Randy Renier I.

Espinoza
Sociology 202
Prof. Laura Samson

Marx, Durkheim, Weber:

Sociological Debate & Relevance of Sociological Theory

(Take-Home Exam on Classical Sociology)

KARL MARX

Category Concepts
Man Human Potential
Powers
Needs
Consciousness
Activity
Labor
Sociability
Alienation
Human emancipation through Socialism or communism
Society Mode of production
• Asiatic
• Ancient
• Feudalism
• Capitalism
Relations of production
Forces of production
Capitalism
Labor Theory of Value
Use Value
Exchange Value
Surplus Value
Capitalist exploitation
Communism
 Science, Sociology, Materialist conception of history
& the Historical sociology
Social Sciences Dialectic
Class
Class conflict
Communism/Socialism
Infrastructure/Superstructure

Man

The greater part, and the most essential, of Marx’s view regarding man and
human nature is contained in his early works, particularly and most notably in the
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. Marx’s basic assumption is that man is
infinitely perfectible. Man’s potential is a given potential. He makes his history; he is the
active agent of change and progress. The essence of man is his productive activity,
labor, done in association with other men and in close relationship with nature. The
essence of man is realized in his species-being; it is inherent in each separate individual
man and manifests the characteristics of human nature. Man’s potential rests on the
species power and needs.

The basic presuppositions of human nature are man’s powers and needs. Powers
are the inherent (either latent or potential) faculties, abilities capacities of people.
Needs are the desires people feel for things. Species powers and needs, those that are
uniquely human, are different from natural powers and needs. Human needs are further
distinguished into two: constant or fixed needs and relative needs. Constant needs exist
under all circumstances which can be changed by social conditions only as far as form
and direction are concerned, such as the need for food, shelter, and love. Relative
needs are those which owe their origin only to a certain type of social organization,
such as drive for maximal economic gain.

Consciousness is the heart of the notion of human potential that differentiates

people from animals. It enables them to think and link this consciousness to their
actions. Furthermore, it equips them the capability of activity that is of a distinctive
kind, quality, and pace. Thus man is infused with the ability to control activities through
consciousness. Finally human nature consists of the sociability of man. Man is inherently
social. He does his activity in close association with his fellow men. The classic
explanation that illustrates the distinguished quality of human consciousness is that
while the bees mechanically builds their beehive, man, through his consciousness, is
able to conceive of a structure before erecting it. Thus while no human structure can
rival the efficiency and precision of the beehive’s structure, consciousness enables man
to plan and conceive it in his mind before even ever making them materialize according
to their creative powers.

What Marx considers the biggest problem of man throughout history is the
curtailment and repression of the human potential and its development. He avers that
under all class societies, most notably under capitalism, man was being debased and
deformed and thus becoming less than animals. And this dehumanization of man is a
consequence of alienation, which is mainly manifested as alienated labor in capitalism.
Alienated labor under capitalism subjects man to multi-pronged estrangement: first,
from the product of his labor (it stands over and above him, confronting him as an alien
power independent of himself, and to which he has no claim) ; second, from himself in
the very act of production (the production process subjects him to working conditions
that that do not make him feel at home in the activity which is his life’s occupation and
in which is supposed to be constitute his humanity); third, from his species-being, his
social essence (his work violates his human potential and does not satisfy his species
needs); and fourth, from other men (the system does not encourage socialization but
sets workers in conflict and competition against each other).

Alienation breaks down the natural interconnectedness that characterizes human

nature and reduce work in capitalism to mere labor in which man does not affirm his
true nature and, in fact, even divests him of his energy, creativity, and happiness.

Marx distinguished between man’s dual role in society: on the one hand as the a
citizen in the political sphere acting out his universalizing role as an active participant in
the political organization through the exercise of his electoral rights, and, on the other
hand, as a private individual in civil (or bourgeois) society, involved in and preoccupied
by his egoistic pursuits. The attainment of what Marx called the “total man” – who
could not be mutilated by the division of labor, who truly realizes his humanity, who
performs those activities which define man – consists in abolishing ownership of the
means of production and the universalization of man. Man must transcend his egoistic
self in bourgeois society and appropriate his political role, which Marx saw as
constituting man’s universal, social nature.

Since the aim of human development is that of the development of the total,
universal man, man must be emancipated from the enslavement of capitalist society.
This can only be completely done when the real, individual man has become as species-
being. Marx views communism or socialism as the only solution to man’s alienation in
capitalist society. Communism is the positive abolition of private property, human self-
alienation, and the real affirmation and objectification of his species-being. It is the
return of man as real, i.e., social being.
Society: The Modes of Production and Capitalism

Marx offered a transhistorical analysis of society, using the functional category

mode of production as the particular system of production of a given society. With the
use of the category Marx was able to trace the development of society based on its
particular mode of production. The concept embraces both productive force and
“relations of production.” The former consists of the organization of production,
instruments, technical knowledge, and natural resources. The latter refers to the power
structure that characterize the relationship among the participants in the production;
economically speaking, this boils down to property relations or forms of ownership. It
configures the social organization into a structure based on the principle of “who owns
the forces of production or who controls the whole productive process?”

Marx saw the relationship between the relations of production and means of
production as that of a dialectical one. The contradiction between these two social facts
is what accounts for the change of the mode of production. This interpretation has
often led to an instrument or technological determination in Marx’s work and assigned
causal priority to economic factors in determining social change. Working on the
concept of mode of production, Marx traced the development of human history. He
offered a seemingly evolutionary conception of the development of the mode of
production from Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and finally, capitalism.

Marx described the first form of ownership as “tribal,” a form which, coinciding
with an elementary division of labor, is limited to the members of the family and clan.
This type of society gave rise to slavery that reached its peak in antiquity. This, in turn,
gave birth to a different form of organization called “feudalism.” Under this society,
market production was absent and, if at all, was only limited and driven by economic
necessity. Feudalism was not an exchange economy and its methods of production
were stable. Later, however, this subsistence type of economy gave way to an
exchange economy.

Society progresses from one mode of production to another as relations of

production, in consonance with the means of production, undergo change. The conflict
between the growing bourgeoisie and the nobility of the European society reached its
culmination in the French Revolution, breaking down the institutions of the old feudal
order and creating new ones while undergoing structural reorganization in terms of
property relations. The ascendancy of the bourgeois class thus ushered in a new order
that established a new hierarchical ordering of society. And based on his analysis of this
system, Marx predicted a new contradiction that will abolish the state of affairs and
create a new society, this time a classless, nonantagonistic society.

The basis of all of Marx’s work and social structure, the place in which that work
is most clearly tied to his views on human potential, is his analysis of commodities, or
products of labor intended for both use and exchange. During the olden time, men’s
products assumed use value, in that the meaning and utility of the product of society
were rooted in its function. Thus pottery wares for most of the premodern societies of
the world were important for people because they served economic, as well as
aesthetic, function for the people: Grecian earthen wares, for example, were not only
designed for their functionality as vessel/containers but were also infused with aesthetic
and cultural values in the process of their being produced. The designs on the wares’
exterior surface depict historic events and/or the everyday life in ancient Greek society.

But, for Marx, the importance of these Grecian artifacts would have been, more
than their significance for historical-cultural reasons, is their specific purpose and the
relative amount of human “creative” work that had been employed and objectified in
them. Although they could have been made under direct order from an aristocrat or
may have been done not in completely free manner (although they may have been
done in the seclusion of the artisan’s workshop), these artifacts could very well have
been an example of Marx’s concept of “human” production labor in that they embodied
the creative potential of man.

In contrast to use value, the exchange value of these artifacts in capitalist

society is its monetary value. Although modern society still attaches historical-cultural
significance to them, their utility in everyday activity of the people in premodern
societies has been reduced to their mere “artifact” function today. Its only utility to
society is their cultural significance as the bearer and record of a bygone civilization.
And the cultural value of the artifacts is essentially what dictates its exchange value, the
price at which it will exchange in the market. The value of artifacts is now viewed, aside
from being an “antique,” in terms of the embodied monetary value in them. But this is
just my own special example of a product exchanged for its monetary value that still, as
it were, retained its cultural utility as a testament to an ancient civilization. Pure
exchange value is the exchange of a product for money, which is used ultimately to
acquire other commodities.

Under capitalism, man’s labor is itself commodified, i.e., having an exchange

value that enables itself to be exchanged for money. The majority of the population
who have limited, if at all, access to income and resources, sell their labor power in the
labor market in order to acquire money that they, in turn, need to support their needs.
Labor, thus, becomes a means to survival and sustenance of life. Labor’s value is thus
equivalent to the cost of supporting one’s life for a given day. A commodity’s value, on
the other hand, is equivalent to the amount of labor power expended in its production.
But in practice, the laborer is subjected to a working condition in which he works far
more time than is required to produce a certain commodity. The excess hours of labor
power exerted is defined as surplus value, the amount of which is equivalent to the
amount of unremunerated work of the laborer.

For example, if a worker works an average of 8 hours of labor time per day and
the necessary labor time required to product a commodity is 4.5 hours, the excess time
of 3.5 hours that the work spends at the factory is the surplus labor time equivalent to
the surplus value of the worker’s labor power. This surplus value translates to profit for
the employer and represents the amount of time robbed of the worker for which he is
not compensated, a fact that is taken for granted by the system. This labor practice,
coupled with the laborer’s subhuman working conditions, constitutes the exploitative
nature of capitalism.

Capitalism, as the existing mode of production, engenders increasingly complex

division of labor, in which each worker specializes in one detail operation. The new
industrial division of labor systematically alienates the workers from his creative powers,
thus diminishing him as a human being. In lieu of the dehumanizing conditions effected
by capitalism, Marx conceived of a revolutionary-practical program of abolishing
alienated labor, exploitation, and oppression from human experience. The
disadvantaged class, the proletariat as well as other classes who suffered under
alienation, will revolt against the system and wrestle power from the oppressing class.
This, accompanied by the gradual abolition of class and class conflict, was hoped to
someday establish a communist society that has for its ends the development of the
human potential.

Some view Marx’s concept of historical development as evolutionary, progressing

from the primitive societies determined by a mode of production wherein the means of
production are owned by the whole community and where consequently there exists
virtually no division of society according to the member’s relation to property, to the
most advanced system, capitalism, where the means of production have become
concentrated in the hand of the propertied elite and, therefore, have the power to
control population and to subsume the general population under their behest.

Marx, however, in his writings on the peculiarities of Asiatic society and

government put forward his conception of the Asiatic mode of production, which he
described as possessing a distinct type of government which he called “Oriental
despotism.” The ascendancy of this type of administration, wherein land was a
communal property for the entire kingdom or empire despite the existence of a
monarchy, precluded genuine private property of land, the precondition of feudalism.
The Asiatic mode was thus, until the entry of European powers, was a stationary one.
From Marx’s discussion of the unique conditions of Asiatic societies vis-a-vis the
“evolutionary” character of Western ones, it follows that Marx did not offer a universal,
unilinear conception of history but, on the contrary allowed two lines of development:
the Western and the Eastern.

Science, Sociology, and the Social Sciences

Marx’s significant contribution to sociology consists in his emphasis on the social

nature of man and the sociability of the productive process, the most important realm
for the species-being, that is, social man. His main contribution to sociology is his
historical sociology, in which the mode of production played a central role in
determining the movement of history. By formulating his materialist conception of
history, Marx was able to trace the development of societies and, in particularly,
analyze the workings of capitalism and, in the process, determine the factors that
account for its stability and future downfall. In his analysis, the notion of class played a
central part in his conception of the relations of production, his critique of capitalism,
and his prediction of a revolution that would usher in a socialist construction (under the
dictatorship of the proletariat, wherein society undergoes the process of abolishing
classes until the final stage where it shall have rid itself of class antagonisms).

Another valuable concept of Marx, and which constitutes the unique role of his
thought-system, is his notion of praxis, the unity of theory and practice that
characterizes his own framework. Praxis highlights the necessity of an informed political
activity, on the one hand, and a theorizing divorced from practice, on the other.

Marx maintained a positive view of science as materialist in nature and

orientation. If Marx decried religion as a human invention that has become an
instrument in itself for man’s alienation from himself and accepted atheism as a
necessary condition for man’s realization of his own nature and the development of his
potential, he ascribed to science the former role that previous societies have assigned
to religion: that of being a guide to knowledge and man’s salvation. Marx recognized
the objective truth that science offered for man. Thus he aspired for a scientific
socialism radically different from the crude socialism current during his time. His high
regard for science guided his careful and rigorous analysis of the structure of capitalism
and his study of the movement of history. And in his lifetime, he was certain of the
accuracy and validity of his theoretical system because he was convinced that it was
informed of a scientific methodology.
 EMILE DURKHEIM

Category Concepts
Man The egoistic and anomic man
Moral poverty
Discipline
Society Social order
Two forms of solidarity
• Mechanical solidarity
• Organic solidarity
Two types of society
• Segmental society
• Societies Characterized by modern division of labor
Two types of law
• Repressive law
• Restitutive or cooperative law
Collective consciousness
Division of labor
Pathological forms
• Anomic division of labor
• Forced division of labor
Occupational guilds
Science, Sociology, and Sociology of deviant behavior
the Social Sciences Suicide
• Egoistic suicide
• Altruistic suicide
• Anomic suicide
Religion
Totemism

Man

The theme of Durkheim’s thought is the relationship between the individual and
the collectivity. Durkheim’s analysis of the types of solidarity prompted an idea central
to his thought-system: the individual is born of society and not society of individuals.
This primacy of society over the individual has two meanings: (1) the historical
precedence of societies in which individuals resemble one another over societies whose
members have acquired both awareness of their individuality and the capacity to
express it, and (2) the priority of the social whole over the individual member.

Thus in Durkheimian sociology, man figures only as a passive individual member

of an all power-full collective and not as an active social man in Marxian as well as
Weberian terms. The individual is only useful and given importance in his particular
function in the complex division of labor. His existence is only seen as part of the social
whole whose only function is to subject itself to the rule of the collective consciousness
and to contribute to the attainment and maintenance of social order.

Durkheim views man as egoistic and anomic. The individual is seen as having
unlimited desires, and insatiable appetite, which are inimical and dangerous to the
collective morality and to the solidarity of society. Moreover, the individual lacks the
moral standard that is supposed to orient him towards the social collectivity. With his
negative view of man, Durkheim aims to establish a morality that will curb and restrain
individual needs and interests.

Discipline serves the function of controlling the individual and orienting him
towards participation in and adherence to the goal of social order, and Durkheim
attached to the occupational guilds the task of disciplining the individuals. Moreover,
Durkheim conceived of education as an ideological tool that could help indoctrinate the
future citizens and steep them towards accepting their role in the division of labor.

Society

Durkheim’s central concern was with the problem of order – that is, with the
question of how the society of his time might establish and maintain social stability and
cohesiveness. Durkheim conceded that moral consensus was a precondition of social
order, and he argued that the division of labor need not lead to a dispersion and
conflict of interests. The development of science and industry, promoting an increasing
interdependence among the individuals and groups within society as a whole, could
serve as the objective basis of a new and higher solidarity.

Durkheim’s set up a distinction between two forms of solidarity, mechanical and

organic solidarity. Mechanical solidarity is a solidarity of resemblance in which the
individuals differ from one another as little as possible. Organic solidarity, on the other
hand, is one in which consensus, or the coherent unity of the collectivity, results from
or is expressed by differentiation. Mechanical solidarity corresponds to the form of
social organization which we can call, in Durkheim’s time, primitive, while organic
solidarity is characteristic of the modern capitalist society.

Durkheim further distinguished between two types of societies. The first type is
the segmental society, an organization characterized by mechanical solidarity and
opposed to organic solidarity. A segmental society, which does not exactly correspond
to mechanical solidarity, is characterized by the relative isolation, self-sufficiency of the
various elements. The other type consists of societies characterized by modern division
of labor Differentiation of occupations and multiplication of industrial activities are an
expression of the social differentiation which Durkheim regards as taking priority.
Dukheim cautions that certain societies which may have very advance forms of
economic division of labor, like Britain of Durkheim’s time, segmental structure may still
persist in part.

Durkheim defines collective consciousness as “the body of beliefs and sentiments

common to the average of the members of a society.” It varies in extent and form from
one society to another. In societies characterized by mechanical solidarity, the
collective consciousness embraces the greater part of individual consciousness. In
societies dominated by differentiation of individuals, everyone is free to believe, to
desire, to act according to his own preferences in a large number of circumstances.

In primitive societies, not only does the collective consciousness dominates the
greater part of individual existence, but the sentiments experienced in common have an
extreme violence which is manifested in the severity of the punishments inflicted on
those who have violated the prohibitions. On the other hand, in organic solidarity, there
is a reduction of the sphere of existence embraced by the collective consciousness, a
weakening of collective reactions against violation of prohibitions and above all a
greater margin for the individual interpretation of social imperatives.

Based on his distinction between two types of solidarity, Durkheim distinguished

between two kinds of law: repressive law, on the one hand, which punishes misdeed
and crimes; and restitutive or cooperative law, on the other, whose essence is not to
punish breaches of social rules but to restore things to order when a misdeed has been
committed and to organize cooperation among the individuals.

Repressive law is the index of the collective consciousness in societies with

mechanical solidarity, wherein crime is simply an act prohibited by the collective
consciousness. Punishment is necessary here as it satisfies the common consciousness.
The misdeed committed by a member of the society has offended the common
consciousness, which demands reparations, and the punishment of the guilty is the
reparation offered to the feelings of all.

The purpose of the restitutive kind of law is not longer to punish but to
reestablish the state of things as it should have been in accordance with justice, an
example of which is commercial law where a man who has not settled his debt must
pay it. Restitutive law includes all aspects of legislation aimed at bringing about
cooperation among individuals. Administrative law and constitutional law belong by the
same token to the categories of cooperative legislation.

Durkheim develops his thesis on the positive consequences of division of labor: it

leads to exchange of services, reciprocity of obligations, interdependence, and so on.
Durkheim conceives of the complex social system as a multiplicity of distinct functions
which need to be coordinated. Durkheim thus maintains that the division of labor, in its
normal condition, engenders cooperation and solidarity. If the increasingly complex
division of labor had yet to produce social solidarity, that was a result of the abnormal
or pathological; forms that the division of labor presently assumed.

For Durkheim, modern society is defined first and foremost by the phenomenon
of social differentiation. Durkheim approved of the phenomenon of the organic division
of labor; he approves of the differentiation of jobs. But he notes that the individual is
not necessarily any more satisfied with his position in modern society. Durkheim is
concerned with the increase in the number of suicide as a manifestation of certain
possibly pathological traits in the contemporary organization.

Durkheim called the first of the abnormal or pathological forms as the anomic
division of labor. The word anomie Durkheim coined from the Greek anomia, referring
to a state of society in which normative standards of conduct are weak or absent.
Durkhem thus observed that what was lacking or poorly developed in modern industrial
society was a moral-legal code appropriate to the new conditions.

Durkheim then introduced a second major pathological form, the forced division
of labor, and went on examine the relationship between order and justice. Justice, for
Durkheim, implied a basic social equality. Durkheim therefore considers it the task of
modern society to ensure justice in order to attain solidarity, and occupational guilds
must be reintroduced and reinstituted. These occupational guilds are to be based on
the existing class structure and their function would be to lay down general moral and
legal principles according to which relations among the various occupations and classes
would be regulated.

Science, Sociology, and the Social Sciences

Durkheim was regarded as a pioneer in the sociological analysis of deviant

behavior. He was considered as the first to set forth the proposition that deviance is no
less firmly rooted in social conditions than conformity. Deviance, he maintained, is
neither morbid nor pathological but rather normal. The “normal” constitutes those social
conditions that are most generally distributed. The social norm consists of the most
frequent forms of behavior. Other, less frequent forms which depart from the norm are
deviant. Thus although crime is a form of deviance, it is nonetheless normal, because it
exists as a social reality in most, if not all, societies. A crime, according to Durkheim, is
an act which antagonizes the powerful and well-defined sentiments of a collectivity,
whereas punishment is first and foremost a passionate social reaction against the
offender.

Moreover, Durkheim studied another form of deviant behavior, suicide. Durkheim

argues that modern man kills himself primarily as a result of two conditions: the loss of
cohesion in modern society and the absence of suitable moral norms by which to orient
himself. defined three types of suicide egoist suicide, altruist suicide, and anomic
suicide.
 Durkheim distinguished between three types of suicide: egoist suicide, altruistic
suicide, and anomic suicide. The first type, egoist suicide, results from the fact that
society is not sufficiently integrated at all points to keep all its members under control.
Altruistic suicide results when social integration was too strong and is endemic to “lower
societies” or those that comprise a relatively controlled population which made solidarity
conducive. Anomic suicide is associated with both rising prosperity and economic crises.
This phenomenon happens when there’s a disturbance to the equilibrium. Thus war,
economic depression, and extreme economic progress all are favorable conditions for
this kind of suicide.

Durkheim’s work on religion aimed at laying bare the fundamental elements of

religion. Based on his study, he offered two domains into which all known religions are
subsumed under: the sacred and the profane. For Durkheim, it is the totality of beliefs
and practices concerned with the sacred that constitutes what we call religion. Thus a
religion, writes Durkheim, “is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred
things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden – beliefs and practices which unite
into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them.”

In his study of the aboriginal societies of Australia and their religion, totemism,
the totem symbolized two things: (1) the impersonal divine force, or “god,” and (2) a
specific society called the clan. Thus, Durkheim concluded that the ultimate source of
the religious experience is society. Religion accordingly reflects both the good and bad
sides of society, its just deeds and practices as well as its moral ugliness.
 MAX WEBER

Category Concepts
Man 4 Types of Action
1) Goal-rational action
2) Value-rational action
3) Affective or emotional action
4) Traditional action
3 Types of Domination or Authority
1) Traditional authority
2) Legal-rational authority
3) Charismatic authority
Society Protestant Ethic
Capitalism
Asiatic Mode of Production
Asian Religions (China, India, Ancient Judaism)
Bureaucracy
Social Class
Meaninglessness
Charismatic Leader
Science, Sociology, Characteristics of Science:
& the Social Sciences • Incompleteness
• Objectivity
Classification of Science:
• Natural Science
• Sciences of human reality
Orientations of the Sciences of Human Reality
• History
• Sociology
Causality
Two directions of causal inquiry
• Historical causality
• Sociological causality
Ideal types

Man

Weber’s conception of man is embodied in his typology of action. He

distinguishes between four types of action: (1) goal-rational action or rational action in
relation to a goal; (2) value-rational action or rational action in relation to a value; (3)
affective or emotional action; and (4) traditional action.
 In a goal-rational type action, the actor conceives his goal clearly and combines
means with a view to attaining it. An example would be a capitalist or a salesman
whose daily business dealings are inspired by his goal of striking a good deal and
earning a princely sum.

In a value-rational action, the actor is acting rationally in accepting all the risks
involved in his actions, not to achieve a goal but to be faithful to his own idea of honor.
An example is the failure of a student to get a high grade because he submitted his
paper beyond the deadline. Taking into consideration that the person’s own value-
system includes his perfectionist attitude to work and granting further that he believes
his paper is hardly passable for his own taste, his action of deferring submission in
order to rework his paper can be regarded as rational only because submitting it
haphazardly done will be a violation of his creed. On the contrary, the student can also
be seen (and actually more so) as having made a rational action when he submits the
paper on time even if he personally feels that its content is insubstantial, because he
thinks that violating the deadline is dishonorable.

An affective or emotional action is the action defined not by a goal or a value-

system but by the emotional reaction of an actor placed in a given set of circumstances.
This is exemplified by a laborer who hollers expletives over his employer who has
scolded him in front of his co-workers or, conversely, an employer who rebukes a
laborer who has arrived late for work or has been spotted, for example, using the
internet for personal needs.

Finally, traditional action is action that is dictated by customs, by beliefs that

have been entrenched and become habitual and second nature. A great many human
actions define everyday social interaction in the formal, ritualistic, or routinary activities
that man do unconsciously, such as routinary stretching right after waking up, a worker
swiping his ID card on the bundy clock, or a provincial folk who automatically utters
“excuse me” to inanimate spirits when roaming at night or passing by an anthill.

Based his typology of human action, Weber made a distinction between three
types of domination or authority: (1) rational-legal domination, (2) traditional
domination, and (3) charismatic domination. Only in the modern type of Western world
can a rational-legal system develop, and only in within that system does one find the
full-scale development of the modern bureaucracy.

In the rational-legal authority, authority is derived from rules legally and

rationally enacted. Thus presidents of national government derive their authority from
the laws of society and the electoral system. Traditional authority, on the other hand,
stems from a long-lasting system of beliefs. An example would be a leader of a clan in
communal societies or a tribal chief who inherited his position . A charismatic leader
derives his or her authority from extraordinary abilities or characteristics, or more likely
simply from the belief on the part of the followers that the leader has such traits. Erap,
Ramon Magsaysay, and Gringo Honasan (among his ranks) were charismatic leaders
who commanded strong following by virtue of their charisma or popularity among the
people, who felt they were capable of leading them.

Society

Weber’s lifelong intellectual preoccupation was with the origin and nature of
modern capitalism and with the question of why it emerged first in the West. For this
purpose, Weber endeavored to have an adequate understanding of the distinctive
nature of Western civilization and its fundamental contrasts with the civilizations of the
East. To this end, he employed a historical-sociological method that is not entirely
different from that of Marx’s.

Weber emphasized the paramount importance of economic developments and

the understanding of economic condition. In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism, however, he set out to analyze how a particular religious value, the
Protestant ethic, influenced or had economic relevance for society and history. His aim
was to analyze the influence of the Protestant ethic in shaping the modern economic
system in an attempt to shed light into the process of how ideas became effective
forces in history.

To defend his thesis, Weber drew upon prominent Protestant figures. He

employed Benjamin Franklin as the ideal type, an ideal representative of these
Protestants, who represented the new capitalistic ethos as well as the Protestant
conception of the economic toil as a calling in a morally dutiful manner. Weber’s
commitment to exploring the question of why rational capitalism emerged first in the
West and not in the East led him to a systematic analysis of the basic structural and
cultural differences between the two civilizations.

Weber characterized Asiatic mode of production as rooted in the need to

construct complex, artificial irrigation systems. The Asiatic political-administrative
structure was a highly centralized bureaucratic state. He described the earliest forms of
“Oriental despotism” based on forced labor and liturgies exacted from the population by
a highly repressive, centralized bureaucracy.

Moreover, Weber attempted to show that in both China and India certain
religious norms prevailed that successfully precluded the spontaneous emergence of a
Western type of capitalism. The Chinese city was fundamentally different from the
Occidental one. It did not become a center in which capitalist relations and institutions
could germinate, for it lacked political autonomy. Political associations of merchant and
craft guilds were nonexistent in the Chinese city and legal contracts, either economic or
political, could not be made. There did not emerge in China an independent bourgeois
class centered in autonomous towns.
 Weber conceived of capitalism as “a very complex system of institution
characterized by a high degree of formal or technical rationality.” Weber sought to draw
significant difference between Protestantism and Catholicism. He averred that
Protestants tended to be more inclined to develop “economic rationalism,” a fact that is
not as true, at least to the same extent, with the Catholics. They were particularly
devoted to conforming to a strict religious and moral code of self-denial, an asceticism.
Ironically, however, this very asceticism oriented them towards a more liberal openness
to the rational spirit of capitalism.

A major presupposition of industrial capitalism, for Weber, is “free labor, which

means that people have to be free from “chattel slavery” and serfdom, that is,
separated from their means of production. Industrial capitalism entailed “the
concentration of all the means of production in the hands of the entrepreneur.
Industrial capitalism depended upon the appropriation of the physical means of
production – land, apparatus, machinery, etc. – as disposable property of autonomous
private industrial enterprise. For capitalism to develop, there have to be a free market
and “free labor.”

For Weber, bureaucratization is one powerful manifestation of the “rationalization

process,” particularly in the West. He described a “bureau” as an official jurisdictional
area regulated by definite administrative policies. The activities of a typical bureaucrat
are regarded as duties for which he has been trained and which he is qualified to carry
out. Bureaus are arranged in a hierarchy, a system of higher and lower offices in which
the lower have less authority than the higher and are, accordingly, supervised by them.

Speed, precision, and other forms of reduction are among the reasons for the
increasing expansion of bureaucracy. But in both private and public spheres, not only
consideration of efficiency, but rather or power that have accounted for growing
bureaucratization.

Weber asserted that the concentration of economic power was, in fact, a

powerful tendency of capitalism. Almost everyone has become a paid laborer, working
in a large complex organization, and depending upon it for livelihood. Once bureaucratic
structures are established, they are practically indestructible, because a bureaucracy is
a power instrument of the first order for those who occupy its command post. It
facilitates the domination and control of large numbers of people.

What Weber saw as the negative effect of the increasing rationalization that
dominated all spheres of human activity is meaninglessness, or simply the lack of
purpose and meaning the people feel as a result of the deterministic and routinary
activities of bureaucratic life. Bureaucratization poses serious threat to democracy,
particularly the rights of individual members of the society.
 To meet this challenge, Weber placed his faith in “leaders” that would be an
antidote to bureaucracy. He assigned considerable weight on the outstanding individual
in history in giving direction and bringing about stability in the society. He hoped that
charismatic leaders will pave the way for a “leader democracy” that will command
bureaucratic administrative apparatus as well as bureaucratic party organization to
ensure that the leaders’ decisions are efficiently carried out.

Meanwhile, Weber enumerated the main social classes in modern society: the
working class, petty bourgeois, the propertyless intelligentsia and specialists, the
classes privileged through property and education. Besides economic position, Weber
attaches importance to “status” as a determinant of distinction among various types of
people. The difference in education, training, and property other than means of
production all played a considerable role in shaping social psychology, and hence, class
identification. For Weber, classes, status, groups, and political parties are phenomena
of the distribution of power.

Weber goes on to say that within the broad categories of propertied and
propertyless, other important distinctions exist, such as prestige or social honor.
Prestige for Weber is associated with the lifestyle of a status group. Within a given
class, one will find several status groups.

Thus as opposed to Marx’s conception of social stratification based on the

polarization of all classes into the two great classes of the proletariat and the
bourgeoisie, Weber had a more holistic description of the hierarchical structure of
society. But it is important to emphasize that Weber’s analysis of the social classes
made use of Marx’s class concepts and that they served to help Weber in understanding
the complexity of the class structure of society.

Weber stressed that the control of access to all types of wealth – not only the
means of production – was a source of power, and that social honor or prestige based
upon property, education, or whatever, might also be transformed into power. Class
situation, according to him, tends to determine “life chances.” Members of a class tend
to share a common fate. Thus someone who grew up in the slum of Tondo – whether
he had the natural talent and intelligence – will find that her chances of moving to a
higher social class, or even status, and moving to a more reputable area constrained
and inhibited by his class origin (to borrow a Marxist term).

Power, to Weber, referred to the ability to realize one’s will despite and against
the resistance of others. Unequal distribution of power is not only observable in the
economic sphere but in several areas of social life as well. Thus the control of the
means of political administration, means of violence, means of scientific research, and
so on, are also major means of dominating man.
Science and Sociology

For Weber, scientific behavior is a combination of goal-rational action and value-

rational action. The value is truth; the rationality is that of the rules of logic and
research, a faithfulness to which is necessary to the validity of the results obtained.
Thus science is an aspect of the process of rationalization which is characteristic of
modern Western societies.

Weber’s science has two characteristics: (1) essential incompleteness, and (2)
objectivity. Never would Weber have described science as fixed and composed of set of
rigid laws that govern the existence of phenomena. Objectivity is defined by the
validity of science for all those who seek this type of truth and by the rejection of value
judgment. Furthermore, Weber classifies science into two: (1) natural science and (2)
sciences of human reality, of history and culture, which are comprehensive, historical,
and have to do with culture.

Weber differentiated two orientations of the sciences of human reality, which are
complementary: toward history, on the one hand, which consists in counting what will
never occur again; and the other toward sociology, toward the reconstructing of social
institutions and their functioning with the help of concepts.

The sciences of culture – history and sociology – propose to understand human

production which creates values or are defined with reference to values. Historical and
sociological statements concern with absent facts, and they seek to arrive at or re-
create definite reality, human behavior in terms of the meaning assigned to it by the
actors themselves.

Historical and sociological sciences seek to explain causally as well as to interpret

comprehensively. Analysis of causal determination is one of the procedures by which
the universal validity of scientific results is ensured. The causal inquiry may be scientific
in two directions: historical causality and sociological causality. Historical causality
determines the unique circumstances that have given raise to a given event, while
sociological causality assumes the establishment of a regular relationship between two
phenomena, which take the form “A is more or less favorable to B.”

An example of these two forms of causality working hand in hand at an analysis

of causal determination is the role of Jose Rizal as an outstanding individual in
Philippine history. Historical causality will probe into the question of whether a
Philippine Reformation Movement and Revolutionary Movement would have taken place
(either during Rizal’s time or thereafter) had Rizal not been born or had he not been as
great a figure as he had become. Then a sociological causality, after a historical
determination of the influencing factor of Rizal’s greatness and martyrdom, will state
that – as opposed to asserting that Rizal determined the course of Philippine history
during the 19th century and thereafter – the existence of Rizal during this conjectural
period in history made favorable the development of nationalist consciousness among
the Filipino elite and the rise of the revolutionary movement.

Weber’s typology of social action is an example of the use of an ideal type. An

ideal type provides the basic method of historical-sociological study. It refers to typical,
“logically consistent” features of social institutions or behaviors. The ideal type is related
to a characteristic of both society and science, namely the process of rationalization.
Ideal type is a means rather than an end, the end of the science of culture always being
to understand the meaning men have given to their existence.
 SOCIOLOGICAL DEBATE

All three – Marx, Durkheim, Weber – were of the opinion that European society
of their time was in crisis, but they differed in the views they held and the way they
studied society. If Marx’s sociology focused on the economic determination of society
and historical movement, the fundamental theme of Weber’s and Durkheim’s thought
was the relation between religion and science. Durkheim and Weber agree that
societies can maintain their cohesion only through common beliefs, not in reference to
traditional religion but a common faith that binds together the members of the
collectivity. Marx, on the contrary, argued that contemporary societies are unstable and
are bound to be superceded by a new mode of social organization. Durkheim thought
he observed that established religion was no longer compatible with the demands of
what he called the scientific spirit. The crisis of modern society seemed to him to have
been caused by the nonreplacement of traditional moralities based on religions by a
morality based on science, and he envisioned sociology to help establish such a
morality.

Weber, however, described modern society as tending toward an increasingly

bureaucratic and rational organization. Weber viewed this development with
apprehension and feared that a society of this type might stifle freedom of choice,
action, and faith. But unlike Durkheim who aspired for a scientific morality, Weber
believed that man need not be in his bureaucratic function and that a commitment
beyond the sphere of the bureaucracy is vital to man. This belief of Weber, to some
extent, is in keeping with Marx’s existential philosophy: like Marx, Weber was critical of
modern society and sympathetic to the well-being of man. But unlike Marx, Weber did
not envision the abolition of the current system and the establishment of a social
organization that is rid of bureaucratic trappings.

For Weber, his classification of human action represents the heart and soul of
social interaction. Weber’s conception of human action embraces the different meanings
that men attach to their reality and the motivations for doing different actions in
changing social circumstances. Thus, more than just affirming Marx’s emphasis on the
primacy of human activity he extends and elaborates on the aspects that Marx had left
out in an attempt, as it were, to delineate a comprehensive nomenclature of human
action. However, for Marx, human action is the free active, capacity to change the
world, and labor was the essential and the only human action that define and realize
man’s species-being.

In contrast to both Marx and Weber, Durkheim focused on social facts and social
structures and aimed at establishing a theory of social order and the particular elements
that contribute to social stability and the solidarity of the various elements that
constitute the social whole. In the Durkheimian framework, there exists a tension
between the individual and the society; subjective reality must necessarily be
subordinated to the demands of society if it was to maintain its organic unity. Thus,
whereas man assumes an active role in both the Marxian and Weberian systems, he
figures in the Durkheimian world as a passive subject that yields to the will of the
collective. This collective constitutes the cohesive force that establishes and maintains
the organic unity of society. The individual member of the collective is characterized by
egoism that prompts his insatiable desires and appetite.

Weber and Durkheim agreed on the importance of moral values as producing

profound, even if unintended, consequences: capitalism for the former and suicide for
the latter. Durkheim stressed the inhibiting and restraining function of moral values: he
saw them as preventing anomic satiability. Weber, however, intended to accent the
energizing, motivational significance of moral values. Durkheim stressed the role of
moral values, when socially shared, as a source of solidarity and cohesion for society.
For Weber, values were significant in lending meaning and purpose to individual life;
they6 hand a human significance.

Durkheim insisted on the usefulness of the division of labor. But he added that
the modern organization of the differentiation in jobs and occupation was not yet
normal; what was needed was a new morality that would restrain man’s appetites,
regulate and interconnect occupational specialization and make men willingly accept
differential role and rewards. Morality, for Durkheim, is that which contributes to or is
useful for social solidarity. Such a view of morality would have been anathema to
Weber, who saw its essential justification in the meaning with which it endowed life
rather than its usefulness to society.

Durkheim feared that man’s insatiable appetite would undermine social order.
Weber’s fear, however, was not of social disorder but of lifelessness or lack of
passionate involvement. Although Weber readily acknowledged the efficiency of modern
bureaucratic society, he feared that it necessitated a routinization of life in which men
accommodate themselves to the social machinery and become lifeless, dependent cogs.
He is in short concerned with the problem of meaninglessness in a bourgeois society.

At this juncture, we can draw a divergence between Durkheim’s and Weber’s

views on society and human nature. We start to see an interesting similarity between
Weber and Marx. Weber’s indifference to the society of his time, which he observed
was undergoing increasing rationalization, was reminiscent of Marx’s renunciation of the
ills of capitalist society. Weber’s concern with meaninglessness as experienced by man
n the highly bureaucratic society is almost parallel to Marx’s contempt for alienation as
debasing and deforming man and inhibiting him from realizing what they are capable of
and what they could become. Thus we can see Weber’s analysis of modern society as
complementary to that of Marx.

But whereas Weber sees the bureaucratization of society, as the resulting

meaninglessness that it engenders, as problems that can be transcended by society,
Marx believes that the crises of capitalism and human alienation can only be solved by a
radical overhaul of the whole structure.

However, in contrast to both Weber and Durkheim, who maintained order and
solidarity as the natural tendency of human society, Marx believed in change and
predicted that a revolution would bring about the social order necessary for the
fulfillment of his conception of the human nature. For Marx, society should be
subordinated to man and that it should exist for the fulfillment of that nature. For him,
a society that restrains and inhibits man’s powers and needs is bound to fail and be
superseded by a humanist one.

But while Marx offered a liberating, humanist conception of human nature,

Weber attempted to outline a general theory of human action that accounted for the
complex interplay of manifold meanings that people attach to social interaction.
Whereas Marx put forward a conception of the universal nature of man, Weber outlined
a comprehensive generalization of the various types of human action. Weber thus came
up with his concept of ideal types, a typology of the general characteristics of the
phenomena under study which, for him, allowed for a more profound understanding of
society. Weber’s typology of action, for instance, attempts to delineate a comprehensive
science of social action. The problem with typologies, however, lies in the danger of
generalization from diverse and infinite number of possible actions that people do in
socially different situations.

If Marx attached a revolutionary role to man, particularly the proletariat, and

Weber pinned his hope on the man of action, Durkheim did not ascribe history-
changing power to the individual (a category that is entirely opposed to Marx’s and
Weber’s category of man). For him, the individual is dwarfed by the all-powerful force
of the society. Man’s existence is thus seen by Durkheim in terms of its function to the
maintenance of unity and cohesiveness of society.

Thus, Durkheim assigned the task of solving the pathological problems of

modern society to the occupational guilds, which he believed was the only social
organization capable of disciplining its respective members and integrating them into
the social whole. It is the role of the these organizations and the state in general to
educate the individuals in a way that will indoctrinize them about their social function
and prepare them for their role in the division of labor.

Based on the foregoing discussion, we can see two general themes that
represent two of the major debates – centering on Marx, Durkheim, and Weber – that
have contributed to the vitality of sociology as an academic discipline: (1) the
polarization of the analysis of society into a perspective of social order which affirms the
solidarity and cohesiveness of society social order, on the one hand, and a perspective
that argues for social change (the former being present in Weber’s and Durkheim’s
theories and the latter being resonated by Marx); and (2) the contrasting view of man’s
role in society as active (as represented by Marx’s concepts of human needs and
powers and Marx’s ideal types of human action) and as passive (expressed by Durkheim
in the subordinate role that he gave to the individual).

RELEVANCE OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

Weber

The comprehensive sweep of Weber’s theoretical system perhaps accounts for its
relative popularity and influence in academic sociology. The diversity of the subjects
that he studied and the variety of the factors that he put into the development of his
theory prompted Raymond Aron to describe Weber as the greatest of all the sociologist,
or as the sociologist. His ideal types of human action and leadership, for instance
provide us with a comprehensive typology that accounts for a holistic understanding of
society.

One of his contribution to sociology is his study on the religions of China, India,
and ancient Judaism and his original work The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism, in which he tried to explain why the development of capitalism happened
first in Western society than in its West counterpart. He can thus be regarded as the
founder of the sociology of religion. His idea of religion is different from Marx’s rejection
of religion as a necessary condition for the emancipation of man from alienation. He
saw religion as an index of the development of society, and religion can thus serve the
sociologist or the social scientist in grasping the nature of society.

In contrast to Marx’s fixation with a two-class conception class conflict and class
structure (in some of his works he recognized other classes besides the proletariat and
them, although he still foresaw that these will polarize into the two great classes),
Weber offered a more holistic system of social hierarchy. Going beyond economic
determination and taking into account other factors such as power, status and prestige,
Weber was able to delineate a comprehensive list of factors that constitute and
determine class. In this sense, and in terms of his ideal types and his study on religion,
Weber’s sociology represents a far more eclectic and cosmopolitan, if you will, sociology
than does Marx’s and Durkheim’s.

His account of the rationalization process and his concept of the bureaucracy
gives us a systematic perspective that will equal Durkheim’s account of the division of
labor. It’s interesting to note a convergence of Weber and Durkheim on this point: both
sought to explain and describe the stratified structure of the society of their time in
which the individuals were seen as occupying differentiated positions and functions in
relation to the social whole.
 The comprehensive scope and relevance of Weber’s sociology, however is
undermined by the centrality that he placed on the role of the man of action or the
charismatic political leader. By attaching history-changing role to the outstanding
individual in history, Weber denigrates the active potential of classes and people’s
movements. While his typology of authority is insightful, it glosses over other factors or
elements that may constitute authority.

The significance of Weber in sociology and in the social sciences in general

perhaps consists in his ideal types and his historical-sociological method, his view of
both history and sociology as constituting the science of humanity and as
complementary tools for analysis of historical and social facts of man’s existence. His
creation of the ideal types has become a useful analytical tool that helps one to study
social phenomena. This methodology maintained the importance of history, specifically
what Weber calls “historical causality,” in the analysis of human development. The
continuing relevance of Weber thus is embodied in the humungous canon of work that
aims to give us a holistic understanding of social facts and processes.

Durkheim

I believe that Durkheim’s theoretical system does not serve the offer much
significance in contemporary society. I may be biased and being too harsh, but I find
his sociological categorization very simplistic. His evolutionary theory of solidarity, which
distinguishes between mechanical society of premodern societies and the organic
society of modern society, is a generalization of all possible societies that have
developed during the entire course of history into two great categories of society and
implies the inferiority of all premodern societies. I see this sweeping generalization as
emanating from a bias toward the modern society. Weber’s theory of solidarity thus
serves a utility for Durkheim, a need to prove the validity of his idea of the inherent
solidarity of modern society.

It follows that his other spheres of study, his distinction between segmental and
societies characterized by modern division of labor, his classification of law into
restitutive and repressive, all seem to me as categories that serve to support
Durkheim’s thesis: the inherent goodness of the division of labor and its unifying
structure for the society. They were conceived in such a way as to dovetail with
Durkheim’s theory of solidarity (e.g., repressive law and segmental society is to
mechanical solidarity as restitutive law and division of labor is to organic solidarity).

Despite the inherent flaws in Durkheim’s theory-system, perhaps his sociology

still holds significance for societies and audiences whose interests find theoretical
support in Durheim. The influence of Durkheim perhaps has its strong following in the
United States, where the economic and political system depends on a systematic
division of labor and whose state policy generally recognizes the highly-differentiated
capitalist system as the ideal. Durkheimian sociology gives credence and validity to
modern society. It serves to support governments and offers them means of
maintaining order, albeit in the form of control and restraint. It reassures them that the
subjugation of individual rights to the will of the state is justified and valid.

Durkheim’s lasting legacy to sociology is his ingenious account of suicide and his
contribution to the sociology of deviant behavior as crystallized in his work on crime and
punishment.

Marx

Despite the increasing influence of Marxism, particularly within sociology, many

still view Marx’s theoretical system as a deficient theory that attempts to outline a
general theory of human society based on the economic determination of historical
change. Foremost among the criticism hurled at Marx is the centrality he attached to
the economic as the basis and catalyst of change and the exclusion of other factors in
his analysis. The failure of Soviet communism and the Maoist alternative, the marginal
influence of Marxism in industrialized nation-states, and the perceived stability of the
capitalist system are often cited as proof that Marx’s theory is flawed and that
communism I an untenable social and political system. I myself find some of Marx’s
assumptions (particularly in his mature works) simplistic.

For one, his formulation of the labor theory of value, inherited from the classical
political economists, appears as an obsolete conceptual system that puts preeminent
centrality to labor as the only power that produces value and ignores other elements
(besides surplus labor) that could contribute to extraction of profit in a capitalist
economy. Although Marx predicted the formation and development of multinational
corporations as a result of concentration of capital and the development of an global
capitalist system (which Lenin later termed as imperialism, the last and final stage of
capitalism), he undermined the role of pricing and other factors that could affect the
complex working of the market economy. I see this weakness in Marx as an
unanticipated consequence (itself a Marxian concept.) of the centrality that he placed
on man and on human labor as constituting his humanity, which all the more
establishes Marx’s system as an existentialist philosophy that attempts to analyze
society in humanist terms.

The relative peace after the dissolution of the Soviet Union may have vindicated
critics in their calling communism a utopia, but it doesn’t render Marx’s analysis of
capitalist society invalid and fallible. I am inclined to believe that despite Marxism’s
deficiency and weaknesses, it is a viable theory that can account for a great number of
phenomena (from imperialism to ideology). Marxism may not be as comprehensive and
sophisticated as Weber’s framework, but it has an extensive analytic utility that many
scholars recognize and actually find useful in doing their study.
 I feel and believe that the Marxist legacy is still alive and very much influential,
be it in the realm of academic discourse or in the sphere of public intellectual and
political debates. In developing as well as developed societies, Marxism remains a
strong force as evidenced by the continuing propagation of various interpretations, re-
interpretations, and modifications of Marxism across academic disciplines.
Notwithstanding. The dissolution of the Soviet bloc and the opening up of the Chinese
economy to the global market, the post-Cold War political climate remains precarious
with the perceived threat posed by North Korea to the major power’s imperialist
activities.

The cogency and paramount importance of Marx’s thought become more

profound in the light of what Marx himself was wont to describe as the inherent crises
that underlie the very nature of bourgeois society and the discontent and desperation
that result from the dehumanizing effects of capitalism (or imperialism, to use a more
appropriate term for the global and all-encompassing influence that it has taken on in
recent history). The increasing problems that beset the system on the macro level –
imperialist hegemony that subordinates the less developed countries under the polical-
economic dominance of the major capitalist powers, elitist and oligarchic political
systems governing most of the world’s nation-states that result in unequal distribution
of power and resources, continuing insurgencies in developing countries resulting from
class struggles for agrarian reform and equal distribution of income, undemocratic legal
and electoral systems that are deferential to the interests of the elite class – and
operating minutely in each individual members or groups of society on the micro level –
basically, alienation, poverty, and feelings of despair and hopelessness that people feel
– all the more render Marx’s humanist sociology timely and relevant.

The overriding appeal and cogency of the Marxist alternative cannot be more
pronounced than today, when man’s security is seen as increasingly becoming
untenable. The decreasing stability of the world’s major capitalist nations, the United
States – as manifested by the falling rate of the dollar (which partly explains the
minimal appreciation of the peso against the dollar) and as exacerbated by the steady
rise of China as an economic power – can be seen as indicative of the vulnerability of
the capitalist system. “Peak oil” – a phenomenon largely unheard-of even among
academic circles that affirms that we have already reached the peak of oil production
and that we are to expect an exponential decrease in supply coupled with exponential
increase in price of oil in the decades to come – has far-reaching consequence for the
future of capitalism.

Conservatives can say that if peak oil does hold true, it will mean a
reconfiguration of the system to adapt it to the extreme conditions that a scarcity of oil
will demand in the future. But I am more inclined to think that it can be the catalyst for
the ultimate demise of the system long heralded by Marx. If it does happen and proves
to be such, it will represent a negation of the Marxist maxim that stipulates that a
change in the mode of production is brought about by class struggle and revolution. It
may be true in many ways, but I am convinced that it is still in keeping with Marx’s
analysis that capitalism is flawed and characterized by crises. And peak oil might have
been the missing link that would have completed Marx’s formula. Be that as it may, I
cam deferential to the view that peak oil will have significant ramifications for capitalism
that will not be altogether inconsistent with Marxian principles.

The solution that scholars prescribe for a possible peak oil crisis – that of a
community-based social organization that rests on a non-monetary, semi-barter
production system in which the material needs of the community are fulfilled by the
exchange of products and services whose values are measured not by money but by
the labor time necessary to produce the product – is in most respect compatible with
Marx’s version of a socialized production that does not operate through the power of
private property but that which promotes a truly human production.

In the Philippines and most developing countries, Marxism is more influential

than in industrialized ones (a fact that many have seen as the unanticipated negation of
Marx’s hope for an adoption of his thought system in industrialized countries, which,
interesting though it is, I will not dwell on since many have long elaborated on it)
primarily because the material conditions here are more congenial and conducive to
Marxist analysis and interpretation. Although majority of the academic sector may not
be as intellectually receptive to Marxist thought (which can be viewed as a result of our
dependence on American curriculum that is not sympathetic, if not averse, to Marxism)
as the European academe, Marxism – combined with Leninism, Maoist thought, and a
host of revisionist types of Marxism – finds its captive followers in the national
democratic movement with its governing body, the Communist Party of the Philippines,
and its military arm, the New People’s Army, adopting it as its official ideology. A
fragmented social democratic movement, progressive (or what the media are used to
calling as “militant, “insurgent,” “rebel”) groups, and most people’s, cause-oriented, and
nongovernmental organizations are inspired by, if not ideologically and/or politically
committed to, Marxism.

Despite the watered-down strength of the “revolutionary” movement since its

peak in the mid to late ‘80s, it remains – fragmented though it may have been – a force
to reckon with. A top-brass PNP official a couple of years ago had declared that
notwithstanding the hyped and sensationalized conflicts between the government forces
and Muslim (MNLF and IMLF) and various terrorist groups, the government’s most
threatening enemy are still the NPA.

The lasting appeal of Marxism to progressive groups, legal and/or underground,

and even individuals perhaps consists in what seems to them convincing description of
the exploitative and dehumanizing effects of capitalism and its vision of a humanist
society. Marxism thus functions, on the one hand, as an ideological framework that
enables them to understand the nature of man and society and, on the other hand, as a
practical political program that guides them in methodically laying down the strategies
and tactics of revolution and establishing a communist regime. In this respect, Marx
sets himself apart from Weber and Durkheim. Whereas Weber and Durkheim offered
only general theories of society and methods of analysis, Marx offered a theoretical and
political program. Marx’s praxis, therefore, becomes the essence and distinguishing
quality of Marx’s sociology. And for as long as society is crises-ridden and man feels
discontent and indifference, I believe that Marx will continue to be relevant.

Marxism’s continuing relevance consists in its critical stance on the inadequacies,

if not anomalies, of modern society, and its avowal of humanist values as the basis of
this critical attitude and the practical solution that it offers. In short, Marxism lays down
a general theory of analysis that enables us to understand the workings of capitalist
society, its inherent defects and its eventual breakdown and supersession by a new,
humanist social organization. Marxism’s originality, cogency, and potency as an holistic,
humanist, and liberating theory of human evolution is what sets it apart as a very
powerful theoretical-practical alternative to the positivistic, conservative societies
offered by most philosophies, including those of Weber and Durkheim, that support the
status quo and deny the anomalous contradictions that characterize modern bourgeois
society and the moral truth of communism, or other versions thereof, as the only
system that will bring about the full development of human nature.

Marxism’s specter still haunts us today. It seems as though it will linger with us
for the rest of man’s history until, and perhaps even after the classless society that
Marxism envisions shall have been achieved by humanity. For even under socialist
construction and the eventual communist social order, the emancipated, total man shall
still need to hark back on the essential humanist philosophy of Marx if he were to
preserve his humanity and not revert to his former alienated self, and to look back on
Marx’s analysis of capitalism and his vision of communism in order to guide him in his
creation and maintenance of a new history of human development.