Criminal Law

MUST READ CASES (CRIMINAL LAW)

BOOK I
I. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
1. Magno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96132, June 26, 1992
Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law,
"affirms that the primary function of punishment is the protective (sic)
of society against actual and potential wrongdoers." It is not clear
whether petitioner could be considered as having actually committed
the wrong sought to be punished in the offense charged, but on the
other hand, it can be safely said that the actuations of Mrs. Carolina
Teng amount to that of potential wrongdoers whose operations should
also be clipped at some point in time in order that the unwary public
will not be failing prey to such a vicious transaction (Aquino, The
Revised Penal Code, 1987 Edition, Vol. I, P. 11)
Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that
"criminal law is founded upon that moral disapprobation . . . of actions
which are immoral, i.e., which are detrimental (or dangerous) to those
conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human
society. This disappropriation is inevitable to the extent that morality is
generally founded and built upon a certain concurrence in the moral
opinions of all. . . . That which we call punishment is only an external
means of emphasizing moral disapprobation the method of punishment
is in reality the amount of punishment," (Ibid., P. 11, citing People v.
Roldan Zaballero, CA 54 O.G. 6904, Note also Justice Pablo's view in
People v. Piosca and Peremne, 86 Phil. 31).
Thus, it behooves upon a court of law that in applying the punishment
imposed upon the accused, the objective of retribution of a wronged
society, should be directed against the "actual and potential
wrongdoers." In the instant case, there is no doubt that petitioner's
four (4) checks were used to collateralize an accommodation, and not
to cover the receipt of an actual "account or credit for value" as this
was absent, and therefore petitioner should not be punished for mere
issuance of the checks in question. Following the aforecited theory, in
petitioner's stead the "potential wrongdoer", whose operation could be

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a menace to society, should not be glorified by convicting the

petitioner.

Mala In se and Mala Prohibita

2. Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157171, March 14, 2006
Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised
Penal Code. When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they
are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law.
Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the other
elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other
hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not
inherently immoral but become punishable only because the law says
they are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether the
law has been violated. Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts
are prohibited for reasons of public policy.
Proximate Cause
3. People v. Villacorta, G.R. No. 186412, September 7, 2011

Nevertheless, there is merit in the argument proffered by Villacorta

that in the event he is found to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should
only be held liable for slight physical injuries for the stab wound he
inflicted upon Cruz. The proximate cause of Cruzs death is the tetanus
infection, and not the stab wound.

Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.
Impossible Crimes
4. Intod v. CA, G.R. No. 103119
Intod fired at Palangpangan's room, although in reality, the latter was
not present in his room; thus, Intod failed to kill him. The factual
situation in the case at bar presents an inherent impossibility of
accomplishing the crime. Under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised

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Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts even if completed,
would not amount to a crime.
5. Jacinto v. People, G.R. No. 162540, July 13, 2009
In Intod, the Court went on to give an example of an offense that
involved factual impossibility, i.e., a man puts his hand in the coat
pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet, but gets
nothing since the pocket is empty.
Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of factual
impossibility given in Intod. In this case, petitioner performed all the
acts to consummate the crime ofqualified theft, which is a crime
against property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere
act of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her
intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the
check bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which
was not rightfully hers.
Stages of Execution
6. People of the Philippines v. Malisce, G.R. No. 190912. January
12, 2015
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of
a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. The essential
elements of an attempted felony are as follows: a) The offender
commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts; b) He
does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony; c) The offender's act be not stopped by his own spontaneous
desistance.
7. Rait v. People, G.R. No. 180425, July 31, 2008
Unlike in Baleros, the acts of petitioner clearly establish his intention to
commence the act of rape. Petitioner had already successfully
removed the victims clothing and had inserted his finger into her
vagina. It is not empty speculation to conclude that these acts were
preparatory to the act of raping her. Had it not been for the victims
strong physical resistance, petitioners next step would, logically, be
having carnal knowledge of the victim. The acts are clearly the first or

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some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission

of the offense after the preparations are made.
8. Rivera v. People, G.R. No. 166326, January 25, 2006
In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of
evidence to prove the intent of petitioners to kill Ruben. Esmeraldo and
Ismael pummeled the victim with fist blows. Even as Ruben fell to the
ground, unable to defend himself against the sudden and sustained
assault of petitioners, Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block.
Edgardo tried to hit Ruben on the head, missed, but still managed to
hit the victim only in the parietal area, resulting in a lacerated wound
and cerebral contusions.
That the head wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial
and could not have produced his death does not negate petitioners
criminal liability for attempted murder. Even if Edgardo did not hit the
victim squarely on the head, petitioners are still criminally liable for
attempted murder.
9. Aristotle Valenzuela v. People, G. R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007
Theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or
consummated.
10.
Ramie Valenzuela v. People, G.R. No. 149988, August 14,
2009
Considering further that the victim sustained wounds that were not
fatal and absent a showing that such wounds would have certainly
caused his death were it not for timely medical assistance, we declare
the petitioners guilt to be limited to the crime of attempted homicide.
11.

People v. Pareja, G.R. No. 188979, September 5, 2012

Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that there is

an attempt when the offender commenced the commission of the
crime directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of
execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. In People v. Publico, we ruled that when the
"touching" of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to
penetrate, attempted rape is committed; otherwise, the crime
committed is merely acts of lasciviousness.
Conspiracy and proposal

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12.

People v. Carandang, G.R. No. 175926, July 6, 2011

In the case at bar, the conclusion that Milan and Chua conspired with
Carandang was established by their acts (1) before Carandang shot the
victims (Milans closing the door when the police officers introduced
themselves, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush), and (2) after the
shooting (Chuas directive to Milan to attack SPO1 Montecalvo and
Milans following such instruction). Contrary to the suppositions of
appellants, these facts are not meant to prove that Chua is a principal
by inducement, or that Milans act of attacking SPO1 Montecalvo was
what made him a principal by direct participation. Instead, these facts
are convincing circumstantial evidence of the unity of purpose in the
minds of the three. As co-conspirators, all three are considered
principals by direct participation.
As held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, Milans act of
closing the door facilitated the commission of the crime, allowing
Carandang to wait in ambush. The sudden gunshots when the police
officers pushed the door open illustrate the intention of appellants and
Carandang to prevent any chance for the police officers to defend
themselves. Treachery is thus present in the case at bar, as what is
decisive for this qualifying circumstance is that the execution of the
attack made it impossible for the victims to defend themselves or to
retaliate.
13.

People v. Bokingco, G.R. No. 187536, August 10, 2011

Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill

Pasion. Bokingco had already killed Pasion even before he
sought Col. Their moves were not coordinated because while Bokingco
was killing Pasion because of his pent-up anger, Col was attempting to
rob the pawnshop.
14.
People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 196960, March 12, 2014
Assuming that the prosecution witnesses failed to identify exactly who
inflicted the fatal wounds on Joey during the commotion, Erwins
liability is not diminished since he and the others with him acted with
concert in beating up and ultimately killing Joey. Conspiracy makes all
the assailants equally liable as co-principals by direct participation.
15.
People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 158754, August 10,
2007

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Petitioners second and third arguments focus on the possible degrees

of participation of Jinggoy in the crime of Plunder. Noticeably, both
arguments, if pursued to their respective logical conclusions, tend to
cancel each other out, one leading as it were to a direction quite the
opposite of the other. For while the second argument attempts to
establish animplied conspiracy between Jinggoy and his father - hence,
the guilt of one is the guilt of the other - the third argument eschews
the idea of conspiracy, but respondent Jinggoy is nonetheless equally
guilty as President Estrada because of his indispensable cooperation
and/or direct participation in the crime of Plunder.
16.

Fernan v. People G.R. No. 145927, August 24, 2007

It is clear that without the tally sheets and delivery receipts, the
general voucher cannot be prepared and completed. Without the
general voucher, the check for the payment of the supply cannot be
made and issued to the supplier. Without the check payment, the
defraudation
cannot
be
committed
and
successfully
consummated. Thus, petitioners acts in signing the false tally sheets
and/or delivery receipts are indispensable to the consummation of the
crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents.
17.
Arias v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 81563 December 19,
1989
Under the Sandiganbayan's decision in this case, a department
secretary, bureau chief, commission chairman, agency head, and all
chief auditors would be equally culpable for every crime arising from
disbursements which they have approved. The department head or
chief auditor would be guilty of conspiracy simply because he was the
last of a long line of officials and employees who acted upon or affixed
their signatures to a transaction. Guilt must be premised on a more
knowing, personal, and deliberate participation of each individual who
is charged with others as part of a conspiracy.
Continuing Crime
18.
People v Jaranilla, G.R. No. L-28547, February 22, 1974
Therefore, the taking of the six roosters from their coop should be
characterized as theft and not robbery. The assumption is that the
accused were animated by single criminal impulse. The conduct of the
accused reveals that they conspired to steal the roosters. The taking is
punishable as a single offense of theft. Thus, it was held that the taking
of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion cannot
give rise to two crimes of theft.

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19.
Santiago v. Garchitorena, G.R. No. 109266 December 2,
1993
The trend in theft cases is to follow the so-called "single larceny"
doctrine, that is, the taking of several things, whether belonging to the
same or different owners, at the same time and place constitutes but
one larceny. Many courts have abandoned the "separate larceny
doctrine," under which there is a distinct larceny as to the property of
each victim. Also abandoned was the doctrine that the government has
the discretion to prosecute the accused or one offense or for as many
distinct offenses as there are victims (annotation, 37 ALR 3rd 1407,
1410-1414).
The American courts following the "single larceny" rule, look at the
commission of the different criminal acts as but one continuous act
involving the same "transaction" or as done on the same "occasion"
(State v. Sampson, 157 Iowa 257, 138 NW 473; People v. Johnson, 81
Mich. 573, 45 NW 1119; State v. Larson, 85 Iowa 659, 52 NW 539).
20.
Ilagan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110617 December 29,
1994
The crime of estafa committed against respondent corporation, on the
one hand, and those committed against the lot buyers, on the other,
are definitely separate felonies. They were dictated by different
criminal
intents,
committed
under different
modes
of
commission provided by the law on estafa, perpetrated by different
acts, consummated ondifferent occasions, and caused injury
to different parties.
Compound Crime/Complex Crime
21.
Samson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-10364 and L10376, March 31, 1958
There is no question that appellant cooperated in the commission of
the complex offense of estafa through falsification by reckless
imprudence by acts without which it could not have been
accomplished, and this being a fact, there would be no reason to
exculpate him from liability. Even assuming that he had no intention to
defraud the offended party if his co-defendants succeeded in attaining
the
purpose
sought
by
the
culprits,
appellant's
participation together with the participation of his co-defendant the
commission of the offense completed all the necessary for the
perpetration of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
commercial document
22.

People v. Castromero, G.R. No. 118992, October 9, 1997

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In relation to the charge that rape was complexed with the crime of
serious physical injuries, we stress the settled principle that a person
who creates in anothers mind an immediate sense of danger that
causes the latter to try to escape is responsible for whatever the other
person may consequently suffer. In this case, Josephine jumped from a
window of her house to escape from Appellant Castromero; as a result,
she
suffered
serious
physical
injuries,
specifically
a
broken vertebra which required medical attention and surgery for more
than ninety days. This being the case, the court a quo correctly
convicted Appellant Castromero of the complex crime of rape with
serious physical injuries.
23.
People v. Punzalan, G.R. No. 199892, December 10, 2012
Appellant was animated by a single purpose, to kill the navy personnel,
and committed a single act of stepping on the accelerator, swerving to
the right side of the road ramming through the navy personnel,
causing the death of SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna and, at the same
time, constituting an attempt to kill SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa, SN1
Bundang and SN1 Domingo.The crimes of murder and attempted
murder are both grave felonies as the law attaches an afflictive penalty
to capital punishment (reclusion perpetua to death) for murder while
attempted murder is punished by prision mayor, an afflictive penalty.
24.
People v. Robios, G.R. No. 138453. May 29, 2002
Since appellant was convicted of the complex crime of parricide with
unintentional abortion, the penalty to be imposed on him should be
that for the graver offense which is parricide.This is in accordance with
the mandate of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which
states: When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, x x x, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, x x x.
25.
People v. Villaflores, G.R. No. 184926, April 11, 2012
There are distinctions between a composite crime, on the one hand,
and a complex or compound crime under Article 48, on the other hand.
In a composite crime, the composition of the offenses is fixed by law; in
a complex or compound crime, the combination of the offenses is not
specified but generalized, that is, grave and/or less grave, or one
offense being the necessary means to commit the other. For a
composite crime, the penalty for the specified combination of crimes is
specific; for a complex or compound crime, the penalty is that
corresponding to the most serious offense, to be imposed in the
maximum period. A light felony that accompanies a composite crime is
absorbed; a light felony that accompanies the commission of a

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complex or compound crime may be the subject of a separate

information.
II. CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Justifying Circumstances
- Self-Defense
26.
Nacnac v. People, G.R. No. 191913, March 21, 2012
Ordinarily, as pointed out by the lower court, there is a difference
between the act of drawing ones gun and the act of pointing ones gun
at a target. The former cannot be said to be unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim. In People v. Borreros, We ruled that for unlawful
aggression to be attendant, there must be a real danger to life or
personal safety. Unlawful aggression requires an actual, sudden and
unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a
threatening or intimidating attitude x x x. Here, the act of the
[deceased] of allegedly drawing a gun from his waist cannot be
categorized as unlawful aggression. Such act did not put in real peril
the life or personal safety of appellant. The facts surrounding the
instant case must, however, be differentiated from current
jurisprudence on unlawful aggression. The victim here was a trained
police officer. He was inebriated and had disobeyed a lawful order in
order to settle a score with someone using a police vehicle. A warning
shot fired by a fellow police officer, his superior, was left unheeded as
he reached for his own firearm and pointed it at petitioner. Petitioner
was, therefore, justified in defending himself from an inebriated and
disobedient colleague.
27.

People v. Campos, G.R. No. 176061, July 4, 2011

An intimidating or threatening attitude is by no means enough. In this

case, other than the self-serving allegation of Danny, there is no
evidence sufficiently clear and convincing that the victim indeed
attacked him. The prosecutions rebuttal witnesses Jaime Maquiling and
Francisco Austerowho admittedly were among those whom Danny and
Bingky had an encounter with on the night of August 19, 2001, never
said in their testimonies that Romeo attacked Danny and a bladed
weapon was used. These witnesses were categorical that Romeo was
not with them during the incident. This testimonial evidence was not
refuted by the defense. Even Bingky who claimed to be a friend of
Romeowas not able to identify the latter as one of those present at the
time. Candid enough, Bingky declared that it was only a certain Ago
and Jaime who confronted Danny. Resultantly, Danny failed to
discharge his burden of proving unlawful aggression, the most
indispensable element of self-defense. Where no unlawful aggression is
proved, no self-defense may be successfully pleaded.

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28.

People v. Mapait, G.R. No. 172606, November 23, 2011

Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful

aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material
unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a
weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the
aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an
attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not
consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely
imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a
revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making
a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a
mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand
to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry
countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.
29.

People v. Patotoy, G.R. No. 102058, August 26, 1996

Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected

attack, or an imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or
intimidating attitude. There must exist a real danger to the life or
personal safety of the person claiming self-defense. [18] This element, in
the case before us, is sorely wanting. No veritable physical force on the
part of Manuel has been shown that could have really endangered
appellant's life. Manuel's alleged act of drawing "something" from his
waist certainly is not the "unlawful aggression" meant in the law that
would justify a fatal strike at the victim with such lightning-speed as
appellant has delivered. In fact, no weapon, supposedly in the person
of Manuel, is shown to have been found. Without unlawful aggression,
self-defense cannot exist nor be an extenuating circumstance.
30.
People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 195534, June 13, 2012
The existence of unlawful aggression is the basic requirement in a plea
of self-defense. In other words, no self-defense can exist without
unlawful aggression since there is no attack that the accused will have
to prevent or repel. In People v. Dolorido, we held that unlawful
aggression
presupposes
actual,
sudden,
unexpected
or imminent danger not merely threatening and intimidating action. It
is present only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat
to ones life. The unlawful aggression may constitute an actual physical
assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury upon the
accused. In case of a threat, it must be offensive and strong, positively
showing the x x x intent to cause injury.
31.

People v. Credo, G.R. No. 197360, July 3, 2013

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As found by the trial court, there can be no unlawful aggression on the

part of Joseph because at the time of the incident, he was only holding
a lemon and an egg. According to the trial court, the fact that Joseph
was unarmed effectively belied the allegation of Ronald that he was
prompted to retaliate in self-defense when Joseph first hacked and hit
him on his neck. The trial court further pointed out that if Joseph
indeed hacked Ronald on the neck, "it is surprising that the latter did
not suffer any injury when according to them (Ronald, Rolando and
Flora Credo), Joseph was running fast and made a hard thrust on
Ronald, hitting the latters neck."
- State of Necessity
32.
Ty v. People, G.R. No. 149275. September 27, 2004
Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the
greater injury feared should not have been brought about by the
negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the actor. In
this case, the issuance of the bounced checks was brought about by
Tys own failure to pay her mothers hospital bills.
-Fulfillment of Duty
33.
Cabanlig v. Sandiganabayan, G.R. No. 148431, July 28,
2005
Certainly, an M16 Armalite is a far more powerful and deadly weapon
than the bamboo lance that the fugitive had run away with in People v.
Delima. The policeman in People v. Delima was held to have been
justified in shooting to death the escaping fugitive because the
policeman was merely performing his duty.
In this case, Valino was committing an offense in the presence of the
policemen when Valino grabbed the M16 Armalite from Mercado and
jumped from the jeep to escape. The policemen would have been
justified in shooting Valino if the use of force was absolutely necessary
to prevent his escape.[22] But Valino was not only an escaping
detainee. Valino had also stolen the M16 Armalite of a policeman. The
policemen had the duty not only to recapture Valino but also to recover
the loose firearm. By grabbing Mercados M16 Armalite, which is a
formidable firearm, Valino had placed the lives of the policemen in
grave danger.
- Obedience to a lawful order of a superior
34.
Tabuena v. People, G.R. No. 103501-03. February 17,
1997

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This is not a sheer case of blind and misguided obedience, but

obedience in good faith of a duly executed order. Indeed, compliance
to a patently lawful order is rectitude far better than contumacious
disobedience. In the case at bench, the order emanated from
the Office of the President and bears the signature of the President
himself, the highest official of the land. It carries with it the
presumption that it was regularly issued. And on its face, the
memorandum is patently lawful for no law makes the payment of an
obligation illegal. This fact, coupled with the urgent tenor for its
execution constrains one to act swiftly without question. Obedientia
est legis essentia.
Battered Woman Syndrome
35.
People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004
Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their
children's bedroom -- and based on past violent incidents, there was a
great probability that he would still have pursued her and inflicted
graver harm -- then, the imminence of the real threat upon her life
would not have ceased yet. Where the brutalized person is already
suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault at the
time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually
have a predictable pattern. To require the battered person to await an
obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life "would amount to
sentencing her to 'murder by installment.'" Still, impending danger
(based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes)
prior to the defendant's use of deadly force must be shown.
Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required
imminence of danger. Considering such circumstances and the
existence of BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not
warrant self-defense. In the absence of such aggression, there can be
no self-defense -- complete or incomplete -- on the part of the victim.
Thus, Marivic's killing of Ben was not completely justified under the
circumstances.
36.
Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought
about by biases and prejudices against women. As emphasized by the
CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through specific
measures focused on women does not discriminate against men.

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Petitioner's contention, therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and

that it is an "anti-male," "husband-bashing," and "hate-men" law
deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the
Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate measures "to modify the
social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view
to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the
superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and
women." Justice Puno correctly pointed out that "(t)he paradigm shift
changing the character of domestic violence from a private affair to a
public offense will require the development of a distinct mindset on the
part of the police, the prosecution and the judges."
Exempting Circumstances
- Insanity
37.
People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 184343, March 2, 2009
Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence
while committing the act; i.e., when the accused is deprived of reason,
he acts without the least discernment because there is a complete
absence of power to discern, or there is total deprivation of freedom of
the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties is not enough,
especially if the offender has not lost consciousness of his acts.
Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the
mental faculties and is manifested in language and conduct. An insane
person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and
consequences of his or her acts.
- Minority
38.
Llave v. People, G.R. No. 166040, April 26, 2006
Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a
person over nine years of age and under fifteen is exempt from
criminal liability, unless he acted with discernment. The basic reason
behind the exempting circumstance is complete absence of
intelligence, freedom of action of the offender which is an essential
element of a felony either by dolus or by culpa. Intelligence is the
power necessary to determine the morality of human acts to
distinguish a licit from an illicit act. On the other hand, discernment is
the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and
wrong. The prosecution is burdened to prove that the accused acted
with discernment by evidence of physical appearance, attitude or
deportment not only before and during the commission of the act, but
also after and during the trial. The surrounding circumstances must
demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it was

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wrong. Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime

and the minors cunning and shrewdness.
In the present case, the petitioner, with methodical fashion, dragged
the resisting victim behind the pile of hollow blocks near the vacant
house to insure that passersby would not be able to discover his
dastardly acts. When he was discovered by Teofisto Bucud who
shouted at him, the petitioner hastily fled from the scene to escape
arrest. Upon the prodding of his father and her mother, he hid in his
grandmothers house to avoid being arrested by policemen and
remained thereat until barangay tanods arrived and took him into
custody.
39.

Madali v. People, G.R. No. 180380, August 4, 2009

As to the criminal liability, Raymond is exempt. As correctly ruled by

the Court of Appeals, Raymund, who was only 14 years of age at the
time he committed the crime, should be exempt from criminal liability
and should be released to the custody of his parents or guardian
pursuant to Sections 6 and 20 of Republic Act No. 9344. Although the
crime was committed on 13 April 1999 and Republic Act No. 9344 took
effect only on 20 May 2006, the said law should be given retroactive
effect in favor of Raymund who was not shown to be a habitual
criminal. This is based on Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, the sentence to be imposed against Rodel should be
suspended pursuant to Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344, which
states: SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child who
is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of
the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall
determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted
from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the
judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with
the law under suspended sentence, without need of application.
Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied
even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the
time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
40.
People v. Sarcia G.R. No. 169641, September 10, 2009
The above-quoted provision makes no distinction as to the nature of
the offense committed by the child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D.
No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D. and Supreme Court

Criminal Law

(SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not
apply to a child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has
been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court
is guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that when the
law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since R.A. No.
9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of
a capital offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser
offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the
automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law
who has been found guilty of a heinous crime.
To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and the judgment
of the RTC had been promulgated, even before the effectivity of R.A.
No. 9344. Thus, the application of Secs. 38 and 40 to the suspension of
sentence is now moot and academic. However, accused-appellant shall
be entitled to appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344,
which provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows:
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and
Other Training Facilities. A child in conflict with the law may, after
conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her
sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an
agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established,
maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination
with the DSWD.
41.
People v. Mantalaba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011
Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21)
years can no longer avail of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA
9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because such is already moot
and academic. It is highly noted that this would not have happened if
the CA, when this case was under its jurisdiction, suspended the
sentence of the appellant. The records show that the appellant filed his
notice of appeal at the age of 19 (2005), hence, when RA 9344 became
effective in 2006, appellant was 20 years old, and the case having
been elevated to the CA, the latter should have suspended the
sentence of the appellant because he was already entitled to the
provisions of Section 38 of the same law, which now allows the
suspension of sentence of minors regardless of the penalty imposed as
opposed to the provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603.
- Accident
42.
Toledo v. People, G.R. No. 158057, September 24, 2004

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It is an aberration for the petitioner to invoke the two defenses at the

same time because the said defenses are intrinsically antithetical.
There is no such defense as accidental self-defense in the realm of
criminal law.
Self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code
necessarily implies a deliberate and positive overt act of the accused
to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression of another with the use of
reasonable means. The accused has freedom of action. He is aware of
the consequences of his deliberate acts. The defense is based on
necessity which is the supreme and irresistible master of men of all
human affairs, and of the law. From necessity, and limited by it,
proceeds the right of self-defense. The right begins when necessity
does, and ends where it ends. Although the accused, in fact, injures or
kills the victim, however, his act is in accordance with law so much so
that the accused is deemed not to have transgressed the law and is
free from both criminal and civil liabilities. On the other hand, the basis
of exempting circumstances under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code
is the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or
the absence of negligence on the part of the accused. The basis of the
exemption in Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code is lack
of negligence and intent. The accused does not commit either an
intentional or culpable felony. The accused commits a crime but there
is no criminal liability because of the complete absence of any of the
conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act. An
accident is a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event
happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which
under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to
whom it happens.
43.

People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 172695, June 29, 2007

Accident is an affirmative defense which the accused is burdened to

prove, with clear and convincing evidence. The defense miserably
failed to discharge its burden of proof. The essential requisites for this
exempting circumstance, are: 1. A person is performing a lawful act; 2.
With due care; 3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident; 4.
Without fault or intention of causing it. By no stretch of imagination
could playing with or using a deadly sling and arrow be considered as
performing a lawful act. Thus, on this ground alone, appellants defense
of accident must be struck down because he was performing an
unlawful act during the incident.

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Mitigating Circumstances
-Praeter Intentionem
44.
People v. Sales, G.R. No. 177218, October 3, 2011
In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different
from that which he intended to commit, it is indispensible (a) that a
felony was committed and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved
person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the
perpetrator. Here, there is no doubt appellant in beating his son
Noemar and inflicting upon him physical injuries, committed a
felony. As a direct consequence of the beating suffered by the child, he
expired. Appellants criminal liability for the death of his son, Noemar, is
thus clear.
-Immediate vindication of a grave offense
45.
People v. Rebucan, G.R. No. 182551, July 27, 2011
As regards the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a
grave offense, the same cannot likewise be appreciated in the instant
case. Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code requires that
the act be committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense
to the one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants,
descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or
relatives by affinity within the same degrees. The established rule is
that there can be no immediate vindication of a grave offense when
the accused had sufficient time to recover his equanimity. In the case
at bar, the accused-appellant points to the alleged attempt of Felipe
and Timboy Lagera on the virtue of his wife as the grave offense for
which he sought immediate vindication. He testified that he learned of
the same from his stepson, Raymond, on November 2, 2002. Four days
thereafter, on November 6, 2002, the accused-appellant carried out
the attack that led to the deaths of Felipe and Ranil. To our mind, a
period of four days was sufficient enough a time within which the
accused-appellant could have regained his composure and selfcontrol. Thus, the said mitigating circumstance cannot be credited in
favor of the accused-appellant.
- Sufficient Provocation
46.
Urbano v. People, G.R. No. 182750, January 20, 2009
Petitioner, being very much smaller in height and heft, had the good
sense of trying to avoid a fight. But as events turned out, a fisticuff still
ensued, suddenly ending when petitioners lucky punch found its mark.
In People v. Macaso, a case where the accused police officer shot and
killed a motorist for repeatedly taunting him with defiant words, the
Court appreciated the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation
or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceding the

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shooting. The Court had the same attitude in Navarro v. Court of

Appeals, a case also involving a policeman who killed a man after the
latter challenged him to a fight. Hence, there is no rhyme or reason
why the same mitigating circumstance should not be considered in
favor of petitioner.
- Passion/Obfuscation
47.
People v. Ignas, G.R. No. 140514 , September 30, 2003
The rule is that the mitigating circumstances of vindication of a grave
offense and passion and obfuscation cannot be claimed at the same
time, if they arise from the same facts or motive. In other words, if
appellant attacked his victim in proximate vindication of a grave
offense, he could no longer claim in the same breath that passion and
obfuscation also blinded him. Moreover, for passion and obfuscation to
be well founded, the following requisites must concur: (1) there should
be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of
mind; and (2) the act which produced the obfuscation was not far
removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of
time, during which the perpetrator might recover his moral
equanimity. To repeat, the period of two (2) weeks which spanned the
discovery of his wifes extramarital dalliance and the killing of her lover
was sufficient time for appellant to reflect and cool off.
48.
People of the Philippines v. Oloverio, G.R. No. 211159.
March 18, 2015
To be able to successfully plead the mitigating circumstance of passion
and obfuscation, the accused must be able to prove the following
elements: 1. that there be an act, both unlawful and sufficient to
produce such condition of mind; and 2. that said act which produced
the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime
by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might
recover his normal equanimity.
49.

Romera v. People, G.R. No. 151978. July 14, 2004

But, we must stress that provocation and passion or obfuscation are

not two separate mitigating circumstances. Well-settled is the rule that
if these two circumstances are based on the same facts, they should
be treated together as one mitigating circumstance. From the facts
established in this case, it is clear that both circumstances arose from
the same set of facts aforementioned. Hence, they should not be
treated as two separate mitigating circumstances.
-Voluntary Surrender
50.
People v. Viernes, G.R. No. 136733, December 13, 2001

Criminal Law

The act of surrender must be spontaneous, accompanied by an

acknowledgment of guilt, or an intention to save the authorities the
trouble and the expense that search and capture would require. Going
to the police station to clear his name does not show any intent of
appellant to surrender unconditionally to the authorities
51.
People v. Abolidor, G.R. No. 147231, February 18, 2004
In the case at bar, appellant surrendered to the authorities after more
than one year had lapsed since the incident and in order to disclaim
responsibility for the killing of the victim. This neither shows
repentance or acknowledgment of the crime nor intention to save the
government the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search
and capture. Besides, at the time of his surrender, there was a pending
warrant of arrest against him. Hence, he should not be credited with
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Aggravating Circumstances
52.
People v. Cortes, G.R. No. 137050. July 11, 2001
As to the aggravating circumstance of nighttime, the same could not
be considered for the simple reason that it was not specifically sought
in the commission of the crime. "Night-time becomes an aggravating
circumstance only when (1) it is specially sought by the offender; (2)
the offender takes advantage of it; or (3) it facilitates the commission
of the crime by insuring the offender's immunity from identification or
capture." In the case at bar, no evidence suggests that accused
purposely sought the cover of darkness to perpetrate the crime, or to
conceal his identity.
"The trial court erred in further appreciating the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Abuse of superior strength
is absorbed in treachery, so that it can not be appreciated separately
as another aggravating circumstance." Here, treachery qualified the
offense to murder.
As to the aggravating circumstance of disregard of sex, the same could
not be considered as it was not shown that accused deliberately
intended to offend or insult the sex of the victim, or showed manifest
disrespect for her womanhood. In fact, the accused mistook the victim
for a man.
- Recidivism
53.
People v Molina, G.R. Nos. 134777-78. July 24, 2000

Criminal Law

On the aggravating circumstance of recidivism, the trial court properly

appreciated the same though not alleged in the information. Article
14(9) of the Revised Penal Code defines a recidivist as "one who, at the
time of his trial for one crime shall have been previously convicted by
final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of this
Code." To prove recidivism, it is necessary to allege the same in the
information and to attach thereto certified copies of the sentences
rendered against the accused. Nonetheless, the trial court may still
give such aggravating circumstance credence if the accused does not
object to the presentation of evidence on the fact of recidivism.
-Reiteracion
54.
People v. Cajara, G.R. No. 122498. September 27, 2000
The records show that the crime was aggravated by reiteracion under
Art. 14, par. 10, of The Revised Penal Code, the accused having been
convicted of frustrated murder in 1975 and of homicide, frustrated
homicide, trespass to dwelling, illegal possession of firearms and
murder sometime in 1989 where his sentences were later commuted
to imprisonment for 23 years and a fine of P200,000.00. He was
granted conditional pardon by the President of the Philippines on 8
November 1991. Reiteracion or habituality under Art. 14, par. 10,
herein cited, is present when the accused has been previously
punished for an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater
penalty than that attached by law to the second offense or for two or
more offenses to which it attaches a lighter penalty. As already
discussed, herein accused can be convicted only of simple rape and
the imposable penalty therefor is reclusion perpetua.Where the law
prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied regardless of
the mitigating or aggravating circumstances attendant to the crime,
such as in the instant case.
- Treachery
55.
People v. Aquino, G.R. No. 201092, January 15, 2014
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the
aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving him of any real chance
to defend himself. Even when the victim was forewarned of the danger
to his person, treachery may still be appreciated since what is decisive
is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to
defend himself or to retaliate. Records disclose that Jesus was stabbed
by the group on the lateral part of his body while he was under the
impression that they were simply leaving the place where they had [a]
shabu session. Judicial notice can be taken that when the tricycle
driver is seated on the motorcycle, his head is usually higher or at the
level of the roof of the side car which leaves his torso exposed to the

Criminal Law

passengers who are seated in the side car. Hence, there was no way
for Jesus to even be forewarned of the intended stabbing of his body
both from the people seated in the side car and those seated behind
him. Thus, the trial courts finding of treachery should be affirmed.
There is treachery when the means, methods, and forms of execution
gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate; and such means, methods, and forms of execution were
deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused without danger to
his person. What is decisive in an appreciation of treachery is that the
execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend
himself.
56.

People v. Yam-Id, G.R. No. 126116. June 21, 1999

Treachery attended the killing of the 6-year old Jerry Tejamo for when
an adult person illegally attacks a child of tender years and causes his
death, treachery exists.
57.

People v. Latag, G.R. No. 153213. January 22, 2004

In the present case, we find nothing in the records that shows the
exact manner of the killing. Though Atienza turned around immediately
after hearing a gunshot, he could not, and in fact did not, testify as to
how the attack had been initiated. The fact that appellant was standing
behind some shrubs when he shot the victim does not by itself
sufficiently establish that the method of execution gave the latter no
opportunity for self-defense. Nor was the attack deliberately and
consciously adopted by the former without danger to himself.
58.
People v. Dinglasan, G.R. No. 101312. January 28, 1997
The Revised Penal Code provides that "(t)here is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make." In the case at
bench, the presence of treachery or alevosia which qualified the killing
to murder was correctly appreciated by the trial court because the
manner by which the perpetrators commenced and consummated the
stabbing of the victim Efren Lasona showed conclusively that the latter
was totally surprised by the attack and not afforded an opportunity to
raise any defense against his attackers. Efren Lasona could not have
expected, while riding in that tricycle, that he would be savagely and
fatally assaulted by knife-wielding attackers. The victim was
defenseless during the attack as his hands were restrained by the
accused-appellant to facilitate the stabbing of the victim by the other
perpetrators. It is well-settled that "(a)n unexpected and sudden attack

Criminal Law

under circumstances which render the victim unable and unprepared

to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the
attack, constitutes alevosia." Parenthetically, the fact that the attack
on deceased Efren Lasona was frontal does not preclude the presence
of treachery in this case as the same made the attack no less
unexpected and sudden.
- Ignominy
59.
People v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-62116 March 22, 1990
The trial court is correct in appreciating the aggravating circumstance
of ignominy because of the greater perversity displayed by the
offenders. The testimony of the examining physician that he did not
find mud on the victim's private organ, does not necessarily belie the
latter's asseveration that the accused "plastered" (in the words of the
lower court) mud on her private part. It is worthwhile mentioning that
the victim was examined and treated by Dr. Claudio at 3:55 p.m. or
about almost two (2) hours after the rape was committed. 17 Given this
circumstance, the absence of mud in the victim's private part when
she was examined by the physician, may be attributed to the
possibility that the mud washed or fell off even before the victim left
the house for her physical examination. Moreover, Rebecca's testimony
was corroborated by that of Amelita Malong who swore that she saw
mud smeared on Rebecca's private part when she (Amelita) saw
Rebecca right after the incident. It is also difficult to conceive why the
offended party, young as she was, and with a chaste reputation, would
go to the extent of fabricating this portion of her testimony
notwithstanding the consequent humiliation on her person and
disgrace on her womanhood. We cannot but agree with the trial court's
finding that the offense was aggravated by ignominy. We are of the
opinion, however that the word "cruelty" used in the dispositive portion
of the judgment, to describe an alternative aggravating circumstance,
is unnecessary. The act of "plastering" mud on the victim's vagina right
after she was raped, is adequately and properly described as
"ignominy" rather than "cruelty or ignominy."
Alternative Circumstances
60.
People v. Fontillas, G.R. No. 184177, December 15, 2010
Accused appellant did not present any evidence that his intoxication
was not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the rape. The
person pleading intoxication must likewise prove that he took such
quantity of alcoholic beverage, prior to the commission of the crime, as
would blur his reason. Accused-appellant utterly failed to present clear
and convincing proof of the extent of his intoxication on the night of

Criminal Law

December 8, 2001 and that the amount of liquor he had taken was of
such quantity as to affect his mental faculties. Not one of accusedappellants drinking buddies testified that they, in fact, consumed eight
bottles of gin prior to the rape incident.
III. PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE
Principal
61.
People v. Janjalani et. al. G.R. No. 188314, January 10,
2011
Accused Rohmat is criminally responsible under the second
paragraph, or the provision on principal by inducement. The
instructions and training he had given Asali on how to make
bombs coupled with their careful planning and persistent
attempts to bomb different areas in Metro Manila and Rohmats
confirmation that Trinidad would be getting TNT from Asali as
part of their mission prove the finding that Rohmats coinducement was the determining cause of the commission of
the crime. Such command or advice [was] of such nature that,
without it, the crime would not have materialized.
Further, the inducement was so influential in producing the
criminal act that without it, the act would not have been
performed. In People v. Sanchez, et al., the Court ruled that,
notwithstanding the fact that Mayor Sanchez was not at the
crime scene, evidence proved that he was the mastermind of
the criminal act or the principal by inducement. Thus, because
Mayor Sanchez was a co-principal and co-conspirator, and
because the act of one conspirator is the act of all, the mayor
was rendered liable for all the resulting crimes. The same
finding must be applied to the case at bar.
62.
People v. Dulay, G.R. No. 193854, September 24, 2012
Under the Revised Penal Code, an accused may be considered a
principal by direct participation, by inducement, or by indispensable
cooperation. To be a principal by indispensable cooperation, one must
participate in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal
purpose and cooperation in the commission of the offense by
performing another act without which it would not have been
accomplished. Nothing in the evidence presented by the prosecution
does it show that the acts committed by appellant are indispensable in
the commission of the crime of rape. The events narrated by the CA,
from the time appellant convinced AAA to go with her until appellant
received money from the man who allegedly raped AAA, are not
indispensable in the crime of rape. Anyone could have accompanied

Criminal Law

AAA and offered the latter's services in exchange for money and AAA
could still have been raped. Even AAA could have offered her own
services in exchange for monetary consideration and still end up being
raped. Thus, this disproves the indispensable aspect of the appellant in
the crime of rape. While this Court does not find appellant to have
committed the crime of rape as a principal by indispensable
cooperation, she is still guilty of violation of Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610,
or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act
Accomplice
63.
People v. Tampus, G.R. No. 181084, June 16, 2009
All the requisites concur in order to find Ida guilty as an accomplice to
Tampus in the rape of ABC. The testimony of ABC shows that there was
community of design between Ida and Tampus to commit the rape of
ABC. Ida had knowledge of and assented to Tampus intention to have
sexual intercourse with her daughter. She forced ABC to drink beer,
and when ABC was already drunk, she left ABC alone with Tampus, with
the knowledge and even with her express consent to Tampus plan to
have sexual intercourse with her daughter.
It is settled jurisprudence that the previous acts of cooperation by the
accomplice should not be indispensable to the commission of the
crime; otherwise, she would be liable as a principal by indispensable
cooperation. The evidence shows that the acts of cooperation by Ida
are not indispensable to the commission of rape by Tampus. First,
because it was both Ida and Tampus who forced ABC to drink beer, and
second because Tampus already had the intention to have sexual
intercourse with ABC and he could have consummated the act even
without Idas consent.
Accessories
64.
Dizon-Pamintuan v. People, G.R. No. 111426, July 11,
1994
Before P.D. No. 1612, a fence could only be prosecuted for and held
liable as an accessory, as the term is defined in Article 19 of the
Revised Penal Code. The penalty applicable to an accessory is
obviously light under the rules prescribed in Articles 53, 55, and 57 of
the Revised Penal Code, subject to the qualification set forth in Article
60 thereof. Nothing, however, the reports from law enforcement
agencies that "there is rampant robbery and thievery of government
and private properties" and that "such robbery and thievery have
become profitable on the part of the lawless elements because of the

Criminal Law

existence of ready buyers, commonly known as fence, of stolen

properties,"
P.D.
No. 1612 was enacted to "impose heavy penalties on persons who
profit by the effects of the crimes of robbery and theft." Evidently, the
accessory in the crimes of robbery and theft could be prosecuted as
such under the Revised Penal Code or under P.D. No. 1612. However, in
the latter case, he ceases to be a mere accessory but becomes
aprincipal in the crime of fencing. Elsewise stated, the crimes of
robbery and theft, on the one hand, and fencing, on the other, are
separate and distinct offenses.
Anti Fencing Law
65.
Dimat v. People, G.R. No. 181184, January 25, 2012
The elements of fencing are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed;
2) the accused, who took no part in the robbery or theft, buys,
receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or
buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article or object taken
during that robbery or theft; (3) the accused knows or should have
known that the thing derived from that crime; and (4) he intends by
the deal he makes to gain for himself or for another. evidently, Dimat
knew that the Nissan Safari he bought was not properly
documented. He said that Tolentino showed him its old certificate of
registration and official receipt. But this certainly could not be true
because, the vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino had no
documents to show. That Tolentino was unable to make good on his
promise to produce new documents undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat
that the Nissan Safari came from an illicit source. Still, Dimat sold the
same to Sonia Delgado who apparently made no effort to check the
papers covering her purchase.
IV. PENALTIES
66.
People v. Rocha, G.R. No. 173797, August 31, 2007
It should be kept in mind that accused-appellants could not avail
themselves of parole if their appeal is dismissed, unless they also
apply for executive clemency and ask for the commutation of their
reclusion perpetua sentences. Republic Act No. 4108, as amended,
otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, does not apply to
persons convicted of offenses punishable with death penalty or life
imprisonment. In several cases, we have considered the penalty of
reclusion perpetua as synonymous to life imprisonment for purposes of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and ruled that said law does not
apply to persons convicted of offenses punishable with the said
penalty.

Criminal Law

67.

People v. Bon, G.R. No. 166401, October 30, 2006

Henceforth, "death," as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code,

shall no longer form part of the equation in the graduation of penalties.
For example, in the case of appellant, the determination of his penalty
for attempted rape shall be reckoned not from two degrees lower than
death, but two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. Hence, the
maximum term of his penalty shall no longer be reclusion temporal, as
ruled by the Court of Appeals, but instead,prision mayor.
There should be little complication if the crime committed was
punishable by the free-standing penalty of "death," as utilized in Rep.
Act No. 7659, as opposed to the ranged penalty of "reclusion
perpetua to death," as often used in the Revised Penal Code and other
penal laws. The facts of the present case do not concern the latter
penalty, hence our reluctance to avail of an extended discussion
thereof. However, we did earlier observe that both "reclusion perpetua"
and death are indivisible penalties. Under Article 61 (2) of the Revised
Penal Code, "[w]hen the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed
of two indivisible penalties x x x x the penalty next lower in degree
shall be that immediately following the lesser of the penalties
prescribed in the respective graduated scale." Hence, as we earlier
noted, our previous rulings that the penalty two degrees lower than
"reclusion perpetua to death" isprision mayor.
68.
Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan,G.R. Nos. L-51065-72, June
30, 1987
Petitioner is mistaken in his application of the three-fold rule as set
forth in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code. This article is to be taken
into account not in the imposition of the penalty but in connection with
the service of the sentence imposed (People v. Escares, 102 Phil. 677
[1957]). Article 70 speaks of "service" of sentence, "duration" of
penalty and penalty "to be inflicted". Nowhere in the article is anything
mentioned about the "imposition of penalty". It merely provides that
the prisoner cannot be made to serve more than three times the most
severe of these penalties the maximum of which is forty years.
69.
People v. Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, December 17,
2008
As a general rule, the application of modifying circumstances, the
majority being generic mitigating and ordinary aggravating
circumstances, does not result to a maximum term fixed beyond the
prescribed penalty. At most, the maximum term is taken from the

Criminal Law

prescribed penalty in its maximum period. Since the maximum term is

taken from the prescribed penalty and the minimum term is taken from
the next lower penalty, then, in this limited sense, the difference would
naturally be only one degree. Concretely, in the case of homicide with
one ordinary aggravating circumstance, the maximum term is taken
from reclusin temporal in its maximum period which is within the
prescribed penalty of reclusin temporal, while the minimum term is
taken from prisin mayor which is the penalty next lower to reclusin
temporal; hence, the one-degree difference observed by the dissent.
In comparison, under the incremental penalty rule, the maximum term
can exceed the prescribed penalty. Indeed, at its extreme, the
maximum term can be as high as 20 years of reclusin temporal while
the prescribed penalty remains at prisin correccional maximum
to prisin mayor minimum, hence, the penalty next lower to the
prescribed penalty from which the minimum term is taken remains at
anywhere within prisin correccional minimum and medium, or from 6
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. In this sense, the
incremental penalty rule deviates from the afore-stated general rule.
70.
Corpuz v. People, G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014
The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not
three, periods, in which case, Article 65 of the same Code requires the
division of the time included in the penalty into three equal portions of
time included in the penalty prescribed, forming one period of each of
the three portions.
- Subsidiary Imprisonment
71.
Narte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132552, July 14, 2004
This Court clarified in Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 dated
February 14, 2001 that there is no legal obstacle to the application of
the RPC provisions on subsidiary imprisonment should only a fine be
imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine. This should finally
dispel the petitioners' importunate claim that the imposition of
subsidiary imprisonment in this case is improper.
- Indeterminate Sentence Law
72.
Spouses Bacar v. Judge De Guzman Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-961349. April 18, 1997
The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the
indeterminate sentence is to prevent the unnecessary and excessive
deprivation of liberty and to enhance the economic usefulness of the

Criminal Law

accused, since he may be exempted from serving the entire sentence,

depending upon his behavior and his physical, mental, and moral
record. The requirement of imposing an indeterminate sentence in all
criminal offenses whether punishable by the RPC or by special laws,
with definite minimum and maximum terms, as the Court deems
proper within the legal range of the penalty specified by the law must,
therefore, be deemed mandatory.
In crimes punishable under the Revised Penal Code, the maximum
term of the indeterminate penalty is determined in accordance with
the rules and provisions of the Code exactly as if the Indeterminate
Sentence Law had never been enacted.
73.

Romero v. People, G.R. No. 171644, November 23, 2011

In Argoncillo v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that the

application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory to
both the Revised Penal Code and the special laws, and in the
same ruling, this Court summarized the application and nonapplication of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to wit:
x x x It is basic law that x x x the application of the
Indeterminate
Sentence
Law
is
mandatory
where
imprisonment exceeds one (1) year, except only in the
following cases:
a. Offenses punished by death or life imprisonment.
b. Those convicted of treason (Art. 114) conspiracy or proposal
to commit treason (Art. 115).
c. Those convicted of misprision of treason (Art. 116), rebellion
(Art. 134), sedition (Art. 139) or espionage (Art. 117).
d. Those convicted of piracy (Art. 122).
e. Habitual delinquents (Art. 62, par. 5).
Recidivists are entitled to an Indeterminate sentence. (People
v. Jaramilla, L-28547, February 22, 1974) Offender is not
disqualified to avail of the benefits of the law even if the crime
is committed while he is on parole. (People v. Calreon, CA 78 O.
G. 6701, November 19, 1982).

Criminal Law

f. Those who escaped from confinement or those who evaded

sentence.
g. Those granted conditional pardon and who violated the
terms of the same. (People v. Corral, 74 Phil. 359).
h. Those whose maximum period of imprisonment does not
exceed one (1) year.
Where the penalty actually imposed does not exceed one (1)
year, the accused cannot avail himself of the benefits of the
law, the application of which is based upon the penalty
actually imposed in accordance with law and not upon that
which may be imposed in the discretion of the court. (People v.
Hidalgo, [CA] G.R. No. 00452-CR, January 22, 1962).
i. Those who are already serving final judgment upon the
approval of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of
the indeterminate sentence is to prevent the unnecessary and
excessive deprivation of liberty and to enhance the economic
usefulness of the accused, since he may be exempted from
serving the entire sentence, depending upon his behavior and
his physical, mental, and moral record. The requirement of
imposing an indeterminate sentence in all criminal offenses
whether punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by special
laws, with definite minimum and maximum terms, as the Court
deems proper within the legal range of the penalty specified
by the law must, therefore, be deemed mandatory.
74.

People v. Mantalaba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011

Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority can

now be appreciated in fixing the penalty that should be imposed. The
RTC, as affirmed by the CA, imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without considering the minority of the appellant. Thus,
applying the rules stated above, the proper penalty should be one
degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority having been
appreciated. Necessarily, also applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law (ISLAW), the minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty
next lower in degree which is prision mayor and the maximum penalty
shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, there

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being
no
other
mitigating
circumstance
nor
aggravating
circumstance. The ISLAW is applicable in the present case because the
penalty which has been originally an indivisible penalty (reclusion
perpetua to death), where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a divisible
penalty (reclusion temporal) by virtue of the presence of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority.
75.

People v. Gunda, G.R. No. 195525, February 5, 2014

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder is
reclusion perpetua to death. There being no other aggravating
circumstance other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the
CA correctly held that the proper imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua, the lower of the two indivisible penalties. "It must be
emphasized, however, that [appellant is] not eligible for parole
pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 which states that
persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or
whose sentence will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this
Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise
known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."
- Probation Law
76.
Padua v. People, G.R. No. 168546, July 23, 2008
The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person
convicted for drug trafficking or pushing, regardless of the penalty
imposed, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or
P.D. No. 968. The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when
the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their
meaning must be determined from the language employed and the
statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. If a statute is
clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is
known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the
maxim,index
animi
sermo,
or
speech
is
the
index
of
intention. Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est
recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no
departure.
77.

Almero v. People, G.R. No. 188191, March 12, 2014

Petitioner cannot make up his mind whether to question the judgment,

or apply for probation, which is necessarily deemed a waiver of his
right to appeal. While he did not file an appeal before applying for
probation, he assailed the validity of the conviction in the guise of a
petition supposedly assailing the denial of probation. In so doing, he

Criminal Law

attempted to circumvent P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D. 1990, which

seeks to make appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies.
78.
Colinares v. People, G.R. No. 182748, December 13, 2011
One of those who dissent from this decision points out that allowing
Arnel to apply for probation after he appealed from the trial courts
judgment of conviction would not be consistent with the provision of
Section 2 that the probation law should be interpreted to provide an
opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender. An accused like
Arnel who appeals from a judgment convicting him, it is claimed,
shows no penitence.
This may be true if the trial court meted out to Arnel a correct
judgment of conviction. Here, however, it convicted Arnel of the wrong
crime, frustrated homicide, that carried a penalty in excess of 6 years.
How can the Court expect him to feel penitent over a crime, which as
the Court now finds, he did not commit? He only committed attempted
homicide with its maximum penalty of 2 years and 4 months.
Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to
under the reduced penalty, it would be sending
bars. It would be robbing him of the chance
reformation as a penitent offender, defeating the
probation law.

apply for probation

him straight behind
to instead undergo
very purpose of the

79.
Moreno v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 168550, August 10, 2006
Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere privilege, an act of
grace and clemency or immunity conferred by the state, which is
granted to a deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme
rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he was
convicted.[15] Thus, the Probation Law lays out rather stringent
standards regarding who are qualified for probation. For instance, it
provides that the benefits of probation shall not be extended to those
sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six
(6) years; convicted of any offense against the security of the State;
those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an
offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month and
one (1) day and/or a fine of not less than P200.00; those who have
been once on probation; and those who are already serving sentence
at the time the substantive provisions of the Probation Law became
applicable.

Criminal Law

It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the

Local Government Code covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or
more of imprisonment, a penalty which also covers probationable
offenses. In spite of this, the provision does not specifically disqualify
probationers from running for a local elective office. This omission is
significant because it offers a glimpse into the legislative intent to treat
probationers as a distinct class of offenders not covered by the
disqualification.
80.

Bala v Judge Jimenez, G.R. No. L-67301, January 29, 1990

The probation having been revoked, it is imperative that the

probationer be arrested so that he can serve the sentence originally
imposed. The expiration of the probation period of one year is of no
moment, there being no order of final discharge as yet, as we stressed
earlier. Neither can there be a deduction of the one year probation
period from the penalty of one year and one day to three years, six
months, and twenty-one days of imprisonment because an order
placing the defendant on "probation" is not a "sentence," but is in
effect a suspension of the imposition of the sentence. 12 It is not a final
judgment but an "interlocutory judgment" in the nature of a conditional
order placing the convicted defendant under the supervision of the
court for his reformation, to be followed by a final judgment of
discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied with, or by a
final judgment if the conditions are violated."
- Modification and Extinction of Criminal Liability
81.
Yapdiangco v. Buencamino, G.R. No. L-28841, June 24,
1983
The rules contained in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code
and Section 1, Rule 28 of the Old Rules of Court deal with the
computation of time allowed to do a particular act, such as, the filing of
tax returns on or before a definite date, filing an answer to a complaint,
taking an appeal, etc. They do not apply to lengthen the period fixed
by the State for it to prosecute those who committed a crime against
it. The waiver or loss of the right to prosecute such offenders is
automatic and by operation of law. Where the sixtieth and last day to
file an information falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the sixty-day
period cannot be extended up to the next working day. Prescription has
automatically set in. The remedy is for the fiscal or prosecution to file

Criminal Law

the information on the last working day before the criminal offense
prescribes.
82.

Romualdez v Marcelo, G.R. Nos. 165510-33, July 28, 2006

Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the prescription shall begin to
run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if
the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment. The running of the prescriptive period shall be interrupted
when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall
begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy. Clearly, Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not provide
that the absence of the accused from the Philippines prevents the
running of the prescriptive period. Thus, the only inference that can be
gathered from the foregoing is that the legislature, in enacting Act No.
3326, did not consider the absence of the accused from the Philippines
as a hindrance to the running of the prescriptive period.Expressio
unius est exclusio alterius.
83.
People v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012
Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of
imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one
year or by a fine for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years
in accordance with the aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive
period, however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings
against the guilty person.
In the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, which is in all
fours with the instant case, this Court categorically ruled that
commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused
before the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively interrupted the
prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under BP
Blg. 22. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their
rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer
unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their
control, like the accuseds delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency
of the investigating agencies.
84.
Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation v. Lidua, G.R. No.
169588, October 7, 2013
Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the
Office of the Prosecutor who then files the Information in court, this
already has the effect of tolling the prescription period. The recent
People v. Pangilinan categorically stated that Zaldivia v. Reyes is not
controlling as far as special laws are concerned. Pangilinan referred to

Criminal Law

other cases that upheld this principle as well. However, the doctrine of
Pangilinan pertains to violations of special laws but not to ordinances.
It stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia that
the running of the
prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is filed in Court
and not on any date before that, is applicable to ordinances and their
prescription period.
85.

People v. Lim, February 13, 1992 G.R. No. 95753

To warrant the dismissal of the complaint, the victim's retraction or

pardon should be made prior to the institution of the criminal action
(People v. Soliao, 194 SCRA 250 [1991]). The present case was filed on
February 24, 1988 while the Affidavit was executed only on March 1,
1988.

86.

People v. Bacang, July 30, 1996 G.R. NO. 116512

While the pardon in this case was void for having been extended
during the pendency of the appeal or before conviction by final
judgment and, therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of Section
19, Article VII of the Constitution, the grant of the amnesty, for which
accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin voluntarily
applied under Proclamation No. 347, 3 was valid. This Proclamation was
concurred in by both Houses of Congress in Concurrent Resolution
No.12 adopted on 2 June 1994.
87.

People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 185843, March 3, 2010

In relation to Article 266-C of the RPC, Article 89 of the same Code

reads
ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability
is totally extinguished:
xxxx
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344
of this Code.
Article 344 of the same Code also provides
ART. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage,
seduction, abduction, rape, and acts of lasciviousness. x x x.

Criminal Law

In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness, and rape, the

marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the
criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. x x x.
On several occasions, we applied these provisions to marriages
contracted between the offender and the offended party in the crime
of rape as well as in the crime of abuse of chastity to totally extinguish
the criminal liability of and the corresponding penalty that may have
been imposed upon those found guilty of the felony.

BOOK II
Crimes Against National Security (Arts. 114-123)
- Treason
88.
Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil 856
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus claiming that a Filipino
citizen who adhered to the enemy, giving the latter aid and comfort
during the Japanese occupation, cannot be prosecuted for the crime of
treason for the reasons that: (1) the sovereignty of the legitimate
government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative
allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that
there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the
proclamation of the Philippine Republic. The Supreme Court dismissed
the petition and ruled that the absolute and permanent allegiance of
the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate
government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy
occupation because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de
jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, and if it is not
transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the
legitimate government.
89.
People v. Perez, 83 Phil 314
7 counts of treason were filed against Perez for recruiting,
apprehending and commandeering numerous girls and women against
their will for the purpose of using them to satisfy the immoral purposes
of Japanese officers. The Supreme Court held that his
"commandeering" of women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or
men or to enliven the entertainment held in their honor was not
treason even though the women and the entertainment helped to
make life more pleasant for the enemies and boost their spirit; he was
not guilty any more than the women themselves would have been if

Criminal Law

they voluntarily and willingly had surrendered their bodies or organized

the entertainment.
- Piracy
90.
People v. Catantan, G.R. No. 118075. September 5, 1997
Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as grave coercion
as penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls
squarely within the purview of piracy. While it may be true that Eugene
and Juan Jr. were compelled to go elsewhere other than their place of
destination, such compulsion was obviously part of the act of seizing
their boat.
Crimes Against Fundamental Laws of the State
- Arbitrary Detention
91.
People v. Flores, G.R. No. 116488. May 31, 2001
Arbitrary detention is committed by any public officer or employee
who, without legal grounds, detains a person. Since it is settled that
accused-appellants are public officers, the question that remains to be
resolved is whether or not the evidence adduced before the trial court
proved that Samson Sayam was arbitrarily detained by accusedappellants.
Jerry
Manlangit,
son
of
Carlito,
also
testified
for
the
proseuction. According to him, he and Samson Sayam went to
Barangay Tabu to have a sack of palay milled on September 29,
1992. At around six in the evening, while on their way home, they
passed by the store of Terry Cabrillos to buy kerosene. There, he saw
the four accused drinking beer. Samson Sayam told him to go home
because he had to show his residence certificate and barangay
clearance to accused-appellant Aaron Flores. Jerry Manlangit then
proceeded to his residence in Hacienda Shangrila, located about half a
kilometer away from the center of Barangay Tabu. Later, he told his
father that Samson Sayam stayed behind and asked him to fetch
Samson. He also testified that he heard gunshots coming from the
direction of the detachment headquarters.
The testimony of Jerry Manlangit does not prove any of the elements of
the crime of arbitrary detention. Neither does it support nor
corroborate the testimony of his father, Carlito, for they dealt on a
different set of facts. Jerry Manlangit did not see any of accusedappellant apprehend or detain Samson Sayam. He did not even see if
accused-appellant Flores really inspected the residence certificate and
barangay clearance of Samson Sayam. The rest of his testimony
comprised of hearsay evidence, which has no probative value. In

Criminal Law

summary, Jerry Manlangits testimony failed to establish that accusedappellants were guilty of arbitrary detention.
92.

People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1

When the accused is arrested on the sole basis of a verbal report, the
arrest without a warrant under Section 6(a) of Rule 113 is not lawful
and legal since the offense must also be committed in his presence or
within his view. It is not enough that there is reasonable ground to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime for an
essential precondition under the rule is that the crime must in fact or
actually have been committed first.
93.

Albor v. Aguis, A.M. No. P-01-1472, June 26, 2003

Respondent might have been motivated by a sincere desire to help the

accused and his relatives. But as an officer of the court, he should be
aware that by issuing such detention order, he trampled upon a
fundamental human right of the accused. Because of the unauthorized
order issued by respondent, the accused Edilberto Albior was deprived
of liberty without due process of law for a total of 56 days, counted
from his unlawful detention on January 27, 1999 until the issuance of
the appropriate order of commitment by the municipal judge on March
25, 1999.
- Expulsion
94.
Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil 778
The forcible taking of the women from Manila by officials of that city,
who handed them over to other parties and deposited them in a
distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as
effectively as if they had been imprisoned. There is no law expressly
authorizing the deportation of prostitutes to a new domicile against
their will and in fact Article 127 punishes public officials, not expressly
authorized by law or regulation, who compel any person to change his
residence.
- Search Warrants Maliciously Obtained
95.
Burgos v Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800
When the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper
publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive
materials, the application and/ or its supporting affidavits must contain
a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive
material he has published or intending to publish since mere
generalization will not suffice. Also, ownership is of no consequence

Criminal Law

and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is

directed has control or possession of the property sought to be seized.
Crimes Against Public Order
-Rebellion
96.
People v. Loverdioro, G.R. 112235, November 29, 1995
If no political motive is established and proved, the accused should
convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion. In cases
rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership in
organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not,
and of itself, suffice.
97.

be
of
an
by

People v. Geronimo, October 23, 1956 G.R. L-8936

Not every act of violence is deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion

solely because it was committed simultaneously with or in the course
of the rebellion. If the killing, robbing, etc. were done for private
purposes or profit, without any political motivation, the crime would be
separately punishable and would not be absorbed by the rebellion and
the individual misdeed could not be taken with the rebellion to
constitute a complex crime, for the constitutive acts and intent would
be unrelated to each other. The individual crime would not be a means
necessary for committing the rebellion, as it would not be done in
preparation or in furtherance of the latter.
- Sedition
98. People v. Hadji October 24, 1963 G.R. L-12686

The rule in this jurisdiction allows the treatment of the common

offenses of murder etc. as distinct and independent acts separable
from sedition. Where the acts of violence were deemed absorbed in the
crime of rebellion, the same does not apply in the crime of sedition.
-Inciting to Sedition
99. Mendoza v. People, G.R. L-2990, December 17 1951
A published writing which calls our government one of crooks
dishonest persons ("dirty") infested with Nazis and Fascists
dictators, and which reveals a tendency to produce dissatisfaction
feeling incompatible with the disposition to remain loyal to

and
i.e.
or a
the

Criminal Law

government, is a scurrilous libel against the Government. Any citizen

may criticize his government and government officials and submit his
criticism to the "free trade of ideas" but such criticism should be
specific and constructive, specifying particular objectionable actuations
of the government. It must be reasoned or tempered and not a
contemptuous condemnation of the entire government set-up.
Illegal Possession of Firearms
100. Celino v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170562, June 29, 2007
When the other offense is one of those enumerated under RA 8294,
any information for illegal possession of firearms should be quashed
because the illegal possession of firearm would have to be tried
together with such other offense, either considered as an aggravating
circumstance in murder or homicide, or absorbed as an element of
rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d etat and
conversely, when the other offense involved is not one of those
enumerated under RA 8294, then the separate case for illegal
possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted. The
constitutional bar against double jeopardy will not apply since these
offenses are quite different from one another, with the first punished
under the Revised Penal Code and the second under a special law.

R.A 10591, SEC. 29. Use of Loose Firearm in the Commission of

a Crime. The use of a loose firearm, when inherent in the
commission of a crime punishable under the Revised Penal
Code or other special laws, shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance: Provided, That if the crime
committed with the use of a loose firearm is penalized by the
law with a maximum penalty which is lower than that
prescribed in the preceding section for illegal possession of
firearm, the penalty for illegal possession of firearm shall be
imposed
in
lieu
of
the
penalty
for
the
crime
charged: Provided, further, That if the crime committed with
the use of a loose firearm is penalized by the law with a
maximum penalty which is equal to that imposed under the
preceding section for illegal possession of firearms, the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period shall be
imposed in addition to the penalty for the crime punishable

Criminal Law

under the Revised Penal Code or other special laws of which

he/she is found guilty.

If the violation of this Act is in furtherance of, or incident to, or

in connection with the crime of rebellion of insurrection, or
attempted coup d etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an
element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, or attempted
coup d etat.

If the crime is committed by the person without using the

loose firearm, the violation of this Act shall be considered as a
distinct and separate offense.
- Direct Assault
101. Justo v. Court of Appeals, 99 Phil 453

The character of person in authority is not assumed or laid off at will,

but attaches to a public official until he ceases to be in office.
Assuming that the complainant is not actually performing the duties of
his office when assaulted, this fact does not bar the existence of the
crime of assault upon a person in authority, so long as the impelling
motive of the attack is the performance of official duty. Also, where
there is a mutual agreement to fight, an aggression ahead of the
stipulated time and place would be unlawful since to hold otherwise
would be to sanction unexpected assaults contrary to all sense of
loyalty and fair play.

102. People v. Dollantes, June 30, 1987 G.R. 70639

When a barangay Captain is in the act of trying to pacify a person who
was making trouble in the dance hall, he is therefore killed while in the
performance of his duties. As the barangay captain, it was his duty to
enforce the laws and ordinances within the barangay and if in the
enforcement thereof, he incurs, the enmity of his people who
thereafter treacherously slew him, the crime committed is murder with
assault upon a person in authority.

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103. Gelig v. People, G.R. No. 173150, July 28, 2010

The prosecution adduced evidence to establish beyond
reasonable doubt the commission of the crime of direct
assault. The appellate court must be consequently overruled in
setting aside the trial courts verdict. It erred in declaring
that Lydia could not be held guilty of direct assault since
Gemma was no longer a person in authority at the time of the
assault because she allegedly descended to the level of a
private person by fighting with Lydia. The fact remains that at
the moment Lydia initiated her tirades, Gemma was busy
attending to her official functions as a teacher. She tried to
pacify Lydia by offering her a seat so that they could talk
properly, but Lydia refused and instead unleashed a barrage of
verbal invectives. WhenLydia continued with her abusive
behavior, Gemma merely retaliated in kind as would a similarly
situated person. Lydia aggravated the situation by slapping
Gemma and violently pushing her against a wall divider while
she was going to the principals office. No fault could therefore
be attributed to Gemma.
- Evasion of Service of Sentence
104. Pangan v. Gatbalite, G.R. No. 141718. January 21, 2005
Pursuant to Article 157 of the same Code, evasion of service of
sentence can be committed only by those who have been convicted by
final judgment by escaping during the term of his sentence.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal
parlance and for purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means
unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his custody. Clearly,
one who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have
escaped therefrom.
Crimes Against Public Interest
-Falsification
105. Galeos v. People, G.R. Nos. 174730-37, February 9, 2011

In this case, the required disclosure or identification of relatives within

the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity in the SALN involves
merely a description of such relationship; it does not call for an

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application of law in a particular set of facts. On the other hand,

Articles 963 to 967 of the Civil Code simply explain the concept of
proximity of relationship and what constitute direct and collateral lines
in relation to the rules on succession. The question of whether or not
persons are related to each other by consanguinity or affinity within
the fourth degree is one of fact. Contrary to petitioners assertion,
statements concerning relationship may be proved as to its truth or
falsity, and thus do not amount to expression of opinion. When a
government employee is required to disclose his relatives in the
government service, such information elicited therefore qualifies as a
narration of facts contemplated under Article 171 (4) of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. Further, it bears to stress that the untruthful
statements on relationship have no relevance to the employees
eligibility for the position but pertains rather to prohibition or
restriction imposed by law on the appointing power.

Since petitioner Galeos answered No to the question in his 1993 SALN

if he has relatives in the government service within the fourth degree
of consanguinity, he made an untruthful statement therein as in fact
he was related to Ong, who was then the municipal mayor, within the
fourth degree of consanguinity, he and Ong being first cousins (their
mothers are sisters). As to his 1994, 1995 and 1996 SALN, Galeos left
in blank the boxes for the answer to the similar query. In Dela Cruz v.
Mudlong, it was held that one is guilty of falsification in the
accomplishment of his information and personal data sheet if he
withholds material facts which would have affected the approval of his
appointment and/or promotion to a government position. By
withholding information on his relative/s in the government service as
required in the SALN, Galeos was guilty of falsification considering that
the disclosure of such relationship with then Municipal Mayor Ong
would have resulted in the disapproval of his permanent appointment
pursuant to Article 168 (j) (Appointments), Rule XXII of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A.
No. 7160)

106. Luagge v. CA, 112 SCRA 97

If the accused acted in good faith when she signed her spouse's name
to the checks and encashed them to pay for the expenses of the
spouses last illness and burial upon the belief that the accused is

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entitled to them and considering that the government sustained no

damage due to such encashment, criminal intent may not be ascribed,
and the accused should be acquitted to such crime.

107. People v. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120

If the falsification is resorted to for the purpose of hiding the

malversation, the falsification and malversation are separate offenses.
Thus, where the provincial treasurer, as the custodian of the money
forming part of the road and bridge fund, effected payments to his coaccused for construction materials supposedly delivered to the
province for various projects when in fact no such materials were
delivered, and to camouflage or conceal the defraudation, the accused
used six vouchers which had genuine features and which appear to be
extrinsically authentic but which were intrinsically fake, the crimes
committed are not complex but separate crimes of falsification and
malversation and the falsifications cannot be regarded as constituting
one continuing offense impelled by a single criminal impulse.
108. Tenenggee v. People, G.R. No. 179448, June 26, 2013
All the above-mentioned elements were established in this
case. First, petitioner is a private individual. Second, the acts
of falsification consisted in petitioners (1) counterfeiting or
imitating the handwriting or signature of Tan and causing it to
appear that the same is true and genuine in all respects; and
(2) causing it to appear that Tan has participated in an act or
proceeding when he did not in fact so participate. Third, the
falsification was committed in promissory notes and checks
which are commercial documents. Commercial documents are,
in general, documents or instruments which are "used by
merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or
credit transactions." Promissory notes facilitate credit
transactions while a check is a means of payment used in
business in lieu of money for convenience in business
transactions. A cashiers check necessarily facilitates bank
transactions for it allows the person whose name and
signature appear thereon to encash the check and withdraw
the amount indicated therein.
-Usurpation

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109. Ruzol v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 186739-960. April 17,

2013
We note that this case of usurpation against Ruzol rests principally on
the prosecutions theory that the DENR is the only government
instrumentality that can issue the permits to transport salvaged forest
products. The prosecution asserted that Ruzol usurped the official
functions that properly belong to the DENR.
But erstwhile discussed at length, the DENR is not the sole government
agency vested with the authority to issue permits relevant to the
transportation of salvaged forest products, considering that, pursuant
to the general welfare clause, LGUs may also exercise such authority.
Also, as can be gleaned from the records, the permits to transport were
meant to complement and not to replace the Wood Recovery Permit
issued by the DENR. In effect, Ruzol required the issuance of the
subject permits under his authority as municipal mayor and
independently of the official functions granted to the DENR. The
records are likewise bereft of any showing that Ruzol made
representations or false pretenses that said permits could be used in
lieu of, or at the least as an excuse not to obtain, the Wood Recovery
Permit from the DENR.
Crimes Relative to Opium and Other Prohibited Drugs
110. People v. Edgardo Fermin, G.R. No. 179344, August, 3, 2011
While Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Republic Act No. 9165 excuses non-compliance with the afore-quoted
procedure, the same holds true only for as long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officers. Here, the failure of the buy-bust team to comply
with the procedural requirements cannot be excused since there was a
break in the chain of custody of the substance taken from appellant. It
should be pointed out that the identity of the seized substance is
established by showing its chain of custody.

The following are the links that must be established in the chain of
custody in a buy-bust situation: first, the seizure and marking, if
practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by
the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover
by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist

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for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of

the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
111. People v. Chua 396 SCRA 657
The crime under consideration is malum prohibitum, hence, lack of
criminal intent or good faith does not exempt appellants from criminal
liability. Mere possession of a regulated drug without legal authority is
punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act.

112. Del Castillo v. People, G.R. No. 185128, January 30, 2012
While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized
should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is
issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is under
appellants control or possession. The CA, in its Decision, referred to the
possession of regulated drugs by the petitioner as a constructive one.
Constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion
and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise
dominion and control over the place where it is found. The records are
void of any evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in
question nor was it established that he used the said structure as a
shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used
the said structure due to the presence of electrical materials, the
petitioner being an electrician by profession.

113. David v. People, G.R. No. 181861, October 17, 2011

The deliberate elimination of the classification of dangerous drugs is
the main reason that under R.A. 9165, the possession of any kind of
dangerous drugs is now penalized under the same section. The
deliberations, however, do not address a case wherein an individual is
caught in possession of different kinds of dangerous drugs. In the
present case, petitioner was charged under two Informations, one for
illegal possession of six (6) plastic heat-sealed sachets containing
dried marijuanaleaves weighing more or less 3.865 grams and the
other for illegal possession of three (3) plastic heat-sealed sachets
containing shabu weighing more or less 0.327 gram.

114. People v. Sadablab, G.R. No. 186392, January 18, 2012

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As this Court held in People v. Berdadero,[27] the foregoing provision,

as well as the Internal Rules and Regulations implementing the same,
is silent as to the consequences of the failure on the part of the law
enforcers to seek the authority of the PDEA prior to conducting a buybust operation x x x. [T]his silence cannot be interpreted as a
legislative intent to make an arrest without the participation of PDEA
illegal or evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible.
[28] In the case at bar, even if we assume for the sake of argument
that Narciso Sabadlab and accused-appellant Marcos Sabadlab y
Narciso alias Bong Pango could have been different persons, the
established fact remains that it was accused-appellant who was caught
in flagrante delicto by the buy-bust team. Following the
aforementioned jurisprudence, even the lack of participation of PDEA
would not make accused-appellants arrest illegal or the evidence
obtained pursuant thereto inadmissible. Neither is prior surveillance a
necessity for the validity of the buy-bust operation.

115. People v. Amansec, G.R. No. 186131, December 14, 2011

The failure of the police officers to use ultraviolet powder on the buybust money is not an indication that the buy-bust operation was a
sham. The use of initials to mark the money used in [a] buy-bust
operation has been accepted by this Court.

116. People v. Dequina, G.R. No. 177570, January 19, 2011

Transport as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean
to carry or convey from one place to another. The evidence in this case
shows that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants were
caught in flagrante carrying/transporting dried marijuana leaves in
their traveling bags. PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco need not even
open Dequinas traveling bag to determine its content because when
the latter noticed the police officers presence, she walked briskly away
and in her hurry, accidentally dropped her traveling bag, causing the
zipper to open and exposed the dried marijuana bricks therein. Since a
crime was then actually being committed by the accused-appellants,
their warrantless arrest was legally justified, and the following
warantless search of their traveling bags was allowable as incidental to
their lawful arrest.

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117. People v. Dumalag, G.R. No. 180514, April 17, 2013

It has already been settled that the failure of police officers to mark the
items seized from an accused in illegal drugs cases immediately upon
its confiscation at the place of arrest does not automatically impair the
integrity of the chain of custody and render the confiscated items
inadmissible in evidence. In People v. Resurreccion, the Court explained
that "marking" of the seized items "immediately after seizure and
confiscation" may be undertaken at the police station rather than at
the place of arrest for as long as it is done in the presence of an
accused in illegal drugs cases. It was further emphasized that what is
of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
118. People v. Laylo, G.R. No. 192235, July 6, 2011
PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor testified that they were the poseur-buyers in
the sale. Both positively identified appellant as the seller of the
substance contained in plastic sachets which were found to be positive
for shabu. The same plastic sachets were likewise identified by the
prosecution witnesses when presented in court. Even the consideration
of P200.00 for each sachet had been made known by appellant to the
police officers. However, the sale was interrupted when the police
officers introduced themselves as cops and immediately arrested
appellant and his live-in partner Ritwal. Thus, the sale was not
consummated but merely attempted. Thus, appellant was charged with
attempted sale of dangerous drugs.
Crimes Against Public Morals
- Immoral Doctrines, Obscene Publications and Exhibits
119. Fernando v. CA, December 6, 2006 G.R. No. 159751
To be held liable for obscenity, the prosecution must prove that (a) the
materials, publication, picture or literature are obscene; and (b) the
offender sold, exhibited, published or gave away such materials; that
which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency.
A picture being obscene or indecent must depend upon the
circumstances of the case, and that ultimately, the question is to be
decided by the judgment of the aggregate sense of the community
reached by it. It is an issue proper for judicial determination and should
be treated on a case to case basis and on the judges sound discretion.
-AntiTrafficking Persons Act
120. People v. Lali y Purih, G.R. No. 195419, October 12, 2011

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The testimony of Aringoys niece, Rachel, that Lolita had been travelling
to Malaysia to work in bars cannot be given credence. Lolita did not
even have a passport to go to Malaysia and had to use her sisters
passport when Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos first recruited her. It is
questionable how she could have been travelling to Malaysia
previously without a passport, as Rachel claims. Moreover, even if it is
true that Lolita had been travelling to Malaysia to work in bars, the
crime of Trafficking in Persons can exist even with the victims consent
or knowledge under Section 3(a) of RA 9208.

Trafficking in Persons under Sections 3(a) and 4 of RA 9208 is not only

limited to transportation of victims, but also includes the act of
recruitment of victims for trafficking. In this case, since it has been
sufficiently proven beyond reasonable doubt, as discussed in Criminal
Case No. 21930, that all the three accused (Aringoy, Lalli and
Relampagos) conspired and confederated with one another to illegally
recruit Lolita to become a prostitute in Malaysia, it follows that they are
also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified
Trafficking in Persons committed by a syndicate under RA 9208
because the crime of recruitment for prostitution also constitutes
trafficking.
Crimes Committed by Public Officers
- Malversation
121. Torres v. People, G.R. No. 175074, August 31, 2011

Malversation may be committed either through a positive act of

misappropriation of public funds or property, or passively through
negligence. To sustain a charge of malversation, there must either be
criminal intent or criminal negligence, and while the prevailing facts of
a case may not show that deceit attended the commission of the
offense, it will not preclude the reception of evidence to prove the
existence of negligence because both are equally punishable under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.

More in point, the felony involves breach of public trust, and whether it

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is committed through deceit or negligence, the law makes it

punishable and prescribes a uniform penalty therefor. Even when the
Information charges willful malversation, conviction for malversation
through negligence may still be adjudged if the evidence ultimately
proves the mode of commission of the offense.

122. Cua v. People, G.R. No. 166847, November 16, 2011

This Court has held that to justify conviction for malversation of public
funds or property, the prosecution has only to prove that the accused
received public funds or property and that he could not account for
them, or did not have them in his possession and could not give a
reasonable excuse for their disappearance. An accountable public
officer may be convicted of malversation even if there is no direct
evidence of misappropriation, and the only evidence is that there is a
shortage in his accounts which he has not been able to satisfactorily
explain.

In the present case, considering that the shortage was duly proven by
the prosecution, petitioners retaliation against the BIR for not
promoting him clearly does not constitute a satisfactory or reasonable
explanation for his failure to account for the missing amount.

123. Labatagos v. Sandiganbayan, 183 SCRA 415

When a collecting officer of a government institution assigns his or her
work to another without the former being the one to misappropriate a
government fund or property malversation may still be at hand.
Malversation consists not only in misappropriation or converting public
funds or property to ones personal use but also by knowingly allowing
others to make use of them.
-Technical Malversation
124. Parungao v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 96025, May 15, 1991

In malversation of public funds, the offender misappropriates public

funds for his own personal use or allows any other person to take such

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public funds for the latter's personal use. In technical malversation, the
public officer applies public funds under his administration not for his
or another's personal use, but to a public use other than that for which
the fund was appropriated by law or ordinance.
Technical malversation is, therefore, not included in nor does it
necessarily include the crime of malversation of public funds charged
in the information.

125. Abdulla v. People, G.R. No. 150129, April 6, 2005

The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation for salary

differentials of secondary school teachers of the Sulu State College in
RA 6688. The third element of the crime of technical malversation
which requires that the public fund used should have been
appropriated by law, is therefore absent. The authorization given by
the Department of Budget and Management for the use of the forty
thousand pesos (P40,000.00) allotment for payment of salary
differentials of 34 secondary school teachers is not an ordinance or law
contemplated in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code.
-Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019)
126. Ambil Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 175457, July 6, 2011

In drafting the Anti-Graft Law, the lawmakers opted to use private

party rather than private person to describe the recipient of the
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference for a reason. The term
party is a technical word having a precise meaning in legal parlance as
distinguished from person which, in general usage, refers to a human
being. Thus, a private person simply pertains to one who is not a public
officer. While a private party is more comprehensive in scope to mean
either a private person or a public officer acting in a private capacity to
protect his personal interest.
In the present case, when petitioners transferred Mayor Adalim from
the provincial jail and detained him at petitioner Ambil, Jr.s residence,
they accorded such privilege to Adalim, not in his official capacity as a
mayor, but as a detainee charged with murder. Thus, for purposes of
applying the provisions of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, Adalim was a
private party.

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127. Alvarez v. People, G.R. No. 192591, June 29, 2011

Despite APIs obvious lack of financial qualification and absence of basic

terms and conditions in the submitted proposal, petitioner who chaired
the PBAC, recommended the approval of APIs proposal just forty-five
(45) days after the last publication of the invitation for comparative
proposals, and subsequently requested the SB to pass a resolution
authorizing him to enter into a MOA with API as the lone bidder for the
project. It was only in the MOA that the details of the construction,
terms and conditions of the parties obligations, were laid down at the
time API was already awarded the project. Even the MOA provisions
remain vague as to the parameters of the project, which the
Sandiganbayan found as placing API at an arbitrary position where it
can do as it pleases without being accountable to the municipality in
any way whatsoever. True enough, when API failed to execute the
construction works and abandoned the project, the municipality found
itself at extreme disadvantage without recourse to a performance
security that API likewise failed to submit.

128. Plameras v. People, G.R. No. 187268, September 4, 2013

As correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan, certain established rules,

regulations and policies of the Commission on Audit and those
mandated under the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160)
were knowingly sidestepped and ignored by the petitioner which
enabled CKL Enterprises/Dela Cruz to successfully get full payment for
the school desks and armchairs, despite non-delivery an act or
omission evidencing bad faith and manifest partiality.

129. Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 187340, August 14, 2013

In the present case, petitioner is solely charged with violating Section

3(e) of R.A. 3019. He is being held liable for gross and inexcusable
negligence in performing the duties primarily vested in him by law,
resulting in undue injury to private complainant. The good faith of

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heads of offices in signing a document will only be appreciated if they,

with trust and confidence, have relied on their subordinates in whom
the duty is primarily lodged. Moreover, the undue injury to private
complainant was established.

The cutting down of her palm trees and the construction of the canal
were all done without her approval and consent. As a result, she lost
income from the sale of the palm leaves. She also lost control and use
of a part of her land. The damage to private complainant did not end
with the canals construction. Informal settlers dirtied her private
property by using the canal constructed thereon as their lavatory,
washroom, and waste disposal site.

130. Go v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172602, April 13, 2007

As early as in 1970, through the erudite Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Luciano

v. Estrella, the Court had ascertained the scope of Section 3(g) of RA
3019 as applying to both public officers and private persons: x x x
[T]he act treated thereunder [referring to Section 3(g) of RA 3019]
partakes the nature of malum prohibitum; it is the commission of that
act as defined by law, not the character or effect thereof, that
determines whether or not the provision has been violated. And this
construction would be in consonance with the announced purpose for
which Republic Act 3019 was enacted, which is the repression of
certain acts of public officers and private persons constituting graft or
corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.

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131. Caunan v. People, G.R. Nos. 181999 & 182001-04, September 2, 2009
In finding that the walis tingting purchase contracts were grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government, the Sandiganbayan
relied on the COAs finding of overpricing which was, in turn, based on
the special audit teams report. The audit teams conclusion on the
standard price of a walis tingting was pegged on the basis of the
following documentary and object evidence: (1) samples of walis
tingting without handle actually used by the street sweepers; (2)
survey forms on the walis tingting accomplished by the street
sweepers; (3) invoices from six merchandising stores where the audit
team purchased walis tingting; (4) price listing of the DBM Procurement
Service; and (5) documents relative to the walis tingting purchases of
Las Pias City. These documents were then compared with the
documents furnished by petitioners and the other accused relative to
Paraaque Citys walis tingting transactions.
Notably, however, and this the petitioners have consistently pointed
out, the evidence of the prosecution did not include a signed price
quotation from the walis tingting suppliers of Paraaque City. In fact,
even the walis tingting furnished the audit team by petitioners and the
other accused was different from the walis tingting actually utilized by
the Paraaque City street sweepers at the time of ocular inspection by
the audit team. At the barest minimum, the evidence presented by the
prosecution, in order to substantiate the allegation of overpricing,
should have been identical to the walis tingting purchased in 19961998. Only then could it be concluded that the walis tingting purchases
were disadvantageous to the government because only then could a
determination have been made to show that the disadvantage was so
manifest and gross as to make a public official liable under Section 3(g)
of R.A. No. 3019.
132. Trieste v. Sandiganbayan, 146 SCRA 508
An official involved need not dispose of his shares in a corporation as
long as he does not do anything for the firm in its contract with
another. The matter contemplated in Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law
is the actual intervention in the transaction in which one has financial
or pecuniary interest in order that liability may attach.
-Anti-Plunder Act
133. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, Nov. 2, 2001

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The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous

offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are
inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does
not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially
since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in
se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as
though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing
Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without
regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.

134. Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 170122, October12, 2009

Nowhere in RA 7080 can we find any provision that would indicate a
repeal, expressly or impliedly, of RA 1379. RA 7080 is a penal statute
which, at its most basic, aims to penalize the act of any public officer
who by himself or in connivance with members of his family amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of
at least PhP 50 million. On the other hand, RA 1379 is not penal in
nature, in that it does not make a crime the act of a public official
acquiring during his incumbency an amount of property manifestly out
of proportion of his salary and other legitimate income. RA 1379 aims
to enforce the right of the State to recover the properties which were
not lawfully acquired by the officer.
Crimes Against Persons
Parricide
135. People v. Sales, G.R. No. 177218, October 3, 2011
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is
killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or
other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused.
In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove the first
element, that is, a person was killed. Maria testified that her son
Noemar did not regain consciousness after the severe beating he
suffered from the hands of his father. Thereafter, a quack doctor
declared Noemar dead. Afterwards, as testified to by Maria, they held a
wake for Noemar the next day and then buried him the day after.
Noemars Death Certificate was also presented in evidence.
136.

People v. De la Cruz, February 11, 2010 G.R. No. 187683

Criminal Law

In the case of Parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship

between the accused and the deceased would be the marriage
certificate. In this case, the testimony of the accused that he was
married to the victim, in itself, is ample proof of such relationship as
the testimony can be taken as an admission against penal
interest. Clearly, then, it was established that Victoriano and Anna
were husband and wife.
Death under Exceptional Circumstances
137.
People v. Abarca, G.R. No. 74433, Sept.14, 1987
There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her
paramour, the victim in this case, in the act of illicit copulation, as a
result of which, he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate
outburst. Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a
legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of
them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. These
elements are present in this case. The trial court, in convicting the
accused-appellant of murder, therefore erred.

Murder
138.
People v. Peteluna, G.R. No. 187048, January 23, 2013
To be convicted of murder, the following must be established: (1) a
person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was with
the attendance of any of the qualifying circumstances under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) the killing neither constitutes
parricide nor infanticide.
139.
Aguilar v DOJ, G.R. No. 197522, September 11, 2013
Records bear out facts and circumstances which show that the
elements of murder namely: (a) that a person was killed; (b) that the
accused killed him; (c) that the killing was attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (d)
that the killing is not parricide or infanticide are, in all reasonable
likelihood, present in Dangupons case. As to the first and second
elements, Dangupon himself admitted that he shot and killed Tetet.
Anent the third element, there lies sufficient basis to suppose that the
qualifying circumstance of treachery attended Tetets killing in view of
the undisputed fact that he was restrained by respondents and
thereby, rendered defenseless. Finally, with respect to the fourth
element, Tetets killing can neither be considered as parricide nor
infanticide as the evidence is bereft of any indication that Tetet is
related to Dangupon.

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140.
People v. Galicia, G.R. No. 191063, October 9, 2013
Since the crime has already been qualified to murder by the attendant
circumstance of treachery, the other proven circumstance of evident
premeditation should be appreciated as a generic aggravating
circumstance. In this case, it was clearly shown that the two accused
who were "riding in tandem" hatched the means on how to carry out
and facilitate the commission of the crime. The time that had elapsed
while the accused were waiting for their victim to pass by, is indicative
of cool thought and reflection on their part that they clung to their
determination to commit the crime; hence evident premeditation is
duly proved.
Homicide
141.
Abella v. People, G.R. No. 198400, October 7, 2013
In cases of frustrated homicide, the main element is the accuseds
intent to take his victims life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly
and convincingly to exclude every possible doubt regarding homicidal
intent. And the intent to kill is often inferred from, among other things,
the means the offender used and the nature, location, and number of
wounds he inflicted on his victim.
142.
Escamilla v. People, G.R. No. 188551, February 27, 2013
The intent to kill was shown by the continuous firing at the victim even
after he was hit.
Anti-Hazing Law
143.
Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258, February 1, 2012
In Vedaa v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate Justice (now
retired Chief Justice) Hilario Davide that in our nations very recent
history, the people have spoken, through Congress, to deem conduct
constitutive of hazing, [an] act[] previously considered harmless by
custom, as criminal. Although it may be regarded as a simple obiter
dictum, the statement nonetheless shows recognition that hazing or
the conduct of initiation rites through physical and/or psychological
suffering has not been traditionally criminalized. Prior to the 1995 AntiHazing Law, there was to some extent a lacuna in the law; hazing was
not clearly considered an intentional felony. And when there is doubt
on the interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of
the accused. In dubio pro reo.
For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is
constrained to rule against the trial courts finding of malicious intent to
inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no proof beyond

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reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent to inflict physical

injuries or animus iniuriandi as required in mala in se cases,
considering the contextual background of his death, the unique nature
of hazing, and absent a law prohibiting hazing.
The accused fraternity members guilty of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean,
however, that the accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of
criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that
are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof,
there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Unintentional Abortion
144.
People v. Salufrania, G.R. No. L-50884, March 30, 1988
The Solicitor General's brief makes it appear that appellant intended to
cause an abortion because he boxed his pregnant wife on the stomach
which caused her to fall and then strangled her. We find that
appellant's intent to cause an abortion has not been sufficiently
established. Mere boxing on the stomach, taken together with the
immediate strangling of the victim in a fight, is not sufficient proof to
show an intent to cause an abortion. In fact, appellant must have
merely intended to kill the victim but not necessarily to cause an
abortion.
Mutilation
145.
Aguirre v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 170723, March 3,
2008
A straightforward scrutiny of the above provision shows that the
elements of mutilation under the first paragraph of Art. 262 of the
Revised Penal Code to be 1) that there be a castration, that is,
mutilation of organs necessary for generation; and 2) that the
mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately, that is, to deprive the
offended party of some essential organ for reproduction. According to
the public prosecutor, the facts alleged did not amount to the crime of
mutilation as defined and penalized above, i.e., [t]he vasectomy
operation did not in any way deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive
organ, which is still very much part of his physical self. Petitioner Gloria
Aguirre, however, would want this Court to make a ruling that bilateral
vasectomy constitutes the crime of mutilation. This we cannot do, for
such an interpretation would be contrary to the intentions of the
framers of our penal code.
Less serious physical injuries

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146.
Pentecostes v. People, G.R. No. 167766, April 7, 2010
Petitioner only shot the victim once and did not hit any vital part of the
latters body. If he intended to kill him, petitioner could have shot the
victim multiple times or even ran him over with the car. Favorably to
petitioner, the inference that intent to kill existed should not be drawn
in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove this fact beyond
reasonable doubt. When such intent is lacking but wounds are inflicted
upon the victim, the crime is not attempted murder but physical
injuries only. Since the Medico-Legal Certificate issued by the doctor
who attended Rudy stated that the wound would only require ten (10)
days of medical attendance, and he was, in fact, discharged the
following day, the crime committed is less serious physical injuries
only. The less serious physical injury suffered by Rudy is defined under
Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that "(A)ny
person who inflicts upon another physical injuries not described as
serious physical injuries but which shall incapacitate the offended party
for labor for ten (10) days or more, or shall require medical attendance
for the same period, shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor."
Rape
147.
People v. Orita, G.R. No. 170723, March 3, 2008
For the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential.
Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ without rupture of the
hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction.
Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female
organ because although the offender has commenced the commission
of a felony directly by overt acts, not all acts of execution was
performed.
148.
People v. Achas, G.R. No. 185712, August 4, 2009
The absence of external signs or physical injuries on the complainants
body does not necessarily negate the commission of rape. This is
because hymenal laceration is not an element of the crime of rape,
albeit a healed or fresh laceration is a compelling proof of defloration.
149.
People v. Cruz, G.R. No. 186129, August 4, 2009
Most important in a prosecution for statutory rape is to prove the
following elements: 1. that the accused had carnal knowledge with a
woman; and (2) that the woman was below 12 years of age. These
elements were sufficiently established during trial and were not
rebutted by the defense with any solid evidence to the contrary.
150.
De Castro v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 155041, February 14,
2007
Petitioner insists that a finger does not constitute an object or

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instrument in contemplation of RA 8353. The insertion of ones finger

into the genital of another constitutes rape through sexual assault.
Hence, the prosecutor did not err in charging petitioner with the crime
of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
151.
People v. Penilla, G.R. No. 189324, March 20, 2013
In rape cases, the moral character of the victim is immaterial. Physical
resistance need not be established in rape when threats and
intimidation are employed, and the victim submits herself to her
attacker because of fear. Physical resistance is not an essential
element of rape. Also, delay in revealing the commission of a crime
such as rape does not necessarily render such charge unworthy of
belief. This is because the victim may choose to keep quiet rather than
expose her defilement to the cruelty of public scrutiny. Only when the
delay is unreasonable or unexplained may it work to discredit the
complainant. Neither does an inconclusive medical report negate the
finding of rape. A medical examination of the victim is not
indispensable in a prosecution for rape inasmuch as the victims
testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused of the
crime and the medical certificate will then be rendered as merely
corroborative.
152.

People v. Funesto, G.R. No. 182237, August 3, 2011

In the present case, the prosecution failed to present any certificate of

live birth or any similar authentic document to prove the age of AAA
when she was sexually violated.Neither did the appellant expressly
admit AAAs age.
This conclusion notwithstanding, we find that the prosecution
sufficiently proved that force and intimidation attended the
commission of the crime, as alleged in the Information. Jurisprudence
firmly holds that the force or violence required in rape cases is relative;
it does not need to be overpowering or irresistible; it is present when it
allows the offender to consummate his purpose. In this case, the
appellant employed that amount of force sufficient to consummate
rape. In fact, the medical findings confirmed AAAs non-virgin state.
Thus, the appellant is guilty of simple rape under Article 335(2) of the
Revised Penal Code, and was properly sentenced with the penalty
of reclusion perpetua

153.

People v. Dahilig G.R. No. 187083, June 13, 2011

As elucidated by the RTC and the CA in their respective decisions, all

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the elements of both crimes are present in this case. The case
of People v. Abay, however, is enlightening and instructional on this
issue. It was stated in that case that if the victim is 12 years or older,
the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph
1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be
accused of both crimes for the same act because his right against
double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice
to criminal liability for a single criminal act.

154.

People v. Laog, G.R. No. 178321, October 5, 2011

In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term

homicide is to be understood in its generic sense, and includes murder
and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on occasion of the
rape. Hence, even if any or all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse
of superior strength and evident premeditation) alleged in the
information have been duly established by the prosecution, the same
would not qualify the killing to murder and the crime committed by
appellant is still rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery with
homicide, the aggravating circumstance of treachery is to be
considered as a generic aggravating circumstance only.

155.

People v. Cadellada, G.R. No. 189293, July 10, 2013

A father who rapes his own minor daughter do not need to use any
physical force or intimidation because in rape committed by a close
kin, such as the victim's father, it is not necessary that actual force or
intimidation be employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes the
place of violence or intimidation.
Anti Child Abuse Law
156.

Garingarao v. People, G.R. No. 192760, July 20, 2011

In this case, the prosecution established that Garingarao touched AAAs

breasts and inserted his finger into her private part for his sexual
gratification. Garingarao used his influence as a nurse by pretending
that his actions were part of the physical examination he was doing.
Garingarao persisted on what he was doing despite AAAs objections.

Criminal Law

AAA twice asked Garingarao what he was doing and he answered that
he was just examining her.
The Court has ruled that a child is deemed subject to other sexual
abuse when the child is the victim of lascivious conduct under the
coercion or influence of any adult.16 In lascivious conduct under the
coercion or influence of any adult, there must be some form of
compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise
of the offended partys free will.17 In this case, Garingarao coerced AAA
into submitting to his lascivious acts by pretending that he was
examining her.

157.

Roallos v. People, 198389, December 11, 2013

Roallos assertion that he is not liable for sexual abuse under Section
5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 since AAA is not a child engaged in
prostitution is plainly without merit. "[T]he law covers not only a
situation in which a child is abused for profit but also one in which a
child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in any lascivious
conduct. The very title of Section 5, Article III (Child Prostitution and
Other Sexual Abuse) of R.A. No. 7610 shows that it applies not only to a
child subjected to prostitution but also to a child subjected to other
sexual abuse. A child is deemed subjected to "other sexual abuse"
when he or she indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or
influence of any adult.
Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security
Kidnapping
158.
People v. Muit, G.R. No. 181043, October 8, 2008
The elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
are the following: (a) the accused is a private individual; (b) the
accused kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the
latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and
(d) the commission of the offense, any of the four circumstances
mentioned in Article 267 is present. The totality of the prosecutions
evidence in this case established the commission of kidnapping for
ransom with homicide.
159.
People v. Niegas, G.R. No. 194582, November 27, 2013
If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the
duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is
kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom,
the duration of his detention is immaterial.

Criminal Law

160.
People v. Baluya y Notarte, G.R. No. 181822, April 13,
2011
Appellant's arguments that the victim is free to go home if he wanted
to because he was not confined, detained or deprived of his liberty and
that there is no evidence to show that Glodil sustained any injury,
cannot hold water. The CA is correct in holding that for kidnapping to
exist, it is not necessary that the offender kept the victim in an
enclosure or treated him harshly. Where the victim in a kidnapping
case is a minor, it becomes even more irrelevant whether the offender
forcibly restrained the victim. As discussed above, leaving a child in a
place from which he did not know the way home, even if he had the
freedom to roam around the place of detention, would still amount to
deprivation of liberty. For under such a situation, the childs freedom
remains at the mercy and control of the abductor. It remains
undisputed that it was his first time to reach Novaliches and that he
did not know his way home from the place where he was left. It just so
happened that the victim had the presence of mind that, when he saw
an opportunity to escape, he ran away from the place where appellant
left him. Moreover, he is intelligent enough to read the signboards of
the passenger jeepneys he saw and follow the route of the ones going
to his place of residence.

161.

People v. Jacalne, G.R. No. 168552, October 3, 2011

The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the

victims liberty, coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it. It
includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the
deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of
time. It involves a situation where the victim cannot go out of the place
of confinement or detention, or is restricted or impeded in his liberty to
move.

In this case, appellant dragged Jomarie, a minor, to his house after the
latter refused to go with him. Upon reaching the house, he tied her
hands. When Jomarie pleaded that she be allowed to go home, he
refused. Although Jomarie only stayed outside the house, it was inside
the gate of a fenced property which is high enough such that people
outside could not see what happens inside. Moreover, when appellant
tied the hands of Jomarie, the formers intention to deprive Jomarie of

Criminal Law

her liberty has been clearly shown. For there to be kidnapping, it is

enough that the victim is restrained from going home. Because of her
tender age, and because she did not know her way back home, she
was then and there deprived of her liberty. This is irrespective of the
length of time that she stayed in such a situation. It has been
repeatedly held that if the victim is a minor, the duration of his
detention is immaterial. This notwithstanding the fact also that
appellant, after more or less one hour, released Jomarie and instructed
her on how she could go home.

162.

People v. Mirandilla, Jr., G.R. No. 186417 July 27, 2011

Notably, however, no matter how many rapes had been committed in

the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime
is only one kidnapping with rape. This is because these composite acts
are regarded as a single indivisible offense as in fact R.A. No. 7659
punishes these acts with only one single penalty. In a way, R.A. 7659
depreciated the seriousness of rape because no matter how many
times the victim was raped, like in the present case, there is only one
crime committed the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape.

However, for the crime of kidnapping with rape, as in this case, the
offender should not have taken the victim with lewd designs,
otherwise, it would be complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. In
People v. Garcia, we explained that if the taking was by forcible
abduction and the woman was raped several times, the crimes
committed is one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, in as
much as the forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape;
and each of the other counts of rape constitutes distinct and separate
count of rape.
Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor
163.
People v. Marquez, G.R. No. 181440, April 13, 2011
It is clear from the records of the case that Marquez was entrusted with
the custody of Justine. Whether this is due to Meranos version of
Marquez borrowing Justine for the day, or due to Marquezs version that
Merano left Justine at her house, it is undeniable that in both versions,
Marquez agreed to the arrangement, i.e., to temporarily take custody
of Justine. It does not matter, for the first element to be present, how
long said custody lasted as it cannot be denied that Marquez was the

Criminal Law

one entrusted with the custody of the minor Justine. Thus, the first
element of the crime is satisfied.
As to the second element, neither party disputes that on September 6,
1998, the custody of Justine was transferred or entrusted to Marquez.
Whether this lasted for months or only for a couple of days, the fact
remains that Marquez had, at one point in time, physical and actual
custody of Justine. Marquezs deliberate failure to return Justine, a
minor at that time, when demanded to do so by the latters mother,
shows that the second element is likewise undoubtedly present in this
case.
Grave Threats
164.
Caluag v. People, 171511, March 4, 2009
In grave threats, the wrong threatened amounts to a crime which may
or may not be accompanied by a condition. Considering the mauling
incident which transpired earlier between petitioner and Julias
husband, petitioners act of pointing a gun at Julias forehead clearly
enounces a threat to kill or to inflict serious physical injury on her
person which constituted grave threat.
Grave Coercion
165.
Alejandro v. Bernas, G.R. No. 179243, September 7, 2011
We find that the mere presence of the security guards is insufficient to
cause intimidation to the petitioners.
There is intimidation when one of the parties is compelled by a
reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon
his person or property, or upon the person or property of his spouse,
descendants or ascendants, to give his consent. Material violence is
not indispensable for there to be intimidation. Intense fear produced in
the mind of the victim which restricts or hinders the exercise of the will
is sufficient.
In this case, petitioners claim that respondents padlocked the Unit and
cut off the facilities in the presence of security guards. As aptly held by
the CA, it was not alleged that the security guards committed anything
to intimidate petitioners, nor was it alleged that the guards were not
customarily stationed there and that they produced fear on the part of
petitioners. To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex
and condition of the person shall be borne in mind. Here, the
petitioners who were allegedly intimidated by the guards are all

Criminal Law

lawyers who presumably know their rights. The presence of the guards
in fact was not found by petitioners to be significant because they
failed to mention it in their Joint Affidavit-Complaint. What they insist is
that, the mere padlocking of the Unit prevented them from using it for
the purpose for which it was intended. This, according to the
petitioners, is grave coercion on the part of respondents.
166.

People v. Astorga, G.R. No. 110097. December 22, 1997

This narration does not adequately establish actual confinement or

restraint of the victim, which is the primary element of
kidnapping. 31 Appellant's apparent intention was to take Yvonne
against her will towards the direction of Tagum. Appellant's plan did not
materialize, however, because Fabila's group chanced upon them. The
evidence does not show that appellant wanted to detain Yvonne; much
less, that he actually detained her. Appellant's forcible dragging of
Yvonne to a place only he knew cannot be said to be an actual
confinement or restriction on the person of Yvonne. There was no
"lockup." Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of kidnapping
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
Rather, the felony committed in this case is grave coercion under
Article 286 of the same code. Grave coercion or coaccion grave has
three elements: (a) that any person is prevented by another from doing
something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against
his or her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or
compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or such a
display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control
over the will of the offended party; and (c) that the person who
restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so or, in
other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of a law or
in the exercise of any lawful right. When appellant forcibly dragged and
slapped Yvonne, he took away her right to go home to Binuangan.
Appellant presented no justification for preventing Yvonne from going
home, and we cannot find any.
167.
Consulta v. People, G.R. No. 179462, February 12, 2009
The difference in robbery and grave coercion lies in the intent in the
commission of the act. The motives of the accused are the prime
criterion:

Criminal Law

The distinction between the two lines of decisions, the one holding to
robbery and the other to coercion, is deemed to be the intention of the
accused. Was the purpose with intent to gain to take the property of
another by use of force or intimidation? Then, conviction for robbery.
Was the purpose, without authority of law but still believing himself the
owner or the creditor, to compel another to do something against his
will and to seize property? Then, conviction for coercion under Article
497 of the Penal Code. The motives of the accused are the prime
criterion. And there was no common robber in the present case, but a
man who had fought bitterly for title to his ancestral estate, taking the
law into his own hands and attempting to collect what he thought was
due him. Animus furandi was lacking.
Unjust Vexation
168.
Maderazo v. People, G.R. No. 165065, September 26,
2006
Although Verutiao was not at her stall when it was unlocked, and the
contents thereof taken from the stall and brought to the police station,
the crime of unjust vexation was nevertheless committed. For the
crime to exist, it is not necessary that the offended party be present
when the crime was committed by said petitioners. It is enough that
the private complainant was embarrassed, annoyed, irritated or
disturbed when she learned of the overt acts of the petitioners. Indeed,
by their collective acts, petitioners evicted Verutiao from her stall and
prevented her from selling therein, hence, losing income from the
business. Verutiao was deprived of her possession of the stall from
January 21, 1997.
Anti-Wire Tapping Act
169.
Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 145 SCRA 112
(1986)
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a
dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of
RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the
wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case
was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for
ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to
determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and
phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered
in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.
170.
Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93833, Sept. 28,
1995

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Petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations"
narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point
of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin
word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting,
as in a conversation, or signifies the "process by which meanings or
thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of
symbols (as language signs or gestures)" 16 These definitions are broad
enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive
communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include
the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between
petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office.
Crimes Against Property
Robbery with Homicide
171.
People v. Comiling, G.R. No. 140405, March 4, 2004
The rule is, whenever homicide is committed as a consequence or on
the occasion of a robbery, all those who take part as principals in the
robbery will also be held guilty as principals of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide.
While we are convinced that appellants are guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of robbery with homicide, we cannot impose the penalty of
death on them. Under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, the
crime of robbery carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. In
imposing the death penalty, the trial court appreciated the aggravating
circumstances of band, evident premeditation, craft and disguise
against appellants. However, these circumstances were not specifically
alleged in the information as required under Rule 110, Section 8 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Hence, inasmuch as no
aggravating and mitigating circumstances can be deemed to have
attended the commission of the offense, the lower penalty of reclusion
perpetua should be imposed on them.
172.

People v. Hijada, G.R. No. 123696, Mar. 11, 2004

There is no crime of Robbery with Multiple Homicide under the Revised

Penal Code. The crime is Robbery with Homicide notwithstanding the
number of homicides committed on the occasion of the robbery and
even if murder, physical injuries and rape were also committed on the
same occasion.

Criminal Law

173.

People v. Diu, G.R. No. 201449, April 3, 2013

In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor

is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by
reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the
taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or
after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or
distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons
intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken into
consideration. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery
and homicide, must be consummated.

It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or

that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that
two or more persons are killed or that aside from the homicide, rape,
intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by
reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact
that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still
be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the
occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with
homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of
the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery
with homicide. The word "homicide" is used in its generic sense.
Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide. When
homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all
those who took part as principals in the robbery would also be held
liable as principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery with
homicide although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless
it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the same. If a
robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the
commission of the robbery, he is guilty only of robbery and not of
robbery with homicide. All those who conspire to commit robbery with
homicide are guilty as principals of such crime, although not all
profited and gained from the robbery. One who joins a criminal
conspiracy adopts the criminal designs of his co-conspirators and can
no longer repudiate the conspiracy once it has materialized.

174.

People v. Barra, G.R. No. 198020, July 10, 2013

In the present case, the crime of robbery remained unconsummated

because the victim refused to give his money to appellant and no

Criminal Law

personal property was shown to have been taken. It was for this reason
that the victim was shot. Accused can only be found guilty of
attempted robbery with homicide. The fact of asportation must be
established beyond reasonable doubt. Since this fact was not duly
established, accused should be held liable only for the crime of
attempted robbery with homicide.
Robbery with Rape
175.
People v. Gallo, G.R. No. 181902, August 31, 2011
For a conviction of the crime of robbery with rape to stand, it must be
shown that the rape was committed by reason or on the occasion of
a robbery and not the other way around. This special complex crime
under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code contemplates a situation
where the original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to
gain, personal property belonging to another and rape is committed on
the occasion thereof or as an accompanying crime. In the case at bar,
the original intent of the appellant and his co-accused was to rob the
victims and AAA was raped on the occasion of the robbery.
176.

People v. Dinola, G.R. No. L-54567, March 22, 1990

If the intention of the accused was to commit robbery but rape was
also committed even before the robbery, the crime of robbery with
rape is committed however, if the original design was to commit rape
but the accused after committing rape also committed robbery
because the opportunity presented itself, the criminal acts should be
viewed as two distinct offenses. In the case at bar, after the
complainant was raped by the accused, the latter threatened to kill her
if she did not give watch on her wrist to him and forcibly took it from
her. Hence, the accused was convicted for two crimes of rape and
robbery.

177.
People v. Moreno, G.R. No. 140033, January 25, 2002
Accused Juan Moreno, who took no part in the rape, is guilty of robbery
only under Article 294, No. 5 of the Revised Penal Code but as to
appellant Reynaldo Maniquez, who had raped Mary Ann Galedo, he
should be guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with rape,
under Article 294, No. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
Theft
178.
Pidelli v. People, G.R. No. 163437, February 13, 2008
There is, here, a confluence of the elements of theft. Petitioner
received the final payment due the partners Placido and Wilson under
the pretext of paying off their obligation with the MTFSH. Under the

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terms of their agreement, petitioner was to account for the remaining

balance of the said funds and give each of the partners their respective
shares. He, however, failed to give private complainant Placido what
was due him under the construction contract.
Qualified theft
179.
Zapanta v. People, G.R. No. 170863, March 20, 2013
The elements of qualified theft, punishable under Article 310 in relation
to Articles 308 and 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), are: (a) the
taking of personal property; (b) the said property belongs to another;
(c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be done without
the owner's consent; (e) it be accomplished without the use of violence
or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; and (f) it be
done under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the
RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of confidence.18
All these elements are present in this case. The prosecutions evidence
proved, through the prosecutions eyewitnesses, that upon the
petitioners instruction, several pieces of wide flange steel beams had
been delivered, twice in October 2001 and once in November 2001,
along Marcos Highway and Mabini Street, Baguio City; the petitioner
betrayed the trust and confidence reposed on him when he, as project
manager, repeatedly took construction materials from the project site,
without the authority and consent of Engr. Marigondon, the owner of
the construction materials.
180.
Ringor v. People, G.R. No. 198904, December 11, 2013
Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of the felony of qualified
theft, must be the result of the relation by reason of dependence,
guardianship, or vigilance, between the appellant and the offended
party that might create a high degree of confidence between them
which the appellant abused. The element of grave abuse of confidence
is present in this case. Verily, the petitioner, as sales clerk/agent of
PCS, is duty-bound to remit to Ingan the payments which she collected
from the customers of PCS. She would not have been able to take the
money paid by LACS if it were not for her position in PCS. In failing to
remit to Ingan the money paid by LACS, the petitioner indubitably
gravely abused the confidence reposed on her by PCS.
Anti-Carnapping Law
181.
People v. Bustinera, G.R. No. 148233, June 8, 2004
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the
unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the
important consideration is the intent to gain. The term "gain" is not

Criminal Law

merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which
in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is
performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without
the owners consent constitutes gain.
182.

People v. Lagat, G.R. No. 187044, September 14, 2011

The tricycle, which was definitively ascertained to belong to Biag, as

evidenced by the registration papers, was found in Lagat and Palalays
possession. Aside from this, the prosecution was also able to establish
that Lagat and Palalay fled the scene when the Alicia PNP tried to
approach them at the palay buying station. To top it all, Lagat and
Palalay failed to give any reason why they had Biags tricycle. Their
unexplained possession raises the presumption that they were
responsible for the unlawful taking of the tricycle.
183.

People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 138470, April 1, 2003

The acts committed by appellant constituted the crime of carnapping

even if the deceased was the driver of the vehicle and not the owner.
The settled rule is that, in crimes of unlawful taking of property through
intimidation or violence, it is not necessary that the person unlawfully
divested of the personal property be the owner thereof. What is simply
required is that the property taken does not belong to the offender.
Actual possession of the property by the person dispossessed suffices.
So long as there is apoderamiento of personal property from another
against the latter's will through violence or intimidation, with animo de
lucro, unlawful taking of a property belonging to another is imputable
to the offender.
184.
People v. Nocom, G.R. No. 179041, April 1, 2013
To prove the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there
must be proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but
also that it was the original criminal design of the culprit and the killing
was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or
on the occasion thereof."
Estafa
185.
Espino v. People, G.R. No. 188217, July 3, 2013
When the information alleges the crime of estafa specified under
paragraph 1(b) and yet what was proven was estafa under paragraph
2(a) of the same Art. 315 of the RPC, what determines the real nature
and cause of the accusation against an accused is the actual recital of
facts stated in the information and not the caption of the information.
The information in this case may be interpreted as charging the

Criminal Law

accused with both estafa under paragraph 1 (b) and estafa under
paragraph 2(a). It is a basic and fundamental principle of criminal law
that one act can give rise to two offenses, all the more when a single
offense has multiple modes of commission.
186.
Brokmann v. People, G.R. No. 199150, February 6, 2012
the offense of estafa, in general, is committed either by (a) abuse of
confidence
or
(b)
means
of
deceit. The
acts
constituting estafa committed
with
abuse
of
confidence
are
enumerated in item (1) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended; item (2) of Article 315 enumerates estafa committed by
means of deceit. Deceit is not an essential requisite of estafa by abuse
of confidence; the breach of confidence takes the place of fraud or
deceit, which is a usual element in the other estafas. In this case, the
charge against the petitioner and her subsequent conviction was
for estafa committed by abuse of confidence. Thus, it was not
necessary for the prosecution to prove deceit as this was not an
element of the estafa that the petitioner was charged with.
187.
Lopez v. People, G.R. No. 199294, July 31, 2013
Unlike estafa under paragraph 1 (b) of Article 315 of the Code, estafa
under paragraph 2(a) of that provision does not require as an element
of the crime proof that the accused misappropriated or converted the
swindled money or property. All that is required is proof of pecuniary
damage sustained by the complainant arising from his reliance on the
fraudulent representation. The prosecution in this case discharged its
evidentiary burden by presenting the receipts of the installment
payments made by Sy on the purchase price for the Club share.
Petitioner and Ragonjan knew that the Club was a bogus project.
188.
Galvez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 187919, February 20,
2013
Despite the charge against the respondent of qualified theft, the mere
filing of a formal charge, to our mind, does not automatically make the
dismissal valid. Evidence submitted to support the charge should be
evaluated to see if the degree of proof is met to justify respondents
termination. The affidavit executed by Montegrico simply contained the
accusations of Abis that respondents committed pilferage, which
allegations remain uncorroborated. "Unsubstantiated suspicions,
accusations, and conclusions of employers do not provide for legal
justification for dismissing employees. The other bits of evidence were
also inadequate to support the charge of pilferage.
189.
People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 157943, September 4, 2013
In every criminal prosecution, however, the identity of the offender,
like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable

Criminal Law

doubt. In that regard, the Prosecution did not establish beyond

reasonable doubt that it was Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by
issuing the check. Hence, he cannot be convicted of estafa.
190.

Milla v. People, G.R. No. 188726, Jan. 25, 2012

In the case at bar, the acceptance by MPI of the Equitable PCI checks
tendered by Milla could not have novated the original transaction, as
the checks were only intended to secure the return of the P2 million
the former had already given him. Even then, these checks bounced
and were thus unable to satisfy his liability. Moreover,
the estafa involved here was not for simple misappropriation or
conversion, but was committed through Millas falsification of public
documents, the liability for which cannot be extinguished by mere
novation.
BP 22
191.
People v. Ojeda, G.R. Nos. 104238-58. June 3, 2004
It is clear from the foregoing that complainant merely presumed that
appellant received the demand letter prepared and sent by her lawyer.
She was not certain if appellant indeed received the notice of dishonor
of the checks. All she knew was that a demand letter was sent by her
lawyer to the appellant. In fact, right after complainant made that
presumption, her lawyer filed the criminal cases against appellant at
the Fiscals office without any confirmation that the demand letter
supposedly sent through registered mail was actually received by
appellant.
With the evident lack of notice of dishonor of the checks, appellant
cannot be held guilty of violation of BP 22. The lack of such notice
violated appellants right to procedural due process. It is a general rule
that when service of notice is an issue, the person alleging that the
notice was served must prove the fact of service. The burden of
proving receipt of notice rests upon the party asserting it and the
quantum of proof required for conviction in this criminal case is proof
beyond reasonable doubt.
192.
Rigor v. People, G.R. No. 144887, November 17, 2004
Violations of B.P. 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes.
A suit on the check can be filed in any of the places where any of the
elements of the offense occurred, that is, where the check is drawn,
issued, delivered or dishonored.

Criminal Law

193.
Dico v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141669, February 28,
2005
A notice of dishonor received by the maker or drawer of the check is
thus indispensable before a conviction can ensue. The notice of
dishonor may be sent by the offended party or the drawee bank. The
notice must be in writing. A mere oral notice to pay a dishonored check
will not suffice. The lack of a written notice is fatal for the prosecution.
The requirement of notice, its sending to, and its actual receipt by, the
drawer or maker of the check gives the latter the option to prevent
criminal prosecution if he pays the holder of the check the amount due
thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of
such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that the
check has not been paid.
194.
Resterio v. People, G.R. No. 177438, September 24, 2012
What Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 punished was the mere act of issuing a
worthless check. The law did not look either at the actual ownership of
the check or of the account against which it was made, drawn, or
issued, or at the intention of the drawee, maker or issuer. Also, that the
check was not intended to be deposited was really of no consequence
to her incurring criminal liability under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
195.
Wong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117857, February 2,
2001
The clear import of the law is to establish a prima facie presumption of
knowledge of such insufficiency of funds under the following conditions
(1) presentment within 90 days from date of the check, and (2) the
dishonor of the check and failure of the maker to make arrangements
for payment in full within 5 banking days after notice thereof. That the
check must be deposited within ninety (90) days is simply one of the
conditions for the prima facie presumption of knowledge of lack of
funds to arise. It is not an element of the offense. Neither does it
discharge petitioner from his duty to maintain sufficient funds in the
account within a reasonable time thereof. Under Section 186 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law, "a check must be presented for payment
within a reasonable time after its issue or the drawer will be discharged
from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay." By
current banking practice, a check becomes stale after more than six (6)
months,23 or 180 days. Private respondent herein deposited the checks
157 days after the date of the check. Hence said checks cannot be
considered stale. Only the presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of
funds was lost, but such knowledge could still be proven by direct or

Criminal Law

circumstantial evidence. As found by the trial court, private respondent

did not deposit the checks because of the reassurance of petitioner
that he would issue new checks. Upon his failure to do so, LPI was
constrained to deposit the said checks. After the checks were
dishonored, petitioner was duly notified of such fact but failed to make
arrangements for full payment within five (5) banking days thereof.
There is, on record, sufficient evidence that petitioner had knowledge
of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the drawee bank at the
time of issuance of the checks. And despite petitioners insistent plea
of innocence, we find no error in the respondent courts affirmance of
his conviction by the trial court for violations of the Bouncing Checks
Law.
196.
Tan v. People, G.R. No. 141466, January 19, 200
The check in question was not issued without sufficient funds and was
not dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. What was stamped on the
check in question was Payment Stopped-Funded at the same time
DAUD meaning drawn against uncollected deposits. Even with
uncollected deposits, the bank may honor the check at its discretion in
favor of favored clients, in which case there would be no violation of
B.P. 22.
197.
Nissan Gallery Ortigas v. Felipe, 199067, November 11,
2013
A person acquitted of a criminal charge, however, is not necessarily
civilly free because the quantum of proof required in criminal
prosecution (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is greater than that
required for civil liability (mere preponderance of evidence). In order to
be completely free from civil liability, a persons acquittal must be
based on the fact he did not commit the offense. If the acquittal is
based merely on reasonable doubt, the accused may still be held civilly
liable since this does not mean he did not commit the act complained
of. Though the accused has been acquitted from the criminal charge,
the acquittal was just based on reasonable doubt and it did not change
the fact that she issued the subject check which was subsequently
dishonored upon its presentment.
- Other Deceits
198.
Guinhawa v. People, G.R. No. 162822, August 25, 2005
For one to be liable for other deceits under the law, it is required that the
prosecution must prove the following essential elements: (a) false
pretense, fraudulent act or pretense other than those in the preceding
articles; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense must be made
or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;
and (c) as a result, the offended party suffered damage or prejudice.[40]
It is essential that such false statement or fraudulent representation

Criminal Law

constitutes the very cause or the only motive for the private complainant
to part with her property.
The provision includes any kind of conceivable deceit other than those
enumerated in Articles 315 to 317 of the Revised Penal Code. It is
intended as the catchall provision for that purpose with its broad scope
and intendment.
-Arson
199.
People v. Malngan, G.R. No. 170470, September 26, 2006
In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine
what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated whether arson, murder or
arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main
objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the burning of
the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion
of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is
absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a
particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is
resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed
is murder only; lastly, (c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular
person, and in fact the offender has already done so, but fire is
resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two
separate and distinct crimes committed homicide/murder and arson.
200.
Lihaylihay v. People, G.R. No. 191219, July 31, 2013
Petitioners were property convicted of the crime of violation of Section
3(e) of RA 3019 which has the following essential elements: (a) the
accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or
official functions; (b) he must have acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (c) his action
caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or
gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
in the discharge of his functions. Having affixed their signatures on the
disputed documents despite the glaring defects found therein,
petitioners were properly found to have acted with evident bad faith in
approving the "ghost" purchases. Their participation in facilitating the
payment of non-existent CCIE items resulted to a loss on the part of
the government.
201.
Buebos v. People, G.R. No. 163938, March 28, 2008
The elements of this form of arson are: (a) there is intentional burning;
and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling.
Admittedly, there is a confluence of the foregoing elements here.
However, the information failed to allege that what was intentionally
burned was an inhabited house or dwelling. That is fatal.

Criminal Law

- Malicious Mischief
202.
Taguinod v. People, G.R. No. 185833, October 12, 2011
Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the evidence for the prosecution
had proven beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the foregoing
elements. First, the hitting of the back portion of the CRV by the petitioner
was clearly deliberate as indicated by the evidence on record. The version of
the private complainant that the petitioner chased him and that the Vitara
pushed the CRV until it reached the stairway railing was more believable
than the petitioner's version that it was private complainant's CRV which
moved backward and deliberately hit the Vitara considering the steepness or
angle of the elevation of the P2 exit ramp. It would be too risky and
dangerous for the private complainant and his family to move the CRV
backward when it would be hard for him to see his direction as well as to
control his speed in view of the gravitational pull. Second, the act of
damaging the rear bumper of the CRV does not constitute arson or other
crimes involving destruction. Lastly, when the Vitara bumped the CRV, the
petitioner was just giving vent to his anger and hate as a result of a heated
encounter between him and the private complainant.
In sum, this Court finds that the evidence on record shows that the
prosecution had proven the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of malicious mischief.
Crimes Against Chastity
-Qualified Seduction
203.
People v. Fontanilla, G.R. No. L-25354, June 28, 1968
While deceit is an essential element of ordinary or simple seduction, it
does not have to be proved or established in a charge of qualified
seduction. It is replaced by abuse of confidence. Under Art. 337 of the
Revised Penal Code, the seduction of a virgin over twelve and under
eighteen years of age, committed by any person in public authority,
priest, house servant, domestic guardian, teacher, or any person who,
in any capacity, shall be entrusted with the education or custody of the
woman seduced is "constitutive" of the crime of qualified seduction
even though no deceit intervenes or even when such carnal knowledge
was voluntary on the part of the virgin.
204.
Perez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-80838, November
29, 1988
There are similar elements between Consented Abduction and
Qualified Seduction, namely: (1) that the offended party is a virgin,
and, (2) that she must be over twelve (12) and under eighteen (18)
years of age. However, Consented Abduction, in addition to the two
common elements, requires that: (1) the taking away of the offended

Criminal Law

party must be with her consent, after solicitation or cajolery from the
offender, and, (2) the taking away of the offended party must be with
lewd designs while Qualified Seduction requires that: (1) the crime be
committed by abuse of authority, confidence or relationship, and, (2)
the offender has sexual intercourse with the woman.
- Acts of Lasciviousness
205.
Sombilon v. People, G.R. No. 175528, September 30, 2009
In cases of acts of lasciviousness, it is not necessary that intimidation
be irresistible. It being sufficient that some compulsion equivalent
to intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of the
offended party. Here, the victim was locked inside a windowless room
together with her aggressor who poked a gun at her forehead. Even a
grown man would be paralyzed with fear if threatened at gunpoint,
what more the hapless victim who was only 15 years old when she was
subjected to such atrocity.
206.

Perez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143838, May 9, 2002

Petitioners acts of lying on top of the complainant, embracing and

kissing her, mashing her breasts, inserting his hand inside her panty
and touching her sexual organ, while admittedly obscene and
detestable acts, do not constitute attempted rape absent any showing
that petitioner actually commenced to force his penis into the
complainants sexual organ. Rather, these acts constitute acts of
lasciviousness. The elements of said crime are: (1) that the offender
commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done (a) by
using force and intimidation or (b) when the offended party is deprived
of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the offended party is
under 12 years of age; and (3) that the offended party is another
person of either sex.
207.

People v Bonaagua , G.R. No. 188897, June 6, 2011

Ireno guilty of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness under Section 5 (b)

of R.A. No. 7610. It must be emphasized, however, that like in the
crime of rape whereby the slightest penetration of the male organ or
even its slightest contact with the outer lip or the labia majora of the
vagina already consummates the crime, in like manner, if the tongue,
in an act of cunnilingus, touches the outer lip of the vagina, the act
should also be considered as already consummating the crime of rape
through sexual assault, not the crime of acts of lasciviousness.
Notwithstanding, in the present case, such logical interpretation could
not be applied. It must be pointed out that the victim testified that

Criminal Law

Ireno only touched her private part and licked it, but did not insert his
finger in her vagina. This testimony of the victim, however, is open to
various interpretation, since it cannot be identified what specific part of
the vagina was defiled by Ireno. Thus, in conformity with the principle
that the guilt of an accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt,
the statement cannot be the basis for convicting Ireno with the crime
of rape through sexual assault.
-Forcible Abduction
208.
People v. Ablaneda, G.R. No. 131914, April 30, 2001
The elements of the crime of forcible abduction, as defined in Article
342 of the Revised Penal Code, are: (1) that the person abducted is any
woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or reputation; (2) that she is
taken against her will; and (3) that the abduction is with lewd designs.
On the other hand, rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman by force or intimidation, or when the woman is deprived of
reason or is unconscious, or when she is under twelve years of age.
All these elements were proven in this case. The victim, who is a
woman, was taken against her will, as shown by the fact that she was
intentionally directed by accused-appellant to a vacant hut. At her
tender age, Magdalena could not be expected to physically resist
considering that the lewd designs of accused-appellant could not have
been apparent to her at that time. Physical resistance need not be
demonstrated to show that the taking was against her will. The
employment of deception suffices to constitute the forcible taking,
especially since the victim is an unsuspecting young girl. Considering
that it was raining, going to the hut was not unusual to Magdalena, as
probably the purpose was to seek shelter. Barrio girls are particularly
prone to deception. It is the taking advantage of their innocence that
makes them easy culprits of deceiving minds. Finally, the evidence
shows that the taking of the young victim against her will was effected
in furtherance of lewd and unchaste designs. Such lewd designs in
forcible abduction is established by the actual rape of the victim.
209.

People v. Sabadlab, G.R. No. 175924, March 14, 2012

The principal objective of Sabadlab and his two cohorts in abducting

AAA from Dapitan Street and in bringing her to another place was to
rape and ravish her. This objective became evident from the
successive acts of Sabadlab immediately after she had alighted from
the car in completely undressing her as to expose her whole body

Criminal Law

(except the eyes due to the blindfold), in kissing her body from the
neck down, and in having carnal knowledge of her (in that
order). Although forcible abduction was seemingly committed, we
cannot hold him guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with
rape when the objective of the abduction was to commit the rape.
Under the circumstances, the rape absorbed the forcible abduction.
210.
People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 141125, February 28, 2002
There can only be one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape.
The crime of forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape.
Thus, the subsequent acts of rape can no longer be considered as
separate complex crimes of forcible abduction with rape. They should
be detached from and considered independently of the forcible
abduction. Therefore, accused-appellant should be convicted of one
complex crime of forcible abduction with rape and three separate acts
of rape.
- Anti Sexual Harassment Act
211.
Bacsin v. Wahiman, G.R. No. 146053, April 30, 2008
The formal charge, while not specifically mentioning RA 7877, The
Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, imputes on the petitioner acts
covered and penalized by said law. Contrary to the argument of
petitioner, the demand of a sexual favor need not be explicit or
stated. In Domingo v. Rayala, it was held, It is true that this provision
calls for a demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor. But it is
not necessary that the demand, request, or requirement of a sexual
favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may
be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender. The
CSC found, as did the CA, that even without an explicit demand from
petitioner his act of mashing the breast of AAA was sufficient to
constitute sexual harassment. Moreover, under Section 3 (b) (4) of RA
7877, sexual harassment in an education or training environment is
committed (w)hen the sexual advances result in an intimidating,
hostile or offensive environment for the student, trainee or
apprentice. AAA even testified that she felt fear at the time petitioner
touched her. It cannot then be said that the CSC lacked basis for its
ruling, when it had both the facts and the law. The CSC found the
evidence presented by the complainant sufficient to support a finding
of grave misconduct. It is basic that factual findings of administrative
agencies, when supported by substantial evidence, are binding upon
the Court.
212.

Alegria v Duque, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2019, 04 April 2007

Criminal Law

Sexual harassment in the workplace is not about a man taking

advantage of a woman by reason of sexual desire it is about power
being exercised by a superior over his women subordinates. That
power emanates from the fact that he can remove them if they refuse
his amorous advances. Under Sec. 3 of A.M. No. 03-03-13-SC (Re: Rule
on Administrative Procedure in Sexual Harassment Cases and
Guidelines on Proper Work Decorum in the Judiciary), work-related
sexual harassment is committed by an official or employee in the
Judiciary who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over
another in a work environment, demands, requests or otherwise
requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the
demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the
latter. It is committed when the sexual favor is made as a condition in
the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued
employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable
compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the
refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or
classifying the employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive
or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
said employee.
In the case at bar, while it is true that the element of moral
ascendancy is present, respondent being the person who
recommended complainant to her present position, complainant has
failed to prove the alleged sexual advances by evidence other than her
bare allegations in the affidavit-complaint. Even her own actions or
omissions operate to cast doubt on her claim.
Crimes Against Civil Status
-Bigamy
213.
Teves v. People, G.R. No. 188775, August 24, 2011
The instant case has all the elements of the crime of bigamy. Thus, the
CA was correct in affirming the conviction of petitioner.
Petitioner was legally married to Thelma on 26 November 1992 at the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. He contracted a second or
subsequent marriage with Edita on 10 December 2001 in Meycauayan,
Bulacan. At the time of his second marriage with Edita, his marriage
with Thelma was legally subsisting. It is noted that the finality of the
decision declaring the nullity of his first marriage with Thelma was only
on 27 June 2006 or about five (5) years after his second marriage to

Criminal Law

Edita. Finally, the second or subsequent marriage of petitioner with

Edita has all the essential requisites for validity. Petitioner has in fact
not disputed the validity of such subsequent marriage.
It is evident therefore that petitioner has committed the crime charged.
His contention that he cannot be charged with bigamy in view of the
declaration of nullity of his first marriage is bereft of merit. The Family
Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the
matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense.
Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
214.

Morigo v. People, G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004

The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must
have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the
petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first
marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage
being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the
beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect.
Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes,
petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the
marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first
marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but
logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where
there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be
acquitted of the instant charge.
No marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a
marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a
marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus,
needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more,
cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which
petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a
judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent
marriage.
215.
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, February
18, 2004
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the

Criminal Law

celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the

spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not
without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or
born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be
considered legitimate.28 There is therefore a recognition written into
the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still
produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is
incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render
the States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow
individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed
in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting
multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the
promise of futurity and commitment.
Crimes Against Honor
- Libel
216.
Alcantara v. Ponce, G.R. No. 156183, February 28, 2007
The crime of libel, as defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code,
has the following elements: (1) imputation of a crime, vice or defect,
real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or
circumstance; (2) publicity or publication; (3) malice; (4) direction of
such imputation at a natural or juridical person, or even a dead person
and (5) tendency to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the
person defamed.
217.

Lopez v. People, G.R. No. 172203, February 14, 2011

An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the

commission of a crime, the possession of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance
which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt or which
tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead. To determine
whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be
construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural
and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by
persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and
understood in another sense. Moreover, [a] charge is sufficient if the
words are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and understand
that the person or persons against whom they were uttered were guilty
of certain offenses or are sufficient to impeach the honesty, virtue or
reputation or to hold the person or persons up to public ridicule.

Criminal Law

Tested under these established standards, we cannot subscribe to the

appellate courts finding that the phrase CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND
SAGAY NEVER tends to induce suspicion on private respondents
character, integrity and reputation as mayor of Cadiz City. There are no
derogatory imputations of a crime, vice or defect or any act, omission,
condition, status or circumstance tending, directly or indirectly, to
cause his dishonor. Neither does the phrase in its entirety, employ any
unpleasant language or somewhat harsh and uncalled for that would
reflect on private respondents integrity. Obviously, the controversial
word NEVER used by petitioner was plain and simple. In its ordinary
sense, the word did not cast aspersion upon private respondents
integrity and reputation much less convey the idea that he was guilty
of any offense. Simply worded as it was with nary a notion of
corruption and dishonesty in government service, it is our considered
view to appropriately consider it as mere epithet or personal reaction
on private respondents performance of official duty and not purposely
designed to malign and besmirch his reputation and dignity more so to
deprive him of public confidence.

218.
Diaz v. People, G.R. No. 159787, May 25, 2007
The last element of libel is that the victim is identified or identifiable
from the contents of the libelous article. In order to maintain a libel
suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable, although it is not
necessary that the person be named. It is enough if by intrinsic
reference the allusion is apparent or if the publication contains matters
of description or reference to facts and circumstances from which
others reading the article may know the person alluded to, or if the
latter is pointed out by extraneous circumstances so that those
knowing such person could and did understand that he was the person
referred to.5 Kunkle v. Cablenews-American and Lyons6 laid the rule
that this requirement is complied with where a third person recognized
or could identify the party vilified in the article.
The libelous article, while referring to "Miss S," does not give a
sufficient description or other indications which identify "Miss S." In
short, the article fails to show that "Miss S" and Florinda Bagay are one
and the same person.
219.

Fermin v. People, G.R. No. 157643, March 28, 2008

Criminal Law

Proof adduced during the trial showed that accused was the manager
of the publication without the corresponding evidence that, as such, he
was directly responsible for the writing, editing, or publishing of the
matter contained in the said libelous article. Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code, however, includes not only the author but also the person
who prints or published it. Thus, proof of knowledge or participation in
the publication of the offending article is not required.
220.

Tulfo v. People, G.R. No. 161032, September 16, 2008

Neither the publisher nor the editors can disclaim liability for libelous
articles that appear on their paper by simply saying they had no
participation in the preparation of the same. They cannot say that Tulfo
was all alone in the publication of Remate, on which the subject
articles appeared, when they themselves clearly hold positions of
authority in the newspaper, or in the case of Pichay, as the president in
the publishing company.
As Tulfo cannot simply say that he is not liable because he did not fulfill
his responsibility as a journalist, the other petitioners cannot simply
say that they are not liable because they did not fulfill their
responsibilities as editors and publishers. An editor or manager of a
newspaper, who has active charge and control of its management,
conduct, and policy, generally is held to be equally liable with the
owner for the publication therein of a libelous article. On the theory
that it is the duty of the editor or manager to know and control the
contents of the paper, it is held that said person cannot evade
responsibility by abandoning the duties to employees, so that it is
immaterial whether or not the editor or manager knew the contents of
the publication.
221.
Bonifacio v. RTC Makati, G.R. No. 184800, May 5, 2010
If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first
published are used by the offended party as basis for the venue in the
criminal action, the Information must allege with particularity where
the defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or
supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business
offices in the case of newspapers, magazines or serial publications.
This pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any
inclination to harass.

Criminal Law

The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to

defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet as there
would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and first
publication. To credit Gimenezs premise of equating his first access to
the defamatory article on petitioners website in Makati with printing
and first publication would spawn the very ills that the amendment to
Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It hardly
requires much imagination to see the chaos that would ensue in
situations where the websites author or writer, a blogger or anyone
who posts messages therein could be sued for libel anywhere in the
Philippines that the private complainant may have allegedly accessed
the offending website.
- Slander
222.
Villanueva v. People, G.R. No. 160351, April 10, 2006
Moreover, pointing a dirty finger ordinarily connotes the
phrase Fuck You, which
is
similar
to
the
expression Puta or Putang Ina mo, in local parlance. Such expression
was not held to be libelous in Reyes v. People, where the Court said
that: This is a common enough expression in the dialect that is often
employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or
displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer,
that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother. Following Reyes, and
in light of the fact that there was a perceived provocation coming from
complainant, petitioners act of pointing a dirty finger at complainant
constitutes simple slander by deed, it appearing from the factual milieu
of the case that the act complained of was employed by petitioner "to
express anger or displeasure" at complainant for procrastinating the
approval of his leave monetization. While it may have cast dishonor,
discredit or contempt upon complainant, said act is not of a serious
nature,
thus,
the
penalty
shall
bearresto
menor meaning,
imprisonment from one day to 30 days or a fine not
exceeding P200.00. We opt to impose a fine following Mari.
223.

Victorio v. CA, G.R. Nos. L-32836-37, May 3, 1989

Appellant-petitioner admitted having called Atty. Vivencio Ruiz,

kayabang, tunaw na utak, swapang, and "estapador", which
attributes to the latter the crime of estafa, a serious and insulting
imputation. Defamatory words uttered specifically against a lawyer
when touching on his profession are libellous per se.

- Intriguing Against Honor

224.
Betguen v Masangcay 238 Scra 475

Criminal Law

Article 364 of the Revised Penal Code defines "intriguing against

honor" as any intrigue which has for its principal purpose to blemish
the honor and reputation of a person. This felony undoubtedly falls
under the coverage of crimes involving moral turpitude, the latter term
having been defined as "an act of baseness, vileness, depravity in the
private and social duties which a man owes his fellow man, or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right
and duty between man and man, or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty and good morals."
Criminal Negligence
225.
Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro, 172716, November 17, 2010
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are
distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the
framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of
the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field by
rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition
that reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of
committing it x x x on three points of analysis: (1) the object of
punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the
legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed
to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal
intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and
intentional crimes