The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets

Tito Boeri
October 2010

Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours (2008)

The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets
Princeton University Press

Chapter 5. Regulation of working hours

Source: Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours (2008), The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, Princeton University Press.

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Working Hours What Are We Talking About

Regulation of working hours: What are we talking

about?

May 1, 1886 day of strikes in the US for the introduction of

eight-hours working day
8 hours products
May 1 Labor Day
Working hours per week declining
Working weeks per year declining
Part-time labor

Source: Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours (2008), The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, Princeton University Press.

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Working Hours What Are We Talking About

Overlaps with other institutions

Collective bargaining and unions tradeoffs wages & hours

Family policies balancing work and family life
Employment protection legislation adjustment costs

Source: Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours (2008), The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, Princeton University Press.

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Working Hours What Are We Talking About

Measures

Intensive margin of labor supply working hours (per week)

Legal restrictions
Normal working week
Maximum number of overtime hours
Overtime premiums
Sometimes specified over calendar time period

Bargained normal hours

Share of part-time work in total employment

Source: Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours (2008), The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, Princeton University Press.

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Working Hours Measures and Cross Country Comparisons

Cross-country comparison

In many countries: normal working week is 40 hours

Wide variation in maximum weekly overtime hours: 2 (Spain), 15
(Netherlands)
Also wide variation in maximum total working hours
Overtime premiums mostly 25-50%, sometimes 100%
Normal weekly hours set by collective bargaining often
substantially lower than legal maximum

Source: Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours (2008), The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, Princeton University Press.

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Working Hours Measures and Cross Country Comparisons

Cross-country information on working hours

Legal maxima on working hours

Normal Overtime Maximum
Denmark
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Spain
UK
US

37
39
48
48
45
40
none
40

none
9
12
12
15
2
none
none

48
48
60
60
60
47
none
none

Bargained
normal
hours
37
39
35-39
36-40
36-40
38-40
34-40
35-40

Premium
overtime
(% )
50
25
25
10

50

Source: Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours (2008), The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, Princeton University Press.

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Working Hours Theory

Theory

Choice of number of hours on the basis of the hourly wage rate

and preferences for leisure and income
Working hours per day, working days per week, workweeks per
year, working years over lifetime
Choice of working hours often restricted to a limited set, most
commonly full-time, part-time and no-time

Source: Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours (2008), The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, Princeton University Press.

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Working Hours Theory

Theory - regulating working hours

Shorter working hours less unemployment?

Lump of labor fallacy
Iso-hours curve may shift: total hours of work is reduced with the
introduction of shorter working hours

Source: Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours (2008), The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, Princeton University Press.

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Working Hours Theory

h1
h2

h1L1 = h2L2

L1

L2

Source: Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours (2008), The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, Princeton University Press.

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Working Hours Theory

h1
h2

h1L1
h2L2

L2

L1

Source: Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours (2008), The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, Princeton University Press.

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Working Hours Theory

Theory - regulating working hours II

If overtime hours pay a higher wage: iso-wage-cost curve no

longer equivalent to iso-hours curve
Kink in iso-wage-cost curve
If working time is reduced, workers often bargain an hourly wage
increase to keep the weekly wage constant

Source: Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours (2008), The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, Princeton University Press.

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Working Hours Theory

h1

D
C

h2
E

Source: Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours (2008), The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, Princeton University Press.

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Working Hours Theory

Theory - part-time work

If only full-time jobs are available, introduction of part-time jobs

increases labor supply
Outward shift of labor supply curve lowers wages and reduces
full-time employment
Introduction of part-time jobs may also shift the labor demand
curve

Source: Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours (2008), The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, Princeton University Press.

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Working Hours Theory

UNP

Labor income

UFT
C

Budget line
A

hFT
Leisure (hours)

Source: Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours (2008), The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, Princeton University Press.

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Working Hours Theory

UPT
UNP

Labor income

UFT
C

Budget line

A
B
E

hPT

hFT
Leisure (hours)

Source: Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours (2008), The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, Princeton University Press.

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Working Hours Theory

w
LS = FT
LD

LS = FT+PT

w0
w1

PT

L0

L1

Source: Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours (2008), The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, Princeton University Press.

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Working Hours Theory

LD2
LS = FT
LD1

LS = FT+PT

w1
w0

PT

L0

L1

Source: Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours (2008), The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, Princeton University Press.

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Working Hours Empirical evidence

Empirical evidence - hours of work

Substantial decline in hours of work between 1955 and 2005

Substantial cross-country differences in annual working hours in
2005: 1409 (Netherlands), 1790 (US)
Anatomy of typical workweek:
Weekly hours: 31.8 (Netherlands), 38.8 (Spain)
Workweeks per year: 38.4 (Netherlands), 42.2 (Spain)

Source: Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours (2008), The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, Princeton University Press.

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Working Hours Empirical evidence

Working hours

Annual hours
1955
2005
Denmark
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Spain
UK
US

2070
2040
2265
1958
2207
2041
2156
2030

1552
1434
1437
1592
1409
1774
1624
1790

Average
annual
change
-10.4
-12.1
-16.6
-7.3
-16.0
-5.3
-10.6
-4.8

Anatomy 2002
Hours
Weeks
Hours
per week per year per year
36.3
38.9
1410
36.2
40.5
1467
36.5
40.6
1480
37.4
41.0
1533
31.8
38.4
1223
38.8
42.2
1639
38.2
40.5
1546

Source: Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours (2008), The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, Princeton University Press.

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Working Hours Empirical evidence

Box 5.1 Mandatory reduction working hours in France

Francois Mitterrand (elected 1981) - 1982:

Workweek 40 to 39 hours
Without loss in workers pay
Intention to reduce to 35 hours in 1985 (not implemented because
of economic situation)

Mandatory nominal (weekly) wage rigidity for current minimum

wage workers: newly hired workers 2.5% cheaper (double wage
structure)

Crepon
and Kramarz (2002): use 39 hours April 1982 as control
group, 40 hours as treatment group

Source: Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours (2008), The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, Princeton University Press.

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Working Hours Empirical evidence

Crepon
and Kramarz (2002)

Probability to loose job (% ):

1982-84 1985-87
40 hours
16.5
11.9
39 hours
12.6
12.1
Diff.
3.9
-0.2

Diff.
4.6
0.5
4.1

So: 4.1% job loss on average due to reduction in working hours

For low-wage workers for whom the reduction in hours was
associated with monthly pay rigidity: 8.4% points
Quite high as the reduction in working hours was only 2.5% (1
hour from 40)

Source: Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours (2008), The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, Princeton University Press.

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Working Hours Empirical evidence

and Sa (2008)
Additional evidence France Estevao

Lionel Jospin: 1998 workweek to 35 hours:

February 2000: large firms (> 19 workers)
January 2002: small firms (< 20 workers)

Government not stupid: also measures to reduce labor costs:

Small firms: overtime premiums reduced
Social rebates were offered
More flexible accounting of overtime work (annual in stead of
weekly)

Argument = reduction in labor costs & increase in productivity:

no need to cut monthly wages

Source: Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours (2008), The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, Princeton University Press.

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Working Hours Empirical evidence

and Sa (2008)
Additional evidence France Estevao

Treatment group: large firms (20-49 workers)

Control group (up to 2002): small firms
Study wage effects (hourly, monthly), employment (level, inflow,
outflow), dual job holdings, job satisfaction
Working 35 hours (% )

1998
1999
2000
2001
2002

Small firms
26.3
27.1
31.4
34.3
57.3

Large firms
25.9
27.6
43.6
52.1
60.4

Difference
-0.4
0.5
11.2
17.8
3.1

Source: Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours (2008), The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, Princeton University Press.

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Working Hours Empirical evidence

Effects dif-in-dif estimates

Difference in differences estimate:
Usual hours
Hourly wage (% )
Men
Women Men
Women
1998
0.2
-1.0
0.9
-0.4
1999
-0.6
-0.7
2.1
-1.7
2000
-0.6
-1.7
3.4
1.3
2001
-1.2
-1.3
3.7
2.0
2002
-0.9
-0.3
3.0
0.0

Monthly wage (% )
Men
Women
0.2
-0.4
0.6
0.2
0.5
-0.4
1.1
-0.8
0.3
0.1

Furthermore:
Hardly any effect on dual jobs
More turnover
No employment effects
Less satisfaction about hours (except for high income women)
Source: Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours (2008), The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, Princeton University Press.

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Working Hours Empirical evidence

Part-time jobs (% )

Part-time jobs (% )

Denmark
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Spain
UK
US

Part-time
Men
Women
12.0
24.9
5.3
23.3
7.4
39.4
5.3
29.2
15.3
60.9
4.2
22.2
10.0
39.3
7.8
18.3

Involuntary PT
Men
Women
13.1
13.9
52.9
38.8
17.8
12.6
8.2

4.6

23.8
7.4

9.5
8.0

PT prefer FT
Men
Women
69
8
69
35
52
12
83
42
25
7
36
37
72
22

FT prefer PT
Men
Women
7
21
11
25
5
10
22
32
13
23
8
14
3
9

Source: Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours (2008), The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, Princeton University Press.

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Working Hours Empirical evidence

How to appreciate part-time jobs?

Old discussion see Sundstrm (1991)

Negative view: trap leading to marginalization of women
Positive view: provide opportunity for continuous employment for
those women for whom fulltime work is not possible

Source: Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours (2008), The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, Princeton University Press.

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Working Hours Empirical evidence

Changes in employment rate 1997-2007

25
SP

Total

20
15
NL

IT

10

BE
FR
FI AU

CA
SW
NZ PO
UK

5
NO

0
-6

-4

-2

GE

SU

DK

4
6
Parttime

10

12

14

Source: Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours (2008), The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, Princeton University Press.

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Working Hours Empirical evidence

Changes in employment rate 1997-2007

25
SP

20

Total

15
NL

IT

10

BE
FR
FI AU

CA

SW
NZ PO
DK
UK

5
NO

0
-6

-4

-2

GE

SU

4
6
Parttime

10

12

14

Source: Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours (2008), The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, Princeton University Press.

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Working Hours Empirical evidence

Involuntary part-time work

35

Percentage involuntary PT

30

IT

SP
CA

25
FR

AU

20
NZ
GE

15
10

DK

BE

SW

UK
NO

5
0
10

15

20

25

30

35

40

NL

45

50

55

Percentage PT
Source: Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours (2008), The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, Princeton University Press.

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Working Hours Empirical evidence

Involuntary part-time work

35

Percentage involuntary PT

30

IT

SP
CA

25
FR

20

AU
NZ
GE

15
DK BE

10

SW
UK
NO

5
0
10

15

20

25

30
35
Percentage PT

40

45

NL

50

55

Source: Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours (2008), The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, Princeton University Press.

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Working Hours Policy issues

Policy issue 1:
Should governments regulate working hours?

Efficiency reasons:
If employers have monopsony power working time reduction (over
a small range) increase in employment
Negative externalities without regulation rat race

Employment is not a lump-of-labor that can be redistributed at no

costs
Difficult to find strong arguments in favor of government
intervention

Source: Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours (2008), The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, Princeton University Press.

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Working Hours Policy issues

Policy issue 2:
Should governments stimulate part-time labor?

Cross-country differences due to differences in institutional

arrangements and union resistance
Growth of part-time jobs may stimulate full-time employment
(Netherlands)
Part-time jobs may facilitate combination of work and care

Source: Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours (2008), The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, Princeton University Press.

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Why Does Regulation of Working Hours Exist?

Why does regulation of working hours exist?

Hours of work is rarely the outcome of a market process

Market failures: conflicting preferences of workers and employers,
institutional restrictions
Unions only represent interests of their workers
Governments may influence hours of work for social reasons
(family life) or because they want to influence composition of
unemployment (early retirement schemes)

Source: Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours (2008), The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, Princeton University Press.

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Review Questions

Review Questions

Under what conditions does work sharing lead to an increase in

employment, and how plausible are these conditions?

Why do firms employ part-time workers instead of full-time

workers?

How does overtime work affect the trade-off between hours and
workers?

Why do overtime premiums exist?

What happens if the standard working week is reduced in a

situation where workers work overtime?

Source: Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours (2008), The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, Princeton University Press.

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