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100
GEORGEP. STEIN
What makes a thing a work of art? And can we answer this question
without the help of a definition of art?
Certain things, through the usual processes of education, come to be
recognized by viewers as works of art simply by their noting that this is
what the works are called by others. And other things get recognized as
works of art in virtue of similarities to already recognized works of art.
One kind of similarityis the similarityin the ways works of art come to
have meaning or are meaningful. There are of course other kinds of
similaritieswhich "stamp"things as works of art, but here we are interested only in the "meaning"similarities.
This manner of recognition has the ring of circularity about it. But
consider how we recognize and value games. After a snowstorm, one
child says to another, "Let's see how many times we can each hit that
tree with a snowball, three throws each." The game is recognizedquickly
and is usually valued and attended to for one or more of a number of
reasons: it is competitive, some skill is involved, some chance is involved,
score can be kept, etc. In a very different setting, such as a stockbroker's
office, a man who buys and sells his securities, keeps his score, etc., can
also be said to be playing a game, although there is no competition in
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THEARTS:BEINGTHROUGH
MEANING
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the usual sense, very little skill according to some, and (unlike in the
snowball game) a great deal of money can be "made." The gamemaking reason in this case is simply the score-keeping.
Analogously, we often recognize or learn to recognize works of art
quickly. Works of art have many art-making characteristics.And some
of these characteristicshave been selected singly or in combination by
theorists as the art-making characteristics,i.e., the definition or essence
of art. But having bracketed out the problem of defining art, we are
here selecting one of the art-making characteristics, namely meaning, for
analysis. The value of the analysis, in addition to its intrinsic value as
analysis, is the clarification it can introduce into discussions about the
meaning of works of art. And incidentally, but importantly for education, a work of art, once stamped as a work of art by virtue of its way
of meaning, is open to valuable ways of attending to it other than
through its meaning.
What are the ways in which works of art have or convey meaning or
become meaningful?
A. Relational Meaning
1934), p. 267.
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GEORGEP. STEIN
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because the aesthetic relevance of what we are terming relational meaning is denied by them. Works of art may have causes or consequences
but these theorists held that such causes or consequences are irrelevant
to the work of art as work of art.
Hanslick, for example, was concerned with destroying the notion of
emotive meaning (before the latter became the philosophical concept
used by Ogden, Richards, Ayer, Stevenson and others). To define the
relationshipsobtaining between a given piece of music and its causal or
consequential emotions, Hanslick thought, was to illuminate no part of
that work of music.4 In painting, Bell, although he used the phrase
"esthetic emotion," considered that emotion to be "unrelated to the
significance of life"5 or to the emotions of life resulting from such painting. And in literature where it is more difficult to hold such an extreme
view (since the basic materials of literature are words), Remy de
Gourmont, theorizing Mallarme's desire "to put some smoke between
the world and himself," said "Mallarme's work is the most marvelous
pretext for reveriesyet offered men weary of so many heavy and useless
affirmations."6
What they had in mind (and this is a usage which is sufficiently
subject to definition to sanction its qualified use) when they denied
meaning to a work of art was, at least in part, that the work of art had
in fact no relevant emotional, image-al, or intellectual consequences or
causes. This denial suggests the theoretical possibility that if a work of
art should have relevant consequences, then those consequences would
be its (relational) meaning. For them the work of art had either a
musically intelligible structure or a sensuously attractive sound (which
were considered by them to be relevant to the work as art), but it had
no meaning since it was not relatable to an element outside of the work
of art.
Now the concept of relational meaning assumes no definition of the
work of art, or of the essentially aesthetic part of the work of art. It
takes the work of art as it occurs. For example, in the Brahms Double
Concerto in A Minor it notes certain consequences,such as are indicated
in comments by Specht, who describes it as "one of Brahms' most
inapproachable and joyless compositions";7and in Tovey's characterization of the same work as having "vast and sweeping humor" which
Edward Hanslick, The Beautiful in Music (New York: Novello, Ewer and
Co., 1891).
Clive Bell, Art (London: Chatto and Windus, 1914), p. 26.
6 Remy de Gourmont, Decadence
(New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1921), p. 155.
7Richard Specht, Johannes Brahms (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1930),
p. 300.
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GEORGE P. STEIN
some think "the most deadly crime possible to a great work"8 of music.
Both of these may be verifiable consequences empirically correlated with
and so related to the work of music. Taken with all the other reactions
to the Double Concerto, in their aggregate, these constitute the relational meanings of the Double Concerto. Which relational meanings are
justified can only be determined by the continuous historical criticism
that is being applied to the Double Concerto. That different and even
contradictory relational meanings coexist seems to me a matter primarily
for musical history and sociological determination, rather than aesthetic
determination, since the relational meanings do not depend upon aesthetic analysis of notes which do not change from generation to generation (except in performance interpretations), but on how people react
to those notes: what emotions are aroused in them, what images, if any,
they form to accompany the music, what arguments the music suggests.
This of course does not preclude the possibility that a changed or
deepened understanding of the Double Concerto's structure will alter
such reactions. The assertion of relational meanings emphasizes the fact
(once disputed) that art exists in no vacuum free of a social atmosphere. Whatever pure or intrinsic qualities a work of art may have, it
has causes and effects, factors influencing it and influenced by it, ideas
which bring it about and ideas brought to life by it. A complete statement of all the relational meanings of a work of art, if this were a
possibility, would be an account of its significance in the life of which
it is a part. If the artist's breakfast can actually be indicated as being
responsible for some elements in the work of art, then the statement of
that responsibility would be a relational meaning. When some other
factor (e.g., the artist's attitude towards some aspect of life) is responsible for elements of the work of art, then a statement of that responsibility could be called a relational meaning, perhaps a more important
one.
B. Interpretive Meaning
A second usage of the word meaning in the arts can be called "interpretive meaning."
For the purpose of framing a preliminary definition, let us consider an
illustration of interpretive meaning. Take Freud's elaboration on how
art gets to mean something. In this elaboration is contained an implicit
assertion of a particular sort of meaning-claim for works of art:
... to those who are not artists the gratification that can be drawn from the
8D. F. Tovey, Essays in Musical Analysis III
Press, 1936), p. 145.
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GEORGEP. STEIN
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GEORGEP. STEIN
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hear
see
,"
without ever having written "Tintern Abbey." There would then certainly have been an experience, but none of the contrivances of poetry
would have been used to create an ordering of events designed to reveal
either to Wordsworth or his possible readers the total context within
which specific events would "add-up" to mean something. The poem
does in fact do the latter and tends to convince the reader of the existence (in some important sense) of the sort of presence he senses.
To be aware of a contextual meaning we do not need an interpretive
theory of the sort which generates an interpretive meaning. But the
distinction between contextual meaning and relational meaning is not so
obvious. The events of the past which may be apparent in the hushed
reverberations (in Santayana's phrase) of the present experience of the
work of art, are events which upon analysis we could theoretically relate
to the work of art. In a contextual meaning there are "these waters"
outside of and related to the poem, and we have apparently simply
another relational meaning. The difference lies in the importance of
context in a contextual meaning. Cezanne's Sainte-Victoire may have
the contextual meaning ascribed to it by critics who speak of its revelation of spiritual forces or of the manner in which it echoes the rhythm
of the universe. But none of its relational meanings could be stated as:
this is the way the world outside this frame can be seen - a world of
spatial depth through nuanced surfaces, where the painting simply indicates this way of looking at the world with no construction of a universal
context. Yet this way of looking at the world is not unrelated to such a
possible context. Any element which is related to the work of art in a
relational meaning may be brought into a context of other elements
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GEORGEP. STEIN
such that where previouslythat element was directly related to the work
of art, it would, in a contextual meaning, take its place in a meaningful
context having a quality and significance of its own. The painting properly has both meanings- one of the values in recognizing both meanings is that there then should be no dispute about which is the meaning.
D. Referential Meaning
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THEARTS:BEINGTHROUGH
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can derive anything from this description that could be called meaning.
We now notice that we have not stepped outside the frame of the picture
except in the very weak sense that we have used words for the description of this painting which are used in other (artistic and nonartistic)
contexts. And we have in principle fully described the surface of this
work of art. We could go on to specify the size, relative position, and
relative hues, intensity, and values of the colors, i.e., all the objective
qualities of the painting.
There is, one may notice, the fact that using words like "yellow" or
"vertical" immediately introduces something exterior to the painting or
outside its frame. A whole group of comparisons to events and objects
outside the frame is made possible by the use of words which are in their
nature generalized so that they may apply to outside events and objects.
These words tend to pull us away from the surface but only in an unimportant because undirected way. If someone were to say, for instance,
that this yellow is like the yellow of many bananas he has seen and that
this painting therefore is about some aspect of bananas, we could only
ask for some rule or direction by which one could go from this yellow to
those bananas. In the absence of such a rule or direction (method) one
could say only that between the description of this work of art and the
description of the experience of a banana there exists only the word
"yellow" describing some element common to the experiences. Thus we
are left on the surface, or, more precisely, in our experience of the surface, despite the use of the word "yellow," because we have no rule by
which to leave the surface. Yet leaving the surface in an undirected way
means that we could derive some meaning (and this may be enough or
all there is in some works of art). These would be relational meanings
such as "this work of art provides perceptual delight of a certain sort,"
or "this work of art reminds us of many previous pleasant experiences
of bananas." But here no direction is given to the way in which we
leave the surface. Reactions differ from observer to observer, from age
to age, and there is no authority as to which reactions must, notwithstanding the artist's intention, be had. The sense configuration he produces may have effects other than he anticipates, intends, or desires, and
there is nothing improperin this happening. A variety and large number
of relational meanings may occur (and this has sometimes been used as
a measure of value of the work of art).
Let us further notice that there are no diagonals or curved lines in the
painting. All lines are straight, vertical, or horizontal; and this determines the fact that all the shapes are rectangles.This is obviouslynot like
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GEORGE P. STEIN
the visual field, as the purity of color was like the calmness of the spectator in the visual field. Then what is its relation to the visual field?
Impressedby the vastnessof nature, I was trying to expressits expansion,
rest,and unity.At the sametime, I was fully awarethat the visibleexpansion
of natureis at the same time its limitation;verticaland horizontallines are
the expressionof two opposingforces;these exist everywhereand dominate
everything;their reciprocalaction constitutes"life." I recognizedthat the
equilbriumof any particularaspect of naturerests on the equivalenceof its
opposites.I felt that the tragicis createdby unequivalence.I saw the tragic
in a wide horizontalor a high cathedral.l1
From Mondrian's composition to the struggle against the tragic might
seem like a long jump, but in this painting we can see the preparations
for, execution of, and ensuing excitement of a very methodical leap.
Looking at this composition with Mondrian's view of "nature expanding" in all vision, we can see it as a visual field of no particular, determined origin or location. In this field we must see a necessarylimitation
if we are to see anything, any form. We see this limitation by means of
verticals and horizontals (curved lines could have accomplished the
same effect to some degree, but the limitations they suggest are not as
abrupt or dramatic as a straightline block).
What we have seen in this painting, as describedin the last paragraph,
is not a matter of simple vision or survey of the surface of the canvas.
It required seeing the verticals and horizontalsof this painting as limitation of the "visible expansion of nature," i.e., in terms of a concept
logically previous to the painting. Mondrian is of course not talking
about the universe (which may actually be expanding but certainly
not visibly). He must be understood as talking about the visual field
and its characteristics.
A concept "the visible expansion of nature" was thus one of the
causes of this painting and is also one of the relational meanings of the
painting. But it is also the pre-work-of-artconcept motivating the painting. This concept has a content made evident by the painting: the visual
field naturally expands when we open our eyes; it expands until it is
limited by two basic sorts of lines, verticals and horizontals; when verticals and horizontals are seen as forces they are sometimes seen to be
in balance, thus giving their visual fields qualities of rest and calm
which may be felt by a spectator. It is possible that this concept be a
constituent of a relational meaning of the painting and still be an inadequate pre-work-of-art concept. For instance there undoubtedly are
12
Piet Mondrian, Plastic Art and Pure Plastic Art (New York: Wittenborn,
Schultz,1945), p. 13.
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