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1.

On July 5, 1990, the respondent court (RTC Makati) issued warrants


2. Lim vs Felix

of arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein. The


respondent Judge said:

G.R. Nos. 94054-57, February 19, 1991


Facts: At the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic
Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province of Masbate,

In the instant cases, the preliminary investigation was conducted by


the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate which found the

Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely

existence of probable cause that the offense of multiple murder was

Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio

committed and that all the accused are probably guilty thereof, which

Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante


another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the

was affirmed upon review by the Provincial Prosecutor who properly

assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound.

filed with the Regional Trial Court four separate informations for

For the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder, the accused

murder. Considering that both the two competent officers to whom

were Vicente Lim, Sr., Mayor Susana Lim of Masbate (petitioners in


G.R. Nos. 94054-57), Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr.,
Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor C. Lim and Mayor Antonio Kho

such duty was entrusted by law have declared the existence of


probable cause, each information is complete in form and substance,

(petitioners in G.R. Nos. 94266-69.) The RTC of Masbate concluded

and there is no visible defect on its face, this Court finds it just and

that a probable cause has been established for the issuance of

proper to rely on the prosecutors certification in each information

warrants of arrest. In the same Order, the court ordered the arrest of
the petitioners plus bail for provisional liberty.

xxx

The entire records of the case were transmitted to the Provincial

Issue: Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without

Prosecutor of Masbate. Respondent Acting Fiscal Antonio C. Alfane

bail by simply relying on the prosecutions certification and

was designated to review the case. A petition to transfer the venue of

recommendation that a probable cause exists

the Regional Trial Court of Masbate to the Regional Trial Court of


Makati was filed by petitioners and granted by the SC.

Held: No.

The Judge cannot ignore the clear words of the 1987 Constitution

Fiscal that a probable cause exists is sufficient for him to issue a

which requires x x x probable cause to be personally determined by

warrant of arrest.

the Judge x x x, not by any other officer or person.


If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this
case where all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or
she

has

determination

not personally determined


is

made

by

the

probable

Provincial

cause.

Prosecutor.

constitutional requirement has not been satisfied.

The
The

Tuesday, February 03, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic


Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

The Judge

commits a grave abuse of discretion.


The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the
Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed by the respondent Fiscal
were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrants
of arrest against the petitioners.

3. TAMBASEN VS. PEOPLE [246 SCRA 184; G.R. NO.


89103; 14 JUL 1995]

There was no basis for the

Facts: In August 1988, P/Sgt. Natuel applied for


issuance of search warrant alleging that he received
information that Petitioner had in his possession at his
house M-16 Armalite rifles, hand grenades, .45 Cal.
pistols, dynamite sticks and subversive documents,
which were used or intended to be used for illegal
purposes. The application was granted.

respondent Judge to make his own personal determination regarding


the existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest as mandated by the Constitution. He could not possibly have
known what transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a
certification.

Significantly, the respondent Judge denied the

petitioners motion for the transmittal of the records on the ground


that the mere certification and recommendation of the respondent

In September, a police team, searched the house of


petitioner and seized 2 envelopes containing P14000,
handset with antennae, transceiver with antennae,
regulator supply, academy notebook and assorted
papers and handset battery pack. In October,
petitioner moved that the search and seizure be
declared illegal and that the seized articles be returned
to him. In December, MTCC, in its order, directed Lt.
Col. Torres to return the money seized to petitioner
ruling that any seizure should be limited to the

specified items covered thereby. SolGen petitioned


with the RTC for the annulment of the order of MTCC
citing that pending the determination of legality of
seizure of the articles, they should remain in custogia
legis. RTC granted the petition.

Facts: Judge Geronimo S. Mangay, presiding judge of the Regional


Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 125, Kalookan
City, issued search warrants 54-953 and 55-954 for the search and
seizure of certain items in Apartment No. 2 at 154 Obiniana
Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan City.
On April 1, 1995, the police searched Apartment No. 8, in the same
compound and found one (1) .45 caliber pistol.

Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the articles which


were not mentioned in the search warrant was legal.

Found in Apartment No. 2 were firearms, ammunitions and


explosives.

Held: Section 2 Article III of the 1987 Constitution


requires that a search warrant should particularly
describe the things to be seized. The police acts
beyond the parameters of their authority if they seize
articles not described in the search warrants. The
evident purpose and intent of the requirement is to
limit the things to be seized, to leave the officers of
the law with no discretion; that unreasonable search
and seizure may not be made and that abuses may not
be committed.

Petitioners were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan


City accusing them with illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions
and explosives, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1866.6
Thereafter, petitioners were arrested and detained.
Petitioners contend that the search and seizure orders violated
Sections 2 and 3 of the Bill of Rights as well as Section 3 of Rule 126
of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure because the place
searched and articles seized were not described with particularity.
They argue that the two-witness requirement under Section 10 of
Rule 126 was ignored when only one witness signed the receipt for
the properties seized during the search, and said witness was not
presented at the trial.

Petition granted. People of the Philippines is ordered to


return the money seized.

ISSUE: W/N the items described in the warrant were sufficiently


described with particularity.

4, Yousef Al Ghoul vs. Court of Appeals


Posted on June 26, 2013 by winnieclaire

S
tandard
GR No.126859, September 4, 2001

HELD: As held in PICOP v. Asuncion, the place to be searched


cannot be changed, enlarged nor amplified by the police. Policemen
may not be restrained from pursuing their task with vigor, but in doing
so, care must be taken that constitutional and legal safeguards are
not disregarded. Exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence is the only
practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against

unreasonable searches and seizures. Hence, we are constrained to

to be seized could bear a direct relation to the offense of violation of

declare that the search made at Apartment No. 8 is illegal and the .

Section 1 and 3 of Presidential Decree No.1866, as amended,

45 caliber pistol taken thereat is inadmissible in evidence against

penalizing illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and

petitioners.

explosives.

Now, in contrast, the search conducted at Apartment No. 2 could not


be similarly faulted. The search warrants in question specifically

5.

mentioned Apartment No. 2. The search was done in the presence of


its occupants, herein petitioners, in accordance with Section 7 of

6.

Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court. Petitioners allege lack of


particularity in the description of objects to be seized pursuant to the
warrants. That the articles seized during the search of Apartment No.
2 are of the same kind and nature as those items enumerated in the
search warrant appears to be beyond cavil. The items seized from
Apartment No. 2 were described with specifity in the warrants in
question. The nature of the items ordered to be seized did not
require a technical description. Moreover, the law does not require
that the things to be seized must be described in precise and
minute details as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the
searching authorities, otherwise, it would be virtually
impossible for the applicants to obtain a search warrant as they
would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for.
Substantial similarity of those articles described as a class or
species would suffice.
The case of Bache and Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Ruiz , 37 SCRA 823, 835
(1971), pointed out that one of the tests to determine the
particularity in the description of objects to be seized under a
search warrant is when the things described are limited to those
which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is
being issued. A careful examination of the Search Warrants shows
that they were worded in such a manner that the enumerated items

7.
8.
9. Malacat vs. Court of Appeals [GR 123595, 12
December 1997] Facts:
On 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., allegedly in
response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier,
Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan
Police Force of the Integrated National Police, Police
Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, was on foot patrol with
three other police officers (all of them in uniform)
along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the
Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced
upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each
group, comprised of three to four men, posted at
opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near
the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting
suspiciously with "their eyes moving very fast." Yu and
his companions positioned themselves at strategic
points and observed both groups for about 30 minutes.
The police officers then approached one group of men,

who then fled in different directions. As the policemen


gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended
Sammy Malacat y Mandar (who Yu recognized,
inasmuch as allegedly the previous Saturday, 25
August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw
Malacat and 2 others attempt to detonate a grenade).
Upon searching Malacat, Yu found a fragmentation
grenade tucked inside the latter's "front waist line."
Yu's companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran,
apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber
revolver was recovered. Malacat and Casan were then
brought to Police Station 3 where Yu placed an "X"
mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave
it to his commander. Yu did not issue any receipt for
the grenade he allegedly recovered from Malacat. On
30 August 1990, Malacat was charged with violating
Section 3 of Presidential Decree 1866. At arraignment
on 9 October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel de
officio, entered a plea of not guilty. Malacat denied the
charges and explained that he only recently arrived in
Manila. However, severalother police officers mauled
him, hitting him with benches and guns. Petitioner was
once again searched, but nothing was found on him.
He saw the grenade only in court when it was
presented. In its decision dated 10 February 1994 but
promulgated on 15 February 1994, the trial court ruled
that the warrantless search and seizure of Malacat was
akin to a "stop and frisk," where a "warrant and seizure
can be effected without necessarily being preceded by
an arrest" and "whose object is either to maintain the
status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks

to obtain more information"; and that the seizure of


the grenade from Malacat was incidental to a lawful
arrest. The trial court thus found Malacat guilty of the
crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section
3 of PD 1866, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of not less than 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of
Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, and not more than
30 years of Reclusion Perpetua, as maximum. On 18
February 1994, Malacat filed a notice of appeal
indicating that he was appealing to the Supreme
Court. However, the record of the case was forwarded
to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CR 15988). In its
decision of 24 January 1996, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court. Manalili filed a petition for
review with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant
to the exception of stop and frisk.

Held:
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and
seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly
ef fect the same. The Constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to
those effected without a validly issued warrant, subject
to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless
arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court. A warrantless arrest under the

circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has


been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while
that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot
pursuit" arrest. Turning to valid warrantless searches,
they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches;
(2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence
in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search
incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) a "stop and frisk."
The concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search
incidental to a lawful arrest must not be confused.
These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms
of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be
validly effected and in their allowable scope. In a
search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent
arrestdetermines the validity of the incidental search.
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante
delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in
light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of
Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on
the part of Malacat, indicating that a crime had just
been committed, was being committed or was going to
be committed. Plainly, the search conducted on
Malacat could not have been one incidental to a lawful
arrest. On the other hand, while probable cause is not
required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless
holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a
"stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light
of the police officer's experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person
detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a
"stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the

general interest of effective crime prevention and


detection, which underlies the recognition that a police
officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in
an appropriate manner, approach a person for
purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior
even without probable cause; and (2) the more
pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which
permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself
that the person with whom he deals is not armed with
a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally
be used against the police officer. Here, there are at
least three (3) reasons why the "stop-and-frisk" was
invalid: First, there is grave doubts as to Yu's claim that
Malacat was a member of the group which attempted
to bomb Plaza Miranda 2 days earlier. This claim is
neither supported by any police report or record nor
corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly
chased that group. Second, there was nothing in
Malacat's behavior or conduct which could have
reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than
that his eyes were "moving very fast"

an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu


and his teammates were nowhere near Malacat and it
was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Malacat
and his companions were merely standing at the
corner and were not creating any commotion or
trouble. Third, there was at all no ground, probable or
otherwise, to believe that Malacat was armed with a
deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he

admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered"


"inside the front waistline" of Malacat, and from all
indications as to the distance between Yu and Malacat,
any telltale bulge, assuming that Malacat was indeed
hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu.
What is unequivocal then are blatant violations of
Malacat's rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and
12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.
10.
11. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs BELEN MARIACOS

GR NO. 188611 June 16 2010

himself on top thereof. He found bricks of marijuana


wrapped in newspapers. He them asked the other
passengers about the owner of the bag, but no one
know.

When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc


alighted together with other passengers.
Unfortunately, he did not noticed who took the black
backpack from atop the jeepney. He only realized a
few moments later that the said bag and 3 other bags
were already being carried away by two (2) women. He
caught up with the women and introduced himself as a
policeman. He told them that they were under arrest,
but on the women got away.
DOCTRINES:

FACTS:

October 27, 2005 in Brgy Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc


met with secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence
Network who informed him that a baggage of
marijuana had been loaded in a passenger jeepney
that was about to leave for the poblacion. The agent
mentioned 3 bags and 1 plastic bag. Further, the agent
described a backpack bag with O.K. marking. PO2
Pallayoc boarded the said jeepney and positioned

ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE PHILIPPINE


CONSTITUTION PROVIDES: The right of the People to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the Judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
Purpose: MOVING VEHICLE (WARRANTLESS SEARCH)

This has been justified on the ground that the mobility


of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to
be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction
in which the warrant must be sought.

12.

This is no way, however, gives the police officers


unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of
automobiles in the absence of probable cause when a
vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extension
search, such a warrantless search has been held to be
valid only as long as officers conducting the search
have reasonable or probable cause to believe before
the search that they will find the instrumentality or
evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be
searched.

Facts:

MALUM PROHIBITUM

.Issue:Whether or not the decision of the trial court


should be reversed (or affirmed) because the accused
argues that the search and arrest was made without a
warrant

When an accused is charged with illegal possession or


transportation of prohibited drugs, the ownership
thereof is immaterial. Consequently, proof of
ownership of the confiscated marijuana is not
necessary.

Appellants alleged lack of knowledge does not


constitute a valid defence. Lack of criminal intent and
good faith are not exempting circumstances where the
crime charge is malum prohibitum

The People of the Philippines vs Mikael MalmstedtThe


Swedish National with Hashish Case

Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, was found, via a


routine NARCOMinspection at Kilometer 14, Acop,
Tublay Mountain Province, carrying Hashish,
aderivative of Marijuana. RTC La Trinidad found him
guilty for violation of theDangerous Drugs Act. The
accused filed a petition to the Supreme Court for the
reversalof the decision arguing that the search and the
arrest made was illegal because there wasno search
warrant

Held:The RTC decision is affirmed.


Ratio:The constitution states that a peace officer or a
private person may arrest a personwithout a warrant
when in his presence the person to be arrested has
committed, isactually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense. The offense was recognizedwith
the warrantless search conducted by NARCOM
prompted by probable cause: (1) thereceipt of
information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from

Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession and (2)


failure of the accused to immediately presenthis
passport
13.

illegality of search and seized objects contained in the


four (4) parcels.

14. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ANDRE MARTI

ISSUE:Whether or not the seizing of illegal objects is


legal?

G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991

HELD:Yes, appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

FACTS:

RATIONALE:Article III, Sections 2 and 3, 1987


Constitution

August 14, 1957, the appellant and his common-law


wife, Sherly Reyes, went to the booth of the Manila
Packing and Export Forwarders carrying Four (4)
wrapped packages. The appellant informed Anita
Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in
Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes asked if she could
examine and inspect the packages. She refused and
assures her that the packages simply contained books,
cigars, and gloves.
Before the delivery of appellants box to the Bureau of
Customs and Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes
(Proprietor), following the standard operating
procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. A
peculiar odor emitted from the box and that the gloves
contain dried leaves. He prepared a letter and reported
to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examinations.
The dried marijuana leaves were found to have
contained inside the cellophane wrappers.
The accused appellant assigns the following errors:
The lower court erred in admitting in evidence the

Mapp vs Ohio, exclusionary rule


Stonehill vs Diokno, declared as inadmissible any
evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search
warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier
adopted in Mercado vs Peoples Court.
The case at the bar assumes a peculiar character since
the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily
discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in
a private capacity and without the intervention and
participation of state authorities. Under the
circumstances, can accused / appellant validly claim
that his constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure.
The contraband in this case at bar having come into
possession of the government without the latter
transgressing appellants rights against unreasonable
search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason
whty the same should not be admitted

FACTUAL CONSIDERATIONS Readily foreclose the


proportion that NBI agents conducted an illegal search
and seizure of the prohibited merchandise, clearly that
the NBI agents made no search and seizure much less
an illegal one, contrary to the postulate of accused /
appellant.

CHADWICK vs STATE, having observed that which is


open, where no trespass has been committed in aid
thereof
BILL OF RIGHTS
The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence
of constitutional democracy, protection against whom,
protection against the STATE.

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