Conspiracy; liability of conspirators.

Assuming that
the prosecution witnesses failed to identify exactly who
inflicted the fatal wounds on Joey during the commotion,
Erwins liability is not diminished since he and the others
with him acted with concert in beating up and ultimately
killing Joey. Conspiracy makes all the assailants equally
liable as co-principals by direct participation. Since about
15 men, including accused Erwin, pounced on their one
helpless victim, relentlessly bludgeoned him on the head,
and stabbed him on the stomach until he was dead,
there is no question that the accused took advantage of
their superior strength. The Supreme Court thus affirmed
the decision of the lower courts finding accused Erwin
guilty of murder. People of the Philippines v. Erwin
Tamayo y Bautisa, G.R. No. 196960, March 12,
2014.
Rape; rape victim with a mental disability either
deprived of reason or demented. Article 266-A,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,

provides for two circumstances when having carnal

knowledge of a woman with a mental disability is
considered rape, to wit: paragraph 1(b) when the
offended party is deprived of reason; and paragraph 1(d)
when the offended party is demented. Under
paragraph 1(d), the term demented refers to a person
who has dementia, which is a condition of deteriorated
mentality, characterized by marked decline from the
individuals former intellectual level and often by
emotional apathy, madness, or insanity. On the other
hand, under paragraph 1(b), the phrase deprived of
reason has been interpreted to include those suffering
from mental abnormality, deficiency, or
retardation. People of the Philippines v. Ernesto
Ventura Sr., G.R. No. 205230, March 12, 2014.
Rape; when rape victim is deprived of reason but
not demented. Since AAA is mentally deficient, she
should properly be classified as a person who is
deprived of reason, and not one who is demented.
Hence, carnal knowledge of a mentally deficient

individual is rape under subparagraph (b) and not

subparagraph (d) of Article 266-A(1) of the RPC, as
amended. Nevertheless, the erroneous reference to
paragraph 1(d) in the Information will not exonerate
Ventura because he failed to raise this as an objection,
and the particular facts stated in the Information were
protestation sufficient to inform him of the nature of the
charge against him. From the foregoing, all that needs to
be proven are the facts of sexual congress between the
rapist and his victim, and the latters mental
retardation. People of the Philippines v. Ernesto
Ventura Sr., G.R. No. 205230, March 12, 2014.
Rape; exact date of rape incident not an essential
element. AAAs failure to recall the exact date of the first
rape and the number of times she was sexually
assaulted by Ventura prior to March 24, 2005, does not
militate against her credibility since rape victims are not
expected to cherish in their memories an accurate
account of the dates, number of times and manner they
were violated. This is especially true in the case of AAA

who obviously cannot be expected to act like an adult

who would have the courage and intelligence to
disregard the threat to her life and complain immediately
that she had been sexually assaulted. AAAs testimony
was clear that every time Ventura would rape her, he
would threaten her against revealing the offense. Given
AAAs mental condition, it can well substitute for violence
and intimidation enough to cow her into submission. The
Supreme Court had repeatedly held that the exact date
when the victim was sexually abused is not an essential
element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the
offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. Indeed, the
precise time of the crime has no substantial bearing on
its commission. As such, the time or place of commission
in rape cases need not be accurately stated.
Inconsistencies and discrepancies as to minor matters
which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot
be considered grounds for acquittal. Hence, the
allegation in the information, which states that the rape
was committed on or about March 24, 2005, is sufficient

to affirm the conviction of Ventura in the said

case. People of the Philippines v. Ernesto Ventura
Sr., G.R. No. 205230, March 12, 2014.
Statutory rape; elements; proof of force,
intimidation or consent not necessary. Statutory
rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman
below 12 years of age regardless of her consent, or the
lack of it, to the sexual act. Proof of force, intimidation or
consent is unnecessary as they are not elements of
statutory rape, considering that the absence of free
consent is conclusively presumed when the victim is
below the age of 12. At that age, the law presumes that
the victim does not possess discernment and is
incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act.
Thus, to convict an accused of the crime of statutory
rape, the prosecution carries the burden of proving: (a)
the age of the complainant; (b) the identity of the
accused; and (c) the sexual intercourse between the
accused and the complainant. People of the

Philippines v. Guillermo B. Candano Jr., G.R. No.

207819, March 12, 2014.
Statutory rape; elements; proof of force,
intimidation or consent not necessary. A judicious
review of the records of this case would reveal that the
aforementioned elements of statutory rape are present.
First, the presentation of AAAs Certificate of Live Birth
showing that she was born on July 25, 1998 has proven
that she was below 12 years of age when the three (3)
rape incidents happened on December 26 and 27, 1996,
and in June 2000, respectively. Second, the prosecution
proved that Cadano indeed had carnal knowledge of
AAA on three (3) separate occasions through the latters
positive, categorical, and spontaneous testimony, as
corroborated by the medico-legal report. People of the
Philippines v. Guillermo B. Candano Jr., G.R. No.
207819, March 12, 2014.
2. SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

Alias; defined. An alias is a name or names used by a

person or intended to be used by him publicly and
habitually, usually in business transactions, in addition to
the real name by which he was registered at birth or
baptized the first time, or to the substitute name
authorized by a competent authority; a mans name is
simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly
designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish
him, but sometimes a man is known by several different
names and these are known as aliases. An alias is thus
a name that is different from the individuals true name,
and does not refer to a name that is not different from his
true name. Revelina Limson v. Eugenio Juan
Gonzalez, G.R. No. 162205, March 31, 2014.
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Section 3(g);
private persons acting in conspiracy with public
officers may be indicted. The only question that
needs to be settled in the present petition is whether
herein respondent, a private person, may be indicted for
conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if

the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have

conspired, has died prior to the filing of the Information.
Respondent contends that by reason of the death of
Secretary Enrile, there is no public officer who was
charged in the Information and, as such, prosecution
against respondent may not prosper. The Supreme Court
was not persuaded. It held that, it is true that by reason
of Secretary Enriles death, there is no longer any public
officer with whom respondent can be charged for
violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that
the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer
be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already
expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of
Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not
extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the
charge of conspiracy between him and private
respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary
Enrile does not mean that there was no public officer
who allegedly violated Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. In fact,
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found

probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement

of Sections 3(e) and (g) of R.A. 3019. Were it not for his
death, he should have been charged. People of the
Philippines v. Henry T. Go, G.R. No. 168539,
March 25, 2014.
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Section 3(g);
private persons acting in conspiracy with public
officers may be indicted. The requirement before a
private person may be indicted for violation of Section
3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private
person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with
a public officer. The law, however, does not require that
such person must, in all instances, be indicted together
with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the
public officer may no longer be charged in court, as in
the present case where the public officer has already
died, the private person may be indicted alone. People
of the Philippines v. Henry T. Go, G.R. No. 168539,
March 25, 2014.