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Alain Badiou
translated by Jorge Jauregui
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The word "democracy" is today the main organizer of consensus. What the
word is assumed to embrace is the downfall of Eastern Socialists States, the
supposed well being of our countries as well as Western humanitarian
crusades.
Thus, the purpose of Communist politics aims at its own disappearance in the
modality of the end of the form separated from the State in general, even if it
concerns a State that declares itself democratic.
and let this end be as well the end of the State, thus the end of all relevance
to the word "democracy."
From this results the idea that "democracy" can only be considered a concept
of philosophy if one of these three following hypotheses is to be rejected. All
three are intertwined and somehow uphold the Leninist view on democracy.
They are:
Lets assume that the ultimate goal of politics is not the pure assertion of
collective presentation, is not the free association of men, disengaged from
the States principle of sovereignty. Lets assume that generic Communism,
even as an idea, is not the ultimate goal of politics. What can then be the
goal of politics, its practices finality, much as this practice involves, or
questions, or challenges, philosophy?
As a passing remark lets say this situation does not apply to the hypothesis
in which the ultimate goal in politics is the withering of the State, since you
are not dealing with "the good State." For the case you are dealing with the
political process as self-cancellation, that is as engaged in the cessation of
the principle of sovereignty. It does not concern a norm associated with the
state configuration. It rather concerns the idea of a process that would bring
about the withering of the entire state configuration. The singularity of
withering does not belong to the normative question as it can be exerted
upon the persistence of the State. On the other hand, if politics ultimate goal
is "the good State" or the preferable State, then the emergence of a norm
seems ineluctable.
Now, this poses a difficult question in that the norm is inevitably external or
transcendent. The State, in itself, is objectivity without norm. It is the
principle of sovereignty, or of coercion, endowed with a separate functioning
necessary to the collective as such. It will obtain its determination in a set of
regulations stemming from subjective topics. These are precisely the norms
that will introduce the subject of "the good State" or the preferable State. In
our present situation, that is, the circumstance in our parliamentary States,
the subjective relation to the issue of the State is regulated according to
three norms: the economy, the national question and, precisely, democracy.
Lets consider the economy first. The State is accountable for assuring a
minimal functioning of the circulation and distribution of goods; it falls into
disrepute as such if it proves exaggeratedly incapable of complying with this
norm. In the sphere of the economy broadly, whatever its organic relation to
the State, the latter is subjectively accountable for the functioning of the
economy.
The second norm is the national question. The State is under a set of
regulations such as the nation, the representation on the world scene,
national independence, etc. It is accountable for the very existence of the
national principle at home and abroad.
Thus the actual situation of the question subordinates the State to the
normative threesome of economic functioning, national evaluation and
democracy. Here "democracy" acts as a normative characterization of the
State, precisely as what can be termed the category of "a politics," not of
So much for the case with regard to the hypothesis that politics ultimate goal
is in determining "the good State." What you get at most is that "democracy"
turns out to be the category of a particular politics, parliamentarism. This is
not a definite reason to posit "democracy" as a philosophical concept.
What we are examining here is the ultimate goal of politics when this goal is
not generic Communism. Our first consideration was that politics aimed at
establishing the best possible State. It follows from there that "democracy" is
not necessarily a concept within philosophy.
The second possible reasoning leads you to the notion that the ultimate goal
of politics is none other than itself. In this case politics would not address the
issue of "the good State" but would be its own goal for itself. Conversely to
what has been reflected previously, politics would then become a movement
of thought and action that freely eludes the dominant state subjectivity and
propounds, convenes, and organizes projects ill-suited for consideration and
representation within the norms under which the State functions. In this case
politics is presented as a singular collective practice estranged from the
State. Again that kind of politics, in its essence, is not the carrier of a State
agenda or a state norm but is instead the development of what can be
termed the dimension of collective freedom, precisely in that it avoids the
normative consensus represented by the State provided the State is
assessed by this organized freedom.
thus to itself its own goal insofar as it is able to withdraw from state
consensus, it could eventually be termed democratic. Yet in this case the
category will not function in a Leninist sense, as a State form. And this brings
you back to the third negative condition with regard to the three Leninist
hypotheses.
Here concludes the first part of our discussion, that is: what if the goal of
politics is not generic Communism?
The second part of the discussion concerns philosophy itself. Lets assume
that philosophy is not related to politics as much as it is the representation or
the seizure of politics ultimate ends, that philosophy has another rapport to
politics and that it is not intended to evaluate the appearance before a
court or legitimate politics ultimate ends. How does philosophy then relate
to politics? What is the name of that relation? How are we to prescribe it?
There is a first hypothesis, namely that the task of philosophy would be what
I call the formal description of politics, its typology. Philosophy would set up a
space where politics are discussed in accordance with their sort. All in all,
philosophy would be a formal apprehension of States and politics as it preelaborates or exposes the said typology to possible norms. Yet, when this is
the case indubitably this is part of the work of thinkers such as Aristotle or
Montesquieu it becomes apparent that "democracy" acts upon philosophy
as the description of a form of the State. There is no doubt about it.
Accordingly, the categorization starts from state configurations, and
"democracy" becomes, from the viewpoint of philosophy, the description of a
form of the State, as opposed to other forms such as tyranny, aristocracy and
so on.
But if "democracy" designates a form of the State, the premise would then be
asserted, regarding this form, about "the goals of politics." Is it a matter of
"willing" this form? If so, we are inside the logic of "the good State," which is
what was previously analyzed. Or is it a matter of going beyond this form,
dissolving sovereignty, even democratic sovereignty? In this case we relapse
inside the Leninist frame, the withering hypothesis. In any event, this option
brings you back to the first part of the discussion.
As a passing remark, the fact that the State does not think is the source of all
sorts of difficulties for philosophical thinking as far as politics is concerned. All
"political philosophies" adduce evidence that the State does not think. And
when these political philosophies posit the State as leading the research on
politics as thought, difficulties increase. The fact that the State does not think
leads Plato, at the end of book IX in Republic, to declare that as a last resort
you can pursue politics everywhere except in your own fatherland. And the
same eventuality brings Aristotle to the distressing conclusion that once the
ideal types of politics have been isolated, only pathological types are left in
the real. For instance, for Aristotle monarchy implies a kind of State that does
think and is reputed to be thinkable. Yet, in the real there are only tyrannies,
which do not think, which are unthinkable. The normative type is never
achieved. This also leads Rousseau to ascertain that in history all that exists
is dissolved States, and no legitimate State. Finally, these postulates, which
are extracted from within utterly heterogeneous political conceptions, agree
on one point: namely, it is not possible to envision the State as the doorway
to politics research. Perforce one comes up against the State as a nonthinking entity. The problem should be pursued from another angle.
There lies the core of the question. It is a problem with conjunction. To what,
other than the State, is "democracy" to be conjoined in order to become a
real approach to politics-as-thought? There is a large political tradition
pertinent to this, and I wont go further into it. Lets suffice to mention just
two examples concerning the attempt to conjoin "democracy" to something
other than the State thus allowing the meta-political (philosophical) reexamination of politics-as-thought.
law. For Rousseau a law necessarily implies a global association relating the
people to the people and thereby cannot involve specific individuals.
The institution of the State cannot be a law. And this suggests that it also
cannot be the practice of sovereignty. For sovereignty is precisely the generic
form of the social contract and it always connotes a relation of totality to
totality of the people to the people. Apparently, we face an impasse here. A
decision is needed, a decision that should be at the same time special (since
it establishes the government) and general (since its taken by the "totality"
of the people and not by the government, which does not yet exist and will
eventually be established). However, it is impossible for Rousseau that this
decision result from the general will, since every decision of this kind should
be manifested in the shape of a law or a deed of sovereignty. And this can
only be the contract agreed upon by all the people and all the people, a
contract that bears no particular character. You can also posit the question
this way: the citizen votes for the laws, the governmental magistrate takes
the concrete measures. How are particular magistrates to be appointed when
there arent yet any magistrates, but only citizens? Rousseau pulls himself
out of this difficulty by stating that "the institution of government is
accomplished by the sudden conversion of sovereignty into democracy so
that without sensible change, and merely by virtue of a new relation of all to
all, the citizens become magistrates, and pass from general to particular acts,
from legislation to the execution of the law." For many this was a singular
conjuring trick. What does this sudden conversion without any modification of
the organic relationship between totality to totality mean? How does a mere
displacement of this relation, which is the social contract as instituting the
general will, allow for the proceeding to the possibility of initiating particular
political acts? Basically this means leaving aside the formal argumentation
that democracy originally refers "to the particular character of the interests
at stake in political regulation." Political regulation with its particular interests
at stake in the last resort it only has particular stakes is confined to
democracy. Rousseaus case for the establishment of government is but one
symbolic example. Generally speaking, the universality of political regulation
much as it evades the singular holding of the State can be deployed as
such only when particular interests are at stake and is constrained, when
deployed under particular stakes, if only to invest the democratic form in
order to remain political. Here a primary conjunction between democracy and
politics effectively takes place.
The reasoning of this position is rather complex and I present a brief outline.
Lets say that "democracy" posits the fact that politics with regard to a
politics of emancipation is sooner or later related to the special nature of
peoples lives, not to the State, but to people as they come forth in the public
space. Again, politics cannot be itself, which is being democratic, in its
dealing with this particularity in peoples lives, unless it dismisses all
inequitable sense in the very dealing. For, if politics allows for an inequitable
acceptation in its dealing, then it introduces a nondemocratic norm in the
original sense I am addressing here and the conjunction is cancelled. This
means politics is no longer competent to deal with the particular from the
perspective of the universal regulation. Politics will deal with the particular
differently; it will deal with it from the perspective of the particular regulation.
Thus, the case would be that every particular regulation redirects politics
towards the State where it is subjected to the constraint of state jurisdiction.
Consequently, the word "democracy," in its philosophical significance,
presupposes a kind of politics insofar as the effectiveness of its emancipatory
process works at the impossibility proper of all inequitable enunciation in
concern with this situation. For the aim of this kind of politics to be real
proceeds from the fact that these enunciations are, by means of such politics,
not forbidden but impossible. Interdiction is always a rule of the State;
impossibility is a regulation of the real.
In the end a very old word, a word very much worn, philosophically nominates
those politics that overcome this ordeal: its the word "justice."