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NIM : 12040284014
Kelas : A 2012
MK : Sejarah Pemikiran Modern
terkenal adalah Novum Organum, bertentangan dengan metode Aristoteles dalam buku
Organum.
Sumber: Salam, Burhanudin. 2000. Sejarah Filsafat Ilmu dan Teknologi. Jakarta:
PT Rineka Cipta
Bacon dealt with his scientific method, which became famous under the name of
induction. Induction implies ascending to axioms, as well as a descending to works, so that
from axioms new particulars are gained and from these new axioms. The inductive method
starts from sensible experience and moves via natural history (providing sense-data as
guarantees) to lower axioms or propositions, which are derived from the tables of
presentation or from the abstraction of notions. Bacon does not identify experience with
everyday experience, but presupposes that method corrects and extends sense-data into
facts, which go together with his setting up of tables (tables of presence and of absence
and tables of comparison or of degrees, i.e., degrees of absence or presence). Bacon's
antipathy to simple enumeration as the universal method of science derived, first of all,
from his preference for theories that deal with interior physical causes, which are not
immediately observable.
Sumber: Urbach, P. 1987. Francis Bacon's Philosophy of Science: An Account
and a Reappraisal. La Salle, IL: Open Court
Sumber: Susanto. 2011. Filsafat Ilmu (Suatu Kajian dalam Dimensi Ontologis,
Epistemologis, dan Aksiologis). Jakarta: Bumi Aksara
Philosohical knowledge, according to Hobbes, is an acquired from of knowledge
that begins with raw material provided by the senses. Hobbes states the first beginnings of
knowledge are the phantasms of sense and imagination. Sensation if it self a kind of
knowledge: sense and memory of things, which are common to man and all living
creatures,be knowledge. Sense knowledge, however, is not philosophical because it is
given immediately by nature, and not gotten by ratiocination. Philosohical knowledge,
unlike that of brute sensations, is acquired by an act of reason, a faculty that computes
ideas by the operations of addition or subtraction. To explain how reason adds and
subtracts ideas, hobbes employs the examples of the perception of a man far off in the
distance. According to this body. When the man comes closer, you see the body is
animated, so reason adds the notion of animation to the notion of body. Finally, when you
see the animated body speaking and acting like a ration creature, reason adds the notion of
rational to the conceptions of animated and body.
Sumber: J. Finn, Stephen. 2006. Thomas Hobbes and The Politics of Natural
Philosophy. London: Continuum
3. John Locke (1632-1704) :
Inti pemikiran John Locke adalah teori Tabula Rasa. Menurut Locke, tabula rasa
adalah teori bahwa pikiran (manusia) ketika lahir berupa "kertas kosong" tanpa aturan
untuk memproses data, dan data yang ditambahkan serta aturan untuk memprosesnya
dibentuk hanya oleh pengalaman alat inderanya. Artinya bahwa setiap pikiran individu itu
"kosong" saat lahir, ia berhak untuk mengisi jiwanya sendiri. Menurut Locke, pikiran
bukanlah sesuatu yang pasif terhadap segala sesuatu yang datang dari luar. Beberapa
aktifitas berlangsung dalam pikiran. Gagasan-gagasan yang datang dari indera tadi diolah
dengan cara berpikir, bernalar, mempercayai, meragukan dan dengan demikian
memunculkan apa yang dinamakannya dengan perenungan.
Locke menekankan bahwa satu-satunya yang dapat kita tangkap adalah
penginderaan sederhana. Ini berarti bahwa semua pengetahuan kita betapapun rumitnya,
dapat dilacak kembali sampai kepada pengalaman-pengalaman inderawi yang pertamatama yang dapat diibaratkan seperti atom-atom yang menyusun objek-objek material. Apa
yang tidak dapat atau tidak perlu dilacak kembali seperti demikian itu bukanlah
sama dengan ide-ide. Dia terkenal dengan ucapannya Esse est percipi (being is being
perceived) artinya, dunia material sama saja dengan dunia idea-idea. Jadi, sebenarnya
dunia material di luar kesadaran itu, substansi material, tidak ada; yang ada hanya
penangkapan persepsi kita, karena itu, being is being perceived sama dengan being is
seeming, atau duniaku adalah duniaku. Adanya sesuatu adalah karena kesan-kesan
yang teramati oleh subjek. Berkeley mengilustrasikan dengan gambar film yang ada dalam
layar putih sebagai benda yang riil dan hidup. Pengakuannya bahwa aku merupakan
suatu substansi rohani. Tuhan adalah asal-usul ide itu ada yang menunjukkan ide-ide pada
kita dan Tuhanlah yang memutarkan film pada batin kita.
Sumber: Praja, Juhaya S. 2008. Aliran-aliran Filsafat dan Etika. Cet. 3. Jakarta;
Kencana
According to Berkeley there only two kinds of things: spirit and ideas. Spirit is
simple, active being which produce and perceive ideas; ideas are passive being which are
produced and perceived
Source: Kenny, Anthony. 2006. A New History of Western Philosophy Volume 3:
The Rise of Modern Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press
5. David Hume (1711-1776) :
Hume menganut paham empiris bahwa semua materi pengetahuan berasal dari
pengalaman inderawi kita. Menurut Hume, pemahaman manusia dipengaruhi oleh
sejumlah kepastian dasar tertentu mengenai dunia eksternal, mengenai masa depan,
mengenai sebab dan bahwa kepastian-kepastian ini merupakan bagian dari naluri alamiah
manusia, yang tidak dihasilkan ataupun bisa dicegah oleh akal budi atau proses pemikiran
manusia. Dengan kata lain, melalui naluri alamiah manusia, manusia bisa mencapai
kepastian-kepastian yang memungkinkan pengetahuan manusia. Hume membedakan dua
proses mental dalam diri manusia. Pertama adalah kesan (impresi), yang tidak lain
merupakan semua macam pencerahan pancaindra yang lebih hidup dan langsung sifatnya.
Kedua adalah pemikiran atau ide yang kurang hidup dan kurang langsung sifatnya. Dari
impresi muncul ide-ide sederhana yang berkaitan dengan objek yang kita tangkap secara
langsung dengan pancaindra. Dari ide sederhana itu, akal budi manusia mampu
melahirkan ide-ide majemuk tentang hal-hal yang tidak kita ditangkap melalui pancaindra
kita. Hume membuang segala kausalitas, karena akal hanya bisa menunjuk pada
kesesuaian antara suatu perbuatan tertentu dengan defacto. Pada dasarnya, pemikiran
Hume bersifat analisis, kritis dan skeptis. Ia berpangkal pada keyakinan bahwa hanya
kesan kesanlah yang pasti, jelas dan tidak diragukan, dari situlah dia sampai pada
keyakinan bahwa aku termasuk dunia khayalan.
Sumber: Sonny Keraf. A Mikhae dua. 2001. Ilmu Pengetahuan Sebuah Tinjauan
Filosofis. Yogyakarta: Kanisius
Though the consistent reconstruction of Humes theory is far from simple, it
might be thought that little of value remains to be said in light of the abun- dance of
classic and contemporary commentaries. I believe, however, that the complexities of
Humes thought leave room for further discussion. Hume con- structs his theory in three
discernible stages. First, Hume needs to display the social artificiality of the virtue of
justice and the mechanisms through which this artificiality is generally masked. Second,
Hume seeks to provide a naturalistic, nonpolitical explanation of the patterns of
behavior that are required by the conventions of justice. Third, Hume wants to explain
why we call those patterns of behavior morally virtuous and why we judge them as
morally praiseworthy. The difference between the second and third stages is that, in the
former, Hume focuses on agents behaviors, whereas in the latter he is concerned with
third- person moral judgment.
Hume says that every moral theory he knows makes a surprising deduction from
propositions connected with is and is not to conclusions connected with ought and
ought not. This changehe goes onis imperceptible; but is, however, of the last
consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new re- lation or
affirmation, it is necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same
time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this
new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. It has
been common to thinkperhaps as a consequence of G. E. Moores account of the
naturalistic fallacythat what Hume really claims is that the derivation of oughtstatements from merely de- scriptive statements is fallacious.
Hume does not share at all Moores thesis that naturalism commits any fallacy,
because he himself provides a naturalistic account of moral notions. For instance, Hume
adopts a naturalistic analysis of natural obligation. Thus, for Hume the proposition
We lie under an obligation to do X means something like The non-performance of X
is vicious. As Frankena (1939) has long ago shown, it would beg the question to claim
that a naturalistic account is fallacious just because one assumes that naturalism is false.
Source: Spector, Horacio. 2014. Humes Theory of Justice. RMM Vol. 5, 2014,
4763, http://www.rmm-journal.de/
Praja, Juhaya S. 2005. Aliran-aliran filsafat dan Etika. Jakarta: Prenada Media
Menurut Fichte, fakta dasar dari alam semesta adalah ego yang bebas atau roh
yang bebas. Dengan demikian dunia merupakan ciptaan roh yang bebas. Filsafatnya
disebut Wissenschaftslehre atau ajaran Ilmu Pengetahuan. Dengan melalui metode
deduktif Fichte mencoba menerangkan hubungan Aku (Ego) dengan adanya benda-benda
(non-Ego). Karena Ego berpikir, mengiakan diri maka terlahirlah non-Ego (benda-benda).
Dengan secara dialektif (berpikir dengan metoda : tese, anti tese, sintese) Fichte mencoba
menjelaskan adanya benda-benda. Secara sederhana dialektika Fichte itu dapat
diterangkan sebagai berikut: manusia memandang obyek benda-benda dengan inderanya.
Dalam mengindera obyek tersebut, manusia berusaha mengetahui apa yang dihadapinya.
Maka berjalanlah proses intelektualnya untuk membentuk dan mengabstraksikan obyek itu
menjadi pengertian seperti yang dipikirannya.
Sumber: Hamersma, Harry. 1983. Tokoh-Tokoh Filsafat Barat Modern. Jakarta:
PT Gramedia
Fichte argues that the sciences of right and morality have discrete, separate
domains. The science of morality is concerned with determining what our duties are and
with whether actions are done from duty. Its domain is the inner domain of conscience
which Fichte regards as cognitively inaccessible to other rational agents. The
science of natural right, by contrast, is concerned with determining rules which
govern publicly observable interaction between rational agents.9 It is not concerned with
whether or not agents act from duty. According to Fichte: In the domain of natural right,
the good will has no role to play. Right must be enforceable, even if there is not a single
human being with a good will; the very aim of the science of right is to sketch out such an
order of things.
Source: Clarke, James Alexander. 009. Fichte and Hegel on recognition. British
journal
for
the
history
of
philosophy.
PP.
365-385.
ISBN
1469-3529,
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/2470/
timbul pertentangan kepentingan satu dengan yang lainnya. Agar tidak terjadi
pertentangan maka dibuatlah suatu perjanjian secara sukarela diantara rakyat. Baru setelah
itu, diadakan perjanjian berukutnya berupa perjanjian penaklukan oleh raja. Dengan
adanya perjanjian itu, berarti tidak ada kekuasaan yang absolut. Semua kekuasaan itu
dibatasi oleh Tuhan, hukum alam, kebiasaan, dan tujuan dari Negara yang didirikan.
Karangan Pufendorf tentang dasar-dasar hukum alam dan hukum antar negar memberikan
pembedaan yang tegas antara hukum dan morl (pendapat ini jelas lebih dekat ke aliran
positivisme hukum daripada hukum alam). Schumid (1965:188-189) menyatakan, karya
Pufendorf justru penting karena pembedaan tersebut. Hukum alam lahir dari faktor-faktor
yang bersifat takdir dan berdasarkan sifat manusia yang fitri, seperti naluri, akan terdesak
ke belakang.
Sumber: Cahyadi, dkk. 2007. Pengantar ke Filsafat Hukum. Jakarta: Kencana
Prenada Media Group
Samuel von Pufendorf was a Protestant caught up in the political aftermath of the
Thirty Years War (1618-1648), a series of conflicts between Protestants and the Roman
Catholic Church which involved many European nations and ended with the Treaty of
Westphalia in 1848. These conflicts highlighted the struggle for political control between
various European monarchs and the Roman Catholic Church. Pufendorf was concerned
with reconciling the political theories of the early Enlightenment with Christian theology.
Early
in
his
academic
career,
Pufendorf
was
influenced
by Hugo
Grotius and Thomas Hobbes. In De jure naturae et gentium (On the Law of Nature and of
Nations), and De officio hominis et civis ("On the Duty of Man and Citizen") he took up
the theories of natural law proposed by Grotius and sought to complete them by means of
the doctrines of Hobbes and of his own ideas. His first important point was that natural
law does not extend beyond the limits of this life and that it confines itself to regulating
external acts. He disputed Hobbes's conception of the state of nature and concluded that
the state of nature is not one of war but of peace. He identified the true foundation of
natural law as the sociality of humankind, concluding that God had created man to live
in society with others. Any man must, inasmuch as he can, he wrote, cultivate and
maintain toward others a peaceable sociality that is consistent with the native character
and end of humankind in general. Peace, however, was insecure, and just war was
sometimes necessary to secure and maintain it.
It must absolutely be maintained that the obligation of the natural law is from
God himself, the creator and supreme governor of the human race, who by virtue of his
sovereignty over men, his creatures, has bound them to its observance.He formed the
nature of things and of man in such a way that the latter cannot be preserved without a
sociable life." (Samuel von Pufendorf)
In the area of public law, Pufendorf, while regarding the state (civitas) as a moral
person (persona moralis), taught that the will of the state was nothing more than the sum
of the individual wills that constituted it. Like Hobbes and Grotius, Pufendorf maintained
that the law of nations was a branch of natural law, and should not be treated as positive
law (law which has been decreed by human beings). Pufendorf strongly defended the idea
that international law is not restricted to Christendom, but constitutes a common bond
between all nations because all nations form part of humanity.
Sumber: Michelbach, Philip A. 2006. Finding voice: The presence of German
political thought (Martin Luther, Samuel von Pufendorf, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing,
Immanuel Kant, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel): (Dissertation). San Diego: University of
California
4. Schelling (1775-1854)
Pemikiran Schelling sering disebut dengan filsafat ketidaksadaran. Schelling
membahas realitas lebih objektif dan menyiapkan jalan bagi idealisme absolut Hegel.
Dalam pandangan Schelling, realitas adalah identik dengan gerakan pemikiran yang
berevolusi secara dialektis. Akan tetapi ia berbeda dalam segala hal dengan Hegel. Pada
Schelling, juga pada Hegel, realitas adalah proses revolusi dunia menuju sosialisasinya
berupa suatu eksresi kebenaran terakhir.
Dalam rasionalisme, Schelling membantah dan mengkritik semua bentuk paham
rasionalisme. Yaitu ketika dia memandang alam ini, katanya, tidak dapat dibayangkan
sistem rasional. Dan semenjak tahun 1809 ia berusaha mengembangkan paham metafisika
emperisme. Disini ia memperlihatkan bahwa susunan rasionalisme adalah konstur
hiipotesis, yang memerlukan pembuktian nyata, baik pada alam maupun pada sejarah. Ia
juga menambahkan bahwa kategori agama pada akhinya merupakan pernyataan yang lebih
berarti dari pada realitas yang lain. filsafat Schelling dibagi menjadi empat periode, yaitu
periode filsafat alam, periode sistem idealistis atau tahap filsafat identitas, periode
sinkretisme, dan periode teosofi.
Sumber: Lily Tjahjadi, Simon Petrus. 2004. Petualangan Intelektual;
Konfrontasi dengan Para Filsuf dari Zaman Yunani Hingga Zaman Modern. Yogyakarta:
Kanisius
Schellings grounding of Positive Philosophy begins with the distinction between
the what of being and that being. What of being is being as essence and that being
is the contingent beings pure actuality of existence. This actuality is not an attribute of
being but its existentiality, the very facticity of its coming into being. From here comes
the distinction between a negative philosophy, that is, the rational philosophy that is
essentially concerned with the essence of being (its what character) and the positive
philosophy that is concerned with the pure actuality of the existence of that being
which comes into its being. Such a being (that being) is not a settled entity that is given,
but that which comes into being . Schelling calls such a coming into being,existence. Since
this coming into being is not a finished entity but yet becoming and always contingent, it
cannot be grasped in the concept. Therefore existence and movement cannot be a logical
category. There is a concept only if a being already exists, for by definition concept can
only grasp the essence of being which in turn is possible if such a being already exists.
Understood in this sense, negative philosophy is not concerned with the facticity of
something that exists at all. Therefore it is not concerned with the question why
something exists at all? The negative philosophy is rather concerned with the question: if
and if something exists, what is its essence, what is the being character of this being
irrespective of the problem whether such a being exists as this being at all.
Source: Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling's Smmtliche Werke, ed. K.F.A.
Schelling, I Abtheilung Vols. 1-10, II Abtheilung Vols. 1-4, Stuttgart: Cotta, 1856-61
5. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz (1711-1776)
Menurut Leibnis, kebenaran terbagi menjadi 2 bagian. Pertama, kebenaran yang
nyata berdasarkan pengalaman. Kedua, kebenaran yang berdasarkan akal manusia.
pemikirannya dipengaruhi oleh Descartes dan J. Locke. Ajaran terkenal dengan istilah
monade-monade, yang merupakan kenyataan yang sebenarnya adalah gaya atau kekuatan.
Kalau kekuatan itu dibagi terus menerus maka akhirnya terdapat kesatuan yang berupa
pusat-pusat gaya yang tak mempunyai luas dan tidak bersifat kebendaan. Pusat-pusat
kesadaran itu mempunyai kesadaran dan kehendak seperti roh atau jiwa manusia.
Karangannya yang terkenal adalah opuscula philosophica (1690).
Sumber: Salam, Burhanudin. 2005. Pengantar Filsafat . Jakarta: Bumi Aksara
Leibnizs epistemology begins with the distinction between clear and obscure
ideas. An idea is clear when it allows one to recognize the thing represented, obscure when
it does not. For example, one may have seen a gerbil and thus have an idea of what a
gerbil is. However, if the next time she encounters a small rodent she cannot tell whether it
is a gerbil or a hamster, then she possesses only an obscure idea of gerbil. By contrast,
when ones idea suffices to reliably distinguish one kind of object from others, then the
idea is clear.
Leibniz divides clear ideas into two classes: confused and distinct. A clear idea is
also distinct when one can catalogue all the marks, or criteria, distinguishing that idea
from others. The animal physiologist can differentiate and enumerate those characteristics
common to all rodents and those unique to gerbils. A child with a pet gerbil might not be
able to do so and thus would have a clear but confused idea. Leibniz believes our sensory
ideas, such as those of color, are clear and confused. Though we reliably distinguish blue
from red, we cannot necessarily spell out the marks or causes which make one object blue
and another red. We perceive colors without explaining them.
Leibniz proceeds to further classify clear and distinct ideas as either adequate or
inadequate. If possessing an adequate idea, one has clear and distinct knowledge not only
of the idea in question, but also of all its component parts. One has clear and distinct
knowledge all the way down to the primitive concepts which compose the idea. Leibniz
admits that he is unsure if any human being possesses an adequate idea, but believes our
arithmetical knowledge most nearly approaches adequacy. In all other cases, where one
cannot carry out comprehensive analyses down to primitive concepts, one has clear,
distinct, yet inadequate ideas.
Source:
2007.
The Leibniz-Des
Bosses
Now for Wolff, possible and possible thing are basically synonymous terms.
What is possible as a concept is simply reducible to what is possible as a thing. The realm
of concepts and the ontological realm of objects converge in the Wolffian system. A thing
or being is defined as that which does not involve a contradiction. A possible concept,
consequently, is that which corresponds to a possible object. This analysis of the concept
of possible typifies Wolff's non-existential and essence-centered approach to ontology.
Very briefly, Wolff's understanding of being (or what-is) involves regarding being in its
most general sense. A being is something if and only if it is intrinsically possible, and
something is intrinsically possible, if and only if its predicates or determinations are not
contradictory. Nothing, in contrast, is simply a term that is empty of all content. In the
ontological realm of objects there is literally no thing to which nothing
corresponds. Nothing, by definition, is not thinkable or conceivable.
Sumber: Gottsched, Johann Christoph. 2014. Christian Wolff. The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/
Pendapat penulis terhadap filsafat aliran Inggris dan filsafat aliran Jerman
Filsafat aliran Inggris merupakan filsafat yang lebih mengedepankan pengalaman indrawi
sebagai sumber pengetahuan manusia. Artinya bahwa kebenaran haruslah berdasarkan pada
bukti atau realitas yang dapat di indera. Hal ini berdampak pada perkembangan pengetahuan
di Inggris, dimana mulai diterapkannya metode ilmiah untuk membangun pengetahuan.
Perkembangan ilmu pengetahuan ini memengaruhi penciptaan-penciptaan teknologi baru
yang didesain untuk memudahkan kerja manusia. Hal inilah yang kemudian mengatarkan
Inggris ke revolusi industri yang kemudian dapat menguasai dunia.
Sementara filsafat aliran jerman lebih mengedepankan rasio sebagai sumber utama
pengetahuan, artinya bahwa kebenaran haruslah ditentukan melalui pembuktian, logika, dan
analisis. Oleh karena itu penelitian-penelitian mengenai ilmu pengetahuan sangat digalakkan
sehingga Jerman dijuluki sebagai negara penuh gagasan. Hal ini berdampak pada
perkembangan teknologi di Jerman yang selalu mengedepankan inovasi, kualitas, dan
kemajuan teknik.