Utah Republican Party

117 E South Temple

Salt Lake City, UT 84111
www.utgop.org
December 3, 2015
VIA EMAIL AND U.S. MAIL
Lieutenant Governor Spencer J. Cox
Utah State Capitol Complex, Ste. 220
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-2325
Email: sjc@utah.gov
Dear Lt. Governor Cox:
I write as a follow up to my letter a few weeks ago, even though you said it was unnecessary, to
clarify what, if any, disagreements exist between the Utah Republican Party (the Party) and
your office regarding SB54 and the matters raised at the recent hearing in Utah Republican Party
v. Herbert, et al., Case No. 2:14-cv-876-DN (D. Utah). I am in receipt of your recent letter to the
Party dated November 19, 2015, and your offices letter to Utah Senator Todd Weiler dated
November 20, 2015.
Background
It is important in discussing these matters that we acknowledge how we got to this point. Your
letters argue that the Partys views are inconsistent with the intent of SB54, but you do not point
to anything in the public record to support that assertion.1 To the contrary, your office spent the
better part of this past year arguing that the intent of SB54 was irrelevant.2 If anything, the
legislative history of SB54 reveals its unconstitutional overreach, as lawmakers admitted that it
was the product of an agreement with Count My Vote to compromise the Partys dominance
and efforts to hold Republican candidates accountable to the Party platform, in part by forcing
the Party to choose to open its primary to unaffiliated voters.3
1

The Utah Legislatures floor debates regarding SB54 are available at http://le.utah.gov/jsp/jdisplay/
billaudio.jsp?sess=2014GS&bill=sb0054&Headers=true.
2
See, for example, the brief your counsel filed accusing the Party of violating a Court order by trying to
introduce evidence concerning the Legislatures purpose or intent in passing SB54. Doc. 194 at 36.
3
See Senate, day 24 (Day 24), at approx. 53:03 (statement of Sen. Bramble); id. at approx. 1:02:02
(statement of Sen. Hillyard); id. at approx. 1:20:25 (statement of Sen. Jones); id. at approx. 1:01:21
(statement of Sen. Weiler); audio file of floor debate in the Senate, Day 37, at approx. 23:55 (statement of
Sen. Bramble); id. at approx. 30:59 (statement of Sen. Dabakis); id. at approx. 41:18 (statement of Sen.
Weiler); audio file of floor debate in the House, Day 37, at approx. 1:40:01 (Rep. Powell); id. at approx.

Lt. Governor Cox

December 3, 2015
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The Court has now struck down that part of SB54. But the Court upheld the remainder of SB54
based on the positions your office took in the litigation. Recall how the Party initially raised in its
lawsuit concerns about how SB54 would have the State intrude on the Partys internal candidate
selection process. Your office publicly disputed those allegations and whether the Party needed
to make any changes to its rules or procedures to certify its preferred candidates to the general
election ballot.4 Your representative admitted under oath that you have little, if any, interest or
authority to review the Partys rules or dictate to the Party how it should select its candidates.5
Based on the position you took, the Court rejected the Partys concerns that its nominee may
not necessarily be a party member or committed to the party platform, suggesting instead that
the Party should adjust its membership requirements to resolve them.6 The Court summarized
your position to give the Party assurances that [t]he State has nothing to say about whos the
member of a party, at least under this statute, except to say its determined in accordance with
party rules.7
In his formal order denying the Partys preliminary injunction motion, Judge Nuffer explained
that a candidate may not file a declaration of candidacy for a political party of which the
candidate is not a member, except to the extent that the political party permits otherwise in the
political partys bylaws.8 Significantly, his analysis of that issue invited the Party to file
objections to a candidates declaration of candidacy under Utah Code 20A-9-202(5) as one
way to ensure that candidates comply with its rules.9 I understand from your letters of November
19 and 20 that you intend to overrule any objection filed by the Party challenging a candidate
who attempts to circumvent the Partys rules and seek its nomination by signature-gathering.
After the April 10 hearing where the Court denied the Partys preliminary injunction motion, the
Party acted in reliance on the Courts statements and your offices sworn testimony, amending its
Constitution and Bylaws to address the issues raised by SB54, as follows:
-

The Party amended Article I, C of its Constitution to restrict membership to those who
comply with its internal rules: Party membership is open to any resident of the State of
Utah who registers to vote as a Republican and complies with the Utah Republican Party
Constitution and Bylaws ....10

1:45:46 (statement of Rep. Nelson); id. at approx. 1:53:42 (statement of Rep. Chavez-Houck); id. at
approx. 1:56:28 (statement of Rep. King); id. at approx. 2:24:26 (statement of Rep. McCay).
4
See deposition of Mark Thomas, Director of Elections (Thomas Tr.), at 119:6-124:7, 131:14-17,
132:9-133:15; 145:18-147:8; 148:24-149:23; 151:21-152:25.
5
Id. at 99:11-103:21, 103:17-104:19, 111:7-112:10, 133:3-24, 135:7-136:5.
6
4/10/2015 Hrg. Tr. at 124:7-12.
7
Id.
8
September 24, 2015 Order, Doc. 170, at 20.
9
Id. at 20 n.79.
10
2015 Utah Republican Party Constitution (hereinafter Const.) Art. I, C.

Lt. Governor Cox

December 3, 2015
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-

The Party amended its Bylaws to require that any candidate choosing to run for its
nomination shall sign and submit a certification that they will comply with the rules and
processes set forth in the Utah Republican Party Constitution and these Bylaws .11

The Party amended the specific provisions of its caucus/convention candidate selection
procedure to provide that any candidate for an office that receives 60% or more of the
votes cast at any point in the balloting process at the state nominating conventions shall
proceed to the general election, nominating the top two candidates to run in a primary
election only if neither receives 60% or more of the delegates vote at the convention.12
These are the only ways that the Party authorizes any candidate to appear on the general
election ballot with its official mark and endorsement.

After enacting these amendments, on August 18, 2015, the Party sent a letter to your office
designating itself a QPP in the 2016 election cycle, certifying its intent to nominate candidates
in 2016 in accordance with its internal rules and procedures and Utah Code Ann. 20A-9-406
without prejudice to the positions the party has asserted in the matter Utah Republican Party v.
Herbert, et al., Case No. 2:14-cv-876 (D. Utah), challenging the constitutionality of recent
amendments to the Utah Election Code.
On October 27, 2015, the Court held a hearing on pending motions for summary judgment. At
that hearing, the Court pointed out that 20A-9-101(12)(d) only required that members of a QPP
be permitted to seek nomination by either or both convention method or signature gathering,
asking your counsel to tell me what that means.13 In response, your legal counsel admitted that
those provisions should be interpreted to hold that a QPP only has to permit nomination by
convention under 101(12)(d).14 Your counsel suggested that provision conflicted with 20A9-406(3), which, he argued, reaffirm[ed] the right of the individual,15 indicating that would be
the next lawsuit.16
Analysis
1. Judicial Estoppel
We are ready to pursue it, if needed, but this issue does not have to be the next lawsuit. As you
know, based on the arguments presented in the lawsuit, the Court granted summary judgment to
the Party, ruling that SB54 was unconstitutional, and striking down 101(12)(a), because it
would have forced association with unaffiliated voters in any primary election, contrary to the
Partys candidate selection processes. Your November 19 and 20 letters now threaten to
disqualify the Party as a QPP if it does not allow its members to seek its nomination by both
11

2015 Utah Republican Party Bylaws (Bylaws), 8.0(A).

Const. Art. XII.2.I & 5.A.
13
10/27/2015 Hrg. Tr. at 34:7-9.
14
Id. at 34:20-24, 35:17-23, 36:8-10.
15
Id. at 34:25-35:6.
16
Id. at 35:13-15.
12

Lt. Governor Cox

December 3, 2015
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convention and signature-gathering methods. First, that is contrary to the positions that you have
taken in the lawsuit, especially to what your attorney asserted at the October 27 hearing.
Where a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in
maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have
changed, assume a contrary position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the
party who has acquiesced in the position formerly taken by him.17
You can see above how the Party relied on the positions your office took in defense of SB54, and
you cannot dispute that Judge Nuffer relied on those statements in rendering his rulings,
including where he left the rest of SB54 in tact. If, as it appears, the Attorney Generals Office is
recommending that you force the Party, under threat of disqualification, to accept candidates
who admittedly do not comply with the rules governing its candidate selection process, you are
being terribly misled. I urge you to reconsider.
2. Either or Both
Contrary to your letters and the statements of your counsel at the October 27 hearing, we do not
believe there is any need to read 101(12)(d) and 406(3) as conflicting. Section 101(12)(d)
requires that a QPP permit its members to seek its nomination by either or both of two
methods. And 406(3) merely provides that an individual may only seek the nomination of the
qualified political party by using a method described in Section 20A-9-407, Section 20A-9-408,
or both.
The phrase either or both in these provisions should be construed pursuant to its plain
language. The rules of statutory construction include the conjunctive/disjunctive canon which
is [t]he doctrine that in a legal instrument, and joins a conjunctive list to combine items, while
or joins a disjunctive list to create alternatives.18 In determining what a statute requires, a
disjunctive obligation is understood as an alternative obligation, meaning [a]n obligation
that can be satisfied in at least two different ways, at the choice of the obligor.19 It is almost
impossible to conclude otherwise. Note that the obligor in this case would be the Party.
Other authorities recognize a similar approach in interpreting the disjunctive or.
While there may be circumstances which call for an interpretation of the words
and and or, ordinarily these words are not interchangeable. The terms and
and or are often misused in drafting statutes.... The literal meaning of these
terms should be followed unless it renders the statute inoperable or the meaning
becomes questionable.20
17

New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001).

See Conjunctive/disjunctive canon, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
19
See Obligation, Blacks Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
20
1A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction 21.14, at 183-84 (6th ed. 2002); Foutz v.
United States, 72 F.3d 802, 805 (10th Cir. 1995) (The word or is not a fertile word which is subject
18

Lt. Governor Cox

December 3, 2015
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Utah cases have consistently construed [t]he disjunctive or between words in a statute
to delineate[] alternative ways a person might trigger the laws applicability.21 In the
only case we could find where the Utah Supreme Court was asked to interpret the
disjunctive or in the context of Utahs election code, it rejected the interpretation
recommended by the State that would have disqualified the Democratic Partys certified
replacement candidate on grounds that or is disqualified stood in contrast to the
preceding phrase dies, resigns, etc., thus demonstrating the legislatures intent to allow
a party to designate a replacement candidate regardless of when the disqualification
arose.22 For the same reason, the words either or both in 101(d) and 406(3) clarify
what the Party is obligated and not obligated to permit its members to do.23
And contrary to your letters, 406(3) and 406(4) should not be read to impose any
obligation on the Party, except that which is, as you say, specifically require[d].24 I
would request that you identify any provision in 20A-9-407, 20A-9-408, and 20A-9409 that the Party is violating by not allowing members to seek its nomination by
signature-gathering. Once you accept the position your office has already taken that
101(12)(d) only requires that a QPP permit its members to seek its nomination by
either or both of the two methods,25 there is nothing in 407, 408 or 409 obligating
that it do more. And forcing the Party to allow members to seek its nomination by
to varied constructions.). In Citizens for Responsible Gov't State Political Action Comm. v. Davidson,
236 F.3d 1174, 1190 (10th Cir. 2000), the Tenth Circuit rejected an argument similar to yours in striking
down a Colorado campaign finance law, concluding that that the legislature meant what it clearly said,
i.e., that all four uses of the word or in 103(11) were intended to signify or not sometimes or and
sometimes and. Similarly, in Riddle v. Hickenlooper, 927 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1098 (D. Colo. 2013)
revd, 742 F.3d 922 (10th Cir. 2014), after the Colorado district court upheld the states constitutional
amendment setting campaign contribution limits for a primary or a general election, thus indicat[ing]
an intent to distinguish between primary and general elections, the Tenth Circuit reversed only after
pointing out that the plaintiffs were not challenging the Colorado Constitution but rather were confining
their challenge to a Colorado statute that did not set contribution limits based on who has a primary and
who doesnt. Riddle, 742 F.3d at 926.
21
State v. Martinez, 896 P.2d 38, 40 (Utah App. 1995) (citing State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12, 20 (Utah App.
1988) (Garff, J., concurring) as noting that or is [a] disjunctive particle used as a function word to
indicate an alternative between different or unlike things) (quoting Blacks Law Dictionary 987 (5th ed.
1979)), and 1A Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction 21.14); see also State v. Parduhn, 2011 UT
55, 26 (construing law providing indigent legal services for counsel, defense resources, or both as
authorizing funding for expert witness even where defendant was represented by private counsel),
superseded by statute as stated in State v. Steinly, 2015 UT 15, 345 P.3d 1182; Calhoun v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2004 UT 56, 20 (holding that legislatures use of the disjunctive or, as opposed
to the conjunction and, clearly mandates that [an insurance] policy need only provide one type of
coverage and not both); In re A.M., 2009 UT App 118, 14 (construing statute as giving the state
jurisdiction unless either divestment provision applies).
22
Peck v. Monson, 652 P.2d 1325, 1326-27 (Utah 1982).
23
In re City of Bridgeport, 128 B.R. 688, 693 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991) (The legislative history of
102(5) states that if a party may do (a) or (b), then the party may do either or both. The party is not
limited to a mutually exclusive choice between the two alternatives.).
24
November 19, 2015, Letter from Spencer Cox to James Evans, at 2.
25
10/27/2015 Hrg. Tr. at 34:20-24, 35:17-23, 36:8-10.

Lt. Governor Cox

December 3, 2015
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signature-gathering pursuant to 408 creates a number of additional issues based on the
unconstitutional burden those provisions impose on the Partys ballot access rights. For
example, it is very likely that, for many of the political subdivisions specified in 408(8),
the law mandates signature requirements that exceed ratios that the Supreme Court has
held to be acceptable generally between of 1-5% of the total population of the Partys
registered members in that subdivision.26 And it is well-established that statutes should be
construe[d] such that no part or provision will be inoperative or superfluous, void or
insignificant, and so that one section will not destroy another.27
3. Choosing
Your letters suggest that, to the extent they do not conflict, 101(12)(d) and 406(3) give the
right to a QPPs member to choose whether to seek its nomination by convention or signaturegathering. But the fact that 101(12)(d) includes the words member[s] choosing to seek the
nomination does not give them the right to dictate to the Party how they will seek it or
obligate the Party to recognize the nomination of candidates who do not comply with its rules
and procedures. This is especially so where candidates certify that they will comply with the
Partys rules and procedures.28 And the language of 406(3), in stating what an individual may
only do, is limiting, as opposed to expanding, with respect to any individuals rights.
It really could not be otherwise. First, it is significant that 20A-9-401(2) provides that [Part 4]
may not be construed to govern or regulate the internal procedures of a registered political
party. Section 20A-9-402(2) provides that [i]f there is any conflict between any provision of
this part and any other sections in Title 20A, Election Code, this part takes precedence. This
suggests that 20A-9-406, 20A-9-407, and 20A-9-408 should not be construed to force the
Party to accept candidates who do not comply with its rules, and that, to the extent you feel that
101(12)(d) and 406(3) conflict, it is 406(3), which is limiting as opposed to granting an
individuals rights should take precedence.
Finally, it is significant that your office previously persuaded the Court that the non-stricken
parts of SB54, as applied, would not force the Party to adopt a different candidate selection
process.29 Your change of position, now construing SB54 to force the Party to accept signaturegathering candidates under threat of disqualification is not only unfair, but it is contrary to
canon of constitutional avoidance, which mandates that when the constitutionality of a statute is
assailed, if the statute be reasonably susceptible of two interpretations, by one of which it would
26

Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 435 (1992) (1%); Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 295 (1992) (2%);
Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 440-42 (1971) (5%).
27
Rapela v. Green, 2012 UT 57, 19 (quoting State v. J.M.S. (In re J.M.S.), 2011 UT 75, 22).
28
Bylaws 8.0(A).
29
Greenville County Republican Party Executive Comm. v. Greenville County Election Commn,
2015 WL 1188395, at *3 (4th Cir. Mar. 17, 2015) (explaining that a court could not, as a matter of law,
compel the State Party to adopt and utilize any particular partisan nomination procedure); Greenville
County Republican Party Executive Comm., 824 F. Supp. 2d at 668 (citing Eu v. San Francisco County
Democratic Cent. Committee, 489 U.S. 214, 230-31 (1988)). Utah similarly requires that statutory
provisions be read in harmony with other sections not isolation. Monarrez v. Utah Dept of Transp.,
2014 UT App 219, 14-16, cert. granted sub nom. Monarrez v. UDOT, 343 P.3d 708 (Utah 2015).

Lt. Governor Cox

December 3, 2015
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be unconstitutional and by the other valid, it is [the courts] plain duty to adopt that construction
which will save the statute from constitutional infirmity.30
4. Your Office Should Respect The Partys Rules And Procedures
Case law on the issue of candidate selection procedures shows how courts defer to the party in
resolving issues like these. In Clegg v. Bennion, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the Republican
Partys choice of candidate at convention even though he had been one day late in filing his
declaration of candidacy,31 rejecting another persons challenge seeking to have the candidate
retroactively disqualified. In part, Clegg reasoned that a ruling disqualifying the partys
candidate would disfranchise its delegates in a manner contrary to what is now 20A-9-401(1),
which provides that the election code be construed liberally so as to insure full opportunity to
become candidates and for voters to express their choice.32 Significantly, Clegg construed the
reference to voters in 401(1) as referring to the Partys convention delegates, as they had
been selected to represent the Partys members.33 Consistent with Clegg, the Party is simply
asking your office to respect its rules and internal procedures.34
The Party requires that its members comply with its Constitution and Bylaws, and those Bylaws
require that members choosing to seek its nomination certify that they will comply with the
Partys candidate selection process.35 Your office has already acknowledged that it must
disqualify the candidacy of any person who does not comply with a QPPs membership
requirements.36 And the Supreme Court has recognized how the state has duty to protect the
integrity of its political processes from frivolous or fraudulent candidacies.37 Except with a
vague reference to SB54s intent, to require that a QPP permit both methods as opposed to
either or both, your letters do not explain why you need to override these considerations and
force a strained interpretation of the law on the Party. But the Partys process is fair, and it is the
product of extensive effort, reflecting the desire of members to vet its candidates and hold them
accountable. In this way, the courts holding in Anderson v. Cook is particularly germane.38
30

Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 423 (2010) (quoting United States ex rel. Attorney General v.
Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407 (1909)); see also United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 45
(1953) (describing the canon as decisive in the choice of fair alternatives).
31
Clegg v. Bennion, 247 P.2d 614, 616 (1952).
32
Id. at 615-16 (quoting then-Utah Code Ann. 25-3-9 (1943)).
33
Id.
34
See also Duke v. Massey, 87 F.3d 1226, 1232-33 (11th Cir. 1996) (upholding a partys right to define
itself in a way that excluded a candidate from its presidential primary ballot); Swanson v. Pitt, 330 F.
Supp. 2d 1269, 1275-79 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (deferring to a partys interpretation of its bylaws and
associational rights to disqualify a candidate from running as that partys candidate); Jolivette v. Husted,
694 F.3d 760, 768-70 (6th Cir. 2012) (upholding the disqualification of an independent candidate from
the general election ballot based on a finding that the claim on that candidates declaration of candidacy
to be unaffiliated was not made in good faith); Van Susteren v. Jones, 331 F.3d 1024, 1025 (9th Cir.
2003) (upholding a states disaffiliation law to deny a candidate access to a partys primary ballot).
35
Const. Art. I C; Bylaws 8.0(A).
36
Thomas Tr. at 197:25-198:23.
37
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972).
38
Anderson v. Cook, 130 P.2d 278 (1942).

Lt. Governor Cox

December 3, 2015
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There, the Utah Supreme Court rejected an individuals attempt to force himself on the general
election ballot as the Partys nominee without having complied with the Partys candidate
selection procedure, which at the time included a sworn affirmation as to certain facts with
respect to [the candidates] political beliefs and a forty-day vetting process before the partys
primary.39 The Court observed:
Any candidate so filing, or accepting a filing, knows that for forty days before the
primary election he is under the spotlight of political scrutiny, and if he cannot
stand the test and pass the examination he will be eliminated by the rank and file
of the party. There cannot be forced down the throats of the party membership a
candidate they do not want.40
In other words, even if you assume that SB54 gives an individual the right to appear on the
ballot, it cannot give that individual the right to appear on the ballot as the Republican Partys
candidate, in violation of the Partys rules.41 The Supreme Court recognizes essentially two lines
of ballot access cases: one involving classifications based on wealth and the other involving
burdens on new or small political parties or independent candidates.42 Neither line recognizes
any right on the part of an individual to force a QPP to accept that individuals preference in how
he or she would prefer to seek the partys nomination in violation of the partys candidate
selection procedures.43 To the contrary, the Court has long-recognized the special protection
afforded to a political partys candidate selection process: [t]he moment of choosing the partys
nominee, we have said, is the crucial juncture at which the appeal to common principles may be
translated into concerted action, and hence to political power in the community.44
Finally, I would ask that you reconsider your position based on Cousins v. Wigoda, and other
authority recognizing that states should generally defer to a partys autonomy when it comes to
candidate selection.45 Cousins emerged out of a battle between two groups of delegates claiming
to represent Chicago at the 1972 Democratic National Convention.46 On the one hand, the
Wigoda delegates asserted their claim based on the fact that they had been elected in their states
Democratic primary, many by overwhelming margins. The Cousins delegates based their claim
on the fact that the Wigoda delegates had failed to comply with their partys new slate-making
and affirmative action guidelines. The partys convention delegates chose to seat the Cousins

39

Id. at 282-83.
Id. at 283.
41
Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 965 (1982).
42
Id. at 964-65.
43
And in those cases dealing with new or small political parties, the issue is whether ballot access
requirements burden the parties rights (of association). Id. at 965.
44
California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 575 (2000) (citations omitted).
45
Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 489 (1975); see also Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin,
450 U.S. 107 (1981); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208 (1986); Eu, 489 U.S.
214 (1989); Jones, 530 U.S. at 575.
46
Cousins, 419 U.S. at 479-81.
40

Lt. Governor Cox

December 3, 2015
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group, and the Wigoda delegates brought a legal action on grounds that was contrary to Illinois
law at the time mandating that a partys national convention delegates be selected by primary.47
The Court sided with the Cousins delegates, ruling that the party and its adherents enjoy a
constitutionally protected right of association that overrode the states interest in mandating that
parties comply with its electoral processes.48 And the Court rejected the argument made by the
Wigoda delegates based on the integrity of [the states] electoral processes and the right of its
citizens under the State and Federal Constitutions to effective suffrage.49 In this, Cousins is also
consistent with the Utah Supreme Courts decision in Clegg, recognizing that, in fact, suffrage
was exercised because the partys convention delegates had voted to seat the Cousins
delegates.50 In asking that your office defer to the Partys internal rules and candidate selection
procedures, we are similarly asking that you respect the votes and determinations made by the
Partys delegates to amend its Constitution and Bylaws as set forth above.
Conclusion
We are prepared to take this dispute immediately back to Court. I wanted to reach out in advance
because I had understood your desire to approach the Court jointly to seek a resolution on an
expedited basis, perhaps even asking the Court to certify a question for the Utah Supreme Court
under Utah Code Ann. 78A-3-102(1), as appropriate.51 If your position has not changed, please
respond with any suggestions that you have about how we may jointly proceed with litigation.
Thank you in advance for your time and consideration.
Sincerely,

James Evans, Chairman

Utah Republican Party

47

Id. at 481-83.
Id. at 487.
49
Id. at 489.
50
Id. at 489-91.
51
See, e.g., Ray v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-104, 2013 WL 5572731, at *9-*11 (D. Utah Oct.
9, 2013); Carranza v. United States, No. 2:07CV291DAK, 2009 WL 1392839, at *4 (D. Utah May 14,
2009).
48