Art Viii

Article VIII
THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Sec.1 The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
Case: SANTIAGO v BAUTISTA 32 SCRA 188, 1970
Facts: Appellant Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a pupil in Grade Six at the public school
named Sero Elementary School in Cotabato City. As the school year 1964-1965 was then
about to end, the "Committee on the Rating of Students for Honor" was constituted by the
Consti 1: Article 8 Cases
teachers concerned at said school for the purpose of selecting the "honor students" of its
graduating class. With the school Principal, Mrs. Aurora Lorena, as chairman, and Juanita
Bautista, Rosalinda Alpas, Rebecca Matugas, Milkita Inamac, Romeo Agustin, Aida
Camino and Luna Sarmago, as members, the above-named committee deliberated and
finally adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia Ligat and Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as first,
second and third honors, respectively. The school's graduation exercises were thereafter
set for May 21, 1965; but three days before that date, the "third placer" Teodoro Santiago,
Jr., represented by his mother, and with his father as counsel, sought the invalidation of the
"ranking of honor students."
Issue: Whether or not there is an actual cause of action for petition for certiorari.
Ruling:
No. The court held to sustain the order of dismissal appealed from for
failure on the part of appellant to comply with the requirements of Section 1 of Rule 65. To
be sure, the lower court's holding that appellant's failure to accompany his petition with a
copy of the judgment or order subject thereof together with copies of all pleadings and
documents relevant and pertinent thereto "is fatal to his cause" is supported not only by the
provision of that Rule but by precedents as well.
Case: MARCOS v MANGLAPUS 177 SCRA 668, 1989

Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to
order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to
former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the
implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners
assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to
impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the
limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has
authorized her to do so.
They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is
guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the
President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from
the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to
travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right
to return to one's country, a distinct right under international law, independent from
although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of
movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the
right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of
is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On
the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to
choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such
rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public
health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country
cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations
to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty
of abode and the right to travel.

The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well
considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted
principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious
threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the
destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved
during the past few years after the Marcos regime. The return of the Marcoses poses a
serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED.
Case: ECHEGARAY v THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE G.R. No. 132601, 19 Jan 1999
FACTS:
On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of
petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice
Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only
violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive
to grant reprieve.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of
judgment has already been rendered that by granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has
in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function.
HELD: No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power
of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and
forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted
as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their
finality.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death
convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than
the right to life.
For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the
right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and
coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.
Case: UNITED STATES v NIXON 418 U.S. 683, 1974
Brief Fact Summary. The special prosecutor, investigating a break-in of the Watergate
Hotel, demanded audiotapes of conversations recorded by President of the United States
Richard Nixon (President Nixon) in the Oval Office. President Nixon asserted that he was
immune from such a demand on the grounds of executive privilege. Synopsis of Rule of
Law. Neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of highlevel communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified, presidential
privilege of immunity from the judicial process.
Facts. A Senate committee was set up to investigate a break-in of the Democratic

National Committee headquarters at the Watergate Hotel. Under public pressure, President
Nixon appointed a special prosecutor to investigate whether the White House was involved
in the break-in. Upon motion by the Special Prosecutor, a subpoena was issued to
President Nixon by the District Court requiring the production of certain tapes and writings
between the President and his aids and advisors. President Nixon brought this action to
quash the subpoena, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction to issue it because the
matter involved an interbranch dispute between a subordinate (the Independent Counsel)
and a superior officer (the President). Alternatively, he argued that the subpoena should be
quashed because it demanded confidential conversations between a President and his
close advisors that would be against public interest to produce.
Issue. Does the separation of powers doctrine preclude judicial review of a Presidents
claim of executive privilege?
Should the subpoena be quashed because it demands confidential conversations between
a President and his aids that would be inconsistent with the public interest to produce?
Held. No and No. The District Courts decision is affirmed. The president must produce
the tapes.
It is the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) responsibility to say what the
law is. The basic concept of separation of powers requires, on occasion, for the federal
courts to interpret the United States Constitution (Constitution) in a manner at variance with
the construction given to it by another branch. Therefore, it is the duty of the Supreme
Court to say what the law is with respect to a claim of executive privilege.
The Presidents need for complete candor and objectivity from advisors calls for great
deference from the courts. But when an asserted privilege depends solely on a broad,
undifferentiated, claim of public interest in the confidentiality of such conversations,
concerns for the fair administration of justice must win out. The allowance of privilege to
withhold evidence that is clearly relevant in a criminal trial would vitiate the guarantee of
due process and seriously impair the basic function of the courts.
Discussion. The student should note that the Court essentially employs a balancing test
here and weighs the importance of the general privilege of confidentiality of Presidential
communications against the inroads of such a privilege against fair administration of

criminal justice.
Case: INFOTECH FOUNDATION, et al. v COMELEC G.R. No. 159139, 13 Jan 2004
Facts: Petitioners were participating bidders questioning the identity and eligibility of the
awarded contractor Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC) where the competing bidder is Mega
Pacific eSolutions, Inc. (MPEI) as signed by Mr. Willy Yu of the latter. Private respondent
claims that MPEI is the lead partner tied up with other companies like SK C&C, WeSolv,
Election.com and ePLDT. Respondent COMELEC obtained copies of Memorandum
Agreements and Teaming Agreements.
Issue: Whether or not there was an existence of a consortium.
Ruling: No. There was no documentary or other basis for COMELEC to conclude that a
consortium had actually been formed amongst MPEI, SK C&C and WeSolv, along with
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Election.com and ePLDT. The president of MPEI signing for allegedly in behalf of MPC
without any further proof, did not by itself prove the existence of the consortium. It did not
show that MPEI or its president have been duly pre-authorized by the other members of
the putative consortium to represent them, to bid on their collective behalf and, more
important, to commit them jointly and severally to the bid undertakings. The letter is purely
self-serving and uncorroborated.
Sec. 2 The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its
jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security
of tenure of its Members.
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Case: MALAGA v PENACHOS, JR. G.R. No. 86695, 3 Sep 1992

FACTS:
The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualifications,
Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26 and
28, 1988 issues of the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a
Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the last day for the
submission of pre-qualification requirements was on December 2, 1988, and that the bids
would be received and opened on December 12, 1988 at 3 o'clockin the afternoon.
Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of BE Construction and
Best Built Construction, respectively, submitted their pre-qualification documents at two
o'clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Occeana submitted his own PREC1 on December 5, 1988. All three of them were not allowed to participate in the bidding
as their documents were considered late.
On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC against the
officers of PBAC for their refusal without just cause to accept them resulting to their non-
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inclusion in the list of pre-qualified bidders. They sought to the resetting of the December
12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance of their documents. They also asked that if the
bidding had already been conducted, the defendants bedirected not to award the project
pending resolution of their complaint.
On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from
conducting the bidding and award the project. The defendants filed a motion to lift the
restraining order on the ground that the court is prohibited from issuing such order,
preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction in government infrastructure
project under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818. They also contended that the preliminary injunction had
become moot and academic as it was served after the bidding had been awarded and
closed.
On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the petition for
preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be constructed at the ISCOF
was an infrastructure project of the government falling within the coverage of the subject
law.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject to
the provisions of PD 1818?
RULING:
The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as
follows: Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated
within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by
law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and
enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory
agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled corporations. (Sec. 2
(5) Introductory Provisions).
The same Code describes a chartered institution thus: Chartered institution - refers to
any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with
functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the
state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12)
Introductory Provisions).It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered
institution and is therefore covered by P.D. 1818. There are also indications in its
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charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality. First, it was created in pursuance of

the integrated fisheries development policy of the State, a priority program of the
government to effect the socio-economic life of the nation. Second, the Treasurer of the
Republic of the Philippines shall also be the ex-officio Treasurer of the state college with its
accounts and expenses to be audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly authorized
representative. Third, heads of bureaus and offices of the National Government are
authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon request of the president of the state college, such
apparatus, equipment, or supplies and even the services of such employees as can be
spared without serious detriment to public service. Lastly, an additional amount ofP1.5M
had been appropriated out of the funds of the National Treasury and it was also decreed in
its charter that the funds and maintenance of the state college would henceforth
be included in the General Appropriations Law. Nevertheless, it does not automatically
follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the said decree as there are irregularities
present surrounding the transaction that justified the injunction issued as regards to the
bidding and the award of the project (citing the case of Datiles vs. Sucaldito).
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Sec. 3 The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary
may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the
previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.
Case: RADIOWEALTH, INC. v AGREGADO 86 Phil 429, 1950
FACTS: A Webster Teletalk and Webster Telephone Speaker were bought for Pho 585 and
installed in the second and third floor of the Malacanang Annex which houses the Supreme
Court. The Chairman of the Property Requisition Committee (appointed by the President)
disapproved of the purchase and its installation invoking EO 302 which discontinues open
market purchases. Petitioners also contended that Judicial functions do not include
purchase of property. Radiowealth, Inc. (vendor) is now requesting that the payment be
approved however, the Auditor of the SC refused to countersign the warrant for payment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Judicial Department can make purchases without the prior
approval of the Executive?
HELD: YES, they can.
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RD:
Found in a ruling in Tarlac VS Gale: All three departments are co-equal and coimportant, each is independent from the other and cannot control or interfere with each other
in the exercise of special function s; Judiciary has the power to maintain its existence and
do whatever is necessary to preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity and ensure
effectiveness in the administration of justice; Officials of the government who owe duty to the
court under the law cannot deprive the courts of anything vital to their functions; Officials and
boards are duty-bound to construct or purchase offices or court rooms and furnish them.
They also have to insure that the character of these rooms would permit the court to exercise
its functions in a reasonably effective manner; In case of conflict to, the court shall
overpower the officials as they will be the ultimate judge in determining what is necessary
for its efficiency; Officials have the power to assign a particular room or court room to the
Court of First Instance and change the assignments provided that the new rooms are
reasonable adequate; Courts have the power to refuse dispossession of the room if they
deem that the new room would be inadequate in the exercise of their duties; If board
refuses to furnish the articles mentioned by law, then the court would have the power either
to purchase things directly or by proper proceedings to compel the officials to perform their
duties to the law; Executive does not have power over the purchase of books and
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other office equipment needed for the convenient transaction of its business; Court could
not maintain its independence and dignity if it executive could determine what the courts
should have. They are of equal footing when it comes to the requisition of fixtures,
equipment and supplies.
Case: BENGZON v DRILON G.R. No. 103524, 15 Apr 1992
FACTS:
Petitioners are retired justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals
who are currently receiving pensions under RA 910 as amended by RA 1797. President
Marcos issued a decree repealing section 3-A of RA 1797 which authorized the adjustment
of the pension of retired justices and officers and enlisted members of the AFP. PD 1638
was eventually issued by Marcos which provided for the automatic readjustment of the
pension of officers and enlisted men was restored, while that of the retired justices was not.
RA 1797 was restored through HB 16297 in 1990. When her advisers gave the wrong
information that the questioned provisions in 1992 GAA were an attempt to overcome her
earlier veto in 1990, President Aquino issued the veto now challenged in this petition.
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It turns out that PD 644 which repealed RA 1797 never became a valid law absent its
publication, thus there was no law. It follows that RA 1797 was still in effect and HB 16297
was superfluous because it tried to restore benefits which were never taken away validly.
The veto of HB 16297 did not also produce any effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President of certain provisions in the GAA of FY
1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices is constitutional or
valid.
HELD: The veto of these specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the
Judiciary ot its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy.
Pursuant to constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of
the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law.
Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former Justices on
the ground that there should be no grant of distinct privileges or preferential treatment to
retired Justices ignores these provisions of the Constitution and in effect asks that these
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Constitutional provisions on special protections for the Judiciary be repealed.

The petition is granted and the questioned veto is illegal and the provisions of 1992 GAA
are declared valid and subsisting.
Sec. 4 (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or
seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive
agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other
cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including
those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential
decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations,
shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually
took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
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(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the
concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations
on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence
of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the
case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid
down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or
reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
Case: FORTICH v CORONA G.R. No. 131457, 19 Aug 1999
The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgements/resolutions of a court
or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations; a
resolution which substantially modifies a decision after it has attained finality is utterly void.
When an administrative agency's decision becomes final and executory and no one has
seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto , the said agency has lost its
jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its decision.
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FACTS:
On March 29, 1996, the Office of the President (OP) issued a decision
converting a large parcel of land from agricultural land to agro-industrial/institutional area.
Because of this, a group of farmer-beneficiaries staged a hunger strike in front of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Compound in Quezon City in October 9, 1997. The
strike generated a lot of publicity and even a number of Presidential Candidates (for the
upcoming 1998 elections)intervened on behalf of the farmers.
Because of this blackmail, the OP re-opened the case and through Deputy Executive
Secretary Renato C. Corona issued the socalled, politically motivated, win - win resolution on November 7, 1997, substantially
modifying its1996 decision after it had become final and executory.
ISSUE: WON the win - win resolution, issued after the original decision had become final
and executory, had any legal effect.
HELD: No; When the OP issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the Decision of
March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for
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reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so
modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more
authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR
Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed Win - Win Resolution.
Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of
Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the
Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was
permitted to be filed in exceptionally meritorious cases, as provided in the second
paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been entertained
considering that the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby
allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of
the President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29, 1996
Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the
rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.
The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court
or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and
regulations. The noble purpose is to write finis to disputes once and for all.
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Case: PEOPLE v DY G.R. No. 115236-37, 16 Jan 2003

FACTS:
Accused-appellants Bryan Ferdinand Dy and Giovan Bernardino filed
separate motions for reconsideration which affirmed the judgement of the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City, Branch 5, finding them guilty of rape and acts of lasciviousness.
In his motion, accused-appellant Dy submits that the decision should have been merely
recommendatory, in view of the provision of Article VIII, Section 5 (2)(d) of the Constitution
which provides that the Supreme Court sitting en banc has jurisdiction over ALL criminal
cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. He contends that
Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89 which provides that death penalty cases shall be within
the jurisdiction of the Court en banc is incongruous and incompatible with constitutional
provision.
ISSUE: Is the contention valid?
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HELD: No. The contention is misleading. Under Article VIII, Section 4(1) of the
Constitution, the Supreme Court may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three,
five, or seven Members. At present case, it is made up of three divisions. However, the
divisions of the Supreme Court are not to be considered as separate and distinct courts.
Actions considered in any of these divisions and decisions rendered therein are, in effect,
by the same Tribunal. The divisions are not to be considered as separate and distinct
courts, but as divisions of the one and the same court.
Case: PEOPLE v EBIO G.R. No. 147750, 29 Sep 2004
Facts:
Appellant Gerry Ebio was convicted by this court of qualified rape and sentenced suffer
the death penalty. The Public Attorneys Office moved for reconsideration on the ground
that the court lacked a quorum when the case was deliberated. This is because the
decision was signed by only 7 justices.
The court granted the Motion for Reconsideration
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The courts decision was concurred in by a majority of the members of the court who
actually took part in the deliberations. It was unanimously signed by the 7 justices who
were present in the deliberations
Issue: Whether or not the seven constitute a quorum of the 14-membercourt
Held: The case was resubmitted to the Court en banc for re-deliberation considering that
the life of the accused is at stake.
Ratio:
A quorum is that number that makes a lawful body and gives it power to pass a law or
ordinance or do any other valid corporate act
As a general rule, a majority of the members of a court is a quorum for the transaction of
business and the decision of cases.
Based on paragraph 3 of Section 4, when the court meets by division, there should at
least be 3 members present for the division to conduct its business
However, paragraph 2 of Section 4 does not state the number of justices required to be
present to constitute a quorum when the court meets en banc
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution are also silent on what constitutes a quorum
when the court is composed of only 14members
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In case of doubt in a criminal case, especially where death penalty is imposed, the doubt
should be resolved in favor of the accused
Sec. 5 The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or
any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
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(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest
may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the
consent of the judge concerned.
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules
shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
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increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and

quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court.
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil
Service Law.
Case: MARBURY v MADISON 1 Cranch 137, 1803
Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff, William Marbury (Plaintiff), was appointed a justice of the
peace in the last days of President of the United States John Adamss presidency
(President Adams). President of the United States Thomas Jefferson (President Jefferson),
later, refused to commission Plaintiffs appointment. Thereupon, Plaintiff sought mandamus
relief from the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court). Synopsis of Rule of
Law. The Supreme Court has the implied power from the United States Constitution
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(Constitution) to review acts of Congress and to declare them void if they are found to be
repugnant to the Constitution.
Facts. Plaintiff had been appointed a justice of the peace by President Adams in the last
days of Adams presidency. Plaintiffs appointment was confirmed by the Senate, but not
finalized by commission before Adams successor, President Jefferson, took office. Upon
seeking delivery of his commission from President Jefferson and being denied it, Plaintiff
asked the Supreme Court to compel President Jeffersons Secretary of State, by Writ of
Mandamus, to deliver the commission. Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (the Act),
pursuant to which Plaintiff filed his claim, read, in relevant part, as follows: The Supreme
court . . . shall have power to issue writs of mandamus . . . [to] persons holding office,
under the authority of the United States.
Issue. Does Plaintiff have a right to the commission he demands? If he has a right and
that right has been infringed, do the laws of this country afford him a remedy? If they do
afford him a remedy, is the Supreme Court the place for Plaintiff to get the relief he
requests?
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Held. Yes. Where an officer has been appointed to an office by the President, and such
officer is not removable at the Presidents will, his appointment cannot be annulled. It has
conferred a legal right. Plaintiff was appointed to an office by President Adams, which was
not removable at the Presidents will, thus, Plaintiff has a legal right to his commission.
The very essence of civil liberty is that an individual has a right to claim the protection of
the laws when he is deprived of a legal right. Moreover, delivering a commission is not a
political act subject to the discretion of the President, thus, the Presidents decision with
regard to delivering Plaintiffs commission cannot be said to be exempt from judicial
examination.
Plaintiff seeks a remedy, mandamus relief that only a court having original jurisdiction can
grant. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction only in cases involving ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls or suits in which a state is a party. Therefore, Plaintiff,
who went directly to the Supreme Court, has initiated his suit in the wrong forum. The
statute on which Plaintiff bases his suit is of no avail to him. The part of the Act that
authorizes the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus to persons holding office is
unconstitutional.
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Discussion. The key part of this case is where Chief Justice John Marshall (J. Marshall)
declares that the Act unconstitutional and thereby establishes judicial review. J. Marshall
starts with the proposition that the Constitution sets out the cases over which the Supreme
Court has original jurisdiction and the cases over which it has Appellate Jurisdiction. J.
Marshall argues that this jurisdictional arrangement cannot be changed by a mere federal
statute (e.g., the Act), because the Constitution is the Supreme law of the land. We know
this, J. Marshall says, because we have a written Constitution.
J. Marshall further argues that the Judicial branch must say what the law is and review the
acts of the Congress if necessary. The job of judge necessarily entails saying what the law
is, according to J. Marshall.
Case: ANGARA v ELECTORAL COMMISSION 63 Phil 139, 1936
In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were
candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of
the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the
NA for the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935,
32
the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the
members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On
Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a Motion of Protest against
the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed
said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by
the NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation,
Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC proclamation
governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the election protest and that the EC
cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.
Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of
the election protest.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict
between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the
33
SC as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the
conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and
appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch
or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all
authority.
That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with
specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification
to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the government.
That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
Case: TOLENTINO v SECRETARY OF FINANCE G.R. No. 115455, 25 Aug 1994
FACTS:RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act
that seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its
34
administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits
questioning and challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of
Representatives but is a mere consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and it
did not pass three readings on separate days on the Senate thus violating Article VI,
Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution, respectively.
Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase
of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in
the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it
has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form
have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity
or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed,
and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays
entered in the Journal.
35
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of
the Constitution.
HELD: No. The phrase originate exclusively refers to the revenue bill and not to the
revenue law. It is sufficient that the House of Representatives initiated the passage of
the bill which may undergo extensive changes in the Senate.
SB. No. 1630, having been certified as urgent by the President need not meet
the requirement not only of printing but also of reading the bill on separate days.
Case: TAN v MACAPAGAL 43 SCRA 678, 1972
FACTS:
The petitioner filed a five-page complaint on October 6, 1971 to assail
the validity of the Laurel Leido Resolution, questioning the competence of the
Constitutional Convention, on the grounds that it is without power to consider, discuss,
and adopt proposals which seek to revise the present Constitution and it is merely
empowered to propose improvements to the present Constitution without altering the
36
general plans laid down by it. The plea was dismissed on Oct. 8, 1971 for lack of merit. On
month end, thepetitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, and an examination of the case
in the light of Separation of Powers now ensues:
ISSUE: Whether the complainant has the requisite standing to seek a declaration ofnullity.
Held: The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have a personal and substantive interest in the case such that he has sustained or will
sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The Senator has usually been
considered as a possessor of the requisite personality. The petitioner cannot qualify in this
category. However, there are instances when the taxpayers can seek action following the
principle that public funds administered for the purposes of unconstitutional acts equate to
misapplication of said funds. The Court has the discretion to entertain a taxpayers suit, as
it has in the case of Gonzales. Moreover, it is only when a statute has been enacted that
the courts can adjudicate on the validity. Filing of the suit has to be after the enactment of
the statute. The doctrine of separation of powers calls for the other departments being left
to discharge its duties. It may only render judgment on the validity of that has been done
37
but only after it is properly challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. As long as any
proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is no room for the interposition of
judicial oversight. It is not within the jurisdiction of the courts to declare the validity or nullity
and the petitioners motion for reconsideration is dismissed. No costs
Case: PACU v SECRETARY OF EDUCATION 97 Phil 806, 1955
FACTS:
The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities made a petition
that Act No. 2706 otherwise known as the Act making the Inspection and Recognition of
private schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction and was
amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional on
the grounds that: (1) the act deprives the owner of the school and colleges as well as
teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of Law; (2) it will also
deprive the parents of their Natural Rights and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency;
and (3) its provisions conferred on the Secretary of Education unlimited powers and
discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute towards unlawful delegation of
Legislative powers.
38
The petitioner also complain that securing a permit to the Secretary of Education before
opening a school is not originally included in the original Act 2706. The defendant Legal
Representative submitted a memorandum contending that: (1) the matters presented no
justiciable controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional
question; (2) Petitioners are in estoppels to challenge the validity of the said act;
and (3) the Act is constitutionally valid. Thus, the court dismissed thepetition for prohibition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Act No. 2706 as amended by Act no. 3075 and Commonwealth Act
no. 180 may be declared void and unconstitutional?
HELD: Petition denied. Law is Constitutional.
Case: JOYA v PCGG G.R. No. 96541, 24 Aug 1993
FACTS:
The PCGG sought to sell at public auction numerous paintings and
silverware alleged to be part of ill-gotten wealth of
Marcos. Petitioners, as taxpayers, sought to enjoin the PCGG to preserve and protect the
countrys artistic wealth.
39
ISSUE: Whether Joya has standing

RULING:
No. Petitioners failed to show that they have personal and substantial
interest in the case such that they have sustained or would have sustained direct injury as
a result of the sale.
Case: MACASIANO v NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
1993
G.R. No. 107921, 1 Jul
Facts: Petitioner seeks to have this Court declare as unconstitutional Sections 28 and 44
of Republic Act No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act
of 1992.He predicates his locust standi on his being a consultant of the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH) pursuant to a Contract of Consultancy on Operation
for Removal of Obstructions and Encroachments on Properties of Public Domain (executed
immediately after his retirement on 2 January 1992 from the Philippine National Police) and
his being a taxpayer. As to the first, he alleges that said Sections 28 and 44 "contain the
40
seeds of a ripening controversy that serve as drawback" to his "tasks and duties regarding
demolition of illegal structures"; because of the said sections, he "is unable to continue the
demolition of illegal structures which he assiduously and faithfully carried out in the past."
As a taxpayer, he alleges that "he has a direct interest in seeing to it that public funds are
properly and lawfully disbursed."
On 14 May 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment to the petition. He
maintains that, the instant petition is devoid of merit for non-compliance with the essential
requisites for the exercise of judicial review in cases involving the constitutionality of a law.
He contends that there is no actual case or controversy with litigants asserting adverse
legal rights or interests, that the petitioner merely asks for an advisory opinion, that the
petitioner is not the proper party to question the Act as he does not state that he
has property "being squatted upon" and that there is no showing that the question of
constitutionality is the very lis mota presented. He argues that Sections 28 and 44 of the
Act are not constitutionality infirm.
Issue: Whether or not Petitioner has legal standing
Held: It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality of an
act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that, question is properly
41
raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case,
i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be very lis mota presented. To reiterate, the essential
requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law are: (a) the
existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of
judicial determination, (b) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper property,
(c) the constitutional question must be raised at the opportunity, and (d) the resolution of
the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case. A proper party is
one who has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the
acts or measures complained of.
It is easily discernible in the instant case that the first two (2)
fundamental requisites are absent. There is no actual controversy. Moreover, petitioner
does not claim that, in either or both of the capacities in which he is filing the petition, he
has been actually prevented from performing his duties as a consultant and exercising his
rights as a property owner because of the assertion by other parties of any benefit under
the challenged sections of the said Act. Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo.
Judicial power is the "right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse
litigants.
42
"Wherefore, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED with costs against
the petitioner. SO ORDERED.
Case: MARIANO, JR. v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 118577, 7 Mar 1995
Facts: Two petitions are filed assailing certain provisions of RA 7854, An Act Converting
The Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati,
as unconstitutional.
Section 52 of RA 7854 is said to be unconstitutional for it increased the legislative district of
Makati only by special law in violation of Art. VI, Sec. 5(4) requiring a general
reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within 3 years following the return of every
census. Also, the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec.
5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands
at only 450,000.
Issue: Whether or not the addition of another legislative district in Makati is
43
unconstitutional
Held: Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such
as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be
composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded,
the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a
law, other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by Congress
in enacting RA 7854 and providing for an increase in Makatis legislative district. Moreover,
to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with
a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide,
would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will
be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. The intolerable
situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty.
Petitioner cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in
accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population
of Makati stands at only 450,000. Said section provides that a city with a population of at
44
least 250,000 shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of
Makati as of the 1990 census stood at 450,000, its legislative district may still be increased
since it has met the minimum population requirement of 250,000.
Case: OPOSA v FACTORAN, JR. G.R. No. 101083, 30 Jul 1993
LANDMARK CASE: In 1990, 44 children, through their parents, sought to make the DENR
Secretary stop issuing licenses to cut timber, invoking their right to a healthful environment.
They brought the case in the name of all the children in the Philippines and in the name of
the generations yet unborn!
FACTS:
The petitioners, all minors, sought the help of the Supreme Court to order
the respondent, then Secretary of DENR, to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement
(TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new TLAs. They alleged that the massive commercial logging in the
country is causing vast abuses on rain-forest.They further asserted that the rights of their
generation and the rights of the generations yet unborn to a balanced and healthful
ecology. Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of
45
continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same
may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their
intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film
evidence in the course of the trial.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have a locus standi.
HELD: The SC decided in the affirmative. Locus standi means the right of the litigant to
act or to be heard. Under Section 16, Article II of the 1987 constitution, it states that: The
state shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology
in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. Petitioners, minors assert that they
represent their generation as well as generation yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling
that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter
expounded considers the rhythm and harmony of nature. Nature means the created world
46
in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the countrys forest,
mineral, land, waters fisheries, wildlife, off- shore areas and other natural resources to the
end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the
present as well as future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a
responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a
balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors assertion of their right to
a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to
ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. This landmark case has
been ruled as a class suit because the subject matter of the complaint is of common and
general interest, not just for several but for ALL CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Case: KILOSBAYAN v GUINGONA, JR. G.R. No. 113375, 5 May 1994
In 1993, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office decided to put up an on-line lottery
system which will establish a national network system that will in turn expand PCSOs
source of income. A bidding was made. Philippine Gaming Management Corporation
47
(PGMC) won it. A contract of lease was awarded in favor of PGMC. Kilosbayan opposed
the said agreement between PCSO and PGMC as it alleged that:
1. PGMC does not meet the nationality requirement because it is 75% foreign owned
(owned by a Malaysian firm Berjaya Group Berhad);
2. PCSO, under Section 1 of its charter (RA 1169), is prohibited from holding and
conducting lotteries in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person,
association, company or entity;
3. The network system sought to be built by PGMC for PCSO is a
telecommunications network. Under the law (Act No. 3846), a franchise is needed
to be granted by the Congress before any person may be allowed to set up such;
4. PGMCs articles of incorporation, as well as the Foreign Investments Act (R.A. No.
7042) does not allow it to install, establish and operate the on-line lotto and
telecommunications systems. PGMC and PCSO, through Teofisto Guingona, Jr.
and Renato Corona, Executive Secretary and Asst. Executive Secretary
respectively, alleged that PGMC is not a collaborator but merely a contractor for a
piece of work, i.e., the building of the network; that PGMC is a mere lessor of the
48
network it will build as evidenced by the nature of the contract agreed upon, i.e.,
Contract of Lease.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Kilosbayan is correct.
HELD: Yes, but only on issues 2, 3, and 4.

1. On the issue of nationality, it seems that PGMCs foreign ownership was reduced
to 40% though.
2. On issues 2, 3, and 4, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42,
prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries in collaboration,
association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity,
whether domestic or foreign. There is undoubtedly a collaboration between PCSO
and PGMC and not merely a contract of lease. The relations between PCSO and
PGMC cannot be defined simply by the designation they used, i.e., a contract of
lease. Pursuant to the wordings of their agreement, PGMC at its own expense
shall build, operate, and manage the network system including its facilities
needed to operate a nationwide online lottery system. PCSO bears no risk and all
49
it does is to provide its franchise in violation of its charter. Necessarily, the use of
such franchise by PGMC is a violation of Act No. 3846.
Case: TATAD v GARCIA, JR. G.R. No. 114222, 6 Apr 1995
In 1989, the government planned to build a railway transit line along EDSA. No bidding
was made but certain corporations were invited to prequalify. The only corporation to
qualify was the EDSA LRT Consortium which was obviously formed for this particular
undertaking. An agreement was then made between the government, through the
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC), and EDSA LRT Consortium.
The agreement was based on the Build-Operate-Transfer scheme provided for by law (RA
6957, amended by RA 7718). Under the agreement, EDSA LRT Consortium shall build the
facilities, i.e., railways, and shall supply the train cabs. Every phase that is completed shall
be turned over to the DOTC and the latter shall pay rent for the same for 25 years. By the
end of 25 years, it was projected that the government shall have fully paid EDSA LRT
Consortium. Thereafter, EDSA LRT Consortium shall sell the facilities to the government
for $1.00.
50
However, Senators Francisco Tatad, John Osmea, and Rodolfo Biazon opposed
the implementation of said agreement as they averred that EDSA LRT Consortium is a
foreign corporation as it was organized under Hongkong laws; that as such, it cannot own
a public utility such as the EDSA railway transit because this falls under the nationalized
areas of activities. The petition was filed against Jesus Garcia, Jr. in his capacity as DOTC
Secretary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition shall prosper.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court made a clarification. The SC ruled that EDSA LRT
Consortium, under the agreement, does not and will not become the owner of a public
utility hence, the question of its nationality is misplaced. It is true that a foreign corporation
cannot own a public utility but in this case what EDSA LRT Consortium will be owning are
the facilities that it will be building for the EDSA railway project. There is no prohibition
against a foreign corporation to own facilities used for a public utility. Further, it cannot be
said that EDSA LRT Consortium will be the one operating the public utility for it will be
DOTC that will operate the railway transit. DOTC will be the one exacting fees from the
people for the use of the railway and from the proceeds, it shall be paying the rent due to
51
EDSA LRT Consortium. All that EDSA LRT Consortium has to do is to build the facilities
and receive rent from the use thereof by the government for 25 years it will not operate
the railway transit. Although EDSA LRT Consortium is a corporation formed for the purpose
of building a public utility it does not automatically mean that it is operating a public utility.
The moment for determining the requisite Filipino nationality is when the entity applies for a
franchise, certificate or any other form of authorization for that purpose.
Case: KILOSBAYAN v MORATO G.R. No. 118910, 17 Jul 1995
FACTS:
In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease
Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to
PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal
annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO
is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of
lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was
filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's
Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It
52
is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987
Constitution. Standing can no longer be questioned because it has become the law of the
case Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding
required. The power to determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of
Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral
crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the
contract
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners have standing?
HELD: NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of
the petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because
no constitutional issues were actually involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply.
Since the present case is not the same one litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs.
Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the law of this case. The
parties are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still
apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot
53
again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving a
different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when
substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an
instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in
the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent
examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous
decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner's standing. STANDING is a
concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The
more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST.
Case: TELEBAP v COMELEC G.R. No. 132922, 21 Apr 1998
Facts: Petitioners challenge the validity of 92 of B.P. Blg. 881. on the ground (1) that it
takes property without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies
radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it
is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the
operation of media of communication or information during the period of election.
54
Issue: Whether is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate
the operation of media of communication or information during the period of election.
Held: No. The petition is dismissed.
With the prohibition on media advertising by candidates themselves, the COMELEC Time
and COMELEC Space are about the only means through which candidates can advertise
their qualifications and programs of government. More than merely depriving candidates of
time for their ads, the failure of broadcast stations to provide air time unless paid by the
government would clearly deprive the people of their right to know. Art. III, 7 of the
Constitution provides that the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized, while Art. XII, 6 states that the use of property bears a
social function [and] the right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises [is]
subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the
common good so demands.
55
To affirm the validity of 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 is to hold public broadcasters to their obligation
to see to it that the variety and vigor of public debate on issues in an election is
maintained. For while broadcast media are not mere common carriers but entities with free
speech rights, they are also public trustees charged with the duty of ensuring that the
people have access to the diversity of views on political issues. This right of the people is
paramount to the autonomy of broadcast media. To affirm the validity of 92, therefore, is
likewise to uphold the peoples right to information on matters of public concern. The use of
property bears a social function and is subject to the states duty to intervene for the
common good. Broadcast media can find their just and highest reward in the fact that
whatever altruistic service they may render in connection with the holding of elections is for
that common good.
Case: GONZALES v NARVASA G.R. No. 140835, 14 Aug 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer,
filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus filed on December 9, 1999, assailing the
constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform
56
(PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. The
PCCR was created by President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive
Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order to study and recommend proposed amendments
and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same.
Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of the PCCR based on the grounds that it is a public
office which only the legislature can create by way of a law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to assail the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 43
HELD: The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen acquires standing only if he can
establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly
illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that he
has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of
the PCCR. If at all, it is on Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any injury in this
case since, according to petitioner, the President has encroached upon the legislatures
57
powers to create a public office and to propose amendments to the Charter by forming
PCCR. Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any indirect, injury. Neither does he
claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he
shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCRs activities. Clearly,
petitioner has failed to establish his locus standi so as to enable him to seek judicial
redress as a citizen.
Furthermore, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue
when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the
law or the Constitution. It is readily apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its
taxing and spending power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of E.O. No.
43, as amended by E.O. No. 70. Under Section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3 million
is appropriated for its operational expenses to be sourced from the funds of the Office of
the President. Being that case, petitioner must show that he is a real party in interest
that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the judgement or that he will be entitled to
the avails of the suit. Nowhere in his pleadings does petitioner presume to make such
representation.
58
Case: DEL MAR, et al. v PAGCOR G.R. No. 138298, 29 Nov 2000
Facts:
Petitioner Raoul del Mar initially filed a petition for prohibition to prevent respondent
PAGCOR from managing and/or operating the jai-alai, by itself or in agreement with Belle
corporation.
- On the ground that the controverted act is patently illegal and devoid of any
basis either from the constitution or PAGCORs own Charter.
However, respondent PAGCOR entered into an agreement with private respondents
BELLE and FILGAME. In the agreement it was agreed that BELLE will make available to
PAGCOR required infrastructure facilities, as well as provide the necessary funding for the
jai-alai operations with no financial outlay from PAGCOR, while PAGCOR handles the
actual management and operation of jai-alai.
A supplemental petition was filed questioning the validity of said agreement, on the
ground that PAGCOR is without jurisdiction, legislative franchise, authority or power to
enter into such Agreement for the opening, establishment, operation, control and
management of jai-alai.
59
Respondents allege that petitioners have no legal standing to file a taxpayers

suit because the operation of jai-alai does not involve the disbursement of
public funds.
Petitioners complain that the operation of jai-alai constitutes an infringement of
the legislatures exclusive power to grant franchise. To the extent the powers of
congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof.
Issues:
Whether or not petitioners suing as taxpayers and in their capacity
members of the House of Representatives possess legal standing to sue.
Held: The record is barren of evidence that the operation and management of jai-alai by
the PAGCOR involved expenditure of public money. In line with the liberal policy of this
court on locus standi when a case involves an issue of overarching significance to our
society, court find and so hold that as members of the House, petitioners have legal
standing to file the petitions at bar.
60
Ratio: A member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain the

prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the constitution in his office.!
Case: MATIBAG v BENIPAYO G.R. No. 149036, 2 Apr 2002
supra Article VII, Sec. 16
Case: TATAD v SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY G.R. Nos. 124360
and 127867, 5 Nov 1997
supra Article VI, Sec. 1
Case: BAYAN v EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. No. 138570, 10 Oct 2000
Case: IBP v ZAMORA G.R. No. 141284, 15 Aug 2000
61
Case: MACALINTAL v COMELEC G.R. No. 157013, 10 Jul 2003

Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the
following grounds, among others.
1. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be
allowed to participate in absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit stating
his intent to return to the Philippines is void because it dispenses of the
requirement that a voter must be a resident of the Philippines for at least one year
and in the place where he intends to vote for at least 6 months immediately
preceding the election;
2. That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim
winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of
winning candidates for president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because it
violates the Constitution for it is Congress which is empowered to do so.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Macalintals arguments are correct.
62
HELD: No.
1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically
reside in the Philippines within the period required for non-absentee voters.
Further, as understood in election laws, domicile and resident are interchangeably
used. Hence, one is a resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is
concerned). The domicile is the place where one has the intention to return to.
Thus, an immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the
Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines for purposes of being
qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant does not execute
the affidavit then he is not qualified as an absentee voter.
2. The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress
to allow COMELEC to include the proclamation of the winners in the vicepresidential and presidential race. To interpret it that way would mean that
Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing and
proclamation of the presidential and vice presidential elections is still lodged in
Congress and was in no way transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.
63
Case: WHITE LIGHT CORP. v CITY OF MANILA G.R. No. 122846, 20 Jan 2009
Facts: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into a law Manila City
Ordinance No. 7774 entitled An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time
Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses,
Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila. On December 15,
1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for
declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order (TRO) impleading as defendant, herein respondent City of Manila represented by
Mayor Lim with the prayer that the Ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium
Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a
motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the
Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and
motels in Manila. The RTC issued a TRO directing the City to cease and desist from
enforcing the Ordinance. The City alleges that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of
police power. On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance
64
null and void. On a petition for review on certiorari, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.
Issue: Whether Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power
Ruling:
Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely
veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and
provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant. Police
power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to
protect itself and its people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and
varied actions by the State. The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not
eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and
alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of
the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all
means for their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution, and our
emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product
and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the
legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of
65
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an

interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be
evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of
private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the
purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under
the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these
requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private
rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review
when life, liberty or property is affected. However, this is not in any way meant to take it
away from the vastness of State police power whose exercise enjoys the presumption of
validity. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Case: MARCOS v MANGLAPUS 177 SCRA 688, 1989
66
Case: DAZA v SINGSON 180 SCRA 496, 1989

Case: SANTIAGO v GUINGONA G.R. No. 134577, 18 Nov 1998
Case: THE DAVIDE IMPEACHMENT
The case filed in 2003 was not the arbitrary act of one person. It was endorsed by 93
congressmen representing 41% of the members of the House of Representatives. The 93
congressmen came from different political parties, not just Teodoro's former party, the
Nationalist Peoples Coalition or NPC. There were 226 members in the House of
Representatives during the 12th Congress in 2001-2004. Only 45 were from the NPC.
Some congressmen later bowed to pressure and withdrew their signatures, but the
remaining number was still more than one-third of the total members of the House. As a
matter of fact, many of the congressmen who endorsed the complaint are now prominent
67
members of the Liberal Party and Nacionalista Party.

The case originated from concerns over possible misuse of the Judiciary Development
Fund (JDF) that were raised in June 2002 by judicial employees of Naga City and nearby
areas, including parts of the congressional district of NPC Rep. Felix William Fuentebella of
the 3rd district of Camarines Sur. Fuentebella took charge of the investigation. On July 22,
2002, the House of Representatives adopted House Resolution No. 460 filed by Rep.
Fuentebella directing the House Committee on Justice to conduct an inquiry. The Court
declined to submit the documents that Fuentebella and the House Committee on Justice
asked for in connection with the inquiry, citing its fiscal autonomy.
Impeachment is not the same as conviction. Impeachment is a process that allows a
transparent investigation to take place. The Supreme Court, however, said no
impeachment proceedings could be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.
Former President Joseph Estrada filed an earlier impeachment complaint against Davide
68
and seven other justices in June 2003, accusing them of violating the Constitution and
plotting his ouster in 2001. Estrada's complaint was dimissed October 22, 2003. The
congressmen filed their complaint October 23, 2003.
The opinion of legal experts was split on whether or not the Court should have allowed the
inquiry. The ones who disagreed with the decision felt that the Court should not have
interfered in the impeachment proceedings, because it was the only way the Legislature
could exercise checks and balances on the Judiciary. The ones who agreed with the
decision felt the Court had to dismiss the inquiry to protect its independence.
A vote was conducted in the House on November 10, 2003 to decide if the articles of
impeachment should be transmitted to the Senate despite the decision of the Supreme
Court. Of the congressmen present, 115 voted to accept the Court's decision, while 77
voted against it. The House members agreed that amendments to PD 1949 should be
considered to give Congress the explicit right to look into the Judiciary's use of the JDF in
the future. This would provide a check on the Commission on Audit (COA), whose head is
appointed by the President. The COA declared there was no fund misuse.
69
Chief Justice Davide retired from the Supreme Court in 2005. He was appointed
Ambassador/Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission of the Philippines to the
United Nations by President Arroyo in 2007.
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES G.R. No.
160261. November 10, 2003
FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,
sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee
on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate
Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust
and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico,
Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House
Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first
70
impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October
22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect
has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of
Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003
of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice
voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary
General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of
the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the
House of Representatives.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one
year bar provided in the Constitution. (2) Whether the resolution thereof is a political
question has resulted in a political crisis.
71
HELD:
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon,
the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint
has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine,
considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this
Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5,
2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr.
and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the
constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the
same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it
is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be
abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief
Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not
72
intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that
there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those
which "are not truly political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial
review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On
the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review
questions which are not truly political in nature.
Case: BUSTOS v LUCERO 81 Phil 648, 1948
FACTS:
The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga after he had been bound over to the court for trial,
praying that the record of the case be remanded to the justice of the peace court of
Masantol, the court of origin, in order that the petitioner might cross-examine the
complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony, on the strength of which
warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused. The accused, assisted by counsel,
appeared at the preliminary investigation. In that investigation, the justice of the peace
informed him of the charges and asked him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he
73
entered the plea of not guilty. Then his counsel moved that the complainant present her
evidence so that she and her witnesses could be examined and cross examined in the
manner and form provided by law. The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected invoking
Section 11 of Rule 108, and the objection was sustained. In view thereof, the accuseds
counsel announced his intention to renounce his right to present evidence, and the justice
of peace forwarded the case to the court of first instance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Justice of the Peace court of Masantol committed grave abuse
of discretion in refusing to grant the accuseds motion to return the record.
HELD: Evidence is the mode and manner of proving competent facts and circumstances
on which a party relies to establish the facts in dispute in judicial proceedings. It is
fundamentally a procedural law. The Supreme Court that Section 11 of Rule 108 does not
curtail the sound discretion of the justice of peace on the matter. Said section defines the
bounds of the defendants in the preliminary investigation, there is nothing in it or any other
law restricting the authority, inherent in a court of justice, to pursue a course of action
reasonably calculated to bring out the truth.
74
The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The minority went further
than the majority and denied even any discretion on the part of the justice of peace or
judge holding the preliminary investigation to compel the complainant and his witnesses to
testify anew. Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition is dismissed with
costs against the petitioner.
Case: IN RE CUNANAN 94 Phil 534
Facts: Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the Bar
Flunkers Act of 1953. In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed
and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by
raising it to 75 percent.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for
admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision of their
examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional
ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of
their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual
75
petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether
or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.
Issue: Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.
Held: RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those
candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate
preparation.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their
supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that
in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension,
disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is
concededly judicial.
On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and
legislative departments of the government.
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law
76
belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of
permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions
for the license.
Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.
Case: JAVELLANA v DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
G.R. No. 102549, 10 Aug 1992
FACTS:
Javellana is an incumbent member of the City Council or Sanggunian
Panglungsod of Bago City, and a lawyer by profession who has continuously engaged in
the practice of law without securing authority for that purpose from the Regional Director,
Department of Local Government, as required by DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 in
relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58.
- As to members of the bar the authority given for them to practice their
profession shall always be subject to the restrictions provided for in Section 6
of Republic Act 5185. In all cases, the practice of any profession should be
77
favorably recommended by the Sanggunian concerned as a body and by the

provincial governors, city or municipal mayors, as the case may be.
c) That no conflict of interests between the practice of profession or
engagement in private employment and the official duties of the concerned
official shall arise thereby;
Five months later or on October 10, 1991, the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160)
was signed into law, Section 90 of which provides:
Sec. 90. Practice of Profession. - (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are
prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the
exercise of their functions as local chief executives.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or
teach in schools except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who
are members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or
any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
78
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national
or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local
government unit of which he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member
concerned is defending the interest of the Government.
HELD: Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and
DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution is
completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme
Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The Local
Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of
conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their
public duties and the private practice of their profession, in those instances where the law
allows it.
79
Case: PEOPLE v MATEO G.R. Nos. 147678-87, 7 Jul 2004

FACTS:
The MTC, Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 1 found Mateo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of 10 counts of rape and to indemnify the complainant for actual and moral
damages. Mateo appealed to the CA. Solicitor General assailed the factual findings of the
TC and recommends an acquittal of appellant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be directly be forwarded to the Supreme Court by
virtue of express provision in the constitution on automatic appeal where the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death.
RULING:
Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review
over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses committed on the same occasion or arising
out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty
of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed). The practice finds
justification in the 1987 Constitution
80
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
x x x x x x x x x
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not preclusive in
character, and it does not necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making
power, from adding an intermediate appeal or review in favour of the accused.
In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the Court, there has been a
marked absence of unanimity on the crucial point of guilt or innocence of herein appellant.
Some are convinced that the evidence would appear to be sufficient to convict; some
would accept the recommendation of acquittal from the Solicitor General on the ground of
inadequate proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the occasion best
demonstrates the typical dilemma, i.e., the determination and appreciation of primarily
factual matters, which the Supreme Court has had to face with in automatic review cases;
yet, it is the Court of Appeals that has aptly been given the direct mandate to review
factual issues.
81
Case: IN RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. DE VERA

2003
A.C. No. 6052, 11 Dec
FACTS:
This is a petition filed by Attys. Oliver Garcia, Emmanuel Ravanera and
Tony Velez seeking the disqualification of Atty. Leonard De Vera from being elected
Governor of Eastern Mindanao in the 16th Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Respondent De
Vera raises new issues. He argues that this Court has no jurisdiction over the present
controversy, contending that the election of the Officers of the IBP are governed by the IBP
By-Laws and are exclusively regulated and administered by the IBP.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the case
HELD: Under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, Section 13, Article VIII of the
1935 Constitution vests the power to promulgate rules affecting the IBP. Moreover, RA No.
6397 confirmed the power of the Supreme Court to effect the integration of the Philippine
Bar.
RATIO:
82
Abovementioned sections are considered as sources of this Courts authority to supervise

individual members of the Bar.
Bar: collectively of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys
IBP By-Laws ironically recognizes the full range of the power of supervision of the
Supreme Court over the IBP
Section 77: vests on the Court the power to amend, modify or repeal the IBP bylaws, either motu proprio or upon recommendation of the Board of Governors of the IBP
Section 15: Court is authorized to send observers in IBP elections, whether local
or national
Section 44: empowers the Court to have the final decision on the removal of the
"members"of"the"Board"of"Governors
Sec. 6 The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and
the personnel thereof.
83
Case: MACEDA v VASQUEZ G.R. No. 102781, 22 Apr 1993

FACTS:
Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of
the Ombudsman against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent
Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by certifying
that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision for a period of 90
days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth and
in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10
criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera alleged that
petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months.
ISSUE: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an
encroachment into the SCs constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts.
HELD: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for
serious misconduct and under Sec.1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable
to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
84
In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with
regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman
encroaches into the Courts power of administrative supervision over all courts and its
personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Judge of the CA down
to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can
oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, and take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of
government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of the
separation of powers.
Where criminal complaint against a judge or other court employees arises from
their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer
the same to the SC for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted
within the scope of their administrative duties.
85
Case: PEOPLE v GACOTT, JR.
G.R. No. 116049, 13 Jul 1995
Facts: For failure to check citations of the prosecutions, the order of respondent RTC
Judge Eustaquio Gacott Jr dismissing a criminal case was annulled by the Supreme Court.
The respondent judge was also sanctioned with a reprimand and a fine of PHP 10k for
gross ignorance of law. The judgment was made by the Second Division of the Supreme
Court.
Issue: Whether or not the Second Division of the Supreme Court has the competence to
administratively discipline respondent judge?
Decision:
To require the entire court to deliberate upon and participate in all
administrative matter or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would
result in a congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court,
especially in administrative matters, since even cases involving the penalty of reprimand
would require action by the Court En Banc.
86
Case: JUDGE CAOIBES, JR. v OMBUDSMAN G.R. No. 132177, 19 Jul 2001
Facts: The present case involves 2 members of Judiciary who were entangled in a fight
within court premises over a piece of office furniture.
Issue: WON an administrative case based on the act subject of the complaint before an
Ombudsman is already pending with the Court should still be referred to the Supreme
Court.
Held: YES. The Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a
complaint against a judge or court employee involves an administrative matter. The
Ombudsman is duty bound to refer to the Supreme Court the determination as to whether
an administrative aspect is involved in all cases against judges and court personnel filed
before it.
Ratio:
Under Sec. 6 of Art. VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested with
exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and personnel.
87
The Ombudsman would not know of this matter unless he is informed of it. He should
also give DUE RESPECT for and RECOGNITION of the administrative authority of the
Court.
The Ombudsman cannot dictate nor bind the Court to its findings because to do this is to
deprive the Court of its administrative prerogative and arrogate unto itself a power not
constitutionally sanctioned.
From the Presiding Justice of CA down to the lowest MTC court clerk, it is only the SC
that can oversee their compliance with all laws and take proper administrative action
against them if they commit any violation.
No other branch of govt may intrude into this powers without running afoul the
doctrine of separation of powers.
Sec. 7 (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower
collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of
the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for
fifteen years or more, a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in
the Philippines.
88
(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no
person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and
a member of the Philippine Bar.
(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity,
probity, and independence.
Case: IN RE JBC v JUDGE QUITAIN JBC No. 013, 22 Aug 2007
Facts: Judge Quitain failed to disclose that he was administratively charged and
dismissed from service for grave misconduct by the former President of the Philippines per
AO 183. He was removed from office after investigation and was found guilty of grave
misconduct
89
Held: Every prospective appointee to the Judiciary should apprise/inform the appointing
authority on every matter regarding his fitness for judicial office, including circumstances
reflecting his integrity and probity. It did not matter that he had resigned from office and that
the administrative case against him had become moot and academic.
Case: KILOSBAYAN v ERMITA G.R. No. 177721, 3 Jul 2007
Only natural-born Filipino citizens may be appointed as justice of the Supreme
Court
Decision of administrative body (Bureau of Immigration) declaring one a naturalborn citizen is not binding upon the courts when there are circumstances that entail
factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings
FACTS:
This case arose when respondent Gregory S. Ong was appointed by
Executive Secretary, in representation of the Office of the President, as Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court. Petitioners contended that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen,
born on May 25, 1953 to Chinese parents. They further added that even if it were granted
90
that eleven years after respondent Ongs birth, his father was finally granted Filipino
citizenship by naturalization, that, by itself, would not make respondent Ong a natural-born
citizen. For his part, respondent Ong contended that he is a natural-born citizen and
presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ declaring him to be
such.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen
RULING:
Respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent
recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot
amend the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were
naturalized along with his father.
The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of
respondent Ongs ancestors, by various births, marriages and deaths, all entail factual
assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings so as to correct the
existing records on his birth and citizenship. The chain of evidence would have to show
that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ongs mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what
still appears in the records of this Court. Respondent Ong has a burden of proving in court
91
his alleged ancestral tree as well as his citizenship under the time-line of three
Constitutions. Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot accept an appointment to this
Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution. For this reason, he can be prevented
by injunction from doing so.
Sec. 8 (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary
of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the
Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a
term of four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the
Members first appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four
years, the professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the
representative of the private sector for one year.
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(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council
and shall keep a record of its proceedings.
(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be
determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual
budget the appropriations for the Council.
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the
Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court
may assign to it.
Sec. 9 The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower courts shall be
appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no
confirmation.
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For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days
from the submission of the list.
Sec. 10
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts, shall be fixed by law. During their
continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.
Case: NITAFAN v COMMISSION OF INTERNAL REVENUE 152 SCRA 284, 1987
David G. Nitafan, Wenceslao M. Polo, and Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., petitioners, vs.
Commissioner Of Internal Revenue and The Financial Officer, Supreme Court Of The
Philippines, respondents.
Facts: Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52,
19 and 53, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all
with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the
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Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from
making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.
Issue: Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court held that the salaries of Justices and Judges are properly
subject to a general income tax law applicable to all income earners and that the payment
of such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitutional protection
against decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office and the ruling that "the
imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a diminution thereof, and so violates
the Constitution" in Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David must be declared
discarded. The framers of the fundamental law, as the alter ego of the people, have
expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning and import of Section 10, Article
VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted.
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Sec. 11 The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold
office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en
banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their
dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
Case: VARGAS v RILLORAZA 80 Phil 297, 1948
Facts: In 1948, Vargas was charged for treason. He was charged before the Peoples
Court presided over by Judge Rilloraza et al. The Peoples Court was created by CA 682 or
the Peoples Court Act. Its main purpose was to charge treason cases and that it would be
the final arbiter of such cases. The Peoples Court would be composed of justices of the
SC with the exclusion of SC justices who were members of the Philippine Executive
Commission during the Japanese occupation. It was deemed by the law that since those
justices who worked with the PEC during the Japanese occupation and that they worked
for the Japanese in one way or the other, they would have to be disqualified from ruling the
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treason cases. Vargas assailed such law asserting that such law created 2 Supreme
Courts; that it also modified the constitutional provision on the membership of the SC; that
it also violated the SCs
power to promulgate its own rules. The Sol-Gen denied all allegations.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress can validly enact a law modifying the SCs original
jurisdiction.
HELD: Treason is a criminal case punishable by death or life imprisonment. As such, the
SC has original jurisdiction over it as provided in Article 8 of the Constitution. Any treason
case may be appealed before the SC and Congress may not validly enact a law depriving
the SC of its original jurisdiction nor may it deprive the SC of its appellate jurisdiction.
Further, the creation of the Peoples Court as the final arbiter of treason cases involving
such acts done during the Japanese occupation has created another supreme court
composed SC justices and some CA justices not otherwise disqualified. Such is a violation
of the constitution. CA 682 is repugnant to the Constitution and the SC held it to be
inoperative and the Peoples Court was rescinded. The jurisdiction of the SC may only be
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exercised by the Chief Justice and Associate Justices appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, sitting in banc or in division, and in cases like
those involving treason they must sit in banc. If, according to section 4 of said Article VIII,
"the Supreme Court shall be composed" of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices there
in referred to, its jurisdiction can only be exercised by it as thus composed. To disqualify
any of these constitutional component members of the Court particularly, as in the
instant case, a majority of them - in a treason case, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving
the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a
judge is a deprivation of his judicial power.
Case: DE LA LLANA v ALBA 112 SCRA 294, 1982
In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary,
Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes, was passed. Gualberto De la
Llana, a judge in Olongapo, was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one
of the judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he said
such law would contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of
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tenure of judges of the courts. He averred that only the Supreme Court can remove judges
NOT the Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the
legislature by such statute (BP 129).
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled the following way: Moreover, this Court is empowered to
discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their
dismissal. Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act,
it was the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be
distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no
tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of
removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in
that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security
of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the
effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the
abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member
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of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in

accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent
justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded
the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord
respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No
question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its
say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but
only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there
any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the
reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs.
There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather
what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to
the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts,
the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or
disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even
one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover,
such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of
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alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute,
the former is to be preferred.
Sec. 12
The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established
by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions.
Sec. 13 The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for
decision en banc or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case is
assigned to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to
this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to
the record of the case and served upon the parties. Any Member who took no part,
or dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution, must state the reason
therefor. The same requirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate courts.
Sec. 14
No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall
be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.
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Case: AIR FRANCE v CARRASCOSO 18 SCRA 155, 1956

Facts: This case is for review on certiorari. Carrascoso was bound for Lourdes and was
issued by defendant Air France, a first-class round trip ticket from Manila to Rome. The
plaintiff traveled in first class from Manila to Bangkok but at Bangkok, he was asked by the
Manager of Air France to vacate because there was a white man who had a better right
to the seat. A commotion ensued and Mr. Carrascoso gave his first-class seat in the
plane. Petitioner seeks that the Court review all the findings of the respondent Court of
Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent court failed to make complete findings of fact on all
the issues properly laid before it
Ratio: Sec 1, Rule 36, Rules of Court: Judgment determining the merits of the case shall
state, clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
Braga v. Millora: The law, however, solely insists that a decision state the essential
ultimate facts upon which the courts conclusion is drawn.
102
Reyes v. People: So long as the decision of the CA contains the necessaryfacts to warrant
its conclusions, it is no error for said court to withholdinformation from any specific finding
of facts with respect to the evidencefor the defense.
People v. Maniqgue: The mere fact that the findings were based entirely onthe evidence
for the prosecution without taking into consideration or evenmentioning the appellants side
in the controversy as shown by histestimony would not vitiate the judgment.
Case: VALDEZ v COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 85082, 25 Feb 1991
Facts: An examination of the decision of the trial court shows that there are no findings of
facts to serve as basis for its conclusions.
Issue: Whether or not the conclusion that the trial court arrived at is what was
contemplated under the Constitution and the Rules of Court
Held: No, the decision rendered by the trial court constitutes a mere conclusion of facts
and of law arrived at by the trial court without stating the facts which serve as the basis
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thereof. The Court has to wade through the records and make its own findings rather than
delay the disposition of the case.
Ratio: The Court is not a trier of facts and that it relies, on the factual findings of the lower
court and the appellate court which are conclusive. Sec 14, Art VIII: No decision shall be
rendered without expressing there in clearly the facts and the law on which it is based. No
petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision shall be refused due course
or denied without stating the legal basis therefore. Sec 1, Rule 36, Rules of Court: All
judgments determining the merits of cases shall be in writing personally and directly
prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctively the facts and the law on which it is
cased, signed by him and filed with the clerk of court. Admin Circular No. 1 reminded all
judges to make complete findings of facts in their decisions, and scrutinize closely the legal
aspects of the case in the light of the evidence presented. They should avoid the tendency
to
generalize and form conclusions without detailing the facts from which such conclusions
are deduced.
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Case: PEOPLE v LIZADA G.R. Nos. 143468-71, 24 Jan 2003

Facts: Accused-appellant contends that the decision of the trial court convicting him of 4
counts of rape is null and void as it failed to comply with the requirements of Section 14,
Article VIII of the Constitution and Section 1, Rule 36 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
1. The court a quo made no findings of facts in its decisions.
2. The court merely summarized the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution and
those of accused-appellant and his witnesses.
3. The trial court failed to state in said decision the factual and legal basis for the
imposition of the supreme penalty of death.
Solicitor Generals Arguments:
1. There should be no mechanical reliance on the constitutional provision.
2. Trial courts may synthesize and simplify their decisions considering that they are
harassed by crowded dockets and time constraints.
3. Even if the trial court did not elucidate the grounds as the legal basis for the
penalties imposed, the decision is still valid.
105
Issue: WON the trial court failed to comply with the requirements under the Constitution
and the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Held: Yes.
Ratio: The trial court merely summarized the testimonies of witnesses and merely made
referral to the documentary evidence of the parties.
The court failed to specifically state the facts proven by the prosecution based on their
evidence, the issues raised by the parties and its resolution of the factual and legal issues,
as well as the legal and factual bases for convicting accused-appellant of each of the
crimes charged.
Note (purpose of provision)
1. To inform the parties and the person reading the decision on how it was reached by
the court after consideration of the evidence of the parties and the relevant facts, of
the opinion it has formed on the issues, and of the applicable laws.
2. To give the losing party an opportunity to analyze the decision so he may elevate what
he may consider its errors for review by a higher tribunal.
3. To persuade the losing party to accept the verdict in good grace.
4. To constitute the decision as a valuable body of case law.
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Case: VELARDE, JR. v SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY G.R. No. 159359, 28 Apr 2004
The Petition prayed for the resolution of the question "whether or not the act of a religious
leader like any of herein respondents, in endorsing the candidacy of a candidate for
elective office or in urging or requiring the members of his flock to vote for a specified
candidate, is violative of the letter or spirit of the constitutional provisions .They alleged that
the questioned Decision did not contain a statement of facts and a dispositive portion.
ISSUE:
What is the standard form of a Decision? Did the challenge Decision
comply with the aforesaid form?
RULING:
The decision shall be in writing, personally and directly prepared by the
judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by the
issuing magistrate, and filed with the clerk of court. In general, the essential parts of a good
decision consist of the following: (1) statement of the case; (2) statement of facts; (3)
issues or assignment of errors; (4) court ruling, in which each issue is, as a rule, separately
considered and resolved; and, finally, (5) dispositive portion. The ponente may also opt to
107
include an introduction or a prologue as well as an epilogue, especially in cases in which

controversial or novel issues are involved.
No. Counsel for SJS has utterly failed to convince the Court that there are enough factual
and legal bases to resolve the paramount issue. On the other hand, the Office of the
Solicitor General has sided with petitioner insofar as there are no facts supporting the SJS
Petition and the assailed Decision. The Petition failed to state directly the ultimate facts
that it relied upon for its claim. During the Oral Argument, counsel for SJS candidly
admitted that there were no factual allegations in its Petition for Declaratory Relief. Neither
were there factual findings in the assailed Decision. At best, SJS merely asked the trial
court to answer a hypothetical question. In effect, it merely sought an advisory opinion, the
rendition of which was beyond the courts constitutional mandate and jurisdiction.
Indeed, the assailed Decision was rendered in clear violation of the Constitution, because it
made no findings of facts and final disposition.
108
Sec. 15
(1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution
must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for
the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for
all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the
filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or
by the court itself.
(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect
signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a
copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the
parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not been
rendered or issued within said period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without
prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof,
shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination,
without further delay.
109
Case: RE: PROBLEM OF DELAYS IN CASES BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN A.M.

No. 00-8-05-SC, 28 Nov 2001
1. WON the Sandiganbayan is covered by Art VIII, Sec 15 (1) & (2)
No. The provision refers regular courts of lower collegiate level that in the present
hierarchy applies only to the Court of Appeals.
Sandiganbayan is a special court of the same level as the CA, with the inherent powers of
a court of justice, and functions of a trial court.
SPECIAL COURTS: Judicial tribunals exercising limited jurisdiction over particular
categories of actions. Court of Tax Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Sharia Courts. The
Sandiganbayans power to promulgate its own rules of procedure was repealed by the
Congress who prescribed that the SCs Rules of Court should apply.
2. What is the reglementary period within which the Sandiganbayan must decide cases
falling within its jurisdiction?
110
Court Administrator:
In cases falling within its original jurisdiction, the Sandiganbayan acts more as a trial court
within the 3-month reglementary period
In cases falling within its appellate jurisdiction, the Sandiganbayanhas the reglementary
period of 12-months for collegiate courts.
HELD:
Section 6 of PD 1606, which created the Sandiganbayan, as well as the rules
promulgated by the Sandiganbayan (Sec. 3), clearly provide a maximum period of 3
months from the date of submission for decision for the termination of cases.
The Sandiganbayan functions as a trial court. Trial allows introduction of evidence by
the parties.
It has the discretion to weigh evidence, admit those which are credible, and reject those
which it regards as perjurious or fabricated
111
Case: COURT ADMINISTRATOR v QUIANOLA A.M. No. MTJ-99-1216, 20 Oct 1999

FACTS:
Respondent made no effort to inform this Court of his reasons for the delay in resolving
the cases, much less to request any extension.
He signed certifications that all pending cases and motions were already resolved within
the prescribed period.
Poor health and heavy case load was the judges defense.
ISSUE: WON respondents acts warrant administrative sanctions
HELD: Taking into account his failing health and having already compulsorily retired,
Judge Quinanola was fined (P40,000).
RATIO:
Code of Judicial Conduct:
112
Judges are required to decide promptly and expeditiously the cases and matters pending
before them within the period prescribed by law. Respondent judges acts constitute gross
inefficiency.
Sec. 16 The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from the opening of each regular
session of the Congress, submit to the President and the Congress an annual report
on the operations and activities of the Judiciary.
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Article VIII

THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

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Case: MARCOS v MANGLAPUS 177 SCRA 668, 1989

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of abode and the right to travel.

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Facts. A Senate committee was set up to investigate a break-in of the Democratic

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communications against the inroads of such a privilege against fair administration of

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Case: MALAGA v PENACHOS, JR. G.R. No. 86695, 3 Sep 1992

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charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality. First, it was created in pursuance of

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Constitutional provisions on special protections for the Judiciary be repealed.

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Case: PEOPLE v DY G.R. No. 115236-37, 16 Jan 2003

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increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and

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ISSUE: Whether Joya has standing

G.R. No. 107921, 1 Jul

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Whether or not Kilosbayan is correct.

HELD: Yes, but only on issues 2, 3, and 4.

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