LEGAL ETHICS

ADVICE TO A YOUNG PERSON INTERESTED IN A CAREER IN THE LAW

In May 1954, M. Paul Claussen, Jr., a 12-year-old boy living in Alexandria, Virginia, sent a letter to Mr. Justice Felix
Frankfurter in which he wrote that he was interested in going into the law as a career and requested advice as to
some ways to start preparing myself while still in junior high school. This is the reply he received:
My Dear Paul:
No one can be a truly competent lawyer unless he is a cultivated man. If I were you I would forget about any
technical preparation for the law. The best way to prepare for the law is to be a well-read person. Thus alone can
one acquire the capacity to use the English language on paper and in speech and with the habits of clear
thinking which only a truly liberal education can give. No less important for a lawyer is the cultivation of the
imaginative faculties by reading poetry, seeing great paintings, in the original or in easily available reproductions,
and listening to great music. Stock your mind with the deposit of much good reading, and widen and deepen your
feelings by experiencing vicariously as much as possible the wonderful mysteries of the universe, and forget about
your future career.
With good wishes,

BY JOSE DALISAY, JR.

To young Filipinos for whom EDSA 1 and the martial-law dictatorship are now vague if not vanished memories, the
name of Jose Wright DioknoPepe to his friends and contemporariesmay be a distant echo. It is a name often
spoken in the same breath as Ninoy Aquino, Tanny Taada, Chino Roces, Jovy Salonga, Gasty Ortigas, and a few other
battle-scarred fighters for freedom, but the association, while uplifting for all, tends to blur the individual in favor of
the group, as these unselfish gentlemen would have preferred.
But every hero is individually formed in the crucible of struggle, every heroic act individually chosen. Each hero
emerges like a pearl in an oyster from the womb of resistance, their brightest and strongest qualities rising to the
surface, the hardened accretions of personal values tested in the arena of public issues.

For a man such as Pepe Dioknochampion of human rights, nationalism, and Philippine sovereigntyheroism was
never something to be actively sought by an illustrious few. It was, rather, a collective virtue immanent in the people,
a people awakened to their rights, opportunities, and civic responsibilities. It was a hero who led a consistent life of
thinking the right ideas and doing the right thingsa life which, by its very nature, and despite its search for quietude
in a roiling universe, would inevitably court danger and alarm.
Dioknos was such a life, that of a lover of books who enjoyed nothing more than to lie prone in his library, devouring
tome after tome of fiction, education, and legal philosophy, and yet who could not and did not refuse to march in the
streets or argue in court as an impassioned combatant for his most cherished principles.
Unlike some of his contemporaries, Diokno was never flashy, never sought attention except to pursue or prove a
point. He came from a conservative, fairly privileged background, but eschewed flamboyance; he was very well
educated and literate in several languages, but forsook bombast for substance. He had a wry sense of humor
demonstrated by a possibly apocryphal story about his deadpan reaction to his reported dourness (You know me
Diokno, no joke.)but he preferred to laugh at the jokes of others. He was, at one time, a Secretary of Justice and
then a Senator of the Republicbut he campaigned alone, traveled without bodyguards, and never kept or fired a
gun in his political life. When he died, it was in the company of those he held dearesthis family, and his books.

Family background

Many of those books came from the library of his father Ramon, himself a lawyer who rose to be become a senator
and later a Justice of the Supreme Court. Ramons father, in turn, was the son of a revolutionary general, Ananias
Diokno, who had liberated much of Panay from the Spaniards in 1898. The Dioknos hailed from Taal, Batangas, but
Pepe was born in Manila on Feb. 26, 1922, to Ramon and his wife Leonor Wright, an American mestiza. (When Pepes

daughter Maris took this subject up with him and asked him if his lineage therefore made him one-fourth or oneeighth American, Pepe huffed and said, One hundred percent Filipino!)
It was a large family; Ramon had married Leonor after the death of his first wife, and there were ten children in the
brood (Pepe himself, by coincidence, would also have ten children). As the son of a general who went on to fight the
Americans, Ramon Dioknodespite the irony of marrying a mestizaloathed the United States and forbade the
speaking of English in his home. Thus Pepe grew up speaking Spanish, and learned English only from a tutor, as part
of his schooling.
Ramon Diokno had been an active lawyer and political figure, serving as a councilor in Batangas and later as a
campaign manager for and counsel to President Manuel L. Quezon before serving in the Senate and the Supreme
Court. Not surprisingly, he wanted his son Jose to take up law as well; a half-brother of Pepes had also finished law,
but died young. The boy resisted and, after graduating as valedictorian of his high school class in De La Salle College
in 1937, he studied commerce instead. Thanks to repeated acceleration, he graduated at the tender age of 17 also
from La Salle, summa cum laude. He took the CPA board examinationsfor which he had to secure special
dispensation, since he was too youngand topped them with a rating of 81.18 percent.

Self-taught bar-topnotcher
At this point, he could no longer ignore his fathers suasions, and he enrolled in law at the University of Sto. Tomas.
He had wanted to go to the University of the Philippines and would later send his own children there, but his
conservative Catholic parents would have none of it. As it happened, after just a year of study, the Second World War
broke out. Pepes father told him to use the time to read, and picked out the books for him to plow through. Pepes
passion for learning manifested itself immediately; after reading a couple of books, he went to the old man and asked
to be tested, but the old manas Maris Diokno recalls her fathers storytold him, You either know it or you dont.
Just read.

He continued reading, and when the war was over he took the bar exams in 1944 under a special dispensation from
the Court, since he had never completed his law degree. Again Pepe Diokno topped them with a rating of 95.3
percentalong with Jovito Salonga, who had gone the full route. At this time, his father took ill and asked him to take
over the firm.
One of his first important cases, as it turned out, involved defending his father. Ramon Diokno ran for the Senate in
the first postwar government in 1946, and won, but he objected to parity rights for American businessmena
nationalist stance supported by Jesus Lava, Luis Taruc, and the communist-affiliated Democratic Alliance in the Lower
House. To punish Ramon, his enemies filed a case of election fraud against him. Pepe rose to his fathers defense, and
eventually they won the case, but only at the end of the term in 1949. The father-and-son team must have made
quite an impression; Lorenzo Taada would later recall the young Pepe assisting his father in court, the both of them
blessed with phenomenally photographic memories. (After winning his case, Ramon Diokno was then appointed to
the Supreme Court, and died in Baguio during one of the tribunals summer sessions.)
Young lawyer

In the meanwhile Pepes life took another happy turn. He had met a pretty Bulakea named Carmen Reyes Icasiano
at a party; they had come with their respective dates. But Pepe and Nena soon fell in love, and they were married in
1949, after a two-year courtship. All in all, they would have ten children: Carmen Leonor, Jose Ramon, Maria de
la Paz, Maria Serena, Maria Teresa, Maria Socorro, Jose Miguel, Jose Manuel, Maria Victoria, and Martin Jose. The last,
Pepe and Nena took in as a two-week old infant in 1967.
Pepe Diokno the young lawyer found corporate law remunerative but boring. He took on some corporate cases, but
what he really enjoyed was litigation, the presentation of evidence. Again the passion showed in his eloquence; when

he argued a case before the Supreme Court, other lawyers flocked to watch him and to listen to him argue fluently in
both English and Spanish.
One of Pepes clients and closest friends was Manila Mayor Arsenio Lacson, a powerful politician who was poised to
run for the presidency. Diokno had successfully defended the outspoken Lacson against a libel charge, stemming
from Lacsons acerbic attacks on his radio program; Lacson also wrote a column for a newspaper that Pepe edited.
Maris Diokno remembers how close the mayor became to the family, who were then living in a house in Paraaque,
near the Baclaran church. Lacson used to go the house at six in the morning and cook breakfast for everyone before
waking them up.

Secretary of Justice

In 1961, Diokno was appointed Justice Secretary by President Diosdado Macapagal. It was a political
anomaly, because Macapagal was a Liberal Party stalwart while Diokno was a lifelong Nacionalista. But Macapagal
had asked the capable Lacsondespite Lacsons also being a Nacionalistato help run his presidential campaign,
and Lacson had agreed only on condition that Diokno be appointed to head Justice if Macapagal won. And so it
happened.
In any event the union did not last long; in March 1962, Sec. Diokno ordered a raid on a firm owned by American
businessman Harry S. Stonehill, who was suspected of tax evasion and bribery, among other crimes. Stonehill
reputedly bragged about having big-name politicians in his pocketbut Jose W. Diokno was not one of them. The
arrest and the subsequent corruption scandal resulted in an embarrassed Macapagal having to fire several Cabinet
membersincluding, inexplicably, Sec. Diokno, who had found the temerity to arrest Stonehill. He simply received a
letter from the President, accepting a resignation he never submitted, Maris recalls.
Diokno received death threats because of the Stonehill case; the family had to move important papers from one
hiding place to another, and Mayor Lacson assigned them a driver, a big, dark plainclothesman from the Manila
Police Department.

Senator

In 1963, Pepe Diokno was invited by the Nacionalistas to run for the Senate, and he agreed. He won, and
would serve two terms: from 1963 to 1969, and from 1969 until the declaration of martial law in 1972.
For the growing Diokno family, it was a happy interlude. The girls came to his office after school and played in the
anteroom until it was time to go. It was a family that prayed the rosary every night, led by Pepe himself. Family
outings usually meant piling up in the big black car for a trip to the PECO bookstore, where they would stay all day,
poring over books. Whenever Pepe and Nena went abroad, the children got more boxes of books, such as those by
Enid Blyton. (The only exception, Maris says, was a brother of Pepes who had aged with a childs mind, and for him
Pepe always had a toy.)
Pepe himself loved novels about cowboys and Indians, devouring them while lying flat on his stomach. After lunch
and his afternoon siesta, he listened to Tony Falcon, Agent X-44; he also loved kung fu movies. He was generous with
money, but he never kept money in his pockets; he gave everything to Nena. So he often found himself strapped for
cash, and Nena would have to run after him before leaving the house to make sure his wallet had something in it.
At work in the Senate, Diokno quickly established himself as a nationalist and reformer. But he also pushed
to promote Philippine businesson fair terms. The activist-writer Ed Garcia reports that: On the floor of the Senate,
he did not hesitate to articulate his thoughts on economic self-reliance and self-determination in the face of the
continued stay of foreign military bases which, he argued, justified foreign intervention in Philippine affairs.

As lawmaker, he successfully fought the oil companies and masterminded the signing into law of the Oil
Industry Commission Bill. He is the acknowledged father of the Board of Investments and author of the Investment
Incentives Act. He also authored Joint Resolution No. 2, which set the policies for economic development and social
progress, and co-authored the Export Incentives Act and the Revised Election Law, among others. For his
performance as legislator, Pepe Diokno was cited Outstanding Senator by the Free Press for four successive years
beginning 1967. (Garcia, 57)

Nationalist
It was typical of Diokno to mince no words in propounding his principles. In a speech before an American
audience in 1968delivered in a bastion of gentility called the Westchester Country Clubhe launched into a
comprehensive and well-measured but clearly critical speech explaining Philippine economic nationalism. The
Philippines, Diokno said, had a dream: It is the dream to join the modern world without sacrificing democracy to
dictatorship, as others are doing; not at the expense of the poorwho have paid the price elsewherebut of those
who reaped the benefits of colonialism and therefore can afford the cost of modernization. Philippine nationalism is
determined to achieve this dream. It knows it must restructure the Philippine economy and Philippine society to do
so. It knows it will be difficult and painful. All it asks of your people and your government is your understanding and,
if you deem it worthwhile, your help to make the process faster, less painful.; and if you do not deem it worthwhile, to
leave us alone.
Let us do it as we believe it must be done, not as you would do it in our place. Let us make our mistakes, not suffer
yours. With your help or despite your hindrance, Philippine nationalism will do the job. No one else can.
(Manalang, 102)
When he finished, his editor would note, there was no applause.

Martial Law

By the early 70s the political climate was darkening, and Pepe Diokno was beginning to sense an alarming
shift in the wind, toward authoritarianism. When Marcos suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, Diokno
resigned from the Nacionalista Party in protest, and took to the streets with the other members of the Movement of
Concerned Citizens for Civil Liberties (MCCCL). He had cast his lot with the resistance.
And so it happened that when Marcos declared martial law on Sept. 21, 1972, Pepe Diokno was among those first
enemies of the State arrested by the military in the early morning hours of September 23.
They had just prayed the novena, and the young Dioknos were planning to step out for a movie with their friends, but
their parents forbade them because of the bombings that had been going on. Just then five or six carloads of armed
soldiers arrived to invite Sen. Diokno to join them. They had no warrant, and had cut the Dioknos phone line. To
avoid any more trouble for his family, Diokno changed from his pajamas and went with the soldiers to Camp Crame,
accompanied by his young son Mike. He was later moved to Fort Bonifacio, there to join the likes of Ninoy Aquino,
Chino Roces, Teddy Locsin Sr., Voltaire Garcia, Nap Rama, Jose Mari Velez, and his other comrades in the civil liberties
movement. The country had been plunged into the maw of martial law, realizing his worst expectations.
Solitary confinement
The close-knit Dioknos were devastated by his arrest and imprisonment, especially when he was transferred, along
with Ninoy Aquino, to solitary confinement in Laur, Nueva Ecija. We didnt know where he had gone, Maris
remembers. One day the military just came and dropped off his belongings, including his underwear, except his
papers, which the military kept.
Laur brought together two of the keenest minds of the resistance to the dictatorship: Diokno and Ninoy Aquino, ten
years his junior, equally impassioned but much more voluble. Ninoy looked up to Pepe as a kind of older brother,
Maris says. Ninoy was a raconteur, with lots of stories. Dad was quiet and enjoyed listening and laughing along.

Unlike Ninoy, Pepes fight with Marcos never had a personal element; he had never had a face-to-face confrontation
with Marcos, and never would.
Solitary confinement would both strain and strengthen the spirit of the two men. Nena Diokno herself was a strong,
intelligent woman. Your mother is really strong and she kept me going, Pepe would later tell Maris. Pepe Diokno
forbade his family to cry in the presence of the guards. Dont give the military the pleasure of seeing you in pain,
he told his children. The only exception was his aunt Paz Wilson, the sister of his mother (who had already died by
then), who had virtually raised him. She often cried during her visits. Pepes solitary imprisonment at Fort Magsaysay
in Laur, Nueva Ecija (with Ninoy in a separate cell) was a painful moment for the family. Upon seeing their faces as
the Diokno family left the visiting area, Cory Aquino and her children prepared themselves for the worst. It was rare
to see the Dioknos in tears.
The whole familyeven Paz, who was in her 90shad to submit to a strip search when they came to visit
him, and again when they stepped out. The family endured the discomfort and the humiliation to spend precious time
with him.

Release
Back in Fort Bonifacio, they brought him booksin French and Spanish, so no one could censor them, as they
did the English texts; Pepe and Nena also spoke in Spanish, or one of the children would play the guitar and the rest
would sing to drown out their parents voices. The family brought in food; he brought out coffee for Nena. When
allowed to spend the day in his cell, usually on a Sunday, they would lay out a mat on the grass and all lie there, next
to each other. Whenever his roses bloomed he would say his release was nearing; the children harvested peanuts
and weeded his tiny garden.
Once, while he was still in prison, Nena brought him disastrous news: the building that housed his library on
M. H. del Pilar had been burned in a suspicious fire. He had known that library so well that he could ask for a book
and specify from memory which shelf it was on. Thankfully, unknown to him and with uncanny intuition, Nena had
earlier moved most of his books to the house, where they lay in topsy-turvy heapsbut safely.
On Sept. 11, 1974Ferdinand Marcoss 57th birthday, and almost two years since he was picked upPepe Diokno
was released from prison. He had never been charged with anything.

Free Legal Assistance Group

Sharpened and toughened by his imprisonment, Diokno plunged, to provide legal help to political detainees
and other martial-law victimsand long before other prominent lawyers and organizations took up the cause of
human rightshe set up the Free Legal Assistance Group. His concerns soon expanded to other causes and
constituencies, including tribal groups threatened by exploitation and military atrocities, peasants, social workers,
and other activists. He worked with Sister Mariani Dimaranan in Task Force Detainees, which had been set up by the
Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines to protect the rights of martial law victims and to document
cases of torture, summary execution, and disappearances.
He had no fear of being arrested again, and went around and outside the country to speak against tyranny and abuse
in the Philippines. But his was no message of gloom and doom; he could see beyond the immediate horizon into a
new dawning of freedom. In one of his most oft-quoted speeches, he said:
And so law in the land died. I grieve for it but I do not despair over it. I know, with a certainty no argument
can turn, no wind can shake, that from its dust will rise a new and better law: more just, more human, and more
humane. When that will happen, I know not. That it will happen, I know. (Manalang, 76)
Against the regimes reasoning that authoritarianism was needed to spur development, he argued:
Development is not just providing people with adequate food, clothing, and shelter; many prisons do as much.
Development is also people deciding what food, clothing, and shelter are adequate, and how they are to be provided.
Authoritarianism does not let people decide; its basic premise is that people do not know how to decide. So it

promotes repression, not development, repression that prevents meaningful change, and preserves the structure of
power and privilege. (Manalang, 42)
Conversely, as Ed Garcia observed, (Diokno) did not confine his defense of human rights merely to victims of civil
and political rights violations but extended his efforts to promote economic, social, and cultural rights as well.
(Garcia, 66-67)
Ka Pepe was often approached for legal help by members of the Communist Party, and he gave help freely;
more than once they asked him to join and even lead them, but he consistently declined. In a speech before the
Bishops-Businessmens Conference of the Philippines in April 1985, he argued forcefully and cogently for the
legalization of the Communist Party, maintaining that It is unjust to prosecute a person for his political beliefs.
(Manalang, 53) But he refused to believe in the necessity of armed struggle. There were not very many among those
who suffered during the long period of martial law who believed that the dictatorship could be overthrown without
resort to arms, Garcia notes. What singled Pepe Diokno out was that he not only believed it was possible to do so
but that more than anything else he worked relentlessly to build an active resistance of citizens that was necessary
to make it happen. (Garcia, 67)

People Power
To this end, in March 1983, he co-founded KAAKBAY (the Movement for Philippine Sovereignty and
Democracy). It took on issues such as elections, the US military bases, and other nationalist concerns. As immersed
as he had long been in the struggle for human rights and civil liberties, the assassination of Ninoy Aquino in August
1983 further spurred his involvement in a broadening network of resistance groups, including the Justice for Aquino,
Justice for All (JAJA) movement, and the Kongreso ng Mamamayang Pilipino (KOMPIL).
When the inevitable happened and EDSA 1 erupted in February 1986, Pepeever the thinking manwas
initially doubtful. He refused to go when this happened in EDSA, says Maris. There was a feeling that this was a
military attempt to save their necks and the people were simply being used to cover that action.
Even when he later agreed to serve the Aquino government as chairman of the Presidential Committee on
Human Rights and chairman of the government panel in charge of negotiations with rebel forces, he never forgot the
need for vigilance, reminding his countrymen that: Above all, we can strengthen the President by pointing out what
she is doing that is wrong. I think we weaken her if we support everything she does even when we do not agree with
that she is doing. Yes-men are not compatible with democracy. People expect our President and public officials to
make mistakesbut of course, to correct them as soon as they are convinced that they have erred. How can they
know they have erred, if we do not tell them so? (162)
As he had feared, the fairy-tale unity of what Maris (as Dr. Ma. Serena Diokno, the professor of history) would
describe as someone who was for agrarian reform sitting next to someone who would refuse to give up their land
sitting next to someone who simply wanted US nuclear weapons and the bases out, next to someone who said we
need the Americans soon unraveled. These contradictions and tensions tragically exploded in what would be known
as the Mendiola Massacre of Jan. 22, 1987, during which 15 peacefully protesting farmers were shot dead by
government troops practically at the doorsteps of the Palace. In deep disgust and even greater sadness, Jose W.
Diokno resigned from his two positions. It was the only time we saw him near tears, Maris says.

Death and legacy

By theneven much earlierDiokno was facing his own death. In 1984, he had been diagnosed with lung
cancer. He had smoked all his adult life, as did Nena. In October 1986, they took him to Manila Doctors Hospital for a
blood transfusion; things looked very bleak at that point, and when Maris asked the doctor how much time they had
left with him, he told her a matter of days. But Pepe himself thought otherwise; I know Im dying, he said, but
not just yet. He had the transfusion stopped and asked to be brought home; he didnt want to die in the hospital.
He lived for four more months. They had brought him down to lie among his books, which was where he died,
in peace and free of pain, at 2:40 am on Feb. 27, 1987. He had just turned 65.

Disease had ravaged his body, and creeping blindness had stilled his writing, but he was lucid to the last. The
children remember him at his hopeful, fighting, smiling best, dreaming of justice on earth, and justice in time. In
1981, in a speech on The Filipino Concept of Justice, Jose W. Diokno took that dream in his hands and said:
Are these standards impossible to meet? If you mean meet completely and immediately, they are. But only
yesterday in world time, it was thought impossible to land on the moon. And not too long ago, Aristotleone of the
wisest of menjustified slavery as natural and listed torture as a source of evidence. So standards thought too high
today may well turn out to be too low tomorrow. But whether they do so or not is not really important. What Nikos
Kazantsakis said of freedom can be said of justice: the superior virtue is not to receive justice, it is to fight
relentlessly for itto struggle for justice in time, yet under the aspect of eternity. (Manalang, 31)
Upon Dioknos death, President Aquino declared a period of national mourning, and in 2004, President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo issued an order declaring a national day of remembrance on his 17th death anniversary. Some
lawmakers sponsored a bill to rename Taft Avenue to Diokno Avenue. None of those encomiums resonate more than
Pepe Dioknos own words and the strength of his faith in a better future. When he observed a young woman cradling
her husband who had been horribly tortured, he saw not despair but hope:
As I looked at the couple, I saw in them the face of every Filipino; and I knew then that martial law could crush our
bodies; it could break our minds; but it could not conquer our spirit. It may silence our voice and seel our eyes; but it
cannot kill our hope nor obliterate our vision. We will struggle on, no matter how long it takes or what it costs, until
we establish a just community of free men and women in our land, deciding together, working and striving together,
but also singing and dancing, laughing and living together. That is the ultimate lesson. (Manalang, 45)

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL.
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as Republic Act
No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the
bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations
successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per
cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the
different bar examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness with which the examination papers
were graded, this court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only 72 per
cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was
raised to 75 per cent.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this court, and feeling
conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who
obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in
1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar
examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The President requested the views of this court on the bill.
Complying with that request, seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse
thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved
Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this court
reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953
without his signature. The law, which incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in full as follows:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN HUNDRED AND
FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered one hundred twenty-seven of
the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general average of seventy per cent in any bar
examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up to the August nineteen hundred and fiftyone bar examinations; seventy-one per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations;
seventy-two per cent in the in the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per cent
in the nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and
fifty-five bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in any subject, shall be
allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar: Provided,
however, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as
one and included as part of the next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject in any bar
examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to have passed in such subject
or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average that said
candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its
provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked
the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the
reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual
petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked
Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be admitted
to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied equally to all
concerned whether they have filed petitions or not. A complete list of the petitioners, properly classified, affected by
this decision, as well as a more detailed account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are appended to this decision
as Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the effects of the law, the following statistical data are set forth:
Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only 586 have filed either
motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere motions for reconsideration.
(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said Republic Act. These
candidates had each taken from two to five different examinations, but failed to obtain a passing average in any of
them. Consolidating, however, their highest grades in different subjects in previous examinations, with their latest
marks, they would be sufficient to reach the passing average as provided for by Republic Act No. 972.
(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of which only 604 have
filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had individually presented motions for
reconsideration which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented
similar motions, which are still pending because they could be favorably affected by Republic Act No. 972,
although as has been already stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the legal profession and the
administration of justice, and because some doubts have been expressed as to its validity, the court set the hearing
of the afore-mentioned petitions for admission on the sole question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is
constitutional.
We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of the members of the bar who
have amply argued, orally an in writing, on the various aspects in which the question may be gleaned. The valuable
studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of
the validity of the law, and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz,
Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V.
Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from the memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M.
Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema
themselves, has greatly helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the court have exhausted almost all Philippine
and American jurisprudence on the matter. The question has been the object of intense deliberation for a long time
by the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the preparation of the majority opinion was assigned to a new member in
order to place it as humanly as possible above all suspicion of prejudice or partiality.
Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered
from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion of the Explanatory Note of the
proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:
The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous handicap which students
during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of
reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law soon after the
liberation.
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is claimed that in
addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because they suffered from "insufficiency of
reading materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who
confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal in the
aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency,
precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one
of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal
profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of those
inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious social
danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated.
There were abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed copies were made available to the
public during those years and private enterprises had also published them in monthly magazines and annual digests.
The Official Gazette had been published continuously. Books and magazines published abroad have entered without
restriction since 1945. Many law books, some even with revised and enlarged editions have been printed locally
during those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports began to be published since 1946, which continued to be
supplemented by the addition of new volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.
Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.
The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicable principles, but the resolution
of the question would have been easier had an identical case of similar background been picked out from the
jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which has been
directly derived the judicial system established here with its lofty ideals by the Congress of the United States, and
which we have preserved and attempted to improve, or in our contemporaneous judicial history of more than half a
century? From the citations of those defending the law, we can not find a case in which the validity of a similar law

had been sustained, while those against its validity cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646), of
Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061),
of Guaria (24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the President which is expressed in his vote of the original bill and
which the postponement of the contested law respects.
This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had been promulgated, the judiciary
immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not within our power to offer a precedent to uphold the
disputed law.
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that has been cited to us as a favorable
precedent of the law that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of New York revoked the decision of
the Supreme court of that State, denying the petition of Cooper to be admitted to the practice of law under the
provisions of a statute concerning the school of law of Columbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was
declared by the Court of Appeals to be consistent with the Constitution of the state of New York.
It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:
They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes for either of them for any
elective office except that of the Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature or the people, shall be void. They
shall not exercise any power of appointment to public office. Any male citizen of the age of twenty-one years,
of good moral character, and who possesses the requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall be
entitled to admission to practice in all the courts of this State. (p. 93).
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as follows:
Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing them had previously rested with the
judges, and this was the principal appointing power which they possessed. The convention was evidently
dissatisfied with the manner in which this power had been exercised, and with the restrictions which the
judges had imposed upon admission to practice before them. The prohibitory clause in the section quoted
was aimed directly at this power, and the insertion of the provision" expecting the admission of attorneys, in
this particular section of the Constitution, evidently arose from its connection with the object of this
prohibitory clause. There is nothing indicative of confidence in the courts or of a disposition to preserve any
portion of their power over this subject, unless the Supreme Court is right in the inference it draws from the
use of the word `admission' in the action referred to. It is urged that the admission spoken of must be by the
court; that to admit means to grant leave, and that the power of granting necessarily implies the power of
refusing, and of course the right of determining whether the applicant possesses the requisite qualifications
to entitle him to admission.
These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the act. (p. 93.)
Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that it provided that the possession of a
diploma of the school of law of Columbia College conferring the degree of Bachelor of Laws was evidence of the legal
qualifications that the constitution required of applicants for admission to the Bar. The decision does not however
quote the text of the law, which we cannot find in any public or accessible private library in the country.
In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of New York, the Court of Appeals said
of the object of the law:
The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College being an institution of established
reputation, and having a law department under the charge of able professors, the students in which
department were not only subjected to a formal examination by the law committee of the institution, but to a
certain definite period of study before being entitled to a diploma of being graduates, the Legislature
evidently, and no doubt justly, considered this examination, together with the preliminary study required by
the act, as fully equivalent as a test of legal requirements, to the ordinary examination by the court; and as
rendering the latter examination, to which no definite period of preliminary study was essential, unnecessary
and burdensome.
The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of the applicant, and for the mere
purpose of substituting the examination by the law committee of the college for that of the court. It could
have had no other object, and hence no greater scope should be given to its provisions. We cannot suppose
that the Legislature designed entirely to dispense with the plain and explicit requirements of the
Constitution; and the act contains nothing whatever to indicate an intention that the authorities of the
college should inquire as to the age, citizenship, etc., of the students before granting a diploma. The only
rational interpretation of which the act admits is, that it was intended to make the college diploma
competent evidence as to the legal attainments of the applicant, and nothing else. To this extent alone it
operates as a modification of pre-existing statutes, and it is to be read in connection with these statutes and
with the Constitution itself in order to determine the present condition of the law on the subject. (p.89)
xxx
xxx
xxx
The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission, that has simply
prescribed what shall be competent evidence in certain cases upon that question. (p.93)
From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar may be clearly seen. Please
note only the following distinctions:
(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia College who failed in the bar examinations
be admitted to the practice of law.
(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the
question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree the admission of any lawyer.
(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines are entirely different on the matter of
admission of the practice of law.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been disputably a judicial function and
responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power
have been demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." Even
considering the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules promulgated by

this Court regarding the admission to the practice of law, to our judgment and proposition that the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly belonging to
Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts,
whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts are governed
by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. And it becomes more undisputably
judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of these same individuals are attempted to
be revoked or modified.
We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending,
disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. A comprehensive
and conscientious study of this matter had been undertaken in the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in
which the validity of a legislative enactment providing that Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts was
discussed. From the text of this decision we quote the following paragraphs:
This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in the history of the English speaking
people so far as we have been able to ascertain. There has been much uncertainty as to the extent of the
power of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate qualifications of attorney at law has been expressly
committed to the courts, and the act of admission has always been regarded as a judicial function. This act
purports to constitute Mr. Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it stands alone as an assertion of
legislative power. (p. 444)
Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1, art. 4.) In so far
as the prescribing of qualifications for admission to the bar are legislative in character, the Legislature is
acting within its constitutional authority when it sets up and prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)
But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its judgment will serve the purpose of
legitimate legislative solicitude, is the power of the court to impose other and further exactions and
qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)
Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct, independent, and coordinate
branches of the government. Neither branch enjoys all the powers of sovereignty which properly belongs to
its department. Neither department should so act as to embarrass the other in the discharge of its respective
functions. That was the scheme and thought of the people setting upon the form of government under which
we exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525; Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)
The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which the administration of justice
is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By committing a portion of the powers of
sovereignty to the judicial department of our state government, under 42a scheme which it was supposed
rendered it immune from embarrassment or interference by any other department of government, the courts
cannot escape responsibility fir the manner in which the powers of sovereignty thus committed to the judicial
department are exercised. (p. 445)
The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is an attache of the
courts. The quality of justice dispense by the courts depends in no small degree upon the integrity of its bar.
An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and reproach to the administration of justice and bring the courts
themselves into disrepute. (p.445)
Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over their bars, at least in the English
speaking countries. (p. 445)
After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:
Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries prior to the adoption of our
Constitution, the courts of England, concededly subordinate to Parliament since the Revolution of 1688, had
exercise the right of determining who should be admitted to the practice of law, which, as was said in Matter
of the Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's New Cases 235, "constitutes the most solid of all titles." If the courts
and judicial power be regarded as an entity, the power to determine who should be admitted to practice law
is a constituent element of that entity. It may be difficult to isolate that element and say with assurance that
it is either a part of the inherent power of the court, or an essential element of the judicial power exercised
by the court, but that it is a power belonging to the judicial entity and made of not only a sovereign
institution, but made of it a separate independent, and coordinate branch of the government. They took this
institution along with the power traditionally exercise to determine who should constitute its attorney at law.
There is no express provision in the Constitution which indicates an intent that this traditional power of the
judicial department should in any manner be subject to legislative control. Perhaps the dominant thought of
the framers of our constitution was to make the three great departments of government separate and
independent of one another. The idea that the Legislature might embarrass the judicial department by
prescribing inadequate qualifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent with the dominant purpose of
making the judicial independent of the legislative department, and such a purpose should not be inferred in
the absence of express constitutional provisions. While the legislature may legislate with respect to the
qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its general and unquestioned power to protect the
public interest. When it does legislate a fixing a standard of qualifications required of attorneys at law in
order that public interests may be protected, such qualifications do not constitute only a minimum standard
and limit the class from which the court must make its selection. Such legislative qualifications do not
constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond which the court cannot go in fixing additional qualifications
deemed necessary by the course of the proper administration of judicial functions. There is no legislative
power to compel courts to admit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit to exercise the prerogatives of
an attorney at law. (p. 450)
Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is quite likely true that the
legislature may exercise the power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a legislative functions.
However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous that the power to admit attorneys to the practice of law is
a judicial function. In all of the states, except New Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our
investigation reveals, attorneys receive their formal license to practice law by their admission as members of

10

the bar of the court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565; Ex parteGarland,
4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285; Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843,
115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann.
Cas. 413.
The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the courts, it having
been so generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to practice is the judgment of the
court, and an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to confer such right upon any one being most
exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an attorney is and always has been a purely
judicial function, no matter where the power to determine the qualifications may reside. (p. 451)
In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of the Senate of that
State, 180 NE 725, said:
It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws that there be members of
the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral character. This arises from the need of
enlightened assistance to the honest, and restraining authority over the knavish, litigant. It is highly
important, also that the public be protected from incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose opportunity
for doing mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C.L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N.Y. 456, 470,
471, 162 N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851: "Membership in the bar is a privilege burden with conditions." One is
admitted to the bar "for something more than private gain." He becomes an "officer of the court", and ,like
the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the end of justice. His cooperation with the court is due
"whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld." Without such attorneys at law the judicial
department of government would be hampered in the performance of its duties. That has been the history of
attorneys under the common law, both in this country and England. Admission to practice as an attorney at
law is almost without exception conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in courts, as
are other proceedings invoking judicial action. Admission to the bar is accomplish and made open and
notorious by a decision of the court entered upon its records. The establishment by the Constitution of the
judicial department conferred authority necessary to the exercise of its powers as a coordinate department
of government. It is an inherent power of such a department of government ultimately to determine the
qualifications of those to be admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting in its work, and to protect itself in
this respect from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient learning, and those not possessing good moral
character. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L.
Ed. 565, "It has been well settled, by the rules and practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively
with the court to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney and counselor, and
for what cause he ought to be removed."
In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to practice the legal profession by
virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:
In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath for attorneys to be
unconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney's office as follows: "They are officers of the court,
admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their possessing sufficient legal learning and fair private
character. It has always been the general practice in this country to obtain this evidence by an examination
of the parties. In this court the fact of the admission of such officers in the highest court of the states to
which they, respectively, belong for, three years preceding their application, is regarded as sufficient
evidence of the possession of the requisite legal learning, and the statement of counsel moving their
admission sufficient evidence that their private and professional character is fair. The order of admission is
the judgment of the court that the parties possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and counselors,
and are entitled to appear as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry the parties become officers of
the court, and are responsible to it for professional misconduct. They hold their office during good behavior,
and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by the judgment of the court after
opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, admission or their exclusion is not the exercise
of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial power, and has been so held in numerous cases. It
was so held by the court of appeals of New York in the matter of the application of Cooper for admission. Re
Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and Counselors", said that court, "are not only officers of the court, but
officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature; and hence their
appointment may, with propriety, be entrusted to the court, and the latter, in performing his duty, may very
justly considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate judicial functions." (pp. 650-651).
We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:
Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the exercise of a judicial
function, and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this point. Admission to practice have also
been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent powers of the court. Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172
Pac. 906.
Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent power of the court.
A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See Annotation on Power of Legislature respecting
admission to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.
On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments
of the government.
The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is that it is the province
of the legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of transactions occurring
subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary determines rights and obligations with reference to
transactions that are past or conditions that exist at the time of the exercise of judicial power, and the
distinction is a vital one and not subject to alteration or change either by legislative action or by judicial
decree.

11

The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other departments of the
government. 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.
If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of them construction of
the law according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by settling aside their judgments,
compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of offenders, or directing what particular steps
shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry. Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.
In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70 per
cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is
not a legislation; it is a judgment a judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year
affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for
justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that
may be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as is
the case with the law in question.
That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rule promulgated by
this Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument. Section 13, article VIII of the
Constitution provides:
Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading,
practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the
power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal,
alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines. Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities concerning
the admission to the practice of law. the primary power and responsibility which the Constitution recognizes continue
to reside in this Court. Had Congress found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have
nothing over which to exercise the power granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules
promulgated by this Court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal,
alter and supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that Congress substitute or take the place of this Tribunal
in the exercise of its primary power on the matter. The Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress may admit,
suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. Its
power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according to its judgment the
need for a better service of the legal profession requires it. But this power does not relieve this Court of its
responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the legal
profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the admission to the
practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them may and should be exercised with the
respect that each owes to the other, giving careful consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each
department requires. These powers have existed together for centuries without diminution on each part; the
harmonious delimitation being found in that the legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on the
admission to the Bar respond to the demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues,
culture, training and responsibility. The legislature may, by means of appeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill
up any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility for a good and
efficient administration of justice and the supervision of the practice of the legal profession, should consider these
reforms as the minimum standards for the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these reforms the lofty
objective that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating
attorneys at law is realized. They are powers which, exercise within their proper constitutional limits, are not
repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the
increasing and exacting necessities of the administration of justice.
The case of Guaria (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guaria took examination and failed by a few points
to obtain the general average. A recently enacted law provided that one who had been appointed to the position of
Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of law without a previous examination. The Government appointed Guaria
and he discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote province. This tribunal refused to give his license without previous
examinations. The court said:
Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks admission to the
bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds the office of provincial fiscal for
the Province of Batanes.
Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:
Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety, entitled "An Act
providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands," is hereby
amended to read as follows:
1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the sovereignty of
Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing as members of the bar of the Philippine
Islands at the time of the adoption of this code; Provided, That any person who, prior to the passage of this
act, or at any time thereafter, shall have held, under the authority of the United States, the position of justice
of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or associate judge of the Court of Land
Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position of Attorney General, Solicitor General, Assistant
Attorney General, assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney General, prosecuting attorney for the City of
Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro
Province, or assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the

12

Philippine Islands without an examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact
to the satisfaction of said court.
The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant took, and failed to pass the
prescribed examination. The report of the examining board, dated March 23, 1907, shows that he received
an average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of legal learning upon which he was examined, thus
falling four points short of the required percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in the performance of our
duty to the public and to the bar, if, in the face of this affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant
in the required qualifications of learning in the law at the time when he presented his former application for
admission to the bar, we should grant him license to practice law in the courts of these Islands, without first
satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass the examination on that occasion, he now "possesses the
necessary qualifications of learning and ability."
But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is entitled as of right to
be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed examination "upon motion before the Supreme Court"
accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and now holds the office of provincial fiscal of the
Province of Batanes. It is urged that having in mind the object which the legislator apparently sought to
attain in enacting the above-cited amendment to the earlier statute, and in view of the context generally and
especially of the fact that the amendment was inserted as a proviso in that section of the original Act which
specifically provides for the admission of certain candidates without examination. It is contented that this
mandatory construction is imperatively required in order to give effect to the apparent intention of the
legislator, and to the candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised.
And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United States, articles 2, 16 and 17 of Act No.
136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:
Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission and confirmed to it by the Act
of Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a case such as that under consideration wholly
destroyed, by giving the word "may," as used in the above citation from Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of
any Act of Congress prescribing, defining or limiting the power conferred upon the commission is to that
extent invalid and void, as transcending its rightful limits and authority.
Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions enumerated, and with particular
emphasis in the case of Guaria, the Court held:
In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the bar under the provisions of this statute
have been considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact that such appointments had been made as
satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the applicant. But in all of those cases we had reason to believe
that the applicants had been practicing attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.
In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was not and never had
been practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of his appointment as provincial
fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the required qualifications at the time
when he last applied for admission to the bar.
In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that occasion, we do not think that his appointment
to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his possession of the necessary qualifications of
learning and ability. We conclude therefore that this application for license to practice in the courts of the
Philippines, should be denied.
In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points short of the
necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice; and in view also of the fact that since that time he
has held the responsible office of the governor of the Province of Sorsogon and presumably gave evidence of
such marked ability in the performance of the duties of that office that the Chief Executive, with the consent
and approval of the Philippine Commission, sought to retain him in the Government service by appointing
him to the office of provincial fiscal, we think we would be justified under the above-cited provisions of Act
No. 1597 in waiving in his case the ordinary examination prescribed by general rule, provided he offers
satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a special examination which will be given him by a committee of
the court upon his application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he desires so to do, to present
himself at any of the ordinary examinations prescribed by general rule. (In re Guaria, pp. 48-49.)
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this
Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely
to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been found also to suffer from the fatal defect of
being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a classification, it is arbitrary and unreasonable.
In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the Supreme Court, until December 31 of that
year, to grant license for the practice of law to those students who began studying before November 4, 1897, and
had studied for two years and presented a diploma issued by a school of law, or to those who had studied in a law
office and would pass an examination, or to those who had studied for three years if they commenced their studies
after the aforementioned date. The Supreme Court declared that this law was unconstitutional being, among others,
a class legislation. The Court said:
This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by virtue of diplomas from law
schools issued to the applicants. The act of the general assembly passed in 1899, under which the
application is made, is entitled "An act to amend section 1 of an act entitled "An act to revise the law in
relation to attorneys and counselors," approved March 28, 1884, in force July 1, 1874." The amendment, so
far as it appears in the enacting clause, consists in the addition to the section of the following: "And every
application for a license who shall comply with the rules of the supreme court in regard to admission to the
bar in force at the time such applicant commend the study of law, either in a law or office or a law school or
college, shall be granted a license under this act notwithstanding any subsequent changes in said rules".
In re Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.

13

. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that up to December 31, 1899, this
court shall grant a license of admittance to the bar to the holder of every diploma regularly issued by any
law school regularly organized under the laws of this state, whose regular course of law studies is two years,
and requiring an attendance by the student of at least 36 weeks in each of such years, and showing that the
student began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual proofs of good
moral character. The other branch of the proviso is that any student who has studied law for two years in a
law office, or part of such time in a law office, "and part in the aforesaid law school," and whose course of
study began prior to November 4, 1897, shall be admitted upon a satisfactory examination by the examining
board in the branches now required by the rules of this court. If the right to admission exists at all, it is by
virtue of the proviso, which, it is claimed, confers substantial rights and privileges upon the persons named
therein, and establishes rules of legislative creation for their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)
Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation, prohibited by the
constitution, and invalid as such. If the legislature had any right to admit attorneys to practice in the courts
and take part in the administration of justice, and could prescribe the character of evidence which should be
received by the court as conclusive of the requisite learning and ability of persons to practice law, it could
only be done by a general law, persons or classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2. The right to practice
law is a privilege, and a license for that purpose makes the holder an officer of the court, and confers upon
him the right to appear for litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees therefor, and creates certain
exemptions, such as from jury services and arrest on civil process while attending court. The law conferring
such privileges must be general in its operation. No doubt the legislature, in framing an enactment for that
purpose, may classify persons so long as the law establishing classes in general, and has some reasonable
relation to the end sought. There must be some difference which furnishes a reasonable basis for different
one, having no just relation to the subject of the legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E.
62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.
The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by experience, may furnish a basis for
classification (Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place where such physician has resided and
practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis, and is an arbitrary discrimination, making an enactment
based upon it void (State vs. Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes to say what
shall serve as a test of fitness for the profession of the law, and plainly, any classification must have some
reference to learning, character, or ability to engage in such practice. The proviso is limited, first, to a class
of persons who began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897. This class is subdivided into two classes
First, those presenting diplomas issued by any law school of this state before December 31, 1899; and,
second, those who studied law for the period of two years in a law office, or part of the time in a law school
and part in a law office, who are to be admitted upon examination in the subjects specified in the present
rules of this court, and as to this latter subdivision there seems to be no limit of time for making application
for admission. As to both classes, the conditions of the rules are dispensed with, and as between the two
different conditions and limits of time are fixed. No course of study is prescribed for the law school, but a
diploma granted upon the completion of any sort of course its managers may prescribe is made all-sufficient.
Can there be anything with relation to the qualifications or fitness of persons to practice law resting upon the
mere date of November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of classification. Plainly not. Those who began the
study of law November 4th could qualify themselves to practice in two years as well as those who began on
the 3rd. The classes named in the proviso need spend only two years in study, while those who commenced
the next day must spend three years, although they would complete two years before the time limit. The one
who commenced on the 3rd. If possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted without examination before
December 31, 1899, and without any prescribed course of study, while as to the other the prescribed course
must be pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless. Such classification cannot rest upon any natural reason,
or bear any just relation to the subject sought, and none is suggested. The proviso is for the sole purpose of
bestowing privileges upon certain defined persons. (pp. 647-648.)
In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, where the legislature attempted by law to
reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court also held with regards to its aspect of being a class legislation:
But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the legislature has power to prescribe
ultimately and definitely the qualifications upon which courts must admit and license those applying as
attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in the manner here attempted. That power must be
exercised through general laws which will apply to all alike and accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of
the right of the Legislature to exact qualifications of those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice Field
in the case of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: "It is
undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States to follow any lawful calling, business or profession
he may choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex, and
condition." This right may in many respects be considered as a distinguishing feature of our republican
institutions. Here all vocations are all open to every one on like conditions. All may be pursued as sources of
livelihood, some requiring years of study and great learning for their successful prosecution. The interest, or,
as it is sometimes termed, the "estate" acquired in them that is, the right to continue their prosecution
is often of great value to the possessors and cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any more than their real
or personal property can be thus taken. It is fundamental under our system of government that all similarly
situated and possessing equal qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutes regulating the
practice of medicine, requiring medications to establish the possession on the part of the application of his
proper qualifications before he may be licensed to practice, have been challenged, and courts have seriously
considered whether the exemption from such examinations of those practicing in the state at the time of the
enactment of the law rendered such law unconstitutional because of infringement upon this general
principle. State vs. Thomas Call, 121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see, also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg,
101 Wis. 172, 76 N.W. 345; State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.

14

This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right to practice law and to constitute
him an officer of this Court as a mere matter of legislative grace or favor. It is not material that he had once
established his right to practice law and that one time he possessed the requisite learning and other
qualifications to entitle him to that right. That fact in no matter affect the power of the Legislature to select
from the great body of the public an individual upon whom it would confer its favors.
A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court to admit to the
practice of law without examination, all who had served in the military or naval forces of the United States
during the World War and received a honorable discharge therefrom and who (were disabled therein or
thereby within the purview of the Act of Congress approved June 7th, 1924, known as "World War Veteran's
Act, 1924 and whose disability is rated at least ten per cent thereunder at the time of the passage of this
Act." This Act was held |unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly violated the quality clauses of the
constitution of that state. In re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227 N.W. 179.
A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as follows:
The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be valid must rest upon
material differences between the person included in it and those excluded and, furthermore, must be based
upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided the constitutional prohibition, must be
founded upon pertinent and real differences, as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones. Therefore,
any law that is made applicable to one class of citizens only must be based on some substantial difference
between the situation of that class and other individuals to which it does not apply and must rest on some
reason on which it can be defended. In other words, there must be such a difference between the situation
and circumstances of all the members of the class and the situation and circumstances of all other members
of the state in relation to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation as presents a just and natural cause
for the difference made in their liabilities and burdens and in their rights and privileges. A law is not general
because it operates on all within a clause unless there is a substantial reason why it is made to operate on
that class only, and not generally on all. (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, have obtained a
general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in
1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe
the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general
average of 75 per cent, which has been invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive of the nature indicated by
the abovementioned authorities, for this classification ? If there is none, and none has been given, then the
classification is fatally defective.
It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the general average indicated, were not
included because the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful candidates of those years. This fact does not justify
the unexplained classification of unsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither
is the exclusion of those who failed before said years under the same conditions justified. The fact that this Court has
no record of examinations prior to 1946 does not signify that no one concerned may prove by some other means his
right to an equal consideration.
To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it is argued that it is
curative, and that in such form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949
were there cases in which the Tribunal permitted admission to the bar of candidates who did not obtain the general
average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained only 72 per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or
more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent, which
was considered by the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of circumstances
deemed to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the passing averages during those years were all that could be
objected to or criticized. Now, it is desired to undo what had been done cancel the license that was issued to those
who did not obtain the prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly not. The disputed law clearly does not propose to do so.
Concededly, it approves what has been done by this Tribunal. What Congress lamented is that the Court did not
consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient to qualify them to
practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or defect of judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to complete the
cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of the disputed law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and 1955,
increasing each year the general average by one per cent, with the order that said candidates be admitted to the Bar.
This purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof that what the law attempts to amend and correct are not the
rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court, by means of simply taking its place. This is doing directly
what the Tribunal should have done during those years according to the judgment of Congress. In other words, the
power exercised was not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which continue in force. What was done was to stop
or suspend them. And this power is not included in what the Constitution has granted to Congress, because it falls
within the power to apply the rules. This power corresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty been confided.
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite intervals. The grave defect of
this system is that it does not take into account that the laws and jurisprudence are not stationary, and when a
candidate finally receives his certificate, it may happen that the existing laws and jurisprudence are already different,
seriously affecting in this manner his usefulness. The system that the said law prescribes was used in the first bar
examinations of this country, but was abandoned for this and other disadvantages. In this case, however, the fatal
defect is that the article is not expressed in the title will have temporary effect only from 1946 to 1955, the text of
article 2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. This is contrary to Section 21 (1), article VI of the
Constitution, which vitiates and annuls article 2 completely; and because it is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious
that its nullity affect the entire law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the legislative powers of
Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because they create or establish arbitrary methods
or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and third, because their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or
its basic principles. As has already been seen, the contested law suffers from these fatal defects.

15

Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional and therefore,
void, and without any force nor effect for the following reasons, to wit:
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinations of 1946-1952, and
who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly found by this Court in the
aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to
determine if they are at present already prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform
something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional
responsibility of the Supreme Court.
2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of these 810 candidates,
without having examined their respective examination papers, and although it is admitted that this Tribunal may
reconsider said resolution at any time for justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other may revise and alter them.
In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules on
admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they ought to be, intended to regulate acts
subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall
consider these rules as minimum norms towards that end in the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily performance of judicial
functions and is essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of
the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law
according to existing rules.
4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes, is contrary to facts
which are of general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar of law students inadequately prepared.
The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation.
5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins,
and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.
6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the examinations of 1953 to 1955,
said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in those years, shall continue in force.

RESOLUTION
Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent and impassioned discussion of
the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close of the debate among the members of the Court, and
after hearing the judicious observations of two of our beloved colleagues who since the beginning have announced
their decision not to take part in voting, we, the eight members of the Court who subscribed to this decision have
voted and resolved, and have decided for the Court, and under the authority of the same:
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all of
article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and effect.
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the examinations subsequent
to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity
with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952
inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per
cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed, whether
they have filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision has become final, they shall be permitted to take
and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on the date or dates that the chief Justice may
set. So ordered.
The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972
As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced to 72 per cent the passing general average in the bar
examination of august and November of 1946; 69 per cent in 1947; 70 per cent in 1948; 74 per cent in 1949;
maintaining the prescribed 75 per cent since 1950, but raising to 75 per cent those who obtained 74 per cent since
1950. This caused the introduction in 1951, in the Senate of the Philippines of Bill No. 12 which was intended to
amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and 16 of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, concerning the admission of attorneys-at-law to
the practice of the profession. The amendments embrace many interesting matters, but those referring to sections
14 and 16 immediately concern us. The proposed amendment is as follows:
SEC. 14. Passing average. In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed the examinations
successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in
any subject. In determining the average, the foregoing subjects shall be given the following relative weights:
Civil Law, 20 per cent; Land Registration and Mortgages, 5 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal
Law, 10 per cent; Political Law, 10 per cent; International Law, 5 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal
Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent; Social Legislation, 5 per cent; Taxation, 5 per cent. Unsuccessful
candidates shall not be required to take another examination in any subject in which they have obtained a
rating of 70 per cent or higher and such rating shall be taken into account in determining their general
average in any subsequent examinations: Provided, however, That if the candidate fails to get a general
average of 70 per cent in his third examination, he shall lose the benefit of having already passed some
subjects and shall be required to the examination in all the subjects.
SEC. 16. Admission and oath of successful applicants. Any applicant who has obtained a general average
of 70 per cent in all subjects without falling below 50 per cent in any examination held after the 4th day of
July, 1946, or who has been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall be allowed to take
and subscribe before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office. (Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No. 12).
With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion pertinent to the matter before us being:
It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at bar examinations should be compelled to repeat even
those subjects which they have previously passed. This is not the case in any other government examination.

16

The Rules of Court have therefore been amended in this measure to give a candidate due credit for any
subject which he has previously passed with a rating of 75 per cent or higher."
Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on May 3, 1951, the President requested the comments of this
Tribunal before acting on the same. The comment was signed by seven Justices while three chose to refrain from
making any and one took no part. With regards to the matter that interests us, the Court said:
The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule 127. One part of this amendment provides that if a bar
candidate obtains 70 per cent or higher in any subject, although failing to pass the examination, he need not
be examined in said subject in his next examination. This is a sort of passing the Bar Examination on the
installment plan, one or two or three subjects at a time. The trouble with this proposed system is that
although it makes it easier and more convenient for the candidate because he may in an examination
prepare himself on only one or two subjects so as to insure passing them, by the time that he has passed the
last required subjects, which may be several years away from the time that he reviewed and passed the firs
subjects, he shall have forgotten the principles and theories contained in those subjects and remembers only
those of the one or two subjects that he had last reviewed and passed. This is highly possible because there
is nothing in the law which requires a candidate to continue taking the Bar examinations every year in
succession. The only condition imposed is that a candidate, on this plan, must pass the examination in no
more that three installments; but there is no limitation as to the time or number of years intervening
between each examination taken. This would defeat the object and the requirements of the law and the
Court in admitting persons to the practice of law. When a person is so admitted, it is to be presumed and
presupposed that he possesses the knowledge and proficiency in the law and the knowledge of all law
subjects required in bar examinations, so as presently to be able to practice the legal profession and
adequately render the legal service required by prospective clients. But this would not hold true of the
candidates who may have obtained a passing grade on any five subjects eight years ago, another three
subjects one year later, and the last two subjects the present year. We believe that the present system of
requiring a candidate to obtain a passing general average with no grade in any subject below 50 per cent is
more desirable and satisfactory. It requires one to be all around, and prepared in all required legal subjects at
the time of admission to the practice of law.
xxx
xxx
xxx
We now come to the last amendment, that of section 16 of Rule 127. This amendment provides that any
application who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without failing below 50 per
cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and
subscribe the corresponding oath of office. In other words, Bar candidates who obtained not less than 70 per
cent in any examination since the year 1946 without failing below 50 per cent in any subject, despite their
non-admission to the Bar by the Supreme Court because they failed to obtain a passing general average in
any of those years, will be admitted to the Bar. This provision is not only prospective but retroactive in its
effects.
We have already stated in our comment on the next preceding amendment that we are not exactly in favor
of reducing the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent to govern even in the future. As to
the validity of making such reduction retroactive, we have serious legal doubts. We should not lose sight of
the fact that after every bar examinations, the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only
admitting to the Bar those who have obtained a passing general average grade, but also rejecting and
denying the petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The present amendment would have the
effect of repudiating, reversing and revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the
petitions of those who may have obtained an average of 70 per cent or more but less than the general
passing average fixed for that year. It is clear that this question involves legal implications, and this phase of
the amendment if finally enacted into law might have to go thru a legal test. As one member of the Court
remarked during the discussion, when a court renders a decision or promulgate a resolution or order on the
basis of and in accordance with a certain law or rule then in force, the subsequent amendment or even
repeal of said law or rule may not affect the final decision, order, or resolution already promulgated, in the
sense of revoking or rendering it void and of no effect.
Another aspect of this question to be considered is the fact that members of the bar are officers of the
courts, including the Supreme Court. When a Bar candidate is admitted to the Bar, the Supreme Court
impliedly regards him as a person fit, competent and qualified to be its officer. Conversely, when it refused
and denied admission to the Bar to a candidate who in any year since 1946 may have obtained a general
average of 70 per cent but less than that required for that year in order to pass, the Supreme Court equally
and impliedly considered and declared that he was not prepared, ready, competent and qualified to be its
officer. The present amendment giving retroactivity to the reduction of the passing general average runs
counter to all these acts and resolutions of the Supreme Court and practically and in effect says that a
candidate not accepted, and even rejected by the Court to be its officer because he was unprepared,
undeserving and unqualified, nevertheless and in spite of all, must be admitted and allowed by this Court to
serve as its officer. We repeat, that this is another important aspect of the question to be carefully and
seriously considered.
The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating the following:
I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of the bill, namely, to elevate the standard of the legal
profession and maintain it on a high level. This is not achieved, however, by admitting to practice precisely a
special class who have failed in the bar examination, Moreover, the bill contains provisions to which I find
serious fundamental objections.
Section 5 provides that any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects
without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, shall
be allowed to take and subscribed the corresponding oath of office. This provision constitutes class

17

legislation, benefiting as it does specifically one group of persons, namely, the unsuccessful candidates in
the 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950 bar examinations.
The same provision undertakes to revoke or set aside final resolutions of the Supreme Court made in
accordance with the law then in force. It should be noted that after every bar examination the Supreme
Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the Bar those who have obtained a passing
general average but also rejecting and denying the petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed.
The provision under consideration would have the effect of revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying
and rejecting the petitions of those who may have failed to obtain the passing average fixed for that year.
Said provision also sets a bad precedent in that the Government would be morally obliged to grant a similar
privilege to those who have failed in the examinations for admission to other professions such as medicine,
engineering, architecture and certified public accountancy.
Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress of the Philippines, but it was not repassed by 2/3 vote of each
House as prescribed by section 20, article VI of the Constitution. Instead Bill No. 371 was presented in the Senate. It
reads as follows:
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946 UP TO AND INCLUDING
1953
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 14, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate
who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to the August
1951 Bar examinations; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per cent in the 1953 bar examinations;
73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; 74 per cent in 1955 bar examinations without a candidate
obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding
oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar; Provided, however, That 75 per cent passing general average
shall be restored in all succeeding examinations; and Provided, finally, That for the purpose of this Act, any
exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole
number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any bar examination after
July 4, 1945 shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be
included in computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent
examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its approval.
With the following explanatory note:
This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of the President and to afford another opportunity to those
who feel themselves discriminated by the Supreme Court from 1946 to 1951 when those who would
otherwise have passed the bar examination but were arbitrarily not so considered by altering its previous
decisions of the passing mark. The Supreme Court has been altering the passing mark from 69 in 1947 to 74
in 1951. In order to cure the apparent arbitrary fixing of passing grades and to give satisfaction to all parties
concerned, it is proposed in this bill a gradual increase in the general averages for passing the bar
examinations as follows; For 1946 to 1951 bar examinations, 70 per cent; for 1952 bar examination, 71 per
cent; for 1953 bar examination, 72 per cent; for 1954 bar examination, 73 percent; and for 1955 bar
examination, 74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the passing mark will be restored with the condition that the
candidate shall not obtain in any subject a grade of below 50 per cent. The reason for relaxing the standard
75 per cent passing grade, is the tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately after
the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy
of the preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation. It is believed that by 1956 the
preparation of our students as well as the available reading materials will be under normal conditions, if not
improved from those years preceding the last world war.
In this will we eliminated altogether the idea of having our Supreme Court assumed the supervision as well
as the administration of the study of law which was objected to by the President in the Bar Bill of 1951.
The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated among his objections that the bill would admit to the
practice of law "a special class who failed in the bar examination". He considered the bill a class legislation.
This contention, however, is not, in good conscience, correct because Congress is merely supplementing
what the Supreme Court have already established as precedent by making as low as 69 per cent the passing
mark of those who took the Bar examination in 1947. These bar candidates for who this bill should be
enacted, considered themselves as having passed the bar examination on the strength of the established
precedent of our Supreme Court and were fully aware of the insurmountable difficulties and handicaps which
they were unavoidably placed. We believe that such precedent cannot or could not have been altered,
constitutionally, by the Supreme Court, without giving due consideration to the rights already accrued or
vested in the bar candidates who took the examination when the precedent was not yet altered, or in effect,
was still enforced and without being inconsistent with the principles of their previous resolutions.
If this bill would be enacted, it shall be considered as a simple curative act or corrective statute which
Congress has the power to enact. The requirement of a "valid classification" as against class legislation, is
very expressed in the following American Jurisprudence:
A valid classification must include all who naturally belong to the class, all who possess a common disability,
attribute, or classification, and there must be a "natural" and substantial differentiation between those
included in the class and those it leaves untouched. When a class is accepted by the Court as "natural" it
cannot be again split and then have the dissevered factions of the original unit designated with different
rules established for each. (Fountain Park Co. vs. Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465 (1926).
Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time with its tides brings new conditions which must be cared for
by new laws. Sometimes the new conditions affect the members of a class. If so, the correcting statute must

18

apply to all alike. Sometimes the condition affect only a few. If so, the correcting statute may be as narrow as
the mischief. The constitution does not prohibit special laws inflexibly and always. It permits them when
there are special evils with which the general laws are incompetent to cope. The special public purpose will
sustain the special form. . . . The problem in the last analysis is one of legislative policy, with a wide margin
of discretion conceded to the lawmakers. Only in the case of plain abuse will there be revision by the court.
(In Williams vs. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36, 77 L. Ed. 1015, 53 Sup. Ct. 431). (1932)
This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective statute which always retroacts to the extent of the care of
correction only as in this case from 1946 when the Supreme Court first deviated from the rule of 75 per cent
in the Rules of Court.
For the foregoing purposes the approval of this bill is earnestly recommended.
(Sgd.) PABLO ANGELES DAVID
Senator
Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by Congress as above transcribed. The President again asked the
comments of this Court, which endorsed the following:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting Executive Secretary, Manila, with the information that,
with respect to Senate Bill No. 371, the members of the Court are taking the same views they expressed on
Senate Bill No. 12 passed by Congress in May, 1951, contained in the first indorsement of the undersigned
dated June 5, 1951, to the Assistant Executive Secretary.
(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS
The President allowed the period within which the bill should be signed to pass without vetoing it, by virtue of which it
became a law on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20, Art. VI, Constitution) numbered 972 (many times erroneously cited as No.
974).
It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an election year, and that both the President and the author of the Bill
were candidates for re-election, together, however, they lost in the polls.

Separate Opinions
LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:
The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always been, the exclusive privilege of this Court, because lawyers
are members of the Court and only this Court should be allowed to determine admission thereto in the interest of the
principle of the separation of powers. The power to admit is judicial in the sense that discretion is used in is exercise.
This power should be distinguished from the power to promulgate rules which regulate admission. It is only this
power (to promulgate amendments to the rules) that is given in the Constitution to the Congress, not the exercise of
the discretion to admit or not to admit. Thus the rules on the holding of examination, the qualifications of applicants,
the passing grades, etc. are within the scope of the legislative power. But the power to determine when a candidate
has made or has not made the required grade is judicial, and lies completely with this Court.
I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the judicial function, and lies beyond the scope of the
congressional prerogative of amending the rules. To say that candidates who obtain a general average of 72 per cent
in 1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per cent in 1955 should be considered as having passed the examination, is to
mean exercise of the privilege and discretion judged in this Court. It is a mandate to the tribunal to pass candidates
for different years with grades lower than the passing mark. No reasoning is necessary to show that it is an
arrogation of the Court's judicial authority and discretion. It is furthermore objectionable as discriminatory. Why
should those taking the examinations in 1953, 1954 and 1955 be allowed to have the privilege of a lower passing
grade, while those taking earlier or later are not?
I vote that the act in toto be declared unconstitutional, because it is not embraced within the rule-making power of
Congress, because it is an undue interference with the power of this Court to admit members thereof, and because it
is discriminatory.

PARAS, C.J., dissenting:

Under section 145 of Rule of Court No. 127, in order that a bar candidate "may be deemed to have passed his
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling
below 50 per cent in any subject.' This passing mark has always been adhered to, with certain exception presently to
be specified.
With reference to the bar examinations given in August, 1946, the original list of successful candidates included only
those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more. Upon motion for reconsideration, however, 12
candidates with general averages ranging from 72 to 73 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of
December 18, 1946. In the examinations of November, 1946 the list first released containing the names of successful
candidates covered only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more; but, upon motion for
reconsideration, 19 candidates with a general average of 72 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of
March 31, 1947. This would indicate that in the original list of successful candidates those having a general average
of 73 per cent or more but below 75 per cent were included. After the original list of 1947 successful bar candidates
had been released, and on motion for reconsideration, all candidates with a general average of 69 per cent were
allowed to pass by resolution of July 15, 1948. With respect to the bar examinations held in August, 1948, in addition
to the original list of successful bar candidates, all those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent or more,
irrespective of the grades in any one subject and irrespective of whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, were
allowed to pass by resolution of April 28, 1949. Thus, for the year 1947 the Court in effect made 69 per cent as the
passing average, and for the year 1948, 70 per cent; and this amounted, without being noticed perhaps, to an
amendment of section 14 of Rule 127.

19

Numerous flunkers in the bar examinations held subsequent to 1948, whose general averages mostly ranged from 69
to 73 per cent, filed motions for reconsideration invoking the precedents set by this Court in 1947 and 1948, but said
motions were uniformly denied.
In the year 1951, the Congress, after public hearings where law deans and professors, practising attorneys,
presidents of bar associations, and law graduates appeared and argued lengthily pro or con, approved a bill
providing, among others, for the reduction of the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent,
retroactive to any bar examination held after July 4, 1946. This bill was vetoed by the President mainly in view of an
unfavorable comment of Justices Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista and Jugo. In 1953, the Congress
passed another bill similar to the previous bill vetoed by the President, with the important difference that in the later
bill the provisions in the first bill regarding (1) the supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court of the study of
law, (2) the inclusion of Social Legislation and Taxation as new bar subjects, (3) the publication of the bar examiners
before the holding of the examination, and (4) the equal division among the examiners of all the admission fees paid
by bar applicants, were eliminated. This second bill was allowed to become a law, Republic Act No. 972, by the
President by merely not signing it within the required period; and in doing so the President gave due respect to the
will of the Congress which, speaking for the people, chose to repass the bill first vetoed by him.
Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any examinations
after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per cent in 1953 bar
examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; and 74 per cent in the 1955 bar examinations, without
obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to pass. Said Act also provides that any bar
candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any examination after July 4, 1946, shall be deemed
to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing in
any subsequent examinations.
Numerous candidates who had taken the bar examinations previous to the approval of Republic Act No. 972 and
failed to obtain the necessary passing average, filed with this Court mass or separate petitions, praying that they be
admitted to the practice of law under and by virtue of said Act, upon the allegation that they have obtained the
general averages prescribed therein. In virtue of the resolution of July 6, 1953, this Court held on July 11, 1953 a
hearing on said petitions, and members of the bar, especially authorized representatives of bar associations, were
invited to argue or submit memoranda as amici curiae, the reason alleged for said hearing being that some doubt
had "been expressed on the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 972 in so far as it affects past bar examinations and
the matter" involved "a new question of public interest."
All discussions in support of the proposition that the power to regulate the admission to the practice of law is
inherently judicial, are immaterial, because the subject is now governed by the Constitution which in Article VII,
section 13, provides as follows:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive right. The existing laws on pleading, practice,
and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the
Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law
in the Philippines.
Under this constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law, the Congress has the power to repeal, alter or supplement said rules. Little
intelligence is necessary to see that the power of the Supreme Court and the Congress to regulate the admission to
the practice of law is concurrent.
The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue that this Act, in so far as it covers bar examinations held prior to its
approval, is unconstitutional, because it sets aside the final resolutions of the Supreme Court refusing to admit to the
practice of law the various petitioners, thereby resulting in a legislative encroachment upon the judicial power. In my
opinion this view is erroneous. In the first place, resolutions on the rejection of bar candidates do not have the finality
of decisions in justiciable cases where the Rules of Court expressly fix certain periods after which they become
executory and unalterable. Resolutions on bar matters, specially on motions for reconsiderations filed by flunkers in
any give year, are subject to revision by this Court at any time, regardless of the period within which the motion were
filed, and this has been the practice heretofore. The obvious reason is that bar examinations and admission to the
practice of law may be deemed as a judicial function only because said matters happen to be entrusted, under the
Constitution and our Rules of Court, to the Supreme Court. There is no judicial function involved, in the subject and
constitutional sense of the word, because bar examinations and the admission to the practice of law, unlike
justiciable cases, do not affect opposing litigants. It is no more than the function of other examining boards. In the
second place, retroactive laws are not prohibited by the Constitution, except only when they would be ex post facto,
would impair obligations and contracts or vested rights or would deny due process and equal protection of the law.
Republic Act No. 972 certainly is not an ex post facto enactment, does not impair any obligation and contract or
vested rights, and denies to no one the right to due process and equal protection of the law. On the other hand, it is a
mere curative statute intended to correct certain obvious inequalities arising from the adoption by this Court of
different passing general averages in certain years.
Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to July 4, 1946, are being discriminated against, because we no longer
have any record of those who might have failed before the war, apart from the circumstance that 75 per cent had
always been the passing mark during said period. It may also be that there are no pre-war bar candidates similarly
situated as those benefited by Republic Act No. 972. At any rate, in the matter of classification, the reasonableness
must be determined by the legislative body. It is proper to recall that the Congress held public hearings, and we can
fairly suppose that the classification adopted in the Act reflects good legislative judgment derived from the facts and
circumstances then brought out.
As regards the alleged interference in or encroachment upon the judgment of this Court by the Legislative
Department, it is sufficient to state that, if there is any interference at all, it is one expressly sanctioned by the
Constitution. Besides, interference in judicial adjudication prohibited by the Constitution is essentially aimed at

20

protecting rights of litigants that have already been vested or acquired in virtue of decisions of courts, not merely for
the empty purpose of creating appearances of separation and equality among the three branches of the Government.
Republic Act No. 972 has not produced a case involving two parties and decided by the Court in favor of one and
against the other. Needless to say, the statute will not affect the previous resolutions passing bar candidates who had
obtained the general average prescribed by section 14 of Rule 127. A law would be objectionable and
unconstitutional if, for instance, it would provide that those who have been admitted to the bar after July 4, 1946,
whose general average is below 80 per cent, will not be allowed to practice law, because said statute would then
destroy a right already acquired under previous resolutions of this Court, namely, the bar admission of those whose
general averages were from 75 to 79 per cent.
Without fear of contradiction, I think the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power conferred by the
Constitution, may pass a resolution amending section 14 of Rule 127 by reducing the passing average to 70 per cent,
effective several years before the date of the resolution. Indeed, when this Court on July 15, 1948 allowed to pass all
candidates who obtained a general average of 69 per cent or more and on April 28, 1949 those who obtained a
general average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, it in effect
amended section 14 of Rule 127 retroactively, because during the examinations held in August 1947 and August
1948, said section (fixing the general average at 75 per cent) was supposed to be in force. In stands to reason, if we
are to admit that the Supreme Court and the Congress have concurrent power to regulate the admission to the
practice of law, that the latter may validly pass a retroactive rule fixing the passing general average.
Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, since this Court
had already adopted as passing averages 69 per cent for the 1947 bar examinations and 70 per cent for the 1948
examinations. Anyway, we should not inquire into the wisdom of the law, since this is a matter that is addressed to
the judgment of the legislators. This Court in many instances had doubted the propriety of legislative enactments,
and yet it has consistently refrained from nullifying them solely on that ground.
To say that the admission of the bar candidates benefited under Republic Act 972 is against public interest, is to
assume that the matter of whether said Act is beneficial or harmful to the general public was not considered by the
Congress. As already stated, the Congress held public hearings, and we are bound to assume that the legislators,
loyal, as do the members of this Court, to their oath of office, had taken all the circumstances into account before
passing the Act. On the question of public interest I may observe that the Congress, representing the people who
elected them, should be more qualified to make an appraisal. I am inclined to accept Republic Act No. 972 as an
expression of the will of the people through their duly elected representatives.
I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting that the Congress, in the exercise of its concurrent power to
repeal, alter, or supplement the Rules of Court regarding the admission to the practice of law, may act in an arbitrary
or capricious manner, in the same way that this Court may not do so. We are thus left in the situation, incidental to a
democracy, where we can and should only hope that the right men are put in the right places in our Government.
Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional and should therefore be given effect in its entirety.

1.
2.
3.

4.

FACTS:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the law was, An Act
to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-195170%
1952 .71%
1953..72%
1954..73%
1955..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be deemed to
have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the general average
in subsequent bar examinations.
ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.
RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title of the Act. As per its
title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent
system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account of the
fact that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was declared in
force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under the following reasons:
The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had
inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;
The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said candidates;
The law is an encroachment on the Courts primary prerogative to determine who may be admitted to
practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of Court. The
rules laid down by Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of
the court on who can practice law; and
The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to declare it void. Moreover,
the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions
denying admission to the bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the power to Congress to
alter, supplement or modify rules of admission to the practice of law.

21

In Re INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES [49 SCRA 22, January

FACTS:
[T]he Commission on Bar Integration submitted its Report with the earnest recommendation on the
basis of the said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 526 of the Court, and consistently with
the views and counsel received from its [the Commissions] Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming
nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar that (the) Honorable (Supreme) Court ordain the
integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court
Rule. The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar, after
due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar
associations.

ISSUES:
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?

HELD:
YES. On all issues.

RATIO:
[T]he Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec.
13 of the Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning x x x the admission to the practice of law.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case
No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the
Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is perfectly constitutional and legally
unobjectionable, within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative means
to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge
its public responsibility fully and effectively.
[T]he Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, ordained the
integration of the Bar of the Philippines effective January 16, 1973.

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.

On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration 1 submitted its Report dated November 30, 1972,
with the "earnest recommendation" on the basis of the said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative
Case No. 526 2 of the Court, and "consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the Commission's] Board
of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar" that "this
Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and
promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule."

22

The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar, after due
hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar associations.
On August 16, 1962, arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were orally expounded before the
Court. Written oppositions were admitted, 3 and all parties were thereafter granted leave to file written memoranda. 4
Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments relative to the matter of the
integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.
In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide sentiment in favor of Bar
integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of
unifying the Philippine Bar.
In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the Integration of the
Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The measure was signed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on
September 17, 1971 and took effect on the same day as Rep. Act 6397. This law provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of
court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to
raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar
to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the
National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such
sums as may be necessary for the same purpose shall be included in the annual appropriations for
the Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar integration and contains all
necessary factual data bearing on the advisability (practicability and necessity) of Bar integration. Also embodied
therein are the views, opinions, sentiments, comments and observations of the rank and file of the Philippine lawyer
population relative to Bar integration, as well as a proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission and
presented to them by that body in a national Bar plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well as ample material
upon which the Court may decide whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time.
The following are the pertinent issues:
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?
A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the meaning of Bar integration. It will suffice, for
this purpose, to adopt the concept given by the Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of its Report, thus:
Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population of the
Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in reasonable amount) of every
attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys.
An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must include all lawyers.
Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do so: the State.
Bar integration, therefore, signifies the setting up by Government authority of a national
organization of the legal profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court.
Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the Rule of Law,
integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their own organized action and
participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the principle of
maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.
The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:
(1) Assist in the administration of justice;
(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity, learning, professional
competence, public service and conduct;
(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;
(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;
(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform, pleading, practice and
procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public, and publish information
relating thereto;
(6) Encourage and foster legal education;
(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective law, and make
reports and recommendations thereon; and
(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.
Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the legal profession to:
(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law;
(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and prosecuting officers;
(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or removal of incompetent
and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers;
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from the
assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity,
impartiality and independence;
(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers;
(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly of local practice
maintained through influence or position;
(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers;

23

(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer reference services
throughout the country so that the poor may not lack competent legal service;
(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in many of our
provinces;
(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for practising attorneys in order to
elevate the standards of the profession throughout the country;
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees schedules;
(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research;
(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and obligations, on the
importance of preventive legal advice, and on the functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer; and
(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide involvement of the lawyer
population in the solution of the multifarious problems that afflict the nation.
Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power,
under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's
constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the
integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent
power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more
specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar
to discharge its public responsibility more effectively."
Resolution of the second issue whether the unification of the Bar would be constitutional hinges on the effects of
Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutional rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech, and on the
nature of the dues exacted from him.
The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the Commission on Bar Integration pages
44 to 49 of its Report:
Constitutionality of Bar Integration
Judicial Pronouncements.
In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in issue, the Courts have
upheld their constitutionality.
The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:
Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege, moreover, clothed with public
interest, because a lawyer owes duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the
profession, to the courts, and to the nation; and takes part in one of the most important functions of
the State, the administration of justice, as an officer of the court.
Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is far and just that the
exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective action; but there can be no
collective action without an organized body; no organized body can operate effectively without
incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and just that all attorneys be required to contribute to the
support of such organized body; and, given existing Bar conditions, the most efficient means of
doing so is by integrating the Bar through a rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues
to the Integrated Bar.
1. Freedom of Association.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom
to associate (or the corollary right not to associate).
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He
became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually
does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The body compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.
Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to pay dues in reasonable
amount. The issue therefore, is a question of compelled financial support of group activities, not
involuntary membership in any other aspect.
The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating the educational and ethical
standards of the Bar to the end of improving the quality of the legal service available to the people.
The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared
by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers.
Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The legal profession has long
been regarded as a proper subject of legislative regulation and control. Moreover, the inherent
power of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes the authority to integrate the Bar.
2. Regulatory Fee.
For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court levies a
tax.
A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while the purpose of a tax is
revenue. If the Court has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to
regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to push

24

through an Integrated Bar program without means to defray the concomitant expenses. The doctrine
of implied powers necessarily includes the power to impose such an exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that the regulation does not impose
an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs
the inconsequential inconvenience to a member that might result from his required payment of
annual dues.
3. Freedom of Speech.
A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject in any manner he wishes,
even though such views be opposed to positions taken by the Unified Bar.
For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to which said member is
opposed, would not nullify or adversely affect his freedom of speech.
Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon membership in the
Integrated Bar, it is difficult to understand why it should become unconstitutional for the Bar to use
the member's dues to fulfill the very purposes for which it was established.
The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a "free speech" issue. Even
the income tax would be suspect. The objection would carry us to lengths that have never been
dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be thus extended, might refuse to
contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end condemned by his conscience as
irreligious or immoral. The right of private judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers
and the compulsion of the agencies of Government.
4. Fair to All Lawyers.
Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although the requirement to pay
annual dues is a new regulation, it will give the members of the Bar a new system which they
hitherto have not had and through which, by proper work, they will receive benefits they have not
heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their public responsibilities in a more effective manner than they
have been able to do in the past. Because the requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of
regulatory power by the Court, because it will apply equally to all lawyers, young and old, at the
time Bar integration takes effect, and because it is a new regulation in exchange for new benefits, it
is not retroactive, it is not unequal, it is not unfair.
To resolve the third and final issue whether the Court should ordain the integration of the Bar at this time
requires a careful overview of the practicability and necessity as well as the advantages and disadvantages of Bar
integration.
In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United States, Bar integration has yielded the
following benefits: (1) improved discipline among the members of the Bar; (2) greater influence and ascendancy of
the Bar; (3) better and more meaningful participation of the individual lawyer in the activities of the Integrated Bar;
(4) greater Bar facilities and services; (5) elimination of unauthorized practice; (6) avoidance of costly membership
campaigns; (7) establishment of an official status for the Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and (9) better and more
effective discharge by the Bar of its obligations and responsibilities to its members, to the courts, and to the public.
No less than these salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact expected from the unification of the Philippine
Bar.
Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of integration, Government authority will
dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened; cliquism will be the inevitable result; effective lobbying
will not be possible; the Bar will become an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its affairs.
It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar integration have failed to
materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience in England, Canada and the United States. In all the
jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar has been tried, none of the abuses or evils feared has arisen; on the other
hand, it has restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged professional consciousness, energized the Bar's
responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved the administration of justice.
How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official statistics compiled by the Commission on
Bar integration show that in the national poll recently conducted by the Commission in the matter of the integration
of the Philippine Bar, of a total of 15,090 lawyers from all over the archipelago who have turned in their individual
responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor of Bar integration, while only 378 (or 2.51 per cent) voted
against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are non-commital. In addition, a total of eighty (80) local Bar association and
lawyers' groups all over the Philippines have submitted resolutions and other expressions of unqualified endorsement
and/or support for Bar integration, while not a single local Bar association or lawyers' group has expressed opposed
position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802 individual lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on the proposed integration
Court Rule drafted by the Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in favor thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per cent) vote
against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are non-committal. 5 All these clearly indicate an overwhelming nationwide
demand for Bar integration at this time.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case
No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the
Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally
unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative means
to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge
its public responsibility fully and effectively.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, hereby
ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in accordance with the attached COURT RULE, effective on
January 16, 1973.
RENATO CAYETANO vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the
Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national
existence.

25

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall
be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five
years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective
position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly
provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall
be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and
holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine
Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal
qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or
advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients
and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the
practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead
describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing
counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his
associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129
Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate
in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights
of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in
the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any
act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.
(State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of
a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as
do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262,
263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any
court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the
giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although
these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject
to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to

26

the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set
forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves
appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is
of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by
persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times
under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on
the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citingIn re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E.
313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis
ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the
dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he
does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice
of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a
practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two
Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten
years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer."
Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are
private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual
or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often
called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the
firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called
shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger
or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful
defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.:
Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court,
commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140
A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because
lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would
obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as
well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large
percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do
continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the
legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so?
Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a
business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one
who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as
businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices
than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in
most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling
than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer,
the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal
medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving
different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the
increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their
specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such

27

as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency.
(Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types a litigator
who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered
the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And
increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a
source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important ways,
at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special
roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature
of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most
common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law
practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law
practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members participating in various
legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in
corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding
of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an
accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved
corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning," has
impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of
significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the
consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of
acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory,
operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment.
Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the
policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is
developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing
therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the
trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and
formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a crossdisciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law
can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various
approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate
degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level of decisionmaking now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions
which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an
astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary
step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law,"
Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de
campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the
tycoons and magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a
corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary
with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all
their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain
matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-house.

28

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a
corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax
laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts
and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other
capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the
business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining policy
and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not
understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating
to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is
sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation
(MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to
enter the international law field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number
of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as
glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs
go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law
libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines
of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot
problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who
surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer
are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the
Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern
management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1)
acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate
counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's
management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the legal
function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them.
Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the
corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the
corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning
that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a
corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms
deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental
units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other often with
those who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly
changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder in some cases
participating in the organization and operations of governance through participation on boards and
other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions
and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations organize for global
operations. ( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion
and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific
technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that differ from
older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental
policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In
Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and
business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct
group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term

29

and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in
the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the
environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements within the
organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of team performance than
internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the
managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to
anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability and
insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner
opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the
COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner
as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and
the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of
86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73.
He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of
his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about
two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries
negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines
in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and
subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal
and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman
(1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its
accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former
Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under
privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative
action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge
as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a
member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for "innumerable
amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list
system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately
constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of
the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager,
and an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the
members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country
Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis
supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the
loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized
into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of
closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from
performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development
policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper,
entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager,
regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International Development, during the Session
on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by
the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)

30

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies,
demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation.
Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or an economist
in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such
a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise
of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel.
(See International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T.
Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and
conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements
of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must
also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a
compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis
is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and
international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said:
"They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are
not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in
Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth
Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern concept of law
practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty.
Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is
vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that
there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question
involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis
supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it
stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment
on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority
to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the
discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the
discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2)
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission
by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent
appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October
14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last
Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of
law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern
concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the
eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require

31

generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week and would
outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the
constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use of a
definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what
people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from
my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or
defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making
use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but
we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been
practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming
lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say, on the
ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or
petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be
entertained since he is the incumbent President?
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court
reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the
negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The
answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides
to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would
still reverse the U.S. Senate.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or
three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her
beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging
on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The
procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
NARVASA, J., concurring:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not appear to
me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the Commission on
Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on
the basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross
as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the
second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not only to
require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court
deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the
inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent
Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence already
showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the constitutional
requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.

32

The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the core issue to
be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the
membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional
provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the
judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining
constitutional boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that he must
have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure
that such standard is met and complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance or
application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes
an active, habitual,repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means, to
exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be
said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice
his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate
manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot
be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner,
127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has
been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis
supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it prepared, enumerated
several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's self out to
the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C.
644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general
practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer
before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention
to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14
SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active
and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the
public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People
v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents involving the
use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Pao, Bar Reviewer in
Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B.
901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay
for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket
Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C.
Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training
and experience is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyerclient relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law
but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he
cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics,
1989 ed., p. 30). 3

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The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not respondent Monsod
meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS
prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded that if ever
he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10)
years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly considered activities
peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such
were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become
engaged in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor
General in People vs. Villanueva: 4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in
theactive and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said
services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified for the position of
COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment
to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same. There are certain
points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent simply because his
nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that
we are barred from resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established
facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our
review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing authority
to choosebetween two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind
of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the required
qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he has passed the
Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate proceeding
notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that
what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in
the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been too sweeping in
its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From the numerous
activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a
lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some law, however
peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal
with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another business and he
interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers every company organized under
the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern

34

society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation the businessman must
know about and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business
concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or
consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he
operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of
law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any acts ... in or out of
court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say
that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the practice of
law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally
(even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer
whose income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has been engaged in
the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in business
and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing
lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his experience
and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if
it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the
NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a member
of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his
abundant talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully vote to grant
the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for public office
would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of law (with
one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4
categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to
amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue;
and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional Commission
on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the
Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically
and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of executive ability,
proficiency in management, educational background, experience in international banking and finance, and instant
recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is
compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never engaged in the practice
of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the term
beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not engaged
in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in
the practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for appointment to the
Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling
real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a
farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful
moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The deliberate choice of
words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent,
incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed

35

participation in something which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in
the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the Commission on
Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr.
Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he
worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also
working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could he
practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar there?
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has given the
lawenough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and candor
the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers
working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice and those
services as an executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the practice of law"
with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon
investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman accepts as having a
familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age of discernment
has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the
business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and
student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice
of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not satisfied with
having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts
of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S.
768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding
one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required component of the
meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's self out to the
public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644)
such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general
practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer
before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention
to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14
SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner)
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge, the use of
such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the denomination of
practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or
in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been
assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the
Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of
law, doing business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and
casual transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam
Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional Commission may possess
the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-President,
Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be
confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this Court to obey its
mandate.

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I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming the
nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
RENATO CAYETANO vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD
FACTS:
Monsod was nominated by President Aquino as Chairman of the Comelec. The Commission on Appointments
confirmed the appointment despite Cayetano's objection, based on Monsod's alleged lack of the required qualification
of 10 year law practice. Cayetano filed this certiorari and prohibition. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1,
Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders
of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding
elections.However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Monsod has been engaged in the practice of law for 10 years.
2. Whether or not the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming Monsods
appointment.
HELD:
1. YES. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. It embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients, and other works where the work done involves the determination of the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions (PLA vs. Agrava.) The records of the 1986 constitutional commission
show that the interpretation of the term practice of law was liberal as to consider lawyers employed in the
Commission of Audit as engaged in the practice of law provided that they use their legal knowledge or talent in their
respective work. The court also cited an article in the January 11, 1989 issue of the Business Star, that lawyers
nowadays have their own specialized fields such as tax lawyers, prosecutors, etc., that because of the demands of
their specialization, lawyers engage in other works or functions to meet them. These days, for example, most
corporation lawyers are involved in management policy formulation. Therefore, Monsod, who passed the bar in 1960,
worked with the World Bank Group from 1963-1970, then worked for an investment bank till 1986, became member
of the CONCOM in 1986, and also became a member of the Davide Commission in 1990, can be considered to have
been engaged in the practice of law as lawyer-economist, lawyer-manager, lawyer-entrepreneur, etc.
2. NO. The power of the COA to give consent to the nomination of the Comelec Chairman by the president is
mandated by the constitution. The power of appointment is essentially within the discretion of whom it is so vested
subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualification required by law. From the evidence,
there is no occasion for the SC to exercise its corrective power since there is no such grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the CA.

N THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C.
ARGOSINO, petitioner.
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101,
charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with
the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of
severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites.
Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such
bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by
the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced
to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the lower court. The
application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T.
Santiago. The period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the
probation officer assigned to supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar
Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation status. He was
allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993. 1 He passed the
Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.

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On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath of office and to
admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period by virtue
of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his probation period did not last for more than ten (10) months from
the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed
three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it.
Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational
qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. 2 The essentiality of good moral character in those who would be
lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard as having persuasive
effect:
In Re Farmer:

xxx xxx xxx

This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the applicant's right
to receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he must, in addition to other
requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary to make up such a character. It is
something more than an absence of bad character. It is the good name which the applicant has
acquired, or should have acquired, through association with his fellows. It means that he must have
conducted himself as a man of upright character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such character
expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of least resistance, but quite often, in the
will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong.
...
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently proper. Consider for a
moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its
ultimate effect, to every man's fireside. Vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient
ofunbounded trust and confidence; he deals with is client's property, reputation, his life, his all. An
attorney at law is a sworn officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the
administration of justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx 4
In Re Application of Kaufman, 5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW 710:
It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate from the
straight and narrow path than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the practice of
profession. For these reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to
possess a high moral standard therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the board of bar examiners
as an arm of the court, is required to cause a minute examination to be made of the moral standard
of each candidate for admission to practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at
the conclusion that the highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral character of a
candidate who presents himself for admission to the bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully
met at its very source, and prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been admitted, and has pursued
his profession, and has established himself therein, a far more difficult situation is presented to the
court when proceedings are instituted for disbarment and for the recalling and annulment of his
license.
In Re Keenan: 6
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the right to carry on
an ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued only to those who
demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character. All may aspire to it on
an absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate machinery has been set up to test
applicants by standards fair to all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those who pass the test
are allowed to enter the profession, and only those who maintain the standards are allowed to
remain in it.
Re Rouss: 7
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and professional
character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not to punish him for past
offense: an examination into character, like the examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness.

38

Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court: 8

Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not only protect the
rights and interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the cause. Yet what
protection to clients or assistance to courts could such agents give? They are required to be of good
moral character, so that the agents and officers of the court, which they are, may not bring discredit
upon the due administration of the law, and it is of the highest possible consequence that both
those who have not such qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had them, have fallen
therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts to aid in the administration of justice.
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the
general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning:
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):
The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the practice of
the law unless he covered an upright moral character. The possession of this by the
attorney is more important, if anything, to the public and to the proper
administration of justice than legal learning. Legal learning may be acquired in after
years, but if the applicant passes the threshold of the bar with a bad moral
character the chances are that his character will remain bad, and that he will
become a disgrace instead of an ornament to his great calling a curse instead of
a benefit to his community a Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a
Smith or a Ruffin. 9
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar.
The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry into the moral proceedings for
disbarment:
Re Stepsay:

10

The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his admission to practice
is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.
Re Wells:

11

. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the California Bar the court
cannot reject him for want of good moral character unless it appears that he has been guilty of acts
which would be cause for his disbarment or suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is
broader in its scope than that in a disbarment proceeding, and the court may receive any evidence
which tends to show the applicant's character as respects honesty, integrity, and general
morality, and may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of any of
the acts declared to be causes for disbarment.
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar must of
necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general public. There is a very
real need to prevent a general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with inadequate
moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people's
confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system as we know it. 12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the required standard of
good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical
injuries which proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character
flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their
moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity
involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to
death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul
Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes
impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is prepared to consider de
novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character
referred to above. We stress that good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated
not only at the time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the
time of application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.

39

Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration, evidence that he may be
now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to
the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community who
have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time,
particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he
has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the
community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person
now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the names and
addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten
(10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of
Raul Camaligan.
Villareal vs people
The public outrage over the death of Leonardo Lenny Villa the victim in this case on 10 February 1991 led to
a very strong clamor to put an end to hazing.[1]Due in large part to the brave efforts of his mother, petitioner Gerarda
Villa, groups were organized, condemning his senseless and tragic death. This widespread condemnation prompted
Congress to enact a special law, which became effective in 1995, that would criminalize hazing. [2] The intent of the
law was to discourage members from making hazing a requirement for joining their sorority, fraternity, organization,
or association.[3] Moreover, the law was meant to counteract the exculpatory implications of consent and initial
innocent act in the conduct of initiation rites by making the mere act of hazing punishable or mala prohibita.[4]
Sadly, the Lenny Villa tragedy did not discourage hazing activities in the country. [5] Within a year of his death, six
more cases of hazing-related deaths emerged those of Frederick Cahiyang of the University of Visayas in Cebu; Raul
Camaligan of San Beda College; Felipe Narne of Pamantasan ng Araullo in Cabanatuan City; Dennis Cenedoza of the
Cavite Naval Training Center; Joselito Mangga of the Philippine Merchant Marine Institute; and Joselito Hernandez of
the University of the Philippines in Baguio City. [6]
Although courts must not remain indifferent to public sentiments, in this case the general condemnation of a
hazing-related death, they are still bound to observe a fundamental principle in our criminal justice system [N]o act
constitutes a crime unless it is made so by law. [7] Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. Even if an act is viewed by a
large section of the populace as immoral or injurious, it cannot be considered a crime, absent any law prohibiting its
commission. As interpreters of the law, judges are called upon to set aside emotion, to resist being swayed by strong
public sentiments, and to rule strictly based on the elements of the offense and the facts allowed in evidence.
Before the Court are the consolidated cases docketed as G.R. No. 151258 (Villareal v. People), G.R. No.
154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People), and G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v.
Escalona).
FACTS
The pertinent facts, as determined by the Court of Appeals (CA)[8] and the trial court,[9] are as follows:
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law signified
their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar Bogs Asuncion, Samuel
Sam Belleza, Bienvenido Bien Marquez III, Roberto Francis Bert Navera, Geronimo Randy Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and
Leonardo Lenny Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the Aquila Fraternity
(Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufos Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards,
they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect during the
initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time.
Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for three days. After their briefing, they were brought to the Almeda
Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults from the Aquilans.
As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards the pelota court of the Almeda compound, some
of the Aquilans delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan
initiation rites. These rites included the Indian Run, which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel
rows of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes; the Bicol Express, which obliged the neophytes to sit
on the floor with their backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran
over their legs; the Rounds, in which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the auxiliaries (the
Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were being
hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and the Auxies Privilege Round, in
which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the
neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They survived their first day of initiation.
On the morning of their second day 9 February 1991 the neophytes were made to present comic plays and to
play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternitys principles. Whenever
they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived
the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them physically and psychologically. The neophytes were
subjected to the same manner of hazing that they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the
initiation for the day officially ended.
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members [10] Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio
Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino),
initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity
members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to paddling and to additional rounds of
physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground.

40

The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical
beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for
the day was officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys shivering and incoherent mumblings.
Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting. When they realized,
though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and
helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the
hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge against accused
Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial. [16] Meanwhile, on different dates between the years
2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano.[17] On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 90153 [18] reversed the trial courts Orders and
dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to
speedy trial.
G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People
The instant case refers to accused Villareals Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. The Petition
raises two reversible errors allegedly committed by the CA in its Decision dated 10 January 2002 in CA-G.R. No.
15520 first, denial of due process; and, second, conviction absent proof beyond reasonable doubt. [20]
While the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for petitioner Villareal filed a Notice of Death of
Party on 10 August 2011. According to the Notice, petitioner Villareal died on 13 March 2011. Counsel thus asserts
that the subject matter of the Petition previously filed by petitioner does not survive the death of the accused.
G.R. No. 155101 Dizon v. People
Accused Dizon filed a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari, questioning the CAs Decision dated 10
January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520. [21] Petitioner sets forth two main issues
first, that he was denied due process when the CA sustained the trial courts forfeiture of his right to present
evidence; and, second, that he was deprived of due process when the CA did not apply to him the same ratio
decidendi that served as basis of acquittal of the other accused. [22]
As regards the first issue, the trial court made a ruling, which forfeited Dizons right to present evidence
during trial. The trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on an earlier date since a co-accused, Antonio
General, no longer presented separate evidence during trial. According to Dizon, his right should not have been
considered as waived because he was justified in asking for a postponement. He argues that he did not ask for a
resetting of any of the hearing dates and in fact insisted that he was ready to present
evidence on the original pre-assigned schedule, and not on an earlier hearing date.
Regarding the second issue, petitioner contends that he should have likewise been acquitted, like the other
accused, since his acts were also part of the traditional initiation rites and were not tainted by evil motives. [23] He
claims that the additional paddling session was part of the official activity of the fraternity. He also points out that one
of the neophytes admitted that the chairperson of the initiation rites decided that [Lenny] was fit enough to undergo
the initiation so Mr. Villareal proceeded to do the paddling. [24] Further, petitioner echoes the argument of the Solicitor
General that the individual blows inflicted by Dizon and Villareal could not have resulted in Lennys death. [25] The
Solicitor General purportedly averred that, on the contrary, Dr. Arizala testified that the injuries suffered by Lenny
could not be considered fatal if taken individually, but if taken collectively, the result is the violent death of the
victim.[26]
Petitioner then counters the finding of the CA that he was motivated by ill will. He claims that Lennys father
could not have stolen the parking space of Dizons father, since the latter did not have a car, and their fathers did not
work in the same place or office. Revenge for the loss of the parking space was the alleged ill motive of Dizon.
According to petitioner, his utterances regarding a stolen parking space were only part of the psychological initiation.
He then cites the testimony of Lennys co-neophyte witness Marquez who admitted knowing it was not true and that
he was just making it up.[27]
Further, petitioner argues that his alleged motivation of ill will was negated by his show of concern for Villa
after the initiation rites. Dizon alludes to the testimony of one of the neophytes, who mentioned that the former had
kicked the leg of the neophyte and told him to switch places with Lenny to prevent the latters chills. When the chills
did not stop, Dizon, together with Victorino, helped Lenny through a sleeping bag and made him sit on a chair.
According to petitioner, his alleged ill motivation is contradicted by his manifestation of compassion and concern for
the victims well-being.
G.R. No. 154954 People v. Court of Appeals
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the CAs Decision dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution
dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520, insofar as it acquitted 19 (Victorino et al.) and convicted 4 (Tecson et al.)
of the accused Aquilans of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries. [28]According to the Solicitor General, the CA
erred in holding that there could have been no conspiracy to commit hazing, as hazing or fraternity initiation had not
yet been criminalized at the time Lenny died.
In the alternative, petitioner claims that the ruling of the trial court should have been upheld, inasmuch as it
found that there was conspiracy to inflict physical injuries on Lenny. Since the injuries led to the victims death,
petitioner posits that the accused Aquilans are criminally liable for the resulting crime of homicide, pursuant to Article
4 of the Revised Penal Code.[29] The said article provides: Criminal liability shall be incurred [b]y any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
Petitioner also argues that the rule on double jeopardy is inapplicable. According to the Solicitor General, the
CA acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in setting aside the trial courts

41

finding
of
conspiracy
and
in
ruling
that
the
criminal
all the accused must be based on their individual participation in the commission of the crime.

liability

of

G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 Villa v. Escalona

Petitioner Villa filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, praying for the reversal of the CAs Decision
dated 25 October 2006 and Resolution dated 17 May 2007 in CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 and 90153. [30] The Petition
involves the dismissal of the criminal charge filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
Due to several pending incidents, the trial court ordered a separate trial for accused Escalona, Saruca,
Adriano, Ramos, Ampil, Concepcion, De Vera, S. Fernandez, and Cabangon (Criminal Case No. C-38340) to commence
after proceedings against the 26 other accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) shall have terminated. On 8
November 1993, the trial court found the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, the proceedings in
Criminal Case No. C-38340 involving the nine other co-accused recommenced on 29 November 1993. For various
reasons, the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28 March 2005, or almost 12 years after the arraignment
of the nine accused.
Petitioner Villa assails the CAs dismissal of the criminal case involving 4 of the 9 accused, namely, Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano. She argues that the accused failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable
period of time. She also points out that the prosecution cannot be faulted for the delay, as the original records and
the required evidence were not at its disposal, but were still in the appellate court.
We resolve herein the various issues that we group into five.
ISSUES
1.
Whether the forfeiture of petitioner Dizons right to present evidence constitutes denial of due process;
2.
Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for violation of the right of the accused to
speedy trial;
3.
Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when it set
aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and adjudicated the liability of each accused according to
individual participation;
4.
Whether accused Dizon is guilty of homicide; and
5.
Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it pronounced Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug
guilty only of slight physical injuries.

DISCUSSION
Resolution on Preliminary Matters
G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People
In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was pending resolution, this Court took note of
counsel for petitioners Notice of Death of Party.
According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for personal penalties is totally
extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast, criminal liability for pecuniary penalties is extinguished if the
offender dies prior to final judgment. The term personal penalties refers to the service of personal or imprisonment
penalties,[31] while the term pecuniary penalties (las pecuniarias) refers to fines and costs,[32] including civil liability
predicated on the criminal offense complained of (i.e., civil liability ex delicto).[33] However, civil liability based on a
source of obligation other than the delict survives the death of the accused and is recoverable through a separate
civil action.[34]
Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his criminal liability for both personal and
pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability directly arising from the delict complained of. Consequently, his
Petition is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against him deemed closed and terminated.
G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People)
In an Order dated 28 July 1993, the trial court set the dates for the reception of evidence for accusedpetitioner Dizon on the 8 th, 15th, and 22nd of September; and the 5th and 12 of October 1993. [35] The Order likewise
stated that it will not entertain any postponement and that all the accused who have not yet presented their
respective evidence should be ready at all times down the line, with their evidence on all said dates. Failure on their
part to present evidence when required shall therefore be construed as waiver to present evidence. [36]
However, on 19 August 1993, counsel for another accused manifested in open court that his client Antonio
General would no longer present separate evidence. Instead, the counsel would adopt the testimonial evidence of the
other accused who had already testified. [37] Because of this development and pursuant to the trial courts Order that
the parties should be ready at all times down the line, the trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on the next
trial date 25 August 1993 instead of his originally assigned dates. The original dates were supposed to start two
weeks later, or on 8 September 1993. [38] Counsel for accused Dizon was not able to present evidence on the
accelerated date. To address the situation, counsel filed a Constancia on 25 August 1993, alleging that he had to
appear in a previously scheduled case, and that he would be ready to present evidence on the dates originally
assigned to his clients.[39] The trial court denied the Manifestation on the same date and treated the Constancia as a
motion for postponement, in violation of the three-day-notice rule under the Rules of Court. [40]Consequently, the trial
court ruled that the failure of Dizon to present evidence amounted to a waiver of that right. [41]

42

Accused-petitioner Dizon thus argues that he was deprived of due process of law when the trial court
forfeited his right to present evidence. According to him, the postponement of the 25 August 1993 hearing should
have been considered justified, since his original pre-assigned trial dates were not supposed to start until 8
September 1993, when he was scheduled to present evidence. He posits that he was ready to present evidence on
the dates assigned to him. He also points out that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the said hearing dates; that
he in fact insisted on being allowed to present evidence on the dates fixed by the trial court. Thus, he contends that
the trial court erred in accelerating the schedule of presentation of evidence, thereby invalidating the finding of his
guilt.
The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution itself. [42] Article
III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel This constitutional right includes the right to present evidence in ones defense,
[43]
as well as the right to be present and defend oneself in person at every stage of the proceedings. [44]
In Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,[45] the Sandiganbayan set the hearing of the defenses presentation of
evidence for 21, 22 and 23 June 1995. The 21 June 1995 hearing was cancelled due to lack of quorum in the regular
membership of the Sandiganbayans Second Division and upon the agreement of the parties. The hearing was reset
for the next day, 22 June 1995, but Crisostomo and his counsel failed to attend. The Sandiganbayan, on the very
same day, issued an Order directing the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Crisostomo and the confiscation of his
surety bond. The Order further declared that he had waived his right to present evidence because of his
nonappearance at yesterdays and todays scheduled hearings. In ruling against the Order, we held thus:
Under Section 2(c), Rule 114 and Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of Court, Crisostomos
non-appearance during the 22 June 1995 trial was merely a waiver of his right to be
present for trial on such date only and not for the succeeding trial dates
xxxxxxxxx
Moreover, Crisostomos absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing should not have been
deemed as a waiver of his right to present evidence. While constitutional rights may be
waived, such waiver must be clear and must be coupled with an actual intention to
relinquish the right. Crisostomo did not voluntarily waive in person or even through his counsel
the right to present evidence. The Sandiganbayan imposed the waiver due to the agreement of the
prosecution, Calingayan, and Calingayan's counsel.
In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the present case,
the court is called upon to see to it that the accused is personally made aware of the
consequences of a waiver of the right to present evidence. In fact, it is not enough that
the accused is simply warned of the consequences of another failure to attend the
succeeding hearings. The court must first explain to the accused personally in clear terms the
exact nature and consequences of a waiver. Crisostomo was not even forewarned. The
Sandiganbayan simply went ahead to deprive Crisostomo of his right to present evidence without
even allowing Crisostomo to explain his absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing.
Clearly, the waiver of the right to present evidence in a criminal case involving a
grave penalty is not assumed and taken lightly. The presence of the accused and his counsel
is indispensable so that the court could personally conduct a searching inquiry into the waiver x x x.
[46]
(Emphasis supplied)
The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present evidence on 25 August 1993 as a
waiver of his right to present evidence. On the contrary, it should have considered the excuse of counsel justified,
especially since counsel for another accused General had made a last-minute adoption of testimonial evidence that
freed up the succeeding trial dates; and since Dizon was not scheduled to testify until two weeks later. At any rate,
the trial court pre-assigned five hearing dates for the reception of evidence. If it really wanted to impose its Order
strictly, the most it could have done was to forfeit one out of the five days set for Dizons testimonial evidence.
Stripping the accused of all his pre-assigned trial dates constitutes a patent denial of the constitutionally guaranteed
right to due process.
Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident guilty plea, an invalid waiver of the right to present evidence
and be heard does not per se work to vacate a finding of guilt in the criminal case or to enforce an automatic remand
of the case to the trial court. [47] In People v. Bodoso, we ruled that where facts have adequately been represented in a
criminal case, and no procedural unfairness or irregularity has prejudiced either the prosecution or the defense as a
result of the invalid waiver, the rule is that a guilty verdict may nevertheless be upheld if the judgment is supported
beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record. [48]
We do not see any material inadequacy in the relevant facts on record to resolve the case at bar. Neither can
we see any procedural unfairness or irregularity that would substantially prejudice either the prosecution or the
defense as a result of the invalid waiver. In fact, the arguments set forth by accused Dizon in his Petition corroborate
the material facts relevant to decide the matter. Instead, what he is really contesting in his Petition is the application
of the law to the facts by the trial court and the CA. Petitioner Dizon admits direct participation in the hazing of Lenny
Villa by alleging in his Petition that all actions of the petitioner were part of the traditional rites, and that the alleged
extension of the initiation rites was not outside the official activity of the fraternity. [49] He even argues that Dizon did
not request for the extension and he participated only after the activity was sanctioned. [50]
For one reason or another, the case has been passed or turned over from one judge or justice to another at
the trial court, at the CA, and even at the Supreme Court. Remanding the case for the reception of the evidence of
petitioner Dizon would only inflict further injustice on the parties. This case has been going on for almost two

43

decades. Its resolution is long overdue. Since the key facts necessary to decide the case have already been
determined, we shall proceed to decide it.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona)
Petitioner Villa argues that the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano should not have been dismissed,
since they failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She points out that the
accused failed to raise a protest during the dormancy of the criminal case against them, and that they asserted their
right only after the trial court had dismissed the case against their co-accused Concepcion. Petitioner also
emphasizes that the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss filed by Saruca, Escalona, Ramos, and
Adriano, because it found that the prosecution could not be faulted for the delay in the movement of this case when
the original records and the evidence it may require were not at its disposal as these were in the Court of Appeals. [51]
The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections 14(2) and 16, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.[52] This right requires that there be a trial free from vexatious, capricious or oppressive delays. [53] The
right is deemed violated when the proceeding is attended with unjustified postponements of trial, or when a long
period of time is allowed to elapse without the case being tried and for no cause or justifiable motive. [54] In
determining the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the
number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. [55] The conduct of both the prosecution and the
defense must be weighed.[56] Also to be considered are factors such as the length of delay, the assertion or nonassertion of the right, and the prejudice wrought upon the defendant. [57]
We have consistently ruled in a long line of cases that a dismissal of the case pursuant to the right of the
accused to speedy trial is tantamount to acquittal. [58] As a consequence, an appeal or a reconsideration of the
dismissal would amount to a violation of the principle of double jeopardy. [59] As we have previously discussed,
however, where the dismissal of the case is capricious, certiorari lies.[60] The rule on double jeopardy is not triggered
when a petition challenges the validity of the order of dismissal instead of the correctness thereof. [61] Rather, grave
abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction prevents double jeopardy from attaching. [62]
We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CAs dismissal of the case against accused Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation of their right to speedy trial. The court held thus:
As illustrated in our ruling in Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, the unexplained interval or inactivity of the Sandiganbayan
for close to five years since the arraignment of the accused amounts to an unreasonable delay in the disposition of
cases a clear violation of the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of cases. [67] Thus, we held:
The delay in this case measures up to the unreasonableness of the delay in the disposition
of cases in Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, where the Court found thedelay of six years by the
Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints to be violative of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to a speedy disposition of cases; similarly, in Roque vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, where the Court held that the delay of almost six years disregarded the
Ombudsman's duty to act promptly on complaints before him; and in Cervantes vs.
Sandiganbayan, where the Court held that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
not quashing the information which was filed six years after the initiatory complaint was
filed and thereby depriving petitioner of his right to a speedy disposition of the case . So
it must be in the instant case, where the reinvestigation by the Ombudsman has dragged
on for a decade already.[68] (Emphasis supplied)
G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals)
The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal justice system. It dictates that when a person is
charged with an offense, and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without
the consent of the accused the accused cannot again be charged with the same or an identical offense. [69] This
principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and conscience. [70] It is embodied in the civil law maxim non bis in
idem found in the common law of England and undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence. [71] It found expression
in the Spanish Law, in the Constitution of the United States, and in our own Constitution as one of the fundamental
rights of the citizen,[72] viz:
Article III Bill of Rights
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act.
Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, which implements this particular constitutional right, provides as
follows:[73]
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by
a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the
charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to
another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.
The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the judgment in order to reverse the
acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either through a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or
through an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules. [74]The requisites for
invoking double jeopardy are the following: (a) there is a valid complaint or information; (b) it is filed before a
competent court; (c) the defendant pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the
case against him or her was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the defendants express consent. [75]
As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, [a] verdict of acquittal is immediately final
and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for

44

the same offense. The finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from
using its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with
accumulated trials. It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from
successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following
conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty. [76] We further stressed that an
acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. [77]
This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower courts acquittal of the accused
or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is
deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due process; [78] (2)
where there is a finding of mistrial;[79] or (3) where there has been a grave abuse of discretion.[80]
The third instance refers to this Courts judicial power under Rule 65 to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. [81] Here, the party asking for the review must show the presence of a whimsical or
capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to
an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of
law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility; [82] or a blatant
abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice. [83] In
such an event, the accused cannot be considered to be at risk of double jeopardy. [84]
The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, which seeks the reversal of (1) the acquittal of
Victorino et al. and (2) the conviction of Tecson et al. for the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, both on the basis
of a misappreciation of facts and evidence. According to the Petition, the decision of the Court of Appeals is not in
accordance with law because private complainant and petitioner were denied due process of law when the public
respondent completely ignored the a) Position Paper x x x b) the Motion for Partial Reconsideration x x x and c) the
petitioners Comment x x x. [85] Allegedly, the CA ignored evidence when it adopted the theory of individual
responsibility; set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court; and failed to apply Article 4 of the Revised Penal
Code.[86] The Solicitor General also assails the finding that the physical blows were inflicted only by Dizon and
Villareal, as well as the appreciation of Lenny Villas consent to hazing. [87]
In our view, what the Petition seeks is that we reexamine, reassess, and reweigh the probative value of the
evidence presented by the parties.[88] In People v. Maquiling, we held that grave abuse of discretion cannot be
attributed to a court simply because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the evidence. [89]Mere errors of
judgment are correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, and not by an
application for a writ ofcertiorari.[90] Therefore, pursuant to the rule on double jeopardy, we are constrained to deny
the Petition contra Victorino et al. the 19 acquitted fraternity members.
We, however, modify the assailed judgment as regards Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug the four fraternity
members convicted of slight physical injuries.
Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on double jeopardy similarly applies when the state
seeks the imposition of a higher penalty against the accused. [91] We have also recognized, however,
that certiorari may be used to correct an abusive judgment upon a clear demonstration that the lower court blatantly
abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. [92] The present case is
one of those instances of grave abuse of discretion.
In imposing the penalty of slight physical injuries on Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug, the CA reasoned
thus:
Based on the medical findings, it would appear that with the exclusion of the fatal
wounds inflicted by the accused Dizon and Villareal, the injuries sustained by the victim
as a result of the physical punishment heaped on him were serious in nature. However, by
reason of the death of the victim, there can be no precise means to determine the
duration of the incapacity or the medical attendance required. To do so, at this stage would
be merely speculative. In a prosecution for this crime where the category of the offense and the
severity of the penalty depend on the period of illness or incapacity for labor, the length of this
period must likewise be proved beyond reasonable doubt in much the same manner as the same act
charged [People v. Codilla, CA-G.R. No. 4079-R, June 26, 1950]. And when proof of the said
period is absent, the crime committed should be deemed only as slight physical
injuries [People v. De los Santos, CA, 59 O.G. 4393, citing People v. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398]. As such,
this Court is constrained to rule that the injuries inflicted by the appellants, Tecson, Ama, Almeda
and Bantug, Jr., are only slight and not serious, in nature. [93](Emphasis supplied and citations
included)
The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v. Penesa[94] in finding that the four accused should be held
guilty only of slight physical injuries. According to the CA, because of the death of the victim, there can be no precise
means to determine the duration of the incapacity or medical attendance required. [95] The reliance on Penesa was
utterly misplaced. A review of that case would reveal that the accused therein was guilty merely of slight physical
injuries, because the victims injuries neither caused incapacity for labor nor required medical attendance.
[96]
Furthermore, he did not die. [97] His injuries were not even serious. [98] Since Penesa involved a case in which the
victim allegedly suffered physical injuries and not death, the ruling cited by the CA was patently inapplicable.
On the contrary, the CAs ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug were liable merely for
slight physical injuries grossly contradicts its own findings of fact. According to the court, the four accused were
found to have inflicted more than the usual punishment undertaken during such initiation rites on the person of
Villa.[99] It then adopted the NBI medico-legal officers findings that the antecedent cause of Lenny Villas death was the
multiple traumatic injuries he suffered from the initiation rites. [100] Considering that the CA found that the physical
punishment heaped on [Lenny Villa was] serious in nature,[101] it was patently erroneous for the court to limit
the criminal liability to slight physical injuries, which is a light felony.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be liable for the consequences of an
act, even if its result is different from that intended. Thus, once a person is found to have committed an initial

45

felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction of physical injuries that results in the death of the victim, courts are
required to automatically apply the legal framework governing the destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and not
subject to discretion.
The CAs application of the legal framework governing physical injuries punished under Articles 262 to 266 for
intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies is therefore tantamount to a whimsical, capricious, and
abusive exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. According to the Revised Penal Code, the mandatory
and legally imposable penalty in case the victim dies should be based on the framework governing the destruction of
the life of a person, punished under Articles 246 to 261 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies,
and not under the aforementioned provisions. We emphasize that these two types of felonies are distinct from and
legally inconsistent with each other, in that the accused cannot be held criminally liable for physical injuries when
actual death occurs.[102]
Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon as if only their acts, in and of themselves, caused the
death of Lenny Villa is contrary to the CAs own findings. From proof that the death of the victim was the cumulative
effect of the multiple injuries he suffered, [103] the only logical conclusion is that criminal responsibility should redound
to all those who have been proven to have directly participated in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. The
accumulation of bruising on his body caused him to suffer cardiac arrest. Accordingly, we find that the CA committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug
criminally liable for slight physical injuries. As an allowable exception to the rule on double jeopardy, we therefore
give due course to the Petition in G.R. No. 154954.
Resolution on Ultimate Findings
According to the trial court, although hazing was not (at the time) punishable as a crime, the intentional infliction of
physical injuries on Villa was nonetheless a felonious act under Articles 263 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
in ruling against the accused, the court a quo found that pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the
accused fraternity members were guilty of homicide, as it was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the
physical injuries they had intentionally inflicted. [104]
The CA modified the trial courts finding of criminal liability. It ruled that there could have been no conspiracy
since the neophytes, including Lenny Villa, had knowingly consented to the conduct of hazing during their initiation
rites. The accused fraternity members, therefore, were liable only for the consequences of their individual acts.
Accordingly, 19 of the accused Victorino et al. were acquitted; 4 of them Tecson et al. were found guilty of slight
physical injuries; and the remaining 2 Dizon and Villareal were found guilty of homicide.
The issue at hand does not concern a typical criminal case wherein the perpetrator clearly commits a felony
in order to take revenge upon, to gain advantage over, to harm maliciously, or to get even with, the victim. Rather,
the case involves an ex ante situation in which a man driven by his own desire to join a society of men pledged to go
through physically and psychologically strenuous admission rituals, just so he could enter the fraternity. Thus, in
order to understand how our criminal laws apply to such situation absent the Anti-Hazing Law, we deem it necessary
to make a brief exposition on the underlying concepts shaping intentional felonies, as well as on the nature of
physical and psychological initiations widely known as hazing.
Intentional Felony and Conspiracy
Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical school of thought. [105] The classical theory posits that a
human person is essentially a moral creature with an absolute free will to choose between good and evil. [106] It asserts
that one should only be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired.
[107]
The basic postulate of the classical penal system is that humans are rational and calculating beings who guide
their actions with reference to the principles of pleasure and pain. [108] They refrain from criminal acts if threatened
with punishment sufficient to cancel the hope of possible gain or advantage in committing the crime. [109] Here,
criminal liability is thus based on the free will and moral blame of the actor. [110] The identity of mens readefined as a
guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent is the predominant consideration. [111] Thus, it is not enough
to do what the law prohibits.[112] In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act be committed
by means of dolo or malice.[113]
The term dolo or malice is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence, and intent.[114] The
first element, freedom, refers to an act done with deliberation and with power to choose between two things. [115] The
second element, intelligence, concerns the ability to determine the morality of human acts, as well as the capacity to
distinguish between a licit and an illicit act. [116] The last element, intent, involves an aim or a determination to do a
certain act.[117]
The element of intent on which this Court shall focus is described as the state of mind accompanying an act,
especially a forbidden act.[118] It refers to the purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds. [119] It
does not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the act, while intent concerns the result of the act. [120] While
motive is the moving power that impels one to action for a definite result, intent is the purpose of using a particular
means to produce the result. [121] On the other hand, the term felonious means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or
proceeding from an evil heart or purpose. [122]With these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in
intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a
forbidden act. Stated otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence of dolus malus that the act or omission be
done willfully, maliciously, with deliberate evil intent, and with malice aforethought. [123] The maxim is actus non facit
reum, nisi mens sit rea a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is
innocent.[124] As is required of the other elements of a felony, the existence of malicious intent must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt.[125]
In turn, the existence of malicious intent is necessary in order for conspiracy to attach. Article 8 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it is to be interpreted to refer only to
felonies committed by means of dolo or malice. The phrase coming to an agreement connotes the existence of a
prefaced intent to cause injury to another, an element present only in intentional felonies. In culpable felonies or
criminal negligence, the injury inflicted on another is unintentional, the wrong done being simply the result of an act

46

performed without malice or criminal design. [126] Here, a person performs an initial lawful deed; however, due to
negligence, imprudence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill, the deed results in a wrongful act. [127] Verily, a deliberate
intent to do an unlawful act, which is a requisite in conspiracy, is inconsistent with the idea of a felony committed by
means of culpa.[128]
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in establishing the
commission of the intentional felony of homicide. [129] Being mala in se, the felony of homicide requires the existence
of malice or dolo[130] immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. [131] Intent to kill or animus
interficendi cannot and should not be inferred, unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent.
[132]
Furthermore, the victims death must not have been the product of accident, natural cause, or suicide. [133] If death
resulted from an act executed without malice or criminal intent but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence
the act must be qualified as reckless or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide. [134]
Hazing and other forms of initiation rites
The notion of hazing is not a recent development in our society. [135] It is said that, throughout history, hazing
in some form or another has been associated with organizations ranging from military groups to indigenous tribes.
[136]
Some say that elements of hazing can be traced back to the Middle Ages, during which new students who
enrolled in European universities worked as servants for upperclassmen. [137] It is believed that the concept of hazing is
rooted in ancient Greece, [138] where young men recruited into the military were tested with pain or challenged to
demonstrate the limits of their loyalty and to prepare the recruits for battle. [139] Modern fraternities and sororities
espouse some connection to these values of ancient Greek civilization. [140] According to a scholar, this concept lends
historical legitimacy to a tradition or ritual whereby prospective members are asked to prove their worthiness and
loyalty to the organization in which they seek to attain membership through hazing. [141]
Thus, it is said that in the Greek fraternity system, custom requires a student wishing to join an organization
to receive an invitation in order to be a neophyte for a particular chapter. [142] The neophyte period is usually one to
two semesters long.[143] During the program, neophytes are required to interview and to get to know the active
members of the chapter; to learn chapter history; to understand the principles of the organization; to maintain a
specified grade point average; to participate in the organizations activities; and to show dignity and respect for their
fellow neophytes, the organization, and its active and alumni members. [144] Some chapters require the initiation
activities for a recruit to involve hazing acts during the entire neophyte stage. [145]
Hazing, as commonly understood, involves an initiation rite or ritual that serves as prerequisite for admission
to an organization.[146] In hazing, the recruit, pledge, neophyte, initiate, applicant or any other term by which the
organization may refer to such a person is generally placed in embarrassing or humiliating situations, like being
forced to do menial, silly, foolish, or other similar tasks or activities. [147] It encompasses different forms of conduct
that humiliate, degrade, abuse, or physically endanger those who desire membership in the organization. [148] These
acts usually involve physical or psychological suffering or injury. [149]
The concept of initiation rites in the country is nothing new. In fact, more than a century ago, our national
hero Andres Bonifacio organized a secret society named Kataastaasan Kagalanggalangang Katipunan ng mga Anak
ng Bayan (The Highest and Most Venerable Association of the Sons and Daughters of the Nation). [150] The Katipunan,
or KKK, started as a small confraternity believed to be inspired by European Freemasonry, as well as by
confraternities or sodalities approved by the Catholic Church. [151] The Katipunans ideology was brought home to each
member through the societys initiation ritual. [152] It is said that initiates were brought to a dark room, lit by a single
point
of
illumination,
and
were
asked
a
series
of
questions to determine their fitness, loyalty, courage, and resolve. [153] They were made to go through vigorous trials
such as pagsuot sa isang lungga or [pagtalon] sa balon.[154] It would seem that they were also made to withstand the
blow of pangherong bakal sa pisngi and to endure a matalas na punyal.[155]As a final step in the ritual, the
neophyte Katipunero was made to sign membership papers with the his own blood. [156]
It is believed that the Greek fraternity system was transported by the Americans to the Philippines in the lat
e 19th century. As can be seen in the following instances, the manner of hazing in the United States was jarringly
similar to that inflicted by the Aquila Fraternity on Lenny Villa.
Early in 1865, upperclassmen at West Point Academy forced the fourth classmen to do exhausting physical
exercises that sometimes resulted in permanent physical damage; to eat or drink unpalatable foods; and in various
ways to humiliate themselves.[157] In 1901, General Douglas MacArthur got involved in a congressional investigation
of hazing at the academy during his second year at West Point. [158]
In Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, decided in 1985, the candidate-victim was injured during the shriners
hazing event, which was part of the initiation ceremonies for Hejaz membership. [159] The ritual involved what was
known as the mattress-rotating barrel trick. [160] It required each candidate to slide down an eight to nine-foot-high
metal board onto connected mattresses leading to a barrel, over which the candidate was required to climb.
[161]
Members of Hejaz would stand on each side of the mattresses and barrel and fun-paddle candidates en route to
the barrel.[162]
In a video footage taken in 1991, U.S. Marine paratroopers in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, were seen
performing a ceremony in which they pinned paratrooper jump wings directly onto the neophyte paratroopers chests.
[163]
The victims were shown writhing and crying out in pain as others pounded the spiked medals through the shirts
and into the chests of the victims.[164]
In State v. Allen, decided in 1995, the Southeast Missouri State University chapter of Kappa Alpha Psi invited
male students to enter into a pledgeship program. [165] The fraternity members subjected the pledges to repeated
physical abuse including repeated, open-hand strikes at the nape, the chest, and the back; caning of the bare soles of
the feet and buttocks; blows to the back with the use of a heavy book and a cookie sheet while the pledges were on
their hands and knees; various kicks and punches to the body; and body slamming, an activity in which active
members of the fraternity lifted pledges up in the air and dropped them to the ground. [166] The fraternity members
then put the pledges through a seven-station circle of physical abuse. [167]
In Ex Parte Barran, decided in 1998, the pledge-victim went through hazing by fraternity members of
the Kappa Alpha Order at the Auburn University in Alabama.[168] The hazing included the following: (1) having to dig a
ditch and jump into it after it had been filled with water, urine, feces, dinner leftovers, and vomit; (2) receiving

47

paddlings on the buttocks; (3) being pushed and kicked, often onto walls or into pits and trash cans; (4) eating foods
like peppers, hot sauce, butter, and yerks (a mixture of hot sauce, mayonnaise, butter, beans, and other items); (5)
doing chores for the fraternity and its members, such as cleaning the fraternity house and yard, being designated as
driver, and running errands; (6) appearing regularly at 2 a.m. meetings, during which the pledges would be hazed for
a couple of hours; and (7) running the gauntlet, during which the pledges were pushed, kicked, and hit as they ran
down a hallway and descended down a flight of stairs.[169]
In Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, decided in 1999, the victim Sylvester Lloyd was accepted to pledge at
the Cornell University chapter of the Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity. [170] He participated in initiation activities, which
included various forms of physical beatings and torture, psychological coercion and embarrassment. [171]
In Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, decided in 2002, the initiate-victim suffered injuries from hazing
activities during the fraternitys initiation rites. [172] Kenner and the other initiates went through psychological and
physical hazing, including being paddled on the buttocks for more than 200 times. [173]
In Morton v. State, Marcus Jones a university student in Florida sought initiation into the campus chapter of
the Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity during the 2005-06 academic year. [174] The pledges efforts to join the fraternity
culminated in a series of initiation rituals conducted in four nights. Jones, together with other candidates, was
blindfolded, verbally harassed, and caned on his face and buttocks. [175] In these rituals described as preliminaries,
which lasted for two evenings, he received approximately 60 canings on his buttocks. [176] During the last two days of
the hazing, the rituals intensified. [177] The pledges sustained roughly 210 cane strikes during the four-night initiation.
[178]
Jones and several other candidates passed out.[179]
The purported raison dtre behind hazing practices is the proverbial birth by fire, through which the pledge
who has successfully withstood the hazing proves his or her worth. [180] Some organizations even believe that hazing is
the path to enlightenment. It is said that this process enables the organization to establish unity among the
pledges and, hence, reinforces and ensures the future of the organization.[181] Alleged benefits of joining include
leadership opportunities; improved academic performance; higher self-esteem; professional networking
opportunities; and the esprit dcorp associated with close, almost filial, friendship and common cause. [182]
Anti-Hazing laws in the U.S.
The first hazing statute in the U.S. appeared in 1874 in response to hazing in the military. [183] The hazing of
recruits and plebes in the armed services was so prevalent that Congress prohibited all forms of
military hazing, harmful or not.[184] It was not until 1901 that Illinois passed the first state anti-hazing law,
criminalizing conduct whereby any one sustains an injury to his [or her] person therefrom. [185]
However, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s, due in large part to the efforts of the Committee to Halt
Useless College Killings and other similar organizations, that states increasingly began to enact legislation prohibiting
and/or criminalizing hazing.[186] As of 2008, all but six states had enacted criminal or civil statutes proscribing hazing.
[187]
Most anti-hazing laws in the U.S. treat hazing as a misdemeanor and carry relatively light consequences for even
the most severe situations.[188] Only a few states with anti-hazing laws consider hazing as a felony in case death or
great bodily harm occurs.[189]
Under the laws of Illinois, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, except hazing that results in death or great
bodily harm, which is a Class 4 felony. [190] In a Class 4 felony, a sentence of imprisonment shall be for a term of not
less than one year and not more than three years. [191] Indiana criminal law provides that a person who recklessly,
knowingly,
or
intentionally
performs hazing that results in serious bodily injury to a person commits criminal recklessness, a Class D felony. [192]
The offense becomes a Class C felony if committed by means of a deadly weapon. [193] As an element of a
Class C felony criminal recklessness resulting in serious bodily injury, death falls under the category of serious bodily
injury.[194] A person who commits a Class C felony is imprisoned for a fixed term of between two (2) and eight (8)
years, with the advisory sentence being four (4) years. [195] Pursuant to Missouri law, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor,
unless the act creates a substantial risk to the life of the student or prospective member, in which case it becomes a
Class C felony.[196] A Class C felony provides for an imprisonment term not to exceed seven years. [197]
In Texas, hazing that causes the death of another is a state jail felony. [198] An individual adjudged guilty of a
state jail felony is punished by confinement in a state jail for any term of not more than two years or not less than
180 days.[199] Under Utah law, if hazing results in serious bodily injury, the hazer is guilty of a third-degree felony. [200] A
person who has been convicted of a third-degree felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not to exceed
five years.[201] West Virginia law provides that if the act of hazing would otherwise be deemed a felony, the hazer may
be found guilty thereof and subject to penalties provided therefor. [202] In Wisconsin, a person is guilty of a Class G
felony
if
hazing
results
in
the
death
of
another. [203] A
Class G felony carries a fine not to exceed $25,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 10 years, or both. [204]
In certain states in the U.S., victims of hazing were left with limited remedies, as there was no hazing statute.
[205]
This situation was exemplified inBallou v. Sigma Nu General Fraternity, wherein Barry Ballous family resorted to a
civil action for wrongful death, since there was no anti-hazing statute in South Carolina until 1994. [206]
The existence of animus interficendi or intent to kill not proven
beyond reasonable doubt
The presence of an ex ante situation in this case, fraternity initiation rites does not automatically amount to
the absence of malicious intent or dolus malus. If it is proven beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators were
equipped with a guilty mind whether or not there is a contextual background or factual premise they are still
criminally liable for intentional felony.
The trial court, the CA, and the Solicitor General are all in agreement that with the exception of Villareal and
Dizon accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug did not have the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa or
the other neophytes. We shall no longer disturb this finding.
As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA modified the Decision of the trial court and found that the two accused
had the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa, not merely to inflict physical injuries on him. It justified its
finding of homicide against Dizon by holding that he had apparently been motivated by ill will while beating up Villa.
Dizon kept repeating that his fathers parking space had been stolen by the victims father. [207] As to Villareal, the court

48

said that the accused suspected the family of Bienvenido Marquez, one of the neophytes, to have had a hand in the
death of Villareals brother.[208] The CA then ruled as follows:
The two had their own axes to grind against Villa and Marquez. It was very clear that they
acted with evil and criminal intent. The evidence on this matter is unrebutted and so for the death of
Villa, appellants Dizon and Villareal must and should face the consequence of their acts,
that is, to be held liable for the crime of homicide. [209] (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing testimony of witness Marquez reveals a glaring mistake of substantial proportion on the part of
the CA it mistook the utterances of Dizon for those of Villareal. Such inaccuracy cannot be tolerated, especially
because it was the CAs primary basis for finding that Villarreal had the intent to kill Lenny Villa, thereby making
Villareal guilty of the intentional felony of homicide. To repeat, according to Bienvenido Marquezs testimony, as
reproduced above, it was Dizon who uttered both accusations against Villa and Marquez; Villareal had no participation
whatsoever in the specific threats referred to by the CA. It wasBoyet Dizon [who] stepped on [Marquezs] thigh; and
who told witness Marquez, [I]to, yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko. It was also Dizon who jumped on
Villas thighs while saying, [T]his guy, his father stole the parking space of my father. With the testimony clarified, we
find that the CA had no basis for concluding the existence of intent to kill based solely thereon.
As to the existence of animus interficendi on the part of Dizon, we refer to the entire factual milieu and
contextual premise of the incident to fully appreciate and understand the testimony of witness Marquez. At the
outset, the neophytes were briefed that they would be subjected to psychological pressure in order to scare them.
They knew that they would be mocked, ridiculed, and intimidated. They heard fraternity members shout, Patay
ka, Recinto, Yari ka, Recinto, Villa, akin ka, Asuncion, gulpi ka, Putang ina mo, Asuncion, Putang ina nyo, patay kayo
sa amin, or some other words to that effect. [215] While beating the neophytes, Dizon accused Marquez of the death of
the formers purported NPA brother, and then blamed Lenny Villas father for stealing the parking space of Dizons
father. According to the Solicitor General, these statements, including those of the accused Dizon, were all part of the
psychological initiation employed by the Aquila Fraternity. [216]
Thus, to our understanding, accused Dizons way of inflicting psychological pressure was through hurling
make-believe accusations at the initiates. He concocted the fictitious stories, so that he could justify giving the
neophytes harder blows, all in the context of fraternity initiation and role playing. Even one of the neophytes
admitted that the accusations were untrue and made-up.
The infliction of psychological pressure is not unusual in the conduct of hazing. In fact, during the Senate
deliberations on the then proposed Anti-Hazing Law, former Senator Lina spoke as follows:
Senator Lina. -- so as to capture the intent that we conveyed during the period of interpellations on
why we included the phrase or psychological pain and suffering.
xxxxxxxxx
So that if no direct physical harm is inflicted upon the neophyte or the recruit but the recruit or
neophyte is made to undergo certain acts which I already described yesterday, like playing the
Russian roulette extensively to test the readiness and the willingness of the neophyte or
recruit to continue his desire to be a member of the fraternity, sorority or similar
organization or playing and putting a noose on the neck of the neophyte or recruit, making the
recruit or neophyte stand on the ledge of the fourth floor of the building facing outside, asking him
to jump outside after making him turn around several times but the reality is that he will be made to
jump towards the inside portion of the building these are the mental or psychological tests that
are resorted to by these organizations, sororities or fraternities. The doctors who appeared
during the public hearing testified that such acts can result in some mental aberration, that they can
even lead to psychosis, neurosis or insanity. This is what we want to prevent. [217] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizons behavior must not be automatically viewed as
evidence of a genuine, evil motivation to kill Lenny Villa. Rather, it must be taken within the context of the fraternitys
psychological initiation. This Court points out that it was not even established whether the fathers of Dizon and Villa
really had any familiarity with each other as would lend credence to the veracity of Dizons threats. The testimony of
Lennys co-neophyte, Marquez, only confirmed this view. According to Marquez, he knew it was not true and that
[Dizon] was just making it up. [218] Even the trial court did not give weight to the utterances of Dizon as constituting
intent to kill: [T]he cumulative acts of all the accused were not directed toward killing Villa, but merely to inflict
physical harm as part of the fraternity initiation rites x x x. [219] The Solicitor General shares the same view.
Verily, we cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code on the basis of the existence of intent to kill. Animus interficendi cannot and should not be
inferred unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent. [220] Instead, we adopt and reinstate the
finding of the trial court in part, insofar as it ruled that none of the fraternity members had the specific
intent to kill Lenny Villa.[221]
The existence of animus iniuriandi or malicious intent to injure not
proven beyond reasonable doubt
The Solicitor General argues, instead, that there was an intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa.
Echoing the Decision of the trial court, the Solicitor General then posits that since all of the accused fraternity
members conspired to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa and death ensued, all of them should be liable for the
crime of homicide pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code,
[222]
the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence
of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the wrongdoer iniuria ex affectu
facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in
case of physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious
intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or well-being of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the
victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt

49

act of inflicting physical injuries per se merely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional
felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions are. [223]
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances [224] that the mere infliction of physical injuries, absent malicious
intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional felony. In Bagajo v. People,[225] the accused
teacher, using a bamboo stick, whipped one of her students behind her legs and thighs as a form of discipline. The
student suffered lesions and bruises from the corporal punishment. In reversing the trial courts finding of criminal
liability for slight physical injuries, this Court stated thus: Independently of any civil or administrative responsibility
[w]e are persuaded that she did not do what she had done with criminal intent the means she actually used was
moderate and that she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred or any malevolent intent. Considering the applicable laws,
we then ruled that as a matter of law, petitioner did not incur any criminal liability for her act of whipping her pupil.
In People v. Carmen,[226]the accused members of the religious group known as the Missionaries of Our Lady of Fatima
under the guise of a ritual or treatment plunged the head of the victim into a barrel of water, banged his head against
a bench, pounded his chest with fists, and stabbed him on the side with a kitchen knife, in order to cure him of
nervous breakdown by expelling through those means the bad spirits possessing him. The collective acts of the group
caused the death of the victim. Since malicious intent was not proven, we reversed the trial courts finding of liability
for murder under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code and instead ruled that the accused should be held criminally
liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 thereof.
Indeed, the threshold question is whether the accuseds initial acts of inflicting physical pain on the
neophytes were attended by animus iniuriandiamounting to a felonious act punishable under the Revised Penal Code,
thereby making it subject to Article 4(1) thereof. In People v. Regato, we ruled that malicious intent must be judged
by the action, conduct, and external acts of the accused. [227] What persons do is the best index of their intention.
[228]
We have also ruled that the method employed, the kind of weapon used, and the parts of the body on which the
injury was inflicted may be determinative of the intent of the perpetrator. [229] The Court shall thus examine the whole
contextual background surrounding the death of Lenny Villa.
Lenny died during Aquilas fraternity initiation rites. The night before the commencement of the rites, they
were briefed on what to expect. They were told that there would be physical beatings, that the whole event would
last for three days, and that they could quit anytime. On their first night, they were subjected to traditional initiation
rites, including the Indian Run, Bicol Express, Rounds, and the Auxies Privilege Round. The beatings were
predominantly directed at the neophytes arms and legs.
In the morning of their second day of initiation, they were made to present comic plays and to play rough
basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternitys principles. Late in the afternoon,
they were once again subjected to traditional initiation rituals. When the rituals were officially reopened on the
insistence of Dizon and Villareal, the neophytes were subjected to another traditional ritual paddling by the fraternity.
During the whole initiation rites, auxiliaries were assigned to the neophytes. The auxiliaries protected the
neophytes by functioning as human barriers and shielding them from those who were designated to inflict physical
and psychological pain on the initiates. [230] It was their regular duty to stop foul or excessive physical blows; to help
the neophytes to pump their legs in order that their blood would circulate; to facilitate a rest interval after every
physical activity or round; to serve food and water; to tell jokes; to coach the initiates; and to give them whatever
they needed.
These rituals were performed with Lennys consent. [231] A few days before the rites, he asked both his parents
for permission to join the Aquila Fraternity. [232] His father knew that Lenny would go through an initiation process and
would be gone for three days.[233] The CA found as follows:
It is worth pointing out that the neophytes willingly and voluntarily consented to undergo
physical initiation and hazing. As can be gleaned from the narration of facts, they voluntarily
agreed to join the initiation rites to become members of the Aquila Legis Fraternity. Prior to the
initiation, they were given briefings on what to expect. It is of common knowledge that before
admission in a fraternity, the neophytes will undergo a rite of passage. Thus, they were made
aware that traditional methods such as mocking, psychological tests and physical
punishment would take place. They knew that the initiation would involve beatings and
other forms of hazing. They were also told of their right and opportunity to quit at any
time they wanted to. In fact, prosecution witness Navera testified that accused Tecson told him
that after a week, you can already play basketball. Prosecution witness Marquez for his part,
admitted that he knew that the initiates would be hit in the arms and legs, that a
wooden paddle would be used to hit them and that he expected bruises on his arms and
legs. Indeed, there can be no fraternity initiation without consenting neophytes.[234]
(Emphasis supplied)
Even after going through Aquilas grueling traditional rituals during the first day, Lenny continued his
participation and finished the second day of initiation.
Based on the foregoing contextual background, and absent further proof showing clear malicious intent, we are
constrained to rule that the specific animus iniuriandi was not present in this case. Even if the specific acts of
punching, kicking, paddling, and other modes of inflicting physical pain were done voluntarily, freely, and with
intelligence, thereby satisfying the elements of freedom and intelligence in the felony of physical injuries, the
fundamental ingredient of criminalintent was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, all that was
proven was that the acts were done pursuant to tradition. Although the additional rounds on the second night were
held upon the insistence of Villareal and Dizon, the initiations were officially reopened with the consent of the head of
the initiation rites; and the accused fraternity members still participated in the rituals, including the paddling, which
were performed pursuant to tradition. Other than the paddle, no other weapon was used to inflict injuries on Lenny.
The targeted body parts were predominantly the legs and the arms. The designation of roles, including the role of
auxiliaries, which were assigned for the specific purpose of lending assistance to and taking care of the neophytes
during the initiation rites, further belied the presence of malicious intent. All those who wished to join the fraternity
went through the same process of traditional initiation; there is no proof that Lenny Villa was specifically targeted or

50

given a different treatment. We stress that Congress itself recognized that hazing is uniquely different from common
crimes.[235] The totality of the circumstances must therefore be taken into consideration.
Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the core principle of mala in
se adhered to under the Revised Penal Code, Congress did not simply enact an amendment thereto. Instead, it
created a special law on hazing, founded upon the principle of mala prohibita. This dilemma faced by Congress is
further proof of how the nature of hazing unique as against typical crimes cast a cloud of doubt on whether society
considered the act as an inherently wrong conduct or mala in se at the time. It is safe to presume that Lennys
parents would not have consented [239] to his participation in Aquila Fraternitys initiation rites if the practice of hazing
were considered by them as mala in se.
Furthermore, in Vedaa v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate Justice (now retired Chief Justice)
Hilario Davide that in our nations very recent history, the people have spoken, through Congress, to
deem conduct constitutive of hazing, [an] act[] previously considered harmless by custom, as criminal.
[240]
Although it may be regarded as a simple obiter dictum, the statement nonetheless shows recognition that hazing
or the conduct of initiation rites through physical and/or psychological suffering has not been traditionally
criminalized. Prior to the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law, there was to some extent a lacuna in the law; hazing was not clearly
considered an intentional felony. And when there is doubt on the interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved
in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo.
For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is constrained to rule against the trial courts
finding of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no proof beyond reasonable doubt of
the existence of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries or animus iniuriandi as required in mala in se cases,
considering the contextual background of his death, the unique nature of hazing, and absent a law prohibiting hazing.
The accused fraternity members guilty of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused fraternity members
are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that are committed by means
of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from which an
immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution or
advertence on the part of the person committing it. [241] In this case, the danger is visible and consciously appreciated
by the actor.[242] In contrast, simple imprudence or negligence comprises an act done without grave fault, from which
an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of foresight or skill. [243] Here, the threatened harm is
not immediate, and the danger is not openly visible. [244]
The test[245] for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as follows: Would a
prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a
reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer the duty to take
precaution against the mischievous results of the act. Failure to do so constitutes negligence. [246]
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness, the degree of precaution
and diligence required varies with the degree of the danger involved. [247] If, on account of a certain line of conduct,
the danger of causing harm to another person is great, the individual who chooses to follow that particular course of
conduct is bound to be very careful, in order to prevent or avoid damage or injury. [248] In contrast, if the danger is
minor, not much care is required.[249] It is thus possible that there are countless degrees of precaution or diligence
that may be required of an individual, from a transitory glance of care to the most vigilant effort. [250] The duty of the
person to employ more or less degree of care will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case. [251]
There was patent recklessness in the hazing of Lenny Villa.
According to the NBI medico-legal officer, Lenny died of cardiac failure secondary to multiple traumatic
injuries.[252] The officer explained that cardiac failure refers to the failure of the heart to work as a pump and as part of
the circulatory system due to the lack of blood. [253] In the present case, the victims heart could no longer work as a
pumping organ, because it was deprived of its requisite blood and oxygen. [254] The deprivation was due to the
channeling of the blood supply from the entire circulatory system including the heart, arteries, veins, venules, and
capillaries to the thigh, leg, and arm areas of Lenny, thus causing the formation of multiple hematomas or blood
clots.[255] The multiple hematomas were wide, thick, and deep, [256] indicating that these could have resulted mainly
from injuries sustained by the victim from fist blows, knee blows, paddles, or the like. [257] Repeated blows to those
areas caused the blood to gradually ooze out of the capillaries until the circulating blood became so markedly
diminished as to produce death. [258] The officer also found that the brain, liver, kidney, pancreas, intestines, and all
other organs seen in the abdominals, as well as the thoracic organ in the lungs, were pale due to the lack of blood,
which was redirected to the thighs and forearms. [259] It was concluded that there was nothing in the heart that would
indicate that the victim suffered from a previous cardiac arrest or disease. [260]
It appears from the aforementioned facts that the incident may have been prevented, or at least mitigated,
had the alumni of Aquila Fraternity accused Dizon and Villareal restrained themselves from insisting on reopening the
initiation
rites.
Although
this
point
did
not
matter
in
the
end,
as records would show that the other fraternity members participated in the reopened initiation rites having in mind
the concept of seniority in fraternities the implication of the presence of alumni should be seen as a point of review in
future legislation. We further note that some of the fraternity members were intoxicated during Lennys initiation rites.
In this light, the Court submits to Congress, for legislative consideration, the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to
include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as
aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
It is truly astonishing how men would wittingly or unwittingly impose the misery of hazing and employ
appalling rituals in the name of brotherhood. There must be a better way to establish kinship. A neophyte admitted
that he joined the fraternity to have more friends and to avail himself of the benefits it offered, such as tips during
bar examinations.[270] Another initiate did not give up, because he feared being looked down upon as a quitter, and
because he felt he did not have a choice. [271] Thus, for Lenny Villa and the other neophytes, joining the Aquila

51

Fraternity entailed a leap in the dark. By giving consent under the circumstances, they left their fates in the hands of
the fraternity members. Unfortunately, the hands to which lives were entrusted were barbaric as they were reckless.
Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall cover only
accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon. Had the Anti-Hazing Law been in effect then, these five accused
fraternity members would have all been convicted of the crime of hazing punishable by reclusion perpetua (life
imprisonment).[272] Since there was no law prohibiting the act of hazing when Lenny died, we are constrained to rule
according to existing laws at the time of his death. The CA found that the prosecution failed to prove, beyond
reasonable
doubt,
Victorino et al.s individual participation in the infliction of physical injuries upon Lenny Villa. [273] As to accused
Villareal, his criminal liability was totally extinguished by the fact of his death, pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Furthermore, our ruling herein shall be interpreted without prejudice to the applicability of the Anti-Hazing
Law to subsequent cases. Furthermore, the modification of criminal liability from slight physical
injuries to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall apply only with respect to accused
Almeda,Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
The accused liable to pay damages
The CA awarded damages in favor of the heirs of Lenny Villa in the amounts of 50,000 as civil indemnity ex
delicto and 1,000,000 as moral damages, to be jointly and severally paid by accused Dizon and Villareal. It also
awarded the amount of 30,000 as indemnity to be jointly and severally paid by accusedAlmeda , Ama, Bantug, and
Tecson.
Civil indemnity ex delicto is automatically awarded for the sole fact of death of the victim. [274] In accordance
with prevailing jurisprudence,[275] we sustain the CAs award of indemnity in the amount of 50,000.
The heirs of the victim are entitled to actual or compensatory damages, including expenses incurred in
connection with the death of the victim, so long as the claim is supported by tangible documents. [276] Though we are
prepared to award actual damages, the Court is prevented from granting them, since the records are bereft of any
evidence to show that actual expenses were incurred or proven during trial. Furthermore, in the appeal, the Solicitor
General does not interpose any claim for actual damages. [277]
The heirs of the deceased may recover moral damages for the grief suffered on account of the victims death.
[278]
This penalty is pursuant to Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code, which provides that the spouse, legitimate and
illegitimate descendants and the ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by
reason of the death of the deceased. [279] Thus, we hereby we affirm the CAs award of moral damages in the amount
of1,000,000.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito Dizon guilty of homicide
is hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954 finding Antonio Mariano
Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries is
also MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony
Ama,Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide defined and penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, accused
are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of 50,000,
and moral damages in the amount of 1,000,000, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from
the date of the finality of this Decision until satisfaction. [280] Costs de oficio.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby AFFIRMED. The appealed
Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the criminal case filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano, are likewise AFFIRMED. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the Petition in G.R. No.
151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against Artemio Villareal deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8049
Section 1. Hazing, as used in this Act, is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into
membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit, neophyte or applicant in
some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other
similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or injury.
The term "organization" shall include any club or the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Philippine
National Police, Philippine Military Academy, or officer and cadet corp of the Citizen's Military Training
and Citizen's Army Training. The physical, mental and psychological testing and training procedure and
practices to determine and enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective
regular members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police as approved
ny the Secretary of National Defense and the National Police Commission duly recommended by the
Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Director General of the Philippine National Police
shall not be considered as hazing for the purposes of this Act.
Sec. 2. No hazing or initiation rites in any form or manner by a fraternity, sorority or organization shall
be allowed without prior written notice to the school authorities or head of organization seven (7) days
before the conduct of such initiation. The written notice shall indicate the period of the initiation
activities which shall not exceed three (3) days, shall include the names of those to be subjected to
such activities, and shall further contain an undertaking that no physical violence be employed by
anybody during such initiation rites.
Sec. 3. The head of the school or organization or their representatives must assign at least two (2)
representatives of the school or organization, as the case may be, to be present during the initiation. It
is the duty of such representative to see to it that no physical harm of any kind shall be inflicted upon a
recruit, neophyte or applicant.

52

Sec. 4. If the person subjected to hazing or other forms of initiation rites suffers any physical injury or
dies as a result thereof, the officers and members of the fraternity, sorority or organization who actually
participated in the infliction of physical harm shall be liable as principals. The person or persons who
participated in the hazing shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) if death, rape, sodomy or mutilation results
there from.
2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period (17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years)
if in consequence of the hazing the victim shall become insane, imbecile, impotent or blind.
3. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period (14 years, 8 months and one day to 17 years
and 4 months) if in consequence of the hazing the victim shall have lost the use of speech or the power
to hear or to smell, or shall have lost an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm or a leg or shall have lost the use of
any such member shall have become incapacitated for the activity or work in which he was habitually
engaged.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its minimum period (12 years and one day to 14 years and 8
months) if in consequence of the hazing the victim shall become deformed or shall have lost any other
part of his body, or shall have lost the use thereof, or shall have been ill or incapacitated for the
performance on the activity or work in which he was habitually engaged for a period of more than
ninety (90) days.
5. The penalty of prison mayor in its maximum period (10 years and one day to 12 years) if in
consequence of the hazing the victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance on the
activity or work in which he was habitually engaged for a period of more than thirty (30) days.
6. The penalty of prison mayor in its medium period (8 years and one day to 10 years) if in consequence
of the hazing the victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance on the activity or work
in which he was habitually engaged for a period of ten (10) days or more, or that the injury sustained
shall require medical assistance for the same period.
7. The penalty of prison mayor in its minimum period (6 years and one day to 8 years) if in consequence
of the hazing the victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance on the activity or work
in which he was habitually engaged from one (1) to nine (9) days, or that the injury sustained shall
require medical assistance for the same period.
8. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum period (4 years, 2 months and one day to 6 years)
if in consequence of the hazing the victim sustained physical injuries which do not prevent him from
engaging in his habitual activity or work nor require medical attendance.
The responsible officials of the school or of the police, military or citizen's army training organization,
may impose the appropriate administrative sanctions on the person or the persons charged under this
provision even before their conviction. The maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed in any of
the following instances:
(a) when the recruitment is accompanied by force, violence, threat, intimidation or deceit on the person
of the recruit who refuses to join;
(b) when the recruit, neophyte or applicant initially consents to join but upon learning that hazing will
be committed on his person, is prevented from quitting;
(c) when the recruit, neophyte or applicant having undergone hazing is prevented from reporting the
unlawful act to his parents or guardians, to the proper school authorities, or to the police authorities,
through force, violence, threat or intimidation;
(d) when the hazing is committed outside of the school or institution; or
(e) when the victim is below twelve (12) years of age at the time of the hazing.
The owner of the place where hazing is conducted shall be liable as an accomplice, when he has actual
knowledge of the hazing conducted therein but failed to take any action to prevent the same from
occurring. If the hazing is held in the home of one of the officers or members of the fraternity, group, or
organization, the parents shall be held liable as principals when they have actual knowledge of the
hazing conducted therein but failed to take any action to prevent the same from occurring.
The school authorities including faculty members who consent to the hazing or who have actual
knowledge thereof, but failed to take any action to prevent the same from occurring shall be punished
as accomplices for the acts of hazing committed by the perpetrators.
The officers, former officers, or alumni of the organization, group, fraternity or sorority who actually
planned the hazing although not present when the acts constituting the hazing were committed shall be
liable as principals. A fraternity or sorority's adviser who is present when the acts constituting the
hazing were committed and failed to take action to prevent the same from occurring shall be liable as
principal.
The presence of any person during the hazing is prima facie evidence of participation therein as
principal unless he prevented the commission of the acts punishable herein.
Any person charged under this provision shall not be entitled to the mitigating circumstance that there
was no intention to commit so grave a wrong.
This section shall apply to the president, manager, director or other responsible officer of a corporation
engaged in hazing as a requirement for employment in the manner provided herein.
Sec. 5. If any provision or part of this Act is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts or
provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective.
Sec. 6. All laws, orders, rules or regulations which are inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of
this Act are hereby amended or repealed accordingly.
Sec. 7. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) calendar days after its publication in at least two (2)
national newspapers of general circulation.

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SC rules RH Law constitutional except for 8 provisions

BAGUIO CITY, Philippines -- (UPDATE 5 - 5:52 p.m.) The Supreme Court on Tuesday ruled that Republic Act 10354, or
the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012, is constitutional, except for eight provisions, mostly
dealing with sanctions for people deemed to be conscientious objectors on account of religious belief.
SC spokesman Ted Te read the decision on what is commonly known as the RH law in a press briefing broadcast over
radio and television stations in from Baguio City, where the high court has been holding its summer sessionn since
March 21.
"The RH law is not unconstitutional," Te said.
The law requires government health centers to hand out free condoms and birth control pills, as well as mandating
that sex education be taught in schools.
It law also requires that public health workers receive family planning training, while post abortion medical care is
also legalized.
The RH law was signed by President Benigno Aquino III, who defied intense lobbying by the Catholic church, on
December 21, 2012.
The new statute was immediately challenged by 14 petitions filed before the Supreme Court by groups associated
with the church. The high court first issued a four-month temporary restraining order against the new law's
implementation in March 2013 and then extended this indefinitely in July the same year.
The 8 provisions
The high court declared unconstitutional these provisions of the law:
Section 7 and the corresponding provisions in the Implementing Rules and Regulations, insofar as (a) they require
private health facilities and non-maternity hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in
an emergency of life-threatening cases, as defined under RA 8544, to another health facility which is conveniently
accessible, and (b) allow minor patients or minors who have suffered miscarriage access to modern methods of
family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian;

Section 23 (a)(1) and the corresponding provision in the IRR, particularly Section 5.24 insofar as it punishes a
health provider who fails or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive
health, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
Section 23(a)(2)(1) insofar as they allow a married individual not in an emergency or life-threatening situation,
as defined under RA 8544, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provisions in the IRR, particularly Section 5.24 insofar as they punish any
health care provider who fails and or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case as
defined under RA 8544 to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently
accessible, regardless of his or her belief;

Section 23 (b) and the corresponding provision in the IRR, particularly Section 5.24 insofar as they punish any
public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full
implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the IRR regarding the rendering pro bono reproductive health
service insofar as they affect the conscientious objector in securing Philhealth accreditation;

Section3.01(a) and (11) insofar as it penalizes a health service provider who will require parental consent from
the minor in not emergency or serious situations.
The decision was penned by Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza. Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno penned her
opinion in Filipino.
During the briefing, the high court's Public Information Office also explained the use of the double negative not
unconstitutional.
The formulation that uses the double negative is peculiar to constitutional adjudication and is premised on the
presumption that all laws are presumed constitutional and the burden of showing that a law is unconstitutional is on
the petitioner," it said. "Failing that burden, the declaration is in the double negative. To assert that it is
'constitutional' would presume that the law operates on a starting point of unconstitutionality, which is not the
situation.
Reactions
"This monumental decision upholds the separation of church and state and affirms the supremacy of government in
secular concerns like health and socio-economic development," former Albay representative Edcel Lagman, the
principal author of the law, said immediately after the verdict.
"A grateful nation salutes the majority of justices for their favorable ruling promoting reproductive health and giving
impetus to sustainable human development," Lagman added.
"This decision is important to the future of our country. We cannot stress the importance of this decision. This is a real
victory, especially for children, women and their families," Speaker Feliciano Belmonte Jr. said.
Both Belmonte and Lagman said that the eight provisions stricken out of the law would not affect its objectives.
"The goals and objectives of the law will still be achieved," Belmonte said when asked about the provisions declared
unconstitutional.
Miriam doubts evidence used vs 8 provisions
Saying thank you and I love you, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago on Tuesday said the Supreme Court decision
declaring the Reproductive Health Law as constitutional is a triumph of reason over superstition, but doubted that
the quantum of evidence it considered in tagging the eight provisions as unconstitutional was enough.
Thank you, Supreme Court! I love you, because you have faced the fears of a nation, and swept them away like
cobwebs, Santiago said.
For lack of time, Defensor said she wanted to make only a general assessment of the chances of a motion for
reconsideration on the eight provisions of the RH law, which were struck down, as follows:

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 The RH law enjoys a presumption of constitutionality, based on the respect of the judiciary for the legislature.
The presumption of constitutionality dictates that doubt should be resolved in favor of the law; and that the Court
should reconcile the law with the Constitution.
With respect to the provisions that did not pass muster, the Court should have granted to Congress the
presumption of good faith and the presumption that legislative determination of factual issues is correct.
Very humbly, I emphasize that the burden of proof lies on the party who alleges unconstitutionality. In the eight
provisions, the petitioners failed to discharge this burden. It is not entirely clear what quantum of proof was applied
by the Court to overcome the presumption of constitutionality, Santiago said.
Santiago said that in many instances, petitioners failed to show that the eight provisions are unconstitutional;
instead petitioners depended only on the argument that there was reasonable, substantial, or rational doubt.
But I very respectfully emphasize the rule that mere preponderance of evidence is not enough.
Hence, I support with full enthusiasm the move to file motions for reconsideration. I am fairly confident that a more
exhaustive study of the principles of constitutional law will support a reconsideration of all eight provisions, she said.
Santiago is the co-author and co-sponsor of the measure.
Purple Ribbon for RH
In a separate statement, the Purple Ribbon for RH movement thanked the high court for helping the advocacy for
reproductive health advance.
"This day is made more meaningful by the Supreme Court by giving justice to years of struggle for the law and
recognizing the contribution of everyone -- individuals from all walks of life, different sectors, from the government
offices to the grassroots -- who fought hard to have this law. This is a manifestation of the Supreme Courts respect
for the will of the majority," the group said.
RH advocates said they would continue to keep watch on how the law would be implemented with adequate
government backing, including funding.
"For as long as the State is still mandated and empowered to implement a reproductive health program with the
appropriate funding necessary for it to reach Filipinos in need, the historic Supreme Court decision is still a victory for
the people, albeit incomplete," Dinagat Island Representative Kaka Bag-ao said.
Former Health Secretary Esparanza Cabral, one of the convenors of the Purple Ribbon for RH, said they expect the
government to fully support the law's implementation so that its benefits would be felt by the people.
Gabriela party-list Representative Luz Ilagan said the high court was correct in upholding the constitutionality of the
law, adding that "the right to health is as basic as the right to life."
"More women can be saved from complications of pregnancy and childbirth. But with or without the RH law, it is the
government's obligation to provide services. Now we wait the implementation of the law," Ilagan said.
The United Nations in the country also hailed the ruling, saying it joined the Filipino people in celebrating "this
landmark ruling which recognizes the basic human right of Filipinos to reproductive health."
The Catholic church, which counts over 80 percent of the country's 100 million population as members, had led street
protests denouncing the law as "evil" and, at one point in its opposition campaign, threatened Aquino with
excommunication.
'Civil disobedience'
One of the law's hardline opponents and a petitioner to the court, former senator Francisco Tatad, said allowing the
law to take effect could force Catholics into an open revolt.
"This means civil disobedience at the very least, actual revolt at the most extreme," Tatad wrote in a commentary in
the Manila Times newspaper on Tuesday. "Some of us will want to defy the power of the devil and die as martyrs, if
need be, in the only cause that gives us a chance to fight for something much bigger than ourselves."
Church leaders have helped lead two revolutions that toppled unpopular presidents in recent Philippine history, and
they continue to insist they have a right to influence the parliamentary and legal branches of government.
Another example of its enduring influence is that the Philippines is the only country where divorce remains illegal.
Nevertheless, many people across the sprawling archipelago have embraced less conservative views in recent
decades.
A recent survey carried by the respected Social Weather Stations polling group said about 84 percent of Filipinos
agreed that the government should provide free family planning options such as contraceptives.
It said 72 percent were "in favor" of the law.
Women's rights groups and other supporters of the law say it will be a powerful tool in fighting poverty and cutting
the birth rate of 3.54, one of the highest in the world.
More than a quarter of the population live on the equivalent of 62 cents a day, according to the government, and
experts say there is an urgent need to provide free reproductive medical services that the poor can not otherwise
afford.
More than a third of the capital's 14 million population live in sprawling slums, according to a 2010 World Health
Organization report, and many of them do not have access to proper sanitation, let alone health centres.
According to the British medical charity Merlin, which has backed the passage of the law, 14-15 mothers die daily in
the Philippines in complications related to child birth. (with a report by Brian Maglungsod and Ernie Reyes,
InterAksyon.com and Arthur L. Allad-iw, Northern Dispatch)

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