AZNAR vs.

GARCIA
G.R. No. L-16749
January 31, 1963

FACTS: EDWARD Christensen died testate. The estate was distributed by Executioner Aznar according to the will, which provides that: Php 3,600 be given
to HELEN Christensen as her legacy, and the rest of his estate to his daughter LUCY Christensen, as pronounced by CFI Davao.

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen, insofar as it deprives her of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she
having been declared by Us an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward in an earlier case.

As to his citizenship, we find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he resided in Sacramento from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay
in the Philippines, and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will he declared that
he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. But at the time of his
death, he was domiciled in the Philippines.

ISSUE: what law on succession should apply, the Philippine law or the California law?

HELD: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as
the Philippine law on succession provides.

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature
of the property and regardless of the country where said property may be found.

The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the term national law is used therein.

The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property?
The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by
will in the form and manner he desires. But HELEN invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of
his domicile.

It is argued on executors behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the
Kaufman case, should govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensens will, such law being in force in the State of
California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and
following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the decedents
domicile, which is the Philippines.

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, its internal law. If the law on succ
ession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re
Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other
jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the
general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law is the internal law of California. But as above
explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other
jurisdictions.

It is argued on appellees (Aznar and LUCY) behalf that the clause if there is no law to the contrary in the place where the property is situated in Sec. 946
of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said
Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained.

As explained in the various authorities cited above, the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California
Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testators domicile. The conflict of laws rule in
California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines
in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of
determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a
citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the
question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts.
887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Edward, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving
his acknowledged natural child, the appellant HELEN, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of
California, not by the internal law of California..

NOTES: There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having its own
private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. The national law indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can
not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.

PILAPIL vs. HON IBAY-SOMERA, VICTOR AND GEILING et al

G.R. No. 80116
June 30, 1989

FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a German national, were married in Germany. After about three
and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in Geiling initiating a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany. The Local Court,
Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.

More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging in one that,
while still married to said Geiling, Pilapil had an affair with a certain William Chia. The Assistant Fiscal, after the corresponding investigation,
recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal Victor approved a
resolution directing the filing of 2 complaint for adultery against the petitioner. The case entitled PP Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia was assigned to the
court presided by the respondent judge Ibay-Somera.

A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was denied by the respondent. Pilapil filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a
prayer for a TRO, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.

As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the
criminal action for adultery.

ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing of the complaint for adultery, considering that it was done after obtaining a divorce decree?

HELD: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioners MTQ is SET ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. The TRO issued in this case is hereby made permanent.

NO

Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long
since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status,
capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a logical consequence since the raison detre of said provision
of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case.

Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the
complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its
legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter
of status of persons Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

VAN DORN vs. HON. ROMILLO and RICHARD UPTON

G.R. No. L-68470
October 8, 1985

FACTS: Petitioner Alice Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the USA. They were married in
Hongkong in 1972 and begot two children. The parties were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982. Alice has then re-married also in Nevada, this time to
Theodore Van Dorn.

In 1983, Richard filed suit against Alice in the RTC-Pasay, stating that Alices business in Ermita, Manila is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that
Alice be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that Richard be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.

Alice moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court
wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had no community property as of June 11, 1982.
The Court below (presiding judge: Judge Romillo) denied the MTD in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the
Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.

ISSUE: What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines?

HELD: Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint

For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between Alice and Richard, after their marriage, were upon
absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce
of the parties.

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of
the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who authorized his attorneys in the divorce case to agree to the divorce on the ground of
incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community property nor community obligations.

As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD. to represent him in the divorce proceedings:

xxx xxx xxx

You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf and do all things necessary and proper to represent me,
without further contesting, subject to the following:

1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.

2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. That there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and
public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as
petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property.

GERBERT R. CORPUZ vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL
G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010

Facts: Petitioner (Gerbert Corpuz) is a former Filipino citizen who became a Canadian citizen through naturalization. Subsequently, the petitioner married the
respondent (Daisylyn Sto. Tomas), a Filipina, in Pasig City. After the wedding, petitioner went back to Canada due to work commitments; however, when he
came back he was shocked to discover that the respondent is having an affair with another man. Thus, petitioner went back to Canada and filed a petition for
divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted the petitioners petition for divorce. The divorce decree took effect a month later,
January 8, 2006.

Two years later, the petitioner has already moved on and found another woman that he wants to marry. Thus, for his love to his fiance; the petitioner went to
the Pasig Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and the respondents marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the
divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed the petitioner that the marriage between him and the respondent still subsists

under the Philippine Law and to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to
NSO Circular No. 4, Series of 1982.

Accordingly, the petitioner filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage dissolved with the RTC. The RTC denied
his petition, hence this recourse by the petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

Ruling: No.

Even though the trial court is correct in its conclusion that the alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as
the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse due to the given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and as such the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code limits its applicability for the benefit of the Filipino spouse.
However, we qualify the above conclusion made by the trial court because in our jurisdiction, the foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right
that clothes the party with legal interest to petitions for its recognition. Even though, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights
in favor of aliens- with the complementary statement that his conclusion is not a sufficient basis to dismiss the petition filed by Corpuz before the RTC. the
unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly
proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render
the judgment or final order is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact.

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action
before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments
and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another
country. This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the
purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be
official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official
publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country
in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to
include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting

evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce
law.

We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious
conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners
presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state,
every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the
effect of res judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect
of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This
same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree.

FROM ATTY. DOBLADA^^

56 SCRA 266 Civil Law Preliminary Title Application of Laws Nationality Principle

In November 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen from Texas made a will. In May 1957, while she was domiciled here in the Philippines (Iloilo
City), she died.

In her will, she left all her estate in favor of her husband, Charles Newton Hodges. Linnie however also stated in her will that should her husband later die,
said estate shall be turned over to her brother and sister.

In December 1962, Charles died (it appears he was also domiciled here). Atty. Leon Gellada, the lawyer of Charles filed a motion before the probate court
(there was an ongoing probate on the will of Linnie) so that a certain Avelina Magno may be appointed as the administratrix of the estate. Magno was the
trusted employee of the Hodges when they were alive. Atty. Gellada manifested that Charles himself left a will but the same was in an iron trunk in Charles
office. Hence, in the meantime, hed like to have Magno appointed as administratrix. Judge Venicio Escolin approved the motion.

Later, Charles will was found and so a new petition for probate was filed for the said will. Since said will basically covers the same estate, Magno, as
admininistratrix of Linnies estate opposed the said petition. Eventually, the probate of Charles will was granted. Eventually still, the Philippine Commercial
and Industrial Bank was appointed as administrator. But Magno refused to turn over the estate.

Magno contended that in her will, Linnie wanted Charles to turn over the property to Linnies brother and sister and since that is her will, the same must be
respected. Magno also contended that Linnie was a Texan at the time of her death (an alien testator); that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, successional
rights are governed by Linnies national law; that under Texas law, Linnies will shall be respected regardless of the presence of legitimes (Charles share in
the estate).

PCIB argued that the law of Texas refers the matter back to Philippine laws because Linnie was domiciled outside Texas at the time of her death (applying the
renvoi doctrine).

ISSUE: Whether or not Texas Law should apply.

HELD: The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the lower court. Both parties failed to adduce proof as to the law of Texas. The Supreme Court held
that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact to be resolved by the evidence that would be presented in the probate court. The Supreme
Court however emphasized that Texas law at the time of Linnies death is the law applicable (and not said law at any other time). NOTE: Dynamics of law.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, G. R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,
G. R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

Facts:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboaga del Sur, Branch 23, granting
respondents petition for authority to remarry invoking par. 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva were married in Lam-an, Ozamis City and were blessed with a son and a daughter. In
1986, Lady Myros left for the U. S. bringing along their son and after a few years she was naturalized as an American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido learned from his son who was living with his wife in the States that his wife had remarried after obtaining her
divorce decree. Thereafter, he filed a petition for authority to remarry with the trial court invoking par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code.

Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur granted the petition of the respondent and allowed him to remarry.

The Solicitor Generals motion for reconsideration was denied. In view of that, petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court. Herein petitioner raised the issue of the applicability of Art. 26 par. 2 to the instant case.

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER THE ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

Held:

Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed to submit competent evidence showing his allegations that his naturalized American wife had
obtained a divorce decree and had remarried. Therefore, the Petition of the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the
RTC Br. 32 of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur is hereby SET ASIDE.

Art. 26 (2) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under the Philippine laws.

Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an
American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the
U. S. A. Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art. 26 does not apply to the instant case.

However, the legislative intent must be taken into consideration and rule of reason must be applied. The Supreme Court ruled that par. 2 of Art. 26 should be
construed and interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of then
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be sanction absurdity and injustice. Were the interpretation of a statute
according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according
to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A stature may therefore be extended to case not within the literal meaning of its
terms, so long as they come within its spirits or intent.

SANTOS, JEWELLE ANN LOU P.2009-31291PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

PAULA T. LLORENTE v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000Petitioner: PAULA T. LLORENTERespondents: COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE
FACTS
The petition alleged the following:-

On February 22, 1937, Lorenco N. Llorente, an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy,and petitioner Paula Llorente were married before a Catholic
priest in Nabua, Camarines Sur.-

On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship.-

Lorenzo discovered that the petitioner Paula was having an adulterous relationship with this brother; thus he returned to the United States and filed for
divorce which was granted by theSuperior Court of the State of California on November 27, 1951 and became final in December 4,1952.-

On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married the private defendant Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. Theunion produced three children

Raul, Luz and Beverly.-

On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament which bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children and appointing the
private defendant as the soleexecutor of the will.-

On June 11, 1985, Lorenzo died.-

On September 4, 1985, Paula filed a petition for letters of adm

inistration over Lorenzos estate in
her favour since (1)
she was Lorenzos surviving spouse, (2) the property were acquired during
their marriage, (3) and the will encroaches here legitimate and share of the conjugal property.-

On May 18, 1987, the RTC ruled in favour of the petitioner since the divorce decree is void andinapplicable to the Philippines and that the defendant is not
entitled to any share from the estate.-

On July 31, 1995, Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts decision with modificat
ion that thedefendant would be a co-owner of properties Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation.-

Petitioner filed for a motion for reconsideration which is denied due to lack of merit.
ISSUES
1.

Whether the divorce obtained by Lorenzo Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid andrecognized under Philippine jurisdiction2.

Whether the Last Will and Testament of Lorenzo Llorente is valid

HELD
1.

As a matter of comity, divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in viewof the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of
persons or
lex patriae
.2.

As per Art. 17 of the Civil Code, The forms and solemnities of

contracts, wills, and other public
instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed. Whether
the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required by the Philippine law, the willwas duly probated.Hence, the petition is granted and decision
of the Court of Appeals is set aside.

ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL and MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH-KUWAITPetitioners, vs. MA. JOSEFA ECHIN,
Respondent.G.R. No. 178551October 11, 2010
FACTS:
Respondent Echin was hired by petitioner ATCI in behalf of its principal co-petitioner, Ministry of PublicHealth of Kuwait, for the position of medical
technologist under a two-year contract with a monthlysalary of US$1,200.00.Within a year, Respondent was terminated for not passing the
probationaryperiod which was under the Memorandum of Agreement.Ministry deni
ed respondents request and she
returned to the Philippines shouldering her own fair.Respondent filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint against ATCI
forillegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of respondent and ordered ATCI to pay her$3,600.00, her salary for the three months unexpired
portion of the contract.
ATCI appealed Labor Arbiters decision, however, NLRC affirmed the latters decision and denie
d
petitioner ATCIs motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner appealed to the Court Appeals contending thattheir principal being a foreign government agency is immune from suit, and as such,
immunity extendedto them.

Appellate Court affirmed NLRCs decision. It noted that under the law, a private employment
agencyshall assume all responsibilities for the implementation of the contract of employment of an overseasworker; hence, it can be sued jointly and
severally with the foreign principal for any violation of therecruitment agreement or contract of employment.
Petitioners motion for r
econsideration was denied; hence, this present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners be held liable considering that the contract specifically stipulates that
respondents employment
shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait.
Ruling:
Court denied the petition. According to RA 8042:

The obligations covenanted in the recruitmentagreement entered into by and between the local agent and its foreign principal are not coterminouswith the
term of such agreement so that if either or both of the parties decide to end the agreement,the responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted
employees under the agreement do not at allend, but the same extends up to and until the expiration of the employment contracts of the employeesrecruited
and employed pursuant to the said recruitment agreement. In international law, the party whowants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law.Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreignlaw is the same as
ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented beforeus

HERALD BLACK DACASIN,

Petitioner
, v.
SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN,

Respondent
.
G.R. No. 168785 : February 5, 2010CARPIO,
J.:
Facts:

Herald, American, and Sharon, Filipino, were

married in Manila in April 1994.
They have one daughter, Stephanie, born on September 21, 1995.

In June 1999, Sharon sought and obtained a divorce decree

from the CircuitCourt, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court). In its ruling, the Illinoiscourt dissolved the marriage of petitioner and
respondent, awarded to respondentsole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcementpurposes.

On January 28, 2002,

both executed in Manila a contract for joint custody overStephanie.

In 2004,
Herald filed a case against Sharon alleging that Sharon had exercised solecustody over Stephanie contrary to their agreement.
o
The trial court held that (1) it is precluded from taking cognizance over thesuit considering the Illinois courts retention of jurisdiction to enforce itsdivorce
decree, including its order awarding sole custody of Stephanie torespondent; (2) the divorce decree is binding on petitioner following thenationality rule
prevailing in this jurisdiction; and (3) the Agreement is voidfor contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibitingcompromise agreements
on jurisdiction and dismissed the case.
Issue:
WON the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioners suit andenforce the Agreement on the joint custody of the parties child
Held/ Rationale:
The trial courts refusal to entertain petitioners suit was grounded not onits lack of power to do so but on its thinking that the Illinois courts divorce decree
stripped itof jurisdiction. This conclusion is unfounded. What the Illinois court retained was jurisdictionx x x for the purpose of enforcing all and sundry the
various provisions of [its] Judgment forDissolution. Petitioners suit seeks the enforcement not of the various provisions of thedivorce decree but of the
post-divorce Agreement on joint child custody. Thus, the actionlies beyond the zone of the Illinois courts so-called retained jurisdiction.

G.R. No. L-23678 (June 6, 1967)

Bellis vs. Bellis

FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had five legitimate children with his first wife (whom he divorced), three
legitimate children with his second wife (who survived him) and, finally, three illegitimate children.
6 years prior Amos Bellis death, he executed two(2) wills, apportioning the remainder of his estate and properties to his seven surviving children. The
appellants filed their oppositions to the project of partition claiming that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they were entitled according to
the Philippine law. Appellants argued that the deceased wanted his Philippine estate to be governed by the Philippine law, thus the creation of two separate
wills.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of the illegitimate childrens successional rights
RULING:
Court ruled that provision in a foreigners will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national
law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in view of those matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code states said
national law should govern.
Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should be governed by his national law. Since Texas law
does not require legitimes, then his will, which deprived his illegitimate children of the legitimes, is valid.
The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the legitimes under the texas law, which is the national law of the deceased.

JACOBUS BERNHARD HULST v. PR BUILDERS INC.

(G.R. No. 156364)
FACTS:
The Petitioner and his spouse, both Dutch Nationals, entered into a Contract to Sellwith PR Builders, Inc. to purchase a 210-sq m residential unit in the
respondent'stownhouse project in Batanagas. When PR Builder's failed to comply with their verbalpromise to complete the project, the spouses Hulst filed a
complaint for recession of contract with interest, damages and attorney's fees before the Housing and LandRegulatory Board (HLURB), which then was

granted. A Writ of Execution was thenaddressed to the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC of Tanauan, Batangas, but upon thecomplaint of the respondent, the
levy was set aside, leaving only the respondent'spersonal properties to be levied first. The Sheriff set a public auction of the said leviedproperties, however,
the respondent filed a motion to quash Writ of levy on the groundthat the sheriff made an over levy since the aggregate appraised value of theproperties at
P6,500 per sq m is P83,616,000. Instead of resolving the objection of therespondent's regarding the auction, the Sheriff proceeded with the auction since
therewas no restraining order from the HLURB. The 15 parcels of land was then awarded toHolly Properties Realty at a bid of P5,450,653. On the same day,
the Sheriff remittedthe legal fees and submitted to contracts of sale to HLURB, however, he then receivedorders to suspend proceedings on the auction for
the reason that the market value of the properties was not fair. There was disparity between the appraised value and thevalue made by the petitioner and the
Sheriff, which should've been looked into by theSheriff before making the sale. While an inadequacy in price is not a ground to annulsuch sale, the court is
justified to such intervention where the price shocks theconscience.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Sheriff erred in the value that was attached to the propertiesduring the auction and as well as disregarding the objection made by
therespondent's?2. Whether or not the market value of the said property was inadequate?2. Whether or not the spouses Hulst's request for damages is
actionable?
HELD:1.
No. According to the Rules of Court, the value of the property levied is not requiredto be exactly the same as the judgment debt. In the levy of property, the
Sheriff doesnot determine the exact valuation of the levied property. The Sheriff is left to his own judgment. He should be allowed a reasonable margin
between the value of theproperty levied upon and the amount of the execution; the fact that the Sheriff leviesupon a little more than is necessary to satisfy the
execution does not render hisactions improper.In the absence of a restraining order, no error can be imputed to the Sheriff inproceeding with the auction sale
despite the pending motion to quash the levy filed bythe respondents with the HLURB. Sheriffs, as officers charged with the task of theenforcement and/or
implementation of judgments, must act with considerable dispatchso as not to unduly delay the administration of justice. It is not within the jurisdiction of the
Sheriff to consider and resolve respondent's objection to the continuation of theconduct of the auction sale. The Sheriff has no authority, on his own, to
suspend theauction sale. His duty being ministerial, he has no discretion to postpone the conductof the auction sale.
2.
No. The HLURB Arbiter and Director had no sufficient factual basis to determine thevalue of the levied property. The Appraisal report, that was submitted,
was based onthe projected value of the townhouse project after it shall have been fully developed,

that is, on the assumption that the residential units appraised had already been built.Since it is undisputed that the townhouse project did not push through, the
projectedvalue did not become a reality. Thus, the appraisal value cannot be equated with thefair market value.
3.
No. Under Article 12, Sec.7 of the 1987 Constitution, foreign nationals, the spousesHulst, are disqualified form owning real property. However, under article
1414 of theCivil Code, one who repudiates the agreement and demands his money before theillegal act has taken place is entitled to recover. Petitioner is
therefore entitled torecover what he has paid, although the basis of his claim for rescission, which wasgranted by the HLURB, was not the fact that he is not
allowed to acquire private landunder the Philippine Constitution. But petitioner is entitled to the recovery only of theamount of P3,187,500.00, representing
the purchase price paid to respondent. Nodamages may be recovered on the basis of a void contract; being nonexistent, theagreement produces no juridical tie
between the parties involved. Further, petitioner isnot entitled to actual as well as interests thereon, moral and exemplary damages andattorney's fees