EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

I.

Past midnight, in the early hours of June 24, 2004, the

Congress acting as the National Board of
Canvassers, in a near-unanimous roll-call vote,
proclaimed Mrs. Arroyo the duly elected President of
the Philippines. Refusing to concede defeat, the
second-placer in the elections, Mr. Poe, filed
seasonably an election protest before this Electoral
Tribunal. As counsels for the parties exchanged lively
motions to rush the presentation of their respective
positions on the controversy, an act of God
intervened. Mr. Poe died in the course of his medical
treatment at St. Lukes Hospital. However, neither the
Arroyos proclamation by Congress nor the death of
her main rival as a fortuitous intervening event
appears to abate the present controversy in the public
arena. Together with the formal Notice of the Death of
Protestant, his counsel has submitted to the Tribunal,
dated January 10, 2005, a MANIFESTATION with
URGENT PETITION/MOTION to INTERVENE AS A
SUBSTITUTE FOR DECEASED PROTESTANT Mrs.
Susan Roces-Poe, by the widow, Mrs. Roces, who
signed the verification and certification therein. Can
Mrs. Roces-Poe substitute his late husband in the
electoral protest against Mrs. Arroyo?
Answer: No. Pursuant to PET rule, only two
persons, the 2nd and 3rd placers, may contest the
election. By this express enumeration, the rule
makers have in effect determined the real parties in
interest concerning an on-going election contest. It
envisioned a scenario where, if the declared winner
had not been truly voted upon by the electorate, the
candidate who received that 2nd or the 3rd highest
number of votes would be the legitimate beneficiary in
a successful election contest. If persons not real
parties in the action could be allowed to
intervene, proceedings will be unnecessarily
complicated, expensive and interminable and
this is not the policy of the law. (Poe, Jr. vs.
Arroyo, March 29, 2005).

II.

Congress sitting as the National Board of Canvassers

(NBC) proclaimed Mr. De Castro the duly elected
Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines. Mrs.
Legarda, the second placer, filed a protest with the
PET for the annulment of the De Castro's
proclamation as the duly elected Vice-President of the
Republic of the Philippines. Subsequently, the Ms.
Legarda was elected as senator and discharged her
duties as such. Did Senator Legarda effectively
abandoned or withdrawn her protest?
Answer: In assuming the office of Senator and
discharging her duties as such, which fact the court
can take judicial notice of, has effectively
abandoned or withdrawn her protest, or
abandoned her determination to protect and
pursue the public interest involved in the matter
of who is the real choice of the electorate. It is
worthy to note that Legarda's tenure in the Senate
coincides with the term of the Vice-Presidency 20042010, that is the subject of her protest. (Legarda vs.
De Castro, 542 SCRA125).

III. Atty. Macalintal filed a petition that questions the

constitution of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
(PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution: The Supreme
Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and
may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
While he concedes that the Supreme Court is
"authorized to promulgate its rules for the purpose,
"he chafes at the creation of a purportedly "separate
tribunal" complemented by a budget allocation, a seal,
a set of personnel and confidential employees, to
effect the constitutional mandate. Further, he
reiterates that the constitution of the PET, with the
designation of the Members of the Court as Chairman

and Members thereof, contravenes Section 12, Article

VIII of the Constitution, which prohibits the
designation of Members of the Supreme Court and of
other courts established by law to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
Is the constitution of the PET, composed of the
Members of this Court, unconstitutional for being
contrary to Section 4, Article VII and Section 12,
Article VIII of the Constitution?
Answer: No. The conferment of additional jurisdiction
to the Supreme Court, with the duty characterized as
an "awesome" task, includes the means necessary
to carry it into effect under the doctrine of
necessary implication. The PET is not a separate
and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit
it has functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is
obvious that the PET was constituted in
implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution, and it faithfully complies not unlawfully
defies the constitutional directive. The adoption of a
separate seal, as well as the change in the
nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the Associate
Justices into Chairman and Members of the Tribunal,
respectively, was designed simply to highlight the
singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunals
functions as a special electoral court.
As regards his claim that the PET exercises quasijudicial functions in contravention of Section 12,
Article VIII, the court said that the said issue is more
imagined than real. The power wielded by PET is a
derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated
to courts of law, expressly provided in the
Constitution. It is the Constitution itself, in Section
4, Article VII, which exempts the Members of the
Court, constituting the PET, from the said
prohibition. (Macalintal vs. PET, 635 SCRA 783 and
651 SCRA 239).
IV. Mr. Elma was appointed and took his oath of office as
Chairman of the PCGG. Thereafter, during his tenure
as PCGG Chairman, Mr. Elma was appointed Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC). He took his oath
of office as CPLC the following day, but he waived
any remuneration that he may receive as CPLC.
Individuals filed an action to declare as null and void
the concurrent appointments of Mr. Elma as Chairman
of the PCGG and as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel
(CPLC) for being contrary to Section 13, Article VII
and Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution.
Is the position of the PCGG Chairman or that of the
CPLC falls under the prohibition against multiple
offices imposed by Section 13, Article VII and Section
7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution?
Answer: To harmonize these two provisions, the
court said that the prohibition against multiple offices
contained in Section 7, Article IX-B and Section 13,
Article VII in this manner: [T]hus, while all other
appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to
hold other office or employment in the government
during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by
the primary functions of their positions, members of
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do
so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article
IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable
to all elective and appointive public officials and
employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to
be the exception applicable only to the President, the
Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants.
The general rule contained in Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution permits an appointive official to hold
more than one office only if "allowed by law or by
the primary functions of his position." In the case
of Quimson vs. Ozaeta, this Court ruled that, "[t]here
is no legal objection to a government official

occupying two government offices and performing the

functions of both as long as there is no
incompatibility." The crucial test in determining
whether incompatibility exists between two offices
was laid out in People vs. Green - whether one
office is subordinate to the other, in the sense that
one office has the right to interfere with the other.

Congress. In strict terms, presidential appointments

that require no confirmation from the Commission on
Appointments cannot be properly characterized as
either a regular or an ad interim appointment.
(General vs. Urro, 646 SCRA 567).
VIII. Is the concept of staggering of terms inconsistent with the
nature of acting appointments?

In this case, an incompatibility exists between the

positions of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC.
The duties of the CPLC include giving independent
and impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads
of various executive departments and agencies and to
review investigations involving heads of executive
departments and agencies, as well as other
Presidential appointees. The PCGG is, without
question, an agency under the Executive Department.
Thus, the actions of the PCGG Chairman are
subject to the review of the CPLC. (Public Interest
Center, Inc. vs. Elma, 494 SCRA 53 and 517 SCRA
336).
V.

A petition for prohibition seeks to enjoin Mison from

performing the functions of the Office of
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and
Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget,
from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison's
salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's
appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not
having been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. Is the argument valid?

Answer: Generally, the purpose for staggering the

term of office is to minimize the appointing
authoritys opportunity to appoint a majority of
the members of a collegial body. It also intended to
ensure the continuity of the body and its policies. A
staggered term of office, however, is not a
statutory prohibition, direct or indirect, against
the issuance of acting or temporary appointment.
It does not negate the authority to issue acting or
temporary appointments that the Administrative Code
grants. (ibid).
IX. Can the President appoint acting secretaries without the
consent of the Commission on Appointments while
Congress is in session?
Answer: The office of a department secretary may
become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a
department secretary is the alter ego of the President,
the acting appointee to the office must necessarily
have the Presidents confidence. Thus, by the very
nature of the office of a department secretary, the
President must appoint in an acting capacity a
person of her choice even while Congress is in
session. That person may or may not be the
permanent appointee, but practical reasons may
make it expedient that the acting appointee will also
be the permanent appointee. However, acting
appointments cannot exceed one year. The law
has incorporated this safeguard to prevent abuses,
like the use of acting appointments as a way to
circumvent confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. (Pimentel vs. Ermita, Oct. 13, 2005).

Answer: It is evident that the position of

Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a
bureau head) is not one of those within the first
group of appointments where the consent of the
Commission on Appointments is required. In the
1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of
"heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments. (Sarmiento vs. Mison, 156 SCRA 549).
VI. It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987
Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers
whom the President shall appoint. Enumerate these
groups and determine which group/s require or
requires the concurrence of the Commission on the
Appointments.
Answer: These four (4) groups are: First, the heads
of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution; Second, all
other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law; Third, those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers
lower in rank whose appointments the Congress
may by law vest in the President alone. The first
group of officers is the only group which requires
the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by
nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments, the President
appoints (ibid).
VII. What are the different classifications of appointments?
Answer: Appointments may be classified into two:
first, as to its nature; and second, as to the manner
in which it is made. Under the first classification,
appointments can either be permanent or temporary
(acting). A basic distinction is that a permanent
appointee can only be removed from office for cause;
whereas a temporary appointee can be removed even
without hearing or cause. Under the second
classification, an appointment can either be regular
or ad interim. A regular appointment is one made
while Congress is in session, while an ad interim
appointment is one issued during the recess of

X.

Congress enacted several laws pertaining to ARMM. RA

6734 established the ARMM and scheduled the first
regular elections for its regional officials. R.A. No.
9054 reset elections to second Monday of September
2001, which was subsequently reset to November 26,
2001 by R.A. No. 9140. R.A. No. 9333, for the third
time, reset it to second Monday of August 2005 and
every 3 years thereafter. Pursuant to R.A. No. 9333,
the next ARMM election should have been on August
8, 2011 but Congress again enacted R.A. No. 10153
resetting it to May 2013 to coincide with the regular
national and local elections and granting the
President power to appoint OICs pending election of
new officials. Does the authority granted to the
President to appoint OICs constitutional?
Answer: During the oral arguments, the Court
identified the three options open to Congress in order
to resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM
officials in the interim [in order to achieve
synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the
[incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to remain in
office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special
elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those
elected to expire when those elected in the [2013]
synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize
the President to appoint OICs, [their respective terms
to last also until those elected in the 2013
synchronized elections assume office.
1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it
would extend the terms of office of the incumbent
ARMM officials.
2nd option: Calling special elections is
unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own, has
no authority to order special elections.
3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to
appoint ARMM OICs in the interim is valid. At the
outset, the power to appoint is essentially

executive in nature and the limitations on or

qualifications to the exercise of this power should
be strictly construed; these limitations or
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be
recognized.
Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs
emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third
group of officials that the President can appoint
pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on
clear constitutional basis. (Kida vs. Senate of the
Philippines, 659 SCRA 270).
XI. President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation No. 420
that mandates the Adoption of a Unified, Multipurpose Identification System by all Government
Agencies in the Executive Department. This is so
despite the fact that the Supreme Court held in an En
Banc decision in 1998 ruled that Administrative Order
No. 308 (National Computerized Identification
Reference System) issued by then President Ramos
is unconstitutional because a national ID card system
requires legislation because it creates a new national
data collection and card issuance system, where
none existed before. The Supreme Court likewise
held that EO 308 as unconstitutional for it violates the
citizens right to privacy. Based on the said ruling,
questions were raised against the constitutionality of
Proclamation No. 420 on the ground that is a
usurpation of legislative power. Is the argument
correct?
Answer: Under the power of control the President,
he/she can direct all government entities, in the
exercise of their functions under existing laws, to
adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to
achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility,
and convenience to the public. The Presidents
constitutional power of control is self-executing and
does not need any implementing legislation. Of
course, the Presidents power of control is limited
to the Executive branch of government and does
not extend to the Judiciary or to the independent
constitutional commissions. Thus, EO 420 does
not apply to the Judiciary, or to the COMELEC which
under existing laws is also authorized to issue voters
ID cards. This only shows that EO 420 does not
establish a national ID system because legislation is
needed to establish a single ID system that is
compulsory for all branches of government. The
President has not usurped legislative power in issuing
EO 420. EO 420 is an exercise of Executive power
the Presidents constitutional power of control over
the Executive department. EO 420 is also
compliance by the President of the constitutional
duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed. (Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. Ermita, et al., April
19 and June 20, 2006).
XII. Then Joseph Estrada issued EO No. 102, entitled
"Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the
Department of Health," which provided for the
changes in the roles, functions, and organizational
processes of the DOH. Under the assailed executive
order, the DOH refocused its mandate from being the
sole provider of health services to being a provider of
specific health services and technical assistance, as a
result of the devolution of basic services to local
government units.
EO No. 102 was enacted pursuant to Section 17 of
the Local Government Code, which provided for the
devolution to the local government units of basic
services and facilities, as well as specific healthrelated functions and responsibilities.
Groups and individuals assailed the validity of the
above-mentioned executive order, contending that a
law, such as EO No. 102, which effects the
reorganization of the DOH, should be enacted by
Congress in the exercise of its legislative function.
They argued that Executive Order No. 102 is void,

having been issued in excess of the Presidents

authority. They also maintain that the Office of the
President should have issued an administrative order
to carry out the streamlining, but that it failed to do so.
Are the arguments against the validity of the
executive order valid?
Answer: First, the court has already ruled in a number of
cases that the President may, by executive or
administrative order, direct the reorganization of
government entities under the Executive
Department. This is also sanctioned under the
Constitution, as well as other statutes. The law grants
the President the power to reorganize the Office of
the President in recognition of the recurring need
of every President to reorganize his or her office
"to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency."
The Administrative Code provides that the Office of
the President consists of the Office of the
President Proper and the agencies under it. The
DOH is an agency which is under the supervision and
control of the President and, thus, part of the Office of
the President.
Consequently, the Administrative Code, granting the
President the continued authority to reorganize the
Office of the President, extends to the DOH. The
power of the President to reorganize the executive
department is likewise recognized in general
appropriations laws. Clearly, Executive Order No. 102
is well within the constitutional power of the President
to issue.
The second objection cannot be given any weight
considering that the acts of the DOH Secretary, as
an alter ego of the President, are presumed to be
the acts of the President. The members of the
Cabinet are subject at all times to the disposition of
the President since they are merely his alter egos.
Thus, their acts, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, are, unless disapproved
by the President, presumptively acts of the
President. Significantly, the acts of the DOH
Secretary were clearly authorized by the President,
who, thru the PCEG, issued the aforementioned
Memorandum Circular No. 62, sanctioning the
implementation of the RSP. (Tondo Medical Center
Employees Association vs. CA, 527 SCRA 746).
XIII. Then President Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 12
(E.O. 12) creating the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to
investigate or hear administrative cases or complaints
for possible graft and corruption, among others,
against presidential appointees and to submit its
report and recommendations to the President.
Thereafter, President Aquino III issued Executive
Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and
transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more
particularly to its newly-established Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division (IAD). Finance Secretary
Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint
affidavit for grave misconduct against Prospero A.
Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the
Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well
as the incumbent members of the LWUA Board of
Trustees. Pichay questioned the authority of the
president in abolishing the PAGC and transferring its
functions to the IAD-ODESLA. Is the argument valid?
Answer: The contention is unavailing. The President
has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive
Department under E.O. 292. In the case of Buklod ng
Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora the Court affirmed that the
President's authority to carry out a reorganization in
any branch or agency of the executive department is
an express grant by the legislature by virtue of E.O.
292. And in Domingo vs. Zamora, the Court gave the
rationale behind the President's continuing authority in
this wise: The law grants the President this power in
recognition of the recurring need of every President to

reorganize his office "to achieve simplicity, economy

and efficiency."

2010 (Truth Commission). Is it within the ambit of the

power of the President to create the above-mentioned
commission? If yes, what justification can be used in
the exercise of such power?

Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of

its functions to a division specially created within the
ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the
President under his continuing "delegated legislative
authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to
E.O. 292. (Pichay vs. Office of the Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs Investigative and
Adjudication Division, 677 SCRA 408).

Answer: Yes. The creation of the PTC finds

justification under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty
to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section
17 reads:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. The
Presidents power to conduct investigations to aid
him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws in
this case, fundamental laws on public
accountability and transparency is inherent in
the Presidents powers as the Chief Executive.
That the authority of the President to conduct
investigations and to create bodies to execute this
power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or
in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such
authority. (Biraogo vs. Truth Commission of 2010, 637
SCRA 78).

XIV. Distinguish the basic authority of the President to

reorganize the Office of the President Proper and his
general power to reorganize offices outside the Office
of the President Proper.
Answer: Generally, this authority to implement
organizational changes is limited to transferring either
an office or a function from the Office of the President
to another Department or Agency, and the other way
around. Only Section 31(1) gives the President a
virtual freehand in dealing with the internal structure
of the Office of the President Proper by allowing him
to take actions as extreme as abolition, consolidation
or merger of units, apart from the less drastic move of
transferring functions and offices from one unit to
another. Again, in Domingo vs. Zamora the Court
noted:
However, the President's power to reorganize the
Office of the President under Section 31 (2) and (3) of
EO 292 should be distinguished from his power to
reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under
Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can
reorganize the Office of the President Proper by
abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by
transferring functions from one unit to another. In
contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the
President's power to reorganize offices outside the
Office of the President Proper but still within the Office
of the President is limited to merely transferring
functions or agencies from the Office of the President
to Departments or Agencies, and vice versa. (ibid).
XV. Can the Office of the President exercise administrative
disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a
Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionallycreated Office of the Ombudsman?
Answer: The Ombudsman's administrative
disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and
Special Prosecutor is not exclusive. Section 8(2) of
the Ombudsman Act of 1989 grants the President
express power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman
and a Special Prosecutor. While the removal of the
Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in
the Constitution, which is by impeachment, there is,
however, no constitutional provision similarly dealing
with the removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman,
or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting
Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a
gap in the law without running afoul of any
provision in the Constitution or existing statutes.
In fact, the Constitution itself authorizes Congress to
provide for the removal of all other public officers,
including the Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, who are not subject to impeachment.
(Gonzales III vs. Office of the President, September
04, 2013).
XVI. When then Senator Aquino III declared his staunch
condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan,
"Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino
people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to
carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good
senator to the presidency. To transform his campaign
slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for
a special body to investigate reported cases of graft
and corruption allegedly committed during the
previous administration. Thus, at the dawn of his
administration, the President signed Executive Order
No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of

XVII.

The President, as Commander-in-Chief, is granted by

the Constitution a "sequence" of graduated powers.
What are these three powers? Enumerate it from the
most to the least benign (of a kind and gentle
disposition).
Answer: From the most to the least benign, these
are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the
power to declare Martial Law (David vs. Arroyo,
May 3, 2006).

XVIII.

Three members from the International Committee of

the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in the vicinity
of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. The three
were purportedly inspecting a water and sanitation
project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when inspecting a
water and sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial
Jail when they were seized by three armed men who
were later confirmed to be members of the Abu
Sayyaf Group (ASG). The leader of the alleged
kidnappers was identified as Raden Abu, a former
guard at the Sulu Provincial Jail. News reports linked
Abu to Albader Parad, one of the known leaders of
the Abu Sayyaf. Thus, Governor Tan declared a state
of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the
police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force to
address the situation. Can Governor Tan validly
exercise emergency powers and call upon the armed
forces at his own bidding?
Answer: It is only the President, as Executive, who is
authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided
under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as
well as what became known as the calling-out powers
under Section 7, Article VII thereof. The provincial
governor does not possess the same calling-out
powers as the President. He is not endowed with
the power to call upon the armed forces at his own
bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation,
Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he
declared a state of emergency and called upon the
Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian
Emergency Force. The calling-out powers
contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive
to the President. An exercise by another official,
even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires.
(Kulayan vs. Tan, July 03, 2012).

XIX. Sen. Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP to

appear at a public hearing before the Senate
Committee on National Defense and Security
concerning the conduct of the 2004 elections wherein
allegations of massive cheating and the Hello Garci
tapes emerged. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued
a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col.
Balutan and company from appearing before the

Senate Committee without Presidential approval.

Nevertheless, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan testified
before said Committee, prompting Gen. Senga to
order them subjected to General Court Martial
proceedings for willfully violating an order of a
superior officer. Can President Arroyo prevent military
officers from testifying at a legislative inquiry?

of a treaty; hence, it must be duly concurred in by the

Senate. Bayan Muna takes a cue from Commissioner
of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading. Bayan Muna
submits that the subject of the Agreement does not
fall under any of the subject-categories that are
enumerated in the Eastern Sea Trading case that may
be covered by an executive agreement. However, the
categorization of subject matters that may be covered
by international agreements mentioned in Eastern
Sea Trading is not cast in stone. The primary
consideration in the choice of the form of agreement
is the parties intent and desire to craft an international
agreement in the form they so wish to further their
respective interests. Verily, the matter of form takes
a back seat when it comes to effectiveness and
binding effect of the enforcement of a treaty or an
executive agreement, as the parties in either
international agreement each labor under the
pacta sunt servanda principle.

Answer: The President has constitutional authority to

prevent military officers from testifying at a legislative
inquiry, by virtue of her power as commander-inchief, and that as a consequence a military officer
who defies such injunction is liable under military
justice. The ability of the President to prevent military
officers from testifying before Congress does not turn
on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executives
power as commander-in-chief to control the
actions and speech of members of the armed
forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commanderin-chief are not hampered by the same limitations
as in executive privilege. (Gudani vs. Senga, 498
SCRA 671).

But over and above the foregoing considerations is

the fact thatsave for the situation and matters
contemplated in Sec. 25, Art. XVIII of the
Constitutionwhen a treaty is required, the
Constitution does not classify any subject, like
that involving political issues, to be in the form of,
and ratified as, a treaty. What the Constitution
merely prescribes is that treaties need the
concurrence of the Senate by a vote defined therein
to complete the ratification process. Indeed, an
executive agreement that does not require the
concurrence of the Senate for its ratification may
not be used to amend a treaty that, under the
Constitution, is the product of the ratifying acts of
the Executive and the Senate. The presence of a
treaty, purportedly being subject to amendment by an
executive agreement, does not obtain under the
premises. (Bayan Muna vs. Romulo, 641 SCRA 244).

XX. The International Criminal Court (ICC) under the Rome

Statute was established with "the power to exercise
its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious
crimes of international concern and shall be
complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions.
The RP, through Charge d Affaires Enrique A.
Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms,
is "subject to ratification, acceptance or approval" by
the signatory states. Thereafter, the Philippines
entered into a Non-Surrender Agreement (Agreement)
with United States of America (USA) which aims to
protect what it refers to and defines as "persons" of
the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits
that might be brought against them in international
tribunals.
a.

Does the Agreement, which has not been submitted

to the Senate for concurrence, contravenes and
undermines the Rome Statute and other treaties?

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
I.

Answer: Contrary to Bayan Munas pretense, the

Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor
does it differ from, the Rome Statute. Far from going
against each other, one complements the other. As a
matter of fact, the principle of complementarity
underpins the creation of the ICC. As aptly pointed out
by the government and admitted by Bayan Muna, the
jurisdiction of the ICC is to "be complementary to
national criminal jurisdictions [of the signatory states]."
Nothing in the provisions of the Agreement, in relation
to the Rome Statute, tends to diminish the efficacy of
the Statute, let alone defeats the purpose of the ICC.
Lest it be overlooked, the Rome Statute contains a
proviso that enjoins the ICC from seeking the
surrender of an erring person, should the process
require the requested state to perform an act that
would violate some international agreement it has
entered into.
b.

Answer: No. Doubtless, the Framers of our

Constitution intended to create a JBC as an
innovative solution in response to the public clamor in
favor of eliminating politics in the appointment of
members of the Judiciary. To ensure judicial
independence, they adopted a holistic approach
and hoped that, in creating a JBC, the private
sector and the three branches of government
would have an active role and equal voice in the
selection of the members of the Judiciary.
Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more
quantitative influence in the JBC by having more
than one voice speak, whether with one full vote
or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would, as one former
congressman and member of the JBC put it,
"negate the principle of equality among the three
branches of government which is enshrined in the
Constitution. It is clear, therefore, that the
Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed
of seven (7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of
another member, whether with one whole vote or half
(1/2) of it, goes against that mandate. Section 8(1),
Article VIII of the Constitution, providing Congress
with an equal voice with other members of the JBC in
recommending appointees to the Judiciary is explicit.
Any circumvention of the constitutional mandate
should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the
supreme law of the land. (Chavez vs. JBC, July 17,
2012).

Does the above-mentioned Agreement require the

concurrence of the Senate to be effective?
Answer: Under international law, there is no
difference between treaties and executive
agreements in terms of their binding effects on
the contracting states concerned, as long as the
negotiating functionaries have remained within their
powers. Authorities are, however, agreed that one is
distinct from another for accepted reasons apart from
the concurrence-requirement aspect. As has been
observed by US constitutional scholars, a treaty has
greater "dignity" than an executive agreement,
because its constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a
treaty having behind it the authority of the President,
the Senate, and the people; a ratified treaty, unlike an
executive agreement, takes precedence over any
prior statutory enactment.
Bayan Muna parlays the notion that the Agreement is
of dubious validity, partaking as it does of the nature

Does the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the

1987 Constitution allow more than one (1) member of
Congress to sit in the JBC? Is the practice of having
two (2) representatives from each house of Congress
with one (1) vote each sanctioned by the
Constitution?

II.

What are the requisites of a Judicial Inquiry?

Answer: In constitutional litigations, the power of
judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites,
viz: (a) there must be an actual case or

controversy; (b) petitioners must possess locus

standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue
of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
(Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. vs.
Anti-Terrorism Council, 632 SCRA 146).
III. In the earlier mentioned case of COCOFED vs. Republic,
is the operative fact doctrine applicable because the
retroactive application to a declaration of
unconstitutionality would be unfair inasmuch as such
approach would penalize the farmers who merely
obeyed then valid laws?
Answer: The doctrine of operative fact, as an
exception to the general rule, only applies as a
matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the
effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing
that the existence of a statute prior to a
determination of unconstitutionality is an
operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always
be erased by a new judicial declaration. The dictates
of justice, fairness and equity do not support the claim
of the alleged farmer-owners that their ownership of
the UCPB shares should be respected.
First, said farmers or alleged claimants do not have
any legal right to own the UCPB shares
distributed to them. Second, to grant all the UCPB
shares to COCOFED and its alleged members would
be iniquitous and prejudicial to the remaining 4.6
million farmers who have not received any UCPB
shares when in fact they also made payments but did
not receive any receipt or who was not able to register
their receipts or misplaced them. Third, the
Sandiganbayan made the finding that due to
enormous operational problems and administrative
complications, the intended beneficiaries of the
UCPB shares were not able to receive the shares
due to them. Fourth, the Court also takes judicial
cognizance of the fact that a number, if not all, of
the coconut farmers who sold copra did not get
the receipts for the payment of the coconut levy
for the reason that the copra they produced were
bought by traders or middlemen who in turn sold
the same to the coconut mills. In addition, some
uninformed coconut farmers who actually got the
COCOFUND receipts, not appreciating the
importance and value of said receipts, have
already sold said receipts to non-coconut
farmers, thereby depriving them of the benefits
under the coconut levy laws. Ergo, the coconut
farmers are the ones who will not be benefited by the
distribution of the UCPB shares contrary to the policy
behind the coconut levy laws. (ibid).
IV. Under the Interim Rules Implementing the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, final decisions, xxx of the
Board of Energy (now the Energy Regulatory Board)
were made appealable to the IAC (Sec. 9). On 1987,
the President promulgated E.O. No. 172. Under Sec.
10 thereof, [a] party adversely affected by a decision,
order or ruling of the Board ... may file a petition to be
known as petition for review with the Supreme Court.
a.

Can the provision be validly enforced?

Answer: It is very patent that since Sec. 10 of E.O.
No. 172 was enacted without the advice and
concurrence of the Supreme Court, this provision
never became effective, with the result that it cannot
be deemed to have amended the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980. Consequently, the
authority of the Court of Appeals to decide cases from
the Board of Energy, now ERB, remains.

b.

Is the transfer of erroneous appeals from one court to

another the proper course of action if the appeal is
brought to either Court (Supreme Court or Court of
Appeals) by the wrong procedure?

Answer: If the appeal is brought to either Court

(Supreme Court or Court of Appeals) by the wrong
procedure, the only course of action open to it is
to dismiss the appeal. There is no longer any
justification for allowing transfers of erroneous
appeals from one court to another. (Diaz vs. CA,
December 5, 1994).
V.

The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees

imposed on GOCCs. The GSIS anchors its petition on
Section 39 of its charter, which provides that [t]axes
imposed on the GSIS tend to impair the actuarial
solvency of its funds and increase the contribution
rate necessary to sustain the benefits of this Act.
Accordingly, notwithstanding any laws to the contrary,
the GSIS, its assets, revenues including accruals
thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exempt from all
taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all
kinds. xxx.
a.

What is the basis of the Supreme Court in imposing

legal fees to litigants (including the GSIS)?
Answer: Rule 141 (on Legal Fees) of the Rules of
Court was promulgated by this Court in the exercise
of its rule-making powers under Section 5(5), Article
VIII of the Constitution: Sec. 5. The Supreme Court
shall have the following powers: x x x (5) Promulgate
rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, xxx.

VI. May the legislature exempt the Government Service

Insurance System (GSIS) from legal fees imposed by
the Court on government-owned and controlled
corporations and local government units?
Answer: The separation of powers among the three
co-equal branches of our government has erected an
impregnable wall that keeps the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure within the sole province of this Court.
The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if
they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal,
alter or modify any of the procedural rules
promulgated by this Court. Viewed from this
perspective, the claim of a legislative grant of
exemption from the payment of legal fees necessarily
fails.
Congress could not have carved out an exemption for
the GSIS from the payment of legal fees without
transgressing another equally important institutional
safeguard of the Courts independence fiscal
autonomy. Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power
and authority of the Court to levy, assess and
collect fees, including legal fees. (Re: Petition for
Recognition of the Exemption of the Government
Service Insurance System from Payment of Legal
Fees, 612 SCRA 193).
VII. Ranada filed an administrative complaint for Gross
Misconduct before the Office of the Ombudsman
against Captain Estarija. Consequently, the
Ombudsman ordered Estarijas preventive
suspension and directed him to answer the complaint.
The Ombudsman rendered a decision in the
administrative case, finding Estarija guilty of
dishonesty and grave misconduct. Estarija
seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration. He
raised the issue of constitutionality of Rep. Act No.
6770. The Ombudsman denied the motion for
reconsideration. The CA held that the attack on the
constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 6770 was
procedurally and substantially flawed. At the outset,
the CA held that the constitutional question on the
Ombudsmans power cannot be entertained because
it was not pleaded at the earliest opportunity. The CA
said that Estarija had every opportunity to raise the
same in his pleadings and during the course of the
trial. Instead, it was only after the adverse decision of
the Ombudsman that he was prompted to assail the

power of the Ombudsman in his motion for

reconsideration.

importance and immediately affects the social,

economic and moral well being of the people. The
instant petition does not allege circumstances and
issues of transcendental importance to the public
requiring their prompt and definite resolution and the
brushing aside of technicalities of procedure. Neither
is the Court convinced that the issues presented in
this petition are of such nature that would nudge the
lower courts to defer to the higher judgment of this
Court. (Moldex Realty, Inc. vs. HLURB, 525 SCRA
198).

One of the requisites for judicial review is that the

issue of constitutionality be raised at the earliest
opportunity. So when is it? Should the issue of
constitutionality of a law be raised in the
Ombudsman?
Answer: Verily, the Ombudsman has no
jurisdiction to entertain questions on the
constitutionality of a law. Thus, when Estarija
raised the issue of constitutionality of Rep. Act
No. 6770 before the Court of Appeals, which is the
competent court, the constitutional question was
raised at the earliest opportune time. (Estarija vs.
Ranada, 492 SCRA 652).
VIII. Moldex claims that since the completion of the subdivision,
it had been subsidizing and advancing the payment
for the delivery and maintenance of common facilities
including the operation of streetlights and the
payment of the corresponding electric bills. However,
Moldex decided to stop paying the electric bills for the
streetlights and advised the homeowners association
to assume this obligation.

IX. PPI and Fertiphil are private corporations incorporated

under Philippine laws. They are both engaged in the
importation and distribution of fertilizers, pesticides
and agricultural chemicals. Then President Marcos,
exercising his legislative powers, issued LOI No. 1465
which provided, among others, for the imposition of a
capital recovery component (CRC) on the domestic
sale of all grades of fertilizers in the Philippines.
The LOI provides that [t]he Administrator of the
Fertilizer Pesticide Authority to include in its fertilizer
pricing formula a capital contribution component of
not less than P10 per bag. This capital contribution
shall be collected until adequate capital is raised to
make PPI viable. Such capital contribution shall be
applied by FPA to all domestic sales of fertilizers in
the Philippines. Pursuant to the LOI, Fertiphil paid
P10 for every bag of fertilizer it sold in the domestic
market to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA).
FPA then remitted the amount collected to the Far
East Bank and Trust Company, the depositary bank of
PPI. After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily
stopped the imposition of the P10 levy. With the return
of democracy, Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund
of the amounts it paid under LOI No. 1465, but PPI
refused to accede to the demand. The Court declared
LOI unconstitutional. Should Planters Products return
what it received, or should it be excused by invoking
the operative doctrine?

The association objected to Moldexs resolution and

refused to pay the electric bills. Thus, Meralco
discontinued its service, prompting the association to
apply for a preliminary injunction and preliminary
mandatory injunction with the HLURB against Moldex.
HLURB issued a Resolution granting the associations
application for injunction by citing HUDCC Resolution
No. R-562, series of 1994. HUDCC Resolution No. R562, series of 1994, particularly provides that
"subdivision owners/developers shall continue to
maintain street lights facilities and, unless otherwise
stipulated in the contract, pay the bills for electric
consumption of the subdivision street lights until the
facilities in the project are turned over to the local
government until after completion of development in
accordance with PD 957, PD 1216 and their
implementing rules and regulations." Moldex moved
for reconsideration but was rebuffed. Moldex elevated
the matter to the CA including the nullification of
HUDCC Resolution No. R-562, series of 1994, on the
ground that it is unconstitutional. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground that
Moldex should have raised the constitutionality of the
questioned resolution directly to the Supreme Court.
Is the action of the CA valid?
Answer: When an administrative regulation is
attacked for being unconstitutional or invalid, a
party may raise its unconstitutionality or invalidity
on every occasion that the regulation is being
enforced. For the Court to exercise its power of
judicial review, the party assailing the regulation must
show that the question of constitutionality has
been raised at the earliest opportunity. This
requisite should not be taken to mean that the
question of constitutionality must be raised
immediately after the execution of the state action
complained of. That the question of constitutionality
has not been raised before is not a valid reason for
refusing to allow it to be raised later. A contrary rule
would mean that a law, otherwise
unconstitutional, would lapse into
constitutionality by the mere failure of the proper
party to promptly file a case to challenge the
same.
It must be emphasized that the Supreme Court does
not have exclusive original jurisdiction over
petitions assailing the constitutionality of a law or
an administrative regulation. The general rule is
that the Supreme Court shall exercise only
appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the
constitutionality of a statute, treaty or regulation,
except in circumstances where the Court believes that
resolving the issue of constitutionality of a law or
regulation at the first instance is of paramount

Answer: The doctrine is inapplicable. The general

rule is that an unconstitutional law is void. It
produces no rights, imposes no duties and
affords no protection. It has no legal effect. It is, in
legal contemplation, inoperative as if it has not been
passed. Being void, Fertiphil is not required to pay the
levy. All levies paid should be refunded in accordance
with the general civil code principle against unjust
enrichment.
The court does not find anything iniquitous in ordering
PPI to refund the amounts paid by Fertiphil under LOI
No. 1465. It unduly benefited from the levy. It was
proven during the trial that the levies paid were
remitted and deposited to its bank account. Quite the
reverse, it would be inequitable and unjust not to
order a refund. To do so would unjustly enrich PPI at
the expense of Fertiphil. The Court cannot allow PPI
to profit from an unconstitutional law. Justice and
equity dictate that PPI must refund the amounts paid
by Fertiphil. (Planters Products, Inc. vs. Fertiphil
Corporation, 548 SCRA 485).
X.

Castro was charged by the Ombudsman before the RTC

with Malversation of Public Funds. Castro pleaded
NOT GUILTY when arraigned. On August 31, 2001,
Castro filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds of lack
of jurisdiction and lack of authority of the Ombudsman
to conduct the preliminary investigation and file the
Information. Citing Uy vs. Sandiganbayan, Castro
further argued that as she was a public employee with
salary grade 27, the case filed against her was
cognizable by the RTC and may be investigated and
prosecuted only by the public prosecutor, and not by
the Ombudsman whose prosecutorial power was
limited to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
The RTC sustained the prosecutorial authority of the
Ombudsman, pointing out that in Uy, upon motion for
clarification filed by the Ombudsman, the Court set
aside its earlier decision and issued a March 20, 2001
Resolution expressly recognizing the prosecutorial

and investigatory authority of the Ombudsman in

cases cognizable by the RTC. When the Information
for Malversation of Public Funds was instituted
against the Castro, can the Ombudsman file the same
in light of this SCs ruling in the First "Uy vs.
Sandiganbayan" case, which declared that the
prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman is limited to
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan? Can the
clarificatory Resolution issued by the SC in the Uy vs.
Sandiganbayan case be made applicable to the
Castro, without violating the constitutional provision
on ex-post facto laws and denial of the accused to
due process?

a.

b.

Can the COMELEC cite in contempt members of the

SC?

Answer: A judicial interpretation of a statute, such

as the Ombudsman Act, constitutes part of that law
as of the date of its original passage. Such
interpretation does not create a new law but
construes a pre-existing one; it merely casts light
upon the contemporaneous legislative intent of that
law. Hence, the March 20, 2001 Resolution of the
Court in Uy interpreting the Ombudsman Act is
deemed part of the law as of the date of its effectivity
on December 7, 1989. Where no law is invalidated
nor doctrine abandoned, a judicial interpretation
of the law should be deemed incorporated at the
moment of its legislation. In the present case, the
March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy made no declaration
of unconstitutionality of any law nor did it vacate a
doctrine long held by the Court and relied upon by the
public. Rather, it set aside an erroneous pubescent
interpretation of the Ombudsman Act. Its effect has
therefore been held by the Court to reach back to
validate investigatory and prosecutorial processes
conducted by the Ombudsman, such as the filing of
the Information against Castro. (Castro vs. Deloria,
577 SCRA 20).
XI. An Investigating Committee was created to investigate the
unauthorized release of the unpromulgated ponencia
of Justice Ruben T. Reyes in the consolidated
Limkaichong cases to determine who are responsible
for the leakage of a confidential internal document of
the En Banc. Earlier, nine Justices, not counting the
Chief Justice, would concur only in the result. Thus,
the Justices unanimously decided to withhold the
promulgation of the said unpromulgated ponencia.
The findings of the committee said that more than
substantial evidence which reasonably points to
Justice Reyes, despite his protestations of innocence,
as the source of the leak. He must, therefore, be held
liable for GRAVE MISCONDUCT. Will the subsequent
retirement of a justice from service preclude the
finding of administrative liability to which he/she is
answerable?
Answer: The subsequent retirement of a judge or
any judicial officer from the service does not
preclude the finding of any administrative liability
to which he is answerable. A case becomes moot
and academic only when there is no more actual
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose
can be served in passing upon the merits of the case.
The instant case is not moot and academic, despite
Justice Reyess retirement. Even if the most severe of
administrative sanctions may no longer be imposed,
there are other penalties which may be imposed if
one is later found guilty of the administrative offenses
charged, including the disqualification to hold any
government office and the forfeiture of benefits.
The fact that Justice Reyes was not formally charged
is of no moment. It is settled that under the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, the Court may impose its
authority upon erring judges whose actuations,
on their face, would show gross incompetence,
ignorance of the law or misconduct. (In Re:
Undated Letter of Mr. Louis C. Biraogo, Petitioner in
Biraogo vs. Nograles and Limkaichong, 580 SCRA
106).
XII. In its 38-page Resolution, the COMELEC First Division
basically insinuates two points as follows:

That it possesses the power to hold in contempt the

Chief Justice and some Associate Justices for their
participation and vote in decisions and orders of this
Court, which allegedly interfered with or impeded the
proceedings of the Commission; and
That it had in fact determined the "existence of
sufficient grounds to declare respondents in contempt
of [the] Commission and to 'impose the proper
penalty," were it not for the fact that the Justices were
impeachable officers who "must first be removed from
office by impeachment before any punitive measure
may be imposed against them.

Answer: The Commission has no jurisdiction to

hold the Court or any of its Members in contempt
for any, decision, order or official action they issue.
The SC has the authority to pass upon, modify or
reverse the quasi-judicial actions of the COMELEC is
UNQUESTIONED. The fact that Supreme Court
Justices are impeachable officers should not be the
ground for the COMELEC's dismissal of the contempt
charges. Rather, they cannot be held liable for
contempt, because their herein questioned Decision,
Resolution, and Order that have allegedly interfered
with, proceedings of the COMELEC were made
pursuant to their constitutional function. The SC has
the inherent authority to enforce its orders and to
hold the COMELEC's Chairman and
Commissioners in contempt when they impede,
obstruct, or degrade its proceedings or orders, or
disobey, ignore or otherwise offend its dignity.
Clearly, the COMELEC has no reciprocal
constitutional power to pass upon the actions of
this Court or its Members. Hence, the Commission
has absolutely no authority to hold them in contempt
as an incident of its inexistent power of review. While
the COMELEC is given specific powers and functions
by the Constitution, the Commission does not have
the same level and standing as the three great
branches of government. (Re: EM No. 03-010
Order of the First Division of COMELEC dated Aug.
15, 2003, A.M. No. 03-8-22 SC, Sept. 16, 2003).
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
I.

Does the system under which various forms of

Congressional Pork Barrel operate defy public
accountability as it renders Congress incapable of
checking itself or its Members?
Answer: Certain features embedded in some forms
of Congressional Pork Barrel, among others the 2013
PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional
oversight. The fact that individual legislators are given
post-enactment roles in the implementation of the
budget makes it difficult for them to become
disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing,
investigating or monitoring the implementation of the
appropriation law. To a certain extent, the conduct of
oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are
vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect,
be checking on activities in which they themselves
participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this very
same concept of post-enactment authorization runs
afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which provides that:
Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may personally appear as counsel
before any court of justice or before the Electoral
Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative
bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be
interested financially in any contract with, or in any
franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any governmentowned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary,
during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any
matter before any office of the Government for his

pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to

act on account of his office.

Thereafter, the Secretary General transmitted the

Reyes groups complaint to Speaker Belmonte who
also directed the Committee on Rules to include it in
the Order of Business. Thereafter, the House of
Representatives simultaneously referred both
complaints to the Committee of Justice. After hearing,
the committee found both complaints sufficient in form
and substance, which complaints it considered to
have been referred to it at exactly the same time.
Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings of the 15th Congress was published.
Ombudsman Gutierrez applied for injunctive reliefs
with the SC. A status quo order was issued by the
Court en banc.

Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the

various phases of project implementation a
matter before another office of government
renders them susceptible to taking undue
advantage of their own office. (ibid).
II.

What is the correct interpretation of the term "initiate in

Section 3(1), Article XI which provides that [t]he
House of Representatives shall have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment?
Answer: From the records of the Constitutional
Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former
Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt
that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress'
taking initial action of said complaint. Having
concluded that the initiation takes place by the act
of filing and referral or endorsement of the
impeachment complaint to the House Committee
on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of
the members of the House of Representatives
with the Secretary General of the House, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear.
Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated, another impeachment complaint may not
be filed against the same official within a one year
period. (Francisco vs. The House of Representatives,
et al., Nov. 10, 2003).

III. Before the 15th Congress opened its first session the
Baraquel group filed an impeachment complaint
against Ombudsman Gutierrez, upon the
endorsement of Party-List Representatives Bagao
and Bello. A day after the opening of the 15th
Congress, the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives, transmitted the impeachment
complaint to House Speaker who directed the
Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of
Business. On another date, the Reyes group filed
another impeachment complaint against the
Ombudsman with a resolution of endorsement by
another group of Party-List Representatives. On even
date, the House of Representatives provisionally
adopted the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings of the 14th Congress.

a.

Is the act of simultaneously referring to the Committee

on Justice two impeachment complaints violative of
the one-year bar rule?
Answer: Contrary to the Ombudsmans asseveration,
Francisco states that the term "initiate" means to file
the complaint and take initial action on it. The
initiation starts with the filing of the complaint
which must be accompanied with an action to set
the complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress
taking initial action of said complaint. The initial
action taken by the House on the complaint is the
referral of the complaint to the Committee on
Justice.

b.

Is the absence of publication in official Gazette or

newspaper of general circulation amount to violation
of due process? (Note that the Impeachment Rules
was published only on September 2, 2010 a day after
the committee ruled on the sufficiency of form of the
complaints).
Answer: No. Article XI Section 3(8) provides that
[t]he Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of
this section. Since the Constitutional Commission did
not restrict "promulgation" to "publication," the
former should be understood to have been used in its
general sense. It is within the discretion of
Congress to determine on how to promulgate its
Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the
Judiciary is permitted to determine that to promulgate
a decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk
of court for filing and publication. (Gutierrez vs. The
House of Representatives, Feb. 15, 2011).