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21. BP Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the supplementary application of the
provisions RPC including the rule on conspiracy.
supplementarily. Thus, a non-issuer of bum check can be held liable for violation of BP Blg. 22
on the basis of conspiracy (Ladonga vs. People, G.R. No. 141066, February 17, 2005). The
principle of conspiracy may be applied to RA No. 9262. Thus, a person (such as mother-inlaw), who has no marital, sexual or dating relationship with the victim, can be held liable for
violence against woman on the basis of conspiracy (Go-Tan vs. Go, G.R. No. 168852, September
30, 2008).
22. Only public officer can be held criminally liable for violation of RA No. 3019.
However, if there is conspiracy, the act of the public officer in violating RA No. 3019 is
imputable to the private individual although there are not similarly situated in relation to the
object of the crime. Moreover, Section 9 provides penalty for public officer or private person for
crime under Section 3. Hence, a private individual can be prosecuted for violation of RA No.
3019 (Henry Go vs. The Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172602, April 13, 2007). Even
if the public officer with whom the private individual allegedly conspired, the latter can still be
prosecuted for violation of RA No. 3019. Death extinguishes the criminal liability but not the
crime. Hence, if there is proof of the crime and conspiracy of dead public officer with private
individual, the latter can still be convicted of violation of RA No. 3019 (People vs. Henry Go, GR
No. 168539, March 25, 2014). However, if the public officer with whom the private individual
allegedly conspired is acquitted, the latter should also be acquitted (Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 126995, October 6, 1998).
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29. A child, who are already serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive
application of RA 9344 (even if he is a habitual delinquent). They shall be immediately released
if they are exempt from criminal liability under this law (Section 68 of RA No. 9344; People vs.
Monticalvo, G.R. No. 193507, January 30, 2013).
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41. Instigation means luring the accused into a crime that he, otherwise, had no
intention to commit, in order to prosecute him. It differs from entrapment which is the
employment of ways and means in order to trap or capture a criminal. In instigation, the
criminal intent to commit an offense originates from the inducer and not from the accused who
had no intention to commit and would not have committed it were it not for the prodding of the
inducer. In entrapment, the criminal intent or design originates from the accused and the law
enforcers
merely
facilitate
the
apprehension
of
the
criminal
by
using
ruses
and
schemes. Instigation results in the acquittal of the accused, while entrapment may lead to
prosecution and conviction (People vs. Espiritu, G.R. No. 180919, January 9, 2013).
42. A police officers act of soliciting drugs from appellant during the buy-bust
operation, or what is known as the "decoy solicitation," is not prohibited by law and does not
invalidate the buy-bust operation. Mere deception by the police officer will not shield the
perpetrator, if the offense was committed by him free from the influence or instigation of the
police officer (People vs. Espiritu, supra).
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44. A plea of guilty made after the prosecution had begun presenting its evidence
cannot be considered voluntary since it was made only after the accused realized that the
evidence already presented by the prosecution is enough to cause his conviction. It is not
required that the prosecution must have presented all its evidence when the plea of guilty was
made to negate the appreciation of mitigating circumstance of voluntary confession (People vs.
Montinola, G.R. No. 131856-57, July 9, 2001, En Banc).
45. Four days after the victims attempted on the virtue of his wife, accused killed them.
The period of four days was sufficient enough a time within which accused could have regained
his composure and self-control. Hence, passion should not be appreciated (People vs. Rebucan,
G.R. No. 182551, July 27, 2011, Justice De Castro).
In the case of U. S. vs. Hicks (14 Phil., 217), the accused therein and a woman illicitly
lived together. Afterwards, the woman separated from him and lived with another man.
Defendant, enraged by her conduct killed her. This Court held that no mitigating circumstance
of passion and obfuscation was present, not even loss of reason and self-control produced by
jealousy as alleged by the defense, inasmuch as the only causes which mitigate the criminal
responsibility for the loss of self-control are such as originate from legitimate feelings, not those
which arise from vicious, unworthy and immoral passions. In sum, to mitigate the liability of the
offender, passion must arise from lawful sentiment.
An employer reprimanded an employee for doing an immoral act. Such reprimand
cannot be a source of passion, which will mitigate the liability of the employer in committing a
crime against his employer. Passion is not mitigating if the accused was actuated more by a
spirit of lawlessness and revenge against his employer (People vs. Caliso, G.R. No. 37271,
July 1, 1933 En Banc).
Not illiteracy alone but also lack of sufficient intelligence and knowledge to fully realize
the consequence of his criminal act are necessary to invoke the benefit of mitigating
circumstance of lack of instruction and education (People vs. Gorospe, G.R. Nos. 10644-45,
February 19, 1959). Where it was established insufficiency of intelligence on the part of the
accused to fully comprehend the consequence of his crime, mitigating circumstance of
instruction and education shall be appreciated even if he received instruction or education in
school.
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48. Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is inequality of forces between
the victim and the aggressor, considering that a situation of superiority of strength is
notoriously advantageous for the aggressor and is selected or taken advantage of by him in the
commission of the crime (People vs. Garchitorena, G. R. No. 175605, August 28, 2009, Justice
De Castro). The victim need not be completely defenseless in order for the said aggravating
circumstance to be appreciated (People vs. Paling, G.R. No. 185390 March 16, 2011). If the
victim is completely defenseless, treachery should be appreciated (People vs. Rebucan, G.R. No.
182551, July 27, 2011). When the circumstance of abuse of superior strength concurs with
treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter (People vs. Dadao, et.al., G.R. No. 201860,
January 22, 2014, Justice De Castro).
49. The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must
be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent
during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment (People vs. Alinao, GR No.
191256, September 18, 2013). If the offender premeditated the killing of a specific person,
evident premeditated will not be appreciable if he killed another person due to mistake of blow,
or mistake of identity (People vs. Mabug-at, 51 Phil., 967; People us. Dueo, G.R. No. L-31102,
May 5, 1979).
50. In aid of armed men, the men act as accomplices only. They must not be acting in
the commission of the crime under the same purpose as the principal accused, otherwise they
are to be regarded as co-principals or co-conspirators (People vs. Enoja, GR No. 204894, March
10, 2014). In band, the armed members thereof, who are at least four, must all be principals by
direct participation who acted together in the execution of the acts constituting the crime
(People vs. Lozano, September 29, 2003, G.R. Nos. 137370-71).
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57. The accused owned the safehouse, where the kidnapped victim was detained and
assisted the kidnappers such as bringing foods to the victim. Ownership of the safehouse and
their participations reasonably indicate that they were among those who at the outset planned
the kidnapping. Providing a safehouse is an evidence of conspiracy since the place where the
victim is to be detained is a primary consideration in planning to commit kidnapping. Although
their participation pertain to those committed by mere accomplices, they are liable as
principals because implied conspiracy is shown. If there is conspiracy, the extent of
participation is not anymore material (People vs. Salvador, GR No. 201443, April 10, 2013).
58. In fencing, the property, which the accused possesses or deals with intent to gain,
must be derived from the proceeds of theft or robbery (Ong vs. People, GR No. 190475, April
10, 2013). If the property is derived from the proceeds of other crime such as malversation or
estafa through misappropriation, fencing is not committed. But the accused can be held liable
as an accessory if he profited or assisted other to profit from this misappropriated property.
However, there is fencing although the subject property has been derived from the proceeds of
carnapping (Dimat vs. People, G.R. No. 181184, January 25, 2012). The concept of carnapping
is the same as that of theft or robbery (People vs. Sia, G.R. No. 137457, November 21, 2001).
Thus, carnapping can be considered as within the contemplation of the word theft or
robbery mentioned in PD No. 1612.
59. Actual knowledge that the property has been derived from the proceeds of theft or
robbery is not required. The accused can still be held liable for fencing if he should have known
that the property is stolen taken into consideration the attending circumstances such as (1) the
price of the property is so cheap; (2) expensive jewelry is being offered for sale at midnight in a
street; (3) accused knew that the car he bought was not properly documented (Dimat vs.
People, supra); or (4) new tires are being peddled in the streets by an unknown seller (Ong vs.
People, GR No. 190475, April 10, 2013). Furthermore, mere possession of stolen property shall
be prima facie evidence of fencing (Section 6 of PD No. 1612).
60. A person who assists a criminal to escape is liable as an accessory provided that:
(1) the criminal being assisted must be a principal in the commission of the crime; (2) the
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61. Credit is full if the detention prisoner executed detainees manifestation, which is
defined as a written declaration of a detained prisoner, with the assistant of a counsel, stating
his refusal to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon a convicted prisoner for the
purpose of availing the full credit of the period of his preventive imprisonment. Credit is 4/5 if
the detention prisoner executed detainees waiver, which is defined as a written declaration of a
detained prisoner, with the assistant of a counsel, stating his refusal to abide by the same
disciplinary rules imposed upon a prisoner convicted by final judgment. There is no credit if
the accused is recidivist; has been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime; or
has failed to surrender voluntarily before a court of law upon being summoned for the
execution of his sentence. Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be deducted from thirty (30) years (Article 29 of RPC as amended by RA No.
10592 and its implementing rules).
63. If detention or convicted prisoner escapes during the calamity, and subsequently
surrenders within 48 hours from the time the President announces the passing away of such
calamity, he is entitled to 1/5 special time allowance for loyalty under Article 98 of RPC as
amended by RA No. 10592; if the convicted prisoner did not surrender within the period, he is
liable for evasion of sentence under Article 158 of RPC punishable by penalty equivalent to onefifth of the time still remaining to be served under the original sentence, which in no case shall
exceed six months; if the detention prisoner did not surrender within the period, he is not liable
for evasion of sentence. Only convicted prisoner can commit evasion of service of sentence
because a detention prisoner is not serving sentence, which he can evade.
In case of the prisoner chose to stay in the place of his confinement notwithstanding the
existence of a calamity, he is entitled to 2/5 special time allowance for loyalty (Article 98 of RPC
as amended by RA No. 10592). A prisoner who did not escape despite of the calamity manifests
a higher degree of loyalty to the penal system than those who evaded their sentence but
thereafter gives themselves up upon the passing away of the calamity. Hence, prisoners, who
did not escape, are entitled to a higher special time allowance.
64. In De Castro vs. People, G.R. No. 171672, February 02, 2015, the court should
prescribe the correct penalties in complex crimes in strict observance of Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code. In estafa through falsification of commercial documents, the court
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If the victim is under 12 years old, and having sexual intercourse with her constitutes:
(a) Rape and sexual abuse - The offender can be prosecuted for rape (Section 5 of RA
No. 7610);
(b) Acts of lasciviousness and sexual abuse - The offender can be prosecuted for acts of
lasciviousness under RPC with the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium prescribed by
Section 5 of RA No. 7610.
(c) Rape through sexual assault and sexual abuse - The offender can be prosecuted for
rape with the penalty of prision mayor prescribed by RPC. However, this rule is unfair. One who
commits acts of lasciviousness in relation to RA No. 7610 suffers the more severe penalty of
reclusion temporal in its medium period than the one who commits rape through sexual assault,
which is merely punishable by prision mayor. To prevent unfairness, the penalty of reclusion
temporal in its medium period shall be imposed to sexual assault committed against a child
subjected to sexual abuse. In People vs. Chingh, G.R. No. 178323, March 16, 2011, the SC
stated To be sure, it was not the intention of the framers of RA No. 8353, to have disallowed the
applicability of RA No. 7610 to sexual abuses committed to children. Despite the passage of RA
No. 8353, R.A. No. 7610 is still good law, which must be applied when the victims are children.
(d) Qualified rape through sexual assault and sexual abuse - The offender can be
prosecuted for rape with the penalty of reclusion temporal prescribed by RPC. In People vs.
Bonaagua, G.R. No. 188897, June 6, 2011, since the crime committed is rape through sexual
assault with qualifying circumstance of minority and relationship, the rationale of unfairness
to the child victim that Chingh case wanted to correct is absent because RPC as amended by
RA No. 8353 already prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for this crime. Hence, there is
no more need to apply the penalty prescribed by RA No. 7610 for sexual abuse. The penalty
under RPC should be imposed.
118. Accompanying a child and offering her sexual services in exchange for money
constitutes child prostitution. The accused who offered the victim to the one who raped her is
not liable for rape as principal indispensable cooperation since bringing the victim to the rapist
is not indispensable to the commission of the crime of rape (People vs. Dulay, GR No. 193854,
September 24, 2012). If the accused is regularly offering the sexual service of the child in
exchange for money, the crime committed is not anymore child prostitution. Maintaining or
hiring the child as purpose of prostitution constitutes qualified trafficking in person because
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119. The Family Code has expressly banned the infliction of corporal punishment by a
school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special parental
authority. A schoolteacher in employing unnecessary violence on her minor student, who even
fainted from the violence suffered at her hands, is liable for child abuse under Section 10 of RA
No. 7610 (Rosaldes vs. People, G.R. No. 173988, October 08, 2014). Accused saw the victim
and his companions hurting his minor daughters. Angered, accused struck minor-victim at the
back with his hand and slapped his face. Since the accused committed the act at the spur of
the moment, they are perpetrated without intent to debase his "intrinsic worth and dignity" as
a human being, or to humiliate or embarrass him. Without such intent, the crime committed is
not child abuse under RA 7610 but merely slight physical injuries (Bongalon vs. People, G.R.
No. 169533, March 20, 2013).
120. In order to constitute estafa through issuance of bouncing check, the postdating or
issuing a check must be the efficient cause of the defraudation. In sum, the offender must be
able to obtain money or property from the offended party by reason of the issuance of the
check, whether dated or postdated (People vs. Reyes, GR No. 157943, September 04, 2013).
Issuance of bouncing check to cover pre-existing obligation is not estafa.
To be guilty of this crime the accused must have used the check in order to defraud the
complainant. What the law punishes is the fraud or deceit, not the mere issuance of the
worthless check. However, prima facie evidence of deceit exists by law upon proof that the
drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three days
from receipt of the notice of dishonor (People vs. Reyes, GR No. 157943, September 04, 2013).
However, receipt of notice of dishonor is not an element of this crime.
121. Estafa through false pretense vs. other deceit - In estafa under Article 315, the
false representation is committed by using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or
by means of other similar deceits. Following the principle of ejusdem generis, other deceit as a
means to commit estafa must be similar to pretending to possess power, imaginary transaction
etc. If the deceit is not similar to pretending to possess power or imaginary transaction, the
crime committed is other deceit under Article 318. In Guinhawa vs. People, G.R. No. 162822
August 25, 2005 () - Fraudulent representation of the seller that the van to be sold is brand
new constitutes other deceit under Article 318. On the other hand, in People vs. Rubaton, C.A.,
65 O.G. 5048, issue of May 19, 1069, false representation that accused has a palay by reason
of which the victim parted his money in consideration of the palay constitutes estafa under
Article 315. Unlike in the Guinhawa case, the transaction in Rubaton case is imaginary.
The false pretense made by accused that Primelink was authorized to sell membership
shares is estafa. False pretense of qualification to sell securities is within the contemplation of
the provision on estafa (Lopez vs. People, GR No. 199294, July 31, 2013)
122. In other forms of swindling under Article 316, (1) and (2) of RPC, offender
perpetrates false representation involving real property and act of ownership such as selling it,
which causes damage to third person. In paragraph 1, the accused represents that he owned
the property, while in paragraph 2, he expressly represents in the deed of conveyance that the
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135. Even if the second marriage is null and avoid because of psychological incapacity,
contracting such marriage is bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on
bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital
contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting
multiple marriages (Tenebro vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, February
18, 2004; Walter vs. People, GR No. 183805, July 03, 2013). Note: Article 40 of the Family Code
is not applicable since the provision contemplates a situation where first marriage and not the
second marriage is null and void.
Even if the first marriage is null and avoid because of psychological incapacity (Wiegel v.
Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499) or the absence of a marriage license or of an affidavit of
cohabitation (Lasanas vs. People, G.R. No. 159031, June 23, 2014), contracting a second
marriage constitutes the crime of bigamy unless a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage has been secured beforehand. Because of Article 40 of the Family Code, a declaration
of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
ground for defense (Lasanas vs. People, supra).
Contracting second marriage without previous judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage consummates the crime of bigamy. One the crime consummates, criminal liability will
attach to the accused. The following subsequent developments will not extinguish his criminal
liability for bigamy: (a) Subsequent declaration of nullity of the first marriage obtained before
the filing of the complaint for bigamy (People vs. Odtuhan, GR No. 191566, July 17, 2013); (b)
Subsequent declaration of nullity of the first marriage and second marriage (Jarillo vs. People,
GR No. 164435, September 29, 2009).
Even if the first marriage was contracted prior to the Family Code, this is not a defense.
Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively. The retroactive
application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise
from, procedural laws (Jarillo vs. People, GR No. 164435, June 29, 2010).
However, the principle that one who enters into a subsequent marriage without first
obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy is not applicable where the parties
merely signed the marriage contract without marriage ceremony performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to
a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Hence, bigamy is not
committed (Morigo vs. People, G.R. No. 145226, February 06, 2004).
X contracted three marriages. His first wife is already dead when X contracted his third
marriage. X is liable for bigamy involving the second marriage on the basis of his first marriage.
X is not liable for bigamy involving the third marriage on the basis of the first marriage since
the first has already been extinguished by reason of death of the first wife when he contracted
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150. Thus, the following links must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust
situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turn over of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turn over by the investigating officer
of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turn over
and submission of the marked illegal drugs seized from the forensic chemist to the court
(People vs. Constantino, Jr. GR No. 199689, March 12, 2014)
151. Where the presence of dangerous drugs as basis for possession is only in the form
of residue and there is a positive confirmatory test result, the accused should be charged with
use of dangerous drugs rather than possession of dangerous drugs. This would be in keeping
with the intent of the law to file charges of use of dangerous drugs in order to rehabilitate first
time offenders of drug use and provide them with an opportunity to recover for a second
chance at life (People vs. Matinez, G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010).
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156. Exerting efforts to reach an amicable settlement with her creditor after the checks
which she issued were dishonored by the drawee bank is a circumstantial evidence of receipt of
notice of dishonor. Accused would not have entered into the alleged arrangements if she had
not received a notice of dishonor from her creditor, and had no knowledge of the insufficiency of
her funds with the bank and the dishonor of her checks (Campos vs. People. G.R. No. 187401,
September 17, 2014).
157. Under Section 114(d) of the Negotiable Instruments Law, notice of dishonor is not
required to be given to the drawer in either of the following cases where the drawer has no right
to expect or require that the drawee or acceptor will honor the check. Since petitioner's bank
account was already closed even before the issuance of the subject check, he had no right to
expect or require the drawee bank to honor his check. By virtue of the aforequoted provision of
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Payment of check after the filing of information is not a defense. Since there is no
showing of intention to mitigate or totally alleviate the ill effects of his issuance of the unfunded
check, then there is no equitable and compelling reason to preclude the prosecution of
accused. In such a case, the letter of the law should be applied to its full extent (Lim vs. People,
supra). In estafa, damage and deceit are the essential elements of the offense, and the check is
merely the accused's tool in committing fraud. In such a case, paying the value of the
dishonored check will not free the accused from criminal liability. It will merely satisfy the civil
liability of the crime but not the criminal liability (Lim vs. People, supra). Note: The essence of
estafa is to punish fraud and not to protect the integrity of the check.
159. Considering that there was a lawful Order from the SEC, the contract is deemed
suspended. When a contract is suspended, it temporarily ceases to be operative; and it again
becomes operative when a condition occurs - or a situation arises - warranting the termination
of the suspension of the contract. When a contract is subject to a suspensive condition, its
birth takes place or its effectivity commences only if and when the event that constitutes the
condition happens or is fulfilled. Thus, at the time complainant presented the check for
encashment, it had no right to do so, as there was yet no obligation due from accused. Thus,
accused is not liable for violation of BP Blg. 22 (Gidwani vs. People, GR No. 195064, January
15, 2014).
160. The deliberation in the Senate regarding the bill on anti-graft shows that the mode
of committing the crime under Section 3 (a) is persuading, inducing or influencing a public
officer by another public officer to commit an offense or to violate rules and regulations by
means of consideration, reward, payment or remuneration (See: Baviera vs. Zoleta, G.R. No.
169098, Oct. 12, 2006). Hence, Grace Poe is not committing this crime since she is not
inducing Secretary De Lima to commit an offense or violate rules in connection with the
criminal complaint against INC officers by means of consideration, reward, payment or
remuneration.
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