SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 4680. August 29, 2000]

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., complainant, vs. ATTYS. ANTONIO M. LLORENTE and

LIGAYA P. SALAYON, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment against respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya
P. Salayon for gross misconduct, serious breach of trust, and violation of the lawyers oath in
connection with the discharge of their duties as members of the Pasig City Board of
Canvassers in the May 8, 1995 elections. Salayon, then election officer of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC), was designated chairman of said Board, while Llorente, who was
then City Prosecutor of Pasig City, served as its ex oficio vice-chairman as provided by law.
[1]
Complainant, now a senator, was also a candidate for the Senate in that election.
Complainant alleges that, in violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b), [2]respondents tampered
with the votes received by him, with the result that, as shown in the Statements of Votes
(SoVs) and Certificate of Canvass (CoC) pertaining to 1,263 precincts of Pasig City, (1)
senatorial candidates Juan Ponce Enrile, Anna Dominique Coseteng, Gregorio Honasan,
Marcelo Fernan, Ramon Mitra, and Rodolfo Biazon were credited with votes which were
above the number of votes they actually received while, on the other hand, petitioners votes
were reduced; (2) in 101 precincts, Enriles votes were in excess of the total number of
voters who actually voted therein; and (3) the votes from 22 precincts were twice recorded in
18 SoVs. Complainant maintains that, by signing the SoVs and CoC despite respondents
knowledge that some of the entries therein were false, the latter committed a serious breach
of public trust and of their lawyers oath.
Respondents denied the allegations against them. They alleged that the preparation of
the SoVs was made by the 12 canvassing committees which the Board had constituted to
assist in the canvassing. They claimed that the errors pointed out by complainant could be
attributed to honest mistake, oversight, and/or fatigue.
In his Consolidated Reply, complainant counters that respondents should be held
responsible for the illegal padding of the votes considering the nature and extent of the
irregularities and the fact that the canvassing of the election returns was done under their
control and supervision.

On December 4, 1998, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to which this matter had
been referred pursuant to Rule 139-B, 13, in relation to 20 of the Rules of Court,
recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. [3] Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration on March 11, 1999, but his motion was denied in a resolution of the IBP
Board of Governors dated April 22, 1999. On June 4, 1999, he filed this petition pursuant to
Rule 139-B, 12(c).
It appears that complainant likewise filed criminal charges against respondents before
the COMELEC (E.O. Case No. 96-1132) for violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b). In its
resolution dated January 8, 1998, the COMELEC dismissed complainants charges for
insufficiency of evidence. However, on a petition for certiorari filed by complainant,[4] this
Court set aside the resolution and directed the COMELEC to file appropriate criminal charges
against respondents. Reconsideration was denied on August 15, 2000.
Considering the foregoing facts, we hold that respondents are guilty of misconduct.
First. Respondent Llorente seeks the dismissal of the present petition on the ground
that it was filed late. He contends that a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading
under Rule 139-B, 12(c)[5] and, therefore, the filing of such motion before the IBP Board of
Governors did not toll the running of the period of appeal. Respondent further contends that,
assuming such motion can be filed, petitioner nevertheless failed to indicate the date of his
receipt of the April 22, 1999 resolution of the IBP denying his motion for reconsideration so
that it cannot be ascertained whether his petition was filed within the 15-day period under
Rule 139-B, 12(c).
The contention has no merit. The question of whether a motion for reconsideration is a
prohibited pleading or not under Rule 139-B, 12(c) has been settled in Halimao v.
Villanueva,[6] in which this Court held:
Although Rule 139-B, 12(c) makes no mention of a motion for reconsideration, nothing
in its text or in its history suggests that such motion is prohibited. It may therefore be filed
within 15 days from notice to a party. Indeed, the filing of such motion should be encouraged
before resort is made to this Court as a matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to
afford the agency rendering the judgment an opportunity to correct any error it may have
committed through a misapprehension of facts or misappreciation of the evidence. [7]
On the question whether petitioners present petition was filed within the 15-day period
provided under Rule 139-B, 12(c), although the records show that it was filed on June 4,
1999, respondent has not shown when petitioner received a copy of the resolution of the IBP
Board of Governors denying his motion for reconsideration. It would appear, however, that
the petition was filed on time because a copy of the resolution personally served on the Office
of the Bar Confidant of this Court was received by it on May 18, 1999. Since copies of IBP

resolutions are sent to the parties by mail, it is possible that the copy sent to petitioner was
received by him later than May 18, 1999. Hence, it may be assumed that his present petition
was filed within 15 days from his receipt of the IBP resolution. In any event, the burden was
on respondent, as the moving party, to show that the petition in this case was filed beyond the
15-day period for filing it.
Even assuming that petitioner received the IBP resolution in question on May 18,
1999, i.e., on the same date a copy of the same was received by the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the delay would only be two days. [8] The delay may be overlooked, considering
the merit of this case. Disbarment proceedings are undertaken solely for public
welfare. The sole question for determination is whether a member of the bar is fit to be
allowed the privileges as such or not. The complainant or the person who called the attention
of the Court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and generally has no
interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of
justice.[9] For this reason, laws dealing with double jeopardy[10] or prescription[11] or with
procedure like verification of pleadings [12] and prejudicial questions[13] have no application to
disbarment proceedings.
Even in ordinary civil actions, the period for perfecting appeals is relaxed in the interest
of justice and equity where the appealed case is clearly meritorious. Thus, we have given
due course to appeals even though filed six, [14] four,[15] and three[16] days late. In this case, the
petition is clearly meritorious.
Second. The IBP recommends the dismissal of petitioners complaint on the basis of
the following: (1) respondents had no involvement in the tabulation of the election returns,
because when the Statements of Votes (SoVs) were given to them, such had already been
accomplished and only needed their respective signatures; (2) the canvassing was done in
the presence of watchers, representatives of the political parties, the media, and the general
public so that respondents would not have risked the commission of any irregularity; and (3)
the acts dealt with in R.A. No. 6646, 27(b) are mala in se and not mala prohibita, and
petitioner failed to establish criminal intent on the part of respondents. [17]
The recommendation is unacceptable. In disciplinary proceedings against members of
the bar, only clear preponderance of evidence is required to establish liability.[18] As long as
the evidence presented by complainant or that taken judicial notice of by the Court [19] is more
convincing and worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto, [20] the
imposition of disciplinary sanction is justified.
In this case, respondents do not dispute the fact that massive irregularities attended the
canvassing of the Pasig City election returns. The only explanation they could offer for such
irregularities is that the same could be due to honest mistake, human error, and/or fatigue on
the part of the members of the canvassing committees who prepared the SoVs.

This is the same allegation made in Pimentel v. Commission on Elections.[21] In rejecting

this allegation and ordering respondents prosecuted for violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b),
this Court said:
There is a limit, We believe, to what can be construed as an honest mistake or oversight
due to fatigue, in the performance of official duty. The sheer magnitude of the error, not only
in the total number of votes garnered by the aforementioned candidates as reflected in the
CoC and the SoVs, which did not tally with that reflected in the election returns, but also in
the total number of votes credited for senatorial candidate Enrile which exceeded the total
number of voters who actually voted in those precincts during the May 8, 1995 elections,
renders the defense of honest mistake or oversight due to fatigue, as incredible and simply
unacceptable.[22]
Indeed, what is involved here is not just a case of mathematical error in the tabulation of
votes per precinct as reflected in the election returns and the subsequent entry of the
erroneous figures in one or two SoVs [23] but a systematic scheme to pad the votes of certain
senatorial candidates at the expense of petitioner in complete disregard of the tabulation in
the election returns. A cursory look at the evidence submitted by petitioner reveals that, in at
least 24 SoVs involving 101 precincts, the votes for candidate Enrile exceeded the number of
voters who actually voted in the said precincts and, in 18 SoVs, returns from 22 precincts
were tabulated twice. In addition, as the Court noted inPimentel, the total number of votes
credited to each of the seven senatorial candidates in question, as reflected in the CoC,
markedly differ from those indicated in the SoVs. [24]Despite the fact that these discrepancies,
especially the double recording of the returns from 22 precincts and the variation in the
tabulation of votes as reflected in the SoVs and CoC, were apparent on the face of these
documents and that the variation involves substantial number of votes, respondents
nevertheless certified the SoVs as true and correct. Their acts constitute misconduct.
Respondent Llorentes contention that he merely certified the genuineness and due
execution of the SoVs but not their correctness is belied by the certification which reads:
WE HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing Statement of Votes by . . . [p]recinct is true
and correct. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we sign these presents at the City/Municipality of
___________ Province of ____________ this _______ day of May, 1995. (Emphasis
added)
Nor does the fact that the canvassing was open to the public and observed by numerous
individuals preclude the commission of acts for which respondents are liable. The fact is that
only they had access to the SoVs and CoC and thus had the opportunity to compare them
and detect the discrepancies therein.
Now, a lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member of
the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. [25]However, if

the misconduct also constitutes a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility or the
lawyers oath or is of such character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral
delinquency on his part, such individual may be disciplined as a member of the bar for such
misconduct.[26]

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

Here, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, respondents committed a
breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code which stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. By express provision of Canon 6, this is made
applicable to lawyers in the government service. In addition, they likewise violated their oath
of office as lawyers to do no falsehood.

A.C. No. 2387 September 10, 1998

CLETO DOCENA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DOMINADOR Q. LIMON, respondent.

Nowhere is the need for lawyers to observe honesty both in their private and in their
public dealings better expressed in Sabayle v. Tandayag[27] in which this Court said:
There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers . . . to behave at all times in a manner
consistent with truth and honor. It is important that the common caricature that lawyers by and large do not
feel compelled to speak the truth and to act honestly, should not become a common reality. . . . [28]

It may be added that, as lawyers in the government service, respondents were under greater
obligation to observe this basic tenet of the profession because a public office is a public
trust.
Third. Respondents participation in the irregularities herein reflects on the legal
profession, in general, and on lawyers in government, in particular. Such conduct in the
performance of their official duties, involving no less than the ascertainment of the popular will
as expressed through the ballot, would have merited for them suspension were it not for the
fact that this is their first administrative transgression and, in the case of Salayon, after a long
public service.[29] Under the circumstances, a penalty of fine in the amount of P10,000.00 for
each of the respondents should be sufficient.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon
GUILTY of misconduct and imposes on each of them a FINE in the amount ofP10,000.00 with
a WARNING that commission of similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

PER CURIAM:
On April 15, 1982, a complaint for disbarment was filed by Cleto Docena against Atty.
Dominador Q. Limon, Sr., on grounds of malpractice, gross misconduct, and violation of
attorney's oath.
It appears that respondent Atty. Limon was complainant's lawyer on appeal in Civil Case No.
425 for Forcible Entry. While the appeal was pending before the then Court of First Instance
of Eastern Samar, Branch I, respondent required therein defendants-appellants Docena
spouses to post a supersedeas bond in the amount of P10,000.00 allegedly to stay the
execution of the appealed decision.
To raise the required amount complainant Cleto Docena obtained a loan of P3,000.00 from
the Borongan, Eastern Samar Branch of the Development Bank of the Philippines; borrowed
P2,140.00 from a private individual; and applied for an agricultural loan of P4,860.00 from the
Borongan, Samar Branch of the Philippine National Bank, wherein respondent himself acted
as guarantor (tsn, Session of July 8, 1983, pp. 33-34). The amount of P4,860.00 was
produced by complainant in response to respondent's letter dated September 2, 1979 (Exh.
"C", tsn, p. 26, ibid.) demanding delivery of the aforesaid amount, thus:
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Docena:
I wish to remind you that today is the last day for the deposit of the balance
of P4,860.00.
Atty. Batica was in court yesterday verifying whether you have deposited the
said balance and the Honorable Judge informed him that you have until
today to deposit the said amount.

I wish to inform you also that the Honorable Judge will be in Sta. Fe
tomorrow for rural service.

Canon 16. xxx xxx xxx

Canon 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received from the client.

We will be waiting for you tomorrow September 22, 1979, at Sta. Fe as you
promised.
Very truly yours,
(Signed)
On November 14, 1980, the Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar rendered a decision on
the appealed case in favor of the Docena spouses.
After receipt of said decision, complainant went to the CFI to withdraw the supersedeas bond
of P10,000.00, but he thereupon discovered that no such bond was ever posted by
respondent.
When confronted, respondent promised to restitute the amount, but he never complied with
such undertaking despite repeated demands from the Docena spouses.
In his answer to the herein complaint, respondent claimed that the P10,000.00 was his
attorney's fees for representing the Docena spouses in their appeal. But this self-serving
allegation is belied by the letter (quoted above) of respondent himself demanding from the
Docena spouses the balance of P4,860.00 supposedly to be deposited in court to stay the
execution of the appealed decision of the MTC. Moreover, the fact that he had promised to
return the P10,000.00 to the Docena spouses is also an admission that the money was never
his, and that it was only entrusted to him for deposit.
After due investigation and hearing, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year and ordered to return the
amount of P8,500.00 (he had earlier paid complainant P1,500.00, but nothing more) within 1
month from notice, and should he fail to do so, he shall be suspended indefinitely.
The Court finds the recommended penalty too light. Truly, the amount involved may be small,
but the nature of the transgression calls for a heavier sanction. The Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates that:
Canon 1. xxx xxx xxx
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.

Respondent infringed and breached these rules. Verily, good moral character is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but it must also be possessed at all
times in order to maintain one's good standing in character that exclusive and honored
fraternity (Villanueva vs. Atty. Teresita Sta. Ana , 245 SCRA 707 [1995]).
It has been said time and again, and this we cannot overemphasize, that the law is not a
trade nor a craft but a profession (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983, p. 1). Its basic ideal is to render
public service and to secure justice for those who seek its aid. [Mayer vs. State Bar, 2 Call2d
71, 39 P2d 206 (1934), cited in Agpalo, id.] If it has to remain an honorable profession and
attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and
principles but should also, by their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. (Agpalo, id.) By
extorting money from his client through deceit and misrepresentation, respondent Limon has
reduced the law profession to a level so base, so low and dishonorable, and most
contemptible. He has sullied the integrity of his brethren in the law and has, indirectly, eroded
the peoples' confidence in the judicial system. By his reprehensible conduct, which is
reflective of his depraved character, respondent has made himself unworthy to remain in the
Roll of Attorneys. He should be disbarred.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Dominador Q. Limon, Sr. is hereby DISBARRED. The Office
of the Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys. Respondent
is likewise ordered to return the amount of P8,500.00, the balance of the money entrusted to
him by complainant Docena, within one (1) month from the finality of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 1334 November 28, 1989

ROSARIO DELOS REYES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR, respondent.
Federico A. Blay for complainant.
Luciano Babiera for respondent.

RESOLUTION

4) sometime in February, 1973, respondent told her that she

should go with him to Manila, otherwise, she would flunk in
all her subjects (pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6, 1975); ... ... ... ;

PER CURIAM:

5) on February 12, 1973, both respondent and complainant

boarded the same plane (Exh. "A") for Manila; from the
Manila Domestic Airport, they proceeded to Room 905, 9th
Floor of the Ambassador Hotel where they stayed for three
days (Exhs. "K", "K-1" to "K-6"; p. 55, tsn, June 6, 1 975);

This is a complaint for disbarment filed against respondent on the ground of gross immorality.
Complainant, a second year medical student of the Southwestern University (Cebu), alleged
in her verified complaint that respondent Atty. Jose B. Aznar, then chairman of said university,
had carnal knowledge of her for several times under threat that she would fail in her
Pathology subject if she would not submit to respondent's lustful desires. Complainant further
alleged that when she became pregnant, respondent, through a certain Dr. Gil Ramas, had
her undergo forced abortion.
In compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated July 9, 1974, respondent filed his
Answer denying any personal knowledge of complainant as well as all the allegations
contained in the complaint and by way of special defense, averred that complainant is a
woman of loose morality.
On September 2, 1974, the Court Resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The findings of the Solicitor General is summarized as follows:
EVIDENCE FOR THE COMPLAINANT
Complainant Rosario delos Reyes testified that:
1) she was a second year medical student of the
Southwestern University, the Chairman of the Board of which
was respondent Jose B. Aznar (pp. 11, 15, tsn, June 6,
1975);
2) she however failed in her Pathology subject which
prompted her to approach respondent in the latter's house
who assured her that she would pass the said subject (pp.
15,16, 26, 33, tsn, June 6, 1975);
3) despite this assurance, however, she failed (p. 33, tsn,
June 6, 1975);

6) after arriving at the Ambassador Hotel, they dined at a

Spanish restaurant at San Marcelino, Malate, Manila for
around three hours (pp 56-57, tsn, June 6, 1975);
7) they returned to the hotel at around twelve o'clock
midnight, where respondent had carnal knowledge of her
twice and then thrice the next morning (p. 59, tsn, June 6,
1975; pp. 154, 155 & 157, tsn, July 18, 1975);
8) complainant consented to the sexual desires of
respondent because for her, she would sacrifice her
personal honor rather than fail in her subjects (p.6l, tsn, June
6, 1975); ... ... ...;
9) sometime in March, 1973, complainant told respondent
that she was suspecting pregnancy because she missed her
menstruation (p. 76, tsn, July 17, 1975); ... ... ...;
10) later, she was informed by Dr. Monsanto (an instructor in
the college of medicine) that respondent wanted that an
abortion be performed upon her (p.82, tsn, July l7,
1975); ... ... ... ;
11) thereafter, Ruben Cruz, a confidant of respondent, and
Dr. Monsato fetched her at her boarding house on the
pretext that she would be examined by Dr. Gil Ramas (pp.
87-88, tsn, July 17, 1975);
12) upon reaching the clinic of Dr. Ramas she was given an
injection and an inhalation mask was placed on her mouth
and nose (pp. 88-90, tsn, July 17, 1 975);

13) as a result, she lost consciousness and when she woke

up, an abortion had already been performed upon her and
she was weak, bleeding and felt pain all over her body (pp.
90-91, tsn, July 17, 1975); ... ... ... (Rollo, pp. 38-40)
Monica Gutierrez Tan testified that she met complainant and a man whom
complainant introduced as Atty. Aznar in front of the Ambassador Hotel (pp.
183-184, tsn, Sept. 10, 1975; Rollo, p. 41).
Dr. Rebecca Gucor and Dr. Artemio Ingco, witnesses for the complainant, testified that
abdominal examinations and x-ray examination of the lumbro-sacral region of complainant
showed no signs of abnormality (Rollo, p. 42).
The evidence for the respondent as reported by the Solicitor General is summarized as
follows:
Edilberto Caban testified that:
1. In December, 1972, respondent Atty. Aznar stayed at
Ambassador Hotel with his wife and children; respondent
never came to Manila except in December, 1972; (pp. 8-9,.
tsn, Nov. 24, 1977);
2. He usually slept with respondent everytime the latter
comes to Manila (p. 13, tsn, Nov. 24, 1977; Rollo, pp. 42-43).
Oscar Salangsang, another witness for the respondent stated that:
1. In February, 1973, he went to Ambassador Hotel to meet
respondent; the latter had male companions at the hotel but
he did not see any woman companion of respondent Aznar;
2. He usually slept with respondent at the Ambassador Hotel
and ate with him outside the hotel together with Caban (pp.
8-9, 13-15, tsn, Jan. 13, 1978; Rollo, p. 43).
The Court notes that throughout the period of the investigation conducted by the Solicitor
General, respondent Aznar was never presented to refute the allegations made against him.
In his Answer, respondent Aznar alleges that he does not have any knowledge of the
allegations in the complaint. As special defense, respondent further alleged that the charge
levelled against him is in furtherance of complainant's vow to wreck vengeance against

respondent by reason of the latter's approval of the recommendation of the Board of Trustees
barring complainant from enrollment for the school year 1973-1974 because she failed in
most of her subjects. It is likewise contended that the defense did not bother to present
respondent in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General because nothing has been
shown in the hearing to prove that respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant.
Contrary to respondent's averments, the Solicitor General made a categorical finding to the
effect that respondent had carnal knowledge of complainant, to wit:
From the foregoing, it is clear that complainant was compelled to go to
Manila with respondent upon the threat of respondent that if she failed to do
so, she would flunk in all her subjects and she would never become a
medical intern (pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6, 1975). As respondent was Chairman
of the College of Medicine, complainant had every reason to believe him.
It has been established also that complainant was brought by respondent to
Ambassador Hotel in Manila for three days where he repeatedly had carnal
knowledge of her upon the threat that if she would not give in to his lustful
desires, she would fail in her Pathology subject (Exhs. "A", "K", "K-1" to "K-6"
pp. 51, 52, 55-59, tsn, June 6, 1975);
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, respondent did not bother to appear during the hearing. It
is true that he presented Edilberto Caban and Oscar Salangsang who
testified that respondent usually slept with them every time the latter came to
Manila, but their testimony (sic) is not much of help. None of them mentioned
during the hearing that they stayed and slept with respondent on February 12
to February 14, 1973 at Ambassador Hotel. ... ... ... Besides, Edilberto Caban
testified that respondent stayed at Ambassador Hotel with his wife and
children in December, 1972. The dates in question, however, are February
12 to 14, 1973, inclusive. His (Caban's) testimony, therefore, is immaterial to
the present case" (Rollo, pp. 43-44).
In effect, the Solicitor General found that the charge of immorality against respondent Aznar
has been substantiated by sufficient evidence both testimonial and documentary; while
finding insufficient and uncorroborated the accusation of intentional abortion. The Solicitor
General then recommends the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for a period
of not less than three (3) years.
On March 16, 1989, the Court Resolved to require the parties to Move in the premises to
determine whether any intervening event occurred which would render the case moot and
academic (Rollo, p. 69).

On April 12, 1989, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation and motion praying that the case
at bar be considered submitted for decision on the bases of the report and recommendation
previously submitted together with the record of the case and the evidence adduced (Rollo, p.
75).

The Solicitor General recommends that since the complainant is partly to blame for having
gone with respondent to Manila knowing fully well that respondent is a married man ,with
children, respondent should merely be suspended from the practice of law for not less than
three (3) years (Rollo, p. 47).

After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the finding of the Solicitor
General that respondent Aznar, under the facts as stated in the Report of the investigation
conducted in the case, is guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" and may therefore be removed
or suspended by the Supreme Court for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar (Sec. 27,
Rule 138, Rules of Court).

On the other hand, respondent in his manifestation and motion dated April 18, 1989 alleges
that since a period of about ten (10) years had already elapsed from the time the Solicitor
General made his recommendation for a three (3) years suspension and respondent is not
practicing his profession as a lawyer, the court may now consider the respondent as having
been suspended during the said period and the case dismissed for being moot and
academic.

Respondent failed to adduce evidence sufficient to engender doubt as to his culpability of the
offense imputed upon him. With the exception of the self-serving testimonies of two witnesses
presented on respondent's behalf, the records are bereft of evidence to exonerate
respondent of the act complained of, much less contradict, on material points, the testimonies
of complainant herself.
While respondent denied having taken complainant to the Ambassador Hotel and there had
sexual intercourse with the latter, he did not present any evidence to show where he was at
that date. While this is not a criminal proceeding, respondent would have done more than
keep his silence if he really felt unjustly traduced.
It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in issue, to satisfy this Court
that he is a fit and proper person to enjoy continued membership in the Bar. He cannot
dispense with nor downgrade the high and exacting moral standards of the law profession
(Go v. Candoy, 21 SCRA 439 [1967]). As once pronounced by the Court:
When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies
the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence
for the relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs
that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all
times is expected of him. ... In the case of United States v. Tria, 17 Phil. 303,
Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he
does not perform that duty, he may not always expect the State to perform it
for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to
meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardy indeed if he demand and
expect that same full and wide consideration which the State voluntarily gives
to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is
particularly so when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals
from the State the very means by which it may assist him (Quingwa SCRA
439 [1967]).

We disagree.
Complainant filed the instant case for disbarment not because respondent reneged on a
promise to marry (Quingwa v. Puno, supra). More importantly. complainant's knowledge of of
respondent's marital status is not at issue in the case at bar. Complainant submitted to
respondent's solicitation for sexual intercourse not because of a desire for sexual gratification
but because of respondent's moral ascendancy over her and fear that if she would not
accede, she would flunk in her subjects. As chairman of the college of medicine where
complainant was enrolled, the latter had every reason to believe that respondent could make
good his threats. Moreover, as counsel for respondent would deem it "worthwhile to inform
the the Court that the respondent is a scion of a rich family and a very rich man in his own
right and in fact is not practicing his profession before the court" (Rollo, p. 70), mere
suspension for a limited period, per se, would therefore serve no redeeming purpose. The
fact that he is a rich man and does not practice his profession as a lawyer, does not render
respondent a person of good moral character. Evidence of good moral character precedes
admission to bar (Sec.2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and such requirement is not dispensed
with upon admission thereto. Good moral character is a continuing qualification necessary to
entitle one to continue in the practice of law. The ancient and learned profession of law exacts
from its members the highest standard of morality (Quingwa v. Puno, supra).
Under Section 27, Rule 138, "(a) member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, ... " In Arciga v. Maniwang (106 SCRA 591, [1981]), this Court had
occasion to define the concept of immoral conduct, as follows:
A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. A member of the bar should
have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what

is grossly immoral conduct or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity
which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The
rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straightlaced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as 'that which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good
and respectable members of the community' (7 C.J.S. 959).
Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became
pregnant by reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of
six children, disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct
was justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896).

In the present case, it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with children, to have
taken advantage of his position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking complainant,
a student in said college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her
under the threat that she would flunk in all her subjects in case she refused.
WHEREFORE, respondent Jose B. Aznar is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered
stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.