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South African Journal of Philosophy

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Defining Philosophical Counselling: An Overview

Dirk Louw

Department of Philosophy , University of Stellenbosch , Private Bag X1 Matieland 7602,

South Africa
Published online: 04 Jun 2013.

To cite this article: Dirk Louw (2013) Defining Philosophical Counselling: An Overview, South African Journal of Philosophy,
32:1, 60-70
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Defining Philosophical Counselling: An Overview1

Dirk Louw

Downloaded by [88.8.89.195] at 06:24 18 October 2014

Department of Philosophy
University of Stellenbosch
Private Bag X1
Matieland 7602
South Africa
djlouw@sun.ac.za
Abstract

The practice of Philosophical Counselling (henceforth PC) is

growing. But what exactly is PC? The variety of attempts to define
PC can be summarised in terms of three overlapping sets of opposites: practical versus theoretical definitions; monistic versus pluralistic definitions; and substantive versus antinomous definitions. Practical definitions of PC include descriptive accounts of its actual practice. Theoretical definitions exclude such accounts. Monistic definitions refers to definitions of PC that define it in terms of the work
of one specific philosopher or approach in philosophy. Pluralistic
definitions draw on the work of a variety of philosophers or approaches. Substantive definitions are definitions that purport to say
what PC is, while antinomous definitions of PC say what it is not.
My aim is not to define PC definitively. The aim of this article is
rather to: (i) provide an overview of the wide variety of efforts to define PC; and, (ii) briefly suggest a preliminary understanding of PC
that seems to cover most of the other definitions thereof.
For David Fourie (1946-2013)

1. Introduction
The practice of Philosophical Counselling (henceforth PC) can be found in a growing list of countries that already includes Germany, the U.S.A., the U.K., The Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland, Norway, Italy, Spain, Canada, Israel, Turkey and South
Africa. This proliferation of PC practices was sparked by the German philosopher,
Gerd Achenbachs founding, in the early nineteen-eighties, of a Philosophical Counselling practice and the Gesellschaft fr Philosophische Praxis, though the idea of PC
is by no means exclusively the outcome of Achenbachs initiatives. On the contrary,
those versed in the Western philosophical tradition will readily trace it back to Socratess (470-399 B.C.) notion of the philosopher as a midwife who assists others in
giving birth to their own ideas (i.e. think through their problems) (LeBon 2001). PC
also resonates with a variety of suggestions of how life should be lived by, amongst
others, the Pythagoreans, the Cynics, the Stoics, the Epicureans, and the Cyrenaic
1

This publication is based on a dissertation completed for the degree of MA in Clinical Psychology at the
University of South Africa (UNISA) under the supervision of prof. David Fourie.

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school of philosophy (Lahav & Tillmanns 1995). It is a contemporary trend with

ancient Greco-Roman roots.
But what exactly is PC? Not really knowing what something is makes it difficult to
talk about it, let alone recommend it. This may undermine the development of PC as a
profession. A vague understanding of PC may also result in a lack of standards to regulate its practice and the training of would be philosophical counsellors. In what follows I would therefore like to: (i) provide an overview of, and thus a handle or grip
on, the wide variety of efforts to define PC; and, by way of conclusion, (ii) briefly
suggest with specific reference to a recent South African study (cf. Louw 2011) a
preliminary understanding of PC that seems to cover most of the other definitions
thereof.
2. Attempts to define PC: A literature survey
The variety of attempts to define PC could be summarised in terms of three overlapping sets of opposites: practical versus theoretical definitions; monistic versus pluralistic definitions; and substantive versus antinomous definitions.
2.1 Practical versus theoretical definitions
The word practical here means hands-on or concrete. Practical definitions of PC
hence include descriptive accounts of its actual practice. Prins-Bakkers (1995) description of her application of philosophical skills in marriage counselling and
Marinoffs (2000) description of his five stage approach may serve as examples.
Prins-Bakkers (1995) marriage counselling comprises six stadia: (a) clients are
asked to give a first description of the problem in their marriage; (b) clients analyse
their respective personalities or identities in view of the question, Who am I?; (c) clients reflect on their lives in terms of questions like, What do I expect from life?, and,
importantly, Is this consistent with how I actually live?; (d) clients reflect on the concept phase of life and on their past and current phase(s) of life; (e) clients individually reflect on their relationship in terms of questions like, What would it mean to be
happily married to you?; and (f) clients reflect on the same question as a couple, thus
gaining a combined perspective on a successful marriage. According to Prins-Bakker
(1995), these stadia require a number of overlapping skills from both counsellor and
clients, among which the skills involved in making the other feel attended to; being a
partner in dialogue, yet also a critical observer; objective assessment; conceptualization, critical examination, and creative imagination; and the ability to analyse and
synthesize.
Marinoff (2000) describes PC not in terms of six stages, but five. He calls it the
PEACE process: problem, emotion, analysis, contemplation, equilibrium
(Marinoff 2000: 38). In the first two stages the problem and the emotional reactions
that it triggers are identified. These emotions must be experienced authentically and
expressed beneficially. For Marinoff (2000: 38-39) most psychology and psychiatry
never progress beyond this stage (much more about PC vis--vis psychology and psychiatry later see 2.3 below). In the third stage options for addressing the problem are
listed and weighed. In the fourth stage the client obtains a philosophical disposition
through exploring, with the counsellor, the philosophical framework within which
what transpired in the first three stages would make sense to the client. This then leads
to the fifth stage in which the client reaches equilibrium, that is, understands the essence of [his/her] problem and are ready to take appropriate and justifiable action
(Marinoff 2000: 39-40). As such, the whole process involves a variety of skills like

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empathetic listening, objectification (i.e. taking a step back), logical reasoning, conceptual analysis, critical and creative thinking, synthesizing a variety of particulars,
and seeing things in perspective.
In contrast, Prins-Bakkers (1995) and Marinoffs (2000) definitions of PC may be
distinguished from theoretical definitions thereof. Theoretical definitions here
means any definition of PC that excludes a description of its actual practice. Wikipedia
(http://www.wikipedia.org/), for example, describes PC as ...a relatively new movement in philosophy which applies philosophical thinking and debating to the resolution of a persons problem, adding that it was proposed as ...an alternative to
psychotherapeutic culture [and medicalization]..., and that it ...frequently involves a
rethinking of values and beliefs and is also a method for the rational resolution of conflicts (Philosophical Consultancy n.d.: para. 1-3; cf. also Douglas 2012: 1). The Canadian Society for Philosophical Practice (CSPP) (http://www.philosophicalpractice.ca/), again, unofficially quotes a board members statement on PC, according to which PC comprises of a dialogue with a professional philosopher. It may address, from an array of historical and contemporary angles, such concrete problems
as troubled relationships, the experience of illness, moral dilemmas, confidence problems, professional crises, anxiety, depression, despair or ...foundational questions
about the meaning of life, God, freedom, [and] death. PC is based on the ancient belief that ...personal problems are of a philosophical nature.... It does not operate via
diagnoses and treatments, but is nevertheless therapeutic in that it ...enliven (sic) and
empower a person (Von Morstein n.d.: para. 1-2, 8), hence supplementing though
not substituting psychotherapy or psychiatry.
2.2 Monistic versus pluralistic definitions
Monistic definitions refers to definitions of PC that define it in terms of the work of
one specific philosopher or approach in philosophy. In so far as the latter is concerned,
Lahavs principle of worldview interpretation (1995: 4; Louw, Daniel 2011: 4)
springs to mind. According to him this principle constitutes the most fundamental element of PC. As such, it is an essential element in all PC approaches. It is what makes
these approaches philosophical. Worldview interpretation seems to imply three roles
that the philosophical counsellor can and, according to Lahav, ought to play in the PC
process: (a) assisting the client in articulating the view of herself and the world that is
being expressed by her everyday life; (b) helping her to critically examine its problematic aspects, for example inconsistencies or aspects that impairs her functioning; and
(c) assisting her to change, enrich or develop her worldview where necessary. A
philosopher, Lahav (1995: 10) claims,
is skilled in uncovering implicit presuppositions and offering alternative ones,
in drawing implications, in analyzing concepts, and in exposing hidden patterns
and structures. A philosopher familiar with the literature about concepts related
to human life those of freedom, the meaning of life, the right and the wrong,
or the self is acquainted with a variety of alternative lines of thought. A philosopher trained in phenomenology is also capable of describing aspects of subjective experience that are commonly overlooked by the average person.
Lahavs (1995) views regarding the embeddedness of worldviews in ways or forms of
life is reminiscent of the views of Ludwig Wittgenstein, the philosopher in terms of
whose work Ellenbogen (2006) illustrates PC monistically. Wittgenstein (as cited in
Ellenbogen 2006: 103) seems to be the most relevant Western philosopher for this

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purpose since for him philosophy is therapy and the philosophers treatment of a
question is like the treatment of an illness. The picture of a philosophical counsellor
that emanates from his work is of a therapist who treats our everyday existential problems through clearing up both our confusing use of language and our confused conceptions about the use of language, thereby to use Wittgensteinian jargon
(Ellenbogen 2006: 103) showing the fly the way out of the fly-bottle through untying the knots in our thinking. According to Ellenbogen (2006), the philosophical
counsellor would not, like a psychotherapist, diagnose a client in terms of ready made
generic labels, but attend to the particularities of her situation. That is, s/he would heed
Wittgensteins warning (Ellenbogen 2006: 106) to not assume that each thing called
X has one thing in common. Moreover, a Wittgensteinian therapist (Ellenbogen
2006: 104) would encourage the client autonomously to identify and critically assess
her hidden or unexamined assumptions the pictures that might be holding her
captive - so as to allow herself rationally to change her way of seeing things if and
where necessary.
Ellenbogens (2006) essay counts among a growing number of definitions of PC
with reference to the work of one specific philosopher though, strictly speaking, in
this regard one needs to distinguish between defining PC in terms of the work of a philosopher and practising PC in similar manner. Ellenbogens (2006) essay serves as an
example of the former. So does, for example, Diass (2006) exposition of the way in
which Descartes served as a philosophical counsellor for Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia. Examples of the latter, that is, of practising PC with reference to the work of a
specific philosopher, may include De Bottons (1997) application of Marcel Prousts
work, Svares (2006) assessment of Immanuel Kants analyses, or Flemings (2006)
use of Chuang Tzus philosophy to name just a few examples.
Pluralistic definitions of PC are definitions that draw on the work of a variety of
philosophers or approaches. It includes attempts to synthesize or integrate the wide
and often contradicting variety of current definitions of PC. Raabes (2001: xviii)
overarching model of PC rates as one of the most prominent in this category. It is
based on a comprehensive survey of both theoretical conceptions of PC and descriptions of practice, that is his own practice and the practice of a number of other philosophical counsellors. Raabe (2001) thus draws on a bewildering variety of not only
philosophers, but also (albeit often indirectly) psychologists. According to his model,
PC consists of four stages (Raabe 2001: 125-166). The first is a free floating stage
that constitutes the building of a rapport between counsellor and client: the counsellor
familiarises himself with his client and her concerns, while assessing whether PC
would be the appropriate response. The client, likewise, becomes acquainted with the
counsellor and his approach. The second stage is called immediate problem resolution and consists of the counsellor allowing the client to use his (i.e. the counsellors)
philosophical reasoning abilities to discover a solution to her immediate concerns (e.g.
a moral dilemma, a difficult decision, prioritising, assessing a situation, etc.). At this
stage the counsellor is clearly the expert, though this status is qualified by two considerations: (a) he is not providing answers, but merely guiding his client towards genuinely discovering her own solutions; and (b) the counsellor draws on the clients own
world view, that is, though he applies his own well developed reasoning skills, his
points of departure are the clients assumptions or beliefs. In stage three the counsellor
intentionally teaches his client the very critical reasoning skills that he applied in
stage two, thereby allowing her to proactively avoid or prevent similar problems. For

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Raabe (2001), it is this stage that makes PC distinctly philosophical and distinguishes
it from psychotherapy. Proactive avoidance commences in stage four when the counsellor assists his client to transcend (Raabe 2001: 158) her focus on her immediate
problems and rather to apply her newly acquired critical reasoning skills to the
worldview or paradigm within which these problems appear. This is the stage where
the counsellor clearly abdicates as an expert, where the client self-critically and autonomously determines the adequacy of paradigms or worldviews (including her own),
and where she thus reflectively gazes beyond the parameters of her current frame of
reference, or, in short, where she practices philosophy as a way of life (cf. Hadot
1995). According to Raabe (2001), his four-stage method serves an end that would
widely (though not universally) resonate with philosophical counsellors, namely to assist clients in the exploration and grounding of their worldviews through a client centred dialogue that involves description (phenomenology), interpretation (hermeneutics), and critical and creative thinking, thereby: (a) addressing the variety of clients
problems including not only conceptual issues or questions about the meaning of life,
but also emotional and behavioural problems in so far as feelings, attitudes and actions
are determined by thinking or reasoning; and (b) enhancing clients self-knowledge,
autonomy and the authenticity of their existence. Moreover, according to Raabe (2001:
xxi), many philosophical counsellors would agree that his model of PC encapsulates
its fundamental elements or requirements, including:
philosophical inquiry, a minimal competency on the part of the client to be able
to conduct a rational inquiry, a cooperative client/counselor relationship, the
ability of the counselor to adapt academic philosophy to counselling, the necessity of direct teaching, an unrestricted agenda which allows for change and
progress in the client, and a clear methodology.
Knapp and Tjeltveit (2005: 559) who, like Raabe (2001), defined PC in view of a survey of conceptions thereof, list him as a broad-scope philosophical counselor, that is
one for whom philosophical problems also include all mental problems (e.g. depression, anxiety, strained relationships, etc.) in so far as they are not medical problems or
biologically caused. Narrow-scope philosophical counselors (Knapp & Tjeltveit
2005: 559), on the other hand, exclusively focus on issues typically outside the domain
of psychotherapy, for example logical, metaphysical, ethical and political issues.
Though they pay particular attention to relating concepts or ideas to the life situations
of clients, narrow-scope philosophical counsellors do not purport to treat mental illness. Both broad-scope and narrow-scope philosophical counsellors follow an array of
divergent approaches: directive and/or nondirective; formal (i.e. methodological)
and/or informal; skills based (i.e. based on philosophical techniques) and/or theory
based (i.e. based on philosophical readings). To varying degrees all these approaches
involve clarifying the philosophical issues in practical issues, defining key terms,
questioning and critically analyzing presuppositions and basic principles (especially
when hidden), and identifying and correcting problems in thinking (e.g., identifying
and eliminating inconsistencies and contradictions) (Knapp & Tjeltveit 2005: 559).
Philosophical counsellors assist clients in identifying the different options available to
them in a given situation and the range of angles from which it could be approached or
perspectives within which it could be understood. Finally, they help clients find their
own philosophical standpoints so as to substantiate their choices autonomously.

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2.3 Substantive versus antinomous definitions

All the above definitions of PC (see 2.1 and 2.2) could be categorized as substantive
definitions, that is definitions that purport to say what PC is. However, PC has more
often, especially during the early years of its existence, been defined antinomously,
that is by saying what it is not. PC, so it is claimed, is to begin with not traditional or
academic philosophy. Academic philosophy merely serves as the general theoretical
edification of interested parties (usually professors and their students at an academic
institution). As such, it has an intrinsic value. That is, it is deemed to be worthwhile irrespective of whether it serves some or other specific practical purpose (Gutknecht
2006). PC, on the other hand, specifically aims to address particular real life problems
of clients (Prins 1997), though it may use the same tools and produce the same knowledge as academic philosophy (Paden 1998). While academic philosophy often appears
as mental gymnastics having nothing to do with life (Marinoff 2000: 8), the philosophical counsellor draws on philosophy as a mode of existing-in-the-world (Hadot
1995: 265) to suggest practical knowledge (Schuster 1998: 48) to counselees.
Yet, in spite of its practical nature it would, for some authors, nevertheless be misleading simply to equate PC with so-called applied philosophy. For them, not all professionals who apply philosophy may rightly be called philosophical counsellors.
Unlike philosophical counsellors, some professionals apply philosophy merely in an
advisory capacity, for example a consultant on an ethics board. As such, s/he objectively deals with theoretical issues, not with the personal problems of an actual individual (Van der Merwe 2001). These consultants qualify as philosophical practitioners, though not as philosophical counsellors (Shipley & Leal 2002). PC constitutes
an actual conversation with an actual person (Schuster 1999: 33; cf. also Schuster
1997, 2002). It does not include the relatively disengaged application of philosophy in
groups. Thus, as Marinoff (2000: 13) summarises:
The term philosophical practice refers to three types of professional activities:
counseling individual clients, facilitating various kinds of groups, and consulting to various kinds of organizations. Hence a philosophical counselor is one
type of philosophical practitioner (italics in original).
For a number of authors, though, PC also refers to working with groups and not just
individual counselling (cf. Raabe 2001). These groups are thought to include not only
corporate meetings or formal organizational gatherings, but also relatively informal
philosophical cafes (cf. Phillips 2001). It may also include groups of children in an
educational setting, as for the philosopher who practices Philosophy for Children (cf.
Lipman 1988). But perhaps the most popular version of PC in group format goes under the name of Socratic Dialogue. This entails more than and even contradicts the
well-known Socratic Approach in which the counsellor-cum-midwife allows the client to give birth to his/her own ideas - a decidedly unstructured and unpredictable process. The Socratic Approach is especially popular amongst those who advocate that
PC does not and should not have any specific method (cf. Achenbach 1995). Socratic
Dialogue, though, is exactly that: a method with strict rules of procedure. As facilitator, the philosophical counsellor puts a question to the group. Participants then need to
submit concrete examples of situations in which they encountered the problem in the
question. The facilitator subsequently decides on one example to serve as the focus of
the discussion. The aim is for all the participants to agree on an appropriate answer to

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the question (excluding the facilitator; s/he remains, in this sense, disengaged)
(Kessels 1997).
But, whether PC is thought to include group work or not, proponents of PC devoted
by far the most of their time and energy to the distinction between PC and psychotherapy (Schuster 1999; Segal 1995). The psychotherapist, so we are told by some, works
with a specific theory and method in terms of which s/he readily identifies or diagnoses the symptomatic behaviour of his/her patients, and in terms of which s/he then tries
to cure or normalise him/her (Mijuskovic 1995). The philosophical counsellor, on the
other hand, is (a) not equipped with a specific method, theory or ready-made answers,
and (b) nor does s/he try to cure or normalise his/her client. Through dialogue with clients philosophical counsellors rather concentrate on the analysis and innovation of
concepts, on interpretations and on trains of thought or reasoning. Healing might follow as a by-product of this process, but it does not constitute its main aim. PC is an
open-ended inquiry in which the philosophical counsellor facilitates the self-diagnosis (Schuster 1998: 38) of his/her client, that is, the philosophical counsellor continually co-creates, with the client, a space within which the latter could clarify his/her
thoughts (Achenbach 1995). This understanding of the differences between PC and
psychotherapy further implies: (c) that the therapist-patient hierarchy of psychotherapy does not obtain in PC and that the philosophical counsellor can therefore not impose his/her idea of illness or wellness on a passive patient (Prins-Bakker 1995); (d)
that PC does not involve the psychotherapeutic manipulation of clients through behavioural techniques or medication and that those who may need such treatment (e.g. psychotic patients) do therefore not qualify as candidates for PC (Marinoff 1998). PC is
therapy for the sane (Marinoff 2000: 11); and (e) that PC does not involve the empirical detection of hidden psychological causes or processes, but the analysis or
interpretation of peoples conceptions of themselves and their world through pure
(non-empirically based) thinking (Lahav 1995: 12; cf. also Lahav 1996).
However, though the PC-psychotherapy demarcation is still extremely popular,
many proponents of PC are starting to realize that: (a) the psychotherapy that is being demarcated from PC really constitutes psychiatry or psychoanalysis, that is it
incorporates the well-known medical model (Sivil 2009) or Freudian assumptions
(Ruschmann 1998); (b) a variety of psychotherapies overlap with PC, including cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT), rational emotive behavioural therapy (REBT), existential phenomenological counselling (EC), narrative therapy, and logotherapy (LeBon
2001); and (c) not only may psychologists and psychotherapists benefit from philosophical training (Raabe 2006), but psychologists and psychotherapists may, on their
part, teach philosophical counsellors to communicate or interact effectively and to
identify clients who are emotionally contained (Marinoff 2004: 11), that is, sane
(Marinoff 2000: 11) enough for PC. Nevertheless, all three of these contentions are
still controversial. Raabe, for example, argues that, in spite of their claims to the contrary, main-stream psychologically-based (Raabe 2005: 521) psychotherapists do in
fact label what they see as problems in their patients (Raabe 2005: 510) in terms of
predetermined categories set out in The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM) or the International Classification of Diseases (ICD). Or, at the very
least, they do so in terms of Freudian diagnostic markers such as transference, repression, resistance, denial, negativism, projection, and suppression (Raabe 2005: 510).
This, Raabe claims, comes from the therapists desire to defend and maintain their
position as the expert and authority; the one who knows the patient, and the patients

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mental illness, better than the patient knows herself (Raabe 2005: 520). For Raabe,
distinguishing PC from psychotherapy (or, in any event, from main-stream psychologically-based psychotherapy) does therefore still make sense. In the same vein,
Blass (1996) argues that what appears to be an overlapping between PC and cognitive
psychotherapies, namely that both focus on ideas, is in fact not as it appears. For the
cognitive psychotherapist ideas are psychic entities and the focus of therapy is the
intra-psychic wiring between ideas (Blass 1996: 283). For the philosophical counsellor, on the other hand, ideas are abstract constructs and the focus of concern is the
nature of conceptual interrelationships (Blass 1996: 283). Finally, while acknowledging that philosophical counsellors need psychological training inter alia to select or refer clients properly, Mills (1999) points out that this may not happen overnight.
Understanding potential risk factors and abnormal behavior, he warns, takes a great
deal of professional preparation, formal study, supervised experience, and extensive
training in diagnostics, assessment, and clinical intervention (Mills 1999: 152).
Concluding remarks
What, then, is PC? By now it should be obvious that defining PC in a way that would
be approved generally is anything but a matter of course. An often cited minimal definition reads as follows:
PC involves a trained philosopher helping an individual to deal with his/her
problem
However, my overview of attempts to define PC indicates that not even this minimal
definition would be welcomed by all. After all, as explained, according to some authors philosophical counsellors also work with groups or organizations (to name only
one possible bone of contention). Be that as it may, many authors do reserve the label
PC for, as Schuster (1999: 33) puts it, an actual conversation with an actual person, preferring alternative terms for work done by trained philosophers with groups
or organizations, like philosophical practice or philosophical consultancy/consultation. For these authors the following definition may just about capture the most
prominent traits of PC:
PC embodies the process wherein I, a trained philosopher, professionally care for
you, my client or guest. I care for your self and world (and thereby for my self and
world) by applying my training in philosophical skills and theory to address your
problem (or by empowering you to address your own problem through teaching you
the self-same skills and theory). I can address your problem only in so far as it involves sane, yet confused or obstructed thinking (i.e. reasoning or conceiving), and not
in so far as it involves physiological or neuropsychiatric dysfunction. I do so
(self-)critically and creatively in a dialogical partnership with you, while constantly securing that you are comfortable in my presence and I in yours, thereby acknowledging
our inter-dependence as discussants and as Is, that is, as autonomous, yet vulnerable
unique selves. Through our probing and prompting questions we continually co-create
a space within which both of us may find and keep finding our own ways of dealing
with the problem in question, whether it be existential or academic.
This understanding of PC was derived from the comprehensive responses of three
South African philosophical counsellors to the question, Please describe your experience(s) of PC, in a recent attempt to define PC as practiced in South Africa (cf. Louw
2011). It zip files the assumptions, process, subject, subject matter, methodology,

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tools and techniques of PC, as well as its scope of practice, potential clients, its counsellor-client relationship, its relations with psychology and psychiatry, and its foreseeable effects. As such, it seems to resonate with the understandings of PC of counsellors practicing outside South Africa, as one would expect of such a comprehensive
(though admittedly cumbersome) definition. Not that all of them would be completely
comfortable with it though. But each of them would at least be able to find something
to agree with!
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