Pil Cases For Finals

Aelan Biruar Arumpac
3-Arellano
Public International Law
PIL CASES FOR FINALS
1) HEAD MONEY CASES EDYE V. ROBERTSON

Issue: WON the act is void because of the conflict with the treaty.
Held: A treaty is a compact between independent nations, which depends
for its enforcement upon the interest and honor of the governments that are
parties to a treaty. Treaties that regulate the mutual rights of citizens and
subjects of the contracting nations are in the same category as acts of
Congress. When these rights are of such a nature as to be enforced by a
court of justice, the court resorts to a treaty as it would to a statute.
However, a constitution gives a treaty no superiority over an act on
congress. In short, so far as treaty made by the US with any foreign nation
can become the subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of this country, it
is subject to such acts as Congress may pass for its enforcement,
modification or repeal.
2) WHITNEY V. ROBERTSON
Issue: Where a treaty and an act of legislation conflict, will the one last
in date control?
HELD: Yes, the one with a later date will control where a treaty and an act of
legislation conflict. The act of congress under which the duties were collected
was passed after the treaty and therefore is controlling.
3) ISLAND OF PALMAS CASE

Issue: Can an inchoate title prevail over a definite title founded on
continuous and peaceful display of sovereignty?
HELD: An inchoate title cannot prevail over a definite title founded on
continuous and peaceful display of sovereignty. The continuous and peaceful
display of territorial sovereignty is as good as title. Discovery alone, without
any subsequent act, cannot suffice to prove sovereignty over the island.
4) YAMASHITA V. STYER

3-Arellano
Issue: 1) Should the petitions for habeas corpus and prohibition be granted
in this case?
2) Was the military commission validly constituted by respondent,
therefore having jurisdiction over the war crimes?
HELD:
1) No. A petition for habeas corpus is improper when release of petitioner is
not sought. It seeks no discharge of petitioner from confinement but merely
his restoration to his former status as prisoner of war, to be interned, not
confined. The relative difference as to the degree of confinement in such
cases is a matter of military measure, disciplinary in character, beyond the
jurisdiction of civil courts. Prohibition cannot issue against one not made
party respondent.Neither may the petition for prohibition prosper against Lt.
Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer.
2) Under the laws of war, a military commander has an implied power to
appoint and convene a military commission. This is upon the theory that
since the power to create a military commission is an aspect of waging war,
military commanders have that power unless expressly withdrawn from
them. By the articles of war, and especially Art. 15, the Congress of the US
has explicitly provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military
tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the laws
of war in appropriate cases.
5) TANADA ET. AL V. ANGARA

Issue: Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in
worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and from
integrating into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and
privatized?
HELD: No, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from
participating in worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and
from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated, and
privatized.
While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods,
services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for
business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and
reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign
2

3-Arellano
corporation and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the
Constitution did not intend to pursue and isolationist policy. It did not shut
out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the
Philippine economy.
6) GONZALES v. HECHANOVA
Issue: WON RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into
by Macapagal.
HELD: Yes. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to
enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the
performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of
his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired
the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive
agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said
laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is
latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar.
Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the contracts adverted to
are not treaties. No such justification can be given as regards executive
agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely
upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up.
7) PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO V. GRP PEACE PANEL

ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN
Issue:
a) WON the signing of the MOA, the Government of the RP would be binding
itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Judicial Entity (BJE) as a
separate state, or a juridical, territorial, or political subdivision not
recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to
the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the MILF for ancestral
domain in violation of RA 8371 (The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997)
HELD:
a) Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that
the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state
or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
3

3-Arellano
The concept
Constitution.
of
association is
not
recognized
under
the
present
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under

our laws as having an associative relationship with the national
government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything
ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also
implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The
Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction
other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory
status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region
recognized in the Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version of
the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being
fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in
all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the
Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined
territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with
other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any
portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it which has betrayed
itself by its use of the concept of association runs counter to the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national
government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is
not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the
formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the
laws. The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even
assuming that it is covered by the term autonomous region in the
constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with
it.
b) The MOA-AD provides that any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring
amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the
signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary
changes to the legal framework, implying an amendment of the
Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect,
guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution .
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of
office, only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power
does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but
4

3-Arellano
simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she

limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper
procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere
recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
The suspensive clause in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the abovediscussed standards.
Given the limited nature of the Presidents authority to propose
constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third party
that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor
even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit
these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in
whom constituent powers are vested.
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is the birthright of all Moros
and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be
accepted as Bangsamoros. It defines Bangsamoro people as the natives
or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan
and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their
descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.
Thus, the concept of Bangsamoro, as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD,
includes not only Moros as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but
all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD
adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected.
What this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The
MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the Bangsamoro homeland, the ownership of
which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior
rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral
domain does not form part of the public domain.
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides
for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral
domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and
prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous
Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or
any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral
domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.
5

3-Arellano
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires
all national offices to conduct consultations beforeany project or program
critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call
for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is
implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that
unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the
Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the
diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total
environment.
CONCLUSION: The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present
Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept
underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between
the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that
the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to
independence
8) THE SAPPHIRE CASE

III was deposed. The case came on to be argued here February 16, 1871.
Three questions were raised:
1. The right of the Emperor of France to have brought suit in our courts.
2. Whether, if rightly brought, the suit had not become abated by the
deposition of the Emperor Napoleon III.
3. The question of merits; one of fact, and depending upon evidence stated
towards the conclusion of the, where the point is considered.
The first question raised is as to the right of the French Emperor to sue in our
courts. On this point, not the slightest difficulty exists. A foreign sovereign, as
well as any other foreign person, who has a demand of a civil nature against
any person here may prosecute it in our courts. To deny him this privilege
would manifest a want of comity and friendly feeling. Such a suit was
sustained a want of comity and King of Spain in the Third Circuit by Justice
Washington and Judge Peters in 1810. The Constitution expressly extends the
judicial power to controversies between a state or citizens thereof
and foreign states, citizens, or subjects without reference to the subject
matter of the controversy. Our own government has largely availed itself of
the like privilege to bring suits in the English courts in cases growing out of
our late civil war. Twelve or more of such suits are enumerated in the brief of
the appellees, brought within the last five years in the English law, chancery,
and admiralty courts. There are numerous cases in the English reports in
which suits of foreign sovereigns have been sustained, though it is held that
a sovereign cannot be forced into court by suit.
6

3-Arellano
The next question is whether the suit has become abated by the recent
deposition of the Emperor Napoleon. We think it has not. The reigning
sovereign represents the national sovereignty, and that sovereignty is
continuous and perpetual, residing in the proper successors of the sovereign
for the time being. Napoleon was the owner of the Euryale, not as an
individual but as sovereign of France. This is substantially averred in the libel.
On his deposition the sovereignty does not change, but merely the person or
persons in whom it resides. The foreign state is the true and real owner of its
public vessels of war. The reigning Emperor or national assembly or other
actual person or party in power is but the agent and representative of the
national sovereignty. A change in such representative works no change in the
national sovereignty or its rights. The next successor recognized by our
government is competent to carry on a suit already commenced and receive
the fruits of it. A deed to or treaty with a sovereign as such enures to his
successors in the government of the country. If a substitution of names is
necessary or proper, it is a formal matter, and can be made by the court
under its general power to preserve due symmetry in its forms of
proceeding. No allegation has been made that any change in the real and
substantial ownership of the Euryale has occurred by the recent devolution of
the sovereign power. The vessel has always belonged and still belongs to the
French nation.
If a special case should arise in which it could be shown that injustice to the
other party would ensue from a continuance of the proceedings after the
death or deposition of a sovereign, the court, in the exercise of its
discretionary power, would take such order as the exigency might require to
prevent such a result.
The remaining question relates to the merits of the case. And on the merits
of the case as presented by the record, we think that the court below erred in
imposing the whole damage upon the Sapphire. We think that
the Euryale was equally in fault, and that the damage ought to be divided
between them. It is not our general practice to scrutinize very carefully the
weight of evidence in cases of collision, where the evidence is substantially
conflicting and where both district and circuit courts have concurred in a
decree upon the merits. Our views upon this subject will be found quite fully
expressed by MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD in the case of The Baltimore. But this
case depends upon a narrow point, the evidence on which is in our view so
decidedly adverse to the sole liability of the Sapphire that it becomes our
duty to notice it.
The Euryale came to anchor in the harbor on the 14th of December, about
six hundred yards from the wharf. She was of four hundred and fifty tons
burden, drew thirteen feet of water, and had out fifty-six fathoms of chain,
and an anchor weighing 3,500 pounds. TheSapphire, of thirteen hundred
tons burden, came to anchor about the 18th of December, about three
hundred yards (as alleged both in the libel and answer) to the southeasterly
of the Euryale, at a point father up the harbor, and farther from the wharf.
7

3-Arellano
She had out about fifty fathoms of chain, and an anchor weighing 3,600 to
3,800 pounds, and she was heavily laden, drawing about twenty-three feet of
water. On the night of the 21st of December, it commenced to blow pretty
strong from the southeast, by midnight blowing a six-knot breeze, and it kept
increasing up to the time of the collision at five o'clock the next morning,
when it seems to have been blowing a gale. At half-past three in the
morning, the tide changed from ebb to flood, the direction of flood tide being
southeasterly, directly contrary to that of the wind. And the captain of
the Euryale says (and he is not contradicted) that the wind was twice as
strong as the tide. The weight of the evidence is that the Sapphire, under the
force of the wind, dragged her anchor and got inside of the Euryale -- that is,
between her and the city. At a few minutes past five, the collision occurred.
The libellant insists that the Sapphire was in fault in two points: 1st, in
anchoring too near the Euryale in the first instance; 2d, in not having out
sufficient anchors. We think that the first charge is not sustained.
Experienced pilots testified that two hundred and fifty yards distance is a
good and sufficient berth in that harbor. And it is to be noted that the master
of the Euryale made no complaint of too great proximity, although she and
the Sapphire were lying in the same relative position for several days. On the
other point, we agree with the district and circuit courts that
the Sapphire was in fault. Had a second anchor been put out at an earlier
period, the collision in all probability would not have occurred. Indeed, the
captain of the Sapphire gave orders to the first officer that if she was likely to
start, to put the second anchor down. But it was not done till the collision
itself broke the ring-stopper and let it down. A more careful watch would
have led to the discovery of the vessel's having started, and would have
prevented the catastrophe which ensued.
But we are also satisfied that the Euryale was not free from fault. The captain
was not on board. The first officer, though on board, was not on deck from
eleven o'clock until after the collision. Le Noir, the third officer, was officer of
the deck that night. He was called up by the head, or chief, of the watch at
three o'clock to observe that the Sapphire was approaching nearer to them
than she had been. He attributed it to her letting out more chain, and
returned below, and did not come on deck again until five o'clock, a few
moments before the collision, when it was too late to avoid it. The instant he
came on deck, he ordered done the thing that could have saved them had it
been done earlier -- the jib to be hoisted. It would have sheered the vessel
off and allowed the Sapphire to pass her. Such is the testimony of the
libellant's own witnesses. It is the judgment of the first officer of the ship.
Why was not this done before? Why was not the officer, on such a night, in
such a gale, at his post? At four o'clock, the man in charge of the watch saw
the Sapphire approaching, and says he made a report to that effect. The first
officer says that no report was made to him. But the third officer, who was
officer of the deck, does not say that it was not made to him. If the fact was
not communicated to the proper officer, that was in itself a fault. If it was
8

3-Arellano
communicated and not attended to, the case of the libellant is not bettered.
But the evidence is very strong that the officer received the information.
Deveaux, the head of the watch, says that he reported the fact at four
o'clock, and Bioux, who had charge of the watch between four and five
o'clock, says that between those hours he saw the Sapphire with the wind
astern, and heading the current, coming towards the Euryale; that she
continued to approach gradually, and that he reported this to Mr. Le Noir
between four and five o'clock. Here, then, was a clear neglect of proper
precautions for an entire hour immediately preceding the collision.
We cannot avoid the conviction that there was a want of proper care and
vigilance on the part of the officers of the Euryale, and that this contributed
to produce the collision which ensued. Both parties being in fault, the
damages ought to be equally divided between them.
Decree of the circuit court reversed and the cause remitted to that court
with directions to enter a decree in conformity with this opinion.
9) US V. MEXICO
HELD: The Commission decides (1) that the claim must be disallowed with
respect to the three money orders issued in the name of the Banco
Germdnico de la America del Sur of Mexico City, totaling the amount of 590
pesos ; and (2) that with respect to the three other money orders the
Government of the United Mexican States shall pay to the Government of the
United States of America on behalf of George W. Hopkins the total amount of
the orders, namely, $211.06 (two hundred and eleven dollars and six cents)
with interest at the rate of six per centum per annum from June 6, 1914, to
the date on which the last award is rendered by the Commission.
10) OETJEN V. CENTRAL LEATHER Co.

'Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the
acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of
grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open
to be available of by sovereign powers as between themselves.' Underhill v.
Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 , 18 S. Sup. Ct. 83, 84 (42 L. Ed. 456);
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 , 29 Sup. Ct. 511, 16
Ann. Cas. 1047.
Applying these principles of law to the case at bar, we have a duly
commissioned military commander of what must be accepted as the
legitimate government of Mexico, in the progress of a revolution, and when
conducting active independent operations, seizing and selling in Mexico, as a
military contribu ion, the property in controversy, at the time owned and in
the possession of a citizen of Mexico, the assignor of the plaintiff in error.
9

3-Arellano
Plainly this was the action, in Mexico, of the legitimate Mexican government
when dealing with a Mexican citizen, and, as we have seen, for the soundest
reasons, and upon repeated decisions of this court such action is not subject
to re-examination and modification by the courts of this country.
The principle that the conduct of one independent government cannot be
successfully questioned in the courts of another is as applicable to a case
involving the title to property brought within the custody of a court, such as
we have here, as it was held to be to the cases cited, in which claims for
damages were based upon acts done in a foreign country, for it rests at last
upon the highest [246 U.S. 297, 304] considerations of international comity
and expediency. To permit the validity of the acts of one sovereign state to
be reexamined and perhaps condemned by the courts of another would very
certainly 'imperil the amicable relations between governments and vex the
peace of nations.'
It is not necessary to consider, as the New Jersey court did, the validity of the
levy of the contribution made by the Mexican commanding general, under
rules of international law applicable to the situation, since the subject is not
open to re-examination by this or any other American court.
The remedy of the former owner, or of the purchaser from him, of the
property in controversy, if either has any remedy, must be found in the
courts of Mexico or through the diplomatic agencies of the political
department of our government. The judgments of the Court of Errors and
Appeals of New Jersey must be affirmed.
11) UNDERHILL V. HERNANDEZ

HELD: Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment
on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory.
Redress of grievances by reason of suct act must be obtained through the
means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.
12) THE CASE OF SS LOTUS (FRANCE V. TURKEY)

Issue: Does a rule of international law which prohibits a state from exercising
criminal jurisdiction over a foreign national who commits acts outside of the
states national jurisdiction exist?
HELD: The offense for which Lt. Demons appears to have been prosecuted
was an act of negligence or imprudence having its origin on board the lotus
whilst the effects made themselves felt on board the Boz-Kourt. These
elements are legally, entirely inseparable, so much so that their separation
renders the offense non-existent. Neither the exclusive jurisdiction of each of
the occurrence which took place on the respective ships would appear
calculated to satisfy the requirements of justice and effectively to protect the
10

3-Arellano
interests of the two (2) states. It is only natural that each should be able to
exercise jurisdiction and to do so in respect of the incident as a whole. It is
however, a case of concurrent jurisdiction.
13) WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION V. AQUINO

Issue: WON personal effect of WHO Officer DR. Verstuyft can be exempted
from search and seizure under the diplomatic immunity
HELD: The executive branch of the Philippines has expressly recognized that
Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the
Host Agreement. The DFA formally advised respondent judge of the
Philippine Governments official position. The Solicitor General, as principal
law officer of the government, likewise expressly affirmed said petitioners
right to diplomatic immunity asn asked for the quashal of the search warrant.
14) CLIPPERTON ISLAND CASE

Issue: Is the rule announced in the Island of Palmas cse absolute?
HELD: No. In the Clipperton Island Case, France proclaimed sovereignty over
an island in 1858 but until 1887 exercised no positive or apparent act of
sovereignty over it. When Mexico later claimed the territory in 1897, the
arbitrator, while recognizing that possession and administration are generally
required for an effective discovery and occupation held that, if territory, by
virtue of the fact that it was completely uninhabited is, from the first moment
when the occupying State makes its appearance there, at the absolute and
undisputed disposition of that State, from that moment the taking of
possession must be considered as accomplished and the occupation is
thereby completed.
15) REPUBLIC OF PERU V. DREYFUS BROTHERS

HELD: A general government de facto having completely taken the place of
the regularly instituted authorities in the State finds the nation. So far as its
international obligations are concerned, it represents the State. It succeeds
to the duty of the regular government it has displaced and transmits its own
obligations to succeeding titular governments. Its loans and contracts bind
the State, and the state is responsible for the government acts of the de
facto authorities. In general, its treaties are valid obligations of the State.
16) WULFSOHN V. RUSSIAN SOCIALIST FEDERATION SOVIET

REPUBLICS
11

3-Arellano
HELD: The Russian Federated Soviet Republic is the existing de facto

government of Russia. This is admitted by the plaintiff. Otherwise there is no
proper party defendant before the court. It is claimed by the defendant. The
Appellate Division states that it is a matter of common knowledge. It has not
been recognized by the government of the United States. The plaintiffs
owned a quantity of furs. They were stored in Russia and they were
confiscated by the Russian government. Treating this act as a conversion the
present
action
is
brought.
The litigation is not, therefore, with regard to title to property situated within
the jurisdiction of our courts, where the result depends upon the effect to be
given to the action of some foreign government. Under such circumstances it
might be that the theory of the comity of nations would have a place. A
different case is presented to us. The government itself is sued for an
exercise of sovereignty within its own territories on the theory that such an
act, if committed by an individual here, would be a tort under our system of
municipal law. It is said that, because of nonrecognition by the United States,
such an action may be maintained. There is no relation between the premise
and
the
conclusion.
The result we reach depends upon more basic considerations than
recognition or nonrecognition by the United States. Whether or not a
government exists, clothed with the power to enforce its authority within its
own territory, obeyed by the people over whom it rules, capable of
performing the duties and fulfilling the obligations of an independent power,
able to enforce its claims by military force is a fact, not a theory. For its
recognition does not create the state, although it may be desirable. So only
are diplomatic relations permitted. Treaties made with the government which
it succeeds may again come into effect. It is a testimony of friendly
intentions. Also in the country granting the recognition that act is conclusive
as to the existence of the government recognized. Again, recognition may
become important where the actual existence of a government created by
rebellion or otherwise becomes a political question affecting our neutrality
laws, the recognition of the decrees of prize courts, and similar questions.
But, except in such instances, the fact of the existence of such a government
whenever it becomes material may probably be proved in other ways.
Here, however, we need no proof. The fact is conceded. We have an existing
government,
sovereign
within
its
own
territories.
There necessarily its jurisdiction is exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of
no limitation not imposed by itself. This is the result of its independence. It
12

3-Arellano
may be conceded that its actions should accord with natural justice and
equity. If they do not, however, our courts are not competent to review them.
They may not bring a foreign sovereign before our bar, not because of
comity, but because he has not submitted himself to our laws. Without his
consent he is not subject to them. Concededly that is so as to a foreign
government that has received recognition.
But, whether recognized or not, the evil of such an attempt would be the
same. To cite a foreign potentate into a municipal court for any complaint
against him in his public capacity is contrary to the law of nations, and an
insult which he is entitled to resent. De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 17 Q. B.
171. In either case, to do so would vex the peace of nations. In either case
the hands of the state department would be tied. Unwillingly it would find
itself involved in disputes it might think unwise. Such is not the proper
method of redress, if a citizen of the United States is wronged. The question
is a political one, not confided to the courts, but to another department of
government. Whenever an act done by a sovereign in his sovereign
character is questioned, it becomes a matter of negotiation, or of reprisals,
or of war.
If the complaint and the affidavits upon which the warrant of attachment was
based in the case before us clearly indicate that the plaintiffs must ultimately
fail, the warrant should be vacated. It does so appear in this case.
17) WALTHIER V. THOMPSON

HELD: In 1960, the State Department recognized immunity of Canadian consular
officer and the dominion of Catholic because the acts in question In the course of
on in connection with the consular officers duties described constitute sovereign or
public acts of Canada. The Court subsequently discussed the action, on the grounds
that a consular official is immune from suit when the acts complained of were
performed in the course of his official duties.
18) NICOLAS V. ROMULO ET AL

ISSUE:
HELD:
The SC ruled The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States, entered into on February 10, 1998, is constitutional, but
the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006 are DECLARED not in
accordance with the VFA.
VFA is Constitutional
13

3-Arellano
The SC ruled that the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate
and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States, and the fact that
(it) was not submitted for advice and consent of the United States does not
detract from its status as a binding international agreement or treaty
recognized by the said State.
Section 25, Article XVIII, 1987 Constitution provides that foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under
a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires,
ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national
referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.
The issue, the Court said, is whether or not the presence of the US Armed
Forces in Philippine territory pursuant to the VFA is allowed under a treaty
duly concurred in by the Senate and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State. It is, the Court ruled. The VFA, which is the instrument
agreed upon to provide for the joint RP-US military exercises, is simply an
implementing agreement to the main RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, the
Court held. visit fellester.blogspot.com The RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of
August 30, 1951 was signed and duly ratified with the concurrence of both
the Philippine Senate and the United States Senate.
Romulo-Kenney Agreements not in accord with the VFA itself
The Court however ruled that the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December
19 and 22, 2006, which are agreements on the detention of the accused in
the United States Embassy, are not in accord with the VFA itself because
such detention is not by Philippine authorities. Article V, Section 10 of the
VFA provides that the confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of
the United States personnel shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by
appropriate Philippines and United States authorities. (Suzette Nicolas y
Sombilon Vs. Alberto Romulo, G.R. No. 175888, February 11, 2009)
19) MEDELLIN V. TEXAS

Issue: Is the ICJs judgment in Avena directly enforceable as domestic law in a
state court in the US?
HELD: This court has long recognized the distinction between treaties that
automatically have effect as domestic law and those that- while they
constitute international law commitments- do not by themselves function as
binding federal law. The distinction was well explained by Chief Justice
Marshalls opinion in Foster v Neilson, overruled on other grounds, US v
14

3-Arellano
Percheman, which held that a treaty is equivalent to an act of the

legislature, and hence, self-executing when it operates of itself without the
aid of any legislative mission. When, in contrast, treaty stipulations are not
self-executing, they can only be enforced pursuant to legislation to carry
them into effect. In sum, while treaties may comprise international
commitments, they are not domestic law unless Congress has either
implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be
self-executing and is ratified on these terms.
Only if the treaty contains stipulations which are self-executing, that it,
requires no legislation to make them operative, will they have the force and
effect of a legislative enactment. In the case at bar, because none of the
treaty sources creates binding federal law in absence of implementing
legislation and because it is uncontested that no such legislation exists, we
conclude that the Avena judgment is not automatically binding domestic law.
20) THE CANAVERO CASE

HELD: According to Peruvian legislation, Rafael Canavero is a Peruvian by
birth because born on Peruvian territory. On the other hand, according to
Italian legislation, he us of Italian nationality because born of an Italian
father. Under these circumstances, whatever Rafael Canaveros status as a
national may be in Italy, the government of Peru has a right to consider him
as Peruvian citizen and to deny his status as an Italian claimant.
21) US (TELLECH) V. AUSTRIA AND HUNGARY

HELD: Citizenship is determined by ruled prescribed by municipal law. Under
the law of Austria, to which claimant had voluntarily subjected himself, he
was an Austrian citizen. The Austrian and the Austro-Hungarian authorities
were well within their rights in dealing with him as such. Possessing as he did
nationality, he voluntarily took the risk incident to residing in Austrian
territory and subjecting himself to the duties and obligations of an Austrian
citizen arising under the municipal laws of Austria.
22) IN RE MUNIER
In Re Meunier, (1894) 2 QB 415, the fugitive was an anarchist and he was
accused of causing explosion at a cafe and in certain barracks in France as a
protest against the French Government. The French Government requested
his extradition after the fugitive had escaped to England. The fugitive
resisted extradition by pleading that the offence was a political offence. Cave
J. held that in order to constitute an offence of a political character, there
must be two or more parties in the State, each seeking to impose the
Government of their own choice on the other, and that, if the offence is
15

3-Arellano
committed by one side or the other in pursuance of that object, it is a

political offence, otherwise not (see page 419 of judgment) The fugitives
plea of political offence failed because he committed the offences with the
mere intention of expressing his hatred, distrust of, or disbelief in
government as an institution. It appears that the court in Meunier had
followed closely the principles laid down in Castioni in that in construing an
offence of a political character, the fugitive had to commit the offence with
the object of staging a political disturbance and that there must be a nexus
between the criminal act and the political disturbance. The interpretation in
Castioni and Meunier was regarded as being too restrictive in R v. Governor
of Brixton Prison, ex pate Kolczynski, (1955) 1 QB 540 (the Polish Seamen
Case). Seven Polish seamen served as members of the crew in a trawler
fishing in the North Sea. The activities of the seamen in the trawler were
monitored by a political officer who was gathering evidence to prosecute
them on account of their political opinion when they returned to Poland.
Knowing that they would be prosecuted for their political opinion if they
returned to Poland, the seamen took control of the trawler and went to
England. The Polish Government requested their extradition for various
criminal offences including that of wounding. In distinguishing the case from
that of Castioni, and Meunier, Cassels J. said: The words offence of a
political character must always be considered according to the
circumstances existing at the time when they have to be considered. The
present time is very different from 1891, when Castionis case was decided.
It was not then treason for a citizen to leave his country and start a fresh life
in another. Countries were not regarded as enemy countries when no war
was in progress. Now a state of totalitarianism prevails in some parts of the
world and it is a crime for citizens in such places to take steps to leave. In
this case the members of the crew of a small trawler engaged in fishing were
under political supervision and they revolted by the only means open to
them. They committed an offence of a political character, and if they were
surrendered there could be no doubt that, while they would be tried for the
particular offence mentioned, they would be punished as for a political crime.
Thus they have brought themselves within section 3(1) (i.e. that the political
offence exception) and made good their claim to have the restrictions
referred to observed.
23) THE NOTTEBOHM CASE
HELD: Nottebohms actual connections with Liechtenstein were extremely

tenuous. No settled abode, no prolonged residence in that country at the
time of his application for naturalization. No intention of settling there was
shown at that time or realized in the ensuing weeks, months, or years- on
the contrary, he returned to Guatemala very shortly after his naturalization
and showed every intention of remaining there.
Naturalization was asked not so much for the purpose of obtaining a
legal recognition of Nottebohms membership in fact in the population of
16

3-Arellano
Liechtenstein ass it was to enable him to substitute for his status as a

national of a belligerent state that of a nationalof a neutral state, with the
sole aim of thus coming within the protection of Liechtenstein without
becoming wedded to its traditions, its interests, its way of life, or assuming
the obligations-other than fiscal obligations-and exercising the rights
pertaining to the status acquired.
Guatemala is under no obligation to recognize a nationality granted in
such circumstances. Liechtenstein consequently is not entitled to extend its
protection to Nottebohm vis--vis Guatemala and its claim must, for this
reason, be held inadmissible.
17

Pil Cases For Finals

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Pil Cases For Finals

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Aelan Biruar Arumpac