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Past and Present Society

The General Crisis of the European Economy in the 17th Century


Author(s): E. J. Hobsbawm
Source: Past & Present, No. 5 (May, 1954), pp. 33-53
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of Past and Present Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/649822
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33

The GeneralCrisisof theEuropeanEconomy


in the 17thCentury

IN THIS ARTICLE I WISH TO SUGGEST THAT THE EUROPEAN ECONOMY

"
the last
passedthrougha " generalcrisis duringthe I7th century,
froma feudalto a capitalisteconomy.
phaseof thegeneraltransition
Since 1300 or so, whensomething
clearlybeganto go seriouslywrong
withEuropeanfeudalsociety1
therehavebeenseveraloccasionswhen
partsof Europe trembledon the brinkof capitalism. There is a
" revolutionabout 14thtaste of " bourgeois" and " industrial
centuryTuscany and Flanders or early I6th-centuryGermany.
Yet it is only fromthe middleof the I7th centurythatthis taste
medievalor feudal
becomesmorethana seasoningto an essentially
dish. The earlierurban societiesnever quite succeeded in the
revolutionsthey foreshadowed.From the early i8th century,
"
checks.
however," bourgeois societyadvancedwithoutsubstantial
The I7th centurycrisisthus differsfromits predecessorsin that
which had
a solutionof the difficulties
it led to as fundamental
previouslystood in the way of the triumphof capitalism,as that
systemwillpermit. In thisarticleI proposeto marshalsomeofthe
evidenceforthe existenceof a generalcrisis,whichis stilldisputed
ofit. In a subsequentarticle
bysome,and to suggestan explanation
I proposeto discusssomeofthechangesit produced,and howit was
overcome. It is veryprobablethata greatdeal of historicalwork
willbe doneonthissubjectandperiodinthenextfewyears. Indeed,
lately historiansin various countrieshave tentativelysuggested
somethinglike that " general check to economic development"
or generalcrisiswithwhichthispaperdeals.2 It maytherefore
be
convenientto take a bird's eye view of the field,and to speculate
if onlyto stimulatebetter
about some sortof workinghypothesis,
work.
ones,or further
Evidencefor a generalcrisis

A good deal of evidencefor the " generalcrisis" is available.


We must,however,be carefulto avoid the argumentthata general
whichhas bedevilledmuch of
crisisequals economicretrogression,
the discussion about the 'feudal crisis" of the I4th and I5th
clearthattherewas a good deal of retrocenturies. It is perfectly
gressionin the 7th century. For the firsttime in historythe

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34

PAST AND PRESENT

ceasedto be a majorcentreofeconomicand political,


Mediterranean
and eventuallyof culturalinfluenceand became an impoverished
backwater. The Iberianpowers,Italy,Turkeywereplainlyon the
downgrade:Venice was on the way to becominga touristcentre.
Withthe exceptionof a fewplaces dependenton the Northwestern
states (generallyfreeports) and the piratemetropolisof Algiers,
which also operatedin the Atlantic,3there was little advance.
Furthernorth,the declineof Germanyis patent,thoughnotwholly
unrelieved. In the Baltic Poland, Denmarkand the Hanse were
on the way down. Though the powerand influenceof Habsburg
Austria increased (perhaps largely because others declined so
herresourcesremainedpoor,hermilitary
and political
dramatically),
structure
evenat theperiodof hergreatestgloryin theearly
rickety
i8th century. On theotherhandin the MaritimePowersand their
dependencies- England,the United Provinces,Sweden, and in
Russia and some minorareas like Switzerland,the impressionis
one of advance ratherthan stagnation;in England, of decisive
advance. France occupied an intermediate
position,thougheven
herepoliticaltriumphwas not balancedby greateconomicadvance
until the end of the century,and then only intermittently.
Indeed an atmosphere
of gloomand crisisfillsthe discussionsthere
can hardly
afterI68o, thoughconditions
in theprevioushalf-century
have been superior. (Possibly the huge catastropheof I693-4
accountsforthis.') It was in the i6th not the I7th centurythat
marvelledat how muchtherewas to loot in
invadingmercenaries
France,and men in Richelieu'sand Colbert'sera looked back on
HenryIV's as a sortof goldenage. It is indeed possiblethat,for
some decades in the middleof the centurythe gains made in the
Central
Atlanticdid not replacethe losses in the Mediterranean,
European and Baltic,the total proceedsfromboth stagnatingor
is the decisive
perhapsdeclining. Neverthelesswhatis important
advancein the progressof capitalismwhichresulted.
The scatteredfiguresfor Europeanpopulationsuggest,at worst
an actual decline,at best a level or slightlyrisingplateaubetween
the mountingslopes of the populationcurvein the later i6th and
18thcenturies. Except forthe Netherlands,
Norwayand perhaps
Swedenand Switzerlandand somelocal areasno majorincreasesin
population appear to be recorded. Spain was a by-wordfor
and the ravagesof
depopulation,SouthernItalymayhave suffered,
the mid-centuryin Germanyand Eastern France are known.
Though Pirenne has argued that Belgian populationincreased,
figuresfor Brabant do not seem to bear him out. Hungarian

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GENERAL CRISIS OF EUROPEAN ECONOMY IN I7TH CENTURY

35

populationfell; that of Poland even more. English population


growthprobablysloweddownrapidlyand mayactuallyhave ceased
afterI630.5 In factit is not easy to see whyClarkconcludesthat
" the I7th centuryin mostof Europesaw,likethe i6th,a moderate
increasein population."6 Mortalitywas certainlyhigherthan in
eitherthe i6th or i8th. No centurysince the I4th has a worse
that
recordforepidemicdiseaseand recentworkhas demonstrated
fromthoseoffamine.7Whilea handitsravagescannotbe dissociated
orcentresof international
fulofcourtand administrative
metropoles
tradeand financegrewto greatsize thenumberofgreatcities,which
remainedstableand smalland medium
had risenin the i6thcentury,
towns frequentlydeclined. This appears to apply in part even
countries.8
to themaritime
? We simplydo not know. Some
Whathappenedto production
areaswereplainlyde-industrialized,
notablyItalywhichtransformed
itselffromthe mosturbanisedand industrialized
countryof Europe
into a typicalbackwardpeasantarea, most of Germany,partsof
France and Poland.9 On the other hand there was fairlyrapid
industrialdevelopmentin some places- Switzerland,and in the
extractive
growth
industries,
Englandand Sweden,and an important
of ruralout-workat the expenseof urbanor local craftproduction
in manyareas whichmayor maynot have meanta net increasein
totaloutput. If pricesare any guide we shouldnot expectto find
a generaldeclinein production,forthe deflationary
periodwhich
followedthe great price-riseof the pre-I64o era is more easily
in demandratherthan
explainedby a relativeor absolutefalling-off
bya declinein thesupplyofmoney. However,in thebasicindustry
of textilestheremay have been not only a shiftfrom" old " to
" new" draperies,but a decline of total output for part of the
century.10

was more general. The two main areas


The crisisin commerce
and the Baltic
of establishedinternational
trade,the Mediterranean
declinein thevolume
and probablytemporary
underwent
revolution,
of trade. The Baltic- theEuropeancolonyof thewesternurbanto
ized countries- changed its staple exportsfromfoodstuffs
productslike timber,metalsand naval stores,whileits traditional
importsof westernwoollensdiminished. Trade as measuredby
the Sound tolls reachedits peak in I590-I620, collapsedin the
aftersome recoveryuntilthe
I62os, and declinedcatastrophically
I65os, remaining in the doldrums until I68o or so.ll

After I650,

becamelikethe Baltican area exchanging


the Mediterranean
locally
fortheAtlanticmanufactures
producedgoods,mainlyrawmaterials,

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36

PAST AND PRESENT

and the orientalgoods now monopolizedby the Northwest. By


the end of thecentury
theLevantgotits spicesfromthe North,not
the East. FrenchLevantinetradehalvedbetweenI620 and 1635,
sank almostto zero by the i65os and did not reallyrecoverfrom
depressionlevels until afterthe i670os. Dutch Levantine trade
did poorlyfromabout I617 to about I650.12 Even thenthe French
levels muchbeforeI700. Did the
hardlyexceededpre-depression
Britishand Dutch sales drivein the Southmakeup forlossesin the
Baltic markets
? Probablynot. It may barelyhave made up for
the declinein previoussales of Italianproducts. The international
- Balticcorn,Dutchherrings
tradein foodstuffs
and Newfoundland
fish- did notmaintainitsJacobeanlevels. The international
trade
in woollenclothsmayhaveshrunk;norwas it immediately
replaced
by othertextiles,forthe greatcentresof exportablelinen, Silesia
and Lusatia, seem to have declinedsomewhatafterI620.
In fact
it is not unlikelythata generalbalanceof risingand decliningtrade
wouldproduceexportfigures
whichdid notrisesignificantly
between
1620 and i66o. Outsidethe maritime
statesit is unlikelythatsales
on thehome-markets
madeup forthis.
As we knowfromthe i9th century,themalaiseof businesscannot
be measuredsimplyby tradeand production
whateverthese
figures,
thatthewholetoneofeconomic
maybe. (It is nevertheless
significant
discussion assumed stable markets and profit opportunities.
Colbertianmercantilism,
it has oftenbeen said, was a policy of
economicwarfareforlargeslicesof a worldtrade-cakeof fixedsize.
Thereis no reasonwhyadministrators
and traders- for economics
was notyetan academicsubject- shouldhaveadoptedviewswhich
weregreatlyat variancewithappearances). It is certainthateven
in countrieswhich did not decline there were secular business
difficulties.English East India trade languished until the
Restoration.13 Though that of the Dutch increasedhandsomely,
the averageannual dividendof theirEast India Companyfell for
each of the ten-yearperiodsfromthe I63os to the i670s (including
both), except for a slightrise in the I66os.

Between I627 and I687

sixteenyearswere withoutdividend;in the restof the Company's


historyfromI602 to I782 none. (The value of its goods remained
stable between I640 and i66o). Similarlythe profitsof the
Amsterdam
Wisselbank
reacheda peakin theI63os andthendeclined
fora couple of decades.14 Again,it maynot be whollyaccidental
thatthe greatestmessianicmovementof Jewishhistoryoccurredat
of thegreattradingcentres
thismoment,sweepingthecommunities
- Smyrna,Leghorn,Venice,Amsterdam,
Hamburg- offtheirfeet

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GENERAL CRISIS OF EUROPEAN ECONOMY IN I7TH CENTURY

37

withspecial success in the middle i66os as pricesreached almost


theirlowestpoint.
It is also clear that the expansionof Europepassed througha
of the fabulouscolonialsystemof
crisis. Though the foundations
the I8th centurywere laid mainlyafterI65015,earliertheremay
of Europeaninfluenceexcept
actuallyhave been some contraction
in the hinterlandsof Siberia and America. The Spanish and
Portugueseempiresof course contracted,and changed character.
But it is also worthnotingthat the Dutch did not maintainthe
remarkablerate of expansionof I6oo to I640 and their Empire
actuallyshrankin the next30 years.16 The collapseof the Dutch
WestIndia companyafterthei64os, and thesimultaneous
winding-up
of theEnglishAfricaCompanyand the Dutch WestIndia Company
in passing.
in theearlyi67os maybe mentioned
It will be generallyagreedthatthe I7th centurywas one of social
revoltboth in Westernand Eastern Europe. This clusteringof
like a general
has led some historiansto see something
revolutions,
France
the
in
the
middle
of
crisis
century.17
social-revolutionary
social movements;Catalan,
had its Frondes,whichwereimportant
Neapolitan and Portugeserevolutionsmarkedthe crisis of the
SpanishEmpirein theI64os; theSwisspeasantwarof I653 expressed
ofpeasantby
boththepost-warcrisisand theincreasing
exploitation
town, while in England revolutiontriumphedwith portentous
results.18Though peasantunrestdid not cease in the West - the
"
stampedpaper " rising which combinedmiddleclass,maritime
occurredin 1675, the
and peasantunrestin Bordeauxand Brittany
Camisardwars even later19- thoseof EasternEurope were more
significant.In the i6th centurytherehad been fewrevoltsagainst
of peasants. The Ukrainianrevolutionof
the growingenserfment
I648-54 maybe regardedas a majorservileupheaval. So mustthe
in Hungary,theirverynameharking
various" Kurucz" movements
back to Dozsa's peasant rebels of I5I4, theirmemoryenshrined
in folksongsabout Rakoczyas that of the Russian revoltof I672
is in the song about Stenka Razin. A major Bohemianpeasant
risingin i68o opened a periodof endemicserfunrestthere.20 It
wouldbe easyto lengthenthiscatalogueof majorsocialupheavalsforinstancebyincludingtherevoltsoftheIrishin 164I and 1689.
Only in one respectdid the I7th centuryas a whole overcome
ratherthan experiencedifficulties.Outside the maritimepowers
withtheirnew,and experimental
bourgeoisregimesmostof Europe
on
in absolutism
and stableformof government
foundan efficient
the Frenchmodel. (But the riseof absolutismhas been takenas a

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38

PAST AND PRESENT

directsignofeconomicweakness.21The questionis worthexploring


further). The greatage ofad hocdevicesin politics,warand administrationvanishedwiththe greatworldempiresof the i6th century,
the Spanishand Turkish. For the firsttimelargeterritorial
states
seemedcapableof solvingtheirthreefundamental
problems:howto
have the ordersof government
obeyed directlyover a large area,
how to have enoughcash forthe large lump-sumpaymentsthey
needed,and - partlyin consequenceof this- how to
periodically
run theirown armies. The age of the greatindependentfinancial
and militarysub-contractors
faded with the ThirtyYears' War.
Statesstillhad to subcontract,
as the practiceof sellingofficesand
farmingtaxes bears witness.22However,the whole businesswas
now officially
controlledby governments,
not merelycontrolledin
had found
practiceby the factthat,as the Fuggersand Wallenstein
to theircost,the monopolybuyercan dictatetermsas muchas the
monopolyseller. Perhaps this obvious political success of the
absolutistterritorial
stateswiththeirpompand splendourhas in the
attention
fromthegeneraldifficulties
oftheage.
pastdistracted
Ifonlypartofthisevidenceholdswater,we arejustified
in speaking
ofa" generalcrisis" in theI 7thcentury;thoughone ofitscharacteristicswas the relativeimmunity
of the stateswhichhad undergone
" bourgeoisrevolution." It is probable- thoughherewe venture
- thatthe crisisbegan
on the complexterritory
of pricehistory23
about I620; perhapswiththeslumpperiodfromI619 intotheearly
I62os.
It seemscertainthat,aftersome distortion
of pricemovementsby the ThirtyYears' War, it reachedits most acute phase
betweenI640 and the I670s, thoughprecisedatesare out of order
in thediscussionoflong-term
economicmovements. Fromthenon
the evidenceis conflicting.Probablythe signsof revivaloutweigh
thoseof crisisnot only(obviously)in the MaritimeStatesbut elsewhere. However,the wild oscillationsof boom and depression,
thefamines,
economic
revolts,epidemicsand othersignsofprofound
troublein I680-I720 shouldwarnus againstante-dating
the period
offullrecovery. If thetrendwas upwardsfrom,say,the i68os-or
evenearlierin individual
countries- it was stillliableto disastrous
fluctuations.
It may,however,
be arguedthatwhatI havedescribedas a " general
crisis" was merelytheresultof I7thcentury
ofthe
wars,particularly
have in fact
ThirtyYears' War (I618-I648). In the past historians
tendedto take(or ratherto imply)thisview. But thecrisisaffected
manypartsof Europe not ravagedby generalsand quartermasters;
" cockpitsof Europe" (e.g. Saxony
and conversely,
sometraditional

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GENERAL CRISIS OF EUROPEAN ECONOMY IN I7TH CENTURY

39

and the Low Countries)did notablybetterthan more tranquil


regions. Moreover, there has been a persistenttendency to
exaggeratethe long-termand permanentdamage done by X7th
centurywars. We now knowthat (otherthingsbeing equal) the
lossesof population,productionand capitalequipmentof even20th
centurywars, whose destructivecapacitiesare much greater,can
be made good withina matterof 20-25 years. if theywerenot in
it was because warsaggravated
in the I7th century,
alreadyexisting
tendenciesof crisis. This is not to denytheirimportance,
though
theireffectswere morecomplexthan appearsat firstsight. Thus
againstthe ravagesof the ThirtyYears' War in partsof Central
Europe we mustset the stimulusit gave to miningandmetallurgy
in non-combatant
boomsit stimulated
in general,and thetemporary
benefitof CharlesI in the i63os). It is
countries(to thetemporary
" would have
also probablethat,but forit, the great" price-rise
ended in the i6ios and not the i64os. The war almostcertainly
shiftedthe incidenceof the crisis and may, on balance, have
aggravatedit. Lastly,it is worthconsideringwhetherthe crisis
did not to some extentproduce a situationwhich provokedor
prolongedwarfare. However,this point,whichis noCessentialto
is perhapstoo speculative
to be worthpursuing.
theargument,
The causes of thecrisis

In discussingtheI7th century
crisiswe arereallyaskingone ofthe
fundamentalquestionsabout the rise of capitalism:why did the
into
expansionof the laterI5th and i6th centuriesnotlead straight
the epoch of the i8th and I9th centuryIndustrialRevolution?
What,in otherwords,were the obstaclesin the way of capitalist
are bothgeneraland
expansion? The answers,it maybe suggested,
particular.
The general argumentmay be summarizedas follows. if
of feudalor agrarian
capitalismis to triumph,the social structure
societymustbe revolutionized.The social divisionof labourmust
is to increase;the sociallabour
be greatlyelaboratedif productivity
fromagriculture
to industry
forcemust be radicallyredistributed
while this happens. The proportionof productionwhich is
exchangedin the supra-localmarketmust rise dramatically.So
so long as most
long as thereis no large body of wage-workers;
men supplytheirneeds fromtheirown productionor by exchange
ofmoreor less autarchiclocal markets
whichexist
in themultiplicity
evenin primitive
societies,thereis a limitto thehorizonof capitalist
whatwe maylooselycall
profitand verylittleincentiveto undertake

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40

PAST AND PRESENT

mass production,the basis of capitalist industrialexpansion.


these processescannotalwaysbe separatedfromone
Historically,
another. We may speak of the " creationof the capitalisthome
market" orthedivorceoftheproducers
fromthemeansofproduction
24: the creationof a
whichMarx called"primitiveaccumulation"
large and expandingmarketfor goods and a large and available
freelabourforcego together,
two aspectsof the same process.
It is sometimesassumedthatthe developmentof a " capitalist
within
class" and oftheelementsofthecapitalist
modeofproduction
feudalsocietyautomatically
producetheseconditions. In the long
run, taking the widest view over the centuriesfrom 1000 to
I800 this is no doubt so. In the shorterrun it is not. Unless
certainconditions
arepresent- it is byno meansyetclearwhatthey
are thescope ofcapitalistexpansionwillbe limitedbythegeneral
of society,i.e. of thepredominant
prevalenceof thefeudalstructure
"
ruralsectoror perhapsbysomeotherstructure
which" immobilizes
boththe potentiallabour-force,
the potentialsurplusforproductive
and the potentialdemandforcapitalistically
produced
investment,
goods, such as the prevalenceof tribaiismor pettycommodity
as Marxshowedin thecase of
production. Underthoseconditions,
mercantile
businessmightadaptitselfto operatingin a
enterprise25
and thepeculiar
feudalframework,
acceptingitslimitations
generally
demandforits services,and becomingin a sense parasiticon it.
That partof it whichdid so wouldbe unableto overcomethecrises
of feudalsociety,and mighteven aggravatethem. For capitalist
expansionis blind. The weaknessoftheold theorieswhichascribed
the triumphof capitalismto the developmentof the " capitalist
spirit" or the " entrepreneurialspirit" is, that the desire to pursue

the maximumprofitwithoutlimitdoes not automatically


produce
whichis required. At the very
thatsocialand technicairevolution
leasttheremustbe massproduction(i.e. production
forthegreatest
- largeprofits,
but not necessarily
largeprofits
per
aggregateprofit
sale) insteadof productionforthe maximumprofitper unit sale.
Yet one of the essentialdifficulties
of capitalistdevelopmentin
societieswhichkeep the mass of the populationoutsideits scope
nor seriousbuyers
(so thattheyare neithersellersof labour-power
is thatin the shortview the profitsof the really
of commodities)
" typesofcapitalist
" revolutionary
arealmostless,orlook
production
less attractive,
than those of the otherkind; especiallywhen they
involveheavycapitalinvestment.ChristianDior thenlooksa more
attractive
thanMontaguBurton. To cornerpepperin
proposition
the i6th centurywould seem much sounderthan to startsugar-

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GENERAL CRISIS OF EUROPEAN ECONOMY

IN I7TH

CENTURY

41

plantationsin the Americas;to sell Bolognasilksthanto sell Ulm


fustian. Yet we know that in subsequent centuriesfar vaster
profitswereachievedby sugarand cottonthanby pepperand silk;
farmoreto the creationof a
and thatsugarand cottoncontributed
worldcapitalisteconomythantheothertwo.
such tradecould,even underfeudal
Under certaincircumstances
conditions,producelarge enoughaggregateprofitsto give rise to
large-scaleproduction;for instanceif it cateredfor exceptionally
such as kingdomsor the church;if the thinly
large organizations
into the
spread demandof an entirecontinentwere concentrated
in a fewspecializedcentressuchas the Italian
handsof businessmen
and Flemishtextiletowns; if a large "lateral extension" of the
fieldof enterprise
tookplace, e.g. by conquestor colonization. A
fairamountofsocialre-division
was also possiblewithoutdisturbing
the fundamentally
feudal structureof society- for instancethe
urbanization
of the Netherlandsand Italyon the basis of foodand
rawmaterialsimportedfromsemi-colonial
territories.Nevertheless
the limitsof the marketwerenarrow. Medievaland earlymodern
societywas a good deal morelike " naturaleconomy" thanwe care
to recall. The i6th and I7th centuryFrench peasant is said hardly

withthe State; retail


to haveused moneyexceptfor his transactions
tradein Germantownswas unspecialized,
likethatin villageshops,
untilthe late i6th century.26Except amonga small luxuryclass
(and even therechangingfashionin the modernsense probably
ofclothesor householdgoods
developedlate)therateofreplacement
was slow. Expansionwas possibleand tookplace; butso longas the
it was
or ruralsocietyhad not been revolutionized
generalstructure
limited,or createdits own limits;and whenit encounteredthem,
entereda periodof crisis.
The expansionof the I5th and i6th centurieswas essentiallyof
thissort;and it therefore
createdits owncrisisbothwithinthehome
market and the overseas market. This crisis the " feudal
businessmen"- who were the richestand most powerfiuljust
becausethebestadaptedformakingbig moneyin a feudalsociety
were unable to overcome. Their inadaptability
intensified
it.
Beforeanalysingthesethingsfurther,
it may be worthstressing
thatthe purelytechnical
obstaclesto capitalistdevelopmentin the
i6th and 17th centurywere not insuperable. While the i6th
centurymay not have been capable of solvingcertainfundamental
problems of technique, such as that of a compactand mobile
sourceof powerwhichso baffledLeonardo,it was quite capable of
at leastas muchinnovation
as producedthe I8th centuryrevolution.

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42

PAST AND PRESENT

Nef and othershave made us familiarwiththe innovationswhich


actually occurred,though the phrase " IndustrialRevolution"

seems less apt for the period I540-I640 than for the Germany of
which evolved the printing press, effectivefire-arms,
I450-I520

watches,and the remarkableadvance in miningand metallurgy


summarizedin Agricola'sDe Re Metallica(1556). Nor was there
a cripplingshortageof capitalor capitalistenterprise
or of labour,
at least in the advancedareas. Sizeable blocks of mobile capital
anxious for investmentand, especiallyin the period of rising
ofvarying
reservoirs
offreewage-labour
population,quiteimportant
of
skillexisted. The pointis, thatneitherwerepouredintoindustry
such
a potentially
moderntype. Moreover,methodsforovercoming
shortagesand rigiditiesof capitaland labour suppliesmighthave
been utilizedas fullyas in the i8th and I9th centuries. The I7th
centurycrisiscannotbe explainedby theinadequaciesof theequipment for IndustrialRevolution,in any narrowlytechnicaland
sense.
organizational
Let us nowturnto themaincausesofthecrisis.
The specializationof "feudal capitalists": thecase of Italy

The declineof Italy (and the old centresof medievalcommerce


in general)was the most dramaticresultof the
and manufacture
crisis. It illustrates
the weaknessesof " capitalism" parasiticon a
feudalworld. Thus i6th centuryItaliansprobablycontrolledthe
of capital,but misinvested
themflagrantly.
greatestagglomerations
themin buildingsand squanderedthemin foreign
Theyimmobilized
(which naturallyfavoured
lending during the price-revolution
activitiesto various
debtors)or divertedthemfrommanufacturing
formsof immobileinvestment.It has been plausiblysuggested
that the failureof Italian manufacture
to maintainitself against
Dutch,Englishand Frenchduringthe I7th centurywas due to this
diversionofresources.'7 It wouldbe ironicto findthatthe Medici
wereItaly'sruin,notonlyas bankersbut as patronsoftheexpensive
arts,and philistinehistoriansare welcometo observethatthe only
majorcitystatewhichneverproducedany art worthmentioning,
Genoa, maintainedits commerceand financebetterthanthe rest.
Yet Italian investors,who had long been aware that too large
cathedralsharm business,28were acting quite sensibly. The
experienceof centurieshad shownthatthe highestprofitswerenot
to be got in technicalprogressor even in production. They had
adapted themselvesto business activitiesin the comparatively

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GENERAL CRISIS OF EUROPEAN ECONOMY IN

7TH CENTURY

43

narrowfieldwhichremainedforthemonceone leftasidethemajority
of the populationof Europe as " economicallyneutral." If they
it may have been
spent vast amountsof capital non-productively,
simplybecause therewas no more room to investit progressively
on any scale withinthe limitsof this " capitalistsector." (The
I7th centuryDutch palliateda similarglutof capitalby multiplying
householdgoods and worksof art29
thoughtheyalso discoveredthe
more moderndevice of a speculativeinvestment
boom). Perhaps
the Italians would have been shockedinto different
behaviourby
economicadversity;thoughtheyhad made moneyforso long by
providingthefeudalworldwithitstradeand financethattheywould
not have learnedeasily. However,the generalboom of the later
I6th century(like the " Indian summer" of EdwardianBritain)
and thesuddenlyexpandeddemandsofthegreatabsolutemonarchies
whichreliedon privatecontractors,
and the unprecedentediuxury
of their aristocracies,postponed the evil day. When it came,
it left Italian
bringingdecay to Italian trade and manufacture,
financestill upright,thoughno longerdominant. Again, Italian
industrymightwell have maintainedsome of its old positionsby
switchingmore completelyfromits old high-quality
goods to the
shoddierand cheapernew draperiesof the North. But who,in the
greatperiodof luxurybuyingfrom1580-1620 would guessthatthe
futureof high-quality
textileswas limited? Did not the courtof
Lorraine,in thefirstthirdof thecenturyuse moretextilesimported
fromItalythanfromall othernon-Frenchcountriesput together
?30
(One would like to reservejudgmenton the argumentthat Italy
lost groundbecause of higherproductioncosts forgoods of equal
evidenceforit is broughtforward
or untilwe
quality,untilstronger
have a satisfactory
explanationforthe failureof Italianproduction,
afterpromisingbeginnings,
fromtowns
to shiftas wholeheartedly
to countryside
as did thetextileindustries
ofothercountries.3
1)
The case of Italyshowswhyparticular
countrieswentdownin the
consider
crisis,notnecessarily
whyit occurred. We must therefore
thecontradictions
oftheveryprocessof i6thcentury
expansion.
The contradictionsof expansion: Eastern Europe

The comparative
townson trade
specializationof west-European
and manufacture
was to some extentachievedin the I5th and i6th
centuriesby the creationof a sizeablesurplusof exportablefoodin
EasternEurope and perhapsby ocean fisheries.32But in Eastern
on a large
Europethiswas achievedbythecreationofserfagriculture
offeudalism. This, we maysuggest,
scale; i.e. a local strengthening

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44

PAST AND PRESENT

had threeeffects. It turnedthepeasantintoless of a cash customer


thanhe had been or mighthave been. (Or else it forcedhim off
good-qualitywesterntextilesinto cheap locally produced cloth).
It diminishedthe numberand wealthof the minornobilityforthe
benefitof a handfulof magnates. In Polandthe formercontrolled
43.80/ of ploughs in the mid-I5th century,II.6% in the mid-I7th;
the share of the latter rose from I3.3 to 30.7 in the same period.

theliveliermarketof thetownsto the freetrade


Lastly,it sacrificed
interestsof exportinglandlords,or else seized muchof whattrade
was going for the benefitof the already bloated lords.33 The
theconditions
forthe
expansionthushadtworesults. Whilecreating
in WesternEurope,it cutdown,fora time
expansionofmanufactures
at least,theoutletsofthesemanufactures
in theBalticarea- perhaps
its mostimportantmarket. The desireto cash in rapidlyon the
growingdemandforcorn - the Balticnow beganto feednot only
- temptedserf-lords
NorthernEuropebut also the Mediterranean
intothatheadlongexpansionof theirdominionsand intensification
of exploitation
whichled to the Ukrainianrevolution,
and perhaps
also to demographic
catastrophes.34
The contradictions
of expansion:overseasand colonialmarkets

Much of thetradebetweenEuropeand therestof theworldhad,


as we know,been passive throughout
the ages, because Orientals
did not need Europeangoods to the same extentas Europe needed
theirs. It had been balanced by bullionpayments,supplemented
fromtimeto timeby such exportsas slaves,furs,amberor other
luxuries. Until the IndustrialRevolutionthe sales of European
were not important. (Africantrade,whichwas not
manufactures
favourable
deficitary,
maybe an exceptionbecauseofthestaggeringly
termsoftradewhichEuropeangoodscommandedamongtheignorant
local buyersand indeed - almost by definition--- because the
continentwas valued chieflyas a sourceof bullionuntillate in the
I7th century. In I665 the Royal African Company still
estimatedits gain from gold at twice its gain from slaves.35)
The European conquestof the main trade-routes
and of America
foreven the Americas
did not changethisstructure
fundamentally,
exportedmorethantheyimported. It greatlydiminishedthe cost
of Eastern goods by cuttingout middlemen,lesseningtransport
and armedbands to rob
chargesand enablingEuropeanmerchants
and cheatwithimpunity. It also greatlyincreasedbullionsupplies,
us withAmericanand AfricanPetersto be robbedto pay
presenting
theAsianPauls. Unquestionably
Europederivedimmensewindfall

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GENERAL CRISIS OF EUROPEAN ECONOMY IN I7TH CENTURY

45

wasimmensely
stimulated
gainsfromthis. Generalbusinessactivity
as wellas capitalaccumulated;but our exportsof manufactures
were
on the whole not greatlyexpanded. Colonial powers- in good
- followed a policy of systematic
medieval business tradition
of outputand systematicmonopoly. Hence therewas
restriction
no reasonwhyexportsof homemanufactures
shouldbenefit.
The benefitwhichEurope drew from these initial conquests
was thusin thenatureofa singlebonusratherthana regulardividend.
When it was exhausted,crisis was likelyto follow. Among the
colonialpowerscosts and overheadsrose fasterthan profits. In
threestages: thatof easy
both East and West we may distinguish
thatof crisis,and withluck eventuallythatof a stableand
profits,
moremodestprosperity.In theinitialphaseconquestor interloping
at low costs. In the East,
broughttemporarily
unchallenged
profits
whereprofits
restedon themonopolyof a restricted
outputof spices
and the like,the crisiswas probablybroughton by the steep rise
in " protection
costs" againstold and newrivals;risingall themore
the
the colonialpowertriedto screwup the monopoly
more
steeply
price. It has been estimatedthatthe Portuguesespice tradebarely
paid its way forthese reasons.38In the West, wheretheyrested
on the cheap bulk productionof bullionand otherraw materials,
protectioncosts probablyplayed a smallerpart,thoughtheyalso
rose with piracyand competition.However,therethe technical
" rat-hole" miningoftheSpaniardsweresoon
limitsoftheprimitive
reached(even allowingforthe uses of the mercuryprocess),and
workedto death,being
verypossiblythe labourforcewas virtually
treatedas an expendableasset.37 At any rate American silver
exportsdiminishedafterI6IO or so. Eventually,of course,in the
East colonialpowersadjustedthemselvesto the new level of overheadsand perhapsfoundnewsourcesoflocal taxationto offset
them.
In the Westthe familiarstructure
of quasi-feudallargeestatescame
into beingin the I7th century.38Since the economicbasis of the
theresults
Spanishcolonialsystemwas broaderthanthePortuguese,
of crisiswould be morefar-reaching.Thus the early emigration
to theAmericastemporarily
stimulated
theexportof goodsfromthe
homecountry;but as, inevitably,
manyofthecolonists'wants came
to be suppliedlocally,the expandedmanufactures
of Spain had to
pay the price. The attemptto tightenthe metropolitan
monopoly
worseby discouraging
thedevelopment,
merelymadematters
among
otherthings,of the potentially
revolutionary
plantationeconomy.39
The effectsof the influxof bullioninto Spain are too well-known
to need discussion.

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46

PAST AND PRESENT

It is thereforeunderstandable
that the " old colonial system"
on the general
passed througha profoundcrisis;and thatits effects
Europeaneconomywere far-reaching.A new patternof colonial
exploitationwhich produced steadily rising exports of manufactures
fromEuropedid indeedreplaceit. (Actinglargelyon their
own the sugarplantersof NorthernBrazilhad shownthe wayto it
fromtheendofthei6thcentury). Yet thelureof theold monopoly
wasirresistible
to all thosewhohada chanceofcapturing
them.
profits
Even the Dutch remainedresolutely" old-fashioned"in their
colonialismuntilthe i8th century,thoughtheirentrepotposition
in Europesavedthemfromthe consequenceof colonialinefficiency.
Old colonialismdid notgrowoverintonew colonialism;it collapsed
and wasreplacedbyit.
The contradictions
of thehomemarkets

There can be littledoubt thatthe i6th centurycame nearerto


creatingthe conditionsfor a really widespreadadoptionof the
thananypreviousage; perhapsbecause
capitalistmodeofproduction
of the impetusgivenby overseasloot, perhapsbecause of the enof rapidlygrowingpopulationand marketsand rising
couragement
prices. (It is nottheobjectofthisarticleto discussthereasonswhich
causedthisexpansionto followthe " feudalcrisis" of the i4th and
of forces,includingeven
I5th centuries). A powerfulcombination
large feudalinterests40
seriouslythreatenedthe resistanceof gilddominatedtowns. Rural industry,of the " putting-out"type,
whichhad previouslybeen largelyconfinedto textiles,spread in
variouscountriesand to new branchesof production(e.g. metals),
especiallytowardsthe end of the period. Yet the expansionbred
its ownobstacles. We maybriefly
considersomeofthem.
Except perhaps in England no " agrarianrevolution" of a
capitalisttypeaccompaniedindustrialchange,as it was to do in the
i8thcentury;thoughtherewas plentyofupheavalin thecountryside.
Here again we findthe generallyfeudalnatureof the social frameworkdistorting
and divertingforceswhich mightotherwisehave
madefora directadvancetowardsmoderncapitalism. In the East,
whereagrarianchangetook the formof a revivalof serfdomby
wereinhibited
lords,the conditionsforsuch development
exporting
locally, though made possible elsewhere. In other regionsthe
theupheavalsin landownership,
and thegrowthofdemand
price-rise,
foragrarianproducemightwellhaveled to theemergence
ofcapitalist
of peasanton a greater
farmingby gentlemenand the kulak-type
scale than appears to have occurred.4' Yet what happened?

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GENERAL CRISIS OF EUROPEAN ECONOMY IN I7TH CENTURY

47

Frenchlords (often" bourgeois" who had boughtthemselvesinto


feudalstatus)reversedthe trendto peasantindependencefromthe
and increasingly
recoveredlostground.42
middleofthe i6th century,
and local middlemeninvestedin the land,partly
Towns, merchants
no doubt because of the securityof farmproduce in an age of
inflation,
partlybecause the surpluswas easy to draw fromit in a
forbeing
feudalmanner,theirexploitation
beingall themoreeffective
combinedwithusury;partlyperhapsin directpoliticalrivalrywith
of townsand theirinhabitants
feudalists.43Indeed,therelationship
as a whole to the surrounding
peasantrywas still,as alwaysin a
generallyfeudalsociety,thatof a specialkindof feudallord. (The
cantons of Switzerlandand in
peasants in the town-dominated
inlandNetherlandswerenot actuallyemancipateduntilthe French
Revolution.
ofurbaninvestment
in agriculture
44) The mereexistence
did not imply
or urban influenceover the countryside,
therefore,
thecreationof ruralcapitalism. Thus thespreadof share-cropping
in France,thoughtheoretically
markinga step towardscapitalism,
in factoftenproducedmerelya bourgeoisieparasiticon a peasantry
exhaustedbyit,and by therisingdemandsofthe State;
increasingly
and consequentdecline.45 The old social structurepredominated
still.
Two resultsmayhave followedfromthis. First,it is improbable
thattherewas muchtechnicalinnovation,
thoughthe first(Italian)
handbookon crop rotationappearedin the mid-i6thcentury,and
certainthatthe increasein agrarianoutputdid not keep pace with
demand.46 Hence towardsthe end of the period thereare signs
returnsand foodshortage,
of exportingareas using
of diminishing
up theircrops for local needs etc., preludesto the faminesand
epidemics of the crisis-period.47Second, the rural population,
subjectto the double pressureof landlordsand townsmen(not to
mentionthe State),and in any case muchless capableof protecting
itselfagainstfamineand warthanthey,suffered.48In someregions
" squeeze" mayactuallyhave led to a declining
this short-sighted
trendin productivity
duringthe I7th century.49The countryside
to lord,townand State. Its appallingrateof mortality
was sacrificed
- if the relativelyprosperous Beauvaisis is any guide

- -

was second

also increasingly
rural.50
only to that of the domesticoutworkers,
Expansionundertheseconditionsbred crisis.
Whathappenedin thenon-agricultural
sectorsdependedlargelyon
the agricultural. Costs of manufacture
may have been unduly
raisedby the morerapid rise of agrarianthan of industrialprices,
of manufacturers.51
thus narrowingthe profit-margin
(However,

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48

PAST AND PRESENT

manufacturers
usedthecheaplabourofruraloutworkers,
increasingly
who were again exploitedto the point of debility.) The market
also had its difficulties.The ruralmarketas a whole must have
proved disappointing.Many freeholding
peasants benefitedfrom
the price-riseand the demandfortheirgoods, providedtheyhad
evenin bad years,a regularsurplus
enoughland to feedthemselves
forsale,and a goodhead forbusiness.52But ifsuchyeomenbought
much morethan before,theyboughtless thantownsmenof equal
The experienceof i9th
standing,being more self-sufficient.53
centuryFranceshowsthata middleand richpeasantryis about as
a marketformassmanufactures
as maybe found,and does
univiting
not encouragecapitaliststo revolutionizeproduction. Its wants
are traditional;mostof its wealthgoes intomoreland and cattle,or
intohoards,or intonewbuilding,or evenintosheerwaste,likethose
gargantuanweddings,funerals,and other feastswhich disturbed
continental
princesat the turnof the i6th century.54The increase
in the demand fromthe non-agricultural
sector (towns, luxury
demandetc.) mayfora timehave obscuredthe
market,government
factthatit grewless rapidlythanproductivecapacity,and that the
in the iong
persistentdecline of the real income of wage-earners
inflation
mayactually,accordingto Nef,have stopped" the growth
of the demand for some industrialproducts."55However, the
slumpsin the exportmarketsfromthe late i6ios on broughtthe
facthome.
Once the decline had begun, of course, an additionalfactor
of manufacture:
the rise in labour costs.
increasedthe difficulties
For thereis evidencethat-- in thetownsat least -- the bargaining
powerof labourrosesharplyduringthe crisis,perhapsowingto the
in townpopulations. At any ratereal wagesrose
fallor stagnation
saw the
in England,Italy,Spain and Germany,and themid-century
in most western
formation
of effective
organizations
journeymen's
countries.56This may not have affectedthe labour costs of the
industries,as theirworkerswere in a weakerposition
putting-out
to benefitfromthe situation,and theirpiece-ratewagesweremore
factor. Moreover,
easilycut. However,it is clearlynota negligible
the slackeningof populationincreaseand the stabilization
of prices
further.
musthave depressedmanufactures
These different
aspectsof the crisismay be reducedto a single
formula:economicexpansiontook place withina social framework
whichit was notyetstrongenoughto burst,and in waysadaptedto
it ratherthanto the worldof moderncapitalism. Specialistsin the
whatactuallyprecipitated
the crisis:
Jacobeanperiodmustdetermine

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GENERAL CRISIS OF EUROPEAN ECONOMY IN I7TH CENTURY

49

the declinein Americansilver,the collapseof the Balticmarketor


someof manyotherpossiblefactors. Once thefirstcrackappeared,
was boundto totter. It did totter,and
thewholeunstablestructure
in the subsequentperiod of economiccrisis and social upheaval
the decisiveshiftfromcapitalistenterpriseadapted to a generally
theworldin its
feudalframework
to capitalistenterprise
transforming
own patterntook place. The Revolutionin Englandwas thus the
mostdramaticincidentin the crisis,and its turning-point." This
nation" wroteSamuel Fortreyin 1663 in his " England'sInterest
" " can expectno less than to becomethe most
and Improvement
of all others." It could and it did; and the
greatand flourishing
effects
on the worldwereto be portentous.
E. J. Hobsbawm

Birkbeck
College.
A NOTE ON PRICE

HISTORY

Long-term price movementshave been deliberatelykept outside the main


argument, because other discussions of long-term economic development
emphasize them so much; perhaps too much. Nevertheless,the course of
prices calls for some comment.
The traditionalview, as put forwardby Simiand and accepted by Labrousse
and others,is that the long price-rise came to an end around I640 and was
followed by a price-fall,or fluctuationsround a stable trend until the second
quarter of the i8th century. This view seems too simple. There are signs
of a change in the price trendbetween I605 and I620; forinstancein Spanish
wheat prices. Cipolla has also noted that Milanese prices cease to rise rapidly
afterI605 and continue steady or risingslowlyfromthen until I630. (Allouvementsmonetairesdans l'dtat de Milan I580-I700.
We should expect
I952).
this, since Hamilton shows that the import of American bullion reached its
peak in I590-I6I0, though it held up quite well until 1620 or so (American
Treasure,35). If priceswenton risinguntil I640 (or I635, which seems to have
been the turning-pointin Italy) it was probably due to debasementof coinage,
to the demand for scarce goods in the ThirtyYears' War, or to a combination
of both. Hence it is not unlikelythat,but forthe war, the period of price-fall
or price-stability
The end of the war intensified
would have begun in I610-20.
the crisis,which undoubtedlyreached its most acute phase (and the lowestpoint
of prices) in the I66os and earlyI67os. The effectsof drasticpost-wardeflation
may be studied in the typical war-profiteering
countryof Switzerland,where
theyled to the peasant war of I653.
The course of prices differed, of course, according to regions and
commodities,and some of the local and sectional phenomena are still very
obscure. No attempt can be made here to account for them. In general,
however, secular price-movementstally quite well with the periods of the
crisis as discussed in the text.

NOTES
1Perroy,Boutruche,Hilton have discussed this in recentyearsin the Annales
and elsewhere. See also the discussion among Dobb, Sweezy, Takahashi,
Hilton and Hill in Science and Society I950-53, and the general survey by
(I am indebted to the Polish
Malowist in Kwartainik HistoricznyI953, I.
Institute,London for a translationof this).

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50

PAST AND PRESENT

2 Braudel, La Mediterranee. . . au tempsde PhilippeII, 1097. R. Romano,


Industriestextileset conjoncture a Florence au I7e s. (Annales Oct.-Dec.
I952, 5sI). French historians regard the " phase de contraction du I7e
siecle " as " un faitmaintenantetabli " (Rev. Hist. 428 (I953), 379). In what
follows I owe a great deal to discussion with J. Meuvret who confirmedmany
of my non-specialistguesses. However I doubt whetherhe would agree with
much of this paper.
3
C. A. Julien, Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord, 538 ff; the " industrial
revolution" in piracy, due to the introductionof Northernsails by English
and Dutch afterI604 may be noted.
4 J. Meuvret in
Melanges d'Histoire Sociale V, I944, 27-44; in Population,
1946, 653-50 and an unpublishedpaper on the effectsof the I693-4 and I709-10
famineson French diplomacy.
5 There are, of course, no reliable statisticsand not always good indirect
indices. This paragraph is based, in particular,on: K. Larsen, History of
Norway, I948, 304 (figuresonly for I665 and after); Mayer, The Populationof
Switzerland (1952), and Patavino's estimate for I6o8 which is as great as
M's for I700 in Nabholz, Muralt, Feller, Bonjour, Gesch. d Schweiz II, 5;
H. Wopfner,Gueterteilung
u. Uebervoelkerung,
I938, 202 ff; H. v. z. Muehlen,
in Oberschlesien",in Vierteljahrschrift
f. Soz.
"Entstehung d. Gutsherrschaft
und Wirtsch. Gesch. XXXVIII, 334-60o; Beloch, Bevoelkerungsgeschichte
Italiens I, I53, 225 ff; Keyser, Bevoelkerungsgesch.
Deutschlands,I94I, 36I ff,
304 ff; Roupnel, La vie et la campagne dijonnaisesau I7e s.; P. Goubert,
"Problemes demographiquesdu Beauvaisis au I7e s." (Annales,Oct.-Dec. 1952,
452-468), for an area which seems to have sufferedratherless; G. Debien,
En Haut-Poitou; Defricheursau Travail (XV-XVIII s.) and for absence of
and recoveryof forestsBull. Soc. Hist. Mod. Mai-Juillet I953,
forest-clearing
6-9; Pirenne,Hist. de BelgiqueIV, 439-40; A. Cosemans, Bevolke,ingv. Brabant
en de I7e eeuw I939, 220-4; G. N. Clark, The Seventeenth
Century;Rutkowski,
Hist. Econ. de la Pologne avant les Partages, I927, 9I-2; Stone in IX Congres
Internationaldes SciencesHistoriquesII, I95I, 49-50, Hoskins, " The Rebuilding
of Rural England I570-I640," Past and Present4, I953.
Op. cit. 6. The same criticismmay be made of the estimatesof Urlanis,
Rost nasieleniav. Jewropie(Moscow I94I) I58 which seem ratheroptimistic.
I am indebted to Mr. A. Jenkinfordrawingmy attentionto these figures.
7 S. Peller, "Studies in mortalitysince the Renaissance" (Bull. Inst.Hist. of
Medicine) I943, 443, 445, 452, and esp. 456; ibid I947, 67, 79. Meuvret and
Goubert op. cit. and the literaturequoted in Habbakuk, English Population
in the i8th Century(Econ. Hist. Rev. 2dS. VI, 2, I953). For the epidemiology
of the century,in addition to innumerable local studies, Haeser, Gesch. d.
Medizin u. d. epidem.Krankheiten(Jena I882), C. Creighton,Hist. of Epidemics
in Britain (I89I, I894), L. F. Hirst, The Conquestof Plague (I953); Prinzing,
"
Epidemicsresultingfrom wars (I916); Brownlee, Epidemiology of Phthisis
in Great Britain and Ireland (Medical Research Council I918); Campbell,
" The Epidemiology of influenza (Bull. Inst. Hist. Medicine I3, I943);
W. J. Simpson, A Treatiseon thePlague (I905).
8 Sombart, Luxus u. Kapitalismus,26-7; Schmoller, DeutschesStaedtewesen
in aeltererZeit, 1922, 60-95; B. Bretholz,Gesch. Boehmensu. Maehrens 1924,
III, 61I-3; Baasch, HollaendischeWirtschaftsgeschichte,
24-5.
Cipolla, "The Decline of Italy" (Econ. Hist. Rev. 2 S.V., 2, 1952);
Roupnel, op. cit. for reversionof Burgundyto autarky;Reuss, Hist. de Strasbourg, 1922, 28o-6; P. Boissonade, "La crise de l'industrie languedocienne
I600-I66o" (Annales du Midi, I909); G. Aubin and H. Kunze, LeinenerI940.
zeugung . . .im oestl.Mitteldeutschland,
10 For figuresof the Dutch and Florentineproduction,N. W. Posthumus,
Gesch.v. d. LeidscheLakenindustrie
III, 932; Romano in Annales,loc cit.
11Bang and Korst, Tabeller over Skibsfart;A. Christensen,Dutch Trade
and theBaltic about I600 (Copenhagen I940).

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51

12G. Tongas, Relations entre la France et l'Empire Ottoman durant la


premieremoitiedu 17e s., 1942; P. Masson, Le CommerceFrancais dans le Levant
au I7e s., 1892, esp. 130-4, App. XV, 236; H. Watjen, D. Niederlanderim
Mittelmeergebiet,
I909, 145, 149.
13Bal Krishna, CommercialRelationsbetweenIndia and England 1601-1757,
caps ii-v; S. A. Khan, East India Trade in the17thC., 1923, 74, ff.
14 C. de Lannoy and H. Van der Linden, Hist. de l'Expansion des Peuples
Europeens:Neerlandeet Danemark (XVII et XVIII ss.), 1911, 334, 344-5, 363.
The indebtednessof the Company was also higherthan beforeor after.
Van Dillen, Bronnentotd. Geschiedenis
d. Wisselbanken,
1925, II, 971 ff.
J. G.
15Barbados began to export sugar in 1646, Jamaicastartedplantingin 1664.
Haiti re-establishedplantationin 1655, Martinique began it in the same year,
St. Kitts' sugar exportspassed its indigo exportsin I66o.
(Lippman, Gesch.d.

Zuckers,
1929).

16 For a comparisonof its size in 1641 and 1667, J. Saintoyant,La ColonisationEuropeenne,1947,27 I1-3.
17 B. Porshnev in Biryukovitch,Porshnev, Skazkin etc., Novaya Istoriya
1640-1789 (Moscow 1951), 444. This follows a suggestionof Marx in 1850
(Sel. Essays, ed. Stenning,1926, 203). The coincidence has oftenbeen noted,
Revolutions,1938.
e.g. Merriman,Six Contemporaneous
18 Merriman, op. cit., Porshnev, Narodnie vosstaniya vo Frantsii pered
Frondoi 1623-1648 (Moscow 1948); 0. Schiff,D. deutschenBauernaufstaende
1525-1789 (Hist. Ztrschr. CXXX 189 ff). Feller, Gesch. Berns II (I953),
cap. iv and v.
19J. Lemoine, La revoltedu Papier Timbre,1898 printsnumerousdocumetts.
20
Marczali, Hungaryin the i8th C., 1910, p. xxxvii; Bretholzloc cit. 57-61.
21 A. Nielsen, Daenische WVirtschaftsgeschichte,
1933, 94-5.
22 R. Mousnier, La venalitedes offices
sous Henri IV et Louis XIII, 1945;
K. W. Swart, Sale ofoffices
in the 17 c., 1949.
23 See the Note on Price
History.
24 V. I. Lenin, The Developmentof Capitalismin Russia, cap. I (conclusions),
II
VIII
(the formationof the Home Market). Capital
cap.
(conclusions), cap.
I (1938 ed.) 738, 772-4. That Marx did not think primarilyof the actual
accumulation of resources is shown, I think, by a preparatorydraft to the
"
Critique of Political Economy: Eigen ist dem Kapital nichtsals die Vereinigung von Haenden und Instrumenten,die es vorfindet. Es agglomeriertsie
unterseinerBotmaessigkeit. Das ist sein wirklichesAnhaeufen;das Anhaeufen
von Arbeitern auf Punkten nebst ihren Instrumenten." (Formen die der
Produktionvorhergehen,
pp. 49-50, Berlin 1952).
kapitalistichen
25 Capital III pt. IV (Merchant's Capital); and esp. vol. II, 63. See also
R. H. Hilton, " Capitalism,What's in a Name " (Past and PresentI, 1952).
26J. Meuvret, " Circulation monetaire et utilisation economique de la
monnaie dans la France du i6e et du I7e s. " (Etudes d'Histoire Moderne et
Contemp,tome I, 1947, 14-29); R. Latouche, La vie au Bas-Quercy, 1923;
E. Koehler, Der Einzelhandelim Mittelalter,1938, 55-60.
27 A. Fanfani, Storia del Lavoro in Italia dalla fine del secolo XV agli inizii
del XVIII, 1943, 42-9.
28 R. S. Lopez, " Economie et architecturemedievales " (Annales Oct.-Dec.
1952,443-8).
29G. Renier, The Dutch Nation, 1944, 97-9.
30H. Roy, La vie, la modeet le costumeau I7e s., 1924, printsa fulllist of all
the types of textileused at this court.
31Cipolla, The declineof Italy (loc cit.) forthe high-costargument.
32 M. Malowist in
des SciencesHistoriquesI,
Reportof IX CongresInternational
1950,305-22.
"
33 For the extent of this
increasingexploitation,J. Rutkowski, Le regime
agraire en Pologne au I8e s. " (Rev. Hist. Econ. and Soc. 1926 and 1927, esp.
1927, 92 ff); J. Rutkowski," Les bases economiques des partagesde l'ancienne

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PAST AND PRESENT

52

Pologne " (Rev. Hist. Moderne N.S. IV, I932); J. Rosdolsky, " The distribution of the agrarian product in feudalism" (Journ. Econ. Hist. I95I, 247 ff),
For unimportance of cash payments, Rutkowski I927.
7I. Rutkowski
I926, 501; Malowist, 317 ff. An example of townimproverishment
due to this,
F. Tremel, Handel d. Stadt Judenburgim I6 Jh. (Ztschr.d. hist. Vereinsfuer
Steiermark,1947, I03-6).
An expansion of the total area of serfexportingagriculture- e.g. in the
Black Sea area might have offsetthis. But this did not take place until the
i8th century,possibly owing to Turkish strengthand grain policy earlier.
D. Ionescu, Agrarverfassung
Rumaeniens,I909, I0-I9, A. Mehlan, " D. grossen
Balkanmessen in der Tuerkenzeit" (Vierteljahrschrift
f. Soz. und Wirtsch.
Gesch.I938, 2-7).
35Cal. St. P. Col. I66I-8, 266.
36 F. C.
Lane, " National Wealth and ProtectionCosts " (in Clarkson and
Cochran ed., War as a Social Institution,I94I, 36 ff).
37C. G. Motten, Mexican Silver and theEnlightenment,
I950, caps. 2-3.
38Thus fromthe end of the I7th centurythe Dutch East India Company
expanded the income fromcolonial taxes, previouslyabout 9% of its revenue,
much more rapidly than tradingprofits. Lannoy and Linden op. cit. 266-7.
F. Chevalier,La formationdes grandsdomainesau Mexique. Terreset Societe au
XVI-XVIIe s., I952. I have only seen the summary of this in Rev. Hist.
I953, 376 ff.
428,
39For
the ending of sugar-plantationsin the early I7th century,E. 0. v.
Lippmann,Gesch.d. Zuckers,I929.
40 Cf. the importH. Aubin, " D. Anfaenged. grossenschlesischenLeineweberei " (Vierteljahrschr.
f. Soz. und Wirtsch.Gesch.XXXV, I54-73).
41 Raveau: L'agriculture. . . en HIaut-Poitouau I6 s., I27;
Marc Bloch,
Caracteres Originaux de l'histoireruralefranfaise,I48-9); but the " gentil"
homme campagnard is not ipso factoa capitalistfarmer.
42 Bloch
op. cit. Braudel 624 ff.
43Bloch, op. cit. I45-6; P. Raveau, op. cit.,249 ff;A. Kraemer,D. wechselnde
. . . Bedeutungd. Landbesitzesd. Stadt Breslau (I927) for systematicbuying
of land 1500 - ThirtyYears' War.
A4 Baasch, Hollaend. Wirtschaftsgeschichte,
50; Roupnel op. cit.
45 Marx,
Capital iII, xlvii, sec. v on metayage;G. de Falguerolles,Decadence
de l'economie agricole a Lempaut (Languedoc) (Annales du Midi 53, I94I,
I42-)

an important
article.

Raveau, op. cit., cap. III. For non-innovating character of French


agricultural handbooks, G. Lizerand, Le regime rural de l'ancienneFrance,
M. J. Elsas, Umriss einer Geschichtec. Preise u. Loehne in
I94I, 79-8I.
Deutschland,I949 for stable agric. productivity.
47G. Coniglio, II regnodi Napoli al tempode Carlo V, I95I and Braudel,
op. cit. V. Barbour, Capitalism in Amsterdam,I949, 26-7; A. Juergens,
im I6. u. I7. Jh, I914, IO-I2 for
Z. schleswig-holsteinschen
Handelsgeschichte
change froman exportingto an importingarea at end of I6th century.
48 Because they relied on local food supplies, while towns imported in any
case, often from great distances. Meuvret, " La geographie du prix des
cereales," (Revista de Economia, Lisbon I95I, 63-9). Falguerolles, loc cit.
forpeasants ceasing to eat wheat,which theyhave to sell to pay taxes.
49Falguerolles,loc cit. argues so.
50 Goubert,loc cit.
51
Elsas, op. cit. 0. Roehlk, Hansisch-Norwegische
Handeslpolitikim i6. Jh.
for an excellent discussion of this, though relatingto the " priceI935, 74-5
"
scissors between corn and fish-prices. Report of Royal Commission on
Cloth Industry,I640 (E.H.R. I942, 485-6).
52 Bloch, op. cit.
on thisimportantlast point.
53M. Campbell,I45The English Yeoman, I942, I86-7, cap. vi passim, and
Hoskins, Past and Present4, I953.
46

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GENERAL CRISIS OF EUROPEAN ECONOMY

IN I7TH

CENTURY

53

54H. Widmann, Geschichte


Salzburgs, 1914, III, 354; Feller, op. cit. II, 368;
H. Schnell, Mecklenburgim Ztalter d. Reformation
(1900) 201.
55 " Prices and Industrial Capitalism " (Econ. Hist. Rev. VII, 184-5).
56 Knoop and Jones, The Medieval Mason, 1949, 207-12, Cipolla in Econ.
Hist. Rev., loc cit. I84,Elsas, op. cit., E. J. Hamilton, War and Prices in Spain
1650-1800, 1947, 219. G. Unwin, Industrial Organisationin the i6th and
17thCenturies,1904, cap. VIII; G. Des Marez, Le Compagnonnage
des Chapeliers
Bruxellois,1909, 17-21; M. St. Leon, Le Compagnonnage,1902; L. Gueneau,
L'organisationde travail a Nevers au I7e s. 1919, 79 ff; J. Gebauer, Gesch. d.
Stadt Hildesheim,1925, 221 ff;etc.

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