it appears that for the release on February 17, 1993, the heirs of Durban received P84,852.00 and for
the second release each of them as well as the complainant was entitled P121,119.11. It could be inferred from here that
complainant was supposed to received (sic) P205,971.11 as her share.
Inasmuch as the attorneys fees of 40% was (sic) supported by evidence instead of (sic) complainants allegation of ten
[10%] percent; then respondent was entitled to P82,388.45 as attorneys fees; leaving a balance of P123,582.66 due to the
complainant.
Respondents allegation that she gave more than what was alleged by the complainant is untenable for she did not submit
evidence to prove the same, therefore, as it is complainants allegation that she received only P79,000.00 for her share as a
whole shall be considered for the moment until such time that proofs to the contrary shall have been submitted.
Considering that complainant was supposed to receive the amount due her which was P123,582.66 and actually received
only P79,000.00; then respondent still has to remit to complainant the amount of P44,582.66.
From the records of this case respondent alleged that she only collected the 40% attorneys fees for the second release
whereby Alfredo Tabada the other heir of Paz Durban received the check from ATO and got a large part of the same.
Respondent did not mention how much she got as attorneys fees against complainants share but on the whole amounting to
P496,895.00 which is unfair to the complainant.
As counsel for the heirs of Paz Durban, complainant herein should have been advised by the respondent and given a
breakdown of whatever amount was received or came to her knowledge as complainants counsel. Short of the foregoing,
respondent violated Rule 16.01 Canon 16 Chapter III of the Code of Professional Responsibility; to wit:
"Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client."
Respondent was given a chance to rectify whatever errors or misgivings (sic) she had done for her client but she
unfortunately failed to do so and did not comply with the Order dated October 29, 1998.
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the Undersigned respectfully recommends that the respondent be required to render an
accounting or inventory duly confirmed by the complainant of all the collected shares due the complainant and remit to the
latter the said amount of P44.582.66;
Until such time that respondent had complied with the aforementioned, she is suspended from the practice of her legal
profession.
Respectfully submitted.
On June 19, 1999, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report of Commissioner Navarro through
Resolution No. XIII-99-165.8
Atty. Reyes moved for reconsideration, but on September 27, 1999 the IBP Board of Governors denied her motion for
reconsideration through Resolution No. XIV-99-117.9
Atty. Reyes then filed a motion for reinvestigation. However, through its Resolution No. XV-2001-111 adopted on July 28,
2001, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for reinvestigation for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the matter had
already been endorsed to the Court.10

Atty. Reyes also stated in the manifestation that the IBP Board of Governors did not accord to her the right to confront
Bayonla during the investigation conducted by the IBP Board of Governors; that Bayonlas counsel had induced Bayonla to
file the estafa charge against her; and that this had prompted her to initiate a disbarment complaint against Bayonlas
counsel.14
On May 24, 2010, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) recommended the final resolution of this case. 15 The
recommendation was noted by the Court on June 29, 2010.16
Issue
Whether or not the findings and recommendations of the IBP Board of Governors were proper.
Ruling
We affirm the findings of the IBP Board of Governors, which were supported by the records, but we modify the sanctions to
be imposed on Atty. Reyes.
I
Respondent was guilty of violating the canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility requires that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of her client that may come
into her possession. Rule 16.01 of Canon 16 imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for all money or property collected
or received for or from the client. Rule 16.03 of Canon 16 demands that the lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of
his client when due or upon demand, subject to the lawyers lien over the funds, or the lawyers option to apply so much of
the funds as may be necessary to satisfy the lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to the client.
The canons are appropriate considering that the relationship between a lawyer and her client is highly fiduciary, and
prescribes on a lawyer a great degree of fidelity and good faith. There is no question that the money or property received by
a lawyer for her client properly belongs to the latter. 17 Conformably with these canons of professional responsibility, we
have held that a lawyer is obliged to render an accounting of all the property and money she has collected for her client. This
obligation includes the prompt reporting and accounting of the money collected by the lawyer by reason of a favorable
judgment to his client.18
Based on the records, Bayonla and her uncle would each receive the amount of P84,852.00 out of the first release, and the
amount of P121,119.11 out of the second release. Her total share from the two releases was P205,971.11. With Atty. Reyes
being entitled to P82,388.44 as attorneys fees, the equivalent of 40% of Bayonlas share, the net share of Bayonla was
P123,582.67. Yet, Atty. Reyes actually delivered to her only P79,000.00,19 which was short by P44,582.67. Despite demands
by Bayonla and despite the orders from the IBP Board of Governors for her to remit the shortage, 20 Atty. Reyes refused to do
so.
By not delivering Bayonlas share despite her demand, Atty. Reyes violated the aforestated canons. The money collected by
Atty. Reyes as the lawyer of Bayonla was unquestionably money held in trust to be immediately turned over to the client. 21
The unjustified withholding of money belonging to the client warrants the imposition of disciplinary sanctions on the
lawyer.22 Without doubt, Atty. Reyes failure to immediately account for and to deliver the money upon demand was deceit,
for it signified that she had converted the money to her own use, in violation of the trust Bayonla had reposed in her. It
constituted gross misconduct for which the penalty of suspension from the practice of law became justified pursuant to
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

4
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinary agency in a
foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis
of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for
disbarment or suspension. (As amended by SC Resolution dated February 13, 1992.)
II
Pendency of other cases not an obstacle to administrative proceeding against respondent . The filing of the perjury charge
by Atty. Reyes against Bayonla and of the estafa charge by Bayonla against Atty. Reyes could not halt or excuse the duty of
Atty. Reyes to render an accounting and to remit the amount due to Bayonla. Nor did the pendency of such cases inhibit this
administrative matter from proceeding on its due course. It is indisputable that the pendency of any criminal charges
between the lawyer and her client does not negate the administrative proceedings against the lawyer. We explained why in
Suzuki v. Tiamson,23 to wit:
The settled rule is that criminal and civil cases are different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first
two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa. In this light, we refer to this Courts ruling in Berbano vs. Barcelona,
citing In re Almacen, where it was held:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial
of an action or a suit, but rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to
inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question
for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an
officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney.
Hence, our only concern in the instant case is the determination of respondents administrative liability and our findings
herein should not in any way be treated as having any material bearing on any other judicial action which the parties may
choose to file against each other. [emphasis supplied]
Relevantly, we have also emphasized in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Naldoza 24 that
xxx a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case.
Conversely, respondents acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him administratively. In the same vein, the trial courts
finding of civil liability against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the administrative action
before this Court. Neither will a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the administrative liability of the lawyer.
It serves well to mention, lastly, that the simultaneous pendency of an administrative case and a judicial proceeding related
to the cause of the administrative case, even if the charges and the evidence to be adduced in such cases are similar, does not
result into or occasion any unfairness, or prejudice, or deprivation of due process to the parties in either of the cases. 25
III
No denial of due process to respondent Atty. Reyes contends that she was denied her right to due process because the IBP
Board of Governors did not permit her to personally confront the complainant.
We do not consider Atty. Reyess contention valid. She was accorded full due process, for she in fact participated in all
stages of the proceedings.
It is true that a lawyer shall not be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law until she has had full opportunity upon
reasonable notice to answer the charges against her, to produce witnesses in her behalf, and to be heard by herself or

counsel.26 Contrary to Atty. Reyes insistence, however, the IBP Board of Governors was under no legal obligation to
conduct a trial-type proceeding at which she could have personally confronted Bayonla. In other words, the lack of such
proceeding neither diminished her right to due process nor deprived her of the right. A formal investigation entailing notice
and hearing is required in administrative proceedings for disbarment, but the imperative need of notice and hearing does not
always mean the holding of an adversarial trial-type proceeding. Due process is still satisfied when the parties are afforded
the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence in support of their respective sides. 27 As the Court said in
Samalio v. Court of Appeals:28
Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where
opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied where
the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. The standard of due
process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not ignored. In
other words, it is not legally objectionable for being violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case
based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may
take the place of their direct testimony.
In this case, petitioner was heard through the various pleadings which he filed with the Board of Discipline of the BID when
he filed his answer and two motions to dismiss, as well as other motions and papers. He was also able to participate in all
stages of the administrative proceeding. He was able to elevate his case to the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, to the
CSC by way of appeal.
We have consistently held that the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, the opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. And any seeming defect in its observance is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration. Denial
of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration. [bold emphasis supplied]
Nevertheless, the IBP Board of Governors actually conducted a formal investigation of the complaint against Atty. Reyes
upon the directive of the Court. In her formal investigation of the complaint, Commissioner Navarro allowed both parties to
submit their respective proofs on the actual amounts released by the ATO, the amounts due to Bayonla as her share, Atty.
Reyes corresponding contingent fees, the remittances by Atty. Reyes to Bayonla, and the receipts showing such
remittances.29 In due course, Atty. Reyes submitted her written answer, attaching to the answer the documents supporting her
defenses.30 Commissioner Navarro took all of Atty. Reyes submissions into good and proper account, as borne out by her
report.31 And even after the IBP Board of Governors had adopted Commissioner Navarros report (and its recommendation),
Atty. Reyes was still afforded the fair opportunity to challenge the adverse findings by filing her motion for reconsideration,
although such motion was ultimately resolved against her.32
IV
Sanction
The penalty for gross misconduct consisting in the failure or refusal despite demand of a lawyer to account for and to return
money or property belonging to a client has been suspension from the practice of law for two years. In Almendarez, Jr. v.
Langit,33 the lawyer who withdrew the rentals pertaining to his client totaling P255,000.00 without the knowledge of the
client and who ignored the demand of the client to account for and to return the amount was suspended from the practice of
law for two years. In Mortera v. Pagatpatan, 34 the lawyer received P155,000.00 from the adversary of his clients as partial
payment of a final and executory decision in favor of the clients pursuant to a secret arrangement between the lawyer and
the adversary, and deposited the amount to the lawyers personal bank account without the knowledge of the clients; the
lawyer thereafter refused to surrender the money to his clients. The suspension of the lawyer for two years from the practice
of law was ordered by the Court. In Small v. Banares, 35 a similar penalty of suspension for a period of two years from the
practice of law was imposed on a lawyer who had failed to file a case for the purpose of which he had received an amount of
P80,000.00, and to return the amount upon demand. In Barcenas v. Alvero, 36 the Court suspended for a period of two years
from the practice of law a lawyer who had failed to immediately account for and to return P300,000.00 received from a
client for the purpose of depositing it in court, after the lawyer had been found not to have deposited the money in court.

5
Considering that the sin of Atty. Reyes had striking resemblance with the sins thus sanctioned in the aforementioned
precedents, the proper penalty for her is suspension from the practice of law for two years, with warning that a similar
offense by her will be dealt with more severely.
Atty. Reyes is further obliged to pay to Bayonla the amount of P44,582.67, which the IBP Board of Governors found to be
still unpaid, by way of restitution. Although the Court renders this decision in an administrative proceeding primarily to
exact the ethical responsibility on a member of the Philippine Bar, the Courts silence about the respondent lawyers legal
obligation to restitute the complainant will be both unfair and inequitable. No victim of gross ethical misconduct concerning
the clients funds or property should be required to still litigate in another proceeding what the administrative proceeding has
already established as the respondents liability. That has been the reason why the Court has required restitution of the
amount involved as a concomitant relief in the cited cases of Mortera v. Pagatpatan, supra, Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, supra,
and Small v. Banares, supra.
In addition, Atty. Reyes is liable for interest of 12% per annum reckoned from June 22, 1997, the date when she was
formally charged with disbarment. This rate of interest was prescribed by the Court in Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit and Small v.
Banares.
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND PRONOUNCES ATTY. PURITA A. REYES guilty of violating Rule 16.01 and Rule
16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and SUSPENDS her from the practice of law for a period of
two years effective upon receipt of this Decision, with warning that a similar offense by her will be dealt with more severely.

This Decision is without prejudice to any pending or contemplated proceedings against Atty. Reyes.
Let this Decision be disseminated to all lower courts and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, with a copy of it to be
included in Atty. Reyes file in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

(On Leave)
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1

Rollo, pp. 3-4.

Id., pp. 32-33.
3
Id., p. 5.
4
Id., pp. 3-4.
5
Id., pp. 24-28.
6
Id., p. 94.
7
Id., pp. 97-102.
8
Id., p. 96.
9
Id., p. 105.
10
Id., p. 107.
11
Id., pp. 146-147.
12
Id., pp. 148-149.
13
Id., pp. 153-155.
14
Id.
15
Id., pp. 190-191.
16
Id., p. 192.
17
Angeles v. Uy, Jr., A.C. No. 5019, April 6, 2000, 330 SCRA 6, 17.
18
Id., at p. 20; Marquez v. Meneses, Jr., Adm. Case No. 675, December 17, 1999, 321 SCRA 1, 6.
19
Rollo, pp. 61 and 100-101.
20
Id., p. 96.
21
Marquez v. Meneses, Jr., supra, note 18, at p. 5.
22
Macarilay v. Serina, A.C. No. 6591, May 4, 2005, 458 SCRA 12, 25.
23
Adm. Case No. 6542, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 129, 141.
24
Adm. Case No. 4017, September 29, 1999, 315 SCRA 406, 413.
25
Saludo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121404, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 14, 19.
26
Section 30, Rule 138, Rules of Court.
27
Pormento, Sr. v. Pontevedra, A.C. No. 5128, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 167, 174.
28
G.R. No. 140079, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 462, 472-473.
29
Rollo, p. 176.
30
Id., pp. 177-186.
31
Id., pp. 99-101.
32
Id., pp. 105 and 107-113.
33
A.C. No. 7057, July 25, 2006, 496 SCRA 402.
34
A.C. No. 4562, June 15, 2005, 460 SCRA 99.
35
A.C. No. 7021, February 21, 2007, 516 SCRA 323.
36
A.C. No. 8159, April 23, 2010, 619 SCRA 1
2

The Court ORDERS Atty. Reyes to pay to complainant Teresita T. Bayonla within 30 days from receipt of this Decision the
amount of P44,582.67, with interest of 12% per annum from June 22, 1997, and to render unto the complainant a complete
written accounting and inventory of: - (a) the amounts she had collected from the Air Transportation Office as expropriation
compensation; (b) the total amount due to the complainant; (c) the total amount she had actually remitted to the
complainant; and (d) the amount she had deducted as her contingent fee vis--vis the complainant.1wphi1
Within the same period of compliance, Atty. Reyes shall submit to the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant,
authentic written proof that her accounting, inventory, and payment were furnished to and received by the complainant in
due course.

Associate Justice

6
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have set out hands this 15th day of May 1995 at Baguio City,
Philippines.

THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 4428

December 12, 2011

ELPIDIO P. TIONG, Complainant,

- versus ATTY. GEORGE M. FLORENDO, Respondent.

(SIGNED)
GEORGE M. FLORENDO

(SIGNED)
ELPIDIO TIONG

(SIGNED)
MA. ELENA T. TIONG

(SIGNED)
ELIZABETH F. FLORENDO"

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Notwithstanding, complainant instituted the present suit for disbarment on May 23, 1995 charging respondent of gross
immorality and grave misconduct. In his Answer 3, respondent admitted the material allegations of the complaint but
interposed the defense of pardon.

Before the Court is an administrative complaint 1 for disbarment filed by Elpidio P. Tiong against Atty. George M. Florendo
for gross immorality and grave misconduct.

In the Resolution 4 dated September 20, 1995, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation and decision.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Finding merit in the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner Agustinus V. Gonzaga,
submitted its Report and Recommendation 5 dated September 21, 2007 for the suspension of respondent from the practice of
law for one (1) year, which was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution 6 dated October 19,
2007. Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration 7 therefrom was denied in the Resolution 8 dated June 26, 2011.

Complainant Elpidio P. Tiong, an American Citizen, and his wife, Ma. Elena T. Tiong, are real estate lessors in Baguio City.
They are likewise engaged in the assembly and repair of motor vehicles in Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan. In 1991, they engaged
the services of respondent Atty. George M. Florendo not only as legal counsel but also as administrator of their businesses
whenever complainant would leave for the United States of America (USA).
Sometime in 1993, complainant began to suspect that respondent and his wife were having an illicit affair. His suspicion was
confirmed in the afternoon of May 13, 1995 when, in their residence, he chanced upon a telephone conversation between the
two. Listening through the extension phone, he heard respondent utter the words "I love you, I'll call you later". When
confronted, his wife initially denied any amorous involvement with respondent but eventually broke down and confessed to
their love affair that began in 1993. Respondent likewise admitted the relationship. Subsequently, at a meeting initiated by
respondent and held at the Salibao Restaurant in Burnham Park, Baguio City, respondent and complainant's wife, Ma. Elena,
confessed anew to their illicit affair before their respective spouses.

Hence, the instant petition on the sole issue whether the pardon extended by complainant in the Affidavit dated May 15,
1995 is sufficient to warrant the dismissal of the present disbarment case against respondent for gross immoral conduct.
After due consideration, the Court resolves to adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD except as to the
penalty imposed.
The pertinent provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility provide, thus:
"CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS
OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

On May 15, 1995, the parties met again at the Mandarin Restaurant in Baguio City and, in the presence of a Notary Public,
Atty. Liberato Tadeo, respondent and Ma. Elena executed and signed an affidavit 2 attesting to their illicit relationship and
seeking their respective spouses' forgiveness, as follows:

Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
xxxx

"WE, GEORGE M. FLORENDO, a resident of Baguio City and of legal age and MA.
ELENA T. TIONG, likewise a resident of Baguio City, of legal age, depose and state:
We committed adultery against our spouses from May 1993 to May 13, 1995 and we
hereby ask forgiveness and assure our spouses that this thing will never happen again with
us or any other person. We assure that we will no longer see each other nor have any
communication directly or indirectly. We shall comply with our duties as husband and wife
to our spouses and assure that there will be no violence against them. That any behaviour
unbecoming a husband or wife henceforth shall give rise to legal action against us; We shall
never violate this assurance;
We, the offended spouses Elizabeth F. Florendo and Elpidio Tiong forgive our spouses and
assure them that we will not institute any criminal or legal action against them because we
have forgiven them. If they violate this agreement we will institute legal action.
This document consists of four (4) typewritten copies and each party has been furnished a
copy and this document shall have no validity unless signed by all the parties.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND

DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.
xxxx
Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession."
It has been consistently held by the Court that possession of good moral character is not only a condition for admission to
the Bar but is a continuing requirement to maintain one's good standing in the legal profession. It is the bounden duty of law
practitioners to observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the integrity of the Bar. 9 Consequently, any
errant behaviour on the part of a lawyer, be it in his public or private activities, which tends to show him deficient in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant his suspension or disbarment.
In this case, respondent admitted his illicit relationship with a married woman not his wife, and worse, that of his client.
Contrary to respondent's claim, their consortium cannot be classified as a mere "moment of indiscretion" 10 considering that it

7
lasted for two (2) years and was only aborted when complainant overheard their amorous phone conversation on March 13,
1995.
Respondent's act of having an affair with his client's wife manifested his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage
and his own marital vow of fidelity. It showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the ethics of his profession. 11
Likewise, he violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by complainant which in itself is prohibited under Canon 17 12
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Undeniably, therefore, his illicit relationship with Ma. Elena amounts to a
disgraceful and grossly immoral conduct warranting disciplinary action from the Court. 13 Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court provides that an attorney may be disbarred or suspended from his office by the Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct, among others.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
A.C. No. 5355

Respondent, however, maintains that he cannot be sanctioned for his questioned conduct because he and Ma. Elena had
already been pardoned by their respective spouses in the May 15, 1995 Affidavit 14.

EN BANC
December 13, 2011

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. DANIEL B. LIANGCO, Respondent.
DECISION

The Court disagrees.

Per Curiam:
It bears to stress that a case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a
civil case but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public
and the courts. It is not an investigation into the acts of respondent as a husband but on his conduct as an officer of the Court
and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar.15 Hence, the Affidavit dated March 15, 1995, which is akin to an affidavit
of desistance, cannot have the effect of abating the instant proceedings. 16
However, considering the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that a penalty of suspension from the practice of law
for six (6) months, instead of one (1) year as recommended by the IBP-CBD, is adequate sanction for the grossly immoral
conduct of respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. GEORGE M. FLORENDO is hereby found GUILTY of Gross Immorality and is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS effective upon notice hereof, with a STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar and furnished
the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts
in the country.
SO ORDERED.

The Case
This is an administrative Complaint for Disbarment filed by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) against respondent
Atty. Daniel B. Liangco.
In a per curiam En Banc Resolution in Gozun v. Hon. Liangco, 1 dated 30 August 2000, this Court ordered the dismissal from
service of respondent as judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Fernando, Pampanga and as acting judge of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Mexico-San Luis, Pampanga. His dismissal was with forfeiture of all his
retirement benefits and accumulated leave credits; and with prejudice to his reinstatement or reemployment in any branch,
instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-owned or -controlled corporations. The Court further
directed the OCA to initiate disbarment proceedings against him for misconduct as a member of the bar. Hence, this present
case for resolution by the Court.
The Facts
We quote the facts as stated in A. M. No. MTJ-97-1136,2 as follows:

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

Complainant Hermogenes T. Gozun (hereinafter referred to as "Gozun") was in open and adverse possession of subject land
for a period of more than thirty years. His familys house was erected on the land. The house was made of old vintage
lumber, cement, hollow blocks, G. I. sheet roofing and other strong materials. Gozun inherited the house and lot from his
parents.
The municipality of San Luis, Pampanga claimed to own the same lot.
On January 12, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga issued Resolution No. 26-96, stating:
"RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED that the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga do hereby consider (sic)
the lot under Tax Dec. No. 114 owned by the Municipal Government of San Luis, Pampanga, specifically the lot where Mr.
Hermogenes Gozun and family were squatting (sic) as the new site of the Rural Health Center will rise (sic).
On May 17, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan issued Resolution No. 34-96 to amend the correct Resolution No. 26-96.

8
On May 24, 1996, Romulo M. Batu, Vice Mayor, on behalf of the Sangguniang Bayan, filed with the MTC, San Luis,
Pampanga, a petition for declaratory relief. We quote the petition:

On June 3, 1996, complainant Gozuns wife together with other public school teachers went to the office of the respondent
judge. When asked about the resolution, respondent judge answered, "Ing Apung Guinu yu y Mayor Bondoc at kaya ko
makisabi" ("Your God is Mayor Bondoc and you should talk to him").

"PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF

On August 8, 1996, agents of the municipal government demolished complainant Gozuns house, using respondent judges
resolution and the mayors executive order as basis.

"THE HONORABLE
JUDGE DANIEL LIANGCO
"In behalf of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga, We would like to petition your good office to render legal
opinion on the following matters, to wit:
"1. The validity of the attached Resolution.
"2. The powers of the Municipal Mayor to enforce said Resolution.
"3. To issue an order to the PNP to assist the Municipal Mayor in implementing said Resolution.
"These request are (sic) in connection with our plan to construct a new site for the Rural Health Center of San Luis,
Pampanga. However, the designated place thereof is presently being squatted (sic) by a certain Mr. Hermogenes Gozun and
inspite of the official notice of Atty. Benlfre S. Galang, our Provincial Legal Officer, and personal request of our Municipal
Mayor Jovito C. Bondoc to Mr. Gozun to vacate his (sic) premises, he continues to defy such notices and request to the
detriment of the proposed project.
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this petition will merit your favorable consideration and appropriate action for
the sake of public interest."
On the very same day, May 24, 1996, respondent judge issued a resolution, reasoning: First, the municipality of San Luis,
Pampanga through its Sangguniang Bayan may enact resolutions and ordinances to regulate the use of property within its
jurisdiction. Second, Resolution No. 34-96 is not contrary to law, morals and public policy. Third, the municipal mayor
through an executive order may order the Philippine National Police or any government law enforcement agency to enforce
or implement the resolution, using reasonable force if necessary and justified. Fourth, squatting in government property is
considered a "nuisance per se". Respondent judge ruled:
"With the issuance by the Municipal Mayor of an executive order, the municipality of San Luis may order the Philippine
National Police (PNP) stationed in San Luis, Pampanga to effect the eviction of Hermogenes Gozun and all other persons
who may be claiming any right under him from Lot No. 114 covered by tax Declaration No. 6030 (underscoring ours)."
Again, on the same day, March 24, 1996, the municipal mayor, Jovito C. Bondoc, pursuant to the aforequoted resolution,
issued Executive Order No. 1, series of 1996, ordering the PNP to implement Resolution No. 34-96.
Note that complainant Gozun was not served with summons or given notice of the petition for declaratory relief.
On June 2, 1996, complainant Gozun learned about the resolution.

On December 18, 1996, complainant Gozun filed this administrative complaint with the Office of the Court Administrator.
He averred that respondent judges issuance of the resolution amounts to "gross misconduct, gross inefficiency and
incompetence." Complainant Gozun further accused the municipal mayor of having bribed respondent judge. Mayor Bondoc
told complainant Gozun that "the respondent judge is in his pocketbecause he (Mayor Bondoc) has given him (respondent
judge) a lot of things ("dacal naku a regalo kaya").
On January 20, 1997, the Office of the Court Administrator submitted the petition to this Court for its consideration,
recommending that the complaint be given due course.
On March 21, 1997, the Court resolved to require respondent judge to comment thereon, within ten (10) days from notice.
On May 15, 1997, respondent judge submitted his comment, denying the charges and urging that the case be dismissed.
On June 23, 1997, we referred the case back to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
On April 13, 2000, after investigation, Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo submitted a memorandum, recommending
the dismissal from office of respondent judge.3
A.M. No. MTJ-97-1136
Dismissal of Respondent from the Bench
The OCA Resolution was forwarded to this Court for evaluation and action and docketed as A.M. No. MTJ-97-1136. On 30
August, 2000, the Court En Banc promulgated a per curiam Resolution adopting the report and recommendation of the
Court Administrator. It ruled that respondent had blatantly ignored the basic rules of fair play, in addition to acting without
jurisdiction in entertaining a Petition for Declaratory Relief despite his being a judge of a first-level court. 4 The Court also
pointed out that his ruling on the said Petition resulted in the demolition of the house of complainant Gozun, thus rendering
his family homeless. 5 It described respondents acts as biased and "maleficent" and ruled that those acts merited the
punishment of dismissal from the service,6 viz:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court hereby orders the DISMISSAL of respondent Judge Daniel B. Liangco, Municipal Trial
Judge, Municipal Trial Court, San Fernando, Pampanga, and Acting Judge Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), MexicoSan Luis, Pampanga, from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and accumulated leave credits, if any, and
with prejudice to reinstatement or reemployment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
The Court directs the Court Administrator to initiate disbarment proceedings against respondent Judge for misconduct as a
member of the bar within thirty (30) days from finality of his decision.
This decision is immediately executory.

9
SO ORDERED.7

had already suffered the supreme penalty of dismissal as MTC judge. 24 Respondent also reiterated the grounds already stated
in his first Motion for Reconsideration.

A.C. No. 5355

Disbarment

On 09 October 2008, the IBP board of governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-525, 25 which adopted the Report and
Recommendation of the investigating commissioner, who found that respondent had acted with manifest bias and partiality
in favor of a party-litigant and shown inexcusable ignorance of the Rules of Procedure. The Resolution likewise adopted the
recommendation to disbar respondent.

On 10 November 2000, the OCA filed a Complaint for Disbarment against respondent. 8 In its Complaint dated 06 November
2000, docketed as Administrative Case No. (A.C.) 5355, the OCA charged him with gross misconduct for acting with
manifest bias and partiality towards a party, as well as for inexcusable ignorance of well-established rules of procedure that
challenged his competence to remain a member of the legal profession. Thus, it prayed that he be disbarred, and that his
name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. 9

On 30 June 2011, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted the case records of A. C. No. 5355 to this Court, which
noted it on 16 August 2011.26
The Courts Ruling

On 28 November 2000, the Court En Banc promulgated a Resolution requiring respondent to file his Comment on the
Complaint for Disbarment against him. 10 On 01 June 2001, he filed his Comment on/Answer to Complaint for Disbarment, 11
appealing for understanding and asking that the Court allow him to continue practicing as a lawyer. He reasoned that when
he acted on the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed by the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of San Luis, Pampanga,
he was merely rendering a legal opinion "honestly and in good faith"; 12 and that his actions were not attended by malice, bad
faith or any other ulterior motive. 13 He further pleads for compassion from this Court and for permission to remain a
member of the bar, because the practice of law is his only means of livelihood to support his family.14

The Court affirms in toto the findings and recommendations of the IBP.
The evidence on record overwhelmingly supports the finding that respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and inexcusable
ignorance of well-established rules of procedures.
Gross Misconduct

On 07 August 2001, the Court En Banc noted the submission of respondent and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of the records of the
case.15
IBPs Report and Recommendation
The IBP held a series of hearings on the disbarment case with respondents participation. On 03 October 2003, the
investigating commissioner issued her Report and Recommendation 16 finding justification for the disbarment of respondent
and recommending that his name be struck off the Roll of Attorneys. The investigating commissioner found that, based on
the facts of the case, there was clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence to warrant the disbarment of respondent. 17 She
observed that he had exhibited lapses, as well as ignorance of well-established rules and procedures. She also observed that
the present Complaint was not the first of its kind to be filed against him. She further noted that before his dismissal from
the judiciary, respondent was suspended for six (6) months when he assigned to his court, without a raffle, fifty-four (54)
cases for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1602 a violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated 23 September 1974.
Also, pending with the Supreme Court were three (3) administrative cases filed against him for dishonesty, gross ignorance
of the law, and direct bribery. In the bribery case, he was caught by the National Bureau of Investigation in an entrapment
operation.18
On 30 January 2009, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration 19 of the Report and Recommendation of the IBP. He
alleged that the evidence presented in the proceedings for his dismissal as judge was the same as that which was used in the
disbarment case against him. Thus, because he did not have the chance to cross-examine the witnesses, he claimed to have
been deprived of due process.20 In addition, respondent emphasized the submission by Gozun of an Affidavit of Desistance
from the Complaint the latter had originally filed against him and contended that the case should have been dismissed. 21
Lastly, respondent averred that he had endeavored to improve himself as a devout Catholic by joining religious
organizations. He also impressed upon the IBP his effort to improve on his knowledge of the law by attending Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE).22
On 12 May 2009, respondent filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration 23 wherein he implored the IBP to take a
second look at his case. He emphasized the submission by Gozun of an Affidavit of Desistance and the fact that the former

In Sps. Donato v. Atty. Asuncion, Jr.27 citing Yap v. Judge Aquilino A. Inopiquez, Jr.,28 this Court explained the concept of
gross misconduct as any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the
administration of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. The
motive behind this conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.
In the case at bar, respondent acted upon the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis,
Pampanga, without the mandatory notice to Gozun who would be affected by the action. The records show that respondent,
upon receipt of the Petition, had it docketed in his court, designated Gozun as respondent in the case title, and quickly
disposed of the matter by issuing a Resolution all on the same day that the Petition was filed without notice and hearing.
Respondent admitted that, to his mind, he was merely rendering a legal opinion at the local governments behest, which he
gladly and expeditiously obliged. Without denying this fact in his Comment, he admitted that he had erred in acting upon the
Petition, but emphasized that his actions were not attended by malice or bad faith.29
We find his statements hard to believe.
The undue haste with which respondent acted on the Petition negates good faith on his part. Moreover, the testimonial
evidence on record indicates that he maintained close relations with the municipal vice-mayor of San Luis, Pampanga, a
party-litigant who had an obvious interest in the outcome of the case. The testimony of Romulo A. Batu, former vice-mayor
of San Luis, Pampanga, showed that respondent denigrated his impartiality as a judge is as follows:
COMM. SANSANO:
You dont remember therefore that at any time at all you were with the mayor in going to see the respondent?
WITNESS: (Mr. Batu)
I do not know any instance that the mayor visited the respondent, Your Honor. I do not know any instance that I was with
him.

10
COMM. SANSANO:

As early as June 6, 2003, OCA Circular No. 70-2003 has directed judges as follows:

But other than the occasion of the filing of this request there were times when you went to see the respondent also in his
office?

In view of the increasing number of reports reaching the Office of the Court Administrator that judges have been meeting
with party litigants inside their chambers, judges are hereby cautioned to avoid in-chambers sessions without the other party
and his counsel present, and to observe prudence at all times in their conduct to the end that they only act impartially and
with propriety but are also perceived to be impartial and proper.

WITNESS:
There was no other visit, Your Honor.
COMM. SANSANO:
So May 24, 1996 was the first time you went to see him in his office?

Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to "the decision itself but also to the
process by which the decision is made." As such, judges must ensure that their "conduct, both in and out of the court,
maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of
the judiciary." In the same vein, the Code of Judicial Conduct behooves all judges to avoid impropriety and the appearance
of impropriety in all their activities, as such is essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge in order to maintain
the trust and respect of the people in the judiciary.
Also relevant is Canon 3, particularly Section 2 of the new code, which exhorts judges not only to be impartial in deciding
the cases before them, but also to project the image of impartiality. 33 Unfortunately, as shown by the facts of the case, these
rules were not properly observed by respondent as a judge of a first-level court.

WITNESS:
Before that, Your Honor, nagpupunta na kami doon kung minsan may nagpapatulong na mga may kaso.

Inexcusable Ignorance of the Law

COMM. SANSANO:
Yon ang tanong ko kanina sa iyo kung bago May 24 pumupunta ka na sa opisina niyang datihan?
WITNESS:
Yes, Your Honor.

30

The testimony of respondents own witness clearly showed his wanton disregard of Canon 1, Sections 4 and 5 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which requires the observance of judicial independence and its
protection from undue influence, whether from private or from public interests. 31
In Edao v. Judge Asdala,32 we explained the rationale behind this imposition:
As the visible representation of the law and justice, judges, such as the respondent, are expected to conduct themselves in a
manner that would enhance the respect and confidence of the people in the judicial system. The New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only maintain their independence, integrity and
impartiality; but they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may erode the peoples faith in the
judiciary. Integrity and impartiality, as well as the appearance thereof, are deemed essential not just in the proper discharge
of judicial office, but also to the personal demeanor of judges. This standard applies not only to the decision itself, but also
to the process by which the decision is made. Section 1, Canon 2, specifically mandates judges to "ensure that not only is
their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of reasonable observers." Clearly, it is of vital
importance not only that independence, integrity and impartiality have been observed by judges and reflected in their
decisions, but that these must also appear to have been so observed in the eyes of the people, so as to avoid any erosion of
faith in the justice system. Thus, judges must be circumspect in their actions in order to avoid doubt and suspicion in the
dispensation of justice. To further emphasize its importance, Section 2, Canon 2 states:
Sec. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not
merely be done but must also be seen to be done.

We are appalled by respondents ignorance of the basic rules of procedure. His wanton use of court processes in this case
without regard for the repercussions on the rights and property of others clearly shows his unfitness to remain a member of
the bar.
A cursory look at the Resolution dated 24 May 1996 issued by respondent would prompt an ordinary person to conclude that
an action in the form of a Petition for Declaratory Relief was indeed filed, because it bears the name and the branch of the
court of law that issued it. It had a docket number and the names of the parties involved. The Resolution even states the
justiciable question to be resolved and accordingly makes a judicial determination thereof. In reality, though, there was no
notice sent to Gozun, the named respondent in the Petition; nor was a hearing held to thresh out the issues involved. As far
as respondent was concerned, he simply issued a "legal opinion," but one with all the hallmarks of a valid issuance by a
court of law, despite the absence of mandatory processes such as notice especially to Gozun and hearing. Even this
excuse is unacceptable. Judges do not, and are not allowed, to issue legal opinions. Their opinions are always in the context
of judicial decisions, or concurring and dissenting opinions in the case of collegiate courts, and always in the context of
contested proceedings.
What is most unfortunate is that the Sanguniang Bayan, relying on the Resolution respondent issued, caused the demolition
of the house of Gozun and his family, who were thus ejected from the property they had been occupying for decades. In
effect, Gozun was deprived of his property without due process. To us, this is precisely the injustice that members of the
bench and the bar are sworn to guard against. Regrettably, respondent as judge was even instrumental in its commission.
When his liability for his act was invoked, he casually justifies them as honest mistakes not attended by malice or bad faith.
His justification is unacceptable to us.
As a member of the bar and former judge, respondent is expected to be well-versed in the Rules of Procedure. This
expectation is imposed upon members of the legal profession, because membership in the bar is in the category of a mandate
for public service of the highest order. Lawyers are oath-bound servants of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed
by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for
which they have sworn to be fearless crusaders.34
As judge of a first-level court, respondent is expected to know that he has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for
declaratory relief. Moreover, he is presumed to know that in his capacity as judge, he cannot render a legal opinion in the

11
absence of a justiciable question. Displaying an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he in effect erodes the publics
confidence in the competence of our courts. Moreover, he demonstrates his ignorance of the power and responsibility that
attach to the processes and issuances of a judge, and that he as a member of the bar should know.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer must uphold the Constitution and promote
respect for the legal processes.35 Contrary to this edict, respondent malevolently violated the basic constitutional right of
Gozun not to be deprived of a right or property without due process of law.
Under Canon 10, Rule 10.03, respondent as lawyer is mandated to observe the Rules of Procedure and not to misuse them to
defeat the ends of justice.36 In this case, however, the opposite happened. Respondent recklessly used the powers of the court
to inflict injustice.
Should the misconduct of respondent as judge also warrant his disbarment from the legal profession? We answer in the
affirmative.
37

In Collantes v. Renomeron, we ruled therein that the misconduct of the respondent therein as a public official also
constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer:
As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said:
"A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is designed to impress upon him his responsibilities. He
thereby becomes an officer of the court on whose shoulders rest the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the
proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that
demands that in his every exertion the only criterion be that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what has given the
law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected
those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of
fiduciary responsibility - all of which, throughout the centuries, have been compendiously described as 'moral character.'
xxx

xxx

xxx

"A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession." (Rule 7.03, Code of Professional
Responsibility.)
This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable, and reliable" may practice the profession of law
(Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for every lawyer must pursue "only the highest standards in the practice of his calling"
(Court Administrator vs. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269, 278).
Recently, in Samson v. Judge Caballero, 38 we ruled that because membership in the bar is an integral qualification for
membership in the bench, the moral fitness of a judge also reflects the latters moral fitness as a lawyer. A judge who
disobeys the basic rules of judicial conduct also violates the lawyers oath.
We note that on 25 August 2011, respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing Resolution No. XVIII-2008525 dated 09 October 2008 promulgated by the IBP board of governors, which adopted and approved the findings of the
investigating commissioner recommending his disbarment. Respondent alleged therein that he had served as assistant
provincial prosecutor in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga for thirteen (13) years prior to his dismissal as
MTC judge of San Luis, Pampanga and as acting MCTC judge of Mexico-San Luis, Pampanga. He also complains that he
was deprived of due process by the IBP board of governors when it approved and adopted the findings of the investigating

commissioner recommending his disbarment; and he prays for a second look at his case, considering the withdrawal of the
Complaint originally filed by Gozun.
In the light of our ruling in this case, we can no longer consider the undocketed Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by
respondent. In the first place, such kind of petition is not available to assail the resolution of the IBP in an administrative
case. His remedies from an adverse resolution is to seek a reconsideration of the same, and when denied, to raise the same
defenses against administrative liability before this Court. He has availed of both remedies in this case.
Disbarment proceedings are sui generis. As such, they render the underlying motives of complainant unimportant and of
little relevance. The purpose of disbarment proceedings is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as
an officer of the court and as participant in the dispensation of justice an issue which the complainants personal motives
have little relevance. For this reason, upon information of an alleged wrongdoing, the Court may initiate the disbarment
proceedings motu proprio. 39lavvphil
Recently in Garrido v. Atty. Garrido,40 we reiterated the unique characteristic of disbarment proceedings and their purpose in
this wise:
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in
this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant do not apply in the
determination of a lawyers qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we see no
reason to depart from this ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is
a matter of public interest because it involves service to the public. The admission qualifications are also qualifications for
the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for
the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court. In
this sense, the complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party whose interest in the outcome of the charge is wholly
his or her own; effectively, his or her participation is that of a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the
Court.lawphi1
Thus, despite Gozuns desistance in A.M. No. MTJ-97-1136, from whence this case originated, respondent is not
exonerated.
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves to DISBAR Atty. Daniel B. Liangco for the following offenses:
1. GROSS MISCONDUCT in violation of Canon 1, Sections 4 and 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary
2. INEXCUSABLE IGNORANCE OF THE LAW in violation of Canons 1 and 10, Rule 10.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Daniel B. Liangco in the Office of the Bar Confidant
and another copy furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The Bar Confidant is hereby directed to strike out the name of Daniel B. Liangco from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

12

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

11

Id. at 198.

12

Id. at 200.

13

Id.

14

Id. at 207.

15

Id. at 212.

16

The Report and Recommendation dated 03 October 2003 promulgated by the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline in OCA v. Atty. Daniel B. Liangco docketed as Adm. Case No. 5355 was penned by Commissioner
Rebecca Villanueva-Maala.
17

IBP Commission on Bar Discipline Records, Vol. IV, p. 3.

18

Id. at 4.

19

Id. at 14.

20

Id. at 15.

21

Id.

22

Id. at 24.

23

IBP Commission on Bar Discipline Records, Vol. IV, p. 34.

24

Id. at 37.

Footnotes
1

A. M. No. MTJ-97-1136, 30 August 2000, 339 SCRA 253.

Rollo, pp. 142-147.
Rollo, p. 136.
25

Resolution No. XVIII-2008-525 was signed by Tomas N. Prado, National Secretary of the IBP Board of
Governors, id. at 1.

Rollo, p. 147.

Id. at 148.

Id. at 152.

27

A.C. No. 4914, 03 March 2004, 424 SCRA 199.

Id. at 152.

28

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1431, 09 May 2003, 403 SCRA 141.

Id. at 154.

29

Rollo, p. 203.

Rollo, p. 159.

30

IBP Commission on Bar Discipline Records, Vol. III, TSN, 26 June 2002, pp. 46-47.

31

New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary:

10

Id. at 172.

26

Letter dated 30 June 2011 by Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, IBP Director for Bar Discipline addressed to Chief Justice
Renato C. Corona.

13
CANON
INDEPENDENCE

Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of a fair trial.
A judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its individual and
institutional aspects.
xxx

xxx

xxx

SEC. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or
judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of
others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to
influence the judge.

38

A.M. No. RTC-08-2138, 05 August 2009, 595 SCRA 42.

39

Que v. Atty. Revilla, Jr., A.C. No. 7054, 04 December 2009, 607 SCRA 1.

40

A.C. No. 6593, 04 February 2010, 611 SCRA 508.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

CONCURRING OPINION
VELASCO, JR., J.:

SEC. 5. Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and influence by, the
executive and legislative branches of government, but must also appear to be free therefrom to a
reasonable observer.
32

A.M. No. RTJ-06-1974, 26 July 2007, 528 SCRA 212.

33

New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary:

I concur with the ponencia of Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno. However, I would like to elucidate on the petition filed by
respondent Atty. Daniel B. Liangco.
When respondent was dismissed by the Court in Gozun v. Liangco, 1 We directed the OCA to initiate disbarment proceedings
against him. The OCA filed the instant disbarment case on the grounds of gross misconduct for acting with manifest bias
and partiality and for inexcusable ignorance of well-established rules of procedure. After respondent filed his Comment on
the complaint, the Court issued a Resolution on August 7, 2001 referring the instant case to the IBP for investigation, report
and recommendation.

Canon 3
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision
itself, but also to the process by which the decision is made.
xxx

xxx

xxx

SEC. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances
the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of
the Judiciary.
34

Apostacy in the Legal Profession, 64 SCRA 784.

35

Code of Professional Responsibility: Canon 1 A LAW YER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION,
OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
36

Id., Canon 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Rule 10.03 A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse to defeat the ends of
justice.
37

Eventually, on October 23, 2003, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline filed its Report with the IBP Board of Governors
with a recommendation for the disbarment of respondent, which was approved by the IBP Board of Governors through the
issuance of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-525 on October 9, 2008. On January 30, 2009, respondent filed his motion for
reconsideration, and on May 12, 2009, a supplemental motion for reconsideration.

A.C. No. 3056, 16 August 1991, 200 SCRA 584.

On June 30, 2011, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted the records of the instant case to the Court, which duly
noted it on August 16, 2011.
However, on August 25, 2011, respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing Resolution No. XVIII-2008-525
dated October 9, 2008. It must be emphasized that the filing of a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the IBP Board
of Governors Resolution adopting and approving the recommendation of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline to disbar
him is not available to respondent. In fact, it is not necessary under the Rules.
Sec. 12 of Rule 139-B, of the Rules of Court pertinently provide:
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. (a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the
IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of
the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is
based. It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following
the submittal of the Investigators report.
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be
suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the
Supreme Court for final action.

14
(c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less than suspension
or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision exonerating respondent or
imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the complainant or other
interested party filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Boards resolution, the
Supreme Court orders otherwise.
<(d) Notice of the resolution or decision of the Board shall be given to all parties through their counsel. A copy
of the same shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court.
Under the Resolution issued on June 17, 2008 in B.M. No. 1755, the Court emphasized the application of the above-quoted
Sec. 12 of Rule 139-B, thus:
In case a decision is rendered by the BOG [Board of Governors] that exonerates the respondent or imposes a sanction
less than suspension or disbarment, the aggrieved party can file a motion for reconsideration within the 15-day period
from notice. If the motion is denied, said party can file a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with
this Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the resolution resolving the motion. If no motion for reconsideration is
filed, the decision shall become final and executory and a copy of said decision shall be furnished this Court.
If the imposable penalty is suspension from practice of law or disbarment, the BOG shall issue a resolution setting forth
its findings and recommendations. The aggrieved party can file a motion for reconsideration of said resolution with the BOG
within fifteen (15) days from notice. The BOG shall first resolve the incident and shall thereafter elevate the assailed
resolution with the entire case records to this Court for final action. If the 15-day period lapses without any motion
for reconsideration having been filed, then the BOG shall likewise transmit to this Court the resolution with the
entire case records for appropriate action. (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing, it is clear that if the IBP Board of Governorsfrom the report and recommendation of the IBP CBD
exonerates the respondent or metes a penalty other than suspension or disbarment, the exoneration of respondent or
imposition of minor penalties becomes final and executory when no motion for reconsideration is filed by a party. And
when a motion for reconsideration is filed and then resolved by the IBP Board of Governors, the aggrieved party
may file a petition for review under Rule 45 to further assail the IBP Board of Governors disposition.
In case the imposable penalty is suspension from the practice of law or disbarment, the approval by the IBP Board of
Governors for such sanctions is merely recommendatory, regardless of whether a party files a motion for reconsideration or
not, and the entire case records of the administrative case is transmitted to the Court for appropriate action on such
recommendation.
In the instant case, the IBP Board of Governors recommended respondents disbarment through its issuance of Resolution
No. XVIII-2008-525 on October 9, 2008. Thus, there is no need for respondent to file a petition for review under Rule 45 to
assail said IBP resolution as such is only recommendatory and is subject to immediate appropriate review and disposition by
this Court. The Rules clearly do not grant respondent the remedy of a petition for review under Rule 45 since such is not
necessary for the Court immediately reviews for appropriate action all resolutions from the IBP Board of Governors
recommending suspension from the practice of law or disbarment.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice